2021 CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATION SUSTAINABILITY INDEX

FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

13th EDITION – DECEMBER 2022
Cover Photo: A youth leader speaks on her opinion of the consequences of climate change, and the
determination of rural women to contribute to the effort to combat the negative effects of climate change, at
the International Women’s Day celebration in Mazamni, Niger. USAID-Jagoranci (Resilient Governance in Niger
Project), USAID-Kulawa and USAID-Wadata projects organized this activity for the celebration of International
Women’s Day. Jagoranci proposed criteria of the participants, promoted the event, and contributed to its
financing. The project supported the women leaders coalition on climate change. It aims to strengthen the social
contract between the state and citizens, and enhances individual and community resilience.

Photo Credit: CR/Jagoranci-CPI/Maradi, Counterpart International
2021 CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATION SUSTAINABILITY INDEX

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Developed by:
United States Agency for International Development
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance
Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance

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Cover Photo: A youth leader speaks on her opinion of the consequences of climate change, and the determination of rural women to contribute to the effort to combat the negative effects of climate change, at the International Women’s Day celebration in Mazamni, Niger. USAID-Jagoranci (Resilient Governance in Niger Project), USAID-Kulawa, and USAID-Wadata projects organized this activity to celebrate International Women’s Day. Jagoranci proposed criteria of the participants, promoted the event, and contributed to its financing. The project supported the women leaders’ coalition on climate change. It aims to strengthen the social contract between the state and citizens and enhances individual and community resilience.

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The 2021 CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa
INTRODUCTION

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is pleased to present the thirteenth edition of the Civil Society Organization (CSO) Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa, covering developments in 2021. This year’s Index reports on the state of CSO sectors in thirty-two countries in the region.

The Index addresses advances and setbacks in seven key components or “dimensions” of the sustainability of the civil society sector: legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, sectoral infrastructure, and public image. The Index is intended to be a useful source of information for local CSOs, governments, donors, academics, and others who want to better understand and monitor key aspects of CSO sustainability in sub-Saharan Africa.

The Index’s methodology relies on CSO practitioners and researchers in each country covered. These teams form expert panels to assess and rate these dimensions of CSO sustainability during the year. The panels agree on scores for each dimension, which range from 1 (the most enhanced level of sustainability) to 7 (the most impeded). The dimension scores are then averaged to produce an overall sustainability score for the CSO sector of a given country. Additionally, seven countries implemented electronic surveys to increase the representativeness and quality of these reports. An international editorial committee composed of technical and regional experts reviews each panel’s scores and the corresponding narrative reports, with the aim of maintaining consistent approaches and standards to facilitate cross-country comparisons. Further details about the methodology used to calculate scores and produce narrative reports are provided in Annex A.

The CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa complements similar publications covering other regions. The various regional editions of the 2021 CSO Sustainability Index assess the civil society sectors in seventy-three countries, including twenty-four in Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, eight in the Middle East and North Africa, eight in Asia, and Mexico.

A publication of this type would not be possible without the contributions of many individuals and organizations. We are especially grateful to our local implementing partners, who play the critical role of facilitating the expert panel meetings and writing the country reports. We would also like to thank the many CSO representatives and experts, USAID partners, and international donors who participate in the expert panels in each country. Their knowledge, perceptions, insights, and contributions are the foundation upon which this Index is based.

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Happy reading,

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December 9, 2022
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CSOs in sub-Saharan Africa proved themselves to be resilient, resourceful, and reliable partners in 2021. Most governments in the region were ill prepared to deal with the triple challenge of the COVID-19 pandemic, escalating conflict, and the deepening effects of climate change, particularly on the heels of the global recession in 2020. Civil society often stepped in where governments could not or did not, meeting the needs and protecting the rights of the poor, the homeless, and other vulnerable citizens. The 2021 CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa reveals a civil society on the upswing, eager to work with governments and domestic and international partners to build better societies while developing its capacity to grow and sustain itself on its own.

THE GLOBAL PANDEMIC, YEAR 2

After a brutal first year, the COVID-19 pandemic receded across most of sub-Saharan Africa in early 2021. Many countries rolled back stringent pandemic-prevention measures introduced in 2020. However, severe third and fourth waves of the virus washed over the continent in summer and fall. The burden of the disease was heaviest in the countries of southern Africa, especially South Africa, where scientists first discovered the quickly spreading Omicron variant. Marginalized groups such as refugees, the elderly, and people with disabilities continued to be most affected by the virus. By mid-December 2021, the African continent had recorded approximately 6.7 million cases of COVID-19, according to the World Health Organization (WHO). Of the thirty-two countries covered in this year’s Index, Liberia reported the highest rate of fatality, followed by Niger, Malawi, The Gambia, Mali, and Tanzania. The lowest fatality rates were reported in Burundi, Benin, Gabon, South Sudan, and Ghana. Experts believe that the actual number of cases and deaths was likely much higher than official records indicate, given low testing and reporting rates in the region.

As infections soared, governments in the region reimposed measures such as curfews, lockdowns, travel restrictions, and bans on large gatherings, only to relax them when the disease receded. Preventative measures such as handwashing and mask-wearing in public remained in place throughout the year. In most countries, CSOs helped raise awareness, distribute hygienic supplies, and provide services to populations experiencing pandemic-related hardships such as water and food shortages, loss of employment, and gender-based violence (GBV). For example, in Rwanda, after a rapid assessment showed an increase in teenage pregnancies because of enforced confinement during the lockdown, CSOs conducted workshops on sexual violence and GBV.

Most countries of sub-Saharan Africa received their first vaccine deliveries by spring 2021 and launched vaccination campaigns in the summer. However, the supply of vaccines to the region was inadequate after high-income countries bought up most available doses. The distribution of vaccines was another challenge as some makes of the vaccine required cold-storage facilities that were unavailable. Vaccine hesitancy was also widespread, in part because of spread of misinformation. As a result, vaccination rates in sub-Saharan Africa lagged far behind those in the rest of the world. Among the countries covered by this year’s Index, only Botswana reached its target of 40 percent of its population vaccinated by December 31, 2021. Our World in Data (as reported by the World Bank) noted that as of mid-September 2021, only 3.3 percent of Africa’s population was fully vaccinated, compared to more than half of the populations of advanced countries. At all levels of society, impatience with pandemic preventative measures grew. In Gabon, people took to banging pots and pans in the evening to protest pandemic restrictions and later took part in a nationwide twenty-four-hour strike. Violent protests in South Africa were triggered in part by ongoing pandemic restrictions and related losses of income.

Several governments continued to weaponize pandemic restrictions to stifle civic action in 2021. The Zimbabwean government curtailed public gatherings (unless hosted by the ruling party), and the Ugandan government refused to recognize CSOs as essential workers, thereby preventing them from providing services to populations affected by COVID-19. The Ugandan police were reported to beat people while enforcing lockdown restrictions.

Intermittent constraints on movement, public assemblies, and face-to-face meetings highlighted the disparities between CSOs with sufficient resources to cultivate an online presence and grassroots organizations with limited to no access to information technology or the internet. Unable to meet with constituencies in person or virtually, smaller organizations struggled to remain active in Namibia and had to cancel their programs in Botswana. Overall, regardless of their financial situations, the pandemic spurred CSOs in sub-Saharan Africa to accelerate their use of...
digital technologies in 2021. In Guinea, large, urban CSOs not only conducted conferences and webinars over the internet but also learned to gather and process data using digital tools. Smaller CSOs in countries such as Burundi and Liberia formed email groups and communicated via social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp, often relying on shared computers and personal cell phones.

### PAN-REGIONAL THREATS: INSECURITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE

Compounding the challenge of the pandemic, countries throughout sub-Saharan Africa faced extreme weather and insecurity in 2021. This confluence of crises strained the ability of weak or unstable governments to meet the needs of their citizens and highlighted civil society’s expanding role as providers of services and defenders of basic rights.

The impact of climate change was obvious across the continent. In the course of the year, Mozambique experienced both a severe, years-long drought and three cyclones, including the ruinous Eloise. Madagascar, Ethiopia, Kenya, and other countries of East Africa suffered their worst droughts in forty years. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Nigeria, South Africa, and The Gambia were deluged with heavy flooding. The African continent is widely observed to be heating up more quickly that the rest of the world, causing food sources to dry up and large numbers of people to migrate in a search for sustenance. The UN World Meteorological Organization (WMO) noted in its State of Climate in Africa Report 2020 (issued in October 2021) that African populations are significantly more vulnerable to the impact of climate change than other parts of the world because of their heavy dependence on agriculture. More than 75 percent of the region’s peoples work directly or indirectly in agriculture, mostly as smallholders, according to the Food and Agriculture Organization.

Many areas of sub-Saharan Africa experiencing extreme climate change also coped with extreme insecurity in 2021. While facing cyclones and drought, Mozambique continued to be assaulted by Islamic insurgents in Cabo Delgado Province. Northeastern Kenya suffered from drought and the worst locust infestation in seventy years while al-Shabaab terrorists killed and maimed dozens of civilians and security personnel in the region. Droughts in East Africa and the Lake Chad region contributed to numerous clashes between nomadic herders and farmers seeking to control scarce natural resources. According to the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) in Sydney, climate change and inadequate water and food supplies are two of the main contributors to the growth of terrorism in the Sahel, especially Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.

As a whole, sub-Saharan Africa was the “global epicenter” of terrorism in 2021, according to IEP’s Global Terrorism Index. The region accounted for 48 percent of terrorism deaths worldwide and was the only region of the world in which the collective impact of terrorism increased during the year. In addition to the conflicts already mentioned, contributing to this unfortunate record was fighting among more than 100 armed groups in the DRC, which claimed among its victims the Italian ambassador. In South Sudan, violent clashes between rebel groups continued despite a peace agreement to end the country’s brutal civil war. Insecurity was also extreme in northern Nigeria and the Anglophone regions of Cameroon, among other places.

War or climate change, and often both, caused millions of people across the continent to suffer food insecurity in 2021. In early 2022, the UN World Food Program (WFP) declared a “food emergency” in the Sahel and West Africa as 41 million people were identified as food insecure because of conflict, poor or non-existent harvests, and economic decline. More than 15 million people in the Horn of Africa faced a humanitarian crisis in 2021 because of the historic drought, according to WFP estimates. This number includes 5 to 7 million Ethiopians, many of whom were forced to relocate because of the war between the federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. Conflict also newly displaced large populations in Nigeria and the DRC in 2021. Altogether, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that as many as 30 million refugees, internally displaced people, and asylum seekers—one-third of the world’s refugee population—lived in sub-Saharan Africa in 2021. Uganda continued to host the largest number of refugees, followed by Sudan and Ethiopia.

These multiple crises posed unprecedented challenges for CSOs in the region. In many countries, both domestic and international CSOs were on the front lines serving massive numbers of people in need. In South Africa, Ladies of Love expanded the number of its weekly soup kitchens, while in Mozambique, women-led teams from ActionAid helped families find safe shelter after Cyclone Eloise. Kaya’s Appeal in Burkina Faso ensured that refugees received appropriate care. CSOs also sought to build community resilience and knit together people in conflict. Midrift Hurinet, a human rights network in Kenya, brought local government officials together with
religious leaders, village elders, youth, and women to discuss human rights concerns. The Gabonese Association for Social Work and SOS Prisoners encouraged the social reintegration of young people released from prison. The Trust for Okavango Cultural and Development Initiatives helped address the medical and other needs of the marginalized San people in Botswana.

But persisting barriers frustrated CSOs’ efforts to fulfill their service-providing missions. Burkinabe organizations seeking to provide humanitarian assistance were often denied access to insecure areas and had to turn over their supplies to a government agency. In Nigeria’s northwest and northeast regions, aid workers were unable to provide services after terrorists attacked and destroyed aid facilities and caused schools to close. The Family Planning Association of Malawi had to scale back programs because of funding problems, leaving a vacuum in services that the government was not prepared to fill. In many countries, CSOs were forced to reduce services in their usual areas as donors continued to redirect funds to the pandemic response.

But overall, CSOs in sub-Saharan were able to meet urgent needs competently in 2021. Working tirelessly and courageously, they provided food, shelter, and medical care; educated children and trained youth and women; constructed community water, hygiene, and sanitation infrastructure; and provided an extraordinary array of other services. In so doing, they more than earned the respect and appreciation of their beneficiaries, their governments, their donors, and the global community.

DOMESTIC CONCERNS: ELECTIONS AND THE ECONOMY

While contending with the pandemic, insecurity, and climate change, government officials in seven countries covered by this year’s Index were focused on remaining in power in 2021. Niger passed an important milestone in holding its first democratic transfer of power through an election, while Ethiopia’s national elections were the first in six years. These elections were generally peaceful. But in Zambia, the government used pandemic restrictions and the Public Order Act to restrict campaigning by opposition candidates. In Benin and Uganda, where incumbent presidents were up for reelection, elections turned violent, and a number of deaths were reported as security forces used live ammunition to quell demonstrations. Both Guinea and Sudan experienced military coups d’état.

The role of CSOs in the elections varied, usually depending on the depth of the authorities’ commitment to democratic processes. The government of Benin rounded up and arrested scores of civil society activists and opposition members, while Uganda and Zambia prevented CSOs from monitoring polling or sharing election results. In The Gambia, which held a presidential election in 2021, CSOs promoted voter registration among youth, women, and persons with disabilities and deployed nearly 1,000 election observers. In Ethiopia, CSOs were able to engage in voter education and election monitoring for the first time ever, thanks to a major change in the legal framework in 2019.

Unlike in previous years, when problematic elections were a major driver of social unrest, economic frustration seemed to be the main trigger in 2021. Most economies of sub-Saharan Africa rebounded slightly in 2021 after receding in 2020, but they were still fragile. The World Bank estimated that the regional economic growth rate was tepid at about 4 percent, fed by higher commodity prices and the recovery of global trade. Inflation rose in most countries, straining household budgets and increasing food insecurity. Unemployment was also a serious problem among workers in the informal economy, who make up more than two-thirds of sub-Saharan Africa’s workforce and in 2021 were often prevented from engaging in economic activities because of pandemic restrictions.

Households’ deteriorating economic conditions caused protests to erupt in Angola, Nigeria, and especially South Africa, where the worst unrest in nearly thirty years was fueled by the withdrawal of relief funds and increasing poverty. Civil society was equally beset by financial challenges, including rising costs due to inflation and donors’ cuts in funding. An especially intractable barrier to civil society’s development was the continued scarcity of domestic resources. The lack of government funding for CSOs (or a lack of transparency in its administration), the absence of local foundations, and a weak culture of corporate giving, coupled with CSOs’ own poor skills at income generation and fundraising, inhibited the diversification of funding streams in 2021.
Despite these challenges, this year’s CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa depicts a civil society recovering from the unprecedented strain of the first year of the global COVID-19 pandemic. In contrast to 2020, when only 5 of the 32 countries recorded overall improvement in sustainability, 11 countries\(^1\) reported overall improvement in 2021. Four countries (Burkina Faso, Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe) reported deterioration in their overall sustainability score, compared to 8 countries in 2020. While improvements in 2021 were distributed fairly evenly across all dimensions, deteriorations were concentrated in the legal environment and financial viability.

Twenty-three countries\(^2\) had overall CSO sustainability scores in the Sustainability Evolving range (the middle range of sustainability), with scores between 3.1 and 5.0. Nine countries\(^3\) fell into the Sustainability Impeded category (the lowest level of sustainability), with overall CSO scores of 5.1 or higher. No country had an overall score in the Sustainability Enhanced range (the highest level of sustainability, between 1.0 to 3.0), and no country changed categories in 2021.

As in 2020, South Africa had the best overall score in the region (3.6), followed by Kenya (3.9). At the other end of the spectrum were Burundi (5.7) and Angola, South Sudan, and Sudan (all 5.5).

**Legal Environment**

Many countries reported improvements in the legal environments governing their CSO sectors in 2021. The clampdown on civic space during the first year of the pandemic caused 17 of 32 countries to show deterioration in this dimension in 2020, while only 4 countries showed improvement. The situation in 2021 was very different. In this year’s Index, 11 countries\(^1\) reported improvements and 9 countries\(^4\) reported deterioration, while 12 countries\(^5\) reported no change. Liberia progressed from Sustainability Impeded to Sustainability Evolving in 2021 thanks to clearer operational guidelines and an easier registration process.

Across the board, improvements were due to governments taking a more positive stance to the CSO sector. Some of this progress took place on a practical level. New online portals helped ease CSO registration in Botswana, Ethiopia, and Tanzania. In Ghana, the supervisory agency for CSOs posted officers across the country to help with registration, while in Liberia, accreditation procedures were clarified and decentralized. In other countries, the legal environment improved as governments introduced or implemented more enabling laws and regulations. The Authority for Civil Society Organizations in Ethiopia adopted five favorable directives for the sector covering areas such as new mechanisms for registration, audit, and compliance report submission and the monitoring and supervision of CSOs. Similarly in Côte d’Ivoire, CSOs were invited to comment on a new draft law for the sector that was largely positive. Zambia showed improvement in part because the new government indicated that it was willing to repeal the repressive law that had governed the sector since 2009.

The regression of legal environments in nine countries was due mainly to deteriorations in the legal and regulatory framework for CSOs, in contrast to 2020, when deteriorations were often due to the harsh implementation of pandemic-related restrictions limiting freedom of assembly. In 2021, the Zimbabwean government presented a Public Voluntary Organizations Amendment Bill that would bring CSOs under tighter government control and even started to enforce some of the bill’s provisions before it became law. In Nigeria, an onerous new law came into force that allows the government to revoke CSO certificates arbitrarily, interfere excessively in their internal affairs, and conduct warrantless searches of their premises. Sudan’s CSOs observed a slowdown in efforts to reform the legal and regulatory framework, while Namibian CSOs feared increased regulation as the government raised the prospect of new registration requirements.

Many governments continued to harass CSOs and constrain freedoms of assembly and expression, whether their countries’ scores for this dimension showed deterioration, improvement, or no change. This year’s reports detail suppression of the right to peaceful protest by denying permits or selectively restricting, interfering in, or canceling protests (Benin, The Gambia, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone);\(^7\) arresting or detaining protesters (DRC, Guinea, Angola, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, The Gambia, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia).

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3. Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Malawi, South Sudan, Sudan.
6. Angola, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Sudan.
7. Throughout the report, the country lists in parentheses are often illustrative rather than exhaustive.
Malawi, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Zambia, Zimbabwe); or using excessive force to disrupt protests (Nigeria, South Africa). Governments sought to restrict freedom of expression by muzzling media and arresting journalists (Uganda), restricting access to the internet or social media (Nigeria, Benin), or introducing restrictive cyber-crime or cyber-security laws (Zambia, Zimbabwe).

Special mention should be made of South Sudan, whose legal environment was judged to have worsened moderately in 2021. This deterioration is not reflected in this year’s score, because in 2020, South Sudan was already at the poorest score for this dimension and the score could not regress further. The deterioration was due mainly to the government’s delay in renewing operating licenses, its freezing of bank accounts, and its arbitrary arrest or expulsion of CSO activists and journalists.

Organizational Capacity

The organizational capacity of CSO sectors in sub-Saharan Africa progressed in 2021. Of the 32 countries covered in this year’s Index, 12 countries reported improvement, 8 countries reported deterioration, and 12 countries reported no change. This performance contrasts markedly with 2020, when 5 countries reported improvement, 11 countries reported deterioration, and 15 countries reported no change. In 2021, Rwanda regressed from the Sustainability Evolving to the Sustainability Impeded category, while Côte d’Ivoire progressed from Sustainability Impeded to Sustainability Evolving.

This improved performance in 2021 was largely due to the amelioration of the impact of the pandemic in comparison to 2020, either because pandemic restrictions were relaxed or organizations were better able to work around operational barriers such as limitations on movement and large gatherings. Particularly pronounced in 2021 were improvements in CSOs’ ability to build or rebuild relationships with constituencies. In Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, and Kenya, the easing of pandemic restrictions allowed CSOs to resume direct contact with beneficiaries. In countries where pandemic restrictions were not eased, some CSOs found new ways to reach target audiences. Organizations in Benin used radio broadcasts or megaphones to communicate with beneficiaries while maintaining social distance, while CSOs in the DRC organized activities in smaller groups that did not violate limitations on the size of gatherings. Large CSOs in Mozambique were able to ensure that victims of the pandemic, cyclones, and insecurity were helped by partnering with community-based organizations (CBOs) having direct access to local communities.

CSOs across the region continued to build capacity in using digital technologies to interact with their constituents, often despite limited financial resources or the lack of regular internet access. Some of the strongest improvements in organizational capacity were seen in countries such as Niger, Nigeria, and Tanzania, where organizations continued to expand their use of internet-based platforms even after pandemic restrictions eased and they were able to resume face-to-face work. Countries ranging from South Africa to Burundi report that their CSOs increasingly work online.

Among the countries reporting deteriorations in organizational capacity, the reason most often cited was the pandemic, which limited outreach or caused activities to be reduced or canceled (Botswana, Ghana, Rwanda, Uganda). Inadequate funding also caused organizations to pare back operations or reduce institution building (South Sudan and Sudan). In Burkina Faso, insecurity caused staff capacity to deteriorate as planned activities were suspended, while in South Sudan, organizations had trouble meeting with beneficiaries because of the need to obtain security clearances from the government. Pervasive insecurity disrupted interactions with constituencies in Ethiopia and Kenya.

Financial Viability

As in previous years, CSOs’ financial viability was the weakest dimension of sustainability in 2021. Thirteen countries reported deterioration, and 11 countries reported no change. But 8 countries reported improvement in 2021, compared to just a single country in 2020 and 3 countries in 2019. All countries in the

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9 Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Namibia, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda.
10 Benin, Cameroon, DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
11 Burkina Faso, Cameroon, DRC, Guinea, Malawi, Namibia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe.
region were in the Sustainability Impeded range except Botswana, Kenya, Niger, Senegal, and South Africa, which were in Sustainability Evolving. Senegal progressed from Sustainability Impeded to Sustainability Evolving as new funding became available and funds were redirected from the pandemic response back to normal activities.

Most other countries reporting improvements also pointed to the resumption of funding for usual activities in 2021 after the suspension or diversion of funds in reaction to the pandemic in 2020. For example, donors in Côte d’Ivoire resumed funding for activities such as raising awareness about the importance of maintaining peace during the elections. In Angola, some organizations received more funding in 2021 thanks to the disbursement of funds that could not be spent in 2020. New funding opportunities were also available in Botswana, Burundi, Gabon, and The Gambia.

At the same time, CSOs’ overwhelming reliance on foreign funding makes them vulnerable to donors’ shifting priorities in response to global developments. The gradual withdrawal of foreign funders from Namibia after it achieved upper-middle income status in 2009 has left CSOs in that country in ever worsening straits, reflected in declining financial viability scores over a number of years. The suspension of foreign assistance in 2021 after the coup d’état in Sudan had severe repercussions for CSOs there. Poorer scores were also reported in countries in which donors continued to suspend implementation of projects because of the pandemic (Cameroun, DRC, Guinea), remained narrowly focused on the pandemic response (Malawi, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe), or decreased their country budgets (Namibia, Nigeria).

A number of reports mention the unhealthy competition between local and international CSOs. Local CSOs in countries including Angola, Botswana, and Guinea in part blame their precarious financial situation on donors’ preference for funding large international organizations with the capacity to meet complex proposal requirements and handle millions of dollars in funding. Although these international CSOs often work with local organizations as implementing partners, the latter feel that the arrangement stunts their institutional growth, undermines their authority, and undervalues the substantial skills and contacts that they bring to the table. In a particularly discouraging trend, Botswana and Malawi reported that international organizations are registering as local organizations and attracting funds earmarked for such groups.

As far as domestic funding goes, only South African and Botswanan CSOs derive significant income from their governments. Elsewhere, government funding of CSOs is not available (Liberia, Ethiopia, Malawi) or, even if offered in the form of service contracts, is not a major source of income (DRC, The Gambia, Madagascar). Corporate funding is similarly meager in most countries except where businesses such as extractive industries are committed to corporate social responsibility practices as part of their concession agreements (Angola, Côte d’Ivoire).

Local fundraising in nascent but developing, held back more by the impoverishment of local communities and the lack of a fundraising culture than CSOs’ failure to seek out new sources of income. Angolan CSOs, for example, have received training in fundraising and find that while their skills have improved there is little for them to draw on. Crowdfunding is still rare except in countries with more developed economies, such as South Africa and Nigeria. Social enterprises are also uncommon but, provided the laws allow them, are taking hold in a handful of countries, including Burundi, Ghana, Malawi, Niger, and Senegal. Many organizations in sub-Saharan Africa continue to raise modest amounts from selling products and services or charging membership fees. These sources of income bounced back in 2021 after declining during the first year of the pandemic but still fall far short of meeting organizational needs.

**Advocacy**

CSO advocacy showed a stunning advance in 2021 as three times as many countries reported improvement (21) as deterioration (7). In one-third of the countries with improvement, scores improved by .2 or .3 points, indicating moderate or significant advances. These results continued the trend established in recent years of a significant number of countries reporting improvement in this dimension. Burundi and Ethiopia remained in the Sustainability Impeded category, while Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa were in the Sustainability Enhanced range.

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15 Burkina Faso, Liberia, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe.
16 Benin, Gabon, The Gambia, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone.
the only scores in this category in this year’s Index. All other countries are in Sustainability Evolving. No countries changed categories in 2021.

Contributing to the high rate of improvement in advocacy was governments’ greater willingness to take CSOs seriously as partners and interlocutors. While in many countries, government policy calls for the inclusion of CSOs in decision making, this has not always functioned as designed. In 2021, practice seemed to be catching up with principle as more governments initiated contact with CSOs and actively solicited their input. The Angolan government was more open to dialogue and broadened CSOs’ participation in decision-making arenas, while the Burundian government took the initiative to arrange meetings with CSOs. The new military junta in Guinea arranged four days of consultations with civil society; the government in Côte d’Ivoire increasingly integrated CSOs into national and local state structures; and Tanzanian authorities showed a more positive attitude to cooperating with CSOs. Similar trends were observed in The Gambia, Ethiopia, Mali, Senegal, and Sierra Leone.

Success on country-specific advocacy initiatives was also responsible for some countries’ improved scores. CSOs in the DRC exposed massive corruption under the Kabila government, while in Ghana, a new movement led by young social media influencers frustrated by unemployment and persisting social and economic problems became the leading voice in public discourse in a short time. Advocacy by Nigerien CSOs resulted in the lifting of a ban on motorcycles, the re-opening of markets, the return of internally displaced persons to their villages in conflict zones, and the mitigation of other measures related to the state of emergency in two regions.

The reasons for deterioration were somewhat more varied. Government clampdowns on civil society in South Sudan and Uganda narrowed the space for advocacy and caused some organizations to self-censor. Pandemic restrictions hindered contact between CSOs and their constituencies or government officials in Rwanda and Zimbabwe. In Burkina Faso, the government was too intently focused on violent conflicts in the country to engage with CSOs on other issues, while in Sudan, incoming government officials discontinued efforts to broaden civic space. Other factors impeding advocacy included the lack of efficient mechanisms to incorporate CSOs into decision-making structures (Mozambique) or government officials’ lack of understanding of CSOs’ role (Angola).

Among the advocacy approaches that worked best for CSOs was strategic litigation. COPIL-Citizen, a Gabonese CSO, won a ruling nullifying certain pandemic restrictions, thereby scoring the first win by a CSO before the Constitutional Court. Gambian civil society won a court case involving loans that the National Assembly had approved for its own members, while Botswanan CSOs successfully appealed a case involving criminal laws that fueled discrimination against sexual minorities.

Across the region, the most common areas of focus for advocacy were women’s rights, gender-based violence, and gender equality (DRC, Kenya, Liberia, Namibia, Senegal, Rwanda); extractive industries, especially their responsibilities to surrounding communities (Cameroon, DRC, Guinea, Nigeria, Mozambique); peace and national reconciliation (Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Niger); children and youth (Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, South Sudan); and governance and government accountability (Botswana, Nigeria, Zimbabwe). Corruption, constitutional reform, land rights and land governance, and government budgeting were other common advocacy concerns. CSOs in Mali and Uganda found strength in numbers as they advocated more effectively in coalitions and networks.

**Service Provision**

CSO service provision was fairly stable in 2021. Seventeen countries reported no change, while 7 countries reported improvement and 8 countries reported deterioration. All countries are in the Sustainability Evolving category in this dimension except for Angola and Sudan, which are in Sustainability Impeded. In 2021, Gabon progressed from Sustainability Impeded to Sustainability Evolving as the easing of pandemic restrictions allowed for the resumption of services unrelated to COVID-19.

The reasons for improvement in 2021 included CSOs’ ability to resume their normal services (Botswana, Gabon) or provide urgently needed pandemic-related services (The Gambia, South Africa). The main reasons for deterioration were funding cuts (Malawi, Namibia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda) or restrictions on movement due to pandemic lockdowns (Ethiopia, Namibia, Uganda) or insecurity (Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, South Sudan).

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17 Angola, Benin, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, DRC, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Zimbabwe.
19 Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Malawi, Namibia, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda.
Even in countries that did not record improvement in this dimension (Burundi, Gabon, Nigeria, Senegal), many CSOs were able to refocus on their traditional services in 2021 after working intently on the pandemic response in 2020. However, probably because CSOs were still in recovery mode in 2021, expansion into new areas of service provision was rare. Similarly, few new efforts to generate income by providing services and products were noted in this year’s reports.

**Sectoral Infrastructure**

The infrastructure supporting civil society was in good health in 2021, with 15 countries reporting improvement and another 15 reporting no change. Seventeen countries were in the Sustainability Evolving category and 15 countries in Sustainability Impeded. The Gambia and Niger progressed from Sustainability Impeded to Sustainability Evolving, while Rwanda and Zimbabwe—the only countries reporting deterioration in this dimension—regressed from Sustainability Evolving to Sustainability Impeded.

The most frequently cited reason for improvement was improved collaboration among CSOs. For example, in Tanzania the national coordinating body for CSOs was revitalized, while in Sudan a “flurry” of new networking activity was underway. New or resumed training opportunities and new intersectoral partnerships also contributed to improved performances in this dimension. CSOs in Cameroon benefitted from new training in areas related to insecurity, and new Ethiopian organizations received training in governance, project management, and human-rights based approaches to development. Limited training opportunities were responsible for the deteriorations in both Rwanda and Zimbabwe.

**Public Image**

CSOs’ public image was on the upswing in 2021. Twelve countries recorded improvement and 16 countries recorded no change. Only four countries (Burkina Faso, Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe) reported deterioration. Improvements were largely due to enhanced media coverage (Madagascar, Senegal, South Sudan, Tanzania) or more effective public relations, especially through social media (Liberia, Namibia, Zambia). In Nigeria, public understanding of the concept of CSOs improved. The main cause of deterioration was negative public views of organizations seen as involved in partisan issues, sometimes propagated by governments hostile to CSOs (Uganda, Zimbabwe). For example, public confidence in CSOs declined markedly in Uganda as the sector was increasingly seen as blind to public needs. All countries’ scores for this dimension were in the Sustainability Evolving range.

Media coverage of CSOs remained generally positive although often lacked depth. The public in sub-Saharan Africa continued to have generally positive views of CSOs, although in some countries (Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Malawi), a segment of the public still does not trust CSOs, misunderstands their role, or sees them as self-serving or partisan organizations. Governments continued to have positive perceptions of CSOs that provide services or have expertise in specific policy areas while mistrusting CSOs that touch on sensitive issues or criticize their actions.

Sector-wide self-regulation showed signs of taking root in 2021. In Ethiopia, the CSO Council published a mandatory code of conduct that was initiated, drafted, and will be monitored by CSOs. In Nigeria, CSOs discussed the need to introduce a self-regulatory framework. In Uganda and Zimbabwe, CSOs pushed for better self-regulation to counter harsh government criticism of the sector. South Africa has a community of practice and online portals dedicated to improving CSO accountability. Otherwise, while codes of conduct have been adopted by larger CSOs and networks in many countries, they are not widely used by smaller organizations.

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21 Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, DRC, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Liberia, Namibia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, South Sudan, Uganda.

22 Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Liberia, Namibia, Nigeria, Madagascar, Mali, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia.

23 Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, DRC, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, Senegal, South Africa.
CONCLUSION

The country reports that follow provide an in-depth look at CSO sectors in thirty-two countries in sub-Saharan Africa during a challenging year. Recovering from a deadly pandemic while coping with the effects of insecurity and climate change, as well as political and economic instability, civil societies across the region proved themselves to be competent, reliable, and responsible partners. We hope that this annual survey continues to capture useful trends that will support the work of the community of civil society actors, governments, donors, and researchers who seek to advance the region’s CSO sectors.
Angola was relatively stable in 2021. Continuing his Governance Closer to the Citizens campaign, President João Lourenço visited Bengo, Huíla, and Cunene provinces to discuss local conditions with the leaders of political parties, CSOs, and traditional and religious groups. The president reiterated his commitment to fight corruption and improve human rights in Angola. He guided the attorney general’s office in an investigation of several cases of alleged corruption. A number of influential members of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola and members of the government of the former president, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, were removed from their positions and charged with fraud, embezzlement, tax evasion, and corruption. The government continued to implement its National Human Rights Strategy, which was prepared with CSOs’ assistance and approved by Presidential Decree 100/20 in February 2020, and local human rights committees operated in all of Angola’s eighteen provinces. A new penal code entered into force that decriminalizes same-sex relationships, criminalizes genital mutilation and sexual harassment, expands the circumstances under which abortion is legally permitted, and protects the rights of children in conflict with the law.

After the president proposed revisions to the country’s 2010 constitution, the parliament agreed to review the constitution in March 2021. The president’s proposed reforms included reducing presidential powers, strengthening parliamentary oversight of the executive, and conducting elections for local government officials in place of the current practice of allowing the party in power to select the officials. CSOs contributed to the review process by advocating to strengthen guarantees of the right to strike and demonstrate. In June, the parliament approved the proposed amendments, and the revised constitution was published under Law No. 18/21 of August 16, 2021. The parliament also approved changes to the electoral law ahead of general elections in 2022. The changes involved, among other things, the format for electing members of parliament and legal instruments to allow Angolans residing abroad to vote, which will happen for the first time in 2022.

Several demonstrations protesting the country’s deteriorating economic conditions and other controversies erupted during the year. On January 30, protests broke out in Lunda Norte over the lack of access to water and other social services. Six people were killed after police used live ammunition to disperse the protesters, according to the U.S. State Department’s 2021 Human Rights Report for Angola. The government justified its use of force as
self-defense, but two officers implicated in the violence were dismissed, Human Rights Watch reported. The police again used force to break up a group of students protesting increases in school fees in Luanda, the capital, in April and during anti-government protests in Luanda on November 11, Angolan Independence Day. In September, opposition political parties demonstrated against a change in the electoral law that will consolidate the counting of votes in Luanda rather than allow it to take place on the local level, which some people fear could reduce transparency in the 2022 general elections.

Angola’s southwest provinces suffered their most severe drought in forty years in 2021. The devastating climatic conditions were exacerbated by heavy locust infestations. In parts of Cunene, Huíla, and Namibe provinces, as many as 1.3 million people faced severe hunger, according to the World Food Program. A spike in prices hampered many people’s ability to access nutritious food, and many families migrated to neighboring Namibia in search of water, food, and pastureland.

Infection rates from COVID-19 varied during the year. At the end of August, the government relaxed pandemic restrictions, including quarantines after travel for vaccinated individuals. Schools reopened, although student attendance remained low in drought-affected areas, as many herding families kept their children out of school to help search for pastureland and water. Other measures to prevent the spread of the virus remained in force, including the mandatory wearing of masks, limits on the size of public gatherings, and distancing in public places. The government began a vaccination campaign in March 2021 and by the end of the year, 28 percent of the population was fully vaccinated.

After suffering from declining oil prices and production levels since 2014, Angola’s economy showed signs of recovery in 2021. The real gross domestic product grew at a rate of 0.2 percent, according to World Bank estimates. Although the government launched a series of economic initiatives to promote stability, household budgets continued to be strained as inflation reached 25 percent. Unemployment increased, in part because of reductions in staffing by private-sector employers, an outcome of the government’s COVID-19 prevention measures.

The overall sustainability of the CSO sector did not change in 2021, although improvements were noted in several dimensions. CSOs’ organizational capacity progressed slightly as they strengthened their ability to build relationships with communities and constituents. CSOs’ financial viability was slightly better as the relaxation of pandemic restrictions enabled donors to resume funding. CSO advocacy improved slightly with more open dialogue with the government, which seemed to view CSOs as true partners and broadened their participation in various decision-making arenas. The sectoral infrastructure was slightly stronger as the number of resource centers and other facilities serving CSOs increased. The other dimensions of sustainability did not change.

According to the Institute for the Promotion and Coordination of Community Assistance (IPROCAC), 421 national CSOs, 29 international CSOs, 10 national foundations, 23 national religious institutions, and 6 international religious institutions operated in Angola in 2021.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.0**

CSOs’s legal environment was unchanged in 2021.

CSOs are governed by Law No. 6/2012 on associations. CSOs must register to operate. To register, organizations submit requests for authorization to operate along with required documentation to the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. After receiving the ministry’s approval, CSOs register with the oversight body, which until 2021 was IPROCAC. Presidential Decree No. 40/21 of February 11, 2021, dissolved IPROCAC and transferred its competencies to the Department of Community Development in the Ministry of Social Action, Family, and Women’s Promotion. In contrast to IPROCAC, which functioned poorly at the provincial level, the new oversight body has better representation throughout the country, which allows it to engage in more regular oversight of CSOs’ activities. CSOs view this as a positive development since provincial offices of the Department of Community Development have the same powers as the national office and thus are able to cooperate more effectively with the sector. CSOs must also register with provincial authorities in the geographic areas in which they will operate.

Although the online public services portal introduced by the government in 2018 was meant to facilitate the registration of new organizations, the registration process remains difficult in practice. The Ministry of Justice and
Human Rights is very slow to process applications for some organizations, especially those that work on human rights. Registration requires numerous visits to the ministry, especially as the online portal does not provide updates on applications. Organizations outside of Luanda find the travel to the ministry particularly difficult, and the cost of travel can be a deterrent to registration. CSOs complain that attempting to contact the ministry by telephone is fruitless. Nevertheless, in 2021, a slight improvement in the registration process was signaled when the government indicated that in 2022 it may introduce a new method to pay registration fees, which would lower travel costs for CSOs.

Under Presidential Decree No. 183/21 of 2021, which establishes rules for public utility organizations and revokes Presidential Decree No. 193/11, CSOs may obtain public utility status after three years of operation. Before the new decree, public utility status had been granted in a non-transparent, discriminatory manner. CSOs that criticized government actions, such as Angolan Network of Non-Governmental Organizations to Fight HIV/AIDS (ANASO), Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA)-Angola, Association for Peace, Justice, and Democracy (AJPD), and Mãos Livres, had applied for public utility status but had been unable to obtain it despite years of relevant experience. At the time the new decree went into effect, forty-one CSOs were recognized as having public utility status. They were required to undergo evaluation to see if such status should continue. It is unknown whether public utility status was revoked for any organization.

All registered CSOs must submit regular progress reports to central and local authorities. Larger organizations must provide semi-annual and annual reports to the central government and quarterly reports to provincial governments. Under Law No. 6/2012, CSOs may not be dissolved and their activities may not be suspended. The law does not allow CSOs to file appeals to challenge government decisions. There are, however, other arenas in which CSOs may air concerns, such as meetings at municipal centers in which the public is able to present problems of general interest for discussion and resolution.

No laws limit the scope of CSOs’ activities. CSOs act freely but can be subject to state harassment, especially if they work on issues such as human rights, corruption, and public oversight of government activities. No specific instances of harassment other than difficulty obtaining public utility status was reported in 2021.

All registered CSOs are entitled to exemptions from income tax and duty on items imported for humanitarian work. However, the process for obtaining these exemptions can be overly bureaucratic and non-transparent. Under a new law in 2019, CSOs must pay value-added tax (VAT) on purchased items. Otherwise, government policies are not clear regarding the taxation of CSOs. Legally registered businesses that make donations to support social and community development projects are eligible for deductions of up to 40 percent of their total taxable profits.

Under Law No. 6/2012, CSOs may earn income provided it is used on projects to support populations in need. They may not carry out income-generating activities with the objective of making a profit.

CSOs must have public utility status to compete for government contracts. An opaque tendering process limits the number of organizations that obtain such contracts. Qualified lawyers in Luanda and a few provincial cities are familiar with the laws related to CSOs. CSOs often lack the resources to hire legal professionals, but some lawyers provide pro bono services. The human rights organizations Mãos Livres provides legal services to CSOs, and ANASO facilitates CSO registration. CSOs also meet informally to discuss legal issues.
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.5

The sector’s organizational capacity improved slightly in 2021 as CSOs strengthened their ability to build relationships with communities and constituencies.

Angolan CSOs are developing more rigorous approaches to building relationships with their beneficiaries. They increasingly design their projects by surveying intended beneficiaries or involving beneficiaries and target groups in the design and implementation of project activities. This approach ensures that the CSOs provide goods and services that targeted populations themselves request. Small CSOs with just one or two small, funded projects, such as Fight For Life (LPV), carry out activities directly with beneficiaries in the localities in which they are based. Larger CSOs, such as ADPP-Angola, OHI, Omunga, and the Association of Social Development and Integration of Vulnerable Populations (ADESPOV), have obtained satisfactory results by relying on beneficiaries to coordinate groups that replicate activities and spread information to others in their communities. A positive result of this approach is that many beneficiaries end up occupying important positions in organizational structures. For example, the staff of grassroots, faith-based, and community organizations that are members of the ANASO network includes beneficiaries who implement HIV projects and work with people affected and infected by HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases. The COVID-19 pandemic was not reported to cause significant disruptions to constituency building in 2021, and constituency building remained strong.

CSOs’ missions are clearly defined in their founding documents. Many CSOs that are dependent on corporate and international funding produce strategic plans to guide their activities, since they know that they are attractive to potential donors and may even be a condition for funding. CSOs usually incorporate strategic planning techniques and annual action plans into their decision-making processes. General assemblies usually approve strategic plans and assess their realization.

Law No. 6/2012 and CSOs’ statutes and internal regulations establish clear rules for internal governance. By law, organizations must have boards of directors, which are supposed to meet regularly to oversee activities and evaluate achievements. A supervisory board typically assesses the reports and balance sheets before they are presented to members at the general assembly. General assemblies meet regularly according to rules established in the statutes. Larger CSOs, such as OHI, Prazedor, Association of Women Living with HIV (MWENHO), and the Luta Pela VIHda Association, have well-defined management tools, including internal regulations and policies, procedural manuals, and organizational charts reflecting the division of responsibilities between the board of directors, the executive, and members. Only a small number of well-established organizations, such as the Youth Support Center (CAJ), ANASO, ADPP-Angola, ADRA, Mãos Livres, and Omunga, have conflict-of-interest policies, although they are becoming more common.

Because of their lack of resources, most CSOs offer poor or irregular pay and therefore are unable to retain staff on a permanent basis. The environment of financial uncertainty leads many employees to quit. CSOs often rely on volunteers. More creative leaders are often able to attract supporters to carry out activities before funding arrives. Some CSOs seek to develop the skills and competencies of their employees as part of their succession plans. For example, the ANASO network held training sessions in 2021 to develop employees’ skills and competencies, including their leadership skills. Some CSOs train their members through in-house exchanges of knowledge. Large CSOs, such as Christian Solidarity and Mutual Help (ASCAM), Youth Forum for Health Support and AIDS Prevention (FOJASSIDA), Prazedor, and LPV, usually have established human-resource practices, such as contracts, job descriptions, payrolls, and personnel policies. Most CSOs do not outsource professional services.

CSOs usually have meager resources for basic office equipment, such as computers, printers, and telephones. However, the pandemic accelerated CSOs’ use of digital technologies regardless of their financial situations. In 2021, CSOs based in Luanda and provincial capitals continued to communicate virtually with their members and beneficiaries but gradually switched to in-person contact as pandemic restrictions relaxed. In areas removed from
larger cities, internet penetration is low but growing rapidly. Although CSOs in these areas do not have regular access to the internet, they effectively use social networks such as Facebook, WhatsApp, LinkedIn, and Snapchat to facilitate their operations. In 2021, OHI, with the support of the Forum of Women Journalists for Gender Equality, carried out a training on cybersecurity for several organizations.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.2**

CSOs’ financial viability was slightly stronger in 2021 as the relaxation of pandemic restrictions enabled donors to resume funding.

Angolan CSOs are highly dependent on foreign funding. The major funders in 2021 were the European Union (EU), various United Nations (UN) agencies, and the governments of Brazil, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United States. World Bank funding went to the Local Development Institute for economic development, with Olikongelo, ADRA, and the Christian International Organization (OIC) as subgrantees. The German organization Misereor supported Omunga’s citizenship development activities. Many donors chose to focus on a specific region. For example, the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief provided support to Olikongelo, Omunga, ADRA, OIC, and other organizations for projects in several municipalities in Benguela Province. Some organizations received more funding in 2021 thanks to the disbursement of funds that could not be spent in 2020. For example, ANASO, ADPP-Angola, FOJASSIDA, Prazedor, CAJ, Cruz Azul, and the Iris Association of Angola received more funding for COVID-19 prevention projects in 2021 than in 2020 because not all funds could be spent the previous year. The Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA) substantially reduced its funding to Angolan CSOs in 2021.

Local CSOs feel increasingly undermined by international organizations, which often have priority access to foreign funding and then subcontract with Angolan CSOs. For example, in 2021, several local organizations, including OIC, CAJ, and the Anglican Council of Angola (CAA), received subgrants from ADPP-Angola and World Vision-Angola, which had funding from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. Donors sometimes allow insufficient time for CSOs to prepare terms of reference for new projects, thereby impeding their access to funding. For example, in 2021, neither the Association of Social Actors for the Promotion of Early Childhood Rights Angola (AASPDPIA) nor the Association of Disadvantaged Children in Angola were able to complete proposals in time for submission to OSISA and People in Need. Another constraint is that some international partners assume that local CSOs are tax exempt and do not reimburse for VAT payments, even if they are included in submitted budgets.

In 2021, funding for CSOs from domestic sources did not improve. Although institutional or programmatic support is sometimes available from the government, no mechanisms exist for the central or local governments to provide grants to CSOs in an open and transparent way. Some CSOs with public utility status, such as the Association of Angolan Youth from Zambia (AJAPRAZ), Spontaneous Movement, Solidarity Cause, and the Lwini, Eduardo Dos Santos, Sagrada Esperança, and Agostinho Neto foundations, obtained government funding in 2021. The government claimed in 2021 that it spends about AOA 4.600 billion (approximately $70 million) each year on organizations with public utility status, but this claim cannot be independently verified.

Chevron, ExxonMobil, Total, Statoil, BP, and other multinational oil companies have corporate social responsibility programs that support CSOs’ community and social projects. A leading domestic bank, Banco Fomento Angola, issues annual calls for proposals and in 2021 provided funds to ADPP-Angola for a pre-school education project in Uige Province. Toyota of Angola reduced its support to CSOs implementing projects in Benguela Province in 2021.

CSOs increasingly recognize that they need to carry out local fundraising campaigns to diversify their sources of support. CSOs’ fundraising capacity has strengthened thanks to training over several years. But their capacity is underutilized, as most CSOs find that there are not many sources of support to draw on. CSOs continue to be...
reluctant to charge for services to beneficiaries who are poor, vulnerable, or important to local communities. A few organizations earn small amounts from their services. For example, ADRA-Angola generates income by providing technical assistance in agriculture and community development; OHI provides consultancy services in the civil society sector, with a focus on organizational development; Prazedor consults in the areas of HIV and community development; and CVA, CAJ, MWENHO, and Caritas de Angola conduct short-term activities such as workshops on community development or HIV prevention. CSOs use such income to ensure their sustainability and fund the internal management of their organizations.

Larger CSOs that receive funding from foreign partners and oil companies must have well-established financial management systems and procedures. They typically use standard accounting software, such as Primavera, QuickBooks, or LCGI, to conduct financial audits and produce monthly, quarterly, and annual reports with financial statements. These CSOs regularly hold internal meetings to weigh completed activities against budgeted amounts and assess whether targets have been met. The majority of CSOs use Microsoft Excel to keep their accounts and are unable to afford professional accounting services.

**ADVOCACY: 4.8**

CSO advocacy improved slightly in 2021 as the government was more open to dialogue and seemed to view CSOs as its true partners. This openness helped not only to consolidate democratic processes in Angola but also to broaden CSOs’ participation in various decision-making arenas.

CSOs have a generally good relationship with the government. But the context for advocacy remains quite challenging because many government officials and other decision makers are not fully aware of the role of CSOs. In addition, the weak capacity of public institutions can lead to CSOs’ exclusion from consultative and institutional dialogues. In view of these challenges, in 2021, ANASO, the leading CSO on advocacy related to HIV prevention, advocated for its member organizations to have better access to local and central government decision-making processes. ANASO’s many efforts included meetings with the government, international organizations, and national CSOs as well as statements on radio and in magazines. ANASO’s interventions improved its members’ access to government decision making, and ANASO’s projects and visibility earned the respect of government officials at both the national and provincial levels. ADRA-Angola is also well regarded by the authorities for its projects in agriculture. OHI and Omunga are accepted by the government of Benguela Province thanks to their community projects. ADPP-Angola is esteemed by the government at all levels for its projects in education, health, agriculture, and other areas and has particularly good relationships with ministries responsible for the areas in which it works.

CSOs undertook several advocacy initiatives in 2021, with organizations working on human rights particularly active. AASPDPIA urged the government to observe its Eleven Commitments to Children and national policy on children. By publicizing these commitments, AASPDPIA helped ensure that local governments comply with them in their activities. The Youth Association for Solidarity (AJS), OIC, OHI, Rasta de Benguela Community, and Faculty of Medicine at Katwala Bwila University worked on sexual and reproductive health policy in Benguela with funding from the EU and coordination by the Vall d’Hebron Institute of Research in Spain.

Mãos Livres, the Regional University Development Forum (FORDU), and Omunga filed a complaint with the Central Criminal Investigation Department in Portugal claiming that bribes totaling more than $50 million had been paid to former senior executives of Sonangol, the Angolan parastatal oil company, over a six-year period. The case was still undecided at the end of the year. OHI, ADRA-Angola, Omunga, AJPD, Friends of Angola, Mãos Livres, the Congregational Evangelical Church of Angola, and the Catholic Episcopal Conference in Angola conferred with the government about the drought and poverty in southern Angola and provided ideas about projects that could help ameliorate the crises.
CSOs contributed to the constitutional reform process by advocating to strengthen guarantees of the right to strike and to demonstrate. CSOs that contributed to the draft constitution included OHI, Mãos Livres, AJPD, ADRA-Angola, and SOS Habitat. CSOs were not directly involved in reform of the electoral law, as participation was restricted to members of parliament. However, they followed the process closely.

In 2021, CSOs used online platforms instead of traveling from province to province to coordinate their advocacy on many issues. For example, ADPP-Angola used Zoom to discuss CSO sustainability with organizations based in various provinces. This method of working together allowed CSOs from all parts of Angola to connect and contributed to improved community and organizational engagement.

Angolan CSOs are aware that the legal framework has many shortcomings that limit their performance. In 2021, many national and local organizations, including OHI and Omunga, shared their opinions with the government, aided by legal experts.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 5.1**

CSO service provision was stable in 2021. CSOs continued to provide services in various fields, including health care, education, social assistance, housing, water, economic development, and environmental protection. Most CSOs continued to be involved in activities related to COVID-19. For example, ADPP-Angola held training sessions on COVID-19 prevention for project workers, community members, and students in all provinces of Angola. OHI held several sensitization sessions in Benguela, and Prazedor carried out awareness-raisers activities in Huila Province. In some communities, CSOs operated technical resource centers where young people could receive training and advice. For example, ADPP-Angola offered professional training on electricity, agriculture, water assistance, cooking, and other fields; MWENHO and ANASO provided training on the prevention of sexually transmitted infections and tuberculosis; and ADRA conducted workshops on agricultural techniques. Many organizations provided people living with HIV with health care, food, and psychosocial support.

CSOs’ interventions in different communities over many years has taught them to understand the needs of their constituents. Organizations typically involve communities in planning, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating their projects. Some CSO activities are aligned with environmental impact policies. Most CSOs collect data to demonstrate their contributions to meeting community needs.

CSOs operate in compliance with the law and without discriminating on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity, or sexual orientation.

CSOs usually provide goods and services free of charge. It is not possible for CSOs to depend on cost recovery to sustain their operations. However, a few CSOs have developed projects aimed at income generation. For example, thanks to their years of experience in both emergency assistance and development, some CSOs have accumulated a know-how and professionalism that gear them toward consultancy services for both the public and private sectors. OHI, ADRA-Angola, ANASO, and Prazedor now offer technical and methodological support in areas such as health care and food security. These can be paid services, but public and private institutions sometimes request that CSOs provide their services free of charge and can be reluctant to offer compensation.

The government at both the national and local levels recognizes the role of civil society, and government officials often make public statements acknowledging CSOs’ contributions to the provision and monitoring of basic social services. Some local governments collaborate with CSOs by drawing on their expertise for ideas about implementing their municipal plans.
SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.6

There was a slight improvement in the sectoral infrastructure in 2021 as the number of resource centers and other facilities serving CSOs continued to increase.

Resource centers serving CSOs in Angola have expanded in recent years. For example, in 2021, the Ufolo Center for the Study of Good Governance, which opened in Luanda in January 2020, began to promote projects and CSO activities in the areas of human rights, justice, youth, and culture, with the aim of monitoring and contributing to good governance in Angola. CSOs also made frequent use of meeting rooms at the National Institute for the Fight against AIDS and the Angolan Writers’ Union. The Training Center of Irmas Paulinas allowed CSOs to use its facilities, and the National Public Health Laboratory was open to CSOs with health projects. Mosaiko and the Development Workshop (DW) continued to welcome CSOs to use their libraries for research and information sharing.

No intermediary support organizations exist in Angola, and few local organizations offer grants or re-grant donor funds.

CSO alliances typically arise from external stimuli, such as a push from donors. For example, the UN Development Programme, ADPP-Angola, and World Vision-Angola have promoted joint initiatives among organizations that implement community response actions in Benguela and Cuanza-Sul provinces under grants from the Global Fund. Such alliances tend to be ephemeral and usually do not last long. In some cases, CSOs that are members of the same network compete against each other rather than act together. However, one area in which CSOs cooperate well is training. For example, ANASO provides its member organizations with training and technical support, and ANASO member organizations share information with each other and work together towards common goals. MWENHO, which assists people living with HIV, is sometimes asked by other CSOs with funded HIV-related projects for training and support, which MWENHO offers them free of charge. The growth of internet-based communications allows CSOs around the country to connect easily with one another, which is also helping build a sense of community in the sector.

CSOs benefited from training offered by donors and other CSOs in 2021. For example, MWENHO and ANASO offered training on the prevention of sexually transmitted infections and tuberculosis to all members of the ANASO network, and ADPP-Angola held workshops on CSO sustainability with more than fifteen organizations. Some training was available to smaller organizations in remote locations, usually when organizations on the municipal level passed on information gathered in provincial workshops. Training manuals are available in Portuguese but rarely in local languages.

CSOs are increasingly aware of the advantages of intersectoral cooperation and seek to establish or maintain such partnerships. For example, several CSOs offered training to government officials in 2021. The Ufolo Study Center for Good Governance trained national police officers in municipalities in Lunda Norte on human rights and the proportional use of force, and ANASO, in partnership with the Ministry of Health, trained government officials on strategies to combat HIV/AIDS, especially in the most vulnerable communities.

The private sector views CSOs as good resources because of their experience in designing and implementing community projects, and many companies seek to partner with CSOs in their social projects. CSOs also have good partnerships with public and private media, such as Jornal de Angola, Radio Nacional Angola, Radio Eclesia, Televisao Publica de Angola, and TV Zimbo.
CSOs’ public image did not change in 2021. Although CSOs received little media coverage during the year, especially on television, some activities were covered by both state and private media. For example, public television, the public radio station Radio Luanda, and the private station Radio LAC covered MWENHO’s activities during International HIV Testing Week in November and public television covered ANASO’s activities on World AIDS Day in December. Media coverage is generally positive. The media do not charge CSOs to cover activities that they consider newsworthy, such as the launch of a new project, donations of goods to beneficiaries, or massive testing programs for HIV or COVID-19. But CSOs are charged if they want to advertise their programs and activities. Media coverage is generally expensive.

The public considers most CSO to be partners in the implementation of activities planned by communities and supported by donors. The public sees CSOs as playing an important role in offering services related to health care, education, culture, and citizenship and in meeting basic needs through social assistance activities.

The government has positive perceptions of CSOs and confidence in the sector as a source of knowledge and expertise. Government officials recognize the value-added of CSOs. For example, the president mentioned several times in 2021 that CSOs are the government’s partners. CSOs’ invitations to meetings with the president and provincial and municipal officials suggest that government entities assign importance to CSOs’ role. However, this recognition does not always translate into strong collaborative relationships. While they respect CSOs that engage with media and communities, they can be unfriendly to organizations that touch on sensitive issues or criticize the government’s actions.

The private sector is aware that CSOs need its support to implement their projects and recognizes the role of CSOs in mobilizing support for needy communities. Larger private-sector entities in Angola, such as Banco de Fomento Angola, Domestic Bank, Chevron, British Petroleum, ExxonMobil, and Toyota of Angola, fund projects that are implemented by CSOs.

Most CSOs use WhatsApp, Facebook, and other social media to publicize their activities. Some CSOs have good access to media such as radio and television and, in 2021, were able to use these connections to publicize their activities and enhance their visibility. For example, ANASO disseminated news about its activities through radio and public television with the help of the Ministry of Health, with which it works closely. Other activities that helped improve CSOs’ visibility included community debates, conferences, and training sessions broadcast on radio and television or over social networks. These efforts helped CSOs’ projects become better known, especially by government authorities, private institutions, and donors.

CSOs share information about their activities with donors and the government. A few prominent CSOs publish their annual reports on their websites and even in hard copy, but most organizations find it too expensive to publish annual reports. Most CSOs have codes of ethics and conduct, which they share with donors if requested.
Benin was marked by a rapidly changing environment in 2020. The COVID-19 virus was first detected in Benin in mid-March. As the virus spread, the authorities closed the country’s borders, schools, universities, and places of worship and established cordons sanitaires to isolate the communities most affected by the pandemic. The quarantine zones were lifted immediately before communal elections took place on May 17. At that time, the country reported 339 diagnosed cases and two deaths.

The government proceeded to hold the elections despite the burgeoning pandemic and a request by the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfCHPR) to suspend and re-organize the elections to make them more inclusive of the opposition. In the aftermath of disputed legislative elections in April 2019, political tensions were high. But voter turnout for the 2020 elections was meagre, and only three parties gained more than 10 percent of the vote, which is required to obtain seats at the local level and will determine the candidates in the 2021 presidential election. Two of the victorious parties were aligned with President Patrice Talon, and only one belonged to the opposition. After the elections, demonstrations ceased and tensions eased somewhat, although several opposition members in exile continued to challenge the electoral process and results.

Freedom of expression remained restricted during the year. After the ruling on the elections by the AfCHPR, Benin withdrew its recognition of the competence of the court to receive cases directly from CSOs and individuals, a move which Amnesty International called “a further step in the growing repression of dissenting voices in Benin.” The Constitutional Court of Benin similarly ruled in April that the protocol of the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) allowing citizens to bring cases before the court had been improperly ratified by Benin and was thus null and void. Several cases from Benin were pending with the ECOWAS court at the time this judgment was made. Journalist Ignace Sossou, who in 2019 had been sentenced to twelve months in prison for tweeting comments by the public prosecutor, was released in June after six months of arbitrary detention. Benin ranked 114 out of 180 countries in the 2021 World Press Freedom Index of Reporters Without Borders.

Benin’s economic growth dropped sharply in 2020 with the effects of the pandemic. The African Development Bank estimated the real growth of gross domestic product at 2.3 percent in 2020, compared to 6.9 percent in 2019. Inflation was low at 1.1 percent. The national poverty rate dipped slightly from 40.1 percent in 2019 to 38.2 percent in 2020, according to the World Bank. On December 16, Nigeria reopened its border with Benin, which had been closed for more than sixteen months in a dispute over smuggling.

The overall sustainability of Beninese CSOs was stable in 2020. CSO advocacy improved moderately as organizations working in social and economic fields increased their activity and their attempts to collaborate with
the government met with modest success. At the same time, the legal environment showed moderate deterioration as the government cracked down on protests during and after the elections and the space for freedom of expression and assembly narrowed. All other dimensions of sustainability were unchanged.

Benin’s civil society sector includes both formal and informal organizations. There is no database of CSOs. The most recent information about the number of CSOs is from 2015, when the Ministry Charged with Relations with Institutions, Civil Society, and Beninese Abroad reported approximately 6,000 registered CSOs. The sector is believed to have grown since then.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.0**

CSOs’ legal environment deteriorated moderately in 2021 as the government restricted freedom of expression.

The 1990 constitution of Benin guarantees freedoms of expression and assembly. Most CSOs register with the Ministry of the Interior under a 1901 law on associations. National-level and foreign organizations register with the Ministry of the Interior as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) under Decree No. 2001-234 of July 12, 2001. In practice, there is no appreciable differences between NGOs and associations registered under the 1901 law, except that NGOs may apply for public utility status, which is granted by the Council of Ministers and entitles an organization to tax benefits and exemptions from duty on imported items. Organizations at the local level register with the prefecture in which they are located. Except in rare cases, CSOs must wait at least three months before receiving registration receipts. CSOs finalize their registration by publishing an announcement in the official gazette. No organization is known to have been denied registration in 2021.

Few other regulations govern CSOs’ existence. No law allows the government to dissolve an association. However, under Decree No. 2001-234, the government may suspend or withdraw official recognition of NGOs that violate the decree or provisions of the customs code with respect to exempted goods.

Online CSO registration was not available in 2021. However, the Ministry of Justice and Legislation launched a secure, dedicated internet portal that offers CSOs access to useful information, such as funding opportunities and ways to improve institutional frameworks. The platform also offers services such as assistance with the publication of registration announcements and the issuance of certificates confirming CSOs’ physical and functional existence or participation in training. CSOs must be registered to access the platform. In 2021, the vast majority of CSOs were still unaware of the platform and the benefits that it offers.

Significant progress was made on a draft law on associations in 2021. On June 9 and 10, CSO and government representatives attended a workshop in Cotonou to discuss the draft law after similar workshops had taken place in Benin’s other eleven departments. The workshop, organized by the Civil Society Promotion Center (Centre de promotion de la société civile, CPSC), a government entity, was opened by the prefect of Littoral Department. The conclusions of the meeting were not publicized.

Freedom of speech deteriorated in 2021. Several people were arrested under the 2017 Digital Code, which allows for prosecution and imprisonment for online content deemed to be false or to harass individuals. In the pre-election period, a web activist was arrested for commenting on a newspaper headline circulating on social media suggesting that President Talon rented the vehicle used in his accountability campaign for XOF 6 million (approximately $10,800) a day. The blogger was convicted of “harassment by means of electronic communication,” sentenced to twelve months in prison, and ordered to pay a XOF 200,000 (approximately $360) fine, according to Amnesty International. In May, the Supreme Court upheld a 2020 ruling by the Cotonou Court of Appeal sentencing Benin Web TV journalist Ignace Sossou to eighteen months in prison (later reduced six months) for having relayed on his personal Twitter account a quote about “anti-fake news” by the public prosecutor. In
December, two journalists from the daily *Le Soleil Info* were each sentenced to a six-month suspended sentence and fined more than XOF 500,000 (approximately $900) following a defamation complaint by a customs inspector.

A revised general tax code adopted in 2021 established new rules for CSOs. The new code establishes exemptions for CSOs from corporate tax and value-added tax on services provided for free and on materials and equipment purchased for their operations and required for their work. CSOs are required to file narrative and financial activity reports with local tax authorities by April 30 of each year. Failure to comply with this obligation can result in tax and criminal penalties.

CSOs may receive foreign financial support provided they comply with the law on money laundering and the financing of terrorism. CSOs are not entitled to bid on government contracts but the government sometimes awards contracts to CSOs for educational and training services.

CSOs may seek legal counsel to defend their interests but rarely do so because of limited financial resources. Several attorneys offer pro bono advice to CSOs.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.6**

CSOs’ organizational capacity did not change in 2021. Most CSOs in Benin, especially those working on health care, education, and human rights, forge close relationships with their communities. The government’s ban on large public gatherings and mandatory social distancing continued to slow or block CSOs’ development of relationships with their constituencies in 2021, especially since many interventions demanded face-to-face interactions. A few CSOs coped with the restrictions by innovating a dual approach to project implementation, with some components such as meetings taking place online. For example, the Beninese Association for Family Promotion (Association béninoise pour la promotion de la famille, ABPF) used both radio broadcasts and social networks to reach its target audiences.

Other organizations adapted their activities to pandemic restrictions. For example, Dedji, an organization of disabled people, was provided with equipment such as an all-terrain motorcycle, a laptop computer, a megaphone, and a printer by Women in Law and Development in Africa (Femmes de droits et développement en Afrique, WiLDAF)-Benin, so that Dedji could continue to participate in an employment support project for handicapped and former prisoners. The Beninese Association for Social Marketing and Communication for Health (Association béninoise pour le marketing social et la communication pour la santé, ABMS) claimed in its 2021 annual report to have been able to implement seven projects despite the health crisis. But CSOs working in rural areas had to cancel or postpone many activities. After the vaccination campaign started, CSOs were able to gradually resume in-person meetings and activities provided participants showed proof of vaccination.

Most CSOs do not engage in strategic planning or consider it a priority. Only more experienced CSOs, such as WiLDAF-Benin, West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (Réseau ouest africain pour l’édification de la paix, WANEP)-Benin, Action Group for Progress and Peace (Groupe d’action pour le progrès et la paix, GAPP)–Africa, and ABMS, make the effort to draft strategic documents with clearly defined missions, objectives, performance indicators, and budgets. For example, ABPF met in September 2021 to develop its advocacy strategy for the period 2021-25. Organizations that have strategic plans normally adhere to them, since the plans are often required by donors, and organizations must present donors with year-end activity reports that align with their plans. The staff of smaller and less experienced organizations usually do not have sufficient skills to draft strategic documents.

Most organizations have executive boards that act as governing bodies. Some CSOs have boards of directors, but they are not usually very active. Only large organizations with years of experience, such as confederations of trade
unions, ABMS, Social Watch, and WiLDAF-Benin, are able to create enough momentum on their boards to engage them in the work of their organizations.

Obtaining qualified human resources is an ongoing challenge for most organizations. Staff usually consists of service providers and support personnel, who are hired for the duration of specific projects. In 2021, staffing challenges worsened as most organizations had less funding and fewer activities to work on. Many organizations find it impossible to hire permanent staff. Small CSOs rarely have sufficient funding to recruit competent fulltime staff and instead depend on interns and volunteers. The 2022 World Giving Index indicated that 24 percent of respondents in Benin reported volunteering in 2021, up from 13 percent the year before.

Equipping their offices with computers, printers, routers, and other materials remains a challenge for many CSOs. However, most organizations have Facebook pages, and some CSOs have websites and are active on other social networks, such as Twitter. Some CSOs are aware of the need for cybersecurity, and larger organizations sometimes hire qualified staff to manage their data.

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**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.4**

CSOs’ financial viability was more or less stable in 2021. The sector relies overwhelmingly on foreign funding. The main foreign partners in 2021 were the governments of Germany, the United States, Switzerland, and the Netherlands and the European Union (EU). Donors continued to focus their funding on the health crisis during the year. Among new funding programs, the French Embassy launched a new funding cycle under the Innovative Projects of Civil Society and Coalitions of Actors program in 2021. Seventeen projects out of 210 proposals were selected to receive a total of XOF 201 million (approximately $785,000). CSOs submitting successful proposals included the Network for Peace and Security of Women in the ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States] Space (Réseau paix et sécurité des femmes dans l’espace CEDEAO, REPSFECO)-Benin, Research and Support Group for Farmers’ Organizations (Groupe de recherche et d’appui aux organisations paysanne, GRAOP), Center for Reflection and Action for Integrated Development and Solidarity (Centre de réflexion et d’action pour le développement intégré et la solidarité, CeRADIS), and Association of Youth for the Development of Arts and Cultures (Association des jeunes pour le développement des arts et cultures, ADJAC). The projects were to be implemented over a six-month period.

Government grants, which are always very scarce, were almost non-existent in 2021. According to information from the various government ministries, no COVID-19 funds were earmarked for CSOs during the year. Local businesses and foundations that used to support local CSOs, such as MTN and MOOV Africa, also reduced their funding to CSOs. To respond to the pandemic, the government launched a fundraising effort that competed with CSOs, and many corporate foundations that had funded CSOs chose to redirect their funding to support the government’s fight against the pandemic.

CSOs have yet to develop strategies for financial sustainability. Many CSOs, especially new organizations and those operating in rural and landlocked areas with limited geographical scope, had trouble covering their operating expenses in 2021. Although the legal and policy framework offers a favorable context for local resource mobilization, almost no CSOs receive financial support from local sources. The culture of giving to CSOs is not developed or encouraged, and CSOs’ members do not contribute. However, several CSOs involved in agriculture and livestock sell products for income. For example, the association of women salt producers of Djègbadji in Ouidah produces salt to sell on the Beninese market.
Most organizations still lack systems for managing their financial resources, although donors increasingly require activity reports and certified accounts before financing new projects. Most organizations with donor funding hire financial officers to prepare financial reports. CSOs do not usually publish their financial reports.

**ADVOCACY: 3.6**

CSO advocacy made moderate progress in 2021 as various capacity-building programs helped organizations develop their advocacy skills and influence government actions. For example, in May, the Benin National Farmers’ Union (Plateforme nationale des organisations paysannes et de producteurs agricoles du Bénin, PNOPPA-Bénin) organized advocacy training for its members with the support of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation and SOS Faim Luxembourg. The Dutch organization Rutgers held a training for some fifty young people from July to September 2021 focused on advocacy for the right to sexual and reproductive health. The Coalition of CSOs for Elections and Peace (Coalition des organisations de la société civile pour les elections et la paix, COSCEP), with support from the International Republican Institute and funding from USAID, organized a workshop in Cotonou in July 2021 for federations and networks of organizations working to protect the civil and political rights of people with disabilities. The workshop resulted in participants’ adoption of an advocacy strategy.

No formal framework for collaboration exists between CSOs and government decision makers at the central or local levels. The government generally seeks to reduce CSOs’ participation in policy making and does not ask for or listen to their opinions on important public policy issues. Government institutions generally interact with CSOs through programs funded by donors. For example, in November, at a meeting organized by the National Malaria Control Program in collaboration with Speak Up Africa, CSOs and grassroots community organizations met with representatives of the ministries of social affairs, the environment, economy and finance, and health as well international organizations such as the World Health Organization and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. The group developed the first national advocacy plan to control malaria in Benin during the period 2022-24.

Several awareness and advocacy campaigns targeting women’s issues took place in 2021. In December, a major success was the adoption by the Beninese legislature of Law No. 2021-12 on sexual reproductive health and abortion, following ABPF’s online advocacy campaign for access to safe abortion. The new law legalizes abortion up to twelve weeks of pregnancy if the pregnancy is likely to cause or worsen material, educational, professional, or moral distress. In June, young women activists from various CSOs sent a plea for gender equality to the minister of social affairs and microfinance. According to the newspaper Matin Libre, the minister reassured the women that the government is implementing mechanisms to reduce gender inequality and she was committed to supporting this initiative. WILDAF-Benin collaborated with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation to carry out an advocacy action in November calling for women’s access to land and other economic resources in rural areas.

In other advocacy action in 2021, a delegation from the CSO Budget Tracking Group (Consortium des OSC de suivi du budget national) presented its recommendations to the budget commission of the National Assembly in November 2021. The group’s position included support for the purchase of domestically produced gas and tax cuts. The recommendations were not incorporated into the final budget.

After CSOs criticized a draft law on associations presented by the Ministry of Justice in 2020, in part because it would reduce CSOs’ financial capacity by creating tedious procedures for accessing donor funds, a new draft law was presented in 2021. Workshops on the draft law took place in eleven of Benin’s departments, culminating in a meeting in June in Cotonou, organized by the CPSC.
SERVICE PROVISION: 4.1

CSO service provision was unchanged in 2021. Despite the continuing health crisis, CSOs resumed providing a broad range of services to their target communities in 2021. CSOs’ areas of intervention include health care (including sexual reproductive health), human rights, education, women’s rights and empowerment, children’s rights and protection, environmental protection, energy, and water and sanitation. In 2021, although the government did not give CSOs responsibility for post-COVID-19 activities, a number of organizations supported the government’s pandemic response with awareness campaigns and donations of equipment, sometimes using their own resources. For example, the International Association for Solidarity in Development (Association internationale de solidarité pour le développement, AISD) supplemented the government’s efforts by organizing awareness sessions and donating handwashing devices. ABPF raised awareness about COVID-19 through videos posted on its Facebook page. The Benin CSO Coalition for Universal Health Coverage (Coalition des OSC du Bénin pour la couverture universelle en santé, COBCUS) mobilized about thirty CSOs throughout the country to encourage households to install handwashing points at their entrances, with support from the Organization for Strengthening Health Systems and Immunization in Francophone Africa (Organisation d’Afrique francophone pour le renforcement des systèmes de santé et de la vaccination, OAFRESS).

CSOs typically determine community needs through surveys, studies, and the achievements of previous projects. Although CSOs seek to respond to those needs, their services are sometimes adjusted to conform to donors’ priorities. For example, in 2021, the organization Bénin Energie offered a six-month training to young people working in the energy sector in Akpro-Misséré and Bohicon communes to promote renewable energy and stimulate Benin’s socio-economic development. The project received XOF 23 million (approximately $90,000) from an EU program to modernize Benin’s energy sector.

Although they target specific audiences, CSOs generally provide their services without discrimination.

A few organizations sell agricultural products, but otherwise CSOs earn little revenue from marketing their products and services.

Unlike in 2020, the government gave little recognition to CSOs’ contributions in 2021.

SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.2

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector was stable in 2021.

The main resource center serving CSOs is the Civil Society House (Maison de la société civile, MdSC), which has offices in Bohicon and Parakou. The MdSC offers specialized services and earns income from membership fees, consulting services, and rental of its conference room. CSOs have free access to the MdSC library as well as public libraries and libraries at the Zinsou Foundation and Ministry of Justice. CSOs also benefit from support from the CPSC, whose mission is to foster CSOs’ participation in national development. The CPSC promotes cooperation between CSOs, publicizes their activities, and provides information on various topics. The CSO portal established in 2021 by the Ministry of Justice and Legislation promises to strengthen CSOs’ accesses to information and other resources, but it was too early to assess its contribution in 2021.

The EU’s Program for the Strengthening and Participation of Civil Society in Benin (RePaSoc), which had been one of the few sources of funds to allow capable CSOs to subcontract projects to smaller, local organizations, ended in September 2021 after four years of operation.
CSO networks and coalitions are common in Benin. They include both permanent and ad hoc groupings that are often formed at the urging of funding partners, which often prefer to fund networks rather than individual CSOs.

CSOs had limited access to training opportunities in 2021. Some organizations received capacity-building support under the Quality Label program of the MdSC, which was launched in 2018 to strengthen the capacity of individual organizations, which then serve as models for other CSOs. The fourth edition of the CSO Quality Label began on June 14, 2021, with selected CSOs receiving technical and financial assistance as well as training on CSO management.

CSOs are often invited to collaborate with the government through technical and financial partners. For example, in 2021, the National Malaria Control Program, which is supported by the U.S. President’s Malaria Initiative, invited CSOs to work with the government on developing a national advocacy plan for fighting malaria in Benin. Collaboration between CSOs and private-sector entities is not common.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.2

CSOs’ public image did not change in 2021.

The relationship between the media and CSOs remained undeveloped. CSOs still have difficulty communicating via local television and radio stations. Organizations that denounce violations of fundamental rights are confused with the political opposition, and many Beninese media have communication contracts with the government that prevent them from giving a voice to any sources that take positions that are different from those of the government. Restrictions on civil liberties have also caused the Beninese media to engage in self-censorship and avoid controversial topics.

In 2021, the public perceived CSO as working hard alongside the government and grassroots communities to fight COVID-19. The government does not see CSOs as constituting a political threat and tends to ignore many of their activities.

Because of the pandemic and their lack of financial means in 2021, CSOs were more active on social networks, where they tend to have large communities of followers. Some organizations do not regularly update their online content, usually because they lack qualified personnel to do the work. CSOs increasingly develop online conferences and debates as part of their communications approaches. For example, ABPF’s Facebook page listed an assortment of online conferences taking place in December on such topics as the new law on sexual and reproductive health. The creation of the national CSO portal allowed CSOs to strengthen their brand image in 2021 by relaying information about their activities and offering enhanced visibility.

There are no initiatives to set and internally monitor standards for the CSO sector in Benin other than the Quality Label certification program. Very few organizations publish their activity reports.
Botswana’s political environment continued to be stable in 2021. A major event was the appointment in April of the first woman minister of finance and economic development, which was encouraging to many activists seeking better representation of women in government. In June, for the first time since 2014, Botswana’s Department of Wildlife and National Parks issued licenses for hunting African forest elephants and African savanna elephants. Although the International Union for the Conservation of Nature declared them to be endangered, CSOs and community members did not object, as they do not consider them to be endangered in Botswana and they benefited from the proceeds from the licenses.

On April 1, for the third time, the parliament extended the pandemic-related state of public emergency by six months. Under the state of emergency, curfews and lockdowns were imposed, movement was restricted, strikes by unions were banned, and businesses that were unable to have employees work remotely or pay salaries were ordered to cease operations rather than terminate employees. Opposition parties, CSOs, trade unions, and others objected that the extensions prolonged overly broad presidential powers to rule by decree. The restrictions heightened some groups’ vulnerability to gender-based violence (GBV), inequality, exclusion, discrimination, and unemployment. For example, the indigenous San people faced new discrimination as health information issued by the government was produced primarily in Setswana and did not take into consideration the language, traditions, and living conditions of the San people. Migrants, refugees, and sexual minorities also faced more intense challenges during the pandemic. The government launched a COVID-19 vaccination campaign on March 2, 2021, with doses donated by India and purchased through the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access facility. CSOs assisted with testing, awareness raising, and the vaccination campaign.

In a key milestone, Botswana became the first country with a heavy HIV burden to be awarded silver-tier status by the World Health Organization (WHO). The award recognized Botswana’s reduction of mother-to-child transmission of HIV among breastfeeding mothers to less than 5 percent and new pediatric HIV infections because of transmission to fewer than 500 cases per 100,000 live births. The Botswana Network of People Living with HIV and AIDS (BONEPWA+) and women’s support groups were commended for mobilizing HIV-positive women to participate in Botswana’s effective program to end mother-to-child HIV transmission.

In 2021, Botswana continued to suffer from the acute dislocations in global and national markets caused by the pandemic. However, after contracting 7.7 percent in 2020, the country’s economic growth rebounded to an estimated 12.1 percent in 2021, according to the World Bank. The improvement was attributed to increased global demand for diamonds, Botswana’s main export, as well as the easing of some pandemic-related restrictions.
and the rollout of the vaccination campaign. At the same time, unemployment climbed to 26 percent by the end of 2021, and the country continued to experience high levels of inequality.

The overall sustainability of CSOs in Botswana improved slightly in 2021. CSOs’ legal environment was slightly more enabling thanks to the introduction of a computerized registration process. Increased funding from foreign sources slightly improved CSOs’ financial viability. CSO service provision improved slightly as permits provided by the Ministry of Health allowed organizations to provide services more effectively during lockdowns. Organizational capacity deteriorated slightly as some organizations’ constituency outreach, strategic planning, and staffing were negatively affected by the pandemic. The other dimensions of sustainability did not change.

Because of the process of converting to a computerized registration system, the Registrar of Societies was unable to provide the total number of CSOs registered in 2021. The most recent year for which data is available is 2018, when the registrar reported 9,756 registered societies.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT:** 3.9

CSOs’ legal environment improved slightly in 2021 with the conversion to a computerized registration system.

CSOs continued to be governed by the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Policy of 2012, which recognizes civil society’s contribution to national development and nation building. The policy defines the relationship between the government and CSOs, provides for mechanisms to support CSOs through line ministries, and identifies the function of the NGO Council, which is to provide a coordinated approach to the implementation of national development plans and international priorities by facilitating communications and partnerships between the government, CSOs, and other stakeholders. The implementation of the NGO Policy is based on the Policy Guidelines for Support to NGOs.

All CSOs are required to register under the Societies Act of 2014, Companies Act as amended in 2008, or Trust Property Control Act of 2018. The Department of Civil and National Registration registers societies, while the Companies and Intellectual Property Authority registers companies and the Master of the High Court registers community trusts. Nearly all CSOs register as societies in what they consider a straightforward process. Within twenty-eight days of adopting written constitutions, new organizations must submit applications and pay required fees to the Registrar of Societies, which then issues certificates of registration.

In 2021, the Registrar of Societies introduced a computerized registration system that allows CSOs to submit applications to register online. The registration system was functional in 2021, although the roll-out was slowed by COVID-19. The system was adopted as part of the government’s strategy to digitize its operations to increase business opportunities and better serve citizens’ needs. It was anticipated that the new system would speed up the registration process, which had been plagued by delays because of limited personnel in the Registrar of Societies office. Among the remaining barriers to registration were the requirement that churches have 150 members at the time of founding and the need for rural organizations to travel long distances to government offices to finish up registration procedures.

CSOs are required to file annual narrative and financial reports. The registrar regularly deregisters organizations that fail to comply with annual reporting requirements.

A few cases of harassment against CSOs and their members were reported in 2021. Several pastors and a musician who publicly addressed the mismanagement of public funds, reckless government spending, and the concentration of wealth in the hands of persons in power and their associates were arrested and charged with violating the Public Order Act and demonstrating without permits. Security agents used excessive force to disperse several demonstrations against corruption and the misappropriation of funds.
CSOs may mobilize resources from foreign, corporate, and individual donors. CSOs obtaining funding from both foreign and domestic donors must identify their sources of income to the Botswana United Revenue Service and comply with international agreements adopted by Botswana to counter money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The requirement that they disclose their sources of financing is of concern to CSOs as some donors are reluctant to have their names published.

CSOs may compete for government tenders provided they register with the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board. Government ministries such as the Ministry of Health and Wellness sometimes award short- or long-term contracts to CSOs on a non-competitive basis. Under the terms of these contracts, only 20 percent of the funding may go to operational costs, such as human resources and utilities. CSOs may establish social enterprises provided all proceeds are reinvested in their activities.

CSOs do not receive tax exemptions.

Local lawyers are familiar with CSO-related laws, but their fees can be high. Under the law, private practitioners have a duty to assist clients with deserving cases who cannot afford to pay legal fees, but no CSO is known to have received pro bono assistance in 2021.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.3**

CSOs’ organizational capacity deteriorated slightly in 2021 as some organizations’ outreach to constituencies, strategic planning, or staffing was negatively affected by the pandemic.

CSOs are used to involving their beneficiaries in planning their programs, which in turn helps build their constituency bases. In 2021, this approach continued to be challenged by pandemic restrictions, which curtailed staff movement, reduced face-to-face interactions, and forced cutbacks or cancellations of activities. Many CSOs, especially those in urban areas with stable internet access, overcame this difficulty by relying on online video-conferencing and virtual meetings to engage with stakeholders on critical issues. For example, the Health Policy Project (HPP), Tebelopele Wellness Center, and Botswana Christian AIDS Intervention Program (BOCHAIP) conducted workshops and training on virtual platforms. In contrast, community-based organizations (CBOs) in rural areas often had limited internet access because of poor connectivity. They were thus unable to meet with constituencies either in person or over the internet and sometimes had to cancel their programs.

Many CSOs have institutionalized strategic planning as a critical governance function. However, they usually do not follow their plans because of inadequate resources and pressure to implement activities requested by donors. In 2021, financial constraints prevented some organizations, such as the Botswana Association of the Deaf and Gaborone Association of People with Disabilities, from adjusting their strategic plans or developing new plans to respond to the pandemic. CSOs often have limited capacity to measure the success of their work because they lack funding to hire staff for monitoring and evaluation.

CSOs in Botswana are generally well managed. Many CSOs observe legally mandated processes such as elections at annual general meetings. But their boards are often non-functional and may meet formally only when elections are held. CSOs in rural areas often lack clarity about the differing roles and responsibilities of their boards and their staff. In 2021, some CBOs reported limited board capacity and a failure by boards to exercise oversight of their organizations.

Most CSOs hire staff on a short-term basis. CSOs tend to find it difficult to retain staff and volunteers because of the poor salaries that they offer, and they experience high levels of staff turnover. In 2021, the staff of many organizations continued to work from home because of the pandemic. CSO staff and volunteers reported increased personal and work-related concerns related to the pandemic, including increased domestic violence,
ment health problems because of heavy workloads, and uncertainty about money and job retention. Although most CSOs in the health sector were able to draw on volunteers for pandemic-related activities, volunteer retention was usually short-lived. The government provided businesses with COVID-19 wage subsidy funds, but for unclear reasons CSOs were excluded from this program even though they were registered and had employees equally affected by the virus.

Networks of CSOs in urban areas, such as Young Love, which serves adolescent girls, and Men and Boys for Gender Equality (MBGE), which focuses on boys and young men, are generally comfortable using platforms such as WhatsApp and Zoom since the younger population is technically savvy. CSOs reported that the shift to virtual formats sometimes reduced active participation in meetings as some participants logged on but failed to take part. For other CSOs, especially in rural areas, digital operations were limited by poor internet connections or the lack of technical know-how. CSOs have become aware of the need for cybersecurity and along with media such as Gabz FM and Duma FM are raising awareness of the issue.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.8

CSOs’ financial viability improved slightly in 2021 as some organizations received increased funding from foreign sources.

After Botswana became an upper middle-income country in 2007, most international donors passed responsibility for financing CSOs to the government. In 2021, donors still funding CSOs, such as the European Union (EU), shifted their focus from advocacy to the humanitarian crisis caused by COVID-19. These donors generally preferred to fund a few large organizations and networks. For example, the EU provided funding to Gender Links Botswana and Men and Boys for Gender Equality for outreach activities about GBV, including disseminating the results of a national GBV study at kgotla, or traditional village meetings. A few organizations received increased funding from donors. For example, the Tebelopele Wellness Clinic, Humana People to People, Stepping Stones International, Hope World Wide, and BOCHAIP received new funding from the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) through USAID and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. This funding was for CSOs in the health-care sector that focus on HIV, tuberculosis, and cervical cancer or provide services to orphans and vulnerable children. International CSOs now compete against Batswana CSOs for funding, sometimes by decentralizing and registering as local CSOs, as was the case with Project Concern International.

CSOs rely mainly on the government for funding. For this reason, they usually align their interventions with government priorities defined in the national planning instrument, which they help develop. In 2021, the government mainly funded organizations engaged in pandemic-related activities. For example, the National AIDS and Health Promotion Agency funded CSOs’ work in high-priority districts and among priority populations, and the Ministry of Health distributed funding from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. The government also offered some support to rural CBOs, such as the Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust, Lake Xau Management Trust, and Topmak Conservation Trust. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Development has produced two publications—Policy Guidelines for Financial Support to NGOs and Botswana’s Fund Strategy for Civil Society-Led HIV Services—to help CSOs develop funding strategies for HIV programs, but they have not been widely distributed.

Most CSOs working in sectors other than health care had limited opportunities to diversify their funding in 2021. Local corporate donors provided limited direct funding to CSOs in 2021, as they channeled their resources to the COVID-19 funding basket set up by the government.

CSOs’ fundraising activities were constrained by pandemic restrictions and the diversion of most funding to pandemic-related concerns in 2021. Most CSOs lack the capacity to engage in crowdfunding and other forms of digital fundraising or have too few employees to devote to resource mobilization. Some networks and umbrella
groups such as BOCHAIP earn income from annual subscription fees from their members, but the earned amounts are low and insufficient to support their operations. Some CSOs receive non-monetary support from their communities.

Most CSO networks have sound financial management systems and qualified financial management staff. Many other organizations do not observe financial controls and cannot afford to obtain professional financial services. Donors and the government often require audited financial statements but do not cover their cost, which disqualifies CSOs from funding if they cannot afford such services on their own.

**ADVOCACY: 3.7**

CSO advocacy remained stable in 2021.

CSOs continued to access government decision-making processes and cooperate effectively with the central and local governments in 2021. Mechanisms allowing CSOs to access government decision making included the country coordinating mechanism for the Global Fund, the NGO Council, and technical working groups in line ministries. Because of pandemic restrictions, most advocacy activities shifted online during the year. For example, in June 2021, CSOs participated through online platforms in a ceremony celebrating the signing of the ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Botswana, which CSOs helped bring about.

CSOs continued to be concerned about corruption, access to information, conflict of interest, and government accountability in 2021. For example, the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) advocated for reform of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence (Controlled Investigation) Bill, which MISA asserted in its present shape would allow the government to intercept communications of journalists and other citizens, force journalists and other citizens to disclose information, and allow the government to spy on citizens. MISA shared its concerns with the CSO sector and in a letter to the president, to which the government did not respond. CSOs such as the Botswana Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (BOCONGO) advocated to ensure the independence of oversight bodies, such as the Independent Electoral Commission, Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime, and the Directorate of Intelligence and Security. The sector held the government accountable through the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), a voluntary instrument for self-assessment and peer reviews of governance policies and practices. Led by BOCONGO, CSOs continued to discuss twelve key governance issues identified by organizations participating in the Botswana APRM Popular Sensitization project in 2020. CSOs also voiced concerns about corruption, mainly through private media, but failed to initiate a discussion with the government on the topic.

Despite the government’s effort to discourage such activities, CSOs played a critical role in shaping policy on politically controversial issues in 2021. For example, in November, Lesbians, Gays and Bisexuals of Botswana (LEGABIBO) won an appeal in a case involving criminal laws that fueled discrimination and violence against sexual minorities and impeded their access to health-care services, including mental health care. As a result of the ruling, these populations gained increased access to services, and the Ministry of Health began a program to train service providers. CSOs such as the Botswana Network on Ethics, Law and HIV/AIDS (BONELA) engaged with lawmakers to influence the legislation and policies on human rights issues.

Because of the pandemic, CSOs did not engage in significant efforts to reform the legal framework for the sector in 2021. Some consultations between Ngamiland Council of Non-Governmental Organizations (NCONGO) members and the NGO Council took place in October.
CSO service provision improved slightly in 2021 as permits provided by the Ministry of Health allowed organizations to engage more effectively in providing health-care services during lockdowns.

CSOs provide a diversified array of basic social services and also work in areas such as economic development, environmental protection, governance, and empowerment. In 2021, many CSOs were involved in mobilizing communities for COVID-19 testing, awareness raising, and vaccinations. Baylor Botswana, Botswana Red Cross Society, Dare to Dream, Botswana Scouts Association, Makgabaneng, Botswana Family Welfare Association, and Young Love received funding from the United Nations Children's Fund to disseminate information on GBV and COVID-19. Unlike in 2020, when CSOs found it difficult to obtain permission to work during lockdowns, in 2021, some organizations received permits to travel and engage in face-to-face interactions despite pandemic restrictions. The permits allowed them to provide vital services during pandemic lockdowns. For example, the Botswana Council for the Disabled (BCD) received permits to coordinate welfare, education, health, employment, and other services for people with disabilities during lockdowns. HPP, BOCHAIP, BONELA, Botswana Network of AIDS Service Organizations (BONASO), Botswana GBV Prevention and Support Center, and other health-care organizations helped mobilize communities for COVID-19 testing and vaccinations. Many organizations in the health-care sector reported increased costs and heavier workloads because of pandemic-related work in 2021.

CSOs are responsive to the needs and priorities of their communities, which they usually determine by reviewing surveys and other primary data. For example, the Trust for Okavango Cultural and Development Initiatives addresses the needs of the San people as a marginalized community in the Okavango sub-district and in 2021 helped administer medication to tuberculosis patients in San settlements. The Thuso Rehabilitation Center provided rehabilitation services to disabled persons in Ngamiland and Chobe District. The Okavango Research Institute undertook research and provided training and services aimed at preserving wetland and adjacent dryland eco-systems at the request of communities in the area.

Although they are legally permitted to do so, most CSOs in Botswana lack the capacity to recover the costs of service provision by charging fees, creating social enterprises, or contracting.

The government recognizes and appreciates CSO service provision at the national and local levels. For instance, the Fifth Botswana AIDS Impact Survey report acknowledged civil society’s role in decreasing HIV infections in local communities.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.8**

The sectoral infrastructure for CSOs did not change in 2021.

Resource centers and other institutions help CSOs obtain information, technology, training, and technical assistance by offering them access to internet facilities. For example, the Botswana Library provides CSOs with access to free internet services in Gumare, Shakawe, Bobonong, and Nata, and the Ngamiland Council of Non-Governmental Organizations provides internet services to at least ten affiliates in Maun. Several CSOs and intermediary support organizations, including FHI 360, Global Communities, BOCONGO, NCONGO, and BCD, also manage resource centers that support CSOs.

CSOs such as BONASO and BONEPWA+, which in the past received and distributed funds from the Global Fund and other sources, did not do so in 2021. The Global Fund’s funding mechanism changed to make the Ministry of Health rather than CSOs the principal recipient of funding.
Networks and coalitions, such as BOCONGO, BCD, and NCONGO, share information with their members and work together to address community challenges. Although the pandemic undermined CSOs’ operations in various ways, cooperation in the sector improved as CSOs made more effective use of virtual platforms to connect. With technical and financial support from the UN Development Programme, BOCONGO offered a number of virtual advocacy workshops in 2021 under the CSO Capacity Strengthening for Meaningful Contribution to National Development Processes and Goals in Botswana project. Workshop topics ranged from CSOs and public policy analysis to gender and inclusive development. BONEPWA+ and women’s support groups, which contributed to the success of the program to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV, were urged by the WHO and UNAIDS to better coordinate their activities to avoid fragmentation and duplication and increase the sustainability of the HIV response effort.

CSOs prioritize training but a lack of funding limited training opportunities in 2021.

Among CSOs’ intersectoral partnerships in 2021, Duma FM’s News Café provided BONELA with airtime to address human rights issues, and Radio Botswana 2 provided free slots to BOCHAIP to discuss issues related to HIV. The Ministry of Health’s district health-management teams partnered with CSOs to share resources such as transportation services provided by businesses. These partnerships were formed in part because CSOs in sectors such as health care are more aware of the possibilities for and advantages of intersectoral cooperation.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.0**

CSOs’ public image remained the same in 2021.

CSOs had an active presence in print, broadcast, and online media in 2021. CSOs are covered by both public and private media outlets, including Duma FM, Radio Botswana 2, Daily News, and BTV. The coverage was mostly positive in 2021.

The public views CSOs as necessary to community development and as critical conduits for the delivery of goods and services. The public is supportive of CSOs and appreciates the services that they provide.

Government views of CSOs improved slightly in 2021 thanks to the services that CSOs provided to communities during the pandemic. CSOs were viewed as flexible and ready to offer their services expeditiously. In his state-of-the-nation address on November 8, 2021, the president recognized CSOs’ “unqualified support” in the fight against COVID-19.

CSOs promoted their image and activities on a regular basis in 2021. For example, NCONGO used Facebook for public outreach and raised awareness of COVID-19 through radio programming.

Most CSOs adopt a code of ethics and publish annual reports to demonstrate transparency and accountability.
The dominant image of Burkina Faso over the last seven years is of a country suffering from chronic insecurity because of unceasing attacks by extremist groups. The situation in 2021 did not deviate from this image and was in fact the deadliest in recent years. According to the Global Terrorism Index of the Institute for Economics and Peace, 216 terrorist attacks took place in Burkina Faso in 2021, making Burkina Faso the country most affected by terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa. The deadliest incidents included an attack in Solhan, Sahel Region, in June, in which 160 people were killed, and an assault on a gendarmerie detachment based in Inata, Sahel Region, in November, in which some fifty soldiers were killed. The regions most affected by insecurity were Est, Sahel, Boucle du Mouhoun, Cascades, Nord, and Centre-Nord.

In addition to a devastating loss of human life, the violence displaced huge numbers of people. The United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Burkina Faso at more than 1.7 million as of December 31, 2021, a significant increase over the previous year. The government operated camps to house IDPs and provide them with material, food, and psychological support. Generous assistance was contributed by UN agencies, bilateral donors, and international CSOs.

The insecurity led to a slowdown of economic activity in affected areas, including in critical sectors such as infrastructure construction, trade, mining, and agriculture. Communities in several localities, including Djibo, Gorom, Markoye, and Mansila in Sahel Region and Madjoari in Est Region, were cut off from the rest of the country for long periods and did not receive basic supplies. People living in these areas were forced to leave their homes and move to refugee camps or towns such as Kaya in Centre-Nord Region, Ouahigouya in Nord Region, and Ouagadougou, the capital.

The country’s political climate suffered as the opposition criticized the government’s handling of the insecurity. In May and June, the leader of the political opposition demanded and obtained the replacement of the ministers of defense and security on the grounds that they were not competent to resolve the crisis. Every major terrorist attack sparked social unrest and public debate, especially on social media. CSOs often held press conferences and advocated on security issues. For example, the Coalition of November 27 (Coalition du 27 novembre, C27), Movement G33 (Mouvement G33), Save Burkina Movement (Mouvement sauvons le Burkina, MSB), Burkinabé Patriotic Movement (Mouvement patriotique burkinabé), and other groups demonstrated in November to demand the resignation of President Kaboré after the attack on the Inata military camp. The activities of some organizations confirmed a widespread impression that CSOs sometimes act as partisan entities.
Burkina Faso received COVID-19 vaccines in May 2021, and the government launched a vaccination program accompanied by a media campaign in June. By the end of the year, more than 1 million doses had been administered and 8 percent of the targeted population was fully vaccinated, according to the World Health Organization. During the year, the pandemic was no longer a major consideration for many people, and much of the population did not take simple precautions such as wearing masks or observing social distancing.

Burkina Faso’s economy grew 8.5 percent in 2021 after contracting in 2020, according to the World Bank. Growth was driven by the recovery of the service sector and a surge in gold exports. Most of the country engages in agriculture. About 40 percent of the population lived below the poverty line, the World Bank reported.

The overall sustainability of Burkina Faso’s CSO sector deteriorated moderately in 2021. The legal environment weakened moderately as some organizations were prevented from holding public demonstrations and the government limited freedom of expression on several occasions. Organizational capacity was slightly weaker as many organizations lacked sufficient funding for operations and institution building. CSOs’ financial viability regressed moderately as funding decreased, forcing several organizations to close. Advocacy deteriorated slightly as the focus of advocacy efforts narrowed and many organizations struggled to implement effective advocacy techniques. Service provision weakened slightly as work became increasingly difficult and at times nearly impossible in areas plagued by insecurity. CSOs’ public image was moderately less favorable as the public increasingly saw some organizations as involved in partisan causes. Only the sectoral infrastructure did not change.

The overall number of CSOs in Burkina Faso is almost impossible to establish because there is no central database of registered organizations. The latest official data indicates that approximately 15,700 organizations were registered in 2016. The Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Security (MATDS), the main regulatory body for CSOs, has registered between 1,500 and 2,000 organizations each year since 2010. Most CSOs are unregistered and operate informally with minimal activity, which the legal system allows.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 3.5**

The legal environment for CSOs deteriorated moderately in 2021 as some organizations were prevented from holding public demonstrations and the government limited freedom of expression on several occasions.

Under Law 064-2015/CNT of 2015 on the freedom of association, CSOs may form freely without government approval. To obtain legal status, an association must submit a declaration of its existence along with draft bylaws, internal regulations, and other information to the MATDS. The government has three months to issue a receipt recognizing the declaration of existence, after which the association is considered registered. Registration can take place through a simplified one-stop process at the MATDS office in Ouagadougou or, outside of the capital city, at the offices of provincial or municipal governments. The MATDS estimates that more than 3,600 receipts of declarations submitted between 2010 and 2021 have not been picked up by applicant organizations. As of 2019, the receipts are valid for the number of years specified in an organization’s statutes, which is variable. After this period, registration must be renewed.

To obtain status as a non-governmental organization (NGO), which brings tax benefits, a CSO must also register with the Ministry of Finance. NGOs are typically national organizations or local offices of large international organizations. CSOs that have operated for at least five years may apply to the MATDS for public benefit status, which establishes eligibility for certain types of government funding.

Some organizations reported that obtaining receipts of declaration could be arduous, especially if they had to engage in repeated exchanges with the MATDS to correct their statutes or internal regulations as instructed by
the MATDS. Some observers believe that CSOs suspected of being close to the political opposition faced the most difficulties in obtaining receipts.

Associations are not required to report to the government. NGOs are supposed to submit annual reports to the Ministry of the Economy, Finance, and Development, but many fail to do so and are not penalized. CSOs with public benefit status must submit annual reports with financial statements to the MATDS, Ministry of the Economy, Finance, and Development, and their line ministries. Failure to do so can be punished by the suspension of funding, although this is not known to have happened. Organizations are rarely suspended or dissolved. Organizations may take legal action if they believe the government has infringed illegally on their existence or operations.

Other than occasional problems with registration, CSOs are subject to almost no pressure from the government. They are free to engage on any topic and take part in public discussions. No instance of state agencies interfering in a CSO’s internal operations was reported in 2021. However, on several occasions the authorities prevented CSOs from holding planned demonstrations. For example, the authorities canceled a demonstration to denounce security procedures by the Save Burkina Movement and a similar protest by the Coalition of African Patriots of Burkina Faso (Coalition des patriotes africains du Burkina Faso, COPA–BF). On the other hand, CSO demonstrations in support of security forces, such as a march organized by Appel de Kaya in July, were supported by the government. The government constrained freedom of expression on several occasions by tightening media access to IDP camps, citing journalists’ safety and the “dignity” of residents; suspending a local outlet’s broadcasts for five days after it allegedly broadcast incorrect information regarding the attack on Solhan in June; and restricting cellular connectivity for eight days in November as anti-government protests took place in several cities, including Ouagadougou.

Criteria for the distribution of public funds to CSOs are unclear. Some public benefit organizations, such as the Consumers’ League (Ligue des consommateurs), receive government funding, while others, such as the Center for Democratic Governance (Centre pour la gouvernance démocratique, CGD), do not. CSOs may compete for government contracts and accept foreign funding. There is no law on private-sector sponsorships or corporate social responsibility. The law does not explicitly ban income-generating activities by CSOs. However, most CSOs feel that such activities do not belong in their scope of activity and do not engage in them.

CSOs are subject to common taxes such as customs duties and value-added tax. NGOs are exempt from taxes on purchases and the importation of certain goods and equipment. NGOs’ tax advantages have recently been threatened by several government offices, particularly the Ministry of the Economy, Finance, and Development. In particular, tax and treasury authorities consider NGOs and other organizations that sign service-level agreements with government entities to be private companies and therefore subject them to income and other taxes as well as costly tax adjustments. This view applies even to organizations that engage in classic nonprofit activities, such as awareness raising and humanitarian assistance. The financial authorities have remained deaf to all arguments to change this policy, including those put forward by the NGO Permanent Secretariat (Secrétariat permanent des ONG, SPONG), Burkina Faso’s oldest and largest NGO network. Some CSOs avoid signing service-level contracts with the government and instead sign grant agreements for specific activities, which are not taxed.

Many attorneys and organizations in Ouagadougou specialize in laws related to civic freedoms. These organizations usually offer legal assistance at no charge to CSOs and seek to recover their costs through external or public funding. They include CGD, Burkinabe Movement for Human and People’s Rights (Mouvement burkinabé des droits de l’homme et des peuples, MBDHP), and Conscious Citizens’ Movement (Mouvement citoyens conscients, MCC). At the local level, few attorneys specialize in CSO-related laws, and CSOs outside of Ouagadougou usually lack access to adequate legal services.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.5**

CSOs’ organizational capacity declined slightly in 2021 as many organizations had to pare back their operations and institution building because of inadequate funding.

Burkinabe CSOs usually seek to involve their constituencies in their activities. However, since 2019, the government has prohibited or severely restricted CSOs’ access to insecure areas, particularly IDP camps. Humanitarian agencies and CSOs seeking to provide humanitarian assistance to the IDPs are required to hand over their supplies to local sections of the Burkinabe Council for Emergency Relief and Rehabilitation, which then
redistribute them to the IDPs. This requirement has prevented most CSOs from interacting directly with IDPs. Burkinabe CSOs believe that their relationships with beneficiaries are further disrupted by the presence of foreign CSOs, which sometimes work directly with local populations and bypass local organizations. International organizations are also known to duplicate activities that Burkinabe CSOs already carry out, which creates confusion about who is doing what and with whom to meet humanitarian needs.

CSOs’ missions are defined in their founding documents. Their need for financial resources forces some CSOs to seek the support of party organizations, which violates the distinction between political parties and CSOs in Law 064 and can lead CSOs to take partisan positions that are outside of their missions and the scope of civil society generally. CSOs develop and implement strategic plans if they have access to sustainable funding. However, the difficult situation with insecurity and the pandemic in 2021 disrupted the strategic planning efforts of most organizations.

Most CSOs have more or less the same internal structure, consisting of a general assembly of members, an elected board of directors and executive board, and a hired executive director and permanent secretary. CSOs’ activities are usually evaluated by their internal bodies, although a small number of organizations have sufficient funding for evaluations by external experts such as audit firms. CSOs’ statutes and internal regulations typically provide for a system of oversight and transparency, although implementation varies. It is not uncommon for CSOs to operate in compliance with their statutes and internal regulations for a few years and then become lax in their observance of them, such as failing to hold regular meetings. A few more established CSOs, such as the African Center for Strategic Studies Burkina Faso (Centre d’études stratégiques pour l’Afrique Burkina Faso, CESA–BF), Center for Citizen Monitoring and Analysis of Public Policy (Centre de suivi et d’analyses citoyens des politiques publiques, CDCAP), and Democracy and Economic and Social Development Research Group (Groupe de réflexion sur la démocratie et le développement économique et social, GERDDES), continue to hold regular statutory meetings.

As the security situation restricted their interventions, especially with populations outside of urban areas, many organizations reduced the size of their staff in 2021. This was true even of large organizations, which in the past had been able to retain their employees by moving them from one project to another. CDG and SPONG, for example, laid off staff whose projects were completed when planned activities were canceled because of the security situation. To conserve resources, most CSOs try to spread the responsibilities of salaried staff over several departments, such as finance, social action, gender, or research. Employees on contract enjoy the same legal protections as other workers. Many CSO staff are volunteers and have other jobs.

The use of digital technologies is increasingly common among Burkinabe CSOs. By using social networks, CSOs can bypass certain obstacles to their operations, such as a lack of financial resources, since communicating through the internet is much less expensive as it requires fewer employees. Many CSOs faced cybersecurity issues such as hacked Facebook or e-mail accounts in 2021. The hacked accounts were used to send requests for money to the account’s contact list under the pretext that the account holder was in distress. These situations are generally resolved by contacting experts and installing protective software.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.4**

The financial viability of Burkinabe CSOs was moderately weaker in 2021 as funding decreased and several organizations were forced to close.

Burkinabe CSOs derive their funding almost exclusively from international development partners and bilateral assistance programs. As has historically been the case, the main donors in 2021 were the European Union, World Bank, UN agencies, and the international cooperation agencies of Switzerland, the United States, Denmark, and Germany. In 2021, the Danish International Development Agency supported twenty-seven CSOs working in human rights, peace, and social cohesion with XOF 8 billion (approximately $14.5 million) in funding.
With the rise of insecurity in Burkina Faso, domestic organizations have faced stiff competition from large foreign CSOs, especially in the humanitarian sector. International donors to CSOs increasingly issue calls for projects involving millions of dollars. This scale of funding systematically disadvantages Burkinabe CSOs, which lack the capacity both to manage large sums of money and to implement the projects on their own and are often unable to find partners. Moreover, the bids are technically difficult to prepare, and small organizations, unlike large international CSOs, are unable to hire experts for this purpose. For these reasons, the funds inevitably go to large international organizations. The competition with international CSOs has caused Burkinabe CSOs’ financial viability to decline rapidly in recent years. According to SPONG and the Women, Peace, and Security Coalition (Coalition femmes, paix et sécurité, COFEPAX), only 3 percent of national CSOs currently have access to funding, mainly because of their difficulties in obtaining foreign funding.

Threats to their financial sustainability have spurred some CSOs to attempt to mobilize resources domestically. However, Burkina Faso’s lack of a law on corporate social responsibility makes it difficult to obtain funds from the private sector. Fundraising campaigns are rarely conducted except by Catholic and Muslim entities, which can rely on established networks. Some schools hold fairs or dances to raise money. With support from CIVICUS, the Civil Society Network for Development (Réseau des organisations de la société civile pour le développement, RESOCIDE) implemented a project in 2021 to develop indigenous funding mechanisms and thereby ensure a regular, minimal level of support for Burkinabe CSOs.

Government funding remains unreliable and is not a viable source of funding for CSOs in Burkina Faso. Some CSOs, such as Tin Tua, receive funding from the Ministry of Education for literacy education, and local municipalities may provide grants to local CSOs, usually for short-term activities.

Although Burkinabe CSOs tend to believe that earning significant income by providing goods and services conflicts with their nonprofit nature, a few CSOs engage in income-generating activities. For example, the Association to Promote Local Initiatives (Association pour la promotion des initiatives locales, APIL), Varena-Asso, Evangelical Development Support Association (Association évangélique d’appui au développement, AEAD), and Christian Relief and Development Organization (CREDO) generate income by processing or selling agricultural products or providing training services.

The quality of CSOs’ financial management ranges from rudimentary to complex, depending on donors’ requirements and the funding available for developing internal systems. CSOs with funding usually have manuals and procedures to guide their financial management.

**ADVOCACY: 3.2**

CSO advocacy declined slightly in 2021 as the focus of advocacy efforts narrowed and many organizations struggled to implement effective advocacy techniques.

Burkinabe CSOs usually take part in dialogue frameworks at the national and local levels. However, in 2021, the prioritization of security concerns pushed all advocacy that was not related directly to the security situation into the background. For example, government officials and political actors requested far less input from CSOs on traditional advocacy issues, such as the needs of women and children, unless it involved IDPs. Most CSO advocacy shifted to supporting the country’s armed forces and security services. For example, the Democratic Expression Framework (Cadre d’expression démocratique, CED) and National Intelligence Agency held meetings on these themes. On the local level, the worsening insecurity made it difficult for CSOs to access local government and political leaders, a large proportion of whom had relocated to large urban centers and were rarely present in local
government offices. CSO leaders in the regions reported that some government officials were unwilling to receive them because of their suspicions that certain organizations were fronts for political parties.

CSOs managed to conduct several notable advocacy campaigns in 2021. COFEPAX monitored and followed up on the implementation of the National Action Plan under UN resolutions 1325, 1820, and 2242, which address the impact of war on women and women’s contribution to peace building. With funding from the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the coalition also implemented a project in the thirteen regional capitals on institutional reforms and the national reconciliation process. Manega’s Appeal (Appel de Manega) campaigned for national reconciliation and peace through discussion panels, press conferences, and meetings over coffee in university settings.

CSOs still struggled to find effective advocacy techniques in 2021. Many organizations continued to employ traditional advocacy methods, such as issuing statements or holding press conferences. Some CSOs circumvented constraints on face-to-face advocacy by engaging intensively on online platforms such as Facebook and WhatsApp, which are popular for discussions of social and political issues. However, the profusion of false information and disclosure of confidential information on these platforms has stirred up accusations that CSOs seek to manipulate public opinion.

No initiatives to amend Law 064-2015/CNT were noted in 2021. Organizations that usually work on this issue, such as SPONG and CDCAP, did not do so during the year. A meeting that the new minister of justice, human rights, and civic promotion was supposed to have with CSOs in late November failed to take place. SPONG continued to fight against attempts to tighten tax exemptions for NGOs by sending many letters to the Ministry of the Economy, Finance, and Development explaining how certain decisions by tax authorities could reduce its members’ tax rights.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.3**

CSO service provision deteriorated slightly as their work became increasingly difficult, and at times nearly impossible, in areas plagued by insecurity.

The bulk of Burkinabe CSOs work in service provision. With the rise in insecurity in 2021, the provision of assistance to IDPs became the overriding goal of many organizations. For example, Kaya’s Appeal (Appel de Kaya) in the Centre-Nord Region harbored refugees and ensured that they received appropriate care. Other CSOs provided training on effective advocacy to community groups so that they could push local authorities to fulfill urgent needs by, for example, ensuring access to water or constructing schools. Some organizations constructed boreholes or distributed agricultural goods such as seeds. Few CSOs continued educational efforts related to COVID-19 because of a lack of funding for this purpose.

Despite this broad range of activity, the security situation and scarcity of financial resources markedly reduced the volume of services provided by CSOs in 2021. Rural areas affected by insecurity were emptied of inhabitants, and human activity was evident only in large towns. In Sahel, East, Boucle du Mouhoun, and Cascades regions, which host the highest number of IDPs, it was almost impossible for CSOs to carry out activities because of terrorist threats. Few CSOs had sufficient resources to refocus their activities, and many of them had to simply stop
delivering services. For example, the Varena Association in Diebougou and Ton Association in Niangoloko suspended agricultural and micro-credit projects before they were completed.

Most CSOs provide their products and services free of charge. Among the few CSOs that seek to cover their costs by charging fees are the Burkinabe Association for Familial Wellbeing (Association burkinabe pour le bien-être familial, ABBEF), which provides health care; REVS+, which serves HIV/AIDS patients; and Siphra, which operates a health clinic. In Dori, the Dotinogo Association has built a local reputation for manufacturing and marketing soaps and soumbala, a popular ingredient for sauces. In Kaya, APIL makes and distributes natural products such as honey, moringa, and shea butter.

Political actors often refer positively to CSOs’ activities in their public speeches. The minister of social action, for example, regularly expresses her gratitude to humanitarian organizations that provide services in place of the government in several areas of the country.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.7**

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector did not change in 2021.

Several resource centers, including those operated by SPONG and CGD, serve CSOs. Most resource centers experienced funding cuts in 2021. CGD offered fewer services and organized only a few sessions of its flagship activity, Democratic Dialogue, which provides information and training.

Intermediary support organizations (ISOs) active in 2021 included Oxfam, NDI, and Diakonia. NDI normally receives funding from donors to distribute to political parties and CSOs for election-related work. Since there were no elections in 2021, this type of funding was not available. More specialized ISOs include the Catholic Organization for Development and Solidarity (Organisation catholique pour le développement et la solidarité, OCADES)—Caritas Burkina, which funds Catholic humanitarian organizations that distribute goods to the poor and conduct awareness-raising and training sessions on health care, literacy, and other social fields.

Burkina Faso’s CSO sector continued to experience difficulties with networking and collective action in 2021. Burkinabe CSOs usually work individually, and networks and collectives are comparatively weak. Mainly because they receive more funding for joint activities, service-providing organizations and CSOs focused on economic, social, and cultural rights cooperate more often than advocacy organizations working on civil rights and governance. One of the most active coalitions in 2021 was COFEPAX.

Training for CSOs continued to be offered mainly by SPONG and CGD, which together trained nearly 200 CSOs on topics such as good governance, elections, advocacy, citizen monitoring of public policies, and organizational and project management. Training is usually offered in the capital by locally based specialists. While training on topics such as literacy and gender is relatively common, Burkinabe CSOs lack adequate access to training that would help improve their advocacy skills.

CSOs sometimes partner with the central and local governments and media on issues of shared concern. Partnerships between CSOs and the private sector are few. Businesses sometimes work with CSOs on sporting events, mainly to obtain opportunities for advertising.
CSOs’ public image deteriorated moderately in 2021 as the public had increasingly negative views of organizations that it saw as involved in partisan causes.

CSO activities are fairly well covered by the media. Media coverage is usually paid, although it is sometimes offered free of charge if it integrates well with a media outlet’s programming aims. Media coverage in 2021 included stories on press conferences hosted by CED and demonstrations by MSB. During major socio-political events, the media often sought CSOs’ analysis and opinions to inform their reporting. A small proportion of CSOs crowded the media space with partisan interventions.

Public perceptions of CSOs were more ambivalent in 2021. CSOs that provided goods and services or protected human rights were positively perceived, while CSOs involved in partisan causes were negatively viewed. The public often attributed political developments to CSOs that had managed to influence political actors. In 2021, CSOs such as Balai Citoyen and the Anti-Referendum Collective (Collectif anti référendum, CAR) rightly or wrongly suffered recriminations related to the failed coup d’état in 2015.

CSOs’ relationship with the government was also mixed. The government tended to treat CSOs that blamed it for the security situation as political opponents and praised or congratulated organizations that supported its actions.

Large NGOs usually have funding to enhance their image through professionally assisted communications campaigns. For example, Manega’s Appeal, an organization dedicated to research and national reconciliation and peace, was able to have the BF1 television station cover its activities. While some organizations cultivate relationships with media to publicize their stances on political and governance issues, other CSOs, such as MBDHP and the Collective Against Impunity and Community Stigmatization (Collectif contre l’impunité et la stigmatisation des communautés, CISC), prefer to maintain their independence by relying on social media to communicate with the public.

Law 064-2015/CNT requires CSOs to have provisions in their statutes and internal regulations to regulate their activities. SPONG and the National Council of CSOs developed a few sample codes of conduct a few years ago, but they remain unknown to most CSOs. Funded CSOs submit reports about their activities to their funding partners but rarely share them with others. CSOs without funding do not always compile reports on their activities.
Political tensions in Burundi eased under the new government of President Évariste Ndayishimiye, who was elected in 2020. The president vowed to bring corruption under control and introduced reforms across multiple sectors, including reorganizing the government’s anti-corruption bodies. Burundi’s relations with the international community improved, and the government resumed discussions with the European Union (EU), which had been suspended in 2016. The United States lifted sanctions against eleven Burundian citizens, citing President Ndayishimiye’s pursuit of reform.

Burundi’s human rights record showed some improvement as the authorities released four journalists and two human rights defenders from jail and produced a technical road map on human rights and other reforms. However, the United Nations (UN) Commission of Inquiry on Burundi, which was established in 2016 to document human rights violations in the country, issued a report in September 2021 stating that human rights continued to be violated and the government had failed to introduce the structural reforms needed to curb abuses. Human Rights Watch and other monitoring groups reported several cases of severe human rights violations, including rape, murder, and torture by the National Intelligence Service and government-backed groups such as the Imbonerakure.

Under President Ndayishimiye, the government took a more aggressive approach to curbing the COVID-19 pandemic in 2021. After refusing to follow pandemic guidelines of the World Health Organization (WHO) and declaring three of its representatives persona non grata in 2020, the government resumed cooperation with the WHO in April 2021. For most of the year, the government refused offers of vaccinations against COVID-19, claiming that 96 percent of Burundi’s patients recovered. However, after the number of cases spiked in the summer, the government launched a vaccination program in October 2021 with 500,000 doses donated by China. In September, to curb the spread of the virus, the government suspended social gatherings during the week, although they were still allowed on weekends. CSOs provided the public with protective equipment and information about the pandemic and implemented COVID-19 prevention measures in their own work.

Burundi’s economy showed some improvement in 2021 as borders reopened, quarantines for incoming visitors were lifted, and other pandemic-related restrictions were eased. The World Bank projected Burundi’s economic growth rate at 2 percent in 2021, compared to -0.3 percent in 2020. However, the poverty rate continued to climb and was expected to reach 87 percent in 2021, according to the World Bank. The majority of Burundi’s people work in agriculture.

The overall sustainability of Burundian CSOs improved slightly in 2021. The legal environment was slightly more enabling as the new government showed signs of a more cooperative attitude towards CSOs. CSOs’ organizational
capacity improved slightly as organizations built on good practices and lessons learned from capacity-building interventions. The sector’s financial viability was slightly stronger after several international partners that had left Burundi in 2018 returned in 2021. Advocacy was slightly improved as the government seemed open to dialogue with the sector. The sectoral infrastructure was more supportive as tensions between CSOs faded and they cooperated more effectively. CSOs’ service provision and public image did not change.

In 2021, 30 new associations and 11 new religious organizations completed their registrations, bringing the total number of organizations to 7,460 associations and 636 religious organizations that had registered since 1992. The total figure includes organizations that are no longer operating as well those that have not yet updated their status, as required by Law No. 1/02 of January 27, 2017. The figure does not include organizations registered at the communal level. Information from the Ministry of the Interior shows that only about 300 organizations were operational in 2021, based on the ministry’s receipt of annual reports.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.7**

The legal environment for civil society in Burundi improved slightly in 2021. Although CSOs continued to operate in a restrictive, highly repressive legal environment, the new government lifted bans on a human rights organization and several media outlets, met with CSO representatives, eased restrictions, and showed other signs of a more cooperative attitude towards CSOs.

Law No. 1/01 of January 27, 2017, governing international CSOs, Law No. 1/02 of January 27, 2017, governing domestic nonprofit associations, and Law No. 1/35 of December 21, 2014, governing religious organizations, remained in force in 2021. To operate at the national level, CSOs register by applying to the Ministry of the Interior, Community Development, and Public Safety, which oversees the CSO sector. If they intend to operate in a single commune, CSOs simply declare their existence to local authorities. The registration process for both types of organizations must be completed within two months. Every organization must re-register every two years. The strict enforcement of these laws continued to cause difficulties for many organizations in 2021. For example, organizations registered under different laws, such as religious organizations and nonprofit associations, were unable to unite in coalitions or collectives because Law No. 1/02 does not specifically allow it. CSOs also struggled financially to secure physical addresses for their headquarters, as required by law. During the year, the government registered very few new organizations and certified few organizations registered before 2017 as having harmonized their bylaws, management, and structures, as required by Law No. 1/02. Like most laws, Law No. 1/02 has not been translated into Kirundi, the national language, and is available only in French, which many Burundians do not understand.

After five years of operation, CSOs working in priority areas specified in Law No. 1/02 may apply for public benefit status, which should bring benefits such as tax and customs exemptions and eligibility for government funding. However, practical modalities for granting public benefit status have yet to be defined, and the status has not been awarded to any organizations.

International organizations registering under Law No. 1/01 of 2017 must harmonize their activities with Burundian law and the government’s programs and priorities, including the National Development Plan (NDP 2018–27). They must collaborate closely with sectoral ministries to identify the scope and geographic area of their work but as of 2020 are no longer required to formally declare the ethnicity of local staff.

Domestic CSOs must submit annual reports to their line ministries by March 31 of each year. The Administrative Court may suspend an organization for up to one month if it fails to submit an annual report, does not hold annual general meetings for two consecutive years, fails to renew its registration for two consecutive two-year periods, or does not have a physical address in Burundi during a two-year period. After the month-long suspension, the court must either overturn or uphold the suspension. In the latter case, the court may impose additional penalties,
such as withdrawing an organization’s authorization to operate. CSOs do not have the right to appeal such decisions. No CSO was suspended in 2021. The suspension of the organization Speech and Action for the Awakening of Consciences and the Evolution of Mentalities (Parole et action pour le réveil des consciences et l’évolution des mentalités, PARCEM), one of Burundi’s few human rights organizations, was lifted in 2021. PARCEM was banned in 2018 on accusations that it “tarnished the country’s image.” No reason was given for the removal of the suspension. Bans of Bonesha FM and the Ikiriho media outlet were also lifted. The BBC and Voice of America remained suspended in 2021.

There are few limits on governmental control of CSOs. CSOs must sign collaboration agreements with sectoral ministries and align their activities with sectoral plans as a condition for working on the national level. The minister of the interior, public safety, and community development continued to demand that CSOs align their activities with NDP 2018–27, a demand that CSOs viewed as unfair as they had not been involved in preparing the NDP and feared the move could lead to an attack on their freedom of action under their stated missions. The government also urged CSOs to reduce the number of training workshops and seminars that they conduct, and its generally unfavorable view of capacity building and training dampened the activities of domestic CSOs with missions in capacity building. At the local level, all CSO activities must be authorized in advance by the governor or communal administrator. In 2021, some local administrators were reported to assume authorities over CSOs beyond those provided for in the law—for example, by refusing to issue recognition documents or interfering in CSOs’ activities. The government continued to encourage CSOs to create cooperatives within the government-controlled Sangwe network of cooperatives. Law No. 1/02 requires the establishment of a cooperative framework between the government and CSOs tasked with monitoring implementation of the law, including the government’s responses to requests for public benefit status. The framework had yet to be put into place in 2021.

Nevertheless, in 2021, the mistrust of certain governors and municipal administrators that had been evident in 2020 faded with the arrival of the new government. Onerous restrictions, including roadblocks and prohibitions on meetings, were eased and the authorities reduced their interventions in sectoral affairs, including the requirement that people appointed by the authorities attend CSO meetings. The authorities seemed to have a more cooperative attitude and even participated in the launch of CSO activities in their districts. Although CSOs remained under government surveillance in 2021, they did not self-censor as in 2020.

The taxation of CSOs did not change in 2021. Most CSOs do not enjoy special tax benefits and must pay value-added tax and taxes on their employees’ salaries.

The laws for mobilizing financial resources were unchanged in 2021. CSOs may generate income to achieve their objectives by fundraising, forming social enterprises, and accepting funding from foreign donors, provided such funds pass through accounts at the Central Bank. CSOs may bid on government contracts if they have the required capacities.

When needed, CSOs have access to the services of several lawyers who have knowledge of the laws governing CSOs. These attorneys are members of Burundi’s two bar associations, which are located in Bujumbura and Gitega. Qualified lawyers are gradually becoming available in other provinces as well, particularly near courts of appeal and the High Court. Their rates are established by the official attorney fee schedule.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 6.0**

CSOs’ organizational capacity improved slightly in 2021 as CSOs built on good practices and lessons learned from capacity-building interventions. CSOs showed themselves to be more dynamic, better structured, and equipped to operate in accordance with higher standards.

Some local CSOs benefited from interventions under the three-year, $3.5 million Civil Society Strengthening Project for Inclusive Participation in Burundi, which was launched in December 2020 with funding from the EU. The project seeks to build CSO capacity, enhance the socio-economic integration of women and youth, and encourage cooperation and dialogue between CSOs and the government. Participating organizations included Support for Integral Development and Solidarity in the Hills (Appui au développement integral et à la solidarité sur les collines, ADISCO), Government Action Observatory (Observatoire de l’action gouvernementale, OAG), Network of Youth in Action (Réseau des jeunes en action, REJA), and the Ministry for Peace and Reconciliation Under the Cross (Ministère paix et réconciliation sous la croix, Mi-PAREC). Activities under the project included
organizational strengthening and training focused on planning, advocacy, entrepreneurship, monitoring and evaluation, association governance, project preparation, and citizen participation.

CSOs usually establish close relationships with their target audiences and identify community needs in consultation with potential beneficiaries. As the culture of participatory planning gradually becomes institutionalized, CSOs increasingly prepare projects based on needs identified through interviews, field visits, inclusive planning sessions, and consultations with local coordinators and leaders.

CSOs’ missions and areas of intervention are clearly defined in their founding documents and integrated into their strategic plans. Generally, CSOs revisit their bylaws and procedural manuals every five or ten years to incorporate any appropriate changes. For example, if an organization wants to expand the scope of its work or its targeted beneficiaries, it will typically update its bylaws. Larger CSOs such as the Gitega Bar Association and Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP) updated their statutory and regulatory texts and adopted new administrative and management tools in 2021. Other organizations developed strategic plans with results frameworks and performance indicators, which provided points of reference for monitoring activities and evaluating results. CSOs usually reinforced monitoring with field visits to ensure that activities are effectively implemented.

CSOs’ awareness of the structure and processes of good governance is growing. In accordance with Law No. 1/02, most organizations have functional statutory bodies, including general assemblies, executive committees, supervisory boards, and other bodies according to their individual needs. Statutory meetings are held regularly, and minutes documenting decisions and recommendations are shared with members. Some CSOs conduct financial, institutional, and organizational audits. Some CSOs held work retreats in 2021 to share updates on organizational life, such as successes, failures, and best practices. High-functioning CSOs continued to develop other essential administrative and management tools, such as procedural manuals, codes of ethics, anti-fraud policies, policies for human resource management and salaries, and strategies to encourage employee loyalty.

A few organizations, such as the Council for Education and Development (Conseil pour l’éducation et le développement, COPED), Association for Familial Well-Being (Association burundaise pour le bien-être familial, ABUBEF), National Association in Support of HIV Positive and AIDS Patients (Association nationale de soutien aux séropositifs et malades du sida, ANSS), and ADISCO, have the means to hire permanent staff on long-term contracts. Many other CSOs lack sufficient resources to hire permanent staff and hire employees on contracts with fixed terms aligned with the length of particular projects. Many organizations rely on their members to implement activities on a volunteer basis.

CSOs usually have basic office equipment such as computers, tablets, printers, photocopierns, and scanners. Very few organizations have sufficient financial resources to rent offices. Internet use continues to grow in Burundi, and CSOs rely heavily on the internet for communications and information sharing. In 2021, CSOs increasingly formed e-mail groups to exchange information, share documents, and submit project proposals. Many organizations have created websites and use internet-based apps and social media, including Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and WhatsApp. In 2021, some CSOs held trainings on data protection and storage to ensure their digital security.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.4**

CSOs’ financial viability improved slightly in 2021 with the return to Burundi of several international partners, who had withdrawn or reduced their presence after Law No. 1/01 was promulgated in January 2017. In addition, the sector’s capacity to mobilize funds was stronger as several organizations took more strategic approaches to raising funds, even though the results were not yet visible.
Burundian CSOs generally find it difficult to access financial resources to carry out their programs and ensure their survival, even in the short term. They are highly dependent on foreign sources of funding, including United Nations (UN) agencies, bilateral and multilateral organizations, and international CSOs such as Oxfam, CARE International, Christian Aid, Cordaid, Lawyers Without Borders, and Doctors Without Borders. This dependency leaves Burundian CSOs financially fragile and highly vulnerable. Overall levels of foreign funding remained limited in 2021, although the return of some international partners, such as the Coalition of the North-South Movement in Flanders 11.11.11, a Belgian group, improved the funding outlook. Burundian organizations received support in 2021 for projects in areas such as health care, agriculture, education, entrepreneurship, democracy strengthening, and girls’ and women’s empowerment. Three consortia composed of local and international organizations have received funding from the EU for three years (2020–23) to build civil society’s capacities for inclusive citizen participation.

Burundian CSOs obtain little funding from local sources. Few organizations initiated revenue-generating activities in 2021, although they are legally permitted to do so. CSOs’ capacity to raise funds from subscriptions or financial contributions from members remained weak, and any funds raised were usually insufficient to cover operations. Several organizations have created social enterprises to generate funding. For example, COPED operates entities that support the processing of agricultural products, schools, and health-care services. A few organizations conduct fundraising activities. For example, each Christmas season, Radio Maria collects voluntary donations through small collection boxes placed in churches, and the Burundi Red Cross puts small collection boxes in the service centers that it has built. In 2021, OAG, Gitega Bar Association, and other organizations finetuned their strategies for mobilizing resources, such as by training staff in project preparation.

The government provides little support to CSOs and did not award contracts to CSOs in 2021. The government provides support to some organizations, including ABUBEF and the Society for Women and AIDS in Burundi, by assigning them employees on government salaries. These employees fulfilled regular staff roles and are viewed by other CSO staff as colleagues who answer to the employing organizations. Businesses do not fund CSOs.

Many CSOs have strong financial management systems, including tools and procedures to guarantee the traceability of transactions. They may also have finance and accounting professionals on their staff, conduct regular audits, and produce financial reports for their members, development partners, and government entities such as the Ministry of the Interior, Community Development, and Public Safety. These practices are reinforced by donors, who make them a condition for accessing funds. Smaller organizations have less developed financial management systems and sometimes lack written financial procedures.

**ADVOCACY: 5.4**

CSO advocacy showed a slight improvement in 2021 as the government seemed open to improved dialogue with the sector.

Although the consultative framework for CSOs and the government mandated under Law No. 1/02 was still lacking in 2021, government entities sometimes organize ad hoc, one-off meetings with CSOs on topics such as legal compliance and CSOs’ contributions to community development. Some organizations take part with government employees in specialized commissions, and CSOs are sometimes invited to sector-specific meetings. CSOs’ participation in these meetings was sometimes constructive, and CSOs felt that their views were being heard. CSOs have little access to decision-making processes on the local level, although the municipal law specifies that CSOs may attend municipal council meetings. There are no mechanisms enabling CSOs to hold the government to account.
Despite this unfavorable context, CSOs’ contact with the government increased slowly in 2021. CSOs view the increased contact as a positive step, even if the dialogue is not yet effective. The Ministry of the Interior, Community Development, and Public Safety initiated two meetings to which all CSOs were invited to attend. The ministry wanted to remind CSOs to follow the law, work within the framework of their missions, align their work with NDP 2018–27, and submit regular activity reports to the ministry by the legally established deadlines.

Although Burundi’s CSOs are comfortable with the concept of advocacy, they carried out few advocacy activities in 2021. The most active organizations focused on the defense of women’s rights. Women’s associations under the leadership of the Women and Peace Network (Réseau femmes et paix, RFP) sought to increase the participation of women in decision-making bodies. A consortium of women’s organizations headed by the Dushirehamwe Association carried out a study of legal instruments available in the fight against gender-based violence. A new advocacy platform, the Strategic Advocacy Alliance, was created in 2021 under the leadership of the Coalition of Women’s Organizations of the Great Lakes Countries (Concertation des collectifs des associations féminines de la région des Grands-Lacs, COCAFEM-GL) to defend women’s rights. The Network of Young People Living with HIV/AIDS (Reseau national de jeunes vivant avec le VIH/SIDA, RNJ+) advocated for revision of unfavorable legal provisions affecting their communities.

After sanctions against it were canceled, PARCEM resumed its economic advocacy work in 2021. OAG, the Bujumbura Bar Association, and a consortium headed by Cordaid continued to cooperate with the Ministry of Justice to promote access to justice and legal aid in 2021.

In 2021, When the minister of the interior, public safety, and community development met with CSO representatives in Kayanza and Bugarama, the mere fact that the meetings took place was viewed by civil society as a positive sign, especially as a few years earlier the authorities had promised to meet at least twice yearly with CSOs but never did so. The agendas for these meetings included issues related to legal compliance and CSOs’ alignment with NDP 2018–27. CSOs asked the government to involve them more closely in all stages of planning and implementation of government programs, especially since the law recognizes public benefit status. CSOs also sought to organize themselves so that they could be ready to seize opportunities to promote a more favorable legal and regulatory framework for their work. For example, OAG and PARCEM were in contact to plan synergistic work with other organizations. Their goal was to create a strong, well-defined cooperative mechanism that would allow CSOs to submit joint proposals for large projects and advocate on specific issues.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 5.0**

CSOs’ service provision was stable in 2021.

CSOs’ normal provision of services resumed in 2021 after the disruptions and mistrust caused by the general elections in 2020. CSOs continued to provide services related to COVID-19, including setting up hand-washing stations and hand sanitizer at the entrances to public buildings, taking temperatures, and educating people about COVID-19 prevention measures, testing, and treatment centers. CSOs also worked in areas such as health care (including sexual and reproductive health), education, economic development, environmental protection, conflict prevention and peace building, capacity building, and the empowerment of youth, girls, and women.

CSOs emphasize local participatory approaches to project design to ensure that their goods and services are aligned with the needs and interests of target groups and government policies. These needs can lead to improvements in community infrastructure, the establishment of rural savings and loan initiatives, or the construction of fruit and vegetable nurseries or anti-erosion ditches. For example, the Council for Education and Development is heavily involved in building infrastructure and providing equipment to the educational and health-care sectors in the zones in which it works. CSOs such as the Family Association to Fight AIDS (Association
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CSOs do not generate significant income through service provision, although some products and services are marketed for token amounts. CSOs’ publications are usually distributed free of charge. Burundian CSOs do not discriminate, as this would be against the law and their values and ethical principles.

Some public officials recognize the added value of CSOs’ interventions, particularly in sectors identified as priorities in Law No. 1/02, such as health care, education, environmental protection, and assistance to Batwa communities, the elderly, orphans, and people living with disabilities. In 2021, government officials participated in launch events for CSO activities, visited orphanages and elderly assistance centers run by CSOs, and supported the coordinators of those facilities with financial assistance, food, and other critical items.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.8**

The sectoral infrastructure was slightly stronger in 2021 as tensions between CSOs faded and they cooperated more effectively.

Resource centers, libraries, and cyber cafés offer CSOs information, computers, and internet access. Some of these facilities are CSO initiatives, while others are operated by public or private-sector entities. With the expansion of urban centers across the country, several new resource centers emerged in 2021 despite Burundi’s limited electricity supplies and frequent power cuts.

CSOs also obtain information from traditional media such as radio, television, and the written press. No intermediary support organizations exist at the national or community level.

CSOs form consortia, collectives, national networks, and sectoral networks to share information, execute joint projects, and promote common interests. Networks active in 2021 included RFP, the Collective of Women’s Organizations in Burundi (Collectif des associations et ONGs féminines du Burundi, CAFOB), the Education for All Coalition (Coalition EPT BAFASHEBIGE), and the Federation of Associations for the Handicapped in Burundi (Fédération des associations des personnes handicapées du Burundi, FAPHB). Tensions between organizations seen as supporting the government and those opposing the government faded in 2021, and CSOs participated together in various meetings and workshops without conflict.

In 2021, CSOs throughout the country had access to training on such topics as organizational governance, strategic planning, project development, entrepreneurship, leadership, advocacy, human rights, sexual and reproductive health, and financial management. The EU, Cordaid, CARE International, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, and many other international partners supported these trainings. Training is usually provided in the national language, Kirundi.

CSOs continued to have collaboration agreements with various government bodies and sought to safeguard those relationships in 2021. For example, BLTP and the Ministry of the Interior, Community Development, and Public Safety worked together to train political party coordinators; OAG and the Ministry of Justice cooperated on activities related to access to justice; ABUBEF and the Ministry of Health and AIDS Prevention partnered to foster
sexual and reproductive health; and SWAA–Burundi and the Ministry of Health pursued joint activities related to HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment. CSOs often have contracts with the media to publicize their activities. For example, Search for Common Ground worked closely with Studio Ijambo on peaceful conflict resolution and community peace building, and Multiplex broadcast CSOs’ messages on topics such as girls’ and women’s rights and tax compliance. CSOs engage in few activities with the business sector.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.9**

CSOs’ public image did not change in 2021.

With the elections over in 2021, the media resumed coverage of CSOs’ activities, including training seminars, work on behalf of the poor, and girls’, women’s, and youth entrepreneurship. Radio-Television Isanganiro continued to offer CSOs a voice on topics such as peace building and conflict resolution.

The public has a positive perception of CSOs, particularly those that work directly with local communities. The public particularly appreciates opportunities to help CSOs identify priorities so that their goods and services address public needs. The public recognizes that the services offered by active CSOs are part of NDP 2018–27 and thus contribute significantly to the development of the country and the improvement of people’s well-being.

The government’s mistrust of CSOs, which soared during the election period in 2020, faded in 2021. CSOs were no longer accused by government officials as being in the pay of “settlers,” or Western powers. Official statements were generally favorable to CSOs, although the government seemed to prefer organizations focused on development and continued to push for CSOs to join the network of Sangwe cooperatives. The private sector pays little attention to CSOs.

In 2021, CSOs made some effort to promote their image and activities through radio and television broadcasts, engagement with the government in identifying public needs and implementing activities, and requests to beneficiaries to express their level of satisfaction with CSOs’ services.

Most CSOs have codes of ethics since they are required by law. CSOs are increasingly aware of the importance of transparency and accountability in their operations and have developed written management procedures and tools. CSOs produce annual activity reports that are approved by their statutory bodies before submission to the authorities.
A second wave of the COVID-19 virus hit Cameroon in April 2021, followed by a third wave in August. In November, Cameroon confirmed 106,190 infections and 1,770 deaths from the virus since it was first detected in March 2020. The government received nearly 240,000 doses of the Sinopharm and AstraZeneca vaccines in April and offered to vaccinate the population on a voluntary basis and free of charge. However, by November, only 1.1 percent of the population was fully vaccinated, mainly because of fake news stories on social networks emphasizing the negative effects of the vaccines. During the second and third waves of infection, the government implemented restrictive measures such as closing schools and universities and limiting the number of people in public transport and at public gatherings. At other times, most pandemic-prevention measures were suspended apart from the compulsory wearing of masks in some public places, offices, and hospitals. CSOs played an important role in sensitizing the population to the need to adopt protective measures to curb the spread of the virus.

At the request of the International Monetary Fund, President Paul Biya ordered an investigation into the use of XOF 180 billion (approximately $325 million) in loans for the pandemic response fund. In May, the Audit Chamber of the Supreme Court circulated a report that implicated government officials in the poor management of pandemic funds and concluded that tens of billions of francs had gone to unknown destinations. By the end of the year, prosecutions had yet to be initiated in what the press dubbed “Covidgate.”

In November 2021, after nine months of consultations with CSOs, political parties, and other stakeholders, seven opposition parties finalized a report with recommendations for reform of the electoral code. The report recommended, among other things, compulsory voting, a ban on polling stations in barracks and chieftaincies, and the reconstitution of the eighteen-member Electoral Council with a more diverse membership, including three civil society representatives. At the planned launch of the report at a hotel in Yaoundé on November 24, the government deployed the police to block its distribution and end the proceedings.

Bloodshed and tensions worsened in 2021 in the two Anglophone regions of Cameroon, where separatist groups seek to form an independent state. The International Crisis Group reported the increased use of violence by both government forces and separatists, including renewed attacks on schools, incidents involving improvised explosive devices, and extrajudicial killings. Tension was such that in October, an angry crowd attacked and killed a gendarme after he allegedly opened fire on a vehicle in Buea, killing a five-year-old schoolgirl. Hundreds of people demonstrated after the incident.

Cameroon struggled with escalating incursions by Boko Haram in the Far North region and an influx of refugees fleeing fighting in the Central African Republic in 2021. The country hosted about 1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), 460,000 refugees and asylum seekers, and 466,000 IDP returnees, according to the United Nations.
(UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). CSOs provided basic social services and other support, such as help to host community members and IDPs in the Northwest and Southwest regions who were seeking to acquire civil and legal documentation.

Despite strong external constraints, Cameroon’s economy showed resilience in 2021 and reached a projected actual growth rate of 3.6 percent after contracting 0.5 percent in 2020. The National Development Strategy 2020–30 (NDS30) unveiled by President Biya in November 2020 seeks to make Cameroon “an emerging nation, democratic and united in its diversity” by structurally transforming the economy and ensuring inclusive development. The NDS30 was issued after intense consultation with civil society actors. CSOs are expected to take part in implementing, monitoring, and possibly revising the plan.

The overall sustainability of the CSO sector did not change in 2021. The legal environment improved slightly with the promulgation of Law No. 2021/023 on inter-branch organizations, which allows CSOs to form a new type of grouping that is eligible for government funding. The sectoral infrastructure was slightly more supportive with the emergence of a new local grantmaker, new training opportunities, and CSOs’ increased reliance on coalitions and digital technologies. CSOs’ financial viability deteriorated slightly as foreign donors suspended the implementation of some projects, causing financial strain for many organizations. The other dimensions of sustainability were unchanged.

According to the National Governance Program, an initiative funded by the United Nations Development Programme to improve public resource management in Cameroon, approximately 56,000 associations were registered in the country at the end of 2021, of which 17 were recognized as public utility organizations. The Ministry of Territorial Administration (MINAT), the government body responsible for CSOs, reported that in 2021, Cameroon had approximately 40 international CSOs and approximately 50 non-governmental organizations (NGOs), a separate legal form. Nearly 500,000 grassroots community organizations, private associations, common initiative groups (that is, economic and social organizations formed by individuals with common interests), development committees, and economic interest groups were thought to exist in 2021. Many of these groups are unregistered.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.9**

CSOs’ legal environment improved slightly in 2021 with the promulgation of Law No. 2021/023 on inter-branch organizations, which allows CSOs to form a new type of grouping with legal personality that is eligible for government funding.

Law No. 90/053 of 1990 on freedom of association governs all CSOs. Various other laws also govern specific types of CSOs, all of which stipulate that organizations must be registered or authorized to acquire legal personality and operate freely. NGOs are governed by Law No. 99/014 of 1999. Sports associations are governed by Law No. 2018/014 of 2018 and cooperatives and common initiative groups by Law No. 92/006 of 1992. Other laws govern artistic and cultural associations and professional unions. Community-based and cultural organizations may operate without registration, although unregistered organizations may not interact with the government or donors.

Law No. 2021/023, which was promulgated in December 2021, allows professional organizations to group together into inter-branch organizations, including simple interprofessional organizations, organizations chiefly serving their members, interprofessional organizations with extended competences, or organizations with broader scopes of activity and working on behalf of their entire economic sector. Platforms that register as interprofessional organizations with extended competences may, like political parties, trade unions, sport associations, NGOs, and artistic and cultural organizations, receive subsidies and collaborate with the government in public-private partnerships. Implementing regulations for the new law were still pending at the end of the year.
CSOs register by submitting declarations with their statutes, internal regulations, leaders’ names, and minutes of their founding to a MINAT divisional office in their place of residence. The registration process is usually simple, although organizations working on governance, anti-corruption, and human rights often encounter delays or difficulties in obtaining registration receipts or can be denied registration arbitrarily, giving rise to the perception that registering authorities do not apply the laws in a fair and consistent manner. The government practices “administrative tolerance” in that it allows many organizations to operate semi-legally, unable to gain full registration but conducting activities without reprisal. Registered associations that have operated for at least three years may apply to MINAT for NGO status with the consent of the Ministry of External Relations. Whereas associations receive funding solely from their members, NGOs, which tend to be larger organizations, may perform services for remuneration, are entitled to tax exemptions and customs benefits, may receive public subsidies and private donations as well as funding from local and foreign partners, and are permitted to contract with third parties. NGOs may apply for public utility status, which is granted exclusively by presidential decree. Organizations with public utility status enjoy the same benefits as NGOs, but their status is of unlimited duration whereas NGO status has a maximum duration of five years. International CSOs that wish to be established in Cameroon are subject to investigations by a specialized government office. CSOs may challenge a refusal of registration in the courts. No organization is known to have been denied registration in 2021.

The law allows MINAT to dissolve any organization that breaches public order or state security. In the event of dissolution, organizations may appeal to administrative courts in their place of residence. MINAT has never officially dissolved an organization, although it has made it difficult for certain organizations to operate.

The legal framework requires legalized organizations to conform to democratic values but does not impose specific internal structures. All CSOs must file annual activity reports with MINAT. This requirement is strictly enforced in the case of NGOs, particularly those that work on human rights and governance. Very few other CSOs comply with this obligation.

Under the law, CSOs are free to form and operate, and public authorities may not interfere in their internal operations. The laws governing CSOs in no way limit the scope of their activities, and CSOs may carry out their activities as stated in their statutes as long as they adhere to applicable laws and regulations. CSOs may freely address issues of public debate and express criticism. However, such activities must remain consistent with an organization’s mission, and CSOs must avoid involvement in politics or matters concerning state security, territorial integrity, and incitement to revolt. CSOs may organize public meetings and demonstrations provided they comply strictly with Law No. 90/055 governing meetings and public events, which provides that organizers must obtain permits for public protests and submit prior notification. In practice, the interpretation of laws varies depending on the individual government official involved in a specific decision.

CSOs are occasionally harassed by government entities. The most notable case of harassment in 2021 involved Doctors Without Borders, which the government originally suspended in December 2020 pending renewal of its partnership agreement. In August 2021, after waiting for eight months for permission to resume its activities, Doctors Without Borders withdrew from Cameroon. A press release issued by the governor of the Northwest Region indicated that the organization had been caring for members of armed separatist groups. The suspension left tens of thousands of people in the Northwest Region without access to essential health services. The government also accused the Ayah Foundation, which started as a law firm and then transitioned into a humanitarian organization, of money laundering and supplying arms to militia groups in the Southwest and Northwest regions. The government subsequently withdrew the foundation’s operating license and closed its offices in some localities. On February 24, 2022, in Bafoussam, West Region, police officers raided the offices of Colibri, an organization that provides HIV prevention and treatment services, and arrested thirteen people on charges of homosexual activity, which is illegal in Cameroon. Several of the arrested individuals later said that some of them were beaten, that they were all threatened and verbally assaulted, and that the police interrogated them without a lawyer present and forced them to sign statements that they were not allowed to read. They were released two or three days later.

CSOs are exempt from customs duties, value-added tax, and social charges for non-contributory social protection programs. CSOs benefit from tax deductions on revenues from grants, donations, fees, and economic activities in conflict-affected areas of the Northwest, Southwest, and Far North regions. Organizations with public utility status receive additional tax benefits.

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NGOs, including organizations with public utility status, may raise funds and receive government grants, bequests, donations from individuals, and foreign funding. Most CSOs may not carry out income-generating activities, although Law No. 99/014 of 1999 does allow NGOs to charge fees for goods and services. Cameroonian law is silent on the creation of social enterprises.

Public subsidies are granted in a transparent manner only to organizations with public utility status. Only NGOs may engage in public procurement and enter into contracts with public authorities and businesses.

Quality legal advice is available in Yaoundé and elsewhere. However, most CSOs cannot afford to pay lawyers’ fees. Pro bono legal counsel is not available.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.2

The organizational capacity of CSOs was stable in 2021. Larger organizations with sufficient resources and technical capacity have been trained to target their work on the ground. They usually define their target audiences in their strategic plans while remaining open to intervening on behalf of other groups that contact them for help in areas that fall within their mission areas. In such a situation, a CSO will conduct a field survey or meet with community members before drawing up an action plan to benefit the group in need. This approach was evident in the work of A Future World (Un Monde avenir) and Cameroun Obosso, which in 2021 helped victims of forced evictions in the vicinity of New Town Airport in Douala. Another approach to constituency building that is gaining momentum among Cameroonian CSOs is community organizing, in which a CSO identifies a community likely to have a problem that falls within its mission area, forms a community group and offers it training and help organizing, and then guides the group in resolving its problem. The associations We Are Together (On est ensemble) and Codas Caritas Douala excel at this approach, particularly if the needs involve access to electricity, water, and roads.

CSOs are sometimes formed by specific groups in response to difficulties that they are facing. For example, the residents of the Bonewonda-Makanda neighborhood in Douala created an association to defend their interests after untimely water and electricity cuts. Many of these grassroots CSOs lack professional expertise and find it difficult to achieve their goals without help. Some CSOs have not carried out activities for years because of a lack of know-how and the precarious financial situation of their supporters. In Douala and its surroundings, many existing CSOs have not operated for a year or more and no longer hold internal meetings because of the attrition of members.

Some CSOs clearly define their missions in their statutes. NGOs generally seek to follow their missions, visions, and strategic plans as much as possible. Larger CSOs, such as the Central Africa Human Rights Defenders Network (Réseau des défenseurs des droits humains en Afrique Centrale, REDHAC), Association of Young Entrepreneurs of Bonassame (Association des jeunes entreprenants de Bonassama, AJE), and Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)-Cameroon, hold annual or biannual meetings to define their strategic directions in line with their visions. However, the ongoing crisis in the Anglophone regions of Cameroon, coupled with the outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020, forced many organizations to change their objectives to address urgent humanitarian and health-care needs. For example, the Nadine Yomb Foundation, Engaged Youth United and Solidarity (Jeunesse engagée unie et solidaire, JEUNES), Cameroun Obosso, We Are Together, and REDHAC improvised activities to help people cope with the pandemic in 2021. Most other CSOs do not have strategic plans, are unfamiliar with the concept, and respond spontaneously to opportunities as they come along.

CSOs are free to define their own internal structures and operations. The CSO sector in Cameroon is still embryonic, and most organizations are too poorly equipped to ensure efficient operations. CSOs usually specify two or three internal bodies in their statutes and internal regulations, such as a general assembly and a board of...
directors, which act as decision-making bodies, and an executive board, which oversees operations. Some CSOs have denser managerial structures that include national and regional bodies. NGOs tend to have relatively developed structures. A small number of NGOs and larger CSOs that receive donor funding have administrative and financial procedural manuals to define organizational policies and financial management systems.

In NGOs and larger CSOs, job responsibilities are clearly defined. Well-structured NGOs tend to recruit staff, including accounting, computer, and legal professionals, through calls for applications. They usually hire employees on fixed-term contracts. Permanent positions are rare. Larger organizations usually offer employees ongoing in-house training to make them more effective at their jobs. Otherwise, management structures can be skeletal, with only two or three people performing almost all tasks, ranging from administrative duties and financial management to the implementation of activities in the field. Because of funding shortfalls, the staff of smaller organizations often work on a voluntary basis, receiving only transportation and communication allowances. They are recruited without a structured application process, and job descriptions are rare. This situation can reduce productivity, as staff members are unavailable when they are involved in external activities to earn income. Compliance with international partners’ human resources procedures can also be difficult.

Many organizations do not have adequate office space. CSO modernize their office equipment when they have available resources. CSO staff usually work with personal mobile telephones and computers. Although the internet is not consistently available across Cameroon, CSOs rely on it heavily to communicate with field staff and partners. Several CSOs use social media to disseminate information. While pandemic restrictions were in effect, many CSOs developed remote work capabilities. Even after resuming normal activities, several CSOs, including JEUNES, Emergency for Development, and REDHAC (which is often regarded as the best-equipped organization in the country) strengthened their reliance on virtual communications and now regularly hold meetings on digital platforms such as Zoom and WhatsApp.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.1**

CSOs’ financial viability declined slightly in 2021 as foreign partners suspended the implementation of some projects, causing financial strains for many CSOs.

Public and private foreign donors support CSO projects in areas such as education, health care, culture, and access to clean water. In 2021, the major funders included UN Women, UN Population Fund, and UN High Commissioner for Refugees; the European Union (EU); and the governments of Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Peace, security, and countering violent extremism and humanitarian response activities are largely funded through initiatives such as the UN Peacebuilding Fund and the Commonwealth Youth Peace Ambassadors Network. The Humanitarian Response program of the Urgent Action Fund Africa was a major donor in the Northwest and Southwest regions in 2021. In some cases, donors extended implementation timelines to accommodate disruptions from COVID-19. Partner organizations such as the International Union for Conservation of Nature, UN Women, and Cuso International offered less funding in 2021 because of budgetary shortfalls. For example, UN Women postponed implementation of projects to promote gender-related activities in agricultural value chains, and some projects in CHA’s Humanitarian Response Plan were drastically reduced or even suspended because of the pandemic.

Funding support from the government is limited. The government regularly supports the small number of CSOs with public utility status, which include religious organizations and large networks such as the National Platform of Professional Agro-Sylvo-Pastoral and Halieutic Organizations of Cameroon (Plateforme nationale des organisations professionnelles agro sylvopastorales et halieutiques du Cameroun, PLANOPAC), Young Professionals Network (Réseau professionnel des jeunes), and Support for Digital Accessibility (Appui au désenclavement numérique, ADEN). Otherwise, the government offers minimal support, citing competing national priorities or the law on
public procurement, which allows only NGOs to obtain government contracts. Municipalities similarly grant little funding to CSOs, in part because they do not have full control over development planning and funding.

Experienced NGOs compete for government contracts but often lose out to companies tied into corrupt networks, including companies that lack qualifications. CSOs that provide contracted services to the government are often not paid because of corruption, funding shortages, or poor management at government agencies.

Businesses rarely fund CSOs. Several organizations with direct links to celebrities or the telecommunications companies Orange and MTN have obtained their support for projects such as orphanages, hospitals, and scholarships. CSOs sometimes ask unions, cooperatives, and self-help organizations for funding for projects to help local communities. Under the law, only NGOs may receive financial and material support from their communities and target groups, but communities often contribute labor to the implementation of CSOs’ projects.

Most CSOs are membership-based and depend on membership fees for income. Because of the pandemic, many CSOs experienced a drop in the payment of membership fees in 2021. Some organizations carry out income-generating activities to help realize their objectives. These activities include the production and sale of embroidery, paid consultancies, and the leasing of office space.

CSOs rarely have specialized financial departments and rely instead on external service providers, especially if they engage in large projects involving government or foreign donors. Large CSOs have accounting manuals and perform external audits. NGOs must be audited annually by independent private auditors and submit activity reports with financial statements to the government. Smaller organizations carry out self-evaluations since they cannot afford the cost of external audits.

**ADVOCACY: 4.6**

CSO advocacy did not change in 2021.

Since the Cameroonian CSO sector is still young, CSOs do not yet act as effective interlocutors with the government. However, Law 2019/024 on the general code of decentralized local authorities recommends that CSOs be involved in decision-making processes in a consultative capacity, and the law seems to be bearing fruit. Several CSOs now work with local councils. For example, in 2021, the Douala IV Council organized consultations with local CSOs to determine how they might cooperate to build national cohesion in Bonaberi, which hosts many IDPs from the Northwest and Southwest regions. The Ministry of Decentralization and Local Development conducted several training workshops with CSOs to promote better understanding of their involvement in the decentralization process. The JEC-8-BC project carried out by the Independent Platform of Youth for Democracy and an Active Citizenry (Plateforme indépendante des jeunes pour la démocratie et la citoyenneté active, PIJEDECA) aims to engage young people in the monitoring of communal budgets in three regions of Cameroon. In 2021, young people trained through the project went on to collaborate with local councils in Douala and elsewhere.

Cameroonian legislation implicitly provides that CSOs are apolitical. Although they may not take part in political activities, CSOs actively seek to influence public debate, government actions, and legislation. For example, in 2021, the Inter-Employees Group of Cameroon (Groupement inter-patronal du Cameroun, GICAM) negotiated certain tax breaks to promote economic recovery after the pandemic had weakened the country’s businesses. The Cameroon Network of Horticulturists (Réseau des horticulteurs du Cameroun, RHORTICAM) worked with the Ministry in Charge of the Economy on the national strategy for developing the horticultural sector. CSOs such as the Indigenous platform Gbabandi and the Center for the Environment and Development (Centre pour l’environnement et le développement, CED) helped traditional leaders petition local administrative authorities and the Ministry of Land to contest a 66,000-hectare concession in the South Region, which was granted to the Neo
Industry, a cocoa processing company, in 2016. Responding to this local opposition, the prime minister signed a decree annulling the concession in May 2021.

A significant advocacy effort in 2021 was the first-ever National Women’s Convention for Peace, which brought together more than 1,000 women in Yaoundé for three days in July. The event was organized by a committee of thirty-eight CSOs, including Reach Out Cameroon and Cameroon Women’s Peace Network. A main outcome of the meeting was the Women’s Call for Peace, which makes demands of key stakeholders in Cameroon’s ongoing civil conflict. A follow-on meeting was organized by the Southwest and Northwest Women’s Taskforce (SNWOT) in December.

In August, the Network for the Fight Against Hunger in Cameroon (Réseau de lutte contre la faim au Cameroun, RELUFA) organized a workshop on land constraints and food security in the Far North region. The workshop took part under the LandCam project, which seeks to improve customary and formal rights to land and natural resources and is supported by the EU. Workshop participants formulated and disseminated recommendations and improved a tool to account for land issues in the design of development projects. The LandCam project also organized a conference on International World Indigenous Peoples’ Day on August 9, which was followed by a press conference that presented an assessment of Cameroon’s implementation of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the rights of indigenous forest peoples as a specific group.

The promulgation of Law No. 2021/023 was a step forward in improving the legal environment for CSOs. The law was drafted by several ministries, the Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Crafts, and other governmental bodies. CSOs were consulted during the drafting process.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.6**

CSO service provision did not change in 2021.

CSOs provide services in areas such as education, health care, governance, assistance, housing, water, energy, environmental protection, local development, gender-based violence (GBV), and population protection. In 2021, CSOs took part in the pandemic response by raising awareness, distributing personal protective equipment, installing water points for hand washing, and training health-care personnel. CSOs also provided humanitarian and psychosocial support to local communities and IDPs while working with local communities to reduce tensions. However, many CSOs were unable to implement activities because of restrictions on travel and gatherings for part of the year. For example, We Care Cameroon, which works in health care, and Green Safe Association, which focuses on the effects of desertification and climate change on women, local populations, and disadvantaged indigenous people, had to cut back their activities in 2021. Some organizations used teleconferencing to carry out activities such as capacity building for their members and target populations.

The goods and services provided by CSOs usually respond to beneficiaries’ needs and priorities. For example, in 2021, a number of organizations responded to GBV by providing safe spaces for women and girls and distributing “dignity kits” with hygienic supplies. CSOs often conduct sociological studies to assess community needs or consult with community members to identify priority projects.

Membership associations usually provide goods and services only to their members. CSOs do not discriminate on the basis of gender, race, or sexual orientation in their provision of goods and services.

Because CSOs are nonprofit organizations, they offer products and services free of charge but generally may not engage in commercial activities. In practice, NGOs and registered associations increasingly sell their services or contract with private companies, international organizations, and other partners. CSOs are informally aware of market demand and the ability of target groups to pay for their services.
The line ministries with which CSOs work regularly send letters of congratulations and encouragement to CSO representatives. After receiving activity reports from CSOs, MINAT sends letters of appreciation at the end of each year.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.2**

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector improved slightly in 2021 as CSOs increasingly formed coalitions, used digital technologies, and had access to a new local grantmaker and more varied training opportunities.

No resource centers specifically serve CSOs in Cameroon. CSOs mainly use centers established by mobile telephone companies such as MTN, Orange, and Nextel, where they usually pay for services such as internet access. Intermediary support organizations (ISOs) serving CSOs at the national level include the EU’s Active Citizenship Strengthening (PROCIVIS) program and international organizations such as the International NGO Safety Organization (INSO) and Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). These ISOs typically offer training and internet access either free of charge or for a fee. Because of limited financial resources, many organizations are unable to pay for services and may find transportation to centers offering services a challenge if they are located in remote areas. Telecenters and community radio stations sometimes serve as communications relay centers for CSOs.

Local grantmaking organizations are practically non-existent in Cameroon. In 2021, however, a consortium composed of CED, RELUFA, and the International Institute for Environment and Development provided grants to CSOs through its Landcam Project, funded by the EU.

Cameroonian civil society is poorly organized, but CSOs increasingly come together in informal platforms, especially through digital means. Organizations involved in these platforms share information, raise awareness, offer training, and work together towards common goals. An especially active platform in 2021 was the Network of Associations for Social Development (Réseau d’associations pour le développement social, RADESO), which brings together CSOs such as Awareness Raising and Action for Disabled People, Their Integration, and Their Recognition (Sensibilisation et action pour les personnes handicapées, leur intégration et leur reconnaissance, SAPHIR) and the Association for the Development of Young Women (Association pour l’épanouissement de la jeune femme, ASEJEFE). A platform on entrepreneurship was put in place in the Littoral region in 2021. These loose platforms do not have legal personality and thus cannot engage in fundraising. CSOs also collaborate on specific activities on an ad hoc basis. In 2021, for example, Gepes, JEUNES, and AJE worked together on the I Log Out (Je me déconnecte) campaign, which aims to make young people more aware of the need to disconnect from deviant behaviors to become more productive and enterprising.

Training on peace building was particularly abundant in 2021, given the country’s security crisis. The UNDP, UN Women, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and Ministry of Women Empowerment and Family organized a workshop to train CSOs on human rights violations and GBV. The Center for Human Rights and Democracy in Africa organized a workshop on women’s support for peace initiatives with funding from the British High Commission in Yaoundé. Beacon of Light Association, a local organization in Bamenda, Northwest Region, conducted a series of trainings on peace building and social cohesion. The U.S. Institute of Peace offered a workshop on the fundamentals of peacebuilding to CSOs from Northwest, Southwest, Littoral, and Center regions. Cameroun Obosso conducted training on monitoring human rights issues for five CSOs in the Far North. Several foreign organizations, including INSO, NRC, PROCIVIS, and OCHA, offered training in CSO management at the regional and divisional levels. Some training was offered via video conferencing. For example, the Europe-Africa-Caribbean-Pacific Liaison Committee organized many online training sessions with RHORTICAM and other CSOs. Most of the available training responds to the needs of CSOs but is sometimes also oriented towards
donors’ interests. Training materials are generally available in French and English. Cameroon has very few local trainers competent in CSO management.

Several international CSOs worked in partnership with the government in 2021. For example, GICAM helped organize the Cameroon Business Forum, and RHORTICAM worked with the Ministry of Economy on a strategy for the horticultural sectors. CSOs such as Dynamique Citoyenne and the Support Center for New Local Development Alternatives (Centre d’accompagnement de nouvelles alternatives de développement local, CANADEL) are members of local committees that monitor the implementation of the public investment budget. The media often offer space to cultural organizations such as Reading I Contribute (La lecture je contribute) and The Young Pen (La jeune plume).

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.9

CSOs’ public image was stable in 2021. Media coverage of CSOs’ activities continued to be meager in 2021. Few public media cover the work of CSOs other than well-known NGOs and public utility organizations. CSOs engage more successfully with private media. For example, in 2021, the mainstream private media published stories featuring human rights organizations such as A Future World. CSOs that lack financial resources find it difficult to obtain coverage, since it is usually paid.

The public’s view of CSOs is mixed. While some CSOs, such as Global Compassion in Santchou, We Are Together in Douala, and Youth Concern For Integration in Foumban, are valued because they have a direct impact on the lives of their beneficiaries, other organizations are viewed as useless. The public does not understand the role of CSOs, and particularly in the Far North, Northwest, and Southwest regions, many people believe that the large number of CSOs created in recent years exist only to enrich a few people rather than fulfill public needs. Some people think that the many CSOs working on peace issues in the Northwest have actually contributed to the war economy.

Government views of CSOs are also mixed. The government has accused organizations such as REDHAC of acting as destabilizing political agents, while other CSOs, such as Women’s Horizons (Horizons femmes) and cultural organizations, enjoy the government’s trust.

CSOs experience little conflict with companies or other private-sector actors, mainly because very few of them attempt to exercise oversight in sectors such as mining, logging, or labor. Businesspeople who perceive civil society as a threat or have negative perceptions of CSOs are usually also politicians.

Many CSOs convey information about their activities using platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram, and WhatsApp. CSO training seminars and conferences in urban areas are often livestreamed on Facebook or YouTube. A few CSOs, such as A Future World, Reading I Contribute, and Global Compassion, work with the media to publicize their activities. It is common for civil society stakeholders to make television appearances in which they describe their activities and highlight their achievements.

Few transparency mechanisms govern CSOs’ operations. Some CSOs make their activity reports available to government authorities, usually without their financial records. Larger CSOs with websites post descriptions of their activities. CSOs do not usually make their annual reports public.
After a controversial presidential election marred by violence in October 2020, the government of Côte d’Ivoire sought to ease tensions before legislative elections on March 6 by resuming dialogue with twenty-one political parties and groups and twenty-six CSOs. The dialogue developed measures to calm the political environment and define the legal and institutional framework for elections. Thereafter the legislative elections took place in a generally peaceful environment. Alliances between new political forces emerged after the presidential election and, for the first time since the military coup of 1999, all main political parties participated in the elections. Positive meetings between major political leaders led to the release of seventy-eight detainees arrested during the 2020 election, as well as the transfer to judicial supervision or provisional release of sixty-nine detainees and pardons for nine people. Exiles returned and civil servants were reinstated, which also contributed to a calmer political climate.

On November 19, 2021, the organization Ivorian Citizen Alternative (Alternative citoyenne ivoiriennne) launched an inclusive program that set out the main lines and projects for the national reconciliation process, to which all political parties responded positively. The political dialogue resumed again on December 16, 2021.

In December 2021, the public prosecutor at the Court of First Instance of Abidjan-Plateau released the results of official investigations into violence during the presidential election. The violence was found to have caused eighty-five deaths and nearly 500 injuries between August and November 2020. At the time of the report, eleven people were still in custody for their alleged involvement in the most serious of election-related crimes, including the beheading of a young demonstrator in Daoukro.

The trial of former prime minister Guillaume Soro opened on May 26, 2021. Soro was charged with plotting a coup against President Alassane Ouattara in 2019. After several days of trial and successive postponements, the Criminal Court sentenced Soro in absentia to life in prison and dissolved his citizen movement, Generations and People in Solidarity.

Côte d’Ivoire continued to make mixed progress in its human rights record in 2021. In November, Interministerial Order No. 972/MJDIH/MEMD/MIS created a mechanism for protecting human rights defenders. The mechanism includes representatives of the ministries of justice, human rights, security, defense, and the National Council of Human Rights but excludes civil society. CSOs protested their exclusion to the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights and the National Council of Human Rights via the Ivorian Coalition of Human Rights Defenders (Coalition Ivoirienne des défenseurs des droits de l'homme, CIDDH), but no change was made before the end of the year. In December, Law 2021-894 on measures to protect victims of domestic violence, rape, and sexual violence other than domestic violence was passed. The new law includes provisions for protection orders to be issued in cases of domestic violence. Law 2021-893 of December 2021, which amends Law 2019-574 on the Penal Code, failed to
include sexual orientation under the scope of discrimination after the provision was rejected by opposition political parties and groups, religious and community leaders, and others.

The government maintained its 2020 withdrawal of recognition of the authority of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) to receive cases directly from the public. The court retained jurisdiction over all cases registered before the government’s withdrawal takes effect in 2022, which included twenty cases brought by individuals from Côte d’Ivoire but none by CSOs.

Côte d'Ivoire was subject to numerous terrorist attacks in 2021. Violent extremists in Kafolo and Kolobougou in March and Tougbo and TehiniTogolokaye in June caused loss of life, property damage, and displacement, particularly of refugee populations from Burkina Faso.

As of March 10, 2022, Côte d'Ivoire had recorded 81,577 confirmed cases of COVID-19 and 795 deaths. A vaccination campaign was launched on March 1, 2021, and more than 4 million people, or 15 percent of the population, had been fully vaccinated one year later. Pandemic-related restrictions on movement and activities imposed at the start of the pandemic were gradually relaxed during the year.

The government announced in October that Côte d'Ivoire’s economic growth rate was estimated at 6.5 percent in 2021, compared to 2 percent in 2020. The improved growth was supported by advances in agribusiness, construction and public works, and the petroleum industries. Côte d'Ivoire started to implement its new National Development Plan (NDP 2021–25) during the year.

In 2021, the overall sustainability of the CSO sector improved slightly. The legal environment became slightly more enabling as the government prepared a new draft law to govern the CSO sector. Organizational capacity was moderately stronger as CSOs resumed activities after pandemic-related restrictions were lifted. Financial viability improved slightly as donor funding resumed and new funding was available from the Leadership and Initiatives of Non-State Actors (Liane 2) project. Advocacy progressed slightly as CSOs engaged in several successful campaigns and contributed comments to the draft bill on CSOs. The sectoral infrastructure was strengthened slightly by several new intersectoral partnerships. CSOs’ public image was slightly better as the public increasingly viewed the sector as responsible and resilient and the government relied on CSOs as community resources. CSO service provision did not change.

The number of CSOs in Côte d'Ivoire is unknown.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.4**

The legal environment for CSOs improved slightly in 2021 as the government prepared a new law to govern the sector, which was generally well received.

CSOs operate in a relatively open climate. They are governed by Law No. 60-315 of 1960 on associations. The General Directorate of Territorial Administration (DGAT) in the Ministry of the Interior and Security distributed a new draft law on CSOs in 2021. Despite shortcomings noted by CSOs in several articles, mainly concerning respect for the freedom of association and the issue of funding for CSOs, the draft law includes measures conducive to CSOs’ autonomy, including a provision for sponsorship. CSOs were able to offer comments on the bill, which was still in draft form at the end of the year.

CSOs obtain legal personality in a slow and opaque process. They first file declarations with the city government of their place of operation and may not undertake activities for two months while their applications are processed. Applicant organizations then receive provisional permits to operate for three months pending final authorization from the DGAT. Registration fees can be set arbitrarily and are generally high, and organizations can be charged for expenses that are not specified in the law. For example, to register in 2021, the organization Tchedjell, which
works on local agriculture in Gagnoa, had to pay XOF 30,000 (approximately $55) for an arbitrary “morality survey” of its members. Final permits are difficult to obtain, and most CSOs without permits are able to operate without interference from the authorities. Some organizations working on sexual orientation and gender identity that have applied for legal recognition have still not received it. The DGAT claims to be unable to reach applicants to resolve a backlog of 1,000 approved applications.

Law No. 2014-388 on the promotion and protection of human rights defenders and its implementing decree No. 2017-121 require human rights organizations to file annual activity reports with the government. Other types of organizations do not file annual reports.

Few regulations govern CSOs’ internal operations. CSOs and their representatives are allowed to work freely, and the government may not interfere in their activities unless they are illegal or immoral. Administrative judges may sanction inappropriate government interference in CSOs’ work as an abuse of power but rarely do so. Article 4 of Law No. 60-315 prohibits CSOs from undermining national security with activities that compromise public safety, cause political unrest, stir up hatred between ethnic groups, discredit or obstruct political institutions, or incite citizens to break the law.

As the political atmosphere was calmer in 2021 and the government focused on political dialogue to foster peace and stability in Côte d’Ivoire, no harassment of CSOs was reported.

The law does not provide for the taxation of CSOs’ income. CSOs pay value-added tax (VAT) and taxes on goods that they import into the country. Cooperatives may receive discounts on VAT and other taxes provided they apply to the tax department, which many cooperatives fail to do. Donors such as the European Union (EU) and government agencies require CSOs to have up-to-date tax returns confirming payment of employee taxes to the National Social Security Fund. Individuals are exempt from paying taxes on donations to humanitarian organizations.

CSOs may solicit funds from individuals and businesses and generate income from the sale of goods and services, provided the profits are reinvested in the organization. CSOs must have public benefit status to receive government funds or to bid on government tenders. Public benefit status is difficult to obtain, as the application process is laborious and involves obtaining the approval of the Ministry of the Interior as well as a decree from the Council of Ministers. CSOs may accept foreign funding.

Human rights CSOs in Abidjan, such as the Ivoirian Human Rights Movement (Mouvement ivoirien des droits humains, MIDH), Ivoirian Human Rights League (Ligue ivoirienne des droits de l’homme, LIDHO), and Action to Protect Human Rights (Action pour la protection des droits de l’homme, APDH), have lawyers who offer advice to CSOs and human rights defenders when needed. The Association of Women Jurists of Côte d’Ivoire (Association des femmes juristes de Côte d’Ivoire, AFJCI) operates a legal clinic.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.9**

CSOs’ organizational capacity showed moderate improvement in 2021 as they resumed activities after pandemic-related restrictions on movement and activities were lifted. In addition, the implementation of the Liane 2 project in 2021 provided CSOs with capacity-building assistance and funding for new projects that strengthened their organizational capacity.

CSOs’ activities reflect the needs of local communities. Before designing projects or launching activities, CSOs usually conduct field studies using focus groups, questionnaires, and participatory dialogues in targeted communities. This preparatory phase allows CSOs to take beneficiaries’ view and goals into consideration and then incorporate them into their projects. For example, the Binkadi (Solidarity is Good) project of the Ivoirian Civil Society Convention (Convention de la société civile ivoirienne, CSCI), which aims to improve the resilience
of vulnerable groups, especially women, youth, and people with disabilities, to the consequences of climate change, is based on participatory diagnoses and community feedback. In rural areas, informal social movements, women’s associations, youth associations, development mutuals, and cooperatives are particularly successful at developing “solidarity chains,” or mutual aid relationships involving members and their communities.

In 2021, with the resumption of activities suspended during the pandemic, CSOs were able to identify new target groups and launch new initiatives. For example, with support from the Liane 2 project, a joint undertaking of the EU and the Ivorian government that was launched in 2021 to improve CSOs’ operations so that they are better able to participate in public-policy formation, organizations such as the Network of Human Rights, Democracy, and Gender Educators (Réseau des éducateurs aux droits de l’homme, à la démocratie et au genre, REDHG), GF3M, West African Civil Society Forum—Côte d’Ivoire (Forum de la société civile d’Afrique de l’ouest Côte d’Ivoire, FOSCAO—CI), and Grenier International embarked on new projects. Liane 2 also provided training on management and governance issues to CSOs with funded projects in 2021. The training helped strengthen CSOs’ capacity to adhere to their missions and strategic plans and provided tools to partner organizations so that they could monitor and evaluate their activities.

The roles and responsibilities of CSOs’ management bodies are usually not clearly defined. Law No. 60-315 does not provide for the creation of boards of directors, and most CSOs do not have them. However, the requirements for accessing donor and partner funding, along with training under the Liane 2 project, have pushed CSOs to better understand the roles and value of their boards. Although it is too early to tell, the hope is that this understanding will strengthen internal management despite constant staff turnover and the lack of resources. Many CSOs find it difficult to find people with appropriate backgrounds to serve on their boards and other management bodies. However, as the culture of good governance takes hold, CSOs are beginning to put in place professional accounting systems and manage their operations more efficiently. This trend is especially evident among organizations in major cities. In smaller cities, CSOs have been slow to adopt good governance practices.

Staff retention remains a challenge at most organizations because of insufficient resources and low pay. Employees are often recruited by international organizations, which offer higher salaries. This trend makes it difficult for local CSOs to retain employees over the long term, and many organizations are constantly hiring new staff. Most CSOs are unable to afford the services of specialists in technology, communications, law, and other fields. However, under the Liane 2 project in 2021, funded CSOs received support for professional services from accountants, information technology managers, and other specialists.

Most CSOs, especially in rural areas and the interior, cannot afford office space. CSOs do not normally have sufficient resources to establish permanent internet lines or purchase equipment such as computers, printers, and cell phones. Internet connections remain expensive, and in remote areas, internet access is poor to non-existent. However, during the pandemic, CSOs were motivated to use digital technologies for training and capacity building, and a number of organizations improved their skills in this area. Social media is widely used in Côte d’Ivoire, and in 2021, the Liane 2 project helped FOSCAO—CI and its member organizations improve their social media skills and expand their use of digital tools. This training emphasized the need for data security to fight the risk of cyberattacks and data theft.

**FINANCIAL VIALIBILITY: 5.2**

The financial viability of Ivorian CSOs improved slightly in 2021 as donor funding resumed and the Liane 2 project made new funding available to CSOs throughout the country.

Most CSOs rely on foreign funding. After the pandemic caused various funding programs to slow down or stop in 2020, most funding and technical partners resumed their normal activities in 2021. The major funders include USAID, UK Aid Direct, the EU, Expertise France, Canada Fund for Local Initiatives, and German foundations such as the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom. The EU’s Liane 2 program revitalized the sector with direct financing along with institutional, material, and technical support in 2021. The selection process for Liane 2, which started in 2020, resulted in ninety-four projects receiving amounts ranging from XOF 5 million to 25 million (approximately $9,000 to $45,000). Several CSOs received grants ranging from XOF 2.5 million to 8 million (approximately $4,500 to $14,500) from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the
Corporate social responsibility programs are a key component of Ivorian public policy. For example, the mining code specifies the social responsibilities of companies and local governments to the communities in which they work. Companies such as Petroci, Orange, Moov, and MTN have set up foundations for community work, but they usually bypass CSOs to provide funding to communities directly.

CSOs’ ability to diversify their funding sources remains weak. Organizations with websites rarely include a “donate” tab. Membership fees are low and difficult to collect except at cooperative societies, which can set up systems for automatic deductions from members. The practice of sponsorship is not widespread except at religious organizations. Some CSOs raise funds by providing consulting services, selling products, or renting equipment. For example, Cavoequiva has built a solid international reputation through its housing facility, which offers paid facilities that visitors to Côte d’Ivoire use for study and research. The Women of Salem (Femmes de Salem) raises funds for vulnerable women through frequent impromptu requests for donations. But while these approaches pull in useful funding, they do not come close to covering organizational needs. Cooperative societies have a special status that allows them to raise funds by marketing agricultural products, which they then use to construct schools, health centers, and water points or to offer direct support to their communities.

Most CSOs’ financial managers do not have specific qualifications for their positions. In recent years, some financial staff have benefited from training to improve their professional skills and improve their organizations’ financial management. In 2021, the Liane 2 program offered training in financial management to organizations such as Aid, Assistance, and Community Development in Côte d’Ivoire (Aide, assistance et développement communautaire de Côte d’Ivoire, ADC-CI) and the UNESCO University Club to Fight Against Drugs (Club unesco universitaire pour la lutte contre la drogue, GLUCOD). Only a few organizations in Abidjan carry out audits of individual projects, usually at the request of technical and financial partners. For example, in 2021, donor support enabled ADC-CI and several other CSOs to conduct audits.

ADVOCACY: 4.2

Advocacy improved slightly in 2021 as CSOs engaged in successful advocacy campaigns and contributed comments to a draft bill to govern the CSO sector.

Government policies and laws do not require public access to government decision-making processes. CSOs usually participate in governance through frameworks set up by line ministries or consultative fora established on the regional or departmental level. However, in 2021, the government was more receptive to CSOs’ influence, particularly as it was encouraged by technical and financial partners. CSOs were increasingly integrated into state structures, particularly independent administrative authorities such as the National Council of Human Rights, whose advisors come largely from the CSO sector. In addition, the National Council for the Fight against the High Cost of Living has four CSO representatives, and the National Press Authority, High Authority for Audio-Visual Communication, Commission for Access to Information and Documents of Public Interest, and Independent Electoral Commission each include one CSO representative. These permanent positions were negotiated after effective advocacy by CSOs.
Other direct channels of communication between CSOs and decision makers exist at the central and local levels. For example, the ministries of agriculture, interior and security, health, environment, women, and solidarity and the fight against poverty organize regular meetings with CSOs to discuss policy issues. Regional prefects increasingly engage in formal meetings with CSOs. Ad hoc and informal channels of cooperation also function effectively, as was evident in CSOs’ and the government’s joint campaign against road rage in April 2021.

CSO advocacy in Côte d’Ivoire has been long hampered by political polarization, but in 2021, CSOs were able to deepen their involvement in policy debates. Several advocacy campaigns were particularly effective. For example, the Cooperative Enterprise of Gaiadi (Entreprise cooperative de Gaiadi, ECOGA) contributed to the fight against child labor in cocoa farming in the San Pedro region by educating the public and raising awareness about the laws against child labor. Their efforts have reduced the number of children working in the cacao fields in the San Pedro region. CSO advocacy also resulted in the construction of an intake center for victims of gender-based violence in Adiake. AFJCI launched a new project to improve the rights of vulnerable women and children and victims of gender-based violence with funding from the German Embassy.

Citizen action networks use websites and WhatsApp groups to share information and mobilize the public. The website of Land Alert, for example, allows any citizen to send a request or to make a proposal to improve land governance. CSOs and the public are less likely to use portals and hotlines set up by the government to request information or register complaints, mainly because of a lack of awareness.

CSO lobbying often puts pressure on decision makers to adopt requested measures. In 2021, the Civil Society Coalition for the Repositioning of Reproductive Health and Family Planning (Coalition de la société civile pour le repositionnement de la santé de la reproduction et de la planification familiale, COSC SR/PF) and other CSOs advocated successfully for passage of a law on reproductive health, which protects victims of domestic violence, rape, and other forms of sexual violence and brings Côte d’Ivoire into alignment with its international commitments. AFJCI, REFPECO, and other women’s organizations helped ensure passage of the Marriage and Succession Act and lobbied on behalf of the pending Adoption and Divorce Act. CSOs also helped with reform of the 1988 law on drugs, which now includes measures for prevention, reintegration, and treatment, as well as the adoption of two decrees on tobacco sales. A decree on forest governance was written entirely by civil society and approved by the government.

The broader CSO community is aware of the benefits of an enabling legal and regulatory framework and view the reform of Law No. 60-315 as a potential paradigm shift for their work. The draft bill was finalized and distributed for comments in the latter part of 2021. From September 20 to 24, CSOs took part in a seminar on the draft law hosted by the Ministry of the Interior and Security with funding from the EU. A thematic platform for the reform of the law has been set up so that CSOs can offer amendments before the law is adopted by the two chambers of the parliament.

SERVICE PROVISION: 3.7

CSO service provision was stable in 2021.

CSOs offer services in diverse areas, including basic social services, economic development, environmental protection, governance, youth and women’s empowerment, democracy promotion, and human rights. In 2021, the Liane 2 project funded ninety-four new micro-initiatives for CSO services. The World Bank-funded Multi-Sectoral Nutrition and Early Childhood Development project supported CSO service delivery in all regions of the country. CSOs such as the Organization of Active Women (Organisation des femmes actives, OFACI), AFJCI, FOSCAO, and WANNEP-CI were able to keep working during the pandemic, and other organizations resumed their activities in 2021 after restrictions were lifted.
CSOs ensure that their goods and services are responsive to the needs of their constituents by conducting initial diagnostics or baseline assessments. For example, the Organization for Democracy, Economic, and Social Development (Organisation pour la démocratie, le développement économique et social, ODDES) conducted field research before launching its Anlé Trëla Sian Anbé Fié Yan (I Take My Life Seriously) project on HIV prevention and counseling for adolescents in the municipality of Sinfrà in 2021. Some organizations collect data during service delivery to document their contributions to meeting local needs. Member associations provide goods and services to their members and other audiences. Some organizations offer publications, awareness-raising activities, workshops, and expert analysis to other CSOs as well as academia, businesses, religious institutions, and the government. For example, MIDH distributed a study on the privatization of education in Côte d’Ivoire in 2021. CSOs’ goods and services are generally provided without discrimination.

Some CSOs charge fees to recover a portion of their service costs. The Center for Research and Action for Peace (Centre de recherche et d’action pour la paix, CERAP), for example, charges for trainings offered to CSO members. Other organizations operate social enterprises to generate income. The Ivorian Agency for Social Marketing (Agence ivoirienne de marketing social, AIMAS) has a social enterprise that sells contraceptives. It is common for CSOs to use studies and other information to identify market demand for their services. They usually gauge the ability of interest groups to pay for their services through face-to-face meetings.

At the central and local levels, the government recognizes CSOs’ contributions through its public statements. For example, in 2021, during the fourth political dialogue on the political environment and national reconciliation, the prime minister applauded the effective, inclusive participation of CSOs, noting that it consolidated the climate of peace and political stability. Some organizations have written partnerships with government agencies that underscore the value of CSOs’ work.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.2**

The infrastructure supporting CSOs showed slight improvement in 2021 with the development of several new intersectoral partnerships.

Intermediary support organizations (ISOs) and resource centers serving CSOs include the University of the National Council of Human Rights, the training center of the National Bureau of Technical Studies and Development, the continuing education center of the Nangui Abrogoua University of Abobo-Adjamé, and the Ivorian Center for Economic and Social Research. Jokkolabs in Angré II-Plateaux is an incubation center available to CSOs. While CSOs in Abidjan have fairly easy access to information, technology, training, and technical assistance, such services are virtually nonexistent in the rest of the country. ISOs and resource centers earn income by providing paid training and services.

Local institutions, organizations, and programs usually provide funding directly to communities without going through CSOs. In rural areas such as the Divo locality, the Association of Women Involved in Development (Association des femmes engagées pour développement, AFED), Federation of Gôh NGOs [Non-Governmental Organizations] (Fédération des ONG du Gôh, FEDOG), and other organizations received grants of more than
XOF 900,000 (approximately $1,600) from local communities. The National Council of Human Rights provides limited funding to CSOs.

Cooperation in the sector is weak. CSOs share little information with each other. A few organizations form coalitions to carry out joint advocacy, often under pressure from ISOs. There is no known organization or committee that promotes cooperation in the CSO sector.

Training opportunities available to CSOs in 2021 focused mostly on accounting, financial management, fundraising, and advocacy. Under the Liane 2 project, fifty CSOs received training on project writing and narrative and financial reporting. ADC-CI benefited from capacity building from the UNDP on the budget cycle in Yamoussoukro. CSCI in Bassam hosted training on public procurement. CERAP and some private companies offer training to CSOs on more specialized topics such as strategic management. Local trainers competent in CSO management usually conduct the sessions in the capital, Abidjan. CSOs in secondary cities have little access to training and competent trainers. Training materials are in French, the official language of Côte d’Ivoire.

Segments of the government and media sector understand the need to cooperate with CSOs and are establishing cross-sectoral partnerships. For example, the Ouagadougou Partnership is a platform for multi-actor collaboration between CSOs, the government, and the media in the area of reproductive health. CSOs collaborated with the government on several levels in 2021. Some organizations have written partnership agreements with government agencies. AFJCI partnered with the Ministry for Solidarity and the Fight against Poverty on a women’s empowerment project funded by the Swedish government. Several trade union platforms are involved in cooperative activities with the government, such as official Labor Day celebrations (although they did not take place in 2021 because of the pandemic). Some CSOs remain mistrustful of working with certain government agencies and do not try to form partnerships with the government. CSO partnerships with the private sector are rare and not very visible.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.8**

CSOs’ public image was slightly better in 2021 as the public increasingly viewed CSOs as resilient and responsible and the government relied on CSOs as community resources.

CSOs have a good presence in the media, although media owners could do more to highlight their work. The media usually only describe CSOs’ activities and do not analyze their role in society. CSOs have generally good relations with private media, and coverage is also favorable in media outlets close to the political opposition, especially if CSOs criticize government actions. CSOs’ relations with public media can be more difficult, since they cover only CSOs that are in favor with the government and prioritize government activities over those of CSOs. Media coverage is paid, with costs ranging from XOF 20,000 to 50,000 (approximately $35 to $90).

Public perceptions of CSOs are mixed. Most people do not know about CSOs’ contributions and find the notion of nonprofit organizations confusing. Some people do not acknowledge CSOs’ accomplishments or believe CSOs do not communicate well and are not interested in public management. However, some people trust CSOs because they benefit directly from their initiatives. In 2021, as the government increasingly engaged in dialogue with CSOs, more people came to view CSOs as resilient and responsible elements of society.

Central and local authorities increasingly rely on CSOs as community resources, although mutual distrust still persists. The government’s confidence in CSOs varies greatly depending on the area of intervention. The Ministry of Waters and Forestry, for example, is very attentive to the recommendations of CSOs involved in forestry governance, while the Ministry of Industry and Mines is wary of working with CSOs. On issues of democracy and
freedoms, only the opposition pays attention to CSOs. The government tends to regard certain CSOs as partners of the opposition.

The corporate sector perceives CSOs as consciousness-raising organizations capable of causing subversion and internal uprisings. This is true especially in the mining sector, where CSOs working on governance can find it difficult to communicate with mining companies.

CSOs increasingly seek to improve their public image and media relations. Nearly all projects, activities, and actions have a communications component. CSOs increasingly use social media to raise awareness and strengthen visibility. CSOs that do not have communications departments call on experts or communications firms for assistance.

Except for a few experienced CSOs, most organizations do not have codes of ethics. CSOs rarely post their bylaws, if they exist. The major CSOs publish their annual activity reports online, but other CSOs, trade unions, cooperatives, and religious associations rarely do so.
The major political event in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2021 was the establishment of a new parliamentary majority supporting President Félix Tshisekedi. A new government was formed by Prime Minister Sama Lukonde, who was appointed in April 2021. The leaders of major government institutions, such as the National Assembly, Senate, and Constitutional Court, were also replaced. The appointment of a new chair of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) was especially contentious, as the leaders of the eight religious denominations charged with appointing the commission’s chair were unable to arrive at a consensus. Thousands of people protested in Kinshasa when the new chair was announced without a consensus. In July, the law governing CENI’s organization and operations was reformed to allocate seats on the commission to civil society groups, the ruling coalition, and the opposition. CSOs opposed the change as an attempt by the ruling coalition to take control of the commission, as coalition members outnumber civil society representatives and therefore are in a better position to influence the outcome of elections.

Security in Ituri and North Kivu provinces deteriorated in 2021 as clashes intensified between more than 100 armed groups. The United Nations (UN) Stabilization Mission in the DRC documented ten attacks on the country’s camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 2021, including a February 1 massacre in Ituri in which sixty-two people were killed with machetes and knives. Unidentified armed men attacked a World Food Program convoy, killing the Italian ambassador, his bodyguard, and his driver. On May 6, the president declared thirty days of martial law in Ituri and North Kivu, during which the provincial governments were suspended and replaced with military governments. Martial law was extended repeatedly through the year as the violence continued unabated. Peaceful protests against the insecurity and martial law were brutally repressed by the government.

The COVID-19 pandemic surged in a third wave of infections in June 2021. The DRC received 1.7 million vaccine doses in March, but the vaccination campaign was hobbled by the reluctance of many people to be vaccinated. According to the Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the unwillingness of the DRC public to take the vaccine was higher than in any other African country. Measures to prevent COVID-19 were tightened on December 4 with the introduction of a strict nighttime curfew, a requirement for masks in public places, mandatory social distancing, and increased infection control and prevention measures at the entrances to all public buildings. CSOs educated the public about the dangers of the pandemic and the prevention measures and distributed hygiene supplies.
After a pandemic-induced slowdown in 2020, the DRC’s economy rebounded to a 5.7 percent growth rate in 2021, according to the World Bank. Increased prices for mining exports such as copper and cobalt were the main drivers of growth. However, as inflation rose to 9.1 percent, the public’s purchasing power continued to decline along with their access to basic services such as water, electricity, education, and health care. The UN estimated in November 2021 that the DRC hosted more than 5.6 million IDPs, and 27 million people faced severe and acute food insecurity.

The overall sustainability of DRC’s CSO sector did not change in 2021. The legal environment deteriorated slightly after the imposition of martial law, which reduced freedom of movement and expression. CSOs’ financial viability was slightly weaker as funding partners redirected or reduced support for CSOs. All other dimensions of CSO sustainability were unchanged.

According to the Ministry of Justice and Keeper of the Seals, of 3,964 applications for legal personality as nonprofit associations in 2021, 68 organizations obtained status and 2,418 applications were still under review at the end of the year.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.6**

The legal environment governing CSOs in the DRC deteriorated slightly in 2021 as martial law in Ituri and North Kivu provinces curtailed freedom of movement and expression.

The requirements for registering CSOs are set out in Law No. 004/2001 of July 20, 2001, on nonprofit associations and public utility establishments. The process for obtaining legal personality is long and costly, especially for CSOs operating in provinces far from the capital city, Kinshasa. CSOs wishing to register must obtain approval from their line ministries and then submit applications with their founding documents to the second directorate of the Ministry of Justice and Keeper of the Seals. The directorate acknowledges its receipt of an application by issuing a written receipt known as an F92, which is valid for six months. CSOs in the provinces obtain provisional permission to operate from provincial governors, whose authority to grant such permission is ambiguous. During the period of provisional authorization, government officials make field visits at the expense of applicant CSOs to ascertain their effectiveness and viability. After the six months have elapsed, an applicant organization is assumed to have obtained legal personality. Many CSOs are uncomfortable operating on this assumption and prefer to re-start the application process as many times as needed to obtain explicit acknowledgement of legal personality. Most CSOs in the provinces operate solely with F92s or provisional authorizations from provincial governors because of the huge outlay of time and money involved in the registration process. Citizen movements and organizations focused on human rights also often operate with only F92s as they have difficulty obtaining legal personality.

Under Articles 40 and 45 of Law No. 004/2001, the government cannot interfere in CSOs’ management. CSOs must periodically submit activity reports to the Ministry of Planning and their line ministries. CSOs may be dissolved for violations of their statutes, the law, public order, or morality through a ruling of the High Court. Under no circumstances may CSOs be dissolved for political reasons. Article 22 of Law No. 004/2001 provides that CSOs with legal personality have the right to appeal government decisions, judgments they deem unjust or unfair, and certain decisions that violate basic freedoms or are harmful to CSOs.

The 2006 constitution and the laws of the DRC guarantee citizens’ rights to freedom of association, expression, assembly, and opinion. CSOs are free to discuss any topic, criticize the government, and participate in demonstrations as long as they respect the law and do not violate public order, morality, or the rights of others. However, according to a report by Human Rights Watch covering 2021, the government repeatedly restricted freedom of expression, suppressed peaceful demonstrations using lethal force, and arbitrarily arrested and prosecuted activists, journalists, and members of the opposition during the year. For example, three members of
the Jicho ya Raiya (Eye of the People) movement in North Kivu were arrested after they criticized the mismanagement of local health structures and remained in pretrial detention for the rest of the year. Two whistleblowers who exposed corruption at Afriland First Bank were sentenced to death in absentia in February. Thirteen activists from Struggle for Change (Lutte pour le changement, LUCHA) were arbitrarily arrested during a peaceful demonstration against martial law in November in Beni and remained in detention for the rest of the year. At least four national and provincial deputies were arrested for criticizing or opposing martial law. In November, the police prevented a protest by groups of lay Catholics and Protestants and opposition parties against the politicization of CENI.

CSOs do not pay taxes on donations or grants. Under Law No. 004/2001, CSOs with legal personality may apply for exemptions from certain other taxes by submitting a request to the Interministerial Commission of the Ministries of Planning and Finance and obtaining the approval of their line ministries. In 2021, of 297 requests for exemptions, forty were successful, twenty-one of which were from foreign organizations and nineteen from Congolese CSOs.

CSOs may engage in income-generating activities and collect revenues from the provision of goods and services, including through social and community enterprises. They may participate in government tenders under conditions specified in the law on public procurement. CSOs are allowed to conduct fundraising campaigns inside and outside of the country. There are no restrictions on Congolese CSOs’ ability to raise funds from foreign donors.

Congolese civil society is full of highly qualified lawyers who specialize in development cooperation issues and have worked with CSOs throughout the country, especially human rights organizations. These lawyers are mostly located in large cities and offer many of their services pro bono.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.1**

CSOs’ organizational capacity showed little change in 2021.

CSOs’ interactions with grassroots communities and beneficiaries suffered in 2021 because of limits on the number of people able to participate in training workshops, advocacy campaigns, demonstrations, and other events. CSOs usually identify their target groups and define their priorities and fields of action in conjunction with beneficiaries, who also participate in the design, implementation, and monitoring of activities. CSOs often train local community leaders to manage, implement, monitor, and evaluate projects in collaboration with beneficiaries. This participatory approach allows close relationships to develop between CSOs, their beneficiaries, and local authorities and fosters a sense of ownership of projects in targeted communities, which often end up taking them over. In 2021, some CSOs developed new strategies to stay in touch with their constituencies without violating pandemic restrictions. For example, to comply with social distancing measures, Publish What You Pay (Publiez ce que vous payez, PCQVP) held a series of meetings with only twenty people to obtain information for the 2018-20 report for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Other organizations continued to rely on video conferencing to maintain momentum in their interventions. The Coalition of Civil Society Organizations for the Monitoring of Reforms and Public Action (Coalition des organisations de la société civile pour le suivi des réformes et de l’action publique, CORAP) attended several online trainings on the use of social networks.

CSOs state their missions and objectives in their statutes. Larger organization use these statements to guide the development of strategic plans. For example, CARE International, which supports a gender equality and women’s empowerment project through its local partner, Women Jurists’ Dynamic (Dynamique des femmes juristes, DFJ), evaluated its 2021 strategic plan for the DRC to ensure that it was geared towards realizing this objective. In 2021, many CSOs revised their strategic plans because of the pandemic. For example, CORAP had to stop organizing the planned National Civil Society Forum on Energy because of COVID-19. Several development partners revised their
budgets to fund emergency humanitarian actions, such as awareness raising, the distribution of COVID-19 kits, screening, and vaccination.

Law 004/2001 sets out the rules for CSOs’ internal governance, including the need for regular general assemblies, the terms and authorities of boards of directors, the appointment and dismissal of management, and internal controls. CSOs’ statutes and internal regulations usually specify these and other requirements. Many CSOs do not hold general assemblies or organize board meetings.

Only large CSOs taking part in donor-funded projects are able to maintain permanent paid staff. Larger CSOs have accountants and computer specialists on staff and rely on outside legal counsel when needed. They sometimes send staff to training workshops or on exchanges to strengthen their leadership capacities. Other organizations hire paid staff for the duration of funded projects or, in the case of small organizations without sufficient funding, rely instead on volunteers. CSOs typically provide meals for volunteers and a small stipend to staff who participate in labor-intensive work, such as building roads, bridges, water wells, or latrines for schools. Very few CSOs are able to recruit a sufficient number of volunteers.

Large CSOs implementing projects funded by technical and financial partners or the government have quality equipment and vehicles. Despite their lack of resources and the poor internet connections in many provinces, CSOs increasingly rely on communications platforms such as Facebook, WhatsApp, Zoom, and Microsoft Teams. Only large CSOs have updated websites.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.8**

CSOs’ financial viability deteriorated slightly in 2021 as donors redirected funding or stopped offering support to CSOs.

Congolese CSOs are largely dependent on foreign sources of funding. The World Bank, European Union (EU), United States, Belgium, United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, and the Netherlands were still the major donors in 2021. The EU issued a new call for proposals that focused on support for citizen participation in society but did not grant any support during the year. The Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA) gave a $70,000 grant to the Women’s Forum for Natural Resource Government (Forum des femmes pour la gouvernance des ressources naturelles, FFGRN) for a project to empower women and girls working in the artisanal mines of Kolwezi.

Some funding partners redirected their resources to pandemic-response activities in 2021, while others reduced or eliminated funding for CSOs. For example, the Eastern Region Stabilization and Peace-Building project of the World Bank, the third phase of which was launched in 2021, no longer calls on CSOs to serve as implementing partners, thus depriving the sector of an important source of funding. Organizations losing funding under this shift included CORAP.

CSOs continued to have contracts with the government for services such as sanitation and road maintenance, in-service training for government staff, the payment of teachers’ salaries, and support for primary health care. For example, the government named SANRU the primary recipient for implementation of malaria prevention activities, with funding from the Global Fund. However, the Social Fund, which previously gave grants to a few CSOs to implement projects with support from the World Bank, changed its intervention strategy in 2021 and now works directly with beneficiaries.

CSOs find it difficult to mobilize funds from the private sector. In 2021, African Resources Watch (AFREWATCH) was able to secure funding from Wellspring to document community views in Haut-Katanga and Tanganika provinces regarding the environmental impact of mining operations by Chinese companies working under partnership agreements with the government.
A few local philanthropic organizations operate in the DRC, and their funding levels were stable in 2021. They often provide services directly to beneficiaries rather than going through other CSOs.

Other sources of funding are minimal, which prevents most organizations from diversifying their funding over the short or long term. Large CSOs, such as Caritas Congo, African Institute for Economic and Social Development (Institut africain de développement économique et social, INADES), and National Support Center for Development and Public Participation (Centre national d’appui au développement et à la participation populaire, CENADEP), collect membership fees sporadically. Faith-based organizations obtain in-kind support from their members. Some CSOs obtain donations from communities, but local fundraising was difficult in 2021 because of pandemic-related restrictions on social interactions.

Some CSOs generate income from the sale of goods and services. For example, the Center for Social Action Studies (Centre d’étude pour l’action sociale, CEPAS) publishes and sells books and rents meeting rooms. The Protestant Publishing and Distribution Center (Centre protestant d’édition et de diffusion, CEDI) generates revenue by printing and selling books.

Large CSOs have fairly well-established financial management systems. This is true, for example, of the Christian Action Center for Business Directors and Managers in the Congo (Centre chrétien d’action pour dirigeants et cadres d’entreprise au Congo, CADICEC), which offers training customized to its clients’ needs. Large CSOs usually use accounting software and undergo regular independent audits as required by donors. They also produce annual reports with financial statements and may offer training to financial managers, accountants, and cashiers on their staff. Small CSOs typically use simple accounting systems to keep track of income and expenses for small, one-off projects.

**ADVOCACY: 3.7**

CSO advocacy was unchanged in 2021.

Collaboration between CSOs and policymakers continued to take place through formal and informal channels in 2021. The Framework for National Consultation of Congolese Civil Society (Cadre de concertation nationale de la société civile en République Démocratique du Congo, CCNSC-RDC) and its provincial branches remained the main channel for CSOs to communicate with the authorities at the national, provincial, and local levels. CSOs could also reach decision-makers through established platforms and initiatives such as the EITI. For example, CSOs working in the energy sector under the leadership of CORAP and AFREWATCH helped produce a position paper on the need to integrate the electricity sector into EITI reporting. Informal channels of communication include many local groups that facilitate CSOs’ contact with public authorities, such as the Group of Organizations for Environmental Protection (Regroupement des organisations pour la protection de l’environnement, ROPE), Dynamique Pole, and Mwangaza Network. CSOs also use social networks to reach decision makers with letters, petitions, and other demands. For example, in 2021, CSOs working on the participatory budget interacted with the communal mayors and revenue departments of the City of Kinshasa via WhatsApp.

Several organizations demanded accountability for human rights violations committed in 2021. In a letter to the prime minister in April, Voice of the Voiceless (Voix des sans voix, VSV), Ukingo Weto Synergy, New Congolese Civil Society (Nouvelle société civile congolaise, NSCC), Haki Zangu, Lotus Group, and many other human rights CSOs expressed concern about the deteriorating human rights situation and massacres in Ituri and North Kivu provinces after the imposition of martial law. They criticized the sentencing of twelve activists from the LUCHA citizen movement to one year in prison for having “demonstrated outside the Goma mayor’s office to protest the massacres” and called for the release of anyone arrested or sentenced for having criticized martial law as well as
the sanctioning of any member of the army or the police who was known to have committed human rights offenses, including murder and torture.

A diverse group of women members of the Consultative Framework for the Congolese Woman (Cadre de concertation pour la femme congolaise, CAFCO) met with the president of the National Assembly to demand compliance with Article 14 of the constitution on gender parity. The Association of Women in the Media (Association des femmes des medias, AFEM) conducted a strong campaign demanding the arrest of officers who raped a young woman in Bukavu. An investigation into the matter was ongoing at the end of the year. In Rusthuru Territory, North Kivu Province, women continued to take part in meetings of the territorial security council as a result of CSO advocacy.

Other advocacy campaigns in 2021 included a successful effort led by the Union for the Defense of Consumer Rights in Congo (Union pour la défense des droits des consommateurs au Congo, UDECOM) to abolish the mobile device registry tax. CORAP and other members of the Mwangaza Network urged the government to adopt measures to compensate local communities for the effects of energy infrastructure development projects. At the end of the year, this issue remained undecided, although community input will be included in the final national energy policy. A collective of CSOs working on civic and electoral education provided recommendations to the National Assembly's Political, Administrative, and Legal Commission for reforming the electoral law. Under the direction of the Voice of the Handicapped for Human Rights (Voix du handicappé pour les droits de l'homme, VHDH), CSOs succeeded in ensuring the approval of a law to protect persons living with disabilities and a law on the promotion and protection of indigenous pygmy peoples.

CSOs' anti-corruption efforts in 2021 included the work of the Congo is Not for Sale (Le Congo n’est pas à vendre, CNPAV) coalition to expose the corrupt dealings under the Kabila government as well as opaque contracts allowing two protected sites to be opened up for oil exploration. “Congo Hold-Up,” a report published by a consortium of international and local media groups and CSOs, exposed massive corruption under the Kabila government based on millions of leaked documents.

CSOs are aware of the need for a more enabling legal framework. In 2019, CCNSC-RDC developed a proposed amendment to Law No. 004/2001 that includes, among other things, automatic legal status if organizations receive no response to their applications within six months, decentralization to provincial governments of the granting of authorizations, withdrawal of the central government from CSOs’ internal management, and withdrawal of the minister of justice from the process of dissolving CSOs. The proposal was still not submitted to legislators for review and adoption in 2021.

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**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.4**

CSO service delivery was stable in 2021.

CSOs normally provide services in a variety of areas, including health care, education, training, information, housing, water, energy, economic development, and environmental protection. In 2021, many CSOs continued to perform pandemic-related services, such as prevention and vaccination awareness-raising and the distribution of masks and handwashing kits. For example, SANRU, which typically works on primary health care, conducted activities to protect health-care workers against COVID-19 and distributed hand sanitizer, liquid soap, and paper towels in health facilities in Kinshasa.

To determine beneficiaries’ priorities, both large and small CSOs often conduct social perception analyses, community consultations, surveys, and participatory action research. They also engage in participatory evaluations to identify adjustments needed for project implementation. As a result of this interactive approach, the goods and services provided by CSOs generally respond to the needs and priorities of their communities. For example, in 2021, Action Against the Violation of the
Rights of Vulnerable People (Action contre les violations des droits des personnes vulnérables, ACVDP) offered training in sewing, hairdressing, and beauty services to empower young mothers in Kimbanseke commune. The Center for Social and Community Promotion (Centre pour la promotion sociale et communautaire, CEPROSOC) distributed solar kits to women in working class neighborhoods of Kinshasa. Women in Solidarity (Femmes solidaire) distributed impregnated mosquito nets in South-Ubangui Province. Several mutual health-insurance associations facilitated their members’ access to quality health care in Kinshasa hospitals.

CSO services are usually intended for members, but other segments of the population benefit as well. For example, the Association of Breeders of the Market Gardener Center of Kembanseke (Association des éleveurs du centre maraîchères de Kimbanseke, AECMK), Union of Market Gardener Cooperatives of the Pool Malebo (Union des coopératives maraîchères du Pool Malebo, UCMPM), and Union of Market Gardener Cooperatives of Kinshasa (Union des coopératives maraîchères de Kinshasa, UCOOPMAKIN) sell organic fertilizers to market gardeners at preferred prices. CSOs provide their goods and services without discriminating on the base of gender, religion, ethnicity, or other factors.

CSOs do not aim to generate income from their services, since, as nonprofit organizations, their primary purpose is to serve community needs. However, CSOs with expertise in particular areas sometimes provide paid services such as sanitation and research to the government or other CSOs. For example, the Friends of Congolese Teachers (Amis de l’enseignant congolais, AMENSCO), Women’s Development Action Association (Association femme action développement, AFAD), Action Group for Integrated Development (Groupe d’action pour le développement intégré, GADI), and many other organizations provide paid sanitation services in Kinshasa. Some organizations, particularly faith-based organizations, earn a portion of their operating revenues by renting out their meeting rooms and other spaces. In 2021, Hope Land Congo developed a fee-based capacity-building program based on an analysis of the needs of youth in the agricultural sector.

Authorities at both the national and local levels recognize CSOs as valuable service providers and rely on their expertise. In 2021, the Network for the Promotion of Democracy and Economic and Social Rights (Réseau de promotion de la démocratie et des droits économiques et sociaux, PRODDES), National Committee of Artisans of Congo (Comité national des artisans du Congo, CNAC), and Center for Exchange of Legal and Institutional Reforms (Centre d'échanges pour des réformes juridiques et institutionnelles, CERJI) were invited by the Ministry of State for Entrepreneurship to help develop a code for crafts and draft laws on entrepreneurship and startups.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.5**

There was no change in the sectoral infrastructure in 2021.

Several intermediary support organizations (ISOs), such as INADES and the Center for Perfecting Development Techniques (Centre de perfectionnement aux techniques de développement, CEPETEDE), facilitate access to training and technical support. ISOs are based in the capital and thus do not always meet the needs of provincial organizations. ISOs usually offer their services free of charge because they are supported by donors.

Local community foundations and ISOs sometimes regrant foreign funding to smaller organizations. For example, in 2021, with support from American Jewish World Service, CORAP was able to fund the organization of ten community forums in Kinshasa to gather public opinion on access to energy. Other foundations, particularly those affiliated with religious denominations, mobilized local resources to help people affected by natural disasters, such as the eruption of the Nyiragongo volcano in 2021.

Networks often offer training in response to needs expressed by member organizations. Several networks and platforms developed mechanisms to facilitate information sharing among their members in 2021. For example, the
Observatory for Public Expenditure (Observatoire pour la dépense publique, ODEP) shared information with its member organizations about the misappropriation of public funds as part of its broad campaign against corruption. ODEP also organized roundtables with its members to identify actions needed to support the work of audit institutions, such as the Court of Accounts and the General Inspectorate of Finance. CORAP held a capacity-building session on national energy policy for its members.

CSOs had access to adequate training in 2021, including many workshops held online because of the pandemic. For example, PCQVP provided training on natural resources and transparency. Local trainers are competent and have produced training modules on CSO management. CEPETEDEE has designed modules on accounting, fundraising, strategic planning, and other topics. Training is usually offered in larger cities, and training materials are usually in French rather than local languages.

Several CSOs partnered with the government, private sector, and media in 2021. For example, ODEP worked on a budget analysis with monitoring institutions and the media. CORAP was involved in elaborating the National Energy Policy under development by the Ministry of Water Resources and Electricity and collaborated with several state research institutions. The Local Development Initiative (Initiative de développement local, IDEL) partnered with the Boma mayor’s office, including the fishing division of Central Kongo. A CSO energy platform worked with the Kipay Corporation to examine the impact on local communities of the planned construction of the Sombwe hydroelectric power plant.

CSOs’ public image was unchanged in 2021.

The media is usually content to report on CSOs’ activities without attempting to analyze them. Many events organized by CSOs in 2021 were covered by national and international media, including Top Congo, Radio-Télévision Groupe Avenir, Radio-Télévision Nationale Congolaise, Radio France Internationale, and Voice of America as well as online news outlets. For example, protests led by Catholic and Protestant groups calling for the depoliticization of CENI was a story in many news outlets. Peaceful marches organized by LUCHA and the Filimbi movement to demand the abolition of martial law in North Kivu and Ituri and an end to the registration tax on mobile devices were also widely reported. CSOs must pay to receive coverage, although media outlets often give them discounts. In the provinces, CSOs often have partnership agreements with community radio stations. Radio Okapi, funded by the UN, provides free media coverage of CSOs’ activities throughout the country, and Radio de la Femme, which is broadcast in Kinshasa and Brazzaville, provides special coverage of women’s organizations free of charge.

Public perceptions of CSOs are favorable as long as their activities meet community needs. The public generally relies on CSOs to convey their wishes to the authorities. Understanding of the concept of CSOs is mixed. Many people confuse CSOs with UN agencies, foreign CSOs, and government departments.

Governments at the local and central levels as well as the business sector have increasingly positive perceptions of CSOs and trust them as a source of community connections and expertise. Politicians sometimes oppose CSOs if they denounce the government’s actions and policies as infringing on basic freedoms or threatening democracy.

Only large-scale CSOs seek to raise awareness about their activities through planned media outreach strategies. Some organizations develop relationships with journalists to promote positive media coverage. For example, in 2021, CORAP organized a group of journalists who had taken part in a capacity-building program on the electricity sector and the Grand Inga Dam. Smaller CSOs sometimes rely on communications experts to help them develop effective communications tools, although they find it difficult to attract media coverage because of their lack of funding. Some CSOs effectively use social media to raise public awareness, although poor public access to the
internet limits their impact. For example, in 2021, the CNPAV platform used social networks such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube to raise national and international awareness of corruption under the Kabila regime.

Large CSOs publish their annual reports in accordance with the expectations of their partners and line ministries. Some CSOs have adopted codes of ethics to be transparent with their donors. All CSOs belonging to the PCQVP coalition, including the African Association for the Defense of Human Rights (Association africaine de défense des droits de l'homme, ASADHO), CENADEP, and Concerted Organization of Ecologists and Friends of Nature (Organisation concertée des écologistes et amis de la nature, OCEAN), are subject to a code of conduct governing civil society’s participation in the EITI process. Although CSOs adopted a code of ethics for the sector at the second National Civil Society Forum in 2019, the code is not yet in use as the observatory responsible for overseeing its implementation is not operational.
The year 2021 in Ethiopia was turbulent, marked by war, political turmoil, humanitarian disasters, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Although CSOs suffered serious setbacks, they managed to maintain the gains of recent years.

The first national elections in six years took place in Ethiopia on June 21, 2021. Originally scheduled for August 29, 2020, the elections were postponed because of the pandemic and security concerns. In forty-six constituencies, problems with voter registration, logistics, and security caused a further delay until September 30, 2021. In the months leading up to the voting, prominent opposition leaders were jailed or disqualified from the ballot, prompting some opposition parties, including the Oromo Federalist Congress and Oromo Liberation Front, to pull out of the elections entirely. Running uncontested in several dozen constituencies, the Prosperity Party of President Abiy Ahmed won 410 of 436 seats. Some opposition leaders and political figures expressed distrust of the official results amid signs of fraud, but the government hailed the elections as historically inclusive and the head of the National Election Board called the elections “credible.” After years of repression, CSOs reached a milestone in engaging in civic and voter education, election observation and monitoring, and the organization of political debates.

As COVID-19 infections surged in the first quarter of 2021, the government restricted travel and social interactions and mandated the wearing of masks and social distancing. The impact of the pandemic—especially its substantial human toll, which included a number of public figures—was evident throughout the country. By late 2021, the number of reported cases was low enough for restrictions to be relaxed. Throughout the crisis, and despite the stresses that the pandemic imposed on their operations, CSOs responded tirelessly to the population’s need for health care and other support.

Tensions between the federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front turned into a full-blown war in the second half of 2021. Although the government persisted in calling its military operations “law enforcement,” the war intensified as fighting moved into the neighboring Amhara and Afar regions. The government declared a nationwide state of emergency on November 2, which included restrictions on movement, the closure of institutions of higher education, and mass detentions of people of Tigrayan descent. More than 2 million people were displaced by the conflict.

About 70 percent of Ethiopians work in agriculture. Their livelihoods were threatened by an unusually severe drought in 2021, especially in the southern and eastern areas. Along with flooding, locust infestations, and the war in Tigray, the drought caused food insecurity to soar. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated that 25.9 million people in Ethiopia were in need as of December 2021.
All of these pressures had devastating repercussions for Ethiopia’s economy. Although the economy continued to be one of Africa’s fastest growing in 2021, the real growth of the gross domestic product is expected to have slowed from about 6 percent in 2020 to 2 percent in 2021, according to the African Development Bank. The World Bank reported that inflation was as high as 19 percent at the beginning of the year.

Despite these multiple crises, the overall sustainability of the CSO sector did not change in 2021. The legal environment showed moderate improvement as the CSO Council became operational, the Authority for CSOs (ACSO) adopted directives favorable to the sector, and a new online system eased registration procedures. Advocacy improved slightly as CSOs undertook election-related and other advocacy campaigns and engaged effectively with various government bodies. The capacity of CSOs to provide goods and services was slightly undermined by pandemic restrictions, internal displacements, and funding challenges. Other dimensions of sustainability did not change.

The ACSO reported as of December 2021, more than 3,500 CSOs were registered in Ethiopia, including 3,040 organizations at the local level, 50 consortia, and 462 international CSOs. Nearly 700 CSOs, including consortia, registered in 2021 alone. This increase is attributable chiefly to a new online registration system.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.3**

CSOs’ legal environment showed moderate improvement in 2021 as the CSO Council became operational, the ACSO adopted directives favorable to the CSO sector, and a new online system eased registration procedures.

Under CSO Proclamation No. 1113/2019, all CSOs must register either as local organizations—which include membership associations, board-led organizations (organizations formed by two or more founders), charitable endowments, charitable trusts, and charitable committees—or as international organizations. Traditional religious institutions known as edir (burial societies) and equb (savings groups), which are deeply rooted in Ethiopian tradition, are not covered by the CSO Proclamation.

In a change from previous years, CSOs working on the federal level were able to complete their registrations entirely online in 2021. The change also eased the challenge of registration for CSOs in regional states, which previously could register only in person in the capital city, Addis Ababa, but can now complete all but the final steps of registration online. Registration requirements vary according to the type of organization. Typically, an organization must provide the minutes of the formative meeting indicating the names, addresses, and citizenship of the founders; the objectives and intended sector of focus; the region in which the organization intends to operate; and the organization’s rules as approved by the founders. Applications must be processed within thirty days of the date of application for local organizations and forty-five days for international organizations. Applications to register may be rejected if the ACSO believes that the applicant organization has failed to fulfill all legal requirements, but this does not happen often. The CSO Proclamation protects CSOs from arbitrary dissolution and provides mechanisms to appeal refusals of registration and other complaints.

CSOs are expected to submit annual activity and financial reports to the ACSO. With the objective of setting standards that apply across the board, the CSO Proclamation provides minimum requirements for CSOs’ internal structures, which CSOs consider fair and reasonable.

Under Article 85 of the CSO Proclamation, a CSO Council to advise the ACSO on matters related to the administration of the sector was established in December 2020 and became operational in 2021. All registered CSOs are council members by default, and three of the council’s board members serve on the ACSO board. In 2021, the council adopted a code of conduct that applies to all CSOs in Ethiopia. The council also played a critical role in the ACSO’s adoption in 2021 of five directives favorable to the sector. These directives cover CSO audit...
and compliance report submission mechanisms; CSOs’ merger, division, conversion, and dissolution; the monitoring and supervision of CSOs; conflict of interest; and civil society administration and registration. CSOs provided inputs to the directives, which are based on the CSO Proclamation. A civic engagement policy remains in draft form and did not progress during the year.

CSOs are generally free to engage in any lawful activity. However, international CSOs may not engage in lobbying political parties. In 2021, the government suspended Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF) Holland and the Norwegian Refugee Council for three months on charges of disseminating misinformation on social media and other platforms outside of their authorized purpose. MSF Holland was also said to have illegally imported and used satellite radio equipment. The ACSO suspended the Al Maktoume Foundation for three months for failure to comply with pandemic protocols and mismanagement of its budget. All three organizations were also alleged to have violated the law by employing foreign nationals without work permits for more than six months. The responses of the organizations are unknown. The government also expelled seven United Nations (UN) employees, saying that they had interfered in the country’s internal matters. No other state harassment of CSOs was reported in 2021.

Under the Income Tax Law No. 976/2016, CSOs are exempt from income tax on grants and membership fees but are required to pay tax on income derived from economic activities. CSOs registered at the federal level have duty-free privileges. To encourage philanthropy, corporations and individuals may deduct donations to CSOs of up to 10 percent of their taxable income. A mapping study of CSOs in Ethiopia conducted in 2021 by the ACSO in partnership with the British Council’s Civil Society Support Program 2 (CSSP2) and the European Union’s Civil Society Fund III (EU-CSF III) observed that nearly all CSOs are unaware of the tax regime.

The CSO Proclamation permits CSOs to engage in business activities, take part in government contracts and procurement, receive foreign funding from legal sources, and engage in fundraising activities.

Paid legal services are available to CSOs in Ethiopia.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.3**

CSOs’ organizational capacity did not change in 2021 and remained one of the sector’s most pressing issues.

In 2021, most organizations did not engage in constituency building because of the insecurity and nearly year-long state of emergency.

Most CSOs lack strategic plans, and programming is typically limited to one-off projects. Often projects are not community driven but instead are dictated by donors’ interests. The 2021 mapping of CSOs in Ethiopia confirmed that the various emergencies during the year, such as internal conflicts, floods, locust infestation, refugees, and the COVID-19 pandemic, forced CSOs to focus on relief and service provision rather than sustainable development activities. For example, most CSOs working in the regional states of Afar, Somali, Benishangul Gumuz, and parts of Amhara and Oromia sought to cope with the various calamities gripping the country. This situation was not appreciably different than in 2020.

The law prescribes minimal organizational structures for CSOs, such as a general assembly, executive committee, managers, and auditor. Organizations are expected to have written policies or bylaws that define their structures and guide their operations. Most governing bodies are not seriously involved in the administration of their organizations, and executive directors usually manage all operations. In 2021, the Pro-Just Research and Training Center trained CSOs on governance, highlighting the board’s role, responsibilities, composition, and structures. As the training was provided to newly registered CSOs, the impact of the training is uncertain, but few of the participating organizations contacted the center for future collaboration or board training.
The CSO Proclamation loosened the previously strict rules regarding administrative costs, freeing up funding that CSOs can now use to hire more staff. Nevertheless, CSOs in Ethiopia are too poorly resourced to maintain skilled employees. Staff turnover was high in 2021, and many local employees were recruited by international organizations offering better salaries.

The war impeded the sector’s technical advancement in 2021. In parts of the country, CSOs’ property was repeatedly vandalized, and internet shutdowns were widespread. Organizations were often unable to hang on to basic equipment needed for their operations, much less install modern office equipment or updated technology. Because of these events, a significant number of CSOs working in areas affected by war had to close their offices and dismiss their staff in 2021.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.2**

CSOs’ financial viability did not change in 2021.

Ethiopian CSOs are overwhelmingly dependent on foreign funding. According to the 2021 CSO mapping exercise, EU-CSF III, CSSP2, the UN, and USAID remained the major sources of funding for local CSOs. In addition, Islamic aid organizations, such as Kuwait Horizons Charity Societies, IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation of Turkey, Qatar Charity International, and Sharjah International, have emerged as a credible source of funding for CSOs. Although the exact amounts are not known, most CSOs perceived foreign funding to have increased in the first part of 2021. Later in the year, foreign funding was constrained by the country’s political environment, and various donors aggrieved by the government’s involvement in the war in Tigray withdrew their funding. Donors’ engagement was also negatively affected by the security situation. For example, CSSP2 was forced to close its regional offices in Amhara. According to the 2021 CSO mapping study, CSOs were involved in a total of 2,885 projects with committed funding of close to $2.75 billion for the period 2015–21.

CSOs made little to no attempt to raise funds locally in 2021, even if they faced closure because of dwindling funding. They tend to see fundraising as a fruitless exercise because the business sector, individuals, and the government offer so little support to CSOs. The culture of corporate philanthropy in Ethiopia remains weak. The sector’s ability to mobilize resources from communities and constituencies is equally limited, as a local culture of giving to CSOs is still rudimentary. Although legally permitted, there is no evidence that government bodies or local businesses contract for services with CSOs. In fact, as the war emptied the government’s coffers, the government competed with CSOs to raise money from local sources such as businesses and individuals. The CSO Fund, which was established in 2019 to support organizations working with vulnerable groups, allocated only in-kind resources such as office furniture to CSOs in 2021.

Although the CSO Proclamation allows CSOs to earn income through business activities, only a few organizations, including the Ethiopian Women Lawyers’ Association (EWLA), Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO), Network of Ethiopian Women’s Associations, Mekedonia Humanitarian Association, and Mary Joy Ethiopia, attempted to engage in income-generating activities in 2021. The sector has yet to try to mobilize resources through digital approaches such as crowdfunding.

CSOs are legally required to keep accounts of their incomes and expenses, conduct independent audits, and submit audit reports to the ACSO. Few CSOs publish their audit reports. Stronger CSOs have sound financial management systems, but the majority of CSOs do not.
ADVOCACY: 5.1

Advocacy improved slightly in 2021 as CSOs undertook election-related and other advocacy campaigns and engaged effectively with various government bodies.

Under the liberalization allowed by the 2019 CSO Proclamation, some government bodies are obliged by law to include civil society in their policymaking processes. For example, CSOs are represented on the ACSO governing board, the nomination board of the National Election Board, the Ethiopian Environment Council, the Federal Transport Council, and the National AIDS Council. The country’s humanitarian disaster in 2021 further expanded CSOs’ cooperation with the government. For example, CSOs helped search for solutions to the war in Tigray. The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, an independent government agency, collaborated with CSOs to organize a public dialogue concerning the elections.

Many CSOs in Ethiopia lack robust advocacy tools, are not accustomed to advocacy work, and, most important, lack knowledge about what lobbying and advocacy actually consist of. Nevertheless, the door seemed open to CSO advocacy in 2021, and several initiatives yielded results. A major CSO advocacy effort involved the national elections. Nearly 170 organizations, including Vote Le Ethiopiaye, Center for Advancement of Rights and Democracy, and Initiative for Peace and Development, registered to offer voter education. Thirty-six organizations, including EHRCO, Coalition of Ethiopian CSOs for Elections, and Consortium of Ethiopian Human Rights Organizations (CEHRO), registered to observe the elections. Most of these organizations received capacity building on election monitoring and voter education from the National Democratic Institute. CEHRO, Vision Ethiopia Congress for Democracy (VECOD), and other organizations also organized a debate among political parties on a range of current issues. The involvement of these organizations in the elections was a breakthrough for CSOs, as they had been forbidden from undertaking such work under legislation that preceded the new CSO Proclamation.

Other advocacy initiatives in 2021 included campaigns to help persons with disabilities, domestic workers, and victims of gender-based violence and to ensure minimum wages for industrial workers.

In an effort to improve the legal environment, CSOs provided comments on the draft directives improving the regulatory environment for the sector and, both at the individual level and through the CSO Council, successfully pushed the ACSO to adopt them. The long-due implementation regulation for the CSO Proclamation was still in draft form and expected to be enacted in 2022.

SERVICE PROVISION: 4.7

CSOs’ capacity to deliver goods and services was slightly impeded by the pandemic, internal displacements, war and natural disasters, and the state of emergency in 2021. In particular, restrictions on movement, CSOs’ refocusing on disaster-related services rather than their usual activities, and reduced access to funding undermined service provision during the year.

CSOs provide social services in areas such as health care, education, agriculture, livelihoods, water, and sanitation. CSOs’ engagement in other areas of service provision is limited, although their involvement in voter education in 2021 may signal an expansion of the sector’s service-providing role. With the pandemic and various conflicts taking place across the country, CSOs participated more actively in humanitarian and welfare-based projects, according to the 2021 mapping study.

Few CSOs conduct needs assessments or otherwise attempt to make sure that their services reflect community priorities. Services are usually determined by donors, as a result of which they may reflect donors’ priorities rather than community needs. Individual CSOs sometimes collect data on their contributions to local communities, but
there is no attempt to produce aggregate data at the country level. Legally, ACSO is responsible for collecting and publishing such data but has not started yet because of capacity limitations.

Professional associations, such as the Ethiopian Lawyers Association, Ethiopian Economic Association, and Ethiopian Public Health Association, provide services to beneficiaries beyond their own members. The Ethiopian Lawyers Association, for instance, provided legal aid to indigents in 2021. As the law dictates, CSOs provide goods and services on a non-discriminatory basis. It is occasionally reported that a few faith-based organizations use their services to promote their religions, which is both illegal and unethical.

CSOs rarely charge fees for their goods and services. On several occasions in 2021, the government extended recognition to CSOs’ service-providing efforts, acknowledging that those services are often ones that it is unable to offer. Funding support from the government to CSOs is almost absent and lacks institutionalization when it exists.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.3**

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector did not change in 2021.

CEHRO, the Consortium of Christian Relief and Development Associations (CCRDA), and other resource centers continued to provide CSOs with services such as office space, capacity building, and furniture during the year. The Ethiopian Civil Society Resource Center was established to serve as a resource center for CSOs, but in 2021, its performance was weak and it was usually short of funds. CSOs in remote areas find the center hard to reach, as it is based in the capital city.

CSSP2 serves as an intermediary support program and channels funding from the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, and Ireland to local CSOs for projects focused on gender transformation, young people, and citizen-state engagement. CSSP2 also provides capacity building. For example, in 2021, CSSP2 conducted training on coalition facilitation and networking for nineteen CSO partners and fourteen non-partner regional networks and coalitions and on using the media for advocacy for seventy-six CSO partner employees, including eighteen women. EU-CSF III and the multi-donor-funded ESAP continued to provide financial support, technical assistance, and training to CSOs. In October, EU-CSF III, in partnership with CSSP2 and ACSO, held a validation workshop on the 2021 mapping study of CSOs. In November, EU-CSF III conducted a two-day training on gender mainstreaming for grantees and women’s organizations, including government organizations. No other local grantmaking institutions or programs operated in Ethiopia in 2021.

CSO networks and coalitions have been formed to build the capacity of member CSOs. In practice, however, these groups sometimes operate in ways that lead to competition and conflict. CEHRO was considered the most active coalition in 2021. Until the CSO Council becomes fully operational, the sector lacks an independent umbrella organization to promote its interests as a whole.

Although training is usually directed to vibrant CSOs, Pro-Just Research and Training Center, in collaboration with the ACSO, broke this pattern by reaching nearly 300 newly registered CSOs in 2021. The training covered areas such as the CSO Proclamation, governance, human-rights-based approaches to development, and project-cycle...
Intersectoral partnerships are beginning to develop in Ethiopia. The government increasingly seeks partnerships with CSOs to implement service-delivery projects, such as the Urban Productive Safety Net Program. Government-CSO forums have been established mainly at regional and local levels. In 2021, some of these forums conducted joint research. CSOs such as Oxfam and Voluntary Service Overseas supported the development of the ACSO’s gender directorate. CSOs also worked with the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs on accessibility for people with disabilities. The collaboration between CSOs and government institutions in the battle against the pandemic was perhaps the most important milestone.

CSOs held several workshops for media in 20201. In February, Population, Health, and Environment Ethiopia provided training to media and other stakeholders on social accountability, human-rights-based approaches, and environmental legal frameworks. In March, the Ethiopian Media Council organized a training on election reporting for journalists. No CSO-business partnerships were reported in 2021.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.3

CSOs’ public image did not change in 2021. CSO leaders appeared more often in electronic and mainstream media and issued commentaries and position statements that were published by the media in 2021. At the same time, the media continued to treat CSOs as weak and unworthy of attention. Asham Television, a private company, and the state-owned Fana Broadcasting Corporation covered numerous stories involving organizations such as the Ethiopian Lawyers for Human Rights and EWLA. Radio stations offered a voice to CSOs such as Pro Pride on topics related to behavioral change. Otherwise, public media made little space available to CSOs. CSOs must pay for media coverage. CSOs’ engagement in humanitarian responses coupled with their role in the elections improved their reputation with the public in 2021. However, negative perceptions of the sector as self-serving still persisted.

The government’s perception of CSOs improved in 2021, as evidenced by its efforts to collaborate with CSOs on the pandemic and other challenges. This improvement is mainly due to political reform and the ongoing growth of the sector. In April 2021, the first CSOs, Government, and Private Partnership Exhibition and Conference was opened by high-level government officials, who made positive remarks about the role of CSOs.

Public relations is a weakness in the sector. Despite increased use of social media, most CSOs do not sell themselves well, as public relations work is not mainstreamed and organizations usually do not have staff in charge of communications. The 2021 CSO mapping study noted that “limited capacity exists among the CSOs on how to collaborate with the media.” However, the sector undertook several pro-media measures in 2021, such as inviting journalists to public events and training media professionals on the work and role of CSOs. For example, the Ethiopian Elderly and Pensioners National Association conducted a training for journalists and media house representatives on the vulnerability of older people in the eyes of the media. CSOs’ use of social media to draw attention to their activities also improved.

Self-regulation advanced in 2021 when the CSO Council issued a code of conduct intended to increase the transparency of CSOs’ operations. Although issued by a statutory body, CSOs initiated, drafted, and will monitor adherence to the code through the council. It is too early to tell whether the code will have significant impact, but it should be noted that it is mandatory for individual organizations to adopt the code. While CSOs endeavor to show accountability to the government and donors through project and annual reports, there has been no
significant improvement in downward accountability to beneficiaries, such as through public disclosure of annual reports.
Like much of the world, Gabon entered 2021 against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic. Early in the year, the government responded to the health crisis by extending the state of emergency, thereby restricting fundamental freedoms. Pandemic-related measures included a ban on gatherings of more than thirty people, limitations on travel, and a daily curfew taking effect as early as 6 p.m. Social protests broke out as the Gabonese people grew frustrated with the persisting restrictions and their effect on household economies. During the casseroles or “saucepan” movement launched by the Free Citizens collective in Libreville in February 2021, the public banged on pots and pans for five minutes every evening. The saucepan movement spread to several towns and led eventually to violent clashes, several deaths, and the arrests of several dozen people for violating the ban on public gatherings. Among the arrested were civil society leaders in Libreville, Port-Gentil, and Moanda.

In May, the government relaxed some pandemic measures. Curfew hours were shortened, religious ceremonies resumed, procedures for obtaining permission to travel were less onerous, and free testing became available. However, stricter measures were reinstated in November with another spike in COVID-19 infections. Government Decree 559 of November 25, 2021, replaced by Government Decree 0685/PM of December 24, 2021, made vaccinations obligatory for access to public workplaces and ended free COVID-19 testing, which thereafter cost between $30 and $80.

The COPIL-Citizen (COPIL-Citizen) movement was founded in November 2021 out of dissatisfaction with the steering committee established by the government to manage the response to COVID-19. COPIL-Citizen called for an end to the more onerous pandemic restrictions, especially the need to show vaccination cards to access public buildings and the high cost of COVID-19 tests. The movement also demanded public oversight of the government’s management of pandemic funds. On December 15, to protest the restrictions, COPIL-Citizen organized a twenty-four-hour general strike known as “Dead City,” in which citizens kept off the street for the day. Several people were arrested in connection with the strike. COPIL-Citizen also filed petitions with the Constitutional Court challenging Government Decree 559 and Government Decree 0685/PM. The Constitutional Court subsequently suspended the government’s strict anti-pandemic measures, declaring them unconstitutional.

The country was disrupted by other strikes in 2021. For example, in October, the National Education Union (Syndicat de l’éducation nationale, SENA) called for a nationwide strike of teachers, claiming that the government was violating the rights of public employees to benefit from training and career development. In December, the Professional Organization of Workers in the Petroleum and Annex Activities, Water, and Electricity, an umbrella organization of trade unions, called for a strike to protest mandatory vaccinations and the cost of COVID-19 tests.
In Senate elections in February, the Gabonese Democratic Party won forty-five of fifty-two open seats. With new powers resulting from constitutional amendments in December 2020, President Ali Bongo Ondimba, whose family has ruled Gabon since 1968, appointed the remaining seven senators.

Gabon continued to rely overwhelmingly on oil exports to fuel its economy in 2021. The slowdown in economic activity during the pandemic eased, and the country’s gross domestic product grew 1.7 percent after contracting 1.8 percent in 2020, according to the African Development Bank. However, the national debt continued to rise as the government systematically resorted to borrowing. Inflation and the closure during the pandemic of informal-sector businesses such as markets and street vendors continued to limit households’ purchasing power.

Overall CSO sustainability improved slightly in 2021. The legal environment experienced a slight improvement as the Constitutional Court declared some pandemic-related restrictions on civic space unconstitutional. Organizational capacity improved slightly as CSOs recognized that better internal governance is necessary to sustain their organizations. CSOs’ advocacy showed moderate improvement with several important successes in human rights, governance, and democracy. Service provision was slightly stronger as the easing of government anti-COVID-19 measures in the first half of the year allowed CSOs to resume offering services other than those related to the pandemic. The other dimensions of sustainability were unchanged.

It is difficult to assess the size of the CSO sector in Gabon because there is no centralized database and the last census of national non-state actors was conducted in 2017. At that time, the Gabonese Network of Organizations and Projects (Réseau des organisations et des projets associatifs du Gabon, ROPAGA) recorded 1,750 organizations.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.4**

The legal environment governing CSOs in Gabon improved slightly in 2021 with the Constitutional Court ruling that two of the government’s anti-pandemic measures restricting civic space were unconstitutional.

CSOs are governed by Law 35/62 on associations, Law 18/92 on public-sector unions, and Law 3/94 on private-sector unions. While registration is not a legal obligation, organizations must have legal personality to perform certain civil acts, such as opening a bank account or obtaining funding from foreign donors. Associations register in a simple procedure at the Ministry of the Interior. After applying, an organization receives a provisional receipt, which is valid for three months while the ministry investigates the moral standards of the founders and, if it deems necessary, obtains assessments from other ministries of the organization’s documents, activities, and compliance with relevant laws. Associations often operate on provisional receipts for much longer than three months. Unions register by submitting applications together with their bylaws and names of board members to the mayor’s office in the towns in which their head offices are located. The costs associated with registration are less than XAF 10,000 (approximately $18). However, the government makes little effort to disseminate information on forming CSOs or to raise awareness about registration procedures among the ministries authorized to give advice about CSOs to the Ministry of the Interior.

It is unknown whether any organizations were unable to register in 2021. However, Educaf and the Association for the Defense of the Collective Interests of Etimboué (Association pour la défense des intérêts collectifs d’Etimboué) struggled to obtain provisional or final documents attesting to their legal recognition. Their difficulties may have been due as much to bureaucratic red tape and the lack of coordination among government offices as their work on democracy, human rights, and governance and criticism of government actions.
Associations with legal status may apply for public benefit status, which enables them to access certain types of funding from sectoral ministries. Associations may be dissolved by presidential decree. CSOs may freely sue and appeal court and government decisions that they consider unfavorable.

CSOs are not required to submit activity reports to the government. CSOs that receive donor funds or engage in fundraising produce and publicize activity reports, but other organizations do not.

Although CSOs may act freely, fundamental freedoms of assembly, expression, and worship were restricted in 2021. Freedom of expression was weakened by provisions of the Criminal Code, Law 042/2018 of 2019, and Law 006/2020 amending the code in 2020, which impose fines for organizing or participating in a banned demonstration. In addition to the several deaths and the arrest of several dozen people participating in the saucepan movement, the pastor of Nazareth Church in Libreville was arrested for organizing a faith procession in violation of the ban on gatherings of more than thirty people during the pandemic. CSOs pushed back against pandemic restrictions by organizing the Dead City strike and filing petitions with the Constitutional Court challenging Government Decree 559 and Government Decree 0685/PM, which made vaccinations obligatory to access public workplaces and ended free COVID-19 testing. On December 15, and again on December 24 and 28, the Constitutional Court ruled in favor of civil society and suspended the government’s strict anti-pandemic measures, declaring them unconstitutional.

CSOs are not liable for income taxes since they do not engage in profit-making activities. CSOs do not pay tax on donations and grants. They are normally subject to value-added tax (VAT), although Law 027/2008 of January 22, 2020, allows CSOs to claim a deduction on VAT through a simple procedure. Law 039/2018 on patronage and sponsorship allows companies and individuals to deduct donations to CSOs from their taxable revenue.

CSOs may accept donations of materials and money and engage in fundraising campaigns. CSOs may charge for their goods and services provided the fees they collect are used for operating expenses. CSOs may compete for public contracts and accept foreign funding, although the acceptance of more than XAF 10 million (approximately $18,000) from foreign sources requires the approval of the government, which can use its discretionary power to block individual organizations. The status of the draft decree proposed by the Ministry of the Interior in 2020 that would strengthen government control of CSOs’ access to foreign funding was unknown in 2021.

CSOs have access to lawyers mainly in large cities such as Libreville, Port-Gentil, and Franceville. Lawyers’ fees tend to be high, and few organizations are able to pay them.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.1**

Organizational capacity improved slightly in 2021 as several CSOs sought to professionalize their operations by strengthening their governance and financial procedures.

CSOs use several methods to identify needs, including stakeholder mapping, socio-economic studies, advice from local pastors, and referrals by community members, businesses, and partners. For example, faith-based groups such as Caritas provide support to needy people identified through field visits and other outreach efforts by the Catholic Church. CSOs usually involve members and beneficiaries in their efforts to respond to community needs. Before pandemic restrictions were reinstated in November 2021, free COVID-19 tests and an easier procedure for obtaining travel permits helped organizations improve their outreach to constituencies. For example, Woman, Environment, Health, and Education (Femme, environnement, santé et éducation, FENSED) helped the women of Kango develop income-generating activities. CSOs that belong to the CSO Coalition for the Monitoring of Corporate Social Responsibility (Coalition des OSC pour le suivi des engagements de la responsabilité sociale d’entreprise, COSC-RSE) provided organizational and technical support to communities affected by forest exploitation and the palm-oil industry in
Ngounié Province. CSOs usually update their lists of members and beneficiaries annually to reflect their level of involvement in organizational activities. In 2021, the Observatory for Women’s Rights and Gender (Observatoire des droits de la femme et de la parité, ODEFPA) published a list identifying their beneficiaries by category, such as widows, orphans, and victims of gender-based violence.

CSOs define their missions in their statutes. CSOs typically seek to obtain funding for activities in an ad hoc manner rather than as part of a strategic plan. In 2021, CSOs that had joined the fight against COVID-19 in 2020 gradually refocused on the missions stated in their bylaws, although many funders, including the European Union (EU) and French Development Agency (AFD), continued to target pandemic-related needs. For example, the youth association Beautiful Stay (Beau séjour) returned to fighting men’s cancers, and ROSCEVAC engaged in advocacy and education to protect forest ecosystems. Monitoring mechanisms are poorly implemented, although some CSOs ensure accountability to donors by publishing annual activity reports.

CSOs’ internal governance and management bodies are stipulated in their statutes and regulated by procedural manuals that establish the principle of accountability. These bodies function poorly in most organizations. This was especially true in 2021, when the pandemic weakened CSOs’ ability to raise funds to develop their internal structures. Most organizations are run by an executive director, who reports directly to the general assembly. However, a small number of organizations have established clearly defined governing bodies that reliably participate in decision-making processes. For example, several local community associations in the palm-plantation areas in Ngounié created internal governance bodies in 2021. This initiative, which was led by the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) with financial support from AFD, sought to improve CSOs’ internal structures and mastery of environmental and social topics so that they could better mobilize communities to monitor the commitments of agro-industries. In July, the general assembly of ROSCEVAC revised the organization’s basic texts to recognize its new status as a subregional entity of the Economic Community of Central African States. In an effort to improve financial oversight, the eight members of the COSC-RSE coalition benefited from capacity building on financial reporting and management from WWF and AFD.

Only a limited number of CSOs have salaried employees. The National Organization of Oil Employees (Organisation nationale des employés du pétrole, ONEP), for example, employs thirteen paid staff. Most other CSOs find it difficult to hire employees on salary, in part because they must assume responsibility for additional expenses that they cannot afford, such as social security, health insurance, and taxes. To get around this difficulty, CSOs usually recruit consultants who offer specialized services such as research, accounting, or audits. Most organizations or their partners seek to build the capacity of members and staff. For example, in 2021, FENSED organized capacity building on participatory mapping for its members, and the staff of Brainforest received training on project management provided by its partner Act Together for Human Rights (Agir ensemble pour les droits de l’homme, AEDH). While CSOs relied heavily on volunteers to offer pandemic-related services in 2020, they used volunteers slightly less often in 2021 as pandemic-related activities decreased.

As their activities gradually resumed in 2021, CSOs continued to use online platforms such as WhatsApp, Zoom, and Google Meet. The cost of internet services remained high. A few organizations, including the Hivos Foundation and the Network of Free Civil Society Organizations in Gabon (Réseau des organisations libres de la société civile du Gabon, ROLBG), offered CSOs training on digital security during the year.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.3**

CSOs’ financial viability did not change in 2021.

CSOs remained dependent on foreign funding in 2021. Technical and financial partners such as AFD, United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF), Azobé Resource Center for Civil Society (a joint project of the EU and Embassy of France), and the African, Caribbean, Pacific–EU Culture program, launched several new calls for projects at the local level in 2021. For example, UNDEF announced a $300,000 program for projects to encourage women’s empowerment, community activism, and other causes, and AFD’s Sectoral Innovation Facility for Non-Governmental Organizations offered EUR 700,000 to 1 million (approximately $800,000 to $1.15 million) for defenders of the environment in the Congo and Amazon Basins. Other funding cycles entered their implementation phases. The Japanese International Cooperation Agency awarded XAF 48 million (approximately $87,000) to Synergy Children Gabon in 2021, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) gave a
large shipment of equipment to four local associations in Ivindo Department to improve their working capacities. Many new calls for proposals included a COVID-19 prevention component. For example, through Gabon’s pandemic contingency plan, EU funding for the pandemic response was made available to CSOs upon approval of the government steering committee.

The government offers some support to a limited number of CSOs, including public utility organizations focused on youth and social welfare organizations, such as the Sylvia Bongo Ondimba Foundation, Red Cross, Graceland, and Federation of People Living with a Disability (Fédération nationale des associations des et pour personnes handicapées du Gabon, FNAPHG). The criteria for obtaining government grants and donations are unclear, and they are allocated in a non-transparent manner.

Companies and corporate foundations sometimes contribute to local CSOs through partnership agreements. For example, in August 2021, the national health insurance agency pledged three years of support to Yemaly for its Girl, You Matter program, which fosters the leadership skills of young girls.

CSOs may contract to offer services to businesses and the government. In 2021, for example, FENSED contracted with Sustainable Landscape and the Gabon Special Economic Zone Port for a socio-ecological study and participatory mapping in Pongara and Ovan-Makokou Mitzic. Some CSOs earned money by marketing products and services. New Training (Formations nouvelles) offered paid three-month training courses in office automation in 2021, and Educaf bought school kits for families at negotiated low prices and resold them, earning 10 percent of the purchase price.

Gabonese CSOs are slowly beginning to fundraise. In 2021, the Faith Culture Education Network (Réseau foi culture education), Caritas, and Hadassa ran several collection campaigns marketing school kits and Christmas gifts to help parents whose incomes were depressed by the pandemic. SAVE organized a fundraising event to provide young girls in secondary schools with sanitary napkins. DigieWomen launched a fundraising campaign called Yamana Ndé (Let’s Help Them) with support from Dare to Undertake, Gabon (Osons entreprendre Gabon, OSEG) to train 100 girls in digital professions. The majority of fundraising campaigns are organized informally. While the government tolerates the solicitation of donations by CSOs, the Ministry in Charge of Social Affairs has initiated a review to provide more structure to CSOs’ impromptu requests for donations.

CSOs continued their efforts to improve their financial management in 2021. For example, organizations receiving donor funds published annual activity reports documenting their use of funds, and members of COSC-RSE benefited from capacity building on financial reporting and management.

**ADVOCACY: 4.5**

CSOs’ capacity to influence policies and laws showed moderate improvement in 2021 as they achieved several significant advocacy successes in human rights, governance, and democracy.

Various multi-stakeholder consultative frameworks promote communications between the government, private sector, civil society, and local communities. At the national level, these groups include the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) Interest Group, Tripartite Group on the Reform of the Labor Code, and National Interpretation Working Group of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil. The Working Group on Community Forests was founded in 2021 and contributed comments from stakeholders that helped validate the government’s national strategy on conflicts between humans and wildlife. At the local level, CSOs take part in various steering committees and project monitoring committees. Most of these groups operate informally and suffer from the absence of viable decision-making mechanisms. For example, CSOs have criticized the structure of consultations under a human rights promotion project funded by the EU and implemented by UNDP in partnership with the National Human Rights Commission, Directorate General of Human Rights, and civil society.
CSOs’ most dynamic interventions in 2021 concerned the pandemic. Civil society urged the government to lift pandemic-related restrictions and ensure transparency in the management of pandemic funds. Many of these actions were led by COPIL–Citizen, which issued analyses of government activities and organized press conferences requesting an audit of the use of pandemic funds. COPIL–Citizen gathered more than 16,000 signatures in two weeks on a petition expressing dissatisfaction with pandemic measures and then submitted the petition to the Constitutional Court in December along with its requests for nullification of Government Decrees 559 and 0685/PM. The Constitutional Court’s ruling in favor of COPIL-Citizen was the first time in Gabonese history that a CSO won a case before the court. The Dead City general strike called by COPIL–Citizen in December was also widely successful. SOS Prisoners and networks such as Turning the Page (Tournons la page, TLP) and ROLBG advocated for the release of youth leaders detained for questioning during the saucepan movement, and three of the five youths were released.

Other successful advocacy efforts by CSOs in 2021 included the validation of Gabon’s EITI candidacy and the investigation and subsequent indictment of Perenco, an international oil company, for an environmental disaster in Etimbo Department in 2020.

CSOs are comfortable lobbying to influence legislation. Their successes during the year included the promulgation in September 2021 of Law 006/2021 on the elimination of violence against women, which was promoted by ODEFPA, Malachie, Action for Gender, Women’s Outcry, and the Sylvia Bongo Ondimba Foundation. Women’s advocacy organizations also celebrated the promulgation in September of Law 004/2021, which modified provisions of Law 15/72 on the Civil Code to redefine family and marriage relations by balancing the rights, responsibilities, and duties of spouses, especially concerning the status of persons and inheritances.

Gabonese civil society understands that the sustainability of civil society depends on a favorable legal environment. To improve their performance, CSOs continued to push for the reform of Law 35/62 on associations, public utility decrees, and the law governing the National Commission on Human Rights.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 5.0**

CSO service provision improved slightly in 2021 as the easing of pandemic measures in the first half of the year allowed them to resume services other than those related to COVID-19. However, these services were insufficient to cover all needs arising during the pandemic.

Gabonese CSOs normally offer a variety of services in areas such as health care, education, support for vulnerable populations, capacity building, awareness raising, legal assistance, and women’s empowerment. In 2021, ODEFPA and ASAFAK raised awareness about female cancers and violence against women and continued to offer legal support to women, including widows. Caritas and the National Association of Midwives of Gabon (Association nationale des sages-femmes du Gabon, ASFG) organized medical consultations, while SOS Prisoners and the Gabonese Association for Social Work (Association gabonaise des œuvres sociales, AGOS) continued to help with the social reintegration of young people released from prison. ONEP led negotiations for a new agreement between the Gabonese...
Petroleum Products Storage Corporation and its employees to improve the latter’s social benefits. Brainforest and WWF helped cocoa planters organize into a cooperative, and COSC-RSE set up four departmental platforms and a provincial federation of communities affected by agro-industrial oil palm plantations in Ngounié Province.

Capacity building was also a focus of CSOs’ service provision. WWF, Publish What You Pay (Publiez ce que vous payez, PCQVP), New Training (Formations nouvelles), and the Network of CSOs for the Green Economy in Central Africa (Réseau des organisations de la société civile pour l'économie verte en Afrique centrale, ROSCEVAC) organized training for local communities and other CSOs on advocacy, project design, and the use of digital tools such as infographics and social media. The Union of Social Security Professionals (Syndicat des professionnels de sécurité sociale, Sypross) educated its members on preventing and treating COVID-19, while the Gabon Youth Union for Progress (Union jeunesse du Gabon pour le progrès, UJGP) distributed 6,000 surgical masks to residents of Libreville, Owendo, and Akanda.

CSOs base their services on surveys and other research reports, requests from targeted communities and other actors, field observations, and current events. Their services respond to the varying needs of beneficiaries. For example, in December 2021, after communities requested help defending their substantive and procedural rights, WWF, in partnership with eight local CSOs, built community capacity as part of a program to mobilize local communities affected by palm-tree plantations. To document the extent to which they fulfill community needs, CSOs often produce activity reports, studies, evaluations, and videos.

CSOs’ services are generally free of charge and available to all segments of society that request them. Some CSOs charge for their services, with fees based on users’ ability to pay, which is usually minimal compared to the actual cost of services. For example, IDRC Africa’s charged the very low fee of XAF 10,000 (approximately $17) for its “agripreneur” training program in 2021.

CSOs sometimes contract with companies for service provision, usually on a short-term basis. CSOs also receive funding for services from corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs. For example, in 2021, the Gabonese Brewing Company supported the Green Thursday initiative, in which citizens did something voluntarily for the environment once a week, and a beach clean-up project of the Gabonese Network for the Environment and Sustainable Development (Réseau gabonais pour l'environnement et le développement durable, RGEDD).

The government appreciates CSOs’ activities that conform with its interests. For example, in 2021, the government worked with Action for Gender (Agir pour le genre), Malachie, Women’s Outcry (Cri de femme), Sylvia Bongo Ondimba Foundation, and other organizations to promote legal reforms to protect women’s rights.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.1**

The infrastructure supporting CSOs was stable in 2021.

Resource centers such as the Azobe Resource Center for Civil Society, which is funded by the EU, and the Civil Society House, which is funded by a government donation and income from fees charged to users, continued to offer financial and technical support to CSOs in 2021. For example, in November, the Azobe Center offered training on gender mainstreaming. With EU support, the National Commission on Human Rights offered office space, office equipment, and internet access to CSOs working on human rights. Intermediary support organizations (ISOs) were less visible during the year, although they continued to provide CSOs with multifaceted support.

Local foundations exist, but it is difficult to assess how much funding they make available to CSOs and the origin of their funds. The Sylvia Bongo Ondimba Foundation normally supports CSOs but in 2021 funded only three CSOs.
along with a capacity-building activity for one organization. The Agathe Okumba d'Okwatsegue Prize, which recognizes achievements in the fight for women’s rights, awarded financial support totaling XAF 50 million (approximately $100,000) to some CSOs.

Several thematic platforms enable CSOs to work together, share information, and develop joint strategies on issues of common interest. These platforms, the most prominent of which include Gabon My Land My Right (Gabon ma terre mon droit, GMTMD), ROSCEVAC, National Youth Network for Sexual and Reproductive Health (Réseau national des jeunes pour les questions de santé sexuelle et de la reproduction, RENAPS/AJ), Dynamique Unitaire, and COSC-RSE Gabon, usually support the activities of individual members, especially if they are active in advocacy. The Community Alternative Group (Groupe alternative communautaire, GAC), set up in 2020 to organize the contribution of CSOs to the fight against COVID-19, ceased to exist at the end of 2021 and was replaced by COPIL-Citizen.

Gabonese CSOs benefited from a number of training opportunities in 2021, including a session on pandemic management and human rights offered by the National Commission on Human Rights, a workshop on associations from the Directorate for the Promotion of Associations (Direction de la promotion des organes associatifs), and training on digital security and EITI from Hivos and PCQVP. The French organization Agir ensemble pour les droits humains and ROPAGA offered several sessions on project development and resource mobilization. Online training continued to be offered in 2021 but was insufficient to meet all needs expressed by CSOs. Although Gabon is usually very dependent on international trainers, reductions in international travel during the pandemic allowed a few national experts to highlight their skills. Training is usually offered in French in Libreville.

Several CSOs partnered with companies to implement joint projects in 2021. For example, the Gabonese Brewing Company supported RGE DD’s Green Thursday and beach clean-up projects, and Bolloré Transport Logistic supported Omanda in promoting mother tongues. Such partnerships usually take place in the framework of CSR programs and are formalized through contracts. CSOs’ collaboration with the government takes place mostly through informal structures, such as the Sustainable Palm Oil Platform (Plateforme pour l’huile de palme durable). In 2021, in cooperation with the Prison Depopulation Commission, CSOs made qualified lawyers available to defend people in detention whose cases they monitored in cooperation with the National Human Rights Commission.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.8

CSOs’ public image was stable in 2021. CSOs work well with the media. Their access to traditional media, particularly public media, generally depends on their relationship to the government. For example, although at the heart of events in 2021, COPIL-Citizen was not covered by public media despite numerous requests. Private media covered COPIL-Citizen and generally continued to collaborate with CSOs. Media services are usually paid. The cost of television reporting is relatively high, averaging between $120 and $400. Public radio is accessible to all CSOs. The public has a positive perception of CSOs and appreciates their efforts to hold the government accountable. In particular, CSOs’ activities related to the pandemic in 2021 helped give civil society more credibility and strengthen perceptions that it serves as a citizen watchdog over government activities. High public trust in CSOs was evidenced in CSOs’ ability to obtain 16,000 signatures in two weeks on a petition to lift the government’s anti-COVID-19 measures. Similarly, CSOs’ Dead City strike in December had a wide public following. The government and the private sector continued to have a positive opinion of CSOs that were supportive of their activities in 2021.
Although often lacking communications plans, most CSOs consider it a priority to inform the public about their activities and beneficiaries. Their efforts to do so are usually spontaneous and rely on both digital communication and traditional media. During the pandemic, CSOs strengthened their presence on social media. CSOs have developed informal partnerships with media outlets to reduce the costs of media services.

Ethics is a key issue for CSOs. Several larger CSOs have their own codes of ethics, since they are important to foreign partners, and they incorporate basic ethical concepts into their internal regulations and procedural manuals. CSOs are among the only organizations in Gabon that prepare and publish annual technical, financial, and audit reports. Some organizations share information about their work only on their websites or in emails.
The year 2021 marked five years since the end of the rule of Yahya Jammeh, the autocratic leader who led The Gambia for more than two decades. After Jammeh’s electoral defeat in 2016, civil society, which until then had been dormant and marginalized, regained its voice and became a leading player in national affairs. By 2021, CSOs had consolidated their participation in public life. But challenges persisted, including pockets of resistance to civil society in the government and CSOs’ own limited financial and organizational capacity.

A presidential election took place in The Gambia on December 4, 2021. Incumbent president Adama Barrow, who had initially promised to serve a transitional term of only three years, ran for re-election and won with 53 percent of the vote. Polling was peaceful, and both domestic and international observers deemed the election free, fair, and transparent. During the election period, CSOs conducted voter education campaigns and deployed hundreds of election observers. CSOs’ participation in the election enhanced compliance with national and international electoral standards and helped generate greater public interest and trust in the electoral process. When the election results were declared and immediately rejected by three major presidential candidates, CSOs issued a joint statement confirming that the elections had been free and fair and recommending that any dispute be settled in the courts.

Interest and support for a new constitution for The Gambia remained high. After the National Assembly voted down a draft constitution in September 2020, CSOs advocated steadily throughout 2021 for passage of a new constitution. A bill to hold a referendum on a new constitution was rejected by the National Assembly. After his re-election, President Barrow promised to continue working on a draft.

Restrictions on movement and the size of social gatherings because of the COVID-19 pandemic continued to be in effect in 2021. The government launched a vaccination campaign to combat the COVID-19 virus in March 2021. The Gambia was hit by a third wave of the pandemic in July. Throughout the year, CSOs continued to raise public awareness about the virus and support communities, individuals, and institutions with services and equipment for prevention and relief.

The Gambia’s economy was estimated by the World Bank to grow by 5.6 percent in 2021 after a 0.2 percent contraction in 2020. Among the main sectors, tourism rebounded and remittances reached record heights. The poverty rate declined from 9.2 percent in 2020 to 8.3 percent in 2021, the World Bank reported. However, households were stressed by increasing inflation, which reached 11.6 percent by early 2022, according to the Central Bank of The Gambia.
Overall CSO sustainability improved moderately in 2021. The legal environment improved slightly with the enactment of an access to information (ATI) law. Organizational capacity was slightly stronger as several large CSOs engaged in strategic planning. Advocacy improved significantly thanks to CSOs’ increased awareness of their advocacy role and more effective engagement with state institutions, communities, and the private sector, including through strategic litigation. CSO service provision improved moderately in 2021 as many organizations provided pandemic-related services. The sectoral infrastructure improved significantly with increased training opportunities and intersectoral partnerships, especially with government agencies. CSOs’ public image was slightly more positive as their activities attracted wide media coverage and the public showed increasing confidence in CSOs’ ability to protect their interests. CSOs’ financial viability did not change.

CSOs have proliferated in almost all sectors in The Gambia. While the total number of organizations is unknown, the Ministry of Justice reported that more than 5,000 CSOs were registered under the Companies Act in 2021. The Association of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Gambia (TANGO), a coalition of NGOs, reported that it had 84 registered members in 2021. The Non-Governmental Organization Affairs Agency (NGOAA) reported 125 registered NGOs in 2021.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.1**

The legal environment for CSOs improved slightly in 2021 with the enactment of an ATI law, which will support CSOs’ efforts to ensure government accountability and responsive service delivery.

CSOs register as charitable organizations with the Ministry of Justice in a process that continued to be fairly open and unrestricted. After two years in operation, an organization may apply for NGO status under the NGO Act. Few organizations do so, as NGO status offers no substantial incentives or benefits. No difficulty with or rejection of registration was reported in 2021. CSOs do not have to register to operate, but registration is required if an organization wishes to open a bank account, undertake certain legal actions, or enjoy benefits such as funding.

The NGO Act of 2009 specifies the role of NGOs and sets out norms and expectations for their operations as well as the relationship between NGOs and the government and other stakeholders. No CSO faced deregistration or closure in 2021.

In July 2021, The Gambia’s National Assembly passed the ATI Bill, which the president signed into law in August. The bill resulted from close collaboration between the government and CSOs led by the CSO Coalition on ATI under the leadership of TANGO and the Gambia Press Union (GPU). The Gambia is the last country in Anglophone West Africa to adopt an ATI law, and the bill’s enactment was welcomed by local and international CSOs. The law will strengthen civil society’s efforts to combat corruption and abuse of office and promote responsive service delivery by public institutions.

CSOs are generally able to govern and manage themselves without interference from the state and to undertake any activity that they wish to carry out. In 2021, the space for CSOs’ operations was largely open and safe. Reprisals were minimal, and CSOs were able to organize public events with relatively little interference, especially in comparison to 2020, when CSOs’ ability to protest was severely constrained. However, there were several instances in which CSOs were denied police permits to stage public demonstrations, usually under the Public Order Act (POA) 2009, which requires organizers of protests and other public gatherings to obtain police authorization in advance and authorizes the police to grant or deny permission as they ‘‘deem fit.’’ The police

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1 The score for the legal environment was recalibrated from 5.5 in 2018 to 5.0 in 2019 to better reflect the situation in the country and align it with other scores in the region. The score for 2019 did not reflect a change in the legal environment, which remained largely the same as in 2018.
denied a permit to another group, Gambia for Five Years and Peacebuilding, to protest activities of the
Independent Electoral Commission, citing heightened political activity because of the presidential election. In
denying protests, the police often cited unspecified security reasons.

When permits were granted, the conditions were generally restrictive, confining protests to a narrow timeframe, a
small location, or an uninhabited location outside of town. For example, the police initially denied a request from
Gambian Women’s Lives Matter to protest the high rate of maternal mortality in November. A day later, the
permit was granted but restricted the protest to a small space and a timeframe of two hours. A solidarity march
for victims of human rights abuses in March was similarly restricted to a short time and small space. In some
instances, the government viewed protests as “causing violence or instability,” and the police used force to
disburse peaceful protesters, including supporters of an opposition presidential candidate, who were sprayed with
teargas in December as they gathered to hear their candidate reject the election results.

In May, charges of unlawful assembly against the leaders of the Three Years Jotna (Three Years is Up) movement
were dropped. The group had been formed in 2019 in reaction to the president’s announcement that he would
step down after three years, and members were charged after the organization staged a series of protests in 2020,
some of which turned violent.

CSOs’ grants, endowments, and income from the sale of products and services are not taxed. Local staff salaries
are taxed, but those of expatriate staff are not. Donations to CSOs from corporate bodies are not eligible for tax
deductions.

The law allows CSOs to raise resources from fundraising and the sale of goods and services. CSOs may accept
foreign funding. CSOs may compete for government contracts, which are sometimes awarded for activities in the
social sectors, such as building schools and health-care facilities.

CSOs have access to adequate legal capacity, although many organizations are unable to pay the high fees. Law
firms serving the entire country are concentrated in the capital, Banjul.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.8**

CSOs’ organizational capacity was slightly stronger in
2021 as several large CSOs engaged in strategic planning.

CSOs usually define their constituents as either their
members or targeted beneficiaries. Youth organizations
such as Think Young Women, organizations of persons
with disabilities such as the Gambia Organization of the
Visually Impaired, and professional associations such as
the Gambia Bar Association (GBA) and GPU mainly
serve their members. Non-membership-based CSOs
include Fantanka (Protect Oneself), a women’s rights
organization that helps survivors of sexual and gender-
based violence. Some CSOs serve both members and
non-members. For example, the Gambia Center for
Vicims of Human Rights Violations was started by
members who were themselves victims but now serves
non-members as well. These organizations are in constant touch with their members and constituents through
regular meetings and emails. They also promote their work and engage their beneficiaries through social media and
WhatsApp groups.

CSOs’ missions are set out in their constitutions. Many CSOs, especially more established and better-funded
organizations, have and largely adhere to strategic plans. In 2021, under new leadership, TANGO revised its
constitution and adopted a new strategic plan for 2022–26 to replace the plan that expired in 2017. GBA released
a strategic plan for the first time in its history for the period 2022–26.

More established CSOs, such as ActionAid The Gambia (AATG), United Purpose (UP), ChildFund (CF), and West
Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP)–The Gambia, have separate, functioning governance and management
bodies. Their boards are usually independent of management and have a significant impact on the way that their organizations function and perform. Smaller CSOs have a less well-defined separation of boards and staff, and the engagement of their boards can be minimal. Their board members are often chosen unilaterally by executive directors rather than elected or otherwise selected through a rigorous, transparent process to ensure board independence. These boards tend not to be actively involved in oversight, and as a result, organizational reporting tends to be poor. Most CSOs have constitutions and other policies that set guidelines to prevent fraud and conflict of interest. Some donors have anti-fraud and conflict-of-interest tools that they expect CSOs to adopt if they receive funding.

Established international CSOs with regular funding, such as AATG, WANEP–The Gambia, and the Young Men’s Christian Association, have permanent, stable staff with requisite competencies, job descriptions, contracts, and personnel policies. Staff members usually include accountants and computer managers. A few CSOs retain lawyers to use as needed. Some younger and smaller local CSOs, such as Gambia Participates, Beakanyang, and the Commission on Political Debates, are seeking to develop and stabilize their staff in terms of size and qualifications. Otherwise, the bulk of the sector has few permanent staff positions and depends largely on interns or volunteers.

Large CSOs, such as CF, UP, and GPU, have modern office equipment and uninterrupted internet access, allowing them to maintain functioning websites and social media accounts. Smaller CSOs are unable to maintain active, updated internet presence because of limitations in funding or expertise or inaccessible or unaffordable internet services. However, a small group of youth and activist CSOs, such as Activista, Team Gomsa Bopa, and Peace Hub Gambia, are adept at using social media to campaign on a wide range of issues, including voter education, peacebuilding, and combating harmful traditional practices. For example, Gambia Participates, a youth-led CSO that seeks to enhance transparency and accountability in the public sector, relies heavily on social media to expose corruption. During the pandemic, internet use increased as online meetings and training workshops became popular. Cybersecurity is not an issue for CSOs in The Gambia, as the incidence of cyberattacks is low. But cyberbullying against individuals has become a concern, and a movement has emerged to foster awareness of it.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.1**

CSOs’ financial viability did not change in 2021.

CSOs have limited sources of funding. The bulk of funding comes from foreign sources, including the governments of the United States, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands and international bodies such as the European Union and United Nations (UN) agencies. In 2021, overall funding increased as international partners supported CSOs’ involvement in the pandemic response, presidential election, and transitional justice initiatives. Most of these funding streams were for more than a year. Donors also continued to fund projects focused on such issues as the environment, anti-corruption, and sexual and gender-based violence.

Larger CSOs, including AATG, UP, WANEP–The Gambia, and CF, often subgrant donor funding to smaller organizations or submit joint proposals with smaller CSOs as junior partners. For example, in 2021, AATG provided grants to community and farmer associations and youth groups such as Activista. CF supported community-based child rights associations such as the Ding-Ding Yiriwa Federation.

Local sources of funding are limited. Gambian businesses and philanthropists provide little support. When they do, their support is usually limited and one-off. For example, beverage companies may provide participants in marches with water and other supplies. The government occasionally contracts with CSOs for services in social sectors such as education and health care or provides grants to CSOs for work on projects funded by the UN or World Bank, whose approaches are inclusive of civil society. For example, in 2021, AATG planted trees in rural Gambia under a UN-funded environmental project implemented by the Ministry of Environment.
CSOs do not earn much revenue from marketing services and products or renting facilities. Some CSOs earn limited income by offering agricultural produce, farming implements, and other goods to beneficiaries at below-market prices. Membership associations earn small amounts from dues, which members often do not pay regularly or in full. There are no social enterprises in The Gambia. Crowdfunding is not a common practice, and CSOs rarely organize fundraising activities such as sporting or cultural events. Communities and constituencies sometimes provide CSOs with in-kind support such as free labor.

CSOs’ financial management is not robust except in more established organizations, which must adhere to donors’ increasingly strict requirements for sound financial management. These organizations usually have specialized staff, defined accountability procedures, and fully computerized operations. Smaller and local organizations usually have bank accounts and accountants but often lack standard internal controls. Most CSOs other than larger organizations supported by donors do not prepare annual financial statements or conduct periodic independent audits. Like the rest of society, the CSO sector is sometimes involved in reports of corruption and a lack of accountability.

**ADVOCACY: 3.6**

CSO advocacy improved significantly in 2021 as CSOs were more aware of their role in advocacy and engaged more effectively with state institutions and communities, including through strategic litigation.

CSOs communicate directly with policy makers at the central and local levels. The government perceives CSOs to be its development partners and relies on them for support, especially in rural areas and poor communities. Top government officials and lawmakers are open to engaging with CSOs even if they do not always consider their suggestions. For example, after the draft constitution failed to gain approval in the National Assembly in September 2020, the Ministry of Justice engaged CSOs such as TANGO, GBA, and WANEP–The Gambia in early 2021 to help revive the drafting process. TANGO led CSOs’ efforts, which included a consultative conference in which civil society defined its role and expected contribution to the drafting process. By the end of the year, it was too early to tell whether CSOs’ recommendations were included in the new draft constitution. At the local level, many CSOs worked closely with local councils on a wide range of issues facing individual communities.

Victim-led CSOs worked with the Truth, Reconciliation, and Reparations Commission (TRRC), which is investigating human rights violations and abuses that occurred during the Jammeh regime, to ensure that victims and their concerns were heard. For example, the Gambia Center for Victims of Human Rights Violations helped victims stay in touch with the TRRC, and several CSOs, including TANGO, the Victims Center, and the African Network against Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances (ANEKED), organized a solidarity march in October to push the government to implement the TRRC’s recommendations for protecting the rights of victims. In response to this advocacy, the Ministry of Justice announced that it would allocate GMD 150 million (approximately $3 million) for reparations to victims in the 2022 budget. The CSO technical working group on transitional justice continued to have a consultative relationship with the TRRC and track its work to ensure that the investigation was transparent and responsive.

CSOs played a major role in the run-up to the December presidential elections by promoting voter registration among youth, women, and persons with disabilities. The Elections Watch Committee, a civil society consortium comprised of Peace Ambassadors–The Gambia (PAG), Activista, and National Youth Parliament, deployed more than 300 political campaign monitors and election observers. The CSO Coalition on Elections, composed of more than twenty-five CSOs, and Gambia Participates together deployed nearly 600 election observers. One of civil society’s major election events was the Rock the Vote concert led by the CSO Coalition on Elections, GBA,
National Youth Parliament, Activista, PAG, and WANEP–The Gambia. Gambia Participates created a mobile app to collect and share information about political parties and candidates, the election results, and other electoral issues. Gambia Participates and the Center for Research and Policy Development (CPRD) successfully challenged a decision of the National Assembly to allocate more than $1 million in loans to assembly members through the use of strategic litigation. The same organizations, in partnership with a local councilor, won a case against the mayor of Banjul, the Independent Electoral Commission, and the attorney general, which confirmed that the mayor did not have the power to issue attestations to Banjul residents before they could register to vote.

In legislative activity, members of the National Assembly Committee on Information held a consultative meeting with members of the CSO Coalition on ATI to hear their views on the ATI Bill, which the coalition had drafted and the National Assembly approved later in 2021. The parliamentary Committee on Human Rights invited organizations of persons with disabilities to review the Disability Bill, which was spearheaded by the Gambia Federation of the Disabled and its affiliates and was enacted later in 2021. TANGO, GBA, CSO Coalition on Elections, and various youth groups reviewed the Elections Bill, while the Open Society Platform The Gambia, Anti-Corruption Coalition, and Gambia Participates offered comments on the Anti-Corruption Bill. It is not known whether CSOs’ comments were included in these draft laws, as they have yet to be tabled in the parliament. CSOs were not able to move along revisions of the Criminal Code and Indemnity Act.

Key CSO networks and organizations expressed the need for the POA to be revised so that constitutional guarantees of the right to peaceful assembly and demonstration are protected. However, progress on revising the act was minimal in 2021. CSOs would like to see the Companies Act and NGO Act harmonized into a single law governing the sector and offering “one-stop shop” for registration. Several efforts by TANGO to ensure a review of the NGO Act in 2021, including consultations with NGO Affairs Agency, CSOs, and the Ministry of Justice, failed to yield results.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.2**

CSO service provision improved moderately in 2021 as many CSOs provided pandemic-related services to communities. Organizations such as TANGO, Peace Ambassadors, and AATG provided food and handwashing detergent to communities, mosques, schools, markets, and other public places.

CSOs provide a wide range of goods and services in all sectors, from education and health care to skills training for farmers, women, and youth. Many service-providing organizations address environmental concerns by, for example, planting trees and distributing farming equipment and seeds. The Gambia Family Planning Association provides health-care services, CF provides educational services, and AATG and UP support farmers and rural communities. WANEP–The Gambia, the Gender Platform, Think Young Women (TYW), and other networks and women’s rights organizations provide capacity building on peacebuilding, gender, and women’s rights. Other CSOs also offer training to individuals, communities, and public- and private-sector institutions.

After the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, Gambian CSOs immediately became major actors in raising public awareness about the virus and supporting communities with vital supplies. These activities continued in 2021. For example, the Vision Development Foundation provided food items to several communities. Similar interventions were carried out in rural and poor communities by RAID-Gambia, Hands-on-Care, Tumana Agency for Development, and 4H The Gambia.

CSOs are close to the Gambian people, and almost every community is home to or served by a CSO. CSOs are aware of the needs and circumstances of individual communities and use that knowledge to guide their interventions. For example, the Agency for Village Support (AVISU), which seeks to eradicate poverty, is a
constant presence in the northern area of Central River Region, one of the most deprived areas of the country. In North Bank Region, the 4H provides educational services. In the Upper River Region, Beakanyang, an indigenous human rights organization, offers human rights education to communities. Many CSOs, including AATG, UP, and various youth groups, have scores of fieldworkers who crisscross the country to visit communities and conduct meetings, collect data, and carry out other activities. For example, in October 2021, AATG and its partners conducted a semi-annual participatory review to discuss the impact of the organization’s work in local communities.

CSO services often benefit groups beyond their members and constituents. For example, TANGO, a membership organization, offers training, information, and advisory services to organizations that are not members. Youth groups such as Activista and Think Young Women usually reach out to many young people other than their members.

CSOs usually offer their services free of charge. Some organizations offer health care or educational services at minimal fees to support the cost of their clinics or schools. CSOs working in agriculture sometimes provide farmers with seeds, fertilizer, and other necessities at a very low cost.

The government’s recognition of the role and contribution of civil society was indicated in 2021 by its invitation to CSOs to take part in the constitution-building process. During the pandemic, the minister of health, in reporting to the parliament, acknowledged CSOs’ contribution to raising awareness, providing protective equipment, and helping with policy issues.

SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.8

The infrastructure for civil society improved significantly in 2021 as training opportunities increased and CSOs’ intersectoral partnerships grew, especially with government agencies.

Several CSOs, such as AATG and Future in Our Hands, run libraries and resource centers that are open to the public. A few international organizations such as the International Republican Institute and National Democratic Institute (NDI) operate in The Gambia and provide training and funding to CSOs. In 2021, NDI helped strengthen CSOs’ capacity to observe electoral processes and built the capacity of PAG to undertake strategic planning, electoral observation, and external communications.

There are no locally funded grantmaking organizations in The Gambia. Some larger CSOs, such as AATG and CF, continued to provide grants to smaller organizations using funds from international donors. A few companies and wealthy individuals offer very limited support to CSOs.

Cooperation within Gambian civil society is strong and growing. TANGO serves as the umbrella organization for NGOs by coordinating their activities and advocating on their behalf. TANGO also provides capacity building and information to CSOs. Many coalitions exist, usually based on themes such as youth, health care, peacebuilding, or children. Coalition members share information and collaborate on joint activities. Among new coalitions in 2021, the Gender Platform coordinated CSOs’ positions on constitutional reforms to increase women’s representation in the parliament, and the Anti-Corruption Coalition brought together CSOs to discuss the Anti-Corruption Bill. Many networks, including TANGO, Child Protection Alliance (CPA), and WANEP–The Gambia, conducted training needs assessments and provided training to CSOs in 2021.

Various training workshops were offered to CSOs in 2021 on issues ranging from financial management to election observation, advocacy, and the environment. The training was usually offered by public institutions such as the National Human Rights Commission, University of The Gambia, Legacy University, and International Open University or international agencies such as the UN, World Bank, and Economic Community of West African States. Some international CSOs, including Amnesty International, Institute for Human Rights and Development in
Africa (IHRDA), Westminster Foundation for Democracy, and International Federation of Journalists, also offered training. For example, the West African Civil Society Institute–The Gambia and Change the Game Academy offered training and technical assistance on domestic resource mobilization and alternative funding models to community-based organizations and self-help groups. Groups benefiting from this training included Raise the Youth Foundation, Rural Poor Association–The Gambia, Catholic Education Secretariat, and Lamin Health Center. IHRDA also provided training to human rights, victim-led, and women’s rights organizations on the implementation of TRRC recommendations. Some organizations have in-house experts who offer training to fellow staff members or other CSOs. There are no specialized training institutes for CSOs in The Gambia.

CSOs worked more closely with government agencies in 2021, focusing on issues such as the pandemic, elections, transitional justice, and constitution building. For example, the CSO Coalition on Elections had several engagements with the Independent Electoral Commission about peaceful and transparent elections. The Ministry of Justice engaged CSOs on the preparation of a government white paper on the TRRC. CSOs usually engage with these partners through policy forums, media programs, and seminars.

CSOs also cooperated effectively with the media in 2021. For example, GPU set up a media council to serve as a self-regulatory mechanism for the media, which the public can use to report harmful media coverage. CSOs’ relationship with the private sector remained limited. Large businesses with corporate social responsibility programs, such as TAF Africa Global and Qcell, prefer to work directly with communities, and cooperation with CSOs is rare.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.3**

CSOs’ public image was slightly stronger in 2021 as their activities attracted wide media coverage and the public showed increasing confidence in CSOs’ ability to protect their interests.

Media coverage of CSOs is generally positive. Various online and terrestrial television stations, radio stations such as West Coast Radio and Star FM, and newspapers such as Foroyaa and The Point provided wide coverage of CSOs’ press conferences, seminars, and protests in 2021. For example, the October solidarity march for victims of human rights abuses under the Jammeh regime and The Gambia Women’s Lives Matter march in November attracted considerable media attention.

Public perceptions of CSOs are positive. Most people in the country have benefitted from CSOs’ interventions and approve of their growing visibility on governance issues and efforts to hold public and private institutions accountable. Ordinary people are now more comfortable reporting cases of abuse and other infringements to CSOs because they believe that CSOs can act and effect change. CPA, for example, received many more reports of child abuse in 2021.

The government engages actively with CSOs and appreciates their role and contributions, especially at the local level. Tensions occasionally flare up between the government and CSOs over issues of governance and accountability. At the highest level of government, there is lingering apprehension and sometimes outright disdain for receiving, listening to, and agreeing with civil society. However, the working relationship between CSOs and the government is generally cordial, even as the two sides agree to disagree on issues such as human rights and public-sector transparency.

Businesses have largely favorable perceptions of CSOs. While there have been no huge donations from the private sector, CSOs have enjoyed piecemeal support from businesses for public events.

Large and medium-sized CSOs undertook efforts to raise their public profiles in 2021, relying heavily on the media not just to provide coverage of their activities but also to popularize them. Some organizations buy radio and television airtime to conduct weekly shows. For example, Activista has a weekly radio talk show on QRadio called...
The Mainstream, in which young people discuss national issues and youth participation. CPRD runs a weekly program called Mandate, also on QRadio, which features young people discussing governance and accountability. CSOs effectively use social media and other platforms in addition to operating their own websites.

There is no general code of conduct for CSOs. Individual organizations and several networks such as CPA have codes of conduct for their staff and members. CSOs submit their financial accounts to donors and the NGOAA but do not usually publish them. NGOs that are members of TANGO are required to submit annual reports, audited accounts, and financial reports to that group as well.
On January 7, 2021, when Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo began his second term as president of Ghana, the country’s political environment was highly polarized. The National Democratic Congress (NDC), Ghana’s opposition party, was contesting the validity of the presidential and parliamentary election results as declared by the Electoral Commission of Ghana in December 2020. The NDC presidential candidate filed a case asking the Supreme Court to annul Akufo-Addo’s victory. Unlike in 2012, when a similar petition dragged on for nearly eight months, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously on March 4 that Akufo-Addo was rightfully elected. Meanwhile, a drawn-out and chaotic election of the speaker of the parliament took place in the hung parliament resulting from the parliamentary election. The polarized political environment continued throughout the year and was evident in the absence of consensus building in most of the parliament’s deliberations.

Threats to Ghana’s security increased in 2021. Internally, conflicts arose from lingering or unresolved issues involving chieftaincy and access to control of land and natural resources. Externally, violent extremism spilled over from the Sahel region. The government launched a national security strategy in 2021 to respond holistically to threats and risks, promote government-community led partnerships, and strengthen community resilience.

The COVID-19 pandemic shaped Ghana’s overall governance and social situation in 2021. Through the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access, a pooled procurement mechanism for COVID-19 vaccines, Ghana received its first doses of vaccine in February. The government announced a free and voluntary vaccination campaign and conducted public education on the importance of receiving the vaccine. More than 3 million people were partially vaccinated and 768,000 people fully vaccinated by December 23, 2021. After a spike in cases early in the year, cases of COVID-19 began to decline, and the government gradually eased restrictions on public gatherings. The parliament set up a committee to investigate alleged breaches by the Ministry of Health in its attempts to procure the Sputnik vaccine through third parties without parliamentary approval.

In July, seven members of parliament introduced the Promotion of Proper Human Sexual Rights and Ghanaian Family Values Bill. Gay sex was already punishable by up to three years in prison, but the bill went further in banning gender-reassignment surgery and making advocacy for the rights of sexual minorities a punishable offense. Proponents of the bill indicated that it would provide for the protection of and support for children and persons who are victims or accused of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI+) activities. The bill was the subject of tremendous public debate. Support for the bill was strong in Ghana, although it was opposed by most human rights organizations and lawyers. Internationally, the bill was criticized by numerous groups, including the United Nations (UN), which expressed its “grave concern” that the bill would establish “a state-sponsored
system of discrimination and violence” against the LGBTQI+ community. At the end of the year, the bill was still with a parliamentary committee.

Although some economic indicators rebounded from the negative growth rate in 2020, Ghana’s macroeconomy was generally weak in 2021. According to the Ghana Statistical Services, Ghana’s real gross domestic product recorded a provisional growth rate of 5.4 percent, far higher than the revised growth rate of 0.5 percent in 2020. However, the Bank of Ghana reported a 5 percent increase in public debt, and Moody’s Investors Service downgraded of the country’s credit rating from B3 to Caa1. The government initiated an economic recovery program in the 2021 budget to recover losses due to the pandemic.

Overall CSO sustainability was stable in 2021. The legal environment was slightly more enabling with the work of the newly established NPO Secretariat. Advocacy was slightly stronger as CSOs engaged more effectively in a range of policy issues. Organizational capacity deteriorated slightly as pandemic-related restrictions and cutbacks in donor funding undermined CSOs’ activities. All other dimensions of sustainability were unchanged.

According to data from the Non-Profit Organizations (NPO) Secretariat, which compiled an updated register of CSOs operating in Ghana in 2021, 10,474 CSOs were registered at the end of December 2021 compared to 10,030 in 2020. The number of CSOs that had renewed their operating permits was 4,840 in 2021 compared to 4,242 in 2020.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 3.7

CSOs’ legal environment improved slightly in 2021 thanks to the work of the newly established NPO Secretariat.

Ghana’s laws are favorable for the establishment of CSOs. Under the NPO Policy, which was approved in October 2020, organizations register with the Registrar General’s Department (RGD) as companies limited by guarantee. After the RGD issues a certificate of incorporation, new organizations register with the NPO Secretariat, which began operations in December 2020. After conducting background checks, the NPO Secretariat awards permits to commence operations. The waiting period for permits is usually longer in rural areas because of local administrative structures and screening processes. CSOs must renew their permits annually. Registered CSOs must submit records of annual audits, while community-based organizations (CBOs) are required to submit financial statements about their activities but may renew their permits without audited accounts.

The establishment of the NPO Secretariat significantly eased the registration process in 2021. For instance, the secretariat maintains a functioning website where CSOs may access forms required for registration (although not register online). NPO officers across the country help CSOs with registration procedures. In general, the NPO Secretariat serves as a useful bridge between CSOs and the government. For example, in 2021, the secretariat consulted with CSOs about a proposed NPO bill and called on registered organizations to submit details about their designated compliance officers in accordance with Sections 49 and 50 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act 2020.

Although the new NPO Policy increased regulation of the sector, it did not introduce significant restrictions on CSOs’ operations. Organizations are free to operate in any sector and have the right to participate in public protests. Ghana’s constitution guarantees freedom of speech, and CSOs can participate in public debates. There are no restrictions on advocacy activities, and CSOs can resort to the courts to contest government policies. The government does not generally harass CSOs or interfere with their work, although social movements and political activists sometimes encounter obstacles. For instance, in 2021, the police secured a High Court order under the pandemic restriction on mass gatherings to prevent the #FixTheCountry movement from staging a street protest.
Later, the Supreme Court quashed the order and allowed the group to go on with their planned demonstration under police protection. CSOs that expose graft and the irregular use of public funds can be attacked by supporters of the ruling party.

CSOs are legally eligible for tax exemptions, which they obtain by filing for tax certificates that confirm their NPO status and compliance with anti-money-laundering regulations. CSOs can find it challenging to obtain the certificates, mainly because of their inadequate understanding of the application process. In addition, personnel with the Ghana Revenue Authority sometimes have minimal understanding of project-based funding, the disbursement of funds by donors, and the effect of these structures on requirements for statutory payments such as pay-as-you-earn tax. In 2021, the NPO Secretariat engaged the Ghana Revenue Authority to address CSOs’ concerns about obtaining tax certificates to support their filing of annual returns.

CSOs in Ghana may obtain funding from multiple sources, including foreign organizations. To comply with regulations to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing, CSOs must state the source and purpose of funds received. In 2021, the Bank of Ghana issued a crowdfunding policy that seeks to ensure compliance with good governance and anti-money laundering requirements and introduces licensing regimes.

CSOs may compete for government contracts, although few organizations obtain them. CSOs may engage in income-earning activities or register as social enterprises to support their operations.

General legal practitioners provide services to CSOs on both a paid and pro bono basis. CSOs rarely engage the services of lawyers.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.3**

CSOs’ organizational capacity deteriorated slightly in 2021 as cutbacks in donor funding and pandemic-related restrictions for part of the year undermined their activities.

CSOs in Ghana seek to meet the perceived needs of their constituents. Their efforts to do so were impeded during the first quarter of 2021, when some pandemic restrictions such as a ban on mass gatherings were reinstated as infection levels rose. But after most pandemic restrictions were relaxed in the second quarter of 2021, CSOs were able to engage more directly with their constituents, including through in-person activities such as training workshops, conferences, and seminars. Thereafter the year was generally a recovery period for CSOs as they had the opportunity to resume full-scale operations and reach out to their constituents. Some organizations sought new projects after pandemic-induced cutbacks in projects in 2020.

The registration requirements for CSO in Ghana include clearly defined mission statements to guide their operations. Most small and rural organizations do not have strategic plans and develop their activities in response to constituents’ concerns. Urban and large CSOs often use strategic plans to guide their operations and decision making, especially if such plans are an expectation of funders. The disruptions caused by COVID-19 and the changing funding landscape in 2021 prompted most CSOs to review their strategic plans or, if they did not have them, to change their activities. For example, with support from the U.S. Embassy, the Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition (GACC) initiated a project to monitor the use of COVID-19 funds by district assemblies. Resource Link Foundation lacked donor funding and revised its activity plan to include domestic fundraising to support its annual reading festival. CSO projects usually have a monitoring and evaluation component, with most organizations measuring the success of their interventions through feedback from funders and beneficiaries. For example, in 2021, the Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG) organized an assessment of the effectiveness of its interventions with small political parties during the 2020 elections.
CSOs typically have boards with clearly defined responsibilities. However, some boards do not play active roles in their organizations, especially if they are rural or small CSOs. Organizations that receive donor funding usually have written policies and procedures to guide management in dealing with various situations, including conflict of interest. For instance, the Center for Livelihood Development and Resistance, a STAR–Ghana grantee in the eastern region of Ghana, has clear operating manuals for its interventions with vulnerable and marginalized communities.

Staffing remained a significant problem in 2021 as core funding shrank and project-based funding dwindled. The funding crunch has dramatically undercut the attractiveness of CSOs as a career path for well-qualified employees. Unless an organization has received funds for new projects, its ability to pay staff salaries can be compromised, especially in rural organizations. Staff retention is a significant problem for all CSOs. Some organizations sought to resolve the lack of staff by relying on interns and volunteers in 2021. For example, the Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD–Ghana) deployed eighty-five trained local volunteers to forty-four border districts across the country to report on issues related to border security.

Only a handful of donor-supported projects include allocations for new equipment. Most CSOs use old or refurbished computers, and smaller organizations in particular are unable to afford sophisticated equipment and software. Internet services are reasonably priced. While the use of online platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Zoom, and WhatsApp, increased during the first year of the pandemic, many of these platforms, especially Zoom and Microsoft Teams, lost popularity in 2021.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.2**

CSOs’ financial viability was unchanged in 2021. CSOs in Ghana are supported mostly by bilateral and multilateral donors, such as UKAid, USAID, German Agency for International Cooperation, Danish International Development Agency, World Bank, and UN agencies. Ghana’s middle-income status, coupled with most donors’ shift in focus from aid to trade in recent years, has led to steep declines in donor funding for CSOs. In 2021, donors continued to divert funding from CSOs’ normal activities to the pandemic response. A few rural and smaller CSOs received funding that allowed them to expand the scope of their activities to post-pandemic recovery projects or new sectors. But many organizations were unable to obtain new funds for their activities in 2021. For instance, IDEG had no major project funding and participated mainly in collaborative activities with other CSOs.

Only a handful of organizations have funding from multiple sources. Under normal conditions, the government and business sector occasionally offer service contracts to CSOs, and local assemblies may contract with CSOs for capacity-building services. However, in 2021, no government contracts were made available to CSOs.

Local fundraising continues to be difficult because of the widespread perception that the sector receives generous funding from international donors. Although local giving increased significantly at the start of the pandemic in 2020, it reduced drastically in 2021. CSOs sometimes receive voluntary labor and non-monetary support from communities for projects in areas such as education or the construction of infrastructure for sanitation. But in general, local philanthropy is not strong. Few CSOs, other than those with experience in online technologies and qualified personnel, raise funds using crowdfunding platforms such as Global Giving. Some organizations, such as the northern-based CSO Songtaba, have links for donations on their websites. Some smaller CSOs have short statements on their website asking for donations.

STAR–Ghana, the major local grantmaking organization, regrants international donor funding to local CSOs. Despite its general funding constraints, STAR–Ghana earmarked $2 million for grants to local CSOs, of which $1.89 million was disbursed (compared to $1.5 million disbursed in 2020). In 2021, STAR–Ghana and the West
Africa Civil Society Institute (WACSI) initiated the Giving for Change initiative to promote domestic philanthropy by experimenting with different models of fundraising at both community and national levels. As part of the project, community members in Ave-Dakpa in the Volta region, for example, made commitments to support the activities of the Power of Voices program of the Dutch government for people with disabilities.

Only a few CSOs engage in income-generating activities or have social enterprises. The Northern Sector Action and Awareness Center operates three innovative revenue models—a revolving fund, a village savings and loans associations scheme, and a subsidiary profit-making enterprise. Members of Social Enterprise Ghana, a network of social entrepreneurs, use business strategies, training, and mentorship to achieve their social or environmental missions. Membership-based CSOs usually collect dues. In 2021, organizations such as the Local Governance Network and Ghana National Education Campaign Coalition found it challenging to collect dues because most of their member organizations were struggling financially.

Urban CSOs and those that regularly receive funds from donors usually have well-structured financial management systems and perform regular audits. Most of these CSOs are required by donors to share their financial reports. Smaller organizations and CBOs in rural areas do not have the capacity to conduct external audits or publish financial statements.

ADVOCACY: 3.2

Advocacy improved slightly in 2021 as CSOs engaged more effectively on a range of important policy issues.

Ghana’s laws allow for public participation in decision making. CSOs and policymakers interact at the national and local levels through both formal and ad hoc mechanisms. For example, in 2021, after the Ministry of Finance invited public input during the preparation of the national budget, the Social Enterprise Development Foundation (SEND) Ghana collected and submitted CSOs’ views. CSO representatives served on the board of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, where they helped formulate policies for the office’s operations. The new speaker of the parliament met with CSO leaders to seek their collaboration in enhancing the legislature’s ability to monitor and hold the administration to account. At the local level, CSOs partner with government officials and metropolitan, municipal, and district assemblies on local development matters. In 2021, these issues included public sensitization to COVID-19 prevention measures and the rollout of the vaccination campaign.

Because of funding limitations, CSO advocacy was relatively limited in 2021. CSO coalitions and other groups continued to promote their positions on issues such as corruption, health care, education, human rights, the government’s budget and expenditures, and the extractive sectors. For example, twelve CSOs, including the Citizens’ Movement Against Corruption, Africa Center for International Law and Accountability, Media Foundation for West Africa, and Africa Center for Energy Policy, called on the government to provide the Office of the Special Prosecutor with adequate funding so that it could function effectively.

Individual organizations also engaged in advocacy to hold the government accountable in 2021. For instance, the Publish What You Pay Africa steering committee called on Ghana’s government to categorically condemn attacks on members of civil society appearing in national media after they criticized an agreement between the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation and Aker Energy concerning oil rights. Pursuing strategic advocacy, three anti-corruption organizations filed a suit against the government of Ghana at the court of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) after the government proposed to sell its gold royalties to an offshore company.

CSOs’ use of online platforms to promote civic engagement decreased in 2021, mainly because the easing of restrictions on large gatherings allowed meetings held online in 2020 to return to face-to-face events. However, social media was important to the efforts of a notable new social movement that emerged in 2021 under the
hashtag #FixTheCountry. The movement was led by young social media influencers frustrated by unemployment and the failure of Ghana’s leaders to address myriad social and economic problems. Within a short period, #FixTheCountry became the leading voice in public discourse, and its campaign was joined by other groups, such as the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) League. Unlike the EFF League, which engages in organized political activism, #FixTheCountry aroused organic support and gained widespread popularity on social media.

Although their lobbying abilities remain weak, CSOs engaged with lawmakers to press for recommended content and the passage of certain bills in 2021. For instance, CSO coalitions and individual organizations participated in public hearings on the Promotion of Proper Human Sexual Rights and Ghanaian Family Values Bill. Civil society expressed both support for and opposition to the controversial bill. For example, a group of fifteen CSO representatives, lawyers, and academics signed a memorandum expressing opposition to the bill. The Tax Justice Coalition, whose members include the Parliamentary Network Africa, GACC, and Public Services International, with support from Oxfam, called on the government to prioritize the tax exemption bill. The bill is designed to prevent revenue leakage associated with unregulated tax exemptions but was not passed in 2021.

Work on a NPO bill based on the NPO Policy was ongoing in 2021. In collaboration with WACSI, the NPO Secretariat consulted about the bill with civil society throughout the country. The consultations were widely supported by CSOs, and many organizations called for further sensitization once the bill is passed.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.5**

CSO service provision did not change in 2021. CSOs identify needed services through community observation, media reports, referrals by other organizations, and specific requests from communities. For instance, following complaints from chiefs and others in the Ayensuano District, the Ark Development Organization, a CSO in the eastern region of Ghana, initiated a project to work with traditional religious leaders and public officials to fight a rise in teenage pregnancy and the poor academic performance of district students. CSOs typically measure the effectiveness of their work through feedback from beneficiaries, donors, and government agencies.

CSOs in Ghana deliver services without discrimination, although societal norms also shape the services that CSOs offer. For instance, because of strong public pushback, CSOs often do not support sexual minorities or people engaged in galamsey, or illegal mining.

Cost recovery remains an exception rather than the norm. Ghanaian CSOs other than social enterprises do not charge fees for their products and services. The government occasionally contracts with CSOs for service delivery but did not do so in 2021.

The government recognizes the role of CSOs in monitoring basic services delivery. For instance, after SEND Ghana issued a report on primary health-care delivery during the pandemic, which highlighted the need for the government to increase its investment in infrastructure for e-health and telehealth service, the president expressed the government’s intention to expand the country’s health infrastructure.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.7**

The sectoral infrastructure did not change in 2021.

Most CSO resource centers are based in Accra. They include those operated by the STAR–Ghana Foundation, which provides technical and financial resources to CSOs, and WACSI, which offers capacity-strengthening...
services to partners in the West African region. Resource centers outside of Accra are limited. During periods that pandemic safety measures were in place in 2021, most resource centers were partially closed.

The STAR–Ghana Foundation remains the most important local funding organization. The foundation did not issue major calls for proposals in 2021 because of cutbacks in support from its main funders.

During the financial crunch in 2021, most CSOs operated on tight budgets and some were unable to carry out activities. Yet there were issues that needed CSOs’ interventions. This situation led to a deepening of collaboration between CSOs and an increased number of coalitions and networks. CSOs came together to foster cooperation, share information, promote their common interests, and pool resources. For instance, Transparency International, Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII), and GACC worked on anti-corruption issues, including filing a case at the ECOWAS court after the government proposed to sell its gold royalties to an offshore company. Following wrangling among parliamentarians over the 2022 national budget, seven CSOs came together as the Ghana Parliamentary Monitoring Organizations Network to urge members of parliament to put the interests of the nation over those of political parties. CSOs focused on gender and anti-corruption also implemented several joint activities.

CSO staff have access to public and private training in organizational development, usually in major cities. All public universities in Ghana have programs on project management and CSO operations. WACSI continued to offer paid training to CSOs, although most organizations did not prioritize capacity building as part of their post-pandemic recovery. With funding from the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, WACSI organized a training on data and financial management and compliance for the newly established NPO Secretariat. There are no national training standards or manuals in local languages.

CSOs partner with the government at both the national and local levels. In 2021, GII held three media engagements in collaboration with RGD and the Ghana Revenue Authority to create awareness about business laws and beneficial ownership among private-sector actors. At the local level, CSOs work with district assemblies to monitor service delivery. For instance, through the Open Government Partnership, the Shama district assembly developed a three-year action plan that includes monitoring service delivery in collaboration with Friends of the Nation.

Partnerships between the media and CSOs remained strong in 2021, as media houses regularly consulted CSO staff for independent assessments of government policies. CSOs found working with the private sector still a challenge in 2021. A few companies partner with CSOs for services and public education, especially related to gender and water, sanitation, and hygiene. But the lack of a clearly defined incentive or mechanism for private-sector support of CSOs constrains the potential for partnerships.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.9**

CSOs’ public image was stable in 2021. CSOs remained visible in both traditional and new media, and coverage of their activities was usually positive. At the national level, CSOs were present in traditional and social media commenting on government policies or demanding accountability from the authorities. For instance, in 2021, a virtual press briefing by the African Center on Energy Policy about illegal meters on the national electricity grid received wide radio, television, and print coverage. The panelists on a popular news analysis program hosted by Joy FM, a major media house, included CSO representatives. The activities of CSOs both for and against the #FixTheCountry movement and LGBTQI+ rights received attention. In contrast, the activities of CSOs in rural communities received little coverage.

The public perceives CSOs as exerting a strong influence on the government by monitoring its work. For instance, a report on the government’s fertilizer policy by the Peasant Farmers Association of Ghana generated wide public
discussion and compelled the minister of agriculture to speak on the subject. However, most of the public does not understand the concept of CSOs and offers little logistical support for their activities.

Local and central governments usually have positive perceptions of CSOs. At the local level, district assembly officials rely on reputable CSOs for information and expertise. However, the government can be skeptical of CSOs’ collaboration with the media to conduct investigative journalism that could undermine its policies. For instance, in 2021, the president accused some CSOs of working with the opposition to make his government unpopular. Political party activists, particularly those of the ruling government, view advocacy-based CSOs as anti-government.

The business sector has a positive image of the CSO sector but does not translate that perception into significant partnerships.

Most CSOs in Ghana seek to improve their public image and promote their work, especially through social media. For instance, in addition to traditional media reports about their events, organizations such as IDEG and CDD–Ghana use their Facebook pages to broadcast news of their major achievements to the public.

Some CSOs have adopted accountability measures such as codes of ethics in their internal operating manuals. CSOs are generally transparent in their activities, especially with their funders, but only a few organizations make their annual reports public. The new NPO bill includes proposals to improve accountability standards in the sector.
The year 2021 in Guinea began in a toxic political climate as tensions persisted over events in the previous year. The approval of a controversial new constitution in March 2020 and the re-election of President Alpha Condé for a third term in October 2020 sparked violent demonstrations and exacerbated ethnic, political, and social divisions. After more than 350 political party and civil society activists, including members of the National Front for the Defense of the Constitution (Front national pour la défense de la constitution, FNDC), a broad social-political movement of CSOs and opposition parties, rejected the new constitution and election results, they were arrested and detained or subjected to intimidation and excessive physical and verbal abuse by security forces. Some people were forced into exile. In April 2021, the government released forty of the detainees, but party activists continued to be arrested in 2021. The suppression prompted some organizations to express “deep concern about the use of judicial harassment to silence pro-democracy activists and journalists in Guinea,” according to Amnesty International.

During these difficult times, the country still suffered from the COVID-19 pandemic. The health crisis worsened in February 2021 as the Ebola virus reappeared in the southern part of the country. The government imposed protective measures for three months, which included isolating all suspected cases, setting up roadblocks, quarantining outbreak locations, and prohibiting weekly markets and religious and traditional ceremonies. A few CSOs contributed significantly to the response to both diseases by conducting community mobilization activities.

In this context, the military staged a coup d’état on September 5, 2021. The leaders of the coup arrested the president and dissolved the constitution, replacing it with a charter establishing a transitional government. Article 34 of the Transitional Charter recognizes the freedom of CSOs to continue their activities in accordance with the laws existing before the coup. Although the military takeover was criticized internationally, it was greeted with public jubilation in Guinea, especially following the release of all political prisoners, including civil society activists. After the coup, the government’s relationship with civil society was favorable. The junta organized national consultations with CSOs with the assistance of the National Council of Guinean CSOs (Conseil national des organisations de la société civile guinéenne, CNOSCG) and the Alliance to Promote Governance and Local Initiatives (Alliance pour la promotion de la gouvernance et des initiatives locales, AGIL). Of the eighty-one members of the National Council of Transition (CNT), seven spots were reserved for civil society. The CNT president comes from civil society, and some members of civil society were included in the transitional government. The FNDC led a sub-regional delegation to the Economic Council of Western African States and its partners to justify the coup and solicit support for the junta.
The abrupt change in leadership intensified Guinea’s economic fragility. Despite growth in the gross domestic product of 5.2 percent in 2021, driven by a vibrant mining sector, the non-mining economy, which employs the vast majority of the population, was hit hard by the COVID-19 and Ebola epidemics. Inflation soared above 12 percent in 2021, driven in part by higher prices for food and shipping, according to the International Monetary Fund. Poverty remained widespread and more than 20 percent of households were food insecure, according to the World Food Program.

CSOs’ overall sustainability did not change in 2021. Organizational capacity improved slightly as CSOs adopted new approaches to working with beneficiaries and incorporated new technologies into their activities. Advocacy improved slightly thanks to CSOs’ improved relationships with central and local governments. The sectoral infrastructure was also slightly stronger as many organizations took advantage of multiple partnership, training, and networking opportunities. CSOs’ financial viability deteriorated slightly as many programs and projects were suspended or reduced because of the COVID-19 and Ebola health emergencies. The other dimensions of sustainability did not change.

The latest data on the number of CSOs in Guinea is from 2017, when the Civil Society Support program of the European Union (EU) reported a total of 1,010 registered CSOs in Guinea. This figure included 941 non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 39 networks, 12 platforms, 11 federations, 5 labor unions, and 2 CSO collectives. Most organizations are based in the capital city of Conakry.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.3**

The legal environment governing CSOs did not change in 2021. While the military junta expressed renewed respect for civil liberties and stopped harassing and prosecuting CSOs, several issues such as registration and the renewal of licenses remained problematic.

The Guinean legal framework is generally favorable to the freedom of association. Law L/2005/013/AN of 2005 governs associations, NGOs, and their collectives. Law L/2005/014/AN of 2005 governs cooperative economic groups, non-financial mutuals, and cooperatives. Registration is a legal requirement for CSOs, and the procedures for registration are clearly defined by law. Associations and NGOs register with the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, either through directors of microprojects at the communal or prefectural level, directors of the Regional Service for the Support and Coordination of Cooperatives and NGOs at the regional level, or the Service for the Regulation and Coordination of NGOs and Association Movements (Service de régulation et de promotion des ONG et des mouvements associatifs, SERPROMA) at the national level. The main difference between associations and NGOs is that associations may operate without state recognition and tend to have limited fields of action, whereas NGOs must be authorized by the state, have wider scope of activities, and must adhere to strict legal provisions governing their creation and operations. Some organizations at the national level operate without registration, either because their accreditation has not been renewed or they have yet to obtain legal recognition. They do not usually encounter problems as long as they do not contradict government interests. Before they can fully function, all national CSOs, with the exception of trade unions, must obtain approval by ministerial order. At decentralized levels, CSOs must be approved by governors and prefects.

Once approved, registration is valid for three years. Many CSOs faced difficulties obtaining registration or re-registration documents in 2021. At the national level, the obstacles to registration seemed for the most part
politically motivated, and organizations lacking registration documents could be more vulnerable to other politically motivated administrative decisions. The registration of some organizations, such as the Club of Friends of the World (Club des amis du monde, CAM), was made easier thanks to personal relationships between their leaders and the authorities.

The laws governing CSOs establish specific rules for their structure and operation, management of resources, and the rights and obligations of members. All CSOs are strictly limited to working in development, human rights, and capacity building. Organizations must adhere to their stipulated areas of focus, and as long as they do so, the government does not interfere in their internal management. CSOs that stray outside of their stipulated areas may be suspended, although this did not happen in 2021, as SERPROMA underwent an institutional reform that prevented it from effectively exercising its oversight role. Organizations registered with SERPROMA must submit activity and financial reports every six months. Because of the epidemics and SERPROMA’s inattention and lack of resources, few CSOs faced repercussions for failing to comply with this obligation in 2021. Article 10 of Law L/2005/013/AN allows CSOs to go to court to challenge administrative decisions to cancel registration, suspend activities, or refuse to authorize a grant. The FNDC filed appeals to several administrative decisions in 2021, which were still in the courts at the end of the year.

CSOs are free to operate within the law and established norms. Limits to government control of CSOs are clearly defined in Articles 29, 30, and 33 of Law L/2005/013/AN. However, the laws and regulations are sometimes implemented inconsistently, as when the government renewed the approvals of only a few CSOs in 2021. CSOs can address issues of public debate and express criticism, but they are sometimes harassed by the central government, local governments, and tax police, especially if they are perceived to be attacking the interests of ruling powers. Compared to 2019 and 2020, when Law L/2019/0029/AN on the use of force by law enforcement agencies allowed the army to be deployed during demonstrations, the year 2021 was relatively calm before the coup d’état in September, especially as many opposition leaders and civil society activists had been arrested and political party headquarters were closed. Some political groupings and CSOs, including human rights organizations, were subjected to harassment and their members were detained following protests against the president’s third term. The FNDC and Platform of Citizens United for Development (Plateforme des citoyens unis pour le développement, PCUD) were particularly targeted in this regard. PCUD, for example, whose president was the FNDC national coordinator, lost all of its contracts with public agencies and was heavily harassed. Although Guinean law provides for freedom of demonstration, public demonstrations were banned by the government for most of 2021, mainly to control the spread of COVID-19 but also expressly to prevent political demonstrations. This ban was upheld in the last quarter of the year by the new military authorities. FNDC filed lawsuits challenging the legality of the ban and the arrest of its leaders. These appeals were still pending at the end of the year.

CSOs can benefit from tax exemptions or deductions on income from grants, donations, fees, and economic activity upon application to the public tax authorities. Few CSOs other than large organizations that receive funding from international partners are knowledgeable about such provisions.

The law allows CSOs to carry out income-generating activities and establish social enterprises provided they scrupulously respect relevant laws and regulations and use the profits to finance their activities. CSOs may conduct fundraising campaigns for their programs. They are allowed to accept funds from foreign donors if the funds are not intended to finance terrorist acts, destabilizing activities, or activities that threaten national security. Foreign funds must come from entities that are not in conflict with Guinea’s national interest, and the receiving organization must have up-to-date approvals. CSOs that meet stated criteria may bid on public contracts at both the national and local levels. In 2019, the National Assembly revised Law L/2005/013/AN to allow NGOs meeting certain criteria to receive government funding as public benefit entities. However, the law has yet to be adopted.

There are no lawyers specializing in the laws affecting CSOs in Guinea. Several members of the Guinean Bar Association and organizations such as The Same Rights for Everyone (Mêmes droits pour tous, MDT) and Lawyers Without Borders (Avocats sans frontières, ASF) advise CSOs on legal and judicial matters, sometimes on a pro bono basis. Large, established organizations often have strong working partnerships with private law firms and individual lawyers. CSOs located in Conakry have access to much better legal advice than those located in secondary cities, which usually have few or no law firms.
Guinean CSOs improved their organizational capacity slightly in 2021 as they adopted new approaches to working with beneficiaries by incorporating technology into their activities.

CSOs usually identify potential beneficiaries through participatory diagnoses based on their areas of intervention and strategic priorities, and community needs and rights. CSOs often collaborate with local authorities and other CSOs to carry out their interventions. They typically seek the support of their communities and target group members by following a cycle of collaborative action planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. With two epidemics underway in 2021, most CSOs used remote communications to engage communities. For example, as part of a performance evaluation for Guinean municipalities, the Citizen Coalition for Elections and Governance (Coalition citoyenne pour les élections et la gouvernance, CoCEG) used smartphones to collect data remotely.

Areas for CSO intervention are spelled out in the law, and an organization’s statutes and internal regulations define its specific mission. Organizations are legally prohibited from engaging in activities outside of their stipulated areas of focus, although enforcement of this rule was relaxed in 2021 because of the need to respond to COVID-19 and Ebola. Organizations that receive financial and technical support from international organizations are usually required by their partners to develop their strategies. Organizations with strategic plans include CoCEG, CENAFOD, ACORD Guinea, Synergy of Civil Society Organizations for the Prevention of Election Conflicts and Resolution in Guinea (Synergie des organisations de la société civile pour la prévention des conflits électoraux et pour leur résolution en Guinée), and West Africa Network for Peace (WANEP)–Guinea. Other CSOs typically do not have strategic plans. CSOs generally follow the instructions of donor agencies when implementing funded projects, including using performance indicators and methodologies such as self-assessments and mid-term reviews to measure the success of their work.

All officially recognized CSOs have statutes and internal regulations assigning clear responsibilities to decision-making bodies. Organizational direction is typically defined by the board of directors and approved by the general assembly. Boards also oversee the implementation of activities and approve annual and financial reports. In 2021, some organizations did not hold board meetings as required because of either a lack of resources or a lack of transparency. Some CSOs group into consortia to execute projects through collegial, non-hierarchical management structures, in which responsibilities are shared and authority is distributed among several people who make important decisions jointly. CSOs that receive public or private-sector funding also have written policies to guide their operations, since they are usually a requirement for funding. Most CSOs address issues of conflict of interest in their bylaws, but in practice many organizations take few steps to avoid it.

Only large national NGOs, such as CENAFOD, CAM, and AGIL, have sustainable and substantial funding that allow them to maintain permanent staff. Otherwise, most Guinean CSOs are unable to maintain permanent staff. CSOs often develop the skills of their employees through training offered by members and staff involvement in the design and implementation of projects. Most CSOs lack structured approaches to human resource management, although organizations such as CENAFOD, WANEP–Guinea, and the Africa Youth Network of Guinea (Réseau Afrique jeunesse de Guinée, RAJ–GUI), introduce practices to reinforce their management of human resources and respect for staff rights when they obtain new projects. CSOs sometimes use outside professionals for accounting, information technology, and legal issues, although this practice is limited because of the cost. Because of their lack of funding, CSOs increasingly engage volunteers in project implementation. Observers estimated that about two-thirds of CSO staff were volunteers in 2021. The 2022 World Giving Index of the Charities Aid Foundation reported that in 2021, 33 percent of respondents in Guinea reported volunteering, a relatively high rate.
Guinean CSOs modernize their basic office equipment only when they receive institutional support from technical and financial partners, the private sector, or donations and legacies. As mobile telephones are widely used throughout the country, all CSOs can access the internet, although they may need to limit their use of internet services because of the high cost. During the resurgence of COVID-19 and Ebola, CSOs increasingly relied on digital platforms such as video conferencing, webinars, and virtual meetings to continue their operations. This trend continued in 2021, as many larger organizations not only used social media such as WhatsApp for communications but also relied on digital technologies to gather and process data. Guinea has a cybersecurity law, but it is unknown to most CSOs, which generally fail to take recommended precautions to protect themselves and their beneficiaries.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.3**

The financial viability of Guinean CSOs deteriorated slightly in 2021, as many programs and projects suspended or reduced because of the COVID-19 and Ebola health emergencies. In addition, after the September coup d'état, the accounts of all public agencies, through which donor funding flows to CSOs, were frozen through the end of the year, and CSOs funded by those agencies were unable to receive funds. Guinea CSOs are very dependent on foreign funding. The main financial partners are the EU, World Bank, USAID, French Development Agency, Asian Development Bank, Enabel, Open Society Initiative for West Africa, various agencies of the United Nations, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. Only a few stronger and older CSOs, such as CENAFOD, CAM, ACORD Guinea, RAJ–GUI, and WANEP–Guinea, have multiple funding sources. Local CSOs are generally underfunded and serve as implementing partners to foreign CSOs, which have greater visibility and credibility with donors. In 2021, foreign donor funding dropped significantly, particularly in the social and political spheres. Funding significantly dropped for CSOs that did not work on COVID-19, and many CSOs, including the Mano River Women’s Network for Peace (Réseau des femmes du fleuve Mano pour la paix), were forced to stop activities. CSOs with steady income from strategic partners or involved in the health crises, such as CNOSCG, AGIL, and the Coalition of Women Leaders of Guinea (Coalition des femmes leaders de Guinée, COFEL), were generally able to avoid reductions in funding.

Central and local governments provide grants to CSOs that meet stated criteria in calls for tenders. For example, the National Association for the Financing of Local Authorities, a public funding agency, provided funding in 2021 to several CSOs, including the Community Center for the Development of Education (Centre communautaire pour le développement de l’éducation, CECODE) and HERE Guinea, to implement its community development program. The Fund for Local Economic Development, which is under the Ministry of Mines, also contracted with several CSOs to implement development activities at the community level in 2021. A few CSOs, including CNOSCG, AGIL, RAJ–GUI, and Tinkisso Antena, received funding from the National Health Safety Agency, although they were a minority of organizations requesting such assistance. After the coup, the accounts of these public agencies were frozen and they were unable to pass funding on to CSOs in a timely manner. For example, the National Agency for the Financing of Local Authorities did not receive expected funding from the World Bank, French Development Agency, or Guinean central government until after its project execution levels were audited. WANEP–Guinea, African Training Center for Development (Centre africain de formation pour le développement, CENAFOD), HERE Guinea, CECODE, and AGIL were among the organizations that experienced funding delays as a result.

Otherwise, local sources of funding are limited. Only a few CSOs, such as the International Trade Center for Development (Centre du commerce international pour le développement, CECIDE) and Action Mine, are able to raise funds from multiple local sources. Among businesses that fund CSO projects, the Rio Tinto Foundation provides grants to CSOs to finance income-generating activities for youth; the KPC Foundation funds projects to
help women and youth create income-generating activities; and the Orange Foundation supports CSOs that carry out educational and basic infrastructure projects in local communities. Some companies and company foundations implement their corporate social responsibility programs through CSOs. The Orange Foundation, for example, has opened several digital houses for women managed by local CSOs, and mining companies sometimes subcontract their community relations to CSOs.

Most organizations collect dues from their members. CSOs also mobilize resources from community members and the diaspora, which help improve basic social services, construct facilities such as schools, health facilities, and water supply systems, and even pay CSO staff. For example, in 2021, the Association of Nationals of the Prefecture of Téléméle, a local CSO, mobilized resources to rebuild the Hore Louba Road.

It is fairly common for Guinean CSOs to carry out income-generating activities. For example, Guinea Dakhamoui markets handicrafts and dyeing services and COFEL sells traditional fabrics. Some organizations derive revenue from renting out meeting centers and other spaces.

Few CSOs have fundraising skills or raise funds through social networks or their websites. Only CSOs that receive foreign funding, such as CENAFOD, AGIL, and CAM, have solid financial management systems. Donors expect to receive certified financial statements as a condition for funding, which requires these CSOs to use professional financial management services, which are easily accessible in Guinea. The majority of CSOs do not have adequate financial management systems. Smaller organizations lacking capacity usually do not publish annual financial reports and statements, although they are required to by law.

**ADVOCACY: 4.8**

CSO advocacy improved slightly in 2021 as organizations improved their relationship with the government at the national and local levels.

Government policies and national laws require that the public have access to government decision-making processes. CSOs regularly participate in joint commissions and other bodies that allow them to hold the government accountable and monitor the implementation of public policies. In 2021, these fora included the National Commission on Land Reform and a national economic governance working group. After the coup in September, CSOs such as CNOSCG, CoCEG, CONAG-DF, PCUD, and the National Coalition of Guinean CSOs (Coalition nationale des organisations de la société civile guinéenne, CONASOC) participated in discussions with the junta about social and political issues facing the country. With support from the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), SYNCERE organized consultations with coalitions of political parties, religious leaders, the country’s mediator, the Economic and Social Council (Conseil économique et social, CESEC), and the CNTG to discuss election-related violence in 2020. The group issued a summary of findings on factors contributing to the conflicts, along with suggestions of ways to exit the crisis through inclusive and structured dialogue. At the local level, local elected officials are required to involve citizens in community decision-making, and CSOs use these platforms to communicate with policymakers. For example, CSOs participate in an advisory capacity in ordinary sessions of communal councils. Some local platforms do not meet regularly despite instructions in the revised municipal code.

In 2021, two developments furthered CSOs’ ability to influence government decision making. First, in January, a presidential decree established a permanent framework for political and social dialogue. Second, after the coup d’état in September, the military junta organized four days of consultations to give CSOs an opportunity to express their views on the transition. Major platforms taking part in the consultations included CNOSCG, CoCEG, Youth Convergence and Leaders for Peace and Democracy Network (Réseau convergence des jeunes et leaders pour la paix et la démocratie, COJELPAID), Coalition of Women/Girls of Guinea for Dialogue, Peacebuilding, and
Development (Coalition des femmes/filles de Guinée pour le dialogue, la consolidation de la paix et le développement, COFFIG-DCPD), Bloggers Association of Guinea (Association des blogueurs de Guinée, ABLOGUI), COCEG, and CNOSCG. The consultations contributed to the formulation of the transitional charter published in September. CSOs also set up structures to monitor the promises of the new authorities, such as the transition monitoring committee established by CNOSCG, which includes some thirty other groups. The Synergy of Civil Society Organizations for the Prevention and Resolution of Election Conflicts in Guinea (Synergie des organisations de la société civile pour la prévention des conflits électoraux et pour leur résolution en Guinée, SYNCERE), in partnership with COCEG, created the Dynamic for Citizen Support for the Transition (Dynamique d’appui citoyen à la transition, DACT), a group that prepared and submitted to the authorities civil society’s recommendations for the transition based on an online survey and consultations with civil society actors, political parties, independent experts, unions, the diaspora, and many others.

CSOs conduct awareness campaigns to influence public debate or legislation. These campaigns often point out shortcomings of government actions, such as the government’s failure to fulfill the legally mandated 30 percent quota for women on electoral candidacy lists. CSOs continued to work on gender parity after the coup by demanding that women be included on the National Transition Council and in the transition government. Through the Publish What You Pay (Publiez ce que vous payez, PCQVP platform, CSOs sought to prevent corruption in the extractive industries and continued to help develop a country report for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). CSOs often select their advocacy initiatives through consultative mechanisms that help them identify citizens’ needs and priorities.

Influential CSOs are comfortable with the concept of lobbying and achieved some success in 2021. For example, efforts by the Coordination of Non-State Actors to Protect Children (Coordination des acteurs non-étatiques pour la protection de l’enfant, CANEPE) in 2021 resulted in the promulgation of the new Guinean Children’s Code, which was passed by the National Assembly in October 2020.

CSOs’ efforts to amend Law 004/2001 to decentralize the registration system did not progress in 2021.

**SERVICE Provision:** 5.0

CSO service provision did not change in 2021.

CSOs provide diverse services. For example, CENAFOD offers training related to local governance; the Guinean Literacy Network (Réseau guinéen de l’alphabétisation, REGA) works in education; Initiatives and Actions for the Improvement of the Populations’ Health (Initiative et action pour l’amélioration de la santé des populations, INAASPO) provides health care; Guinean Organization for the Defense of Human Rights (Organisation guinéenne de défense des droits de l’homme et du citoyen, OGDH) raises awareness about human rights; and Kindia Economic Promotion Association (Association pour la promotion économique de Kindia, APEK) focuses on agriculture. The activities of most CSOs at the community level are linked to plans for local development and annual investments.

CSOs seek to provide products and services that meet community needs. Organizations determine those needs through consultations with communities, situational analyses, and the involvement of the communities in planning project activities. For example, in collaboration with Expertise France, RAJ-GUI organized consultations in the commune of Matam before responding to a call for tenders for a participatory analysis to support a study on hygiene and waste management. In 2021, some CSOs’ field activities were limited to the bare minimum because of restrictions related to the COVID-19 and Ebola health emergencies. Other CSOs, such as CENAFOD, worked outside of their usual scope of activities to provide urgently needed services in response to COVID-19. The shift in...
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focus was sometimes made possible in consultation with donors, who agreed to redirect funding, while other organizations simply took advantage of the opportunity to obtain available resources.

CSOs do not discriminate against any group and in fact oppose such practices. CSOs are governed by legal and regulatory texts that prohibit them from having a political, ethnic, or regional character. CSOs generally bring together people from different backgrounds, and ensuring diversity remains a concern for most organizations as well as their technical and financial partners.

CSOs frequently exchange information with other CSOs, universities, businesses, and public institutions. Some CSOs reach larger audiences through products such as training workshops and expert analysis. For example, in 2021, the International Merit of Guinean Youth (Mérite international de la jeunesse-Guinée) contributed to training more than 200 young students at the General Lansana Conté University of Sonfonia on citizenship, leadership, and community service.

CSOs often engage in cost recovery by charging fees or creating social enterprises. However, the weak management system of most CSOs makes it difficult to document such practices. To determine market demand, CSOs usually rely on consultations with community members and other stakeholders.

The government recognizes CSOs’ contributions by partnering with them at the national and local levels. Government officials recognize CSOs’ efforts through statements and official recognition. For example, the prefect of Labé cited SOS Children’s Villages for its contribution to the revitalization of local child protection committees.

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector improved slightly in 2021 as the decrease in field activities because of the health crises allowed many organizations to take advantage of multiple partnership, training, and networking opportunities.

Several resources centers and intermediary support organizations (ISOs) offer support to CSOs. For example, “blue zones” or cultural spaces for youth, as well as the Citizen’s House (Maison du citoyen), Rural Farmers’ House (Maison du paysan), and Subcontracting Exchange (Bourse de sous-traitance), offer access to digital services. Several incubators support idea generation and creativity among youth-driven CSOs. Resource centers and ISOs usually cover some of their operating expenses through paid services or participation fees. Their services, while very useful, do not meet all of the needs of Guinean CSOs, especially in capacity building.

Several international and national NGOs reallocate funds to local CSOs for specific activities at the local level. For example, in 2021, CAM awarded fifteen grants to local CSOs.

CSOs share information or work together on common goals through coalitions, platforms, and direct collaboration. Prominent coalitions include CNOSCG, COLTE, CANEPE, the National confederation of Guinean workers (Confédération nationale des travailleurs de Guinée, CANEG), CoCEG, National Coalition of Guinea for the Rights and Citizenship of Women (Coalition nationale de Guinée pour les droits et la citoyenneté des femmes, CONAG-DCF), and PCUD, which often facilitate their members’ access to funding or pooling of efforts for more effective advocacy. However, Guinean CSOs are not always united to defend the sector’s interests. The national political debate occasionally influences relationships in Guinean civil society, causing CSOs to weaken the sector by engaging in non-productive disputes. For example, CNOSCG and PCUD were at odds with each other in 2021 because of their allegedly conflicting political views.

CSOs have access to specialized training in areas such as advocacy, interpersonal communications, and social mobilization. Some large international organizations, such as the National Endowment for Democracy, Catholic
Relief Services, IFES, and Search for Common Ground, provide training to CSOs at the national level. Experienced and competent local trainers provide training in CSO management and association structures. Simplified materials such as accounting and meeting guides are translated into national languages and distributed by Tostan International, Guinean Center for Development Training and Education (Centre guinéen de formation et d’éducation pour le développement, CEGUIFED), and REGA.

CSOs enjoy successful partnerships with the private sector, government, and media. For example, in 2021, CENAFOD continued to collaborate with the Mahatma Gandhi University on a food security project to strengthen women’s economic empowerment. CSOs and UN agencies partnered with the Union of Free Radio and Television of Guinea (Union des radios et télévisions libres de Guinée, ULTERGUI) to help with social mobilization in the fight against the Ebola epidemic in 2021.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.5

CSOs’ public image was unchanged in 2021. While a growing number of CSOs improved their public relations and use of new media, other organizations lacked the technical capacity to join in this trend.

CSOs recognize the value of media in improving their visibility and awareness. Many CSO activities benefit from media coverage, and most media offer positive analyses of CSOs’ role in national life. For example, the participation of CSOs in the consultations with the military junta was positively covered by the main Guinean media, which view civil society as a sort of counterweight to political organizations. CSOs do not usually receive free media coverage, although the media distinguish between community service announcements and corporate advertising and may offer discounts to CSOs.

Grassroots communities have positive perceptions of CSOs when they carry out activities or provide needed services. Many people see CSOs as contributing to local development and improved living conditions, and it is not uncommon for communities to call on CSOs to address urgent social issues. For example, CSOs working on violence against women are often asked to address cases of rape and sexual violence. However, some CSOs are perceived, rightly or wrongly, as politically oriented and in the pay of the government or the opposition. Not all citizens share the same understanding of the concept of CSOs.

Local and central governments tend to have positive perception of CSOs because the sector contributes to the implementation of its development policies. Government offices sometimes rely on CSOs for their expertise and community involvement. The National Agency for the Financing of Local Authorities, for example, has entrusted CSOs with the entire community mobilization component of its community financing function. However, government officials see some CSOs as supporting the opposition.

Companies trust CSOs primarily for their expertise, impact, and community connections. For example, almost all mining companies use CSOs to carry out their community relations activities. Some company foundations implement their corporate social responsibility programs through CSOs.

Most CSOs use several communication channels, such as online and traditional media, to promote their public image. Guinean organizations increasingly collaborate with traditional media by developing relationships with journalists, entering into partnership agreements, participating in hosting interactive programs, and even organizing training for journalists. Several CSOs now have a strong presence on social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn. However, many CSOs do not use social media as effectively as they could because of a lack of skills.

Some CSOs use the SERPROMA code of ethics, although in general it is not well known. NGOs such as CENAFOD and CAM have developed their own codes of ethics to meet the requirements of foreign partners for transparency in their operations. National CSOs usually publish annual reports and post them on their websites, but local CSOs generally do not.
Prolonged drought conditions, the COVID-19 pandemic, and attacks by al-Shabaab insurgent groups caused humanitarian needs to skyrocket in Kenya’s arid and semi-arid regions in 2021. Mandera and Lamu counties were most affected by terrorist attacks, while across northeastern Kenya, inter-communal conflicts increased as water sources dried up. More than 2.9 million people were in urgent need of humanitarian assistance and more than 1.5 million livestock had died by September 2021, according to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance. On September 8, the government declared a national disaster because of the drought and introduced a cash transfer program to assist affected families.

The COVID-19 pandemic continued to pose a grave challenge in 2021. After infections jumped more than 20 percent in the first part of the year, a lockdown and dusk-to-dawn curfew were reinstated. The lockdown and ban on public gatherings and in-person meetings ended in May, but the curfew stayed in place. After another spike in infections, the ban on public gatherings and in-person meetings was reimposed in July. The government launched a vaccination campaign in March and by the end of the year had administered more than 10 million vaccines. On October 20, the president lifted the curfew, citing a significant decline in infection rates, and eased but did not eliminate the restriction on public gatherings.

Despite the pandemic, Kenya was in campaign mode in 2021 in anticipation of general elections in August 2022. Campaigning for president, Deputy President William Ruto criticized the 2019 Building Bridges Initiative (BBI), a joint undertaking of President Uhuru Kenyatta and opposition leader Raila Odinga to draft a new constitution that would unite Kenyans and end historical inequalities. Ruto claimed that changes to the constitution proposed by the BBI task force, including reducing the size of the cabinet and introducing the post of prime minister, were a plot to allow Kenyatta to remain in power as prime minister. After the National Assembly and the Senate passed the BBI-drafted Constitution of Kenya Amendment Bill 2020 (popularly known as the BBI Bill) in May 2021, a constitutional referendum was scheduled for June. However, CSOs and individual activists took the matter to court, arguing that the BBI process was illegal because it was not a popular initiative as required by Kenya’s 2010 constitution. On May 13, the High Court agreed with the plaintiffs and issued a permanent injunction against proceeding with the referendum. The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling.

After contracting by 0.3 percent in 2020, Kenya’s real gross domestic product rebounded by 5.3 percent year-on-year in the first half of 2021, according to the World Bank. However, agricultural output fell by 0.5 percent in the first half of the year, in part because of below-average rainfalls. Although unemployment receded to pre-pandemic levels, a World Bank telephone survey in June 2021 found increased food insecurity because of the pandemic, especially in rural areas.
Overall CSO sustainability was stable in 2021. Advocacy improved slightly with several noteworthy achievements, including on the BBI and gender issues. All other dimensions of sustainability remained unchanged.

According to the annual NGO sector report released in March 2022, the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Coordination Board newly registered 362 NGOs, a separate legal form and the most common type of CSO in Kenya, in fiscal year 2019–20. This number included 297 national organizations and 65 international organizations. During the same period, a total of 9,255 NGOs were active and no NGOs were deregistered.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.5**

The legal environment governing CSOs did not change in 2021.

Organizations may register as NGOs under the NGO Coordination Act No. 19 of 1990 and its regulations of 1992; as trusts under the Registration of Documents Act, CAP 285; as companies limited by guarantee under the Companies Act, CAP 486; or as societies under the Societies Act, CAP 108. Most organizations register as NGOs. To do so, an organization must submit an application with supporting documents to the NGO Coordination Board, which has one month to process the application and issue a certificate. As part of its mandate as stipulated in the NGO Act, the NGO Coordination Board may cancel a certificate if it deems that its terms or conditions have been violated or the organization has breached the act. As the NGO Coordination Board is housed under the Ministry of Interior, some CSOs are concerned that its ability to carry out its mandate independently may be compromised.

Organizations that wish to register as trusts prepare trust deeds, submit them for stamp duties, and then file them with the Ministry of Lands and Physical Planning. Registration as companies limited by guarantee requires only a decision of the company board and the approval of the registrar of companies. Community-based organizations (CBOs) register with the Department of Gender and Social Services in the locations in which they will operate.

Registered NGOs must file annual financial reports with the NGO Coordination Board and seek the board’s approval for any changes in their bank accounts and signatories. An NGO is required to inform the NGO Coordination Board in writing if a new board member joins the organization or its physical location changes. The NGO Coordination Board is obliged to inform NGOs about compliance requirements and seeks to do so through activities such as its annual NGO Week.

In March 2021, the Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes (Amendment) Bill was introduced in the parliament. The bill seeks to prevent the internet from being used to share pornography and contains provisions that would allow the government to block access to internet websites and other digital platforms. In July, six CSOs (ARTICLE 19 Eastern Africa, Access Now, Bloggers Association of Kenya, Defenders Coalition, Kenya ICT Action Network, and Kenya Union of Journalists) sent a letter to the government protesting the bill, which they said limited freedom of expression and access to information and undermined the rule of law. The bill was still under consideration at the end of the year.

In November 2021, the National Assembly passed the Community Groups Registration Bill, which provides a regulatory framework for the registration and regulation of community groups. The bill establishes the office of the director of social development, which will mobilize communities to form groups to undertake community projects, as well as county-level coordinators of social development. Every sub-county has a social development committee composed of civil society groups and development partners, which helps set priorities for the types of social development projects to be implemented by community groups.
Despite CSO advocacy and several court orders to implement the Public Benefit Organizations (PBO) Act of 2013, the government still did not do so in 2021. When implemented, the PBO Act will abolish and replace the NGO Coordination Act. The PBO Act is expected to create a more enabling legal environment for CSOs by introducing an independent regulator, mandatory government support, and higher standards of governance and management through self-regulation.

CSOs have the right to manage their internal affairs without unnecessary state interference as long as they comply with the law and, informally, with the government’s political agenda. CSOs have the right to develop their bylaws and freely decide on diverse internal issues, including governance and management structures, decision-making process, membership requirements, and frequency of meetings. CSOs are free to address matters of public debate as long as they remain objective and factual. CSOs face difficulties operating only when the government perceives them as unfriendly to its interests. Little state harassment of CSOs was reported in 2021.

CSOs are required by law to file tax returns and pay taxes on behalf of their employees. Tax exemptions are available to CSOs, but the application process is long and laborious and includes field visits by the Kenya Revenue Authority for audit and verification purposes. In 2021, the Kenya Community Development Foundation (KCDF) had yet to obtain a tax exemption despite initiating the process in 2018.

CSOs may compete for government contracts, although many organizations choose not to do so for fear of tainting their reputations because of perceived corruption in government procurement processes. CSOs may engage in income-generating activities, but most organizations do not do so because they are primarily donor funded.

CSOs may accept foreign funding but must declare their funding sources. The government scrutinizes foreign funding sources to ensure that they do not support terrorism or money laundering.

Legal services are readily available to CSOs. Most CSOs avoid paid legal services as the fees are usually high. Some organizations offer pro bono legal advice. For example, Kituo Cha Sheria offers legal advice to organizations with limited budgets that need help with litigation.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 3.9**

CSOs’ organizational capacity was stable in 2021.

During the year, CSOs sought to rebuild relationships with constituencies that had been undermined during the first year of the pandemic. Some CSOs, such as World Vision Kenya, Kenya Red Cross, Plan International, and Institute of Public Finance Kenya, resumed face-to-face meetings with beneficiaries. But many organizations continued to rely on digital communications, even after the Ministry of Health lifted the ban on in-person meetings in May. For example, International Budget Partnerships Kenya (IBP), which focuses on national and county-level budgeting, engaged with its partners through virtual meetings. The Network on Human Rights Defenders and the Good Governance Coalition of Transparency International Kenya (TI-Kenya) took a different approach and partnered with local organizations that could mobilize members to monitor the implementation of community development projects. KCDF found that its relief work slowed in 2021 because of the need to address the security concerns of partners at the community level and to adapt to digital modes of working. Organizations that lacked internet access and computer equipment or whose beneficiaries lacked mobile telephones that would allow them to participate in virtual meetings were usually unable to engage effectively with their constituents.

Most CSOs at the national and county levels have visions and missions that are identified at the time of registration. They frequently have well-defined strategic plans, including objectives, goals, indicators, and implementation frameworks, as most donors require these tools for funding. However, an organization’s ability to
translate its strategies into action can be affected by donors’ priorities. Donors commonly structure their projects first and then find CSOs to implement them, thereby forcing organizations that seek funding to realign their strategies to fit with donors’ interests. Many CSOs change their areas of intervention to align with funding opportunities and lack sustainability strategies that could position them securely in their specific areas of expertise. Some larger, national-level CSOs, such as the Center for Enhancing Good Governance, which focuses on social accountability in service delivery, have long-term relationships with donors and are thus able to realize their own objectives as well as those of their donors. Most CSOs find that core funding best ensures success in implementing their strategic plans, as it gives them flexibility in designing programs that align with their strategic objectives.

The management structure of small CSOs is usually lean, sometimes consisting of only a program officer, a financial officer, and field officers. Established CSOs, such as the Tax Justice Network Africa (TJNA) and TI-Kenya, have more elaborate, clearly defined management structures and organograms. These larger organizations also have boards able to provide strategic direction and help ensure that strategic goals are achieved in conformity with annual work plans. For example, the board of TI-Kenya engages actively in organizational activities, including program development, to ensure that the Kenya chapter lives up to expectations of the global movement. CSO movements and coalitions usually lack well-defined internal structures during their start-up phase and develop these structures as they grow.

Staffing depends mostly on the availability of funding and is not homogeneous across the sector. In 2021, as in 2020, the pandemic forced many CSOs to cut their staff as funding flows declined. Some organizations had their staff work in staggered shifts. CSOs continued to find staff retention a challenge in 2021, since donors provide little funding for administrative support and employees often leave for better-paying jobs elsewhere. Many CSOs employ staff on renewable contracts subject to funding. Although CSO staff typically have clear job descriptions, employees must usually remain flexible, since newly funded projects may require them to perform duties in areas in which they do not have expertise. Most organizations have human resource policies.

CSOs sought to expand their use of technology in 2021 provided they had unrestricted funding from donors for such a purpose. CSOs with limited resources to expand their technology had to limit their activities until bans on travel and in-person contact were lifted. Most CSOs are aware of cybersecurity risks and seek to ensure that their network systems are secure. The expenditures associated with secure network systems are a challenge for CSOs that lack discretionary funding.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.9**

CSOs’ financial viability was largely unchanged in 2021. The majority of CSOs in Kenya rely on international funding, most of which is pegged to projects and activities rather than capacity building for recipient organizations. The most active development partners in 2021 included USAID, United Kingdom (UK) Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO), German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ), and Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria.

With the arrival of COVID-19 in Kenya in 2020, donors turned to funding pandemic-related activities, which in turn caused some CSOs to refocus their activities to access such funding. This trend continued in 2021. For example, under the European-Union-funded Openness 4 Covid-19 Response & Recovery in Kenya program, the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) implemented a project to improve transparency and efficiency in the use of public resources during and after the COVID-19 crisis. Some donors, such as USAID and FCDO, provided support for election-related activities. FHI 360’s Safeguarding Democratic Space in Kenya program, which ended in November 2021, provided bridge funding between election periods to help with governance reform and support CSOs involved in building media and civic space. The impending elections in 2022 discouraged some donors from funding activities unrelated to the elections. For example, Econews Africa was unable to obtain funds from its...
partner, the Heinrich Böll Foundation, to ensure that its recommendations for the Treaty-Making and Ratification (Amendment) Bill were folded into the draft law because of concerns that the approaching election period would make it difficult to engage parliamentarians’ attention.

Most CSOs prefer not to risk their public reputations by competing for government funding and few organizations are known to do so in 2021.

Kenyan CSOs continued to receive some support from the private sector in 2021. For example, Living Positive Kenya, an organization that improves the livelihoods of women-headed households affected by HIV/AIDS, received funding from Total Energies to build a modern kitchen and dining hall in a school serving informal settlements in Mathare. Safaricom Foundation partnered with Mombasa Women Empowerment Network under the Ndoto Zetu Uwezo Wetu (Our Dreams Our Ability) initiative to improve the equipment and services at a rehabilitation unit for mentally challenged patients in Mombasa County. Under the same initiative, Fresh Hope Youth Group in Limuru, Kiambu County, received funding to purchase an incubator for chicken eggs for beneficiaries’ use. Coca-Cola Kenya supported a project by Nature Kenya to plant about 90,000 tree seedlings in the Hombe Forest in Mt. Kenya to preserve the rain catchment area.

Local donations to KCDF rose in 2021 in response to COVID-19. Most donations were from private-sector sources, although individuals also donated. Among its projects in 2021, KCDF funded agricultural activities by seven CSOs in Baringo, Kakamega, Kisumu, Busia, Migori, Turkana, and West Pokot counties. KCDF also put out a call for proposals that required organizations to contribute 50 percent of the total project cost. Most CSOs that applied for support were able to match the funding. The Urria Trust, a local grantmaking organization that traditionally funds work on elections, supported only a few organizations planning projects with voter-education components in 2021.

The majority of organizations do not seek to earn income from income-generating activities. Membership organizations, such as the CSO Reference Group and IEA, often charge membership fees. IEA also has corporate members whose membership fees are larger than those of individuals. Several CSOs, especially those performing research, have been able to diversify their sources of funding with consultancy work. Smaller organizations are often sustained by their ability to mobilize in-kind support from volunteers and local communities. CSOs’ fundraising skills are still at a nascent stage and mobilizing funds locally is a challenge. The Yetu initiative of the Aga Khan Foundation and USAID continued to support CSOs’ local fundraising campaigns in 2021.

Many organizations rely on software such as QuickBooks to manage their finances. NGOs that receive or spend more than KES 1 million (approximately $9,300) annually are required to file audited accounts with the NGO Coordination Board. Donors also require annual financial audits.

**ADVOCACY: 2.8**

CSO advocacy improved slightly in 2021 with a number of noteworthy achievements, including on the BBI and gender issues.

The law requires public participation in all government policy-making processes. CSOs at the national and county levels continued to work through established relationships with policymakers in 2021, usually combining face-to-face meetings with virtual meetings because of the pandemic. The government welcomed CSOs’ budget analysis, and several organizations engaged with policymakers and communities in budget-making processes at the national and county levels. For example, a CSO network formed by the Center for Enhancing Democracy and Good Governance, Center for Transformational Leadership, and Midrift Hurinet proposed issues for consideration by the Budget and Appropriations Committee of the Nakuru County Assembly as it prepared the 2021-22 budget. The National Treasury invited national-level organizations to consult on the
budgeting process. CSOs at the national and county levels also cooperated with sectoral working groups and submitted memoranda with recommendations.

CSOs demanded accountability in the government’s management of donor funds for the pandemic response in 2021. The CSO Accountability Network, whose members include the Institute of Social Accountability (TISA), Kenya Legal and Ethical Issues Network on HIV and AIDS (KELIN), and International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)-Kenya, submitted recommendations on the matter to the parliament. The CSO Accountability Network also advised the government on a human rights-based approach to dealing with the pandemic. On the local level, the Good Governance Coalition for Transparency, comprised of CSOs operating in various counties, advocated for county governments' management of pandemic funding to be transparent and accountable. IEA implemented a project to ensure transparency and efficiency in the government’s use of public resources during and after the pandemic.

A major advocacy achievement in 2021 was civil society’s successful challenge to the constitutional amendment proposed by the BBI task force. CSOs raised concerns in various fora about the BBI process and the recommendations put forth in the 2019 BBI report, which presented the views of 7,000 people on ways to end ethnic divisions, solve polarizing elections, deal with corruption, and other matters. The Uwazi consortium, an association of CSOs and citizens working on democracy and governance, claimed that the BBI process was not legitimate because it was a top-down process initiated by the two principals rather than driven by the public. The consortium questioned the BBI’s proposed constitutional amendments, which included provisions that would claw back basic constitutional rights and expand the powers of the executive. Five CSO activists filed a petition with the High Court arguing that the amendments were unconstitutional. They were joined by other individuals and CSOs serving as amicus curiae, including Kituo Cha Sheria and the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC). The High Court ruled in their favor and issued a permanent injunction against proceeding with the referendum, which was upheld on appeal.

CSO coalitions were active on a number of women and youth issues in 2021. The technical working group of the social protection thematic group in Nakuru County worked with the local government on issues related to gender-based violence (GBV), especially budget allocations and policy implementation. The thematic group met several times with the county assembly and executive to discuss the establishment of a GBV center. The Women Lead Nairobi coalition conferred with Nairobi County officials, political party leaders, and national leaders about gender-responsive county budgets and policies. The coalition contributed to the development of the Nairobi County Youth Policy and ensured that the policy was gender responsive. The CSO network in Siaya County successfully pushed through the enactment of the Siaya County Youth Service Act, which establishes a county youth service board to assist with youth training and employment.

The annual conference of the Elimu Yetu Coalition (EYC), Kenya’s national education coalition, brought together 184 CSOs to develop recommendations for a competency-based curriculum, quality education, and equity. EYC also held county-level dialogues and sub-national learning forums to address educational policies and regional action plans and engaged with the Senate Standing Committee on Education and the Ministry of Education on a number of policy issues. In April, the Global Action Week for Education was organized by a group of twelve CSOs, including Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE) Kenya, Save the Children, SOS Children’s Village, We World, and VSO Kenya, to campaign for increased financing for education.

The Kenya Water and Sanitation Civil Society Network (KEWASNET) campaigned against “sex for water,” a demand experienced by women and considered a major obstacle to access to clean water. KEWASNET also campaigned for the implementation of hygiene measures at posts on the borders with Uganda and Tanzania to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 and supply-chain disruptions. The Kenya Red Cross Society campaigned to encourage the public to be vaccinated and, together with the British and Dutch Red Cross societies and with financing from the IKEA Foundation, provided farmers in West Pokot and Kitui counties with drought-resistant seeds to increase their resilience to climate change.

CSOs’ years-long efforts to ensure implementation of the PBO Act experienced a lull in 2021 as the government continued to refrain from publishing a commencement date for the act. For some organizations, the general lack of political will to implement the PBO Act puts the effectiveness of further CSO advocacy on the matter in doubt.
CSO service provision was unchanged in 2021. Many organizations were unable to implement their full range of usual activities in 2021 because of the diversion of funds to meet pandemic-related needs. However, CSOs continued to provide a wide range of services in water, agriculture, health care, education, relief, housing, water, and energy. Other services included community economic empowerment, environmental protection, and governance-related processes such as planning, budgeting, and monitoring public-service delivery and development projects. Many organizations provided services on the community level. For example, ActionAid Kenya helped to ensure access to water services by local communities, the Family Health Options of Kenya and Tunza in Mombasa provided health services to communities, and Kituo cha Sheria offered free legal services to communities.

Kenyan CSOs seek to be responsive to community needs. For example, in 2021, Tembea Youth Center for Sustainable Development conducted field visits to identify target populations and needs so that it could implement needs-based community-empowerment programs in Siaya County. The center then offered training and agricultural inputs such as seeds and equipment to targeted farmer groups. In preparation for the general elections in 2022, the center also provided training to youth on voting and monitoring the elections. KCDF focused on strengthening communities by building the capacity of community members to participate in local governance, especially budgeting. KCDF implemented a national economic empowerment program that included financial literacy training and start-up grants to caregivers and households wanting to start a business or engage in farming. Its partner CSOs at the grassroots level implemented interventions such as revolving community funds to support needy individuals.

Midrift Hurinet, a human rights network, implemented peace projects using multi-sectoral engagement forums, sub-county engagement forums, and community peace dialogue sittings (vikao waa usalama) in Nakuru and Baringo counties in 2021. The meetings brought together county officials, sub-county intelligence security committees, CSOs, village elders, religious leaders, and women and youth leaders to discuss preparations for the 2022 elections and human rights concerns. Midrift Hurinet also held conversations with communities on the shores of Lake Naivasha in Nakuru County to address conflicts between legal and illegal fisher folks. These dialogues were held in collaboration with the sub-county fisheries and intelligence committees.

CSOs do not normally seek to recover the costs of their services, as the costs are covered by donors and targeted beneficiaries are usually poor inhabitants of rural areas and informal settlements with no ability to pay. Most CSOs are not involved in income-generating activities or, if they are, raise only small amounts.

CSOs often implement projects that serve audiences larger than their immediate members. For example, the Poverty Eradication Network drilled a borehole in Mutolani with funding from Global Giving and was able to connect water pipes to the local health center and school with labor donated by the community.

The government recognizes the role played by CSOs in community and national development as well as their contribution to realizing the government’s mandate to deliver public services. A good example of the government’s recognition of the value of CSOs’ work is the cooperative effort of the Garissa County government and World Vision to deliver water services and, with other humanitarian-assistance CSOs, to identify areas in which to locate water projects.
SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 3.6

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector was stable in 2021.

The Ndula Center of KHRC in Kiambu County and the Mapaka Center in Makueni County serve as CSO resource centers but operated at minimal levels in 2021 because of the pandemic. The Kenya Correspondents Association Center for Journalists in Kisumu County remained closed in 2021. CSOs such as the International Commission of Jurists and KEWASNET operate online resource centers, but they do not offer a lot of information.

Among local grantmaking organizations, KCDF provided funding for projects targeting needy populations such as marginalized and pastoralist groups, orphans and vulnerable children, drug users, and people with terminal illnesses.

Kenyan CSOs share information on issues of common interests. Among the major coalitions, the Civil Society Reference Group (CSRG), whose members include CBOs, national and international CSOs, and citizen groups, seeks to provide a common voice for the sector and provide support by advocating for an enabling legal, institutional, and operational environment for CSOs. The Yetu Initiative supports the formation of umbrella organizations known as local development organizations, which bring together CSOs and private-sector entities to help citizens solve their own problems with equitable participation by women and youth. As of 2021, local development organizations were operating in five counties.

CSOs have access to training in areas such as organizational and project management, monitoring and evaluation, proposal writing, specific technical areas, and civic education. Training is often provided for a fee and thus unavailable to many organizations. Some international organizations engage consultants to train the staff of local CSOs, thereby helping to realize donor objectives. Established CSOs sometimes mentor growing or weaker organizations to build their capacity. For example, in 2021, KELIN and the Federation of Women Lawyers-Kenya offered technical and fundraising support to CBOs. KCDF provides training, mentorship, and coaching to its partner organizations. In 2021, KCDF reached about forty county-based CSOs with training on local fundraising, communications, financial systems, governance, and leadership.

CSOs increasingly cooperate with the government on policy, governance, and other issues of public concern. For example, KHRC, TI-Kenya, and the Inter-Religious Council of Kenya collaborated with the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, Independent Policing Oversight Authority, and ICJ-Kenya in the Kenya Integrity Leadership Forum, which is hosted by the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission. In 2021, the forum developed strategies to improve its governance and oversight work. Governments at the national and county levels are open to partnering with CSOs on public policy. In 2021, for example, the government of Nakuru County worked closely with CSOs on the budgeting process and considered recommendations from the county CSO network for inclusion in the budget. The county government of Nairobi developed its youth policy in partnership with organizations working with youth. The government of Baringo County collaborated with local CSOs on civic education.

Collaboration and partnerships between CSOs and the private sector take various forms. Often the two sectors complement each other by sharing knowledge, skills, and resources. In 2021, CSOs received technical and in-kind support from private-sector entities. CSOs were represented on the Multi-Sectoral Anti-Corruption Forum, an umbrella group that brings together the private sector, religious groups, media, civil society, trade unions, academia, development partners, youth, and others. A second-hand clothes dealers organization, the Mutumba Consortium Association of Kenya, partnered with IEA on a study of the trade in second-hand clothing and footwear in Kenya in 2021.

The media collaborated with CSOs in 2021 by inviting them to take part in talk shows and covering their work in areas such as farming, health care, youth, and education. In 2021, increased collaboration between media,
government, and CSOs took place through educational and informational sessions about governance at the county level. Panelists drawn from government and CSOs discussed service delivery, accountability, and budgets on local radio stations. However, issues of trust can limit partnerships between media and CSOs. Some CSOs view the media as lacking neutrality, reporting inaccurately, and tailoring messages in ways that are likely to have a negative impact on CSOs.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.2**

CSOs’ public image was stable in 2021. The media is highly commercialized, and coverage of the CSO activities is not extensive. When such coverage is presented, the emphasis is usually on activities that improve the public welfare. Organizations that have established themselves as authorities in particular areas and have good relationships with the media are routinely invited to share opinions on live radio and television shows. For example, in 2021, both radio and television hosted representatives of TISA and IBP Kenya to discuss national financial issues. The media also cover CSOs focused on topics that are of interest to the public, such as corruption. At the county level, CSOs work with local radio stations to sensitize the public about county budget-making processes.

Public perceptions of CSOs vary. Communities working with Oxfam, ActionAid Kenya, Save the Children, and other organizations that provide humanitarian services see the benefits of CSOs’ interventions and appreciate their role in the country’s social and economic development. The public also appreciates organizations that empower citizens in areas such as land rights and participation in governance processes. However, the public can view CSOs that work in areas with less direct impact on their lives as benefiting themselves at public expense.

Governments at the national and county levels view CSOs as stakeholders to be consulted in the development and review of public policies. The private sector appreciates the role of CSOs in service delivery and often partners with them on various projects.

CSOs publicize their activities at events such as launches, public forums, and webinars on mainstream and social media. For example, IEA used its Twitter account to invite participants to the many webinar forums that it hosted in 2021. CSOs operating at the local level use public barazas, or meetings, organized by local administrations to publicize their work. Organizations such as TI–Kenya and TISA often invite local media to cover their activities. Organizations that lack funding for media coverage are disadvantaged, as without payment journalists and editors may refuse to cover their work.

Larger CSOs, such as Amref Health Africa and Access to Medicines platform, produce timely annual and financial reports. TJNA has placed its financial and procurement procedures manual in the public domain as part of its transparency initiative. CSRG also works to enforce standards of transparency and self-regulation practices as part of its mandate. Some organizations, such as Grassroots Development Initiatives Foundation, have codes of ethics and standard operating procedures. The CSO network in Siaya County has a memorandum of understanding that requires members to comply with government regulations. Codes of ethics are rare among smaller organizations.
A constitutional reform process in Liberia that began in 2012 under former president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf culminated on April 1, 2021, with the release of the results of a constitutional referendum held on December 8, 2020. After two years of consultations with CSOs, political parties, and other groups, the constitutional committee proposed eight amendments, which, among other things, would reduce the term of the president from six to five years and eliminate a ban on dual citizenship. Although all eight proposals were approved by a majority of voters, none met the required two-thirds approval threshold and so they were not enacted.

Corruption and fraud in the public sector remained a serious concern in 2021. In a prominent case, the head of the Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission resigned in February after he was accused of obtaining his citizenship illegally. After CSOs staged protests, issued press statements, and presented petitions to national legislators, the commission’s new head gave former and current public officials four months to voluntarily return stolen government assets or face arrest. The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Liberia 136 out of 180 countries in 2021, noting that a persistent culture of impunity, a weak judiciary, and the underfunding of anti-graft institutions undermined the country’s fight against corruption.

After declining at the end of 2020, the number of COVID-19 infections in Liberia rose in the first half of 2021. Severe challenges in dealing with the crisis included the country’s lack of trained health workers, insufficient financial resources for the health-care system, inadequate water supplies and sanitation, and the poor health of much of the population. In June, the government issued stricter pandemic protocols, including a requirement for masks to be worn in public and a ban on gatherings of more than twenty people. As the Delta variant spread, several Liberian CSOs, including Naymote, Accountability Lab, Center for Transparency and Accountability in Liberia (CENTAL), and Integrity Lab, criticized the government’s response to the pandemic and attributed the rise in cases to failed leadership and the mismanagement of the government’s Incident Management System, which was in charge of the national pandemic response.

In 2021, Liberia’s five-year, $257 million compact with the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) concluded. The project encouraged economic growth and reduced poverty by improving road infrastructure, rehabilitating the Mt. Coffee Hydropower Plant, and reconstructing a water pipeline linking the dam to a water sewage plant. Liberia could be eligible for a second MCC grant in the future if it passes at least ten of the twenty indicators on the MCC scorecard, which measures performance in areas such as fiscal policy and civic freedoms. In 2021, Liberia passed only nine indicators and failed to reach the required threshold.

Liberia’s economy improved in 2021. The country’s gross domestic product grew 3.6 percent, driven mainly by the export of commodities such as gold and iron ore, according to the World Bank. This was a notable improvement.
over the -3 percent growth rate in 2020. Inflation fell to 7.1 percent by July 2021 as the prices of some commodities rose and the Central Bank of Liberia took a cautious monetary stance. However, there was little direct benefit for ordinary Liberians. According to the World Bank, extreme poverty in Liberia increased in 2021, although at a much slower pace than in the previous year.

The overall sustainability of CSOs was stable in 2021. The legal environment improved slightly thanks to the implementation of the National Aid and Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Policy, which offers clearer guidelines for NGO operations and an easier process for incorporation and accreditation. Service provision was slightly stronger as CSOs were better able to provide goods and services to address urgent needs. The sector’s public image improved slightly as CSOs became more aware of the importance of public relations and media campaigns, including on social media. Advocacy deteriorated slightly as CSOs faced interference in their activities, including an inability to obtain information from government sources. The other dimensions of sustainability were unchanged.

The NGO Coordination Unit of the Ministry of Finance, Planning, and Development accredited 166 local and 40 international NGOs or a total of 206 organizations in 2021, compared to 710 organizations in 2020. These figures reflect only organizations applying for accreditation in 2021 rather than all NGOs operating in the country, the number of which is unknown. More than 1,500 CSOs are registered with the National Civil Society Council of Liberia, according to the European Union (EU)’s Supporting Effective Advocacy in Liberia (SEAL) project. The number of unregistered organizations is thought to be high. Many of them exist in name only but are reactivated quickly when grant opportunities arise.

The legal environment governing CSOs improved slightly in 2021, thanks to the implementation of the new National Aid and NGO Policy, which offers clearer guidelines for NGO operations and eased the process for incorporation and accreditation.

The CSO sector is governed by the Government-CSO Partnership Policy of 2006, CSO Accord of 2012, and National Aid and NGO Policy, launched in September 2020. The NGO Policy sets forth the government’s responsibilities to NGOs and mechanisms by which NGOs can hold the government accountable. Civil society views the policy as generally offering a more positive framework for its work in that accreditation procedures are clearer and easier to follow and accreditation can now be accomplished at county-level service centers outside of the capital city, Monrovia. A centralized reporting mechanism replaces the demand for separate reports from multiple government agencies, and the new legally grounded fee structure is published and transparent. The Ministry of Finance, Development, and Planning, with support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), organized awareness and training workshops about the new policy in 2021 to ensure that CSOs understood its basic tenets. The ministry also set up a joint committee comprised of civil society representatives, ministry officials, and members of the government’s Governance Commission to review the policy after some CSOs criticized it as too narrow in scope, as it focused exclusively on the activities of NGOs while overlooking other types of organizations.

CSOs may register as various types of organizations, including associations, cooperative societies, and trade unions. The most common form is associations. To register as an association, an organization must secure articles of incorporation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then secure accreditation from the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs. Registered associations may apply to the NGO Coordination Unit at the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning for accreditation as NGOs. Organizations with NGO status tend to have somewhat more autonomy than other types of organizations, which are more likely to be closely monitored by government entities. NGOs are also freer to design and implement their interventions, which tends to increase funding.
possibilities. To apply for accreditation as NGOs, organizations must submit memoranda of understanding with the government ministries or agencies responsible for the sectors in which they will work. All CSOs are obliged to register with the Business Registry for tax purposes before becoming operational.

Many CSOs view the laws and regulations governing accreditation as inconsistently implemented. In 2021, CSOs continued to complain that corruption hindered the process of obtaining accreditation and sectoral clearance, which should take only one day but often takes longer. CSOs that align themselves with the government or remain neutral on controversial issues usually face few barriers with accreditation, while organizations that the government considers to be critical of its actions or that work in certain areas may face barriers such as difficulties obtaining clearance. In December 2021, the Liberia NGO Forum contributed $24,100 to the Ministry of Finance for the development of an automated online platform for the accreditation process. CSOs may operate without legal status but are unable to apply for support from the government or foreign donors.

NGOs must renew their accreditation yearly and submit annual program reports to the NGO Coordination Unit. Organizations with budgets of $50,000 or more must submit annual audited financial statements as part of the reaccreditation process, although this rule is not strictly enforced. The NGO Coordination Unit resumed in-person inspections of NGOs in 2021 after cutting back on inspections in 2020, when many organizations were not fully operational because of the pandemic.

Although the constitution guarantees freedoms of assembly and expression, CSOs view their ability to protest as somewhat limited, especially if they voice opinions that the government perceives as antagonistic to its activities or supportive of the opposition. Strained relationships between government institutions and CSOs can make it difficult for organizations to obtain permits for protests or to protest without interference. For example, at a protest organized by women-led groups, protesters were allegedly subject to police harassment and had personal items such as telephones seized. In August, on the first of three days of protest against the rising rate of rape, partisan violence broke out between protesters and persons believed to be supporters of the ruling party. Stone-throwing resulted in injuries to two persons. Stone-throwing occurred again on the second day of the protest when an unidentified group attempted to disperse the protesters. On the third day, police officers drove the protesters off the streets, reportedly using tear gas and arresting several protesters.

CSOs are exempt from taxes on income that does not derive from profit-making business activities or other activities inconsistent with their charitable purpose. CSOs must pay taxes on employees’ salaries and on goods and services. Many CSOs are not fully compliant with their tax obligations, even though most donors prefer to work with CSOs that pay their taxes and show those expenses in their project budgets. After the total lockdown and suspension of economic activities during the pandemic in 2020, the Liberia Revenue Authority required CSOs to pay taxes for 2020 in 2021 despite their requests for tax relief.

CSOs may earn income from the provision of goods and services, receive funds from foreign sources, and compete for government contracts. The NGO Policy allows the government to investigate organizations’ financing to curb money laundering. Government agencies may deny partnership agreements and grants to organizations whose work they does not condone.

Most CSOs in Liberia have insufficient financial resources to obtain legal help. Some CSOs receive support from board members with legal backgrounds or in the form of pro bono legal counsel.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.2**

CSOs’ organizational capacity was stable in 2021.

Engaging with constituencies was a serious challenge for most CSOs in 2021. Although recent years have seen some improvement, CSOs still find it difficult to build relationships with individuals and groups that should benefit from their services. For example, beneficiaries often expect to be paid to attend meetings organized by CSOs, and many organizations lack the resources to meet this expense.

CSOs are beginning to recognize the importance of strategic planning based on clear missions and visions. The Development Education Network–Liberia (DEN-L), in partnership with United Nations (UN) Women, has enhanced the capacity of more than 300 CSOs in five counties to develop policy documents and work plans. Most of these CSOs now have clear visions and missions, write their own grant proposals, and have their own offices.
For example, Naymote, a leading grassroots organization, has a five-year strategic plan that articulates its focus on citizen engagement in advocacy and issue-based reform. But other CSOs lack clear visions and other tools that they need to achieve their mission and goals. Instead, they wait for donors or the government to support their programs, shifting their focus to align with funders’ priorities. This approach leaves many organizations working across multiple sectors with no particular expertise.

The Liberian CSO sector has few board members who actively support or provide day-to-day oversight of their organizations. Many board members are linked to their organizations only out of financial interest. For example, board members are often compensated from project funds for transportation to meetings and day-to-day communications and internet access. Board members are sometimes provided with equipment such as laptops, especially if they were involved in developing a particular proposal. There is often a gap between written policies and actual practice, and recently founded organizations in particular tend to have weak policy and procedural frameworks. A significant proportion of CSOs are unaware of best practices for organizational governance and financial management and may lack accountability mechanisms and internal controls. Even if staff is honest and well meaning, in the absence of internal controls, the margins for error are numerous and corruption may be difficult to avoid.

CSOs tend to be heavily dependent on their executive directors and have little capacity at the lower levels of their organizations. Many CSOs lack sufficient funding to hire permanent or highly qualified employees. Staff retention has become a serious problem because of CSOs’ limited resources. Few professional development opportunities are offered to core staff, and there is little segregation of duties among employees. Many organizations have a generous number of program staff and almost no operational staff. Many CSO staff work overtime without remuneration. The NGO Policy imposes limits on the number of foreign staff that CSOs may hire.

Modern equipment is scarce at most CSOs. Many organizations have limited technological capacity and are unable to work remotely, especially if they are located in areas with a poor internet infrastructure. The sector’s sizable presence on the internet and social media is achieved mostly by staff using their personal cell phones. Organizations sometimes share a computer with internet access so that they can attend meetings online. A 2021 consultation with youth organizations in Liberia showed that during the pandemic, the majority of CSOs were viewed as responding quickly and effectively to the crisis by switching to online work in whatever way possible.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.1**

CSOs' financial viability was unchanged in 2021. Liberian CSOs are sorely underfunded and have few sources of revenue other than international donors. Most CSOs depend on single donors for intermittent, project-based funding. According to the Financial Tracking Service of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the major donors to Liberia in 2021 were the EU, United States, Sweden, Qatar Charity, and Saudi Arabia. Total funding amounted to $2.8 million in 2021, compared to $13.2 million in 2020 and $557,214 in 2019. Most funding was earmarked for food aid and the pandemic response, with Concern Worldwide, Qatar Charity, and Action Against Hunger the major CSO recipients. The Women’s Peace and Humanitarian Fund and Spotlight Initiative supported...
projects to build peace and empower women that were implemented by local CSOs, including the Foundation for Community Initiatives, Platform for Dialogue and Peace, and Gbowee Peace Foundation Africa.

CSOs tend to receive funding from different donors sequentially rather than at the same time. Many organizations, especially smaller CSOs, work intermittently. If a project finishes and no follow-on funding is available, organizations face the possibility that they will be unable to carry on.

The government rarely provides direct grants or contracts to CSOs other than small amounts to organizations providing services that complement its agenda. For example, in early 2021, the Ministry of Labor awarded grants of $1,000 to five CSOs, including the Defense for Children International and Community Watch Forum, to raise community awareness of the impact and dangers of human trafficking. There have been reports that kickbacks are required before organizations can obtain government contracts or grants. The CSO Council has begun to give modest grants to smaller CSOs.

Business organizations generally support CSO service delivery through their corporate social responsibility programs. International companies are usually required to support CSOs in their concession agreements. Through the Liberia Employment and Entrepreneurship Program, Mercy Corps helped youth-development CSOs find private-sector support to bolster their programs to develop the employment and entrepreneurship potential of at-risk youth.

Liberian CSOs have started to address their dependence on foreign donor funding by generating earned income through business activities, fee-for-service models involving agricultural activities, or the small-scale production of goods and services. For example, in 2021, Actions for Community Matters, a local CSO, generated income by giving out microloans for livelihood empowerment with a repayment period of between six and eight months. Donations from local communities continued to help CSOs support disadvantaged populations affected by the pandemic in 2021. However, CSOs’ efforts to fundraise are often hampered by a lack of capacity, and only a few CSOs have been successful in this area.

The majority of CSOs lack sound financial management systems. Few organizations perform internal audits or are financially transparent and accountable. However, in 2021, many CSOs took advantage of capacity-building training offered by organizations such as the UN and African Development Bank to strengthen their financial management systems.

**ADVOCACY: 3.5**

Advocacy deteriorated slightly in 2021 as CSOs faced interference in their activities, including an inability to obtain information from government sources.

CSOs take part in national and local government decision making through formal and informal channels. CSOs are usually invited to provide input about government programs and validate national policies, although their level of involvement varies by sector. Among the committees and taskforces that included CSOs as members in 2021 were the Government of Liberia and Partners Anti-SGBV Roadmap (2020–22) Committee, Inter-Ministerial and CSO Taskforce on SGBV, and Committee for Implementation of the National GBV Plan of Action.

In 2021, a gap was evident in CSOs’ ability to engage in advocacy. While policy makers generally welcome opportunities to work with CSOs, at the same time, most government officials are uncomfortable sharing information with CSOs and respond slowly to their requests for information. Although a Freedom of Information Act exists, CSOs still struggle to obtain government information. For example, CSOs’ efforts to obtain declarations of assets by public officials, including the president, were unsuccessful and hindered their work on corruption in 2021. In such situations, CSOs rarely rely on the Freedom of Information Act to obtain needed information. CSOs’ efforts to engage in advocacy in 2021 were further
frustrated by their difficulty in obtaining permits to protest and the blackout of some media, starting with the government’s ban of a popular talk-show program in January. As a result, many organizations turned away from efforts to change policy and focused instead on awareness-raising activities.

Nevertheless, CSOs achieved several notable advocacy successes during the year. For example, the Sustainable Development Institute (SDI) and other CSOs called on the government to ensure that agribusinesses, especially the palm oil company Golden Veroleum, stopped violating human rights and lived up to their commitments to communities. After assessing Golden Veroleum’s poor record of compliance, SDI and Milieudefensie sent out public letters asking investors to cut their financial ties to the company. In response to this pressure, the company paid sixteen dismissed workers their benefits amounting to $35,541 and pledged to support the goals of various communities in which they work.

In the last quarter of 2021, several CSOs, including ActionAid Liberia (AAL) and Medica Liberia, undertook advocacy to reform women’s legal rights. The organizations commissioned a policy brief highlighting critical issues of gender inequality in selected legal frameworks, which they shared with the House of Representatives. At the end of the year, the legislature was still considering provisions of the brief for follow-on action. CSOs were also active in addressing incidents of rape in 2021. After President George Weah declared rape a national emergency in September 2020, largely in response to CSO advocacy, activists reported in 2021 that the number of SGBV cases kept increasing. They called on national policy makers to strengthen existing rape laws and take more stringent action against convicted perpetrators of rape. After Medica Liberia, an organization that advocates for the rights of women and girls affected by SGBV, was unable to obtain a permit for a public protest and encountered harassment in 2021, it turned to awareness-raising and behavior-change projects. By the close of its program in 2021, Medica Liberia had observed positive change, including more people speaking out against SGBV and offering support to women who experienced violence. Women’s inclusion in educational facilities was supported by several CSOs that participated in revising the Liberia Technical and Vocational Education Training (TVET) Policy (2022-27).

The CSO community understands the need to unite behind legal reforms to benefit the sector and demonstrates some commitment to advocating for these reforms. In 2021, CSOs held a series of consultations and workshops to discuss recommendations for revising the new NGO Policy and set up a committee to continue this work.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.9**

Service provision was slightly enhanced in 2021 as CSOs were better able to provide goods and services to meet urgent needs.

CSOs work in a variety of fields, including health care, education, and energy. The government limits CSOs’ ability to offer services in areas considered controversial, such as political and religious freedoms, human rights, voter registration, and the needs of sexual minorities. Some CSOs work under the radar in these areas, implementing programs that seek to protect civil and political rights and related objectives. CSOs reported a decrease in the harassment of field workers by local officials in 2021 thanks to the government’s efforts to involve civil society in its development agenda.

CSOs provide much-needed services that the state is unable to provide. Especially in communities in the country’s interior, CSOs are often the only source of services to meet people’s basic needs. Key among these needs are business loans and economic empowerment opportunities, including village savings and loan associations targeting disadvantaged women and households. For example, in 2021, several CSOs, including the Rural Integrated Center for Community Empowerment (RICCE), organized a training on gender inclusion in forestry and land matters to increase access to employment in the informal sector by vulnerable households, which were at risk of falling deeper into poverty because of the pandemic. Their interventions included providing grants and training in business skills to more than 2,000 households. However, many CSOs prioritize donor-supported services, which do not always reflect the priority...
needs of specific communities. In 2021, CSOs’ ability to meet community needs was limited by their insufficient engagement with communities to define and agree on needed support, limited donor flexibility in the implementation of support services, and too few vulnerability needs assessments. For example, while women and girls were affected by a sharp increase in domestic and sexual violence after pandemic restrictions eased in 2021, many CSOs that normally offer referral services for survivors of SGBV focused instead on COVID-19. Liberian and, more often, international organizations usually collect data at the end of projects to assess the success of their interventions.

Membership-based associations rarely extend their services to beneficiaries other than their members. Otherwise, CSOs generally provide their goods and services without discriminating on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or religious affiliation.

Few CSOs market their products and services or seek to recover their costs, since they usually work with constituencies that cannot afford to pay.

Government bodies, primarily at the local level, recognize CSOs’ contributions to some extent. In 2021, several CSOs, including Give Directly, Jhpiego, Humanity First, and Actions for Community Matters, were on a list of national and international organizations recognized for making positive contributions to individual projects and the larger development process. CSO contributions mentioned in the report included mobilizing resources in ways that the state by itself cannot, facilitating citizen participation in development initiatives, promoting an effective and honest government through public scrutiny and advocacy-based activities, giving voice and assistance to underprivileged and marginalized populations, and flexibly responding to shifts in local conditions during project implementation.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.8**

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector was unchanged in 2021.

Liberia has only a few resource centers and intermediary support organizations providing training and other support to CSOs. Since they are largely dependent on foreign funding, their capacities and reach are limited. The major resource centers include iCampus and the DEN-L, which offer training, rental space, internet access, and logistical support; the Center for Media Studies and Peace Building, which convenes dialogues and workshops for CSOs; and the Media Resource Center (MRC), which provides free training and services. MRC generates income by renting space for training and meetings and charging for internet access.

Liberia has several local foundations. They usually do not fund CSOs, although a few of them regrant limited amounts of donor funding to organizations working in local communities. The National CSO Council of Liberia has begun to give out small grants to small and new CSOs and community-based organizations (CBOs) with funding from the Embassy of Sweden, Mercy Corps, and the Ministry of Finance.

Although CSOs understand the need to work together and share information, very few coalitions and networks exist in Liberia. The main coalition is the National CSO Council of Liberia, a consortium with a membership of more than 1,500 organizations. Although the council has been in existence for more than ten years, it had little visibility until recently. The council has grown more functional and engaged by coordinating sectoral activities, fundraising for various efforts, and focusing more intently on advocacy on behalf of CSOs, which was not a priority in the past. The council has an executive committee composed of a group of CSOs, including FCU and the Alliance for Transitional Justice, as well as county and regional chairpersons who facilitate coordination between CSOs at the local level. In most counties, the National CSO Council provides opportunities for rural CSOs to participate in
its work. In 2021, thanks to the council’s coordination, CSOs had a louder and more credible voice, expanded their access to decision makers, and benefited from exposure to each other’s skills and practices.

Other leading networks and coalitions include the Liberia NGO Network, which unites organizations working in a variety of sectors and serves as a watchdog, advocate, and lobbyist to improve the quality of governance in Liberia. The National Education Coalition of Liberia and the Education NGO Forum provide training, share information, and engage in advocacy on behalf of their members. The CSO Working Group on Land Rights supports the formulation and passage of land rights laws in Liberia, and the Multi-Actor Platform on Land Governance hosts thematic groups that focus on land rights and sustainable green agriculture.

CSOs have access to a limited pool of local experts, consultants, and trainers who provide basic training in nonprofit management, the legal framework, and fundraising. Training is offered mainly in the major urban areas and funded by international donors. For example, in 2021, UNDP offered training to financial and program staff of forty-five CSOs from across the country to help strengthen their program planning and implementation.

The concept of intersectoral partnerships is not well understood in Liberia. The government and CSOs engage in limited partnerships to provide basic services in areas such as water, sanitation, education, and health care. For example, in 2021, CSOs, CBOs, and the National CSO Council of Liberia took part in the COVID-19 Advocacy Campaign project launched by the National Public Health Institute of Liberia. The Ministry of Finance organized a two-day dialogue with CSOs on the 2022 budget, which allowed CSOs to develop a shadow budget that emphasized government accountability and transparency in spending to better the lives of the Liberian people.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.6

The public image of CSOs improved slightly in 2021 as they became more aware of the importance of public relations and media campaigns, including on social media. Media coverage of CSOs’ activities tends to be mixed or polarized. CSOs rely on the media to enhance civic engagement, disseminate information, and mobilize public support. Outlets such as Integrity TV offer a platform to CSOs to discuss critical national issues. However, most radio and television stations carefully screen their stories to avoid conflict with the government, and they do not want to cover CSOs’ activities or air controversial topics or criticism of government officials for fear of legal sanctions and the loss of revenue from government advertising, their largest source of revenue. CSOs are normally required to pay for coverage from electronic and print media, which many organizations cannot afford.

The public supports CSO advocacy and often trusts the sector more than the central government. Local communities depend on CSOs to speak on their behalf. A recent consultative meeting with youth organizations in Liberia suggested that public confidence in CSOs increased in 2021 thanks in part to stakeholder coordination and collaboration. The consultation also showed that in volatile contexts CSOs appear to have more legitimacy than the government because of their ability to deal with political pressures and conflict sensitivities.

The government has a favorable view of CSOs working in service delivery but distrusts advocacy organizations that question its decisions and policies. For example, in 2021, when a group of CSOs known as Citizens United Against Secret Killings called for an end to mysterious disappearances and deaths allegedly linked to traditional ritualistic practices, the government complained that they were confusing ritual violence with domestic violence, robberies, and suicides. This assertion created tension between CSOs and the government and subsequently led to clashes between police and protesters.

The private sector has mixed views of the sector’s credibility and the legitimacy of its contributions. CSOs recognize that they should put a higher priority on developing their relationship with the private sector to broaden their economic base.
CSOs increasingly seek to inform the public about their work and activities, often by using social media such as Twitter and Facebook. For example, Naymote, Sustainable Development Initiatives, and CENTAL have active Facebook pages where they offer updates about their achievements and ongoing projects. Other CSOs use their Facebook pages and websites to involve the public in their work. For example, Accountability Lab’s Integrity Icon Initiative organizes weekly live talkshows on Facebook where experts and other guests discuss various topics of interest.

More established CSOs share their annual reports online, but most CSOs do not have websites and do not share their annual reports with the public. Some CSOs self-regulate by adopting internal code of ethics and otherwise seeking to demonstrate transparency and adherence to international best practices. There have been ongoing discussions in the sector about the need for a general code of conduct or ethics, but these discussions have yet to bear fruit.
After a particularly difficult year in 2020, Madagascar began 2021 with a hint of optimism. An attempted coup d’état was foiled, the government was reshuffled, and new presidents of the Senate, High Constitutional Court, and Independent National Electoral Commission were inaugurated. A number of people were tried and convicted of corruption, including a former prime minister, who in October was fined MGA 100 million (approximately $24,000) and sentenced to five years in prison. (He did not attend his trial and instead fled the country.) Madagascar created its twenty-third region in 2021, which will facilitate administrative aspects of local CSOs’ work.

But in February, Madagascar was hit by a new wave of COVID-19 infections, recording nearly 2,500 cases and forty-five deaths in the course of a month. In April, the government reintroduced a fifteen-day state of emergency, which included closing the country’s borders, imposing a curfew, banning large public gatherings and demonstrations, and quarantining certain regions. The government provisionally suspended nine radio and television shows that it said were likely to disrupt public order and public safety and harm national unity. To resume broadcasting, the media outlets were required to sign letters of commitment not to broadcast information about the pandemic that was deemed incorrect or could “harm public order and safety.” The state of emergency was extended repeatedly until it finally ended on September 3, 2021.

Madagascar continued to face its most acute drought in forty years, which added to an unprecedented level of human distress. The impacts of climate change was especially acute in the southern regions of Androy, Anosy, and Atsimo Andrefana, where more than 70 percent of communes struggled with deepening food insecurity and one in five children was found to be acutely malnourished. Local and international CSOs worked with the government, United Nations (UN) World Food Program, and other humanitarian organizations to provide life-saving food aid.

The health crisis continued to strain the budgets of the government, households, companies, and CSOs in 2021. Along with the National Crisis Response Plan, a flash appeal by the UN enabled the government to cover almost 53 percent of its funding needs between January and May 2021. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) awarded a $312.4 million Extended Fund Facility to support the country’s recovery from the pandemic and revive reforms aimed at stimulating growth and reducing poverty. The IMF predicted the country’s growth rate to reach 3.5 percent in 2021 after a contraction in 2020, driven by the resumption of mining-sector activities. Madagascar improved from 149th to 147th place out of 180 countries in the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2021.

The overall sustainability of CSOs improved slightly in 2021. CSOs’ organizational capacity improved slightly in 2021 with the strengthening of internal structures and improved command of new technologies. Advocacy was slightly stronger as CSOs participated more fully in policy formulation and public oversight. Service provision was
slightly more effective thanks to CSOs’ tireless work with the government to respond to the pandemic and food crises. The sectoral infrastructure improved moderately as organizations cooperated more effectively and training resumed. CSOs’ public image was slightly better as both public and private media portrayed civil society more positively. CSOs’ legal environment and financial viability were unchanged.

Official statistics on the number of CSOs in Madagascar remain unavailable. The sector consists of associations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), unions, foundations, cooperatives, savings and credit groups, religious and cultural groups, community-based organizations (CBOs), and informal village associations.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.8**

The legal environment governing CSOs did not change in 2021.

CSOs may register under various legal regimes. The majority of organizations register as associations under Order No. 60-133 by submitting applications accompanied by declarations of existence and their statutes to regional registration offices. Receipts are issued that are considered proof of registration. NGO status, which increases funding opportunities and allows CSOs to own real estate and generate income, is obtained through the additional step of filing an application for approval with a regional bipartite committee. Trade unions register with their prefectures or districts under Decree No. 2011-490. Registration is usually completed within two weeks and is rarely denied.

The main obstacle to registration continues to be the requirement that some organizations travel long distances over roads that are often in poor condition. However, CSOs do not need to register to operate, and many organizations, especially those located in remote or isolated areas, do not bother to do so.

Associations have minimal internal structures consisting of management or administrative bodies. They are not required to submit annual activity or financial reports. However, in practice, they must file reports with the tax authorities to obtain tax identification numbers and statistical cards, which are required to open bank accounts. NGOs have more complex internal structures, including general meetings, boards of directors, management committees, and oversight entities such as statutory auditors. NGOs must file annual activity and financial reports and detailed operational plans for the following fiscal year. The government does not consistently monitor compliance or take measures against organizations that do not comply, and most CSOs tend to neglect these requirements. In 2021, however, several youth associations learned that their failure to file reports disqualified their members from election to the Youth Parliament. Some regional authorities have required CSOs to produce quarterly reports according to a pre-established template, but this obligation is not stated in the law. Foreign CSOs must submit annual activity reports and financial statements to the tax authorities to renew their headquarters agreements.

Despite a prohibition on public demonstrations during the state of emergency, CSOs were generally able to express themselves freely in 2021. However, in several cases this right was infringed. For example, in November 2021, CSOs invited by a regional television channel to participate in a debate on the pandemic were told by government officials that they were formally forbidden to give statistics on the pandemic and that the authorities would be present during the broadcast. A journalist from a local media outlet was publicly reprimanded for publishing statistics on COVID-19 cases, which prompted a condemnation from the Order of Journalists. The national vice president of the National Elections Observation Committee—Citizen Education (Comité national d’observation des élections—Éducation des citoyens, KMF–CNOE) was arrested following the publication of a report on social networks and was later released. Threats were occasionally made against CSO staff. For example, an association working to protect the environment had to exfiltrate a member who was openly threatened by a person involved in the trafficking of precious wood. Since the adoption of Law No. 2014-06 on fighting cybercrime, CSOs report that they are more likely to self-censor and post less information on social media.
CSOs’ earned income is exempt from income tax provided it is used exclusively for educational, cultural, social, or economic development activities. Unless otherwise agreed, income from income-generating activities is subject to the same tax regime as commercial enterprises. Charitable, humanitarian, and cultural organizations recognized as being of public utility and foreign CSOs with headquarters agreements are eligible for exemptions from duties and taxes on profits and transfers. Such exemptions are not automatic and require decisions by the director general of customs, or, in the case of shipments related to disaster relief, the Council of Ministers. Although information about the taxation of CSOs is published on the Ministry of Finance website, CSOs do not always fully understand certain tax incentives. For example, in 2021, Ny Tanintsika learned only by chance that its package of 9,000 solar lamps was exempt from import taxes under the 2019 Rectifying Finance Law. Only donations to foundations are eligible for tax deductions.

CSOs may collect revenues from the provision of goods and services, bid on government tenders, engage in fundraising campaigns, and receive funds from foreign donors. CSOs with public benefit status are eligible for support from the state, provinces, and municipalities. A law on social enterprises is still lacking.

The Malagasy Bar Association includes lawyers experienced in areas of CSO intervention, such as land law, labor and union law, and environmental law. However, with only one lawyer per 18,000 inhabitants in the country, access to legal expertise is limited. Lawyers’ fees are high. Legal aid offices and legal clinics such as Trano Aro Zo and several clinics focused on environmental law are of great help to CSOs. Some networks offer legal expertise to their members. For example, the Alliance Voahary Gasy (AVG) has twelve lawyers on its staff who specialize in environmental justice, and the Rural Training Institutions Liaison Office (Bureau de liaison des institutions de formation rurale, BIMTT) has a legal office.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.0**

CSOs’ organizational capacity improved slightly in 2021 as they strengthened their internal structures and improved their command of new technologies.

CSOs, including informal neighborhood associations, are attentive to their communities’ expectations and responsive to their needs. The Youth Observatory, for example, takes advantage of twice-weekly exchanges with its members to compile statistical data based on their feedback. In August 2021, using information collected from 500 municipalities, the Youth Observatory launched the Committed Citizens for More Inclusive, Effective, and Peaceful Governance project. During the year, CSOs resumed meeting with constituents in person, although some organizations continued virtual meetings.

Most larger CSOs and platforms, such as the Organization of Citizens for the Defense of the Common Interest and Good (Organisation des citoyens pour la défense des intérêts et des biens communs, ROHY), Civil Society Platform HINA, and AVG, have strategic plans and schedule meetings to develop, monitor, and evaluate them. In 2021, for example, with the support of its technical and financial partners, the Tafo Mihaavo network identified goals to reach by 2030 and developed an action plan for the years 2021–25. To achieve greater member support for its strategic plan, the HINA Platform incorporated information about local needs as identified by its member CSOs. The platform also updated its membership list to eliminate empty shell associations and ensure that all of its members were legitimate CSOs. CSOs sometimes develop their strategic plans to align with available funding and ministries’ sectoral plans. They may also deviate from their plans to respond to emerging funding opportunities and situations on the ground. This happened in 2021, when funding was made available to respond to the pandemic, the health emergency in the south, and the government’s campaign to reach 60 percent modern contraceptive prevalence by 2030. Producing a strategic plan is not yet a major concern for most small and medium-sized associations, such as youth associations, which are often limited by their financial resources. However, some smaller organizations are beginning to develop basic action plans and even engage in strategic planning. For
example, in March 2021, Youth First renewed its commitment to youth empowerment with a strategic plan for the years 2021–25. CSOs do not normally engage in program monitoring and evaluation, as the costs of these activities are considered administrative in nature and are usually not covered by donor funding. Even if budgeted for, the results of monitoring and evaluation are often not useful to CSOs without an appropriate methodological framework.

CSOs’ legal form dictates their internal structures. CSOs usually report to their general assemblies. In smaller associations, any division of responsibilities is often just a formality, as the president may also serve as the secretary and treasurer. There is anecdotal evidence that the teacher, normally considered the most erudite resident, heads up almost all associations in a given location. NGOs have boards of directors. In 2021, the board of directors and executive director of the HINA Platform worked together to meet the challenges of good management by conducting a financial audit of the platform.

Internal procedures are described in the statutes and bylaws filed at the time of registration. Procedural manuals are not a legal requirement but are usually required by donors in applications for funding. While most CSOs are aware that such manuals can help with the search for funding, many organizations, especially in rural areas, have oral traditions and are not used to documenting their policies and operating procedures in writing. CSOs with donor-funded projects follow the donor’s procedural requirements.

CSOs have difficulty building a permanent staff and retaining employees because of the lack of sustainable resources. Donors usually pay only the salaries of consultants hired for funded projects and do not contribute to operating expenses. For this reason, organizations are able to allocate only a tiny portion of their already limited funds to pay the salaries of a core group of staff, usually about seven people. The other employees perform what is called “professional volunteering” and are paid according to available funding. A common problem is that many experienced association and NGO executives are hired away by international CSOs, public companies, and the private sector. In this “brain drain,” a few CSO employees have been appointed to positions in the government, including a CSO leader in the southern part of the country who was appointed minister in the new government in 2021. To deal with insufficient staffing, CSOs often recruit interns and assign multiple roles to one person. CSOs rarely hire professional accountants or lawyers because of funding shortfalls.

Because they are absorbed in issues of survival, few people are able to volunteer for CSOs full time. Most volunteering consists of one-off offers to help. This was true during the pandemic and the acute food crisis in the south, when some CSOs were able to rely on citizen solidarity. In 2014, the Development Department of the Church of Jesus Christ in Madagascar (Département pour le développement de l’Église de Jésus Christ à Madagascar, SAF/FJKM) integrated volunteering into its cyclone preparedness and care for disaster victims, which it then extended to its other activities. The church now has volunteers working on environmental protection and health and hygiene.

Very few CSOs have the means to acquire, maintain, or upgrade their computer equipment on their own. At the end of projects, donors sometimes distribute computer equipment to CSOs. For example, the Hajavao Association received quality equipment from a donor in 2021. Employees usually use their own computers, cell phones, and personal e-mail accounts. Of the sixteen CSOs in the city of Toliara, only one has a business e-mail account, even though organizations find that possession of a business account can tip the balance in their favor during competitions for funding. The majority of small CSOs, particularly in rural areas, still operate with notebooks and pens.

The pandemic accelerated CSOs’ conversion to digital communications. In addition, the presence in CSOs of young people who are comfortable with digital technologies has helped many organizations overcome technological gaps and blockages. CSOs often use videoconferencing to collaborate effectively and attend meetings with international partners. For example, Ny Sahy was able to take part in virtual meetings of the ninth session of the Conference of the Parties to the World Health Organization (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and the annual general meeting of the Tobacco Control Alliance in Africa. While some CSOs seem unconcerned about cybersecurity, others are aware of the threat but have little capacity to take appropriate action.
There was no significant change in CSOs’ financial viability in 2021.

Funding from bilateral and multilateral donors increased in 2021, although it was insufficient to meet all needs. The major donors remained the European Union, UN, World Bank, International Organization of the Francophonie, USAID, and development agencies of France, Japan, Germany, Switzerland, and Monaco. Foreign funding is often channeled through large international CSOs or UN agencies, which act in consortium with local CSOs. An influx of funding targeted the pandemic and food scarcity in southern Madagascar in 2021. CSOs working in southern Madagascar or offering solid experience in areas such as the management of emergencies, pandemics, and nutrition and water, including some smaller organizations, were best able to pivot their activities to benefit from this increased funding. For example, in April, Action Against Hunger (Action contre la faim, ACF) and the French Development Agency signed a EUR 500,000 (approximately $600,000) financing agreement to strengthen the pandemic response. The French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs provided EUR 300,000 (approximately $360,000) to the French organization GRET to fight malnutrition in two communes of the Ambovombe District.

Not all CSOs benefitted from the increased funding in 2021. The activities of CSOs focused on malaria, tuberculosis, and AIDS, for example, were not covered by the influx of funding for health care. Malagasy CSOs often maintain, rightly or wrongly, that the same organizations benefit repeatedly from foreign funding and each donor has its favorite CSOs. The easing of procedures for accessing funding from the Fanainga program, which with support from several European governments seeks to build a sustainable and inclusive civil society in Madagascar, has benefitted smaller associations, which are generally unable to compete against large CSOs experienced in complex application procedures. But some CSOs are frustrated that to date the Fanainga program has funded projects in only seven of the country’s twenty-three regions.

Local sources of funding are still in their infancy. The central government helps fund CSOs through service contracts. For example, the Ministry of Population has contracts with fifty CSOs working on family planning, and the Project Coordination Unit of the General Secretariat of the Presidency contracts with the Collective of Citizens and Citizen Organizations (Collectif des citoyens et des organisations citoyennes, CCOC) under the Public Sector Performance Support Project.

Only large companies, especially those with foundations, were able to maintain their usual level of support in 2021. The Axian Foundation issued calls for applications from CSOs and continued its program targeting children’s access to education in partnership with CSOs such as Sekoly Telma. Orange Solidarité Madagascar launched a call for projects for its Villages and Maternal and Child Health 2021 program. BOA Bank, through its foundation, is committed to fighting malnutrition and funded the Fitia association’s project to supply twenty school canteens in the south. The VISEO Foundation provided financial support to Fitia for the construction of new classrooms in Tsihombe in Androy Region. In Atsinanana Region, the timid resumption of corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities by the three major companies provided a small infusion of funds to CSOs.

The difficult situation in 2021 was not conducive to fundraising. For example, because of pandemic-related restrictions, ACF was unable to plan its Race Against Hunger for the second year in a row. However, the fifteenth edition of Races of the Heart organized by a collective of volunteers to benefit about twenty NGOs and shelters for disadvantaged children did take place in 2021. Contributions from supporters in Mauritius made it possible for the Federation of Women and Development Associations (Fédération des associations femmes développement, FAFED) of Toamasina to pay school registration and canteen fees for 100 girls whose parents’ resources were reduced by the second wave of the pandemic.
Few CSOs pursue fundraising campaigns as they are usually unproductive. The most significant fundraisers are organized by service clubs with large networks and by zanaka ampielezana or associations of people from the provinces or regions who have moved to the major cities. Malagasy expatriates in Canada, Luxembourg, and elsewhere send donations to CSOs. Online fundraising is not common, although some associations have taken successful first steps. For example, an online campaign conducted by an informal youth association to benefit the University Hospital Center of Tambohombe Fianarantsoa reached its goal in only a few days in 2021.

In rural areas, targeted groups contribute building materials, labor, rice, and dried wood rather than cash. In a new approach, the communes of Vohitrindry, Mahazoarivo, and Lokomby in Fitovinany Region have agreed with traditional authorities to reintroduce a head tax of MGA 5,000 (approximately $1.30), which will generate funding for priority development initiatives, including partnerships with CSOs. Membership fees remain obligatory at most organizations but are usually symbolic. In 2021, as part of its revitalization, the HINA Platform launched a major awareness campaign on the importance of paying membership fees, which proved to be successful since all of its member CSOs paid their dues.

CSOs are allowed to carry out income-generating activities provided the funds go to their activities rather than members. Typical income-generating activities include organizing conferences and training, publishing books, consulting, and renting out movable and immovable property. Organizations successfully pursuing such activities include the Ny Sahy smoking cessation center, Kananaka restaurant, and SAF-FJKM’s sale of agricultural products.

Apart from large organizations, few CSOs have the resources to set up sound financial management systems, recruit qualified financial staff, or hire the services of auditing firms. Audits are typically carried out only at the request of donors. The ROHY movement is innovating by planning to conduct an audit of its accounts using its own funds.

ADVOCACY: 3.2

CSO advocacy was slightly stronger in 2021 as CSOs participated more fully in policy formulation and public oversight.

CSOs have opportunities to cooperate with the government through institutionalized frameworks. Ongoing fora initiated by the authorities include regional budget conferences; the National Independent Election Commission’s multi-stakeholder consultative framework; the committee that manages and monitors the local development fund; the consultative committee overseeing the fight against smoking, alcoholism, and drugs; the control and monitoring committee of the anti-corruption unit; and local consultative structures. Collaboration resulting from CSOs’ approaches include partnership agreements between the HINA Platform and regional governments and KMF-CNOE’s multi-stakeholder meetings to establish a cooperative framework for citizens, elected officials, and others in positions of responsibility. CSOs also enjoy opportunities to speak directly to government officials. For example, in Tulear, thirty-five associations that belong to the Network of Humanitarian CSOs in the Atsimo Andrefana Region (Réseau des OSC à caractère humanitaire de la région Atsimo Andrefana, ROCH) requested and received a meeting with the governor, prefect, and regional COVID-19 Operational Command Center. Governors are particularly accessible, and some ministers usually respond to mail from CSOs. The Youth Observatory is frequently consulted by officials of the Ministry of Youth and Sports.

CSOs conducted various awareness campaigns in 2021. A dozen members of the Nifin’Akanga movement fighting to decriminalize abortion formed a committee to follow up on a proposed bill on the therapeutic termination of pregnancy and initiated a major investigation into abortion practices in Madagascar. The committee included representatives of the media, the paramedics union, and the Independent National Commission on Human Rights. AVG met with government decision makers to discuss the management of precious wood stocks and the implementation of environmental justice. Civil society also spoke out against the suspension of nine radio call-in
shows, and the government retracted the decision five days after it was published. The outcry of youth associations such as Liberty 32 against the hasty organization of the election of members to the Youth Parliament forced ministerial officials to suspend the electoral process in certain regions.

Thanks in part to CSO lobbying, excise taxes on cigarettes and the central government’s budget for the social and environmental sector increased in 2021. The HINA Platform succeeded in ensuring that funding to integrate nutrition into communal and regional development plans was included in the budgets of forty-four communes. Towards the end of the year, after thirteen CSOs signed a communiqué calling on the government to proceed with the stalled Access to Information Bill, the bill went to a second reading before the government council. CSO efforts to ensure revision of the 2006 law establishing the legal regime for untitled private land ownership was unsuccessful.

Some CSOs fear that any effort to reform the laws governing the sector would give the government an opening to restrict their scope of activity. Other organizations consider such reform urgent, as the current legal framework has disparate and obsolete texts that barely allow CSOs to carry out the tasks that trickle down to them and do not foster CSO sustainability. The effort to draft a law on social enterprises and conservation enterprises stayed on track in 2021 with the support of USAID’s Hay Tao project. The draft law was presented to members of the national social entrepreneurship and conservation platform in December 2020 and was the subject of a validation workshop with various government and civil society entities in 2021. It is expected that the document will be submitted to the parliament for development into a bill. CSOs also intensified advocacy to pass a whistleblower law and establish the Economic, Social and Cultural Council, which is provided for in the constitution and would enable civil society to weigh in on bills, orders, decrees, and other legislative instruments.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.9**

Service provision improved slightly in 2021 as CSOs worked tirelessly in cooperation with the government to respond to urgent needs resulting from the pandemic and the drought in southern Madagascar. CSOs provide services in highly diverse fields, including training and schooling, research, public health, reproductive health, water, sanitation and hygiene, renewable energies, and the empowerment of women and youth. In 2021, CSOs were involved in providing low-cost community wells, solar lamps, cash transfers, risk and disaster management, and environmental legal assistance. They were heavily involved in the COVID-19 response in multifaceted ways. Many CSOs were active in improving food security, better access to water, sanitation and hygiene, and community pandemic resilience. Some organizations, such as Matsiatra Mania Firaínsan‘kina in Amoron’i Mania Region, Fikambanan’ny Mpanarato Mivondrona Ho amín’ny Fandrosoa na in Fitovinany Region, Fanoitra in Atsiman Andrèfana Region, and Heirs of the South (Les héritiers du Sud) in Androy Region, conducted educational activities in fokontany (neighborhoods), schools, public locations, and the media.

Other CSOs, such as Socio-Health Action (Action socio sanitaire, ASOS) and Flanakaviana Sambatra, worked alongside the central government and technical and financial partners on food aid programs, mobile health services, and social protection. With funding from the Canadian Foodgrains Bank and World Renew, SAF/FJKM, through its Avana project, supported 1,500 households in the Berano Ville rural municipality in Amboasary Sud with training in livestock raising, crop-growing techniques, and community management of village savings and loan associations. Together with Ny Tanintsika, CARE Madagascar conducted activities in the Vatovavy Region to improve access to water, hygiene, and sanitation for the most vulnerable populations. ACF and ASOS disseminated messages from the Ministry of Health in the local dialect. CSO members also served as resource persons for training institutes, religious organizations, and decentralized government services.
CSOs identify the expectations and needs of communities through field visits, consultations with target groups, and community dialogues. In 2021, for example, the Madagascar Red Cross held a community dialogue in Anosipatrana Andrefana fokontany in the capital to identify problems and priorities under a project to improve local living conditions. The Red Cross also identified community income-generating opportunities in the municipality of Ambatoabo in Anosy Region. In implementing its school cafeteria project in 403 schools in Amoron’i Mania, Haute Matsiatra, Fitoynani, and Vatovavy regions, Ny Tanintsika first held informational sessions about the project to solicit community participation.

CSO services usually benefit the entire community without discrimination.

Service provision is sometimes a significant source of income for CSOs. For example, PSI generated significant income by delivering, storing, and distributing long-lasting insecticide-treated mosquito nets and conducting training. Associations trained in performing educational puppet shows, such as the Matezatsara marionette group in Ampanihy and the Mihary group in Tulear, signed three-month service contracts worth between MGA 5 million and 20 million (approximately $1,300 to $5,300) in 2021 to perform shows about managing rumors around COVID-19. The shows were part of the MW3 campaign in southern Madagascar implemented by ASOS in partnership with the Adventist Development and Relief Agency and ACF. In cooperation with the urban commune of Fianarantsoa, Ny Tanintsika charged for garbage collection and waste treatment services.

Although the authorities sometimes regard CSOs as competitors for funding streams from technical and financial partners, they publicly recognize CSOs’ contributions. For example, in 2021, the Directorate of Social and Political Affairs of the Presidency sent a letter of appreciation to CSO partners of the mobile medical caravan offering on-site health care along National Route 2.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 3.9**

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector improved moderately in 2021 thanks to better cooperation among organizations and the resumption of training.

Throughout 2021, intermediary support organizations continued to provide CSOs with technical and financial support. Fanainga provided funding and capacity-building support through customized or online trainings, as well as consulting and strategy trainings. Resource centers such as the Arrupe Training and Research Center in Antananarivo, operated by the Catholic Congregation of the Society of Jesus; the Youth House of the rural commune of Ambohimahasina in Ambalavao Fianarantsoa District, established in 2007 by Ny Tanintsika; and the center run by the Organization of the Civil Society of Antsirabe for Childhood (Organisation de la société civile d’Antsirabe pour l’enfance, OSCAPE), continued to offer services. In 2021, several new centers were established, including the Outilothèque i-tafa, a fully equipped work and training space offering materials and equipment for rent, which was created through the Tanomafy project of the Young Ambassadors for Peace (Jeunes ambassadeurs de paix, JAP). The new Youth Impact Lab of Youth First provided technical and technological support to youth groups, associations, and others.

Local grantmaking organizations include the Tany Meva Foundation, which together with various bilateral and multilateral partners, such as the UN system, the World Bank, and WWF, launched a call in 2021 for CSO projects to help reach the UN Sustainable Development Goals. The Africa Tobacco Control Alliance funds tobacco-control projects with support from the US-based organization Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids and the African Capacity-Building Foundation. The alliance also informs CSOs about existing and potential funding opportunities.

Many service-providing CSOs are grouped into coalitions and platforms. Important coalitions include the Malagasy Coalition for the Strengthening of the Health and Immunization System (Coalition malagasy pour le renforcement
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In 2021, technical and financial partners and other groups resumed training sessions online or face-to-face throughout the country. For example, ASOS offered training as part of its project to strengthen civil society leadership in the south; KMF-CNOE trained trainers in five districts; and the Workers’ Association of Madagascar (Conférence des travailleurs de Madagascar, CTM) provided a six-month training to trade union members under a partnership between the International Labor Organization and the National Labor Institute. Training is provided by both national and foreign trainers.

Malagasy CSOs readily form cross-sectoral partnerships to mobilize resources and optimize results. For example, the Network of Champions for Nutrition was created by the HINA Platform, ACF, and ASOS along with sports and music stars, members of parliament, and journalists. CSOs’ have established successful partnerships with businesses, including private-sector groups that support the establishment of an economic, social, and cultural council. The mining company Rio Tinto Madagascar is developing partnerships with CSOs such as ASOS in Fort Dauphin.

CSOs also partner frequently with the government. In 2021, CCOC provided training to CSOs on the annual budget law to encourage better efficiency at regional budget conferences. AVG trained employees of public institutions about laws concerning forests, the environment, and protected natural resources and, with support from USAID, co-produced a practical guide on the issue. A network of parliamentarians for nutrition, which seeks to ensure that policies, legislation, and budget allocations improve nutrition, was formed after consultations between the HINA Platform and parliamentarians. Ny Tanintsika and regional authorities in Fianarantsoa Province worked together on a school cafeteria program, and the Ministry of National Education assisted with the first meals served in the school cafeterias in Ifanadiana.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.8

CSOs’ public image improved slightly in 2021 as both public and private media showed greater openness to CSOs and for the most part portrayed civil society positively.

Radio and television stations frequently invite CSOs to participate in special programs. For example, Ny Sahy was invited to discuss drug use on the morning show Korambe Mandraigny on Madagascar’s national radio station. Nifan’Akanga appeared on TV Plus Madagascar’s show Don-Dresaka to discuss the proposed law on abortion. CSOs can also be allocated broadcast time slots. For example, ASOS broadcast its show Covid Dot Com on Radio Television Siteny. CSOs’ activities, declarations, and positions on national affairs are covered in print and digital press. In November 2021, more than twenty press items covered civil society news, including a study by Transparency International—Initiative Madagascar of citizen perceptions of political parties and an open letter to the president from six farmers’ organizations asking that he not promulgate a new law on untitled private land ownership.

Communities have tremendous expectations of CSOs and generally see them as the source of solutions to problems beyond their control. For example, Ny Tanintsika was favorably acknowledged by communities in which it built infrastructure such as wells and classrooms in 2021, and a food distribution campaign that Ny Tanintsika organized during the quarantine was greatly appreciated by its beneficiaries. CSOs’ interventions during the health crisis and natural disasters made a particularly good impression.
Although government officials sometimes see CSOs as their opponents, especially when CSOs criticize and question the government, they recognize their value-added. CSOs also enjoy a good reputation among private-sector companies, which associate them with their CSR activities.

CSOs increasingly seek to promote their image and activities on social networks. Many CSOs have Facebook pages, and some have hired web and mobile developers. For example, the Madagascar Red Cross hired a marketing intern to optimize its use of social networks. Some organizations have formed pools of journalists whom they train about their issues and then invite into the field. In 2021, as part of its revitalization process, the Madagascar Tobacco Control Advisory Committee developed new communications materials, including a poster, booklet, video spot, audio spot, thirteen-minute documentary, and testimonial video, with support from the Ministry of Health and the WHO office.

Thematic platforms or networks have codes of conduct that are binding for their members. CSOs routinely report to their members and boards, and donors require reports as well. Few CSOs make their reports available to the public by posting them on their websites or other means.
Malawi’s political environment was relatively stable in 2021, although the public was somewhat frustrated by the government’s slow pace in implementing campaign promises made during the 2020 elections. Corruption was a major public concern during the year. In April, an audit uncovered improper management of pandemic funds. In August, a sitting cabinet minister, a presidential advisor, and a lawmaker were arrested and charged with graft regarding the selection of oil companies to supply the national oil company. Their trials were still underway at the end of the year. CSOs, development partners, and key international financial institutions demanded reforms in Malawi’s management of public funds. For example, the International Monetary Fund indicated that the government needed to enhance budget transparency and accountability before it would renew a four-year extended credit facility, which was canceled in 2018. The president commissioned a taskforce headed by the vice president to propose reforms, but its report was not made public.

Several strikes and demonstrations disrupted public life during the year. In February, teachers went on strike to demand better personal protective equipment and bonus pay for working during the pandemic. Strikes by the Professional Drivers Union in February and Malawi Housing Corporation in October expressed workers’ dissatisfaction with salaries and other grievances. Some CSOs organized demonstrations to protest the high cost of living. A notable feature of the demonstrations in 2021 was that they were organized by a new set of CSOs, including the Center for Democracy and Economic Development Initiatives (CDEDI) and the Social Revolution Movement. The government responded to the demonstrations by urging the public to be patient as it tried to solve problems inherited from the previous regime.

A spike in COVID-19 infections in January prompted the government to impose a temporary lockdown and nighttime curfew. After third and fourth waves of infections emerged in July and December, the curfew was reinstated along with restrictions on the number of people at indoor gatherings and on public transportation. In March, the president was the first person in the country to be vaccinated in a campaign that aimed to reach 60 percent of the population by the end of 2023. Vaccine hesitancy was high, and only about 4 percent of the country was vaccinated by early 2022, the World Health Organization reported. CSOs helped raise awareness about the safety of the vaccine and COVID-19 prevention measures.

Malawi’s economy grew 2.4 percent in 2021, up from 0.8 percent in 2020, according to the World Bank. Inflation remained high, edging to over 12 percent by early 2022. Despite record harvests in 2021, food insecurity was widespread. The national poverty rate has hovered at slightly over 50 percent since 2016, the World Bank reported. More than 80 percent of the population works in agriculture.
The overall sustainability of Malawian CSOs was stable in 2021. CSOs’ financial viability deteriorated slightly as funding declined because of the pandemic. Service provision shrank because of pandemic-related funding cuts. Advocacy improved as CSOs achieved several important milestones, including a decision by the government to include more women on parastatal boards. The sectoral infrastructure was slightly stronger as organizations engaged in new collaborations and training opportunities increased. All other dimensions of sustainability were unchanged.

According to the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Board, there were 866 registered CSOs in Malawi at the end of 2021. The NGO Board indicated that 40 percent of these organizations were non-existent and only 175 organizations were compliant with the requirement to submit annual reports. The actual number of CSOs in Malawi is higher than officially reported, as many groups do not register because of insufficient funds and frustrating registration procedures.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.5

The legal environment for CSOs in Malawi was stable in 2021.

The sector is governed by the 2001 NGO Act. All CSOs other than faith-based organizations and informal organizations without written constitutions must register with the NGO Board and the Council for Non-Governmental Organizations in Malawi (CONGOMA), both of which are statutory entities established under the NGO Act. Registration with the NGO Board requires that organizations apply to the Office of the Registrar General, which approves applications directly or refers them to the minister of justice for approval. When registering, applicant organizations must pay fees and submit audited accounts to the NGO Board. Organizations that work in the youth sector also register with the National Youth Council. Depending on the nature of their work, community-based organizations (CBOs) register with district social welfare offices or district youth offices. National-level and international CSOs registered with the NGO Board are not required to register with district offices, although they usually make themselves known to those offices to promote cordial working relationships. Online registration is not possible.

The barriers to registration in 2021 included the need to register with multiple bodies and the high fees associated with registration and audit reports. To mitigate the financial burden on organizations with few funds, the NGO Board allows CSOs to pay registration fees in installments. Through CONGOMA, CSOs obtained an injunction against increases in registration fees proposed by the NGO Board in 2020. The injunction also prevented the NGO Board from going after organizations that did not register voluntarily and suggested that the NGO Board was collecting registration fees illegally. The NGO Board was ordered by the court to refund registration fees paid as far back as 2018, but the board had yet to do so by the end of 2021.

The NGO Board became somewhat more accessible to CSOs in 2021 thanks to the desk officers that it introduced to every district council as part of its 2020 decentralization of management of the CSO sector. The desk officers proved to be a great help in that they were authorized to conduct preliminary investigations of claims raised by CSOs and handle other matters affecting CSOs operating in their districts.

Under the NGO Act, CSOs are required to submit annual financial and audit reports to the NGO Board. CSOs suspect that this requirement is a surveillance mechanism allowing the government to identify their funders and the amount of funding that they receive.

The NGO Bill, which was introduced in 2017 to amend the NGO Act, was debated in the parliament in 2021 despite an injunction against debate obtained by CSOs in 2018. The bill vests all authority to register, regulate, and deregister CSOs in the NGO Board, thereby excluding CONGOMA. The bill also allows international CSOs to register and raise funds locally, which domestic CSOs fear will disadvantage them in the intense competition for
funding because of their weaker organizational capacity. During consultations with CSOs about the bill in February 2021, the government agreed to remove several of the more contentious clauses. This did not happen, however, and the disputed clauses remained in the bill, which continued to be debated throughout the year.

The 2017 Access to Information Act, which intends to improve the accountability of public institutions by allowing citizens and CSOs to access government information, came into effect in 2020 but had yet to be operationalized in 2021. According to the government, a lack of resources for costs such as employees and office facilities delayed operationalization of the act. CSOs continued to struggle to obtain information from public officials during the year.

CSOs were exposed to renewed harassment in 2021. While the new government that came into power in 2020 was more accommodating of civil society than the previous regime, the situation changed in 2021 as the government seemed to become uncomfortable with CSOs’ activities and sought to silence its critics. For example, in August, after attempting to protest peacefully outside the parliament building over an improperly tabled loan authorization bill for MWK 93 billion (approximately $115 million), eleven members of CDEDI were arrested and charged with failure to comply with a prohibition order issued by the City Council. The activists were later released on bail. In December, a prominent activist was arrested and charged with making false statements during a demonstration against the country’s economic troubles. He was released on bail and the following week was rearrested and charged with malicious damage of property. At the end of the year, the activists were still out on bail while their cases continued in court.

CSOs are required to pay taxes on all income, including grants. The Malawi Revenue Authority receives CSOs’ tax returns and scrutinizes them carefully to confirm that they comply with the Taxation Act. Registered CSOs may receive exemptions from the Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning, and Development on taxes on essential imported goods.

As nonprofit organizations, most CSOs are not legally allowed to engage in business ventures to generate funds. No law bars CSOs from competing for contracts with the central and local governments, but most CSOs do not do so because they view contractual work as business activity. CSOs may conduct fundraising campaigns and accept funds from foreign donors.

CSOs turn to lawyers on an as-needed basis. They may find it challenging to obtain adequate legal counsel because few lawyers specialize in CSO-related laws and policies and the cost of legal services is high. The Malawi Legal Aid Bureau, a government-funded agency, has regional offices that serve CSOs, although its priority is vulnerable individuals.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.5**

CSOs’ organizational capacity was unchanged in 2021.

CSOs usually seek to involve their beneficiaries in project planning and implementation. However, in 2021, a lack of funding, partially because of COVID-19, discouraged CSOs from engaging frequently with their beneficiaries. The intervals between CSOs’ interactions with their constituents grew longer, undermining organizations’ ability to build sustainable relationships and respond to community needs. For example, in the health-care sector, the Christian Health Association of Malawi (CHAM) struggled to provide health-care services to beneficiaries at the same levels as in previous years. High internet costs prevented many organizations from engaging remotely with their constituencies. Some small, resource-constrained organizations were largely dormant because they could neither afford the cost of the internet nor visit their communities in person.

Very few CSOs had up-to-date strategic plans in 2021, although they acknowledged that such plans are important for governing their organizations. The high cost associated with planning and erratically scheduled board meetings
were the main obstacles to developing strategic plans. Among the few organizations with up-to-date strategic plans were Youth Net and Counselling, Tilitonse Foundation, and Creative Center for Community Mobilization. CSOs usually have matrices and other tools for monitoring and measuring the success of their interventions. In the case of funded projects, CSOs usually conduct end-of-project evaluations. Organizations understand that keeping a record of their success stories increases their chances of obtaining funding for their next projects. With this in mind, some organizations are thought to conduct monitoring and evaluation exercises as an empty ritual rather than to add value to their programming and to exaggerate project successes to make a positive impression on potential funders.

A few CSOs, mainly large local and international organizations such as Youth and Society (YAS), Malawi Health Equity Network, World Vision International, and CARE, had written policies and procedural manuals in 2021. Adherence to the policies was uneven, however, as the development of these tools was often viewed as a box-ticking exercise rather than a way to guide organizational behavior. Some organizations seem to regard policies and procedural manuals as most handy when they are submitted alongside applications for funding in accordance with donors’ requirements.

Most CSOs do not have permanent employees. As a cost-cutting measure, some organizations engaged volunteer interns in 2021, but the quality of projects could be affected if the interns had to learn on the job. Some CSOs found it difficult to allow their staff to attend training because of the negative impact of staff absences on their operations. Trainings for staff were conducted mainly online rather than in face-to-face sessions, and some employees were unable to attend all sessions because of difficulties with internet connectivity. The number of women running cooperatives has increased in recent years, especially with the emergence of microfinancing institutions and village savings and loans groups, whose members are mostly women.

CSOs’ use of technology has greatly improved in recent years, especially during the pandemic, when the need for access to digital technologies became urgent for all organizations, no matter what their financial situation. However, with high internet costs and only a small proportion of Malawians owning smartphones, the use of digital tools was largely confined to urban CSOs.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.6**

CSOs’ financial viability worsened slightly in 2021 as funding declined because of the pandemic.

The main sources of funding in 2021 were bilateral donors such as China, Iceland, the United States, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Germany and multilateral donors such as the World Bank and African Development Bank. Donors continued to allocate their resources largely to pandemic-related interventions in 2021. For instance, the European Union (EU) provided approximately $915,000 to a coalition of nine international CSOs, including United Purpose, Save the Children, Trócaire, and Concern Worldwide, and one local CSO, United Purpose, to help roll out Malawi’s national COVID-19 vaccination campaign in 2021. The Tithete Nkhanza! (Let’s End Violence!) program to prevent and respond to gender-based violence (GBV), which was expected to be a six-year, GBP 17 million (approximately $23.5 million) program, was stopped in 2021 after its third year because of cuts in the budget of the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. The Titukulane Project funded by USAID continued to be implemented in 2021 by the National Smallholder Farmers Association and several international organizations, including WaterAid, Save the Children, and CARE.

Local CSOs struggle to compete for funding from international donors, in part because they are unable to afford required audits. In addition, local CSOs’ proposal drafting skills are low, and they find it particularly difficult to write proposals geared toward their long-term institutional goals, and they lack access to resources that would help develop these skills. International CSOs highlight Malawian CSOs’ lack of capacity and inability to meet donor
requirements as reasons to bypass them in the implementation of projects. Local CSOs continued to raise concerns in 2021 that the drive to “Malawianize” international CSOs by registering them as local organizations would prevent indigenous CSOs from developing.

Most CSOs have not embraced the spirit of diversification in their search for funds, and few organizations have sources of funding other than donor aid. Resource mobilization from domestic sources was limited in 2021, in part by CSOs’ lack of awareness of the existence of local funders and their inability to meet local funders’ requirements. For example, the Tilitonse Foundation, a local grantmaking organization supported by development partners, offered funding for interventions in areas chosen by applicants, but their proposals had to be based on a specific theory of change espoused by the foundation. This requirement prevented some CSOs and CBOs from competing for funding. CSOs and CBOs receiving support included Youth Action in Development Activities, Misuku Beekeepers Association, Mponela AIDS Information and Counselling Center, and Salima Governance Network.

The government did not provide funding to CSOs in 2021. The authorities indicated that CSOs had to secure their own resources and could work with the government on the pandemic response but should not expect the government to provide funding for this purpose.

In 2021, membership-based organizations struggled to collect dues from their members, many of whom suffered declines in income because of the pandemic. CSOs’ beneficiaries were unable to offer financial support because they also suffered from resource constraints. Few CSOs engaged in fundraising campaigns, and most organizations lack the capacity to organize campaigns or write winning project proposals.

No law compels the private sector to allocate resources to CSOs, and it rarely does so.

A few organizations are able to self-generate funding for their operations by including commercial activities in their resource-mobilization strategies. For example, Timveni Child and Youth Media and Youth Net and Counselling have radio stations that operate on a commercial basis.

International CSOs in Malawi have robust financial management systems. Larger and more established domestic organizations, such as Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, Church and Society, YAS, and Center for Human Rights and Rehabilitation, usually also have relatively strong financial management practices. Smaller organization and especially CBOs tend to be weak in this area.

**ADVOCACY: 4.0**

CSO advocacy improved slightly in 2021 with the achievement of several important milestones, including the government’s decision to include more women on parastatal boards.

CSOs’ engagement with government officials in 2021 was largely ad hoc, especially at the national level. Following the launch in early 2021 of Malawi 2063, a new national development policy that aims for Malawi to become a wealthy, self-reliant, industrialized upper-middle-income country by 2063, CSOs participated in technical working groups that developed strategies to help reach this goal. CSOs continued to engage with presidential advisors on issues such as governance, youth, and gender, but CSO representation on the Presidential Committee on COVID-19 was withdrawn without explanation. CSOs found it difficult to meet with members of parliament in 2021, in part because members rejected virtual meetings in favor of in-person meetings that include huge sitting allowances and the reimbursement of travel costs. CSOs were able to engage on policy issues more frequently with government officials at the district level.

Some CSOs, including the Commission for Justice and Peace, Malawi Economic Justice Network, and Human Rights Ambassadors, advocated for an end to corruption and the need to improve living conditions in 2021. The
advocacy was conducted in various ways, including demonstrations, press conferences, petitions, and social media campaigns. The Women and Law in Southern Africa Research and Educational Trust-Malawi provided financial support to a minor for a case in which the Malawi High Court reaffirmed statutory protections for legal abortion under narrow circumstances.

CSOs’ efforts to improve the legal framework for their work focused on the NGO Bill in 2021. In particular, the sector was concerned about provisions of the bill dealing with the roles of the NGO Board and CONGOMA, the weakening of CONGOMA’s mandate, and financial requirements for registration. Through CONGOMA, CSOs met with government officials, including the presidential advisor on NGOs and civil society, to discuss the bill. The government seemed open to listening to CSOs’ needs, but little progress was evident in a later draft of the bill.

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CSO service provision was slightly weaker in 2021 as organizations had to reduce their services because of funding cuts.

CSOs in Malawi offer diverse services, ranging from education and health care to support for victims of GBV. In 2021, organizations in many sectors struggled to provide services because of declines in funding. For example, CHAM severely cut back its community health-care services because of reduced funding from sources such as the Health Services Joint Fund, which is supported by the Norwegian, UK, and German governments. Grant-aided schools received government funding only erratically during the year, rendering them unable to meet students’ needs effectively. Schools that depend on teaching and learning materials from the government received fewer materials in 2021, and the School Protection Bursary drastically cut its scholarship program for needy students. In the area of sexual reproductive health, CSOs such as the Family Planning Association of Malawi and Banja la Mtsoyolo scaled back their services in most districts because of funding problems, leaving vacancies in services that the government was not prepared to fill.

CSOs usually identify community needs by conducting needs assessment through surveys, feasibility studies, and other means. The assessments are orchestrated as part of routine project cycles. Many CSOs undertake project evaluations to demonstrate their contributions to meeting local needs. Such evaluations are more generally regarded as a ritual for the benefit of funders, and the collected data is not always utilized to make changes in programming approaches.

Membership associations provide goods and services to beneficiaries beyond their members. For example, in a particular village, they may provide goods and services to all local people who meet established criteria. A few CSOs, such as YAS, Action Hope Malawi, and ActionAid Malawi, shared brochures and other information about the projects that they were implementing in 2021, usually on social media.

Many CSOs do not seek to recover the costs of service provision because of they view their work as philanthropy on behalf of their constituents. In addition, CSO beneficiaries are usually underprivileged people with limited funds.

In 2021, the government continued to recognize CSOs that provide goods and services as their partners in development. At a CSO network meeting in Balaka District in 2021, the district commissioner praised organizations that were willing to work hand in hand with the district council, noting that they had become more accountable and transparent in their operations. During the year, the presidential advisor on NGOs and civil society remarked that “we cannot neglect the CSO sector as they are making a significant development. [The] time for a cat and mouse relationship between the government and NGOs is over. [The] evidence is there that we can work together towards one goal.”
The sectoral infrastructure for CSOs was slightly stronger in 2021 as organizations engaged in new collaborations and training opportunities increased.

Few resource centers exist in Malawi. CSOs’ main source of information is the district offices of the National Initiative for Civic Education (NICE) Trust, which have up-to-date major newspapers as well as meeting spaces that CSOs and other community members can use. In 2021, NICE scaled back its operations because of funding constraints.

Several CSOs and CBOs received funds in 2021 from the main local grantmaking institution, the Tilitonse Foundation. The Tilitonse Foundation held informational sessions with CSOs in the country’s three regions to clarify its grantmaking process.

Sectoral and multi-sectoral CSO networks, such as the Youth Consultative Forum, Civil Society Education Coalition, National Advocacy Platform, and Civil Society Platform for Good Governance, continued to operate in 2021. Their record was mixed, although in general, cooperation in the sector improved as CSOs showed better understanding of the importance of working together. The members of some groups, such as MISA–Malawi, find that they are stronger and have a more visible impact when they collaborate. New collaborations in 2021 on advocacy for inclusive and better governance included YAS’s work with Oxfam, Human Resources for Health Advocacy, and Civil Society Platform on Immunization.

CSO district networks were also notably stronger and more effective in 2021 thanks to the desk officers introduced by the NGO Board. For instance, the desk officers were able to provide advice on matters related to CSO governance. District councils encouraged local CSO networks to work together, and district networks sometimes evaluated the activities of their member CSOs and presented their findings at district council meetings.

Some collaborations take place at donors’ request and are largely temporary. This was especially true during the pandemic, when many CSOs worked together because they were requested to do so by funders. Many CSOs join networks to be linked to funding opportunities. For example, in 2021, networks such as the Malawi Equity Health Network were pressured by members to help them raise funds or link them to funding agencies. Tensions occasionally flare up between network secretariats and member organizations if the latter view the secretariats as overstepping their mandate by applying for funding for their own use or implementing projects on their own.

Network member organizations can also regard each other as competitors. For example, cooperation on advocacy by groups of CSOs is sometimes blocked if individual organizations are seen by the others as promoting their own visibility. In some collaborations, power imbalances emerge when organizations with more developed technical and financial skills override the interests of weaker CSOs. This most commonly happens in coalitions joining international organizations or UN agencies with local CSOs.

Training opportunities increased in 2021 with the launch of the Next Generation of CSO Leaders Academy, implemented by the National Democratic Institute with support from the National Endowment for Democracy. The academy chose thirteen fellows from a pool of 150 applicants for training in leadership, communications, resource mobilization, project management, and corporate governance. The training sessions were led by local and international experts. Other training opportunities were offered by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) as part of its Social Impact Incubator program. Malawi’s high internet rates prevented some CSOs from taking advantage of these training opportunities, which were mostly conducted online. Malawian CSOs continued to lack access to any sort of mentorship program or development center that could help develop their skills at writing project proposals and grant applications, which are serious deficits. Training materials are sometimes translated into local languages, depending on funding.

Partnerships between CSOs and the government in 2021 included a joint effort to foster the sustainable environmental and natural resource management funded by UNDP. Participating entities included the Center for Environmental Policy and Advocacy, Poverty Environment Assessment Team, Coordination Unit for the
Rehabilitation of the Environment, and Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs and Public Sector Reforms. Nine international CSOs worked with national, district, and community authorities to support the national COVID-19 vaccination campaign.

A few CSOs partnered with private-sector entities to implement local projects in 2021. For example, Oxfam worked with the Malawi Chamber for Commerce and Industry and local CSOs to implement a project on responsible large-scale land-based investment. Service-delivery CSOs worked with media houses to disseminate information about COVID-19.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.7

CSOs’ public image remained unchanged in 2021. Media coverage of CSOs was mostly positive during the year. Organizations covered in stories in print and electronic media included the Catholic Development Commission in Malawi, Save the Children, Malawi Human Rights Resource Center, Development Communications Trust, and Cooperazione Internazionale. CSOs usually pay for coverage, although media sometimes provide coverage free of charge if organizations pay associated costs such as transportation for journalists and camera operators.

Despite some advocacy successes in 2021, resentment of advocacy CSOs was evident in local communities in 2021. Many organizations, especially those that were vocal during the 2020 elections, were seen as silent on critical issues facing the public, including the high cost of living and increasing corruption. As a result, CSOs were considered as not acting in the public interest. In contrast, the public values service-providing organizations such as Youth Net and Counselling, which protects girl children, because of the benefits that they bring to local communities.

Government perceptions of CSOs are mixed. Government officials describe CSOs as partners in development if they complement government activities, such as by providing needed goods and services. But the authorities can describe CSOs as adversaries if they demand accountability. For example, the government sometimes condemned CSOs working on governance as “anti-development” and unpatriotic in 2021.

CSOs seek to promote their image by releasing press statements and circulating posters on social and traditional media. Organizations that have good relationships with media invite journalists to press conferences or the launch of new projects. CSOs do not engage public relations staff to raise awareness about their activities or promote their image. The NGO Board established a facility called MyNGO that allows communities to lodge complaints with the NGO Board if they think they were mistreated by a CSO.

Very few organizations publish annual reports with financial statements. An objective of the stalled NGO Bill is to develop a robust CSO code of conduct emphasizing principles of fiduciary integrity, public accountability, and democratic decision making.
The year 2021 in Mali was marked by a second coup d’état just nine months after a coup in August 2020. Although the leaders of the second coup claimed it was necessary to rectify mistakes made by the transitional government, this new, unconstitutional seizure of power aggravated the country’s political and social crisis. Some leaders of the transitional government were detained and arrested, and Colonel Assimi Goïta, the leader of both coups, eventually assumed the position of transitional president. These developments led to a diplomatic crisis as the United Nations (UN), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), African Union, United States, and European Union issued a joint statement condemning the coup. On the national level, some voices spoke out against the coup, but in general civil society did not respond to it forcefully.

As a result of the crisis, the transitional government was not able to organize timely elections. However, in December the government organized a national meeting known as the National Refoundation Conference, which brought together representatives of the military, political parties, religious groups, and civil society for many days of discussion about the country’s future. Although some political parties boycotted the meeting, CSOs were deeply involved in the talks. Among the meeting’s closing recommendations was a proposal that CSOs depoliticize civil society, prepare a code of conduct for the sector, create a national high council of CSOs, and periodically evaluate associations and other organizations. A recommendation that elections be delayed by six months to five years caused extreme disagreement and prompted ECOWAS to add new sanctions on Mali to those already in place. The new sanctions included closing land and air borders between Mali and ECOWAS states, suspending non-essential financial transactions, and freezing Malian state assets in ECOWAS central and commercial banks.

Mali continued to suffer from extreme insecurity in its north and central regions in 2021. Implementation of the peace agreement between the government and Tuareg and Arab rebel groups, which came out of the 2015 Algiers process, continued to run into difficulties. Terrorism, gang activity, and violence were the norm and continued to spread. In many areas, the rule of law was tenuous, and human rights violations flared on all sides.

The government began a vaccination campaign against COVID-19 in March 2021, but acceptance of the vaccine was low. More than 150,000 doses of the Johnson & Johnson vaccine were administered as of August 5, 2021, and nearly 56,000 people were vaccinated in the second round of the campaign. The pandemic, coupled with insecurity, kept more 2.9 million children out of school in 2021.

Mali’s gross domestic product grew by 3.1 percent in 2021, after shrinking in 2020, according to the World Bank. Extreme poverty remained widespread. The UN estimated that more than 6.3 million people in Mali were in need of humanitarian assistance in 2021.
The overall sustainability of Mali’s CSOs improved slightly in 2021. CSOs’ financial viability improved significantly with the resumption of funding that had been suspended or redirected in 2020 because of the pandemic. Advocacy improved moderately as CSOs took on a new role as interlocutors in ending the country’s political crisis. The sectoral infrastructure improved slightly as several CSOs worked together to address challenges in their areas of intervention. CSOs’ public image improved slightly with an increase in public and government esteem for their contributions to overcoming the country’s crisis. The other dimensions of sustainability did not change.

According to the Grassroots Development Support Unit of the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization (which, before the May 2021 coup, was known as the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Local Authorities), about 2,500 formal local organizations existed in Mali at the end of 2020, an increase of about 25 percent over 2019. More than 2,200 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were registered in 2020, compared to 2,150 in 2019. More recent data is unavailable. The number of informal organizations is unknown.

### LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.2

The legal environment for CSOs did not change in 2021. Law No. 04-038-PRM of 2004 governs associations in Mali. The law offers great flexibility regarding the creation and operation of CSOs. An organization acquires legal status simply by submitting a declaration to the government. Once the declaration is approved, an announcement is published in the official journal. CSOs that wish to work on the national level register in Bamako, the capital, while organizations intending to work in specific localities register with district, regional, or prefecture offices. While in past years the registration process was often slow and onerous, in 2021, registration was faster as the transitional government sought to include CSOs in rebuilding the country. The easing of registration procedures led to a spike in the number of organizations applying for legal status in 2021. CSOs may operate without registration. Under Chapter II, Section III of Law No. 04-038-PRM, associations may apply for NGO status three years after they gain legal status, provided they have filed annual activity reports and financial accounts certified by an approved accountant. Organizations obtain NGO status by signing framework agreements with the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization. NGOs are eligible for certain types of state support and tax exemptions. NGOs are supposed to submit annual activity and financial reports and undergo annual audits by national, regional, and local governments, but in practice, few NGOs comply with these requirements. CSOs may also obtain public utility status, which is a condition for bidding on government contracts. Public utility status is conferred by decree by the Council of Ministers following a decision by the Supreme Court and a probationary period of at least five years.

CSOs are free to administer their operations as they choose. The law does not specify rules for their internal structures and systems. Governing bodies and procedures are normally defined in an organization’s bylaws and internal regulations. All CSO directors must undergo background checks. The central government may not dissolve CSOs for political or arbitrary reasons, and organizations are rarely deregistered.

After the coup d’état in 2021, several political figures were arrested. Otherwise, CSOs were able to denounce restrictions on freedoms without reprisal.

The tax regime is generally favorable to CSOs. CSOs do not pay income tax but do pay taxes on services as well as social charges and taxes for employees. NGOs are eligible for tax exemptions on imports such as vehicles, provided they have submitted annual activity reports with certified financial statements. NGOs may also obtain rebates of taxes on purchased products. Since the procedure for obtaining the rebates is long and complex, most organizations apply for rebates only on large purchases. Individual and corporate donors are not eligible for deductions.
All CSOs in Mali may seek funding from public and private donors provided they use the funds to realize their missions. CSOs, including unregistered organizations, may accept foreign funding on a tax-free basis. Organizations with public utility status may bid on contracts for government funding.

Few lawyers in Mali specialize in CSO law, and CSOs rarely seek legal services. Some umbrella organizations, such as the National Council of Civil Society (Conseil nationale de la société civile, CNSC), Coordination of Women’s Associations and NGOs (Coordination des associations et ONG féminines, CAFO), and Association for the Advancement and Defense of Women’s Rights (Association pour le progrès et la défense des droits des femmes, APDF) have staff with expertise in laws governing the CSO sector.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.4**

CSOs’ organizational capacity was unchanged in 2021.

Although core documents and framework agreements specify areas of intervention, in practice they serve only as a guide. Organizations often move away from their stated missions to take on initiatives in new areas that offer funding. Most CSOs work in several areas at once as determined by funding opportunities. Very few CSOs have strategic plans, and most organizations rely instead on action plans prepared to satisfy funders’ expectations.

A few CSOs, such as the Association of Youth for Active Citizenship and Democracy (Association des jeunes pour la citoyenneté active et la démocratie, AJCAD) and Think Peace, function as stable institutions with permanent technical teams, temporary staff, and interns who receive allowances. But the majority of CSOs have only a few permanent employees, usually the founders and essential support staff. The general impression is that most CSOs at the national level are created to give their founders access to jobs, although some lack experience, management skills, and fundraising abilities. The result is that these organizations struggle to prosper and often end up closing.

CSOs typically hire other staff for the duration of particular projects and let them go when projects are completed and funding ends. CSOs often find it difficult to find staff with the required qualifications in specific areas. Competent human resources are lacking at many organizations, in part because of the poor basic education offered by Mali’s weak educational system and the absence of opportunities for continuing education. Faced with the difficulty of recruiting qualified employees, CSOs often resort to hiring external consultants. Organizations sometimes also rely on volunteers to serve as interns or replace staff members who resign. Community volunteers are particularly common in the health-care and educational sectors. Most CSOs have professional accountants but rely on external service providers for informational and technological services. CSOs do not have staff development plans.

Office equipment and internet access among CSOs is more or less adequate. It is informally estimated that approximately 90 percent of Malian CSOs had access to the internet in 2021. CSOs are doing their best to adopt new technologies so that they can respond to calls for proposals. Many CSOs and CSO networks with donor support have access to and use information and communication technologies to promote their activities. Grants from international partners generally cover only programmatic expenses, which limits CSOs’ ability to purchase new supplies and equipment, upgrade existing equipment, or pay for services that are considered luxuries, such as high-speed internet access. Most donors reclaim or repurpose equipment such as motorcycles, computers, tables, and desks when grants end.
CSOs’ financial viability improved significantly in 2021 with the resumption of funding for activities that were suspended in 2020 because of the pandemic.

Malian CSOs have been heavily dependent on foreign funding for many years. In 2021, the main international partners were the UN, European Union (EU), and governments of France, the United States, Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Denmark. Specific information about levels of support from these sources is not available, but the amounts are not believed to have changed significantly from previous years.

Malian CSOs tend to be sub-contractors for international CSOs, which donors view as having stronger technical capacity and more transparent management practices. Malian CSOs generally lack access to short-term funding, and competition for even small amounts of funds is intense.

In 2021, many donors redirected their funding from existing programs to the pandemic response, including the government’s COVID-19 fund. This shift had benefitted several organizations. For example, the UN Population Fund provided approximately $68,000 in financial support to the NGO Agir to fight the pandemic. The Alliance to Remake Governance in Africa (Alliance pour refonder la gouvernance en Afrique, ARGA)–Mali received $30,660 from FHI 360 to fight the COVID-19 virus through awareness-raising activities.

In 2021, Mali’s technical and financial partners financed numerous initiatives to address major issues facing the country, especially challenges involving youth and women. Considerable support was offered to medium- to long-term projects focused on needs such as youth employment. For example, the Fund to Support Youth Business Creation (Fonds d’appui à la création d’entreprise par les jeunes, FACEJ), which is supported by the embassies of Denmark and the Netherlands, enabled youth in Sikasso, Bamako, Kati, Kita, Koulikoro, Mopti, Séguo, and Timbuktu to access funding for small businesses under a project implemented by the PlanBørnfonden consortium and Swisscontact: Swiss Foundation for Technical Cooperation.

Government funding is not always available. The government sometimes asks CSOs to support its preparation and implementation of public policy but always on a voluntary basis. Although CSO-government relations showed marked improvement in 2021, the central government was unable to provide significant funding to Malian CSOs.

Some CSOs have boosted their expertise in various areas, which allows them to offer paid services such as research, consultation, and training. For example, the International Research Group for Development in Africa (Groupe international de recherche pour le développement en Afrique, GIRAD–Afrique), ARGA–Mali, Accountability Lab, Malien Institute for Research Action for Peace (Institut malien de recherche-action pour la paix, IMRAP), and Center for Study and Reflection of Mali (Centre d’études et de réflexion au Mali, CERM) earn income from training, research, and evaluations. Other CSOs generate income by renting out facilities. For example, the Action Research Group on Child Rights in Mali (Groupe de recherche action sur les droits de l’enfant du Mali, GRADEM) and Malian Aide to Children in the Sahel (Oeuvre malienne d’aide à l’enfant du sahel, OMAES) rent out their training rooms and use the income to maintain the rooms and pay for cleaning and staff.

Environment and Development in Africa (Environnement et développement en Afrique) grows and sells vegetables to earn money.

Most CSOs keep accounts and prepare annual financial statements. CSOs that receive funding tend to have sound financial management systems and conduct annual audits, which they must submit to the government and their donors. Otherwise, audits are rarely conducted.
ADVOCACY: 3.2

Advocacy improved moderately in 2021 as CSOs took on a new role as interlocutors seeking to end the country’s political crisis.

The year 2021 brought new opportunities for dialogue between the central government and CSOs at all levels. CSOs were able to weigh in on key questions facing the country in areas such as the environment, education, and health care. At the local level, preparation of municipal economic, social, and cultural development programs also presented opportunities for dialogue between the government and CSOs. Quarterly meetings of state and non-state actors at the territorial level also presented opportunities for dialogue and discussion.

Malian CSOs often operate on the front lines defending human rights and ensuring community access to basic social services. CSOs canvass and pressure decision makers and raise public awareness about specific causes, usually involving the plight of vulnerable groups such as women, the physically handicapped, and ethnic minorities. For example, in 2021, the Center for Assistance to and Promotion of Human Rights (Centre d’assistance et de promotion des droits humains, CAPDH) and the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP)–Mali carried out several actions to alert the authorities to human rights violations in the country.

CSOs have recently created advocacy networks on various themes. In 2021, these networks operated in almost every regional capital and elsewhere around the country. In the central and northern regions, coalitions of regional CSOs and humanitarian organizations, such as International Rescue Committee, Malian Association for Survival in the Sahel (Association maliéenne pour la survie au Sahel, AMSS), and Advice and Support for Basic Education (Conseils et appui pour l’éducation à la Base, CAEB), conducted awareness campaigns on issues such as access to water, education, and health care. WANEP–Mali monitored the human safety situation on an ad hoc basis and produced weekly reports on human security as part of its early warning and conflict prevention system. Some CSOs have launched discussion forums that address the relationship between humanitarian aid and development and help reestablish links between communities. However, the security situation and a lack of funding forced some CSOs to reduce the number of inter-community forums that they hosted in 2021. As it does every year, the Citizen Coalition of Civil Society for Peace, Unity, and National Reconciliation in Mali (Coalition citoyenne de la société civile pour la paix, l’unité et la réconciliation nationale, CCSC–PURN) produced an alternative report on the implementation of the Algiers agreement. Other active advocacy groups included the Coalition for Citizen Monitoring of Elections in Mali (Coalition pour l’observation citoyenne des élections au Mali, COCEM), Mali Citizen Monitoring Pool (PCIM), and a network of CSOs that supports the election process.

In Mali, advocacy has not traditionally been the specialty of a certain type of CSO but something that many organizations pursue in parallel with their other activities. However, in 2021, several CSOs were created to focus specifically on the promotion of democracy and good governance. These organizations include Radio Akhabar, which was created by a CSO in Gourma Rharous; Action Research for the Development of Local Initiatives (Action recherches pour le développement des initiatives locales, ARDIL) in Diré; CCC-Média in Timbuktu; Jigger in Niono; and the Free Association for the Promotion of Housing and Accommodations (Association libre pour la promotion de l’habitat et du logement, ALPHALOG) in Ségou.

CSOs are aware that Law 04-038-PRM is outdated and needs revision. CSO advocacy helped ensure the easing of the registration process in 2021. During the National Refoundation Conference, participating CSOs proposed the creation of a high council of CSOs.
SERVICE PROVISION: 3.6

CSO service delivery was unchanged in 2021.

Conditions in the country, including the crumbling state apparatus and the closure of borders, challenged CSOs’ ability to provide services. However, service-providing CSOs tend to be the best structured organizations and have high-quality human resources. In addition, these CSOs often benefit from belonging to networks formed through personal relationships or in the course of their relatively long projects.

CSOs do not generally seek to recover their costs through paid services, especially in communities where they are seen as providers. However, water users, health-care, and sanitation organizations, associations that manage medical centers, and health associations can bill for services such as health care, drinking water, and training.

The government acknowledges the services CSOs provide to displaced populations and issues certificates to show that the services have been properly provided.

SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.2

The sectoral infrastructure improved slightly in 2021 as several CSOs worked together to address challenges in their areas of intervention.

Locally based grantmakers include the Drivers of Change Fund (Fond d’appui aux moteurs du changement, FAMOC), which strengthens civil society’s contribution to the peace and reconciliation process with support from the Danish government, and the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund, which works to combat violent extremism. These organizations also provide technical support to grantees.

CSO coalitions exist, but no single council, national coalition, or coordinating group truly represents the interests of all CSOs. CSOs working in areas such as education, health care, nutrition, food security, and children’s rights have created coalitions to better engage, share information, and work together to reach common objectives. Their activities allow younger organizations to improve their capabilities by learning from better organized peers. In 2021, some CSOs conducted joint activities. For example, the Observatory Consortium, AJCAD, Tuwindi, Mali Bloggers’ Association, and Doniblog joined efforts to ensure a return to constitutional order. ARGA–Mali offered its members a series of trainings to help build their organizational capacity to promote gender equality and reform the security sector. CCSC–PURN also organized many training sessions with financial support from partners such as the Ebert Foundation and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

CSOs also received technical support and capacity building from umbrella organizations, international CSOs, and national CSOs. Training addressed issues such as conflict, violent extremism, human rights, and security-sector reform. For example, training organized by the MINUSMA human rights and protection division drew fifty-five participants, including nineteen women, from CSO discussion fora no the defense of human rights in Bamako, Mopti, Ségou, and Sikasso. CSOs also received capacity building on topics such as project management, monitoring,
and human rights investigations and reporting. There is currently no entity that specializes in CSO training. Private entities offer paid training programs on many topics of interest to CSOs, but organizations often find it difficult to access these programs because of budget constraints. Trainings are normally conducted by skilled facilitators and experts working as independent consultants. Some CSOs have internal trainers. The number of trainers is growing. Most training is offered in French and English.

CSOs collaborated effectively with the government and businesses in 2021. For example, the Association of Malian University Students for Development (Association des étudiants maliens pour le développement), a network of young Malian university students who live abroad, partnered with the private sector, the government, donors, and international partners to eliminate malnutrition and poor hygiene and conducted many health-related activities for the public.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.9

CSOs’ public image improved slightly in 2021 as public and government esteem for their contributions increased, especially as they were seen as offering critical services to communities and support to the central government during the transition period.

The public generally has a good perception of CSOs, since they work for the public’s best interests. Many people believe that CSOs meet their needs more efficiently than the central government, probably because they have more nimble structures, are closer to communities, and take community needs into account when designing and implementing projects. Relations between CSOs and the central government also tend to be good.

Social networks play an increasingly important role in CSOs’ work. Many organizations, including the Tiwundi Foundation and AJCAD, have created online platforms to use in their work. Their social media presence gave them broad audiences in 2021. ARGA-Mali also received wide coverage on social media of its research and training work with local and state actors.

CSOs typically demonstrate openness and transparency by producing activity reports and sharing them with donors and other supporters. Malian CSOs do not typically have codes of conduct.
Mozambique recorded several significant political and socio-economic successes in 2021. Most important was the country’s progress in fighting terrorism. The number of people killed by terrorist attacks dropped 82 percent compared to the previous year, according to the Global Terrorism Index. This was the best performance worldwide and was attributed mainly to the Mozambican armed forces, which, with support from Rwanda and the Southern African Development Community, stopped insurgents in several locations and destroyed their military bases. However, violence continued to have devastating effects. According to the United Nations (UN) International Organization for Migration, 735,000 people were internally displaced by conflict as of November 2021, up from 560,000 the previous year. CSOs, the government, and diplomatic and humanitarian missions worked continuously to meet their needs for food, accommodations, health care, and education while also seeking to restore social and political trust and resilience, particularly among youth.

Progress was made in the final phase of the military demobilization implemented under the peace agreement signed in 2019 by the ruling party, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), and the main opposition party, the National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO). The year saw a gradual cessation of attacks by the self-proclaimed RENAMO Military Junta, a splinter faction of the opposition party that perpetuated violence in the country’s central region because of its dissatisfaction with the terms of the 2019 peace agreement. The last members of the group surrendered in 2021, and the process of reintegrating them into the National Defense Forces was still underway at the end of the year.

The COVID-19 pandemic in Mozambique, which first began in March 2020, was somewhat less destructive than in other countries in the region. During spikes in infections in January and June, the government imposed tighter restrictions, such as nighttime curfews, school closures, and the curtailment of cultural events and economic activities, particularly in the restaurant and tourism industries. In March 2021, Mozambique received its first COVID-19 vaccines, and in June, the World Bank approved $115 million in grants for a vaccination campaign, which the government launched in August. CSOs continued to help with COVID-19 awareness raising and the distribution of materials and equipment.

Mozambique suffered severe damage from cyclone Eloise, the second of three cyclones to hit the country in 2021, while it was still recovering from two ruinous cyclones in 2019. Nampula, Sofala, and Zambézia provinces experienced extreme flooding and extensive loss of infrastructure. More than 43,000 people were displaced by the cyclone, according to the UN Sustainable Development Group. At the same time, a severe, years-long drought continued to shrivel fields in a vast swath of the country, wrecking the livelihoods of the large portion of the population engaged in agriculture. These simultaneous catastrophes caused widespread food insecurity. The UN
Office for the Coordination of Refugee Affairs estimated that 1.5 million people were in need in Mozambique in 2021, up from 1.3 million in 2020.

Mozambique continued to deal with the fallout of the hidden-debt scandal in 2021. The scandal was first discovered in 2016 and involved some $2 billion in fraudulent debt by state-owned companies. In September 2021, nineteen defendants, including the son of the former president and the former head of security services, went on trial for blackmail, forgery, embezzlement, and money laundering. For civil society, the trials were an important achievement in their push for government accountability. An agreement was reached to extradite a former finance minister implicated in the scandal to the United States from South Africa, where he had been detained since 2018. (However, the individual stayed in South Africa for the duration of 2021 while he appealed this decision.) The 2021 Corruptions Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency International ranked Mozambique 147 out of 180 countries, a two-point improvement in score over 2020.

Mozambique’s economy continued to be greatly weakened by the pandemic in 2021, with a high number of layoffs and closures. The gross domestic product grew at a rate of 2.2 percent after contracting in 2020. The country continued to rank near the bottom of the Human Development Index of the UN Development Programme.

Overall CSO sustainability did not change in 2021. Organizational capacity improved slightly as CSOs reached new audiences and strengthened their ability to respond to beneficiaries’ needs. Advocacy also progressed slightly with the major victory in the hidden-debt scandal and several other advocacy campaigns. All other dimensions of sustainability were unchanged.

No official data are available on the number of CSOs in Mozambique. The number is thought to be about 10,000.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.2**

The legal environment governing CSOs did not change in 2021.

CSOs are governed by Law 8/91 on associations. CSOs may register at the national, provincial, or district level depending on the geographical scope of their work. To register, organizations must publish their articles of association in the official gazette. Registration fees and the cost of publishing their articles of association can be a barrier to registration for community-based organizations (CBOs), which often function without registration. The government usually does not interfere in the operations of unregistered organizations, although the lack of registration can be a problem for CSOs applying for funding or seeking to partner with organizations that require them to have legal status.

Article 10, No. 2 of Law 8/91 authorizes the attorney general to disband organizations with fewer than ten members for a period of not less than one year. Many CSOs would qualify for dissolution under this rule, but the government has never applied it. No CSO was suspended by the government in 2021.

Although Law 8/91 offers some degree of legal security, CSOs consider the law too general, out of step with reality, and badly in need of reform. Despite CSOs’ concerns about the law, no progress was made in revising it in 2021. CSOs that address the urgent problems affecting the country in recent years, such as terrorist attacks, corruption scandals, the pandemic, natural calamities, and political-military conflicts, often complain that they do not feel legally secure. For example, although lacking legal justification, national defense officials often bar media CSOs such as the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) from covering events in conflict areas, sometimes by resorting to physical violence. The vagueness of Law 8/91, especially concerning the limits of government control, leaves many CSOs feeling intimidated and reluctant to carry out advocacy on issues involving politics, extreme violence, or corruption. For example, when attacks were threatened by extremists in the northern area, the government discouraged the Forum of Non-Governmental Associations of Niassa (FONAGNI), without explanation, from sensitizing youth to avoid extremist practices. At the same time, more robust CSOs seeking to
work on multiple peace and social cohesion projects in Cabo Delgado had no trouble getting permission to conduct baseline studies and community surveys and to access hazardous areas in which a large number of inhabitants needed support. 

Law 8/91 is ambiguous on the taxation of CSOs. Under Articles 11-14 of the law, organizations with public utility status are exempt from paying taxes, but the law leaves the exemptions undefined and states only that exemptions and other benefits may be granted to public utility associations at the discretion of the Council of Ministers. As a result, organizations are taxed inconsistently and on a case-by-case basis. The application process for public utility status is long and complex and not always successful, and few organizations have such status.

CSOs may charge for their services as long as any excess income is returned to the organization. There is no restriction on CSOs' eligibility to compete for government funding, although few organizations do so or are successful if they try. There is no legal impediment to fundraising by CSOs, and they may accept funding from national and international donors.

CSOs find legal advice and the judicial infrastructure difficult to access. Some CSOs provide valuable legal support to CBOs, but their services reach only a limited number of communities. More robust CSOs contract the services of law firms or individual lawyers.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.1**

Organizational capacity improved slightly in 2021 as CSOs reached new audiences and accessed increased training opportunities that strengthened their ability to respond to beneficiaries’ needs.

Pandemic-related restrictions limited CSOs' ability to conduct face-to-face meetings of more than fifty people in 2021. Despite this challenge, both national-level and community-based CSOs continued to work with new and existing constituencies during the year. CSOs purposefully designed strategies for identifying priority beneficiaries, such as victims of the pandemic, populations displaced by violence, and households disrupted by cyclones. As CBOs often had the most direct access to these populations, they frequently provided services in partnership with more robust national organizations, which helped them make strides in building their own capacity. For example, through the MOBILIZE initiative for the inclusion and civic participation of youth, which is funded by the Civil Society Support Mechanism (MASC) Foundation, local CSOs were able to build bridges to local governments and informal movements, such as youth and community savings groups, and thereby implement activities more effectively. At the national level, CSOs such as Peace Platform, Mozambican Citizens, and the Youth Parliament brought together young people of different political orientations, ethnicities, and educational backgrounds in “civic incubators,” where they discussed community issues and formulated strategies for improving governance and public accountability.

In 2021, a number of training programs strengthened CSOs' ability to serve their targeted beneficiaries. For example, through the Civil Society Platform for Health and Human Rights (PLASOC-M), with funding from the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), CBOs working to contain HIV/AIDS were trained on methods for improving the accessibility and quality of HIV services, which resulted in increased antiretroviral testing and treatment of infected populations. The Center for Humanitarian Analytics and Sphere, in partnership with the National Agency for Disaster Management, provided training on the management, collection, and analysis of data on natural disasters, which helped 200 CSOs and media, including the CSO Kubatsira in the central region and JTV, an online television channel, more effectively meet the multiple humanitarian challenges facing the country in 2021. CBOs and local communities helped improve the competence and responsiveness of members of local judicial courts after receiving training on local legal regimes from the Legal and Judiciary Training Center (CFJJ), in coordination with the Provincial Justice and Labor Service and the National Directorate for the Administration of
Justice. Village development organizations were able to advocate for improved participatory budgeting process in their communities after receiving programmatic and budgetary training from various intermediary support organizations (ISOs).

The more robust CSOs often engage in strategic planning and typically have a full array of planning instruments, such as long-term strategic, programmatic, and budget plans, theories of change, and risk matrices. The application of these tools helps them ensure higher levels of sustainability for their projects and better realize their missions and visions. Small CSOs, informal movements, emergency responders, and CBOs lack the capacity to draw up detailed planning instruments and tend to work off annual operational plans. Smaller CSOs' ability to monitor and evaluate results is also limited.

Large, national-level organizations usually have more developed divisions of responsibilities among their organizational structures, such as the executive body and governing board. In small CSOs, staff members tend to have multiple crosscutting responsibilities. For example, the president of the organization is often also the executive director, and the finance officer may be responsible for implementing and monitoring activities. Many CSOs find it difficult to hire and retain qualified staff. In 2021, many organizations, including the Mozambican Association for Active Citizenship, Mozambican Association of People with Disabilities, Christian Council of Mozambique, and Cuamba Social Accountability Monitoring Committee, resorted to using volunteers, especially to respond to priority demands, such as disseminating information about COVID-19 and providing support to the victims of extremist attacks and cyclones. Organizations usually provide small subsidies, transportation, or cell-phone credit to volunteers.

More established organizations tend to have better-equipped offices than other CSOs. Digital communications are still a challenge in Mozambique, and only about one-fifth of the population had internet access in 2021, according to the Institute for Economic and Social Studies (IESE). But internet usage is growing, and in 2021, most larger organizations relied increasingly on online resources, including Microsoft Teams for internal meetings, Zoom for training and meetings with partners and donors, and WhatsApp and Facebook for sharing information.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.3**

CSOs' financial viability was unchanged in 2021. The sector's financial situation remained precarious during the year. Donor funding to CSOs continued to be fairly limited because of the global pandemic, which partially diverted funding from CSOs. The major donors in 2021 included the United States, European Union (EU), United Kingdom, Switzerland, Ireland, Norway, the Netherlands, Canada, Germany, France and, to a lesser extent, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Donors' main priority is traditionally agriculture and food. In 2021, the World Bank Group approved a $150 million grant for the first phase of Mozambique’s Sustainable Rural Economy program, which CSOs will help implement. USAID provided direct financial support to CSOs responding to humanitarian needs in conflict zones and areas hit by cyclones. In December, the EU approved Mozambique's Multiannual Indicative Program, which will provide EUR 428 million (approximately $500 million) for projects addressing green growth, youth, and governance, peace, and social justice. These investments are channeled through the government rather than directly to CSOs.

As in previous years, CSOs did not receive significant support from the government or private sector, in part because the government sees them as capable of raising their own funds. As a result, CSOs had fewer resources to support target groups, and more organizations became heavily dependent on donors and ISOs for funding. Some national foundations, including the Foundation for Community Development (FDC), MASC Foundation, and Joaquim Chissano Foundation, offered limited support to CSOs.
Law 8/91 on associations allows CSOs to engage in fundraising, but most CSOs lack the requisite skills. Some CBOs point to the fragility of their internal financial management as the main obstacle to raising funds. Organizations such as the Leite Couto Cultural Foundation, Youth Parliament, theater groups, and university associations stage cultural events to raise funds. CSOs and CBOs count on in-kind contributions such as labor from volunteers.

CSOs have limited experience earning revenue from the sale of services or products and rarely own assets that they could rent. Any income generated from members’ fees is negligible. There is some awareness in the sector of the concept of social enterprises and the market for paid services, but few organizations have internal management structures able to deal with such activities.

Most national and provincial CSOs produce semi-annual and annual financial reports for donors. In 2021, smaller CSOs continued to benefit from training on budgeting processes. They usually report on their finances annually or at the end of specific projects.

**ADVOCACY: 4.1**

CSO advocacy advanced slightly in 2021 with another major victory in the hidden-debt scandal, which the Budget Monitoring Forum (FMO) and other CSOs, including N’weti and the Mozambican Debt Group, have followed for years. After FMO secured a decision in 2020 from the Mozambican Constitutional Court to void two loans totalling more than $1 billion and state guarantees for $1.57 billion in other loans in 2020, the trials of nineteen defendants in 2021 represented another step forward in civil society’s push for government accountability and social justice. CSOs’ success was compounded by the agreement to extradite the former finance minister to the United States for trial, which FMO and about twenty other national CSOs had forcefully demanded. CSOs were very focused on this case throughout the year and ensured that the public stayed well informed about its development.

Another CSO advocacy achievement in 2021 involved the demobilization of the self-proclaimed RENAMO Military Junta. The last members of the group surrendered in 2021 in Nampula Province, and the process of reintegrating them into the National Defense Forces was still underway at the end of the year. Many CSOs work on peace and stability, and they advocated intensively through several local projects for peace and disarmament agreements between the government and RENAMO. They were also involved in ongoing assessments of demilitarization, demobilization, and reintegration in the country. CSO leaders made public statements on national television and radio about the country’s need to move forward with the process and held meetings and debates at the community level. Many CSOs, such as the Institute for Multiparty Democracy, complained about the lack of transparency and public openness in the process and appealed to the government to make it more participatory.

CSO were also involved in efforts to end extreme violence in the country in 2021. For example, in Cabo Delgado, the Center for Democracy and Development proposed talks with insurgent groups and promoted community development as possible ways out of the conflict and held a workshop on the topic in October.

Direct interactions between CSOs and the government were limited in 2021. There was still a lack of efficient mechanisms to ensure CSOs’ participation in government decision-making processes and CSO-government collaboration on important issues, particularly those involving democratic governance, transparency, and public accountability. In addition, the country’s political decentralization process, which aims to increase citizen participation, experienced a setback during the year, including a lack of financial and material resources for the process and difficulties with compliance on the local level. In response, CSOs relied on civic platforms such as the Citizen Observatory, informal community spaces, public debates, the publication of information on their official web pages, and media articles to engage on topics of concern. CSOs continued to draw attention to the need for
better monitoring of public income and expenditures to overcome rent-seeking and corruption. For example, the Mozambican Debt Group continued to highlight the widening gap between the country’s debt and its economic development, and the BROTAR Association and its local partners advocated effectively with municipal governments in the south for the reform of local tax quotas to improve public services.

Particularly successful in 2021 were two efforts at political lobbying, an area that is otherwise still undeveloped among Mozambican CSOs, especially CBOs working at the local level. Lobbying by the National Youth Council, Association of Small and Medium Enterprises (APME), and other organizations culminated in the establishment of the Fund to Support Youth Initiatives, which will help youth in the post-pandemic period through access to jobs and internships through the Alberto Cassimo Institute for Professional Training and Labor Studies (IFPELAC). In Zambézia Province, a new coalition composed of Mulaba and other CSOs was set up to advocate for reform of the Mining Law to benefit communities located near explorations for heavy sands. The coalition focused on gathering information before beginning monitoring and evaluation activities.

CSOs generally understand that a favorable legal framework would allow for greater success in their work. In 2021, CSOs continued to push for a revision of Law 8/91, although the parliament had yet to respond to the draft law they submitted in 2018.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.1**

CSO service provision was stable in 2021. Many CSOs in Mozambique provide needed services in areas such as education, health care, agriculture, and infrastructure. For example, the Association of Peasant Women in the north and social cooperatives throughout the country focus on agricultural development, which is the main livelihood in the country. Many organizations provided humanitarian support to internally displaced persons in Cabo Delgado in 2021. Nweti, Civil Society Learning and Training Center, and PLASOC-M helped strengthen awareness of COVID-19 prevention and treatment measures and distributed materials such as informative magazines, masks, and disinfectant gel. CSOs also provided humanitarian services to victims of Tropical Cyclone Eloise. For example, women-led local emergency teams from ActionAid Mozambique helped more than 600 families evacuate and find safe shelter in two districts of Sofala Province. A partnership between First Nacional Bank (South Africa) in Mozambique and Doctors Without Borders and Pro-Vision International helped affected communities access health-care services, clean water, food, and sanitation.

In a nation challenged by high levels of poverty and a deficient infrastructure, most CSOs, regardless of their areas of focus, at some point find themselves providing goods and services to the communities in which they operate. For example, the Rural Environment Observatory disseminates research on policies and other issues involving rural development but also provides support services to local agricultural development projects. Even CSOs focused on advocacy and democratic governance usually have a service-provision component in their strategic plans.

CSOs increasingly use statistical data to ascertain communities’ main problems and priorities. Important sources of data for CSOs include the Municipal Governance Barometer compiled by the IESE and the Transparency Assessment conducted by MISA. Many more robust CSOs identify service needs through baseline studies, an approach that they have passed on to their local partners, such as CBOs and village development organizations.

CSOs seek inclusivity in providing their services, especially in target communities, and avoid discrimination of any sort.
CSOs provide most goods and services on a non-commercial basis, as most of their funding comes from donations and its purpose does not involve a return on investments. CSOs do not seek reimbursement from their beneficiaries.

The government at national and local levels recognizes the role of CSOs in delivering services that align with its work or that close gaps in particular services or specific communities. However, public acknowledgements of this recognition are rare.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.0**

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector did not change in 2021.

CSO resource centers do not exist in Mozambique. A few ISOs offer services to CSOs and support the institutional advance of many organizations, including informal groups and movements. For example, the MASC Foundation provides services to local CSOs, community cooperatives, and women’s savings groups, which are concentrated in the north but are now expanding throughout the country. CESC offers CBOs training in local participation, FMO helps CSOs with budgeting and public spending, and OMR supports local CSOs. Their main sources of funding are international partners.

ISOs also offer financial support to local CSOs. For example, FDC, in cooperation with the German Agency for International Cooperation through the EnDev-Mozambique program, launched a call for proposals in 2021 for projects involving sustainable access to renewable energies. Under the EU’s Non-State Actors Support Program, the MASC Foundation awarded small grants to twenty-one organizations for projects in peace and social cohesion, education, health, infrastructure, water and sanitation, innovation, and corruption in 2021. Local grantmakers usually identify areas for proposals through baseline studies, community scorecards, local soundings, and reports from previous years. USAID’s CSO Sustainability Index for Mozambique has also become a relevant source of information about CSOs’ needs.

No one organization represents the interests and areas of activity of all CSOs in Mozambique. A small number of CSO coalitions are active, mainly in advocacy. For example, in 2021, the Mozambican Youth Coalition Association and Mozambique Volunteers continued to work on a project to end child marriage through youth exchanges in Mozambique and Malawi, with funding from Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation. More than twenty CSOs pursued the hidden-debt scandal, joining together to petition the government and the High Court in South Africa. A new coalition formed in Zambézia Province to advocate for reform of the Mining Law.

Donors and ISOs such as PLASOC-M, CFJJ, and the Center for Humanitarian Analytics offered training to grantees or organizations working in specific sectors. In April 2021, USAID announced its five-year, $4.89 million Local Empowerment to Advance (LEAD) program to improve the institutional capacity of Mozambican CSOs. Every year, the program will provide approximately five CSOs from various sectors with technical assistance and other support. Otherwise, training opportunities are limited. Basic training for CSOs is offered at the provincial level, typically by ISOs, but few organizations can afford it. More advanced training on program management, accounting, and financial management is not widely available. Training materials are published in Portuguese and occasionally in the main local languages.

CSOs engage in partnerships with the government, mainly to deliver services and monitor government activities. For example, in 2021, a partnership between the government and the Rural Association of Mutual Aid in Niassa, which sought to resolve conflicts between local communities and the DH Mining Development Company, resulted in the resettlement of communities affected by mining activities, improvement in basic services, and the creation of district forums to discuss issues of community concern.
CSO partnerships with the private sector usually arise when companies have legal commitments to implement projects in local communities as part of their corporate social responsibility programs. In 2021, the TOTAL company and CSOs in the north worked together on a project to promote peace, security, and social cohesion. CSOs also work with the media on issues of public concern. For example, in 2021, the National Forum of Community Radios (FORCOM), which works to raise public awareness about social issues and share information, published information through Radio Watana in Nampula about two small girls who were lost. After the information circulated, the girls were found.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.5

The public image of CSOs did not change in 2021.

Media coverage of CSOs was largely positive in 2021. Obtaining a space in the national media, particularly television and newspapers, is still a challenge for many CSOs, both because of the cost and their areas of work. CSOs with a more service-oriented focus and in closer contact with the government tend to get more media space, particularly on state broadcasters such as Mozambique Television. CSOs working on issues considered sensitive, such as corruption, governance monitoring, and accountability, are more likely to be covered by independent television and newspapers, such as SAVANA, Canal de Moçambique, and Grupo Soico. This is particularly true when they achieve advocacy successes or address issues that attract public attention.

At the local level, CSOs’ activities are sometimes covered by community radio stations. CSOs must pay for airtime, but stations often charge reduced rates to broadcast CSOs’ programs and public service announcements.

Public perceptions of CSOs are divided, particularly between urban and rural areas. In urban areas, people question the role of civil society and challenge their role in society. Studies of Mozambican CSOs by IESE point to CSOs’ need to become more socially credible. In rural areas, many communities tend to welcome CSOs, especially if they receive or expect to receive their support.

The government tends to look at CSOs that engage in service delivery as development partners. The government has poorer opinions of CSOs focused on governance, transparency, and public accountability, and sometimes considers them its opponents. The private sector tends to be neutral about CSOs but sometimes partners with them.

Many CSOs hire journalists to produce stories about their activities, which are then reproduced in magazines, fact sheets, and other channels. More robust CSOs make use of social media to disseminate information, increase their visibility, and advocate.

A CSO code of ethics created a few years ago with funding from the EU is not widely used. Mozambican CSO generally try to function in accordance with the laws and general standards of ethics and accountability. CSOs usually make reports available to funders and seek to keep the public informed about the results of their actions through social media, television, or community radio. CSOs’ financial and audit reports are rarely made public.
In 2021, life in Namibia was dominated by a deadly third wave of COVID-19 infections. Between the start of the pandemic in March 2020 and the end of 2021, Namibia recorded 3,645 deaths related to the virus, 75 percent of which took place in a harrowing period between May and August 2021. The government rolled out an immunization campaign in March 2021, but it was hampered by delivery delays and widespread hesitancy to accept the vaccine fueled by disinformation. The government imposed varying restrictions on freedom of movement and the size of public gatherings throughout the year. A nighttime curfew was in place from June to October. However, freedoms of expression and of the media were respected, and the police exercised more restraint in enforcing pandemic restrictions than in 2020. CSOs remained relatively uninvolved in the pandemic response, although a few national organizations sought to provide accurate information and expose fake news about the pandemic while other CSOs mitigated pandemic-related hardships by distributing food and clothing.

Politically, the year was marked by stretches of pandemic-induced inactivity. Parliamentary sessions were suspended for part of the year. When the National Assembly was in session, debates were often acrimonious, with little law making actually taking place. In April, the speaker of the National Assembly had security staff forcibly remove from the chamber two leaders of the populist opposition party, the Landless Peoples Movement, after they disrupted President Hage Geingob’s state-of-the-nation address. The parliamentarians’ subsequent suspension from the parliament was overturned by the Supreme Court.

In May, the Namibian and German governments reached an agreement regarding reparations and an official apology for the genocide of the Herero and Nama peoples in the early twentieth century. Germany’s offer of EUR 1.1 billion (approximately $1.3 billion) in reparations to be paid over thirty years was swiftly rejected by opposition parties as well as the affected traditional communities, which felt that they had been sidelined during the negotiations. When members of parliament from the ruling Swapo Party of Namibia also voiced concerns about the settlement, the government shelved parliamentary ratification of the agreement.

Namibians continued to experience economic travails in 2021 after an unprecedented 7.9 percent contraction in the country’s economy in 2020. Although the economy bounced back to an estimated 2.4 percent rate of growth in 2021, according to the Namibia Statistics Agency, 15,442 formal jobs were lost since the start of the pandemic, of which nearly 30 percent were in the travel and tourism sector, the Ministry of Labor reported. Given the predominance of the informal sector in the Namibian economy, labor experts estimated that the true number of jobs lost to COVID-19 was actually much higher.

The overall sustainability of CSOs did not change in 2021. The legal environment was slightly less enabling as the government seemed intent on increased regulation of the sector and a long-standing legal dispute over the right to
conduct research was left unresolved. CSOs’ organizational capacity regressed slightly as existing challenges with human resources and finances were compounded by pandemic restrictions, unplanned expenditures, and the shift of program funds to meet emergency needs. Many CSOs experienced a slight deterioration of their financial situations as funding for core costs remained scarce and an ailing economy made the private sector unable or unwilling to step in. Service provision was slightly weaker as precarious finances and pandemic restrictions forced many CSOs to cut back on services. At the same time, advocacy was moderately stronger as CSOs successfully pressed for change on issues related to the environment, corruption, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex, and other (LGBTQI+) rights. CSOs’ public image improved slightly as their activities received ample media coverage and their use of social media increased. Only the sectoral infrastructure did not change.

The overall size of the Namibian CSO sector in 2021 was unclear as there is no official register of nonprofit organizations. The Civil Society Information Center (also known as CIVIC +264) verified that 104 CSOs countrywide were active as of the end of 2021.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 3.9

The legal environment for CSOs declined slightly in 2021 as the government seemed intent on increasing regulation of the sector and a long-standing legal dispute over the right to conduct research was left unresolved.

The rules regarding the various forms of CSO registration did not change in 2021. CSOs are required to register with the Business and Intellectual Property Authority as not-for-profit companies under the Companies Act or with the Master of the High Court as trusts under the Trust Moneys Protection Act. Many smaller organizations choose to constitute themselves as membership-based voluntary associations, which do not require registration. CSOs continued to struggle with bureaucratic barriers and inefficiencies in the registration systems in 2021. The Namibia Development Trust (NDT), for example, encountered a very slow process when it sought to update its records with the Master of the High Court. Similarly, the Namibian Chapter of the Internet Society (ISOC) found the process of registering with the Business and Intellectual Property Authority to be laborious and costly.

CSOs remained concerned about the authorities’ efforts to introduce increased oversight and compliance requirements for the sector in 2021. The government continued to raise the prospect of a government-civil society partnership framework with possible new registration requirements. The European Union-funded Enhancing Participatory Democracy in Namibia (EPDN) project helped facilitate discussions about such a framework. However, little was achieved, partially because of pandemic restrictions, which limited consultations. The EPDN project is expected to start driving this initiative more intently in 2022. While CSOs acknowledge that internal governance deficits exist in the sector, they also fear that additional requirements will increase their administrative burden and could be abused to limit their activities and target their funding.

The long-running legal case to have parts of the Research, Science, and Technology Act of 2004 declared unconstitutional was still not resolved in 2021. Three organizations—the Legal Assistance Center (LAC), Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), and The Namibian newspaper—have challenged the law and its regulations, claiming that it imposes draconian controls on entities conducting any kind of research. In 2021, these organizations came to view the case as also involving access-to-justice issues, as its resolution had been delayed for several years to allow the government to revise the act. In view of the government’s failure to deliver an acceptable revised draft of the law, the complainants felt that the case was being dragged out unnecessarily. They indicated that they would ask for it to be put back on the court’s agenda in 2022 so that a judgment could finally be issued.

There are no legal limitations on CSOs’ access to foreign funding. However, in March 2021, the Bank of Namibia’s Financial Intelligence Center (FIC) circulated an assessment report claiming that CSOs are at serious risk of
exposure to money laundering and terrorism financing. During stakeholder consultations, CSOs expressed the view that the FIC’s claims were questionable given the sector’s modest assets and limited access to funding. Several CSOs and churches felt that they had been unfairly targeted, especially when high-profile corruption and money-laundering cases in Namibia do not normally involve CSOs but do often implicate politicians. Following issuance of this report, the FIC urged all CSOs to register with it so they could be monitored. Very few organizations are believed to have done so.

CSOs may compete for government contracts. Few organizations do so, mainly because of limited capacity, a tedious and lengthy procurement process, most tenders’ lack of relevance to CSOs’ areas of expertise, and the possibility that working with government institutions will undermine their independence and control over projects. CSOs may also engage in income-generating activities.

All CSOs are supposed to pay pay-as-you-earn tax on permanent employees’ salaries. CSOs are exempt from value-added tax except when they provide services or sell products for commercial purposes. Charitable, religious, and welfare organizations are exempt from taxes on income, including funding from donors. CSOs find that remaining compliant with tax and labor laws is an ongoing challenge requiring dedicated resources and skilled staff. For example, the Namibia Media Trust (NMT), an organization campaigning on issues related to media freedom and freedom of expression, became involved in a protracted effort to rectify a tax issue in 2021. Authorities did not revive plans proposed in 2019 to tax income that charities derive from commercial activities.

Private legal services are available to CSOs but are costly. LAC normally provides legal advice to CSOs on a pro bono basis. However, as the only nonprofit law firm, LAC is unable to provide sufficient services to keep up with demand.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.5**

As the COVID-19 pandemic entered its second year, the organizational capacity of CSOs weakened slightly. Existing challenges with human resources and finances were compounded by pandemic restrictions, unplanned expenditures, and the shift of program funds to meet emergency needs. This uncertain situation in turn hampered strategic planning, while lockdowns and other pandemic-related measures disrupted internal management.

Although national and some international travel restrictions were eased during the year, the severe mid-year wave of COVID-19 infections and deaths overwhelmed the country’s health-care system. CSOs’ day-to-day operations were undermined by exposure to the virus and infections among staff and their families. CSO staff found it harder to communicate with stakeholders or lost valuable work time getting tested, recuperating from illness, or taking care of sick family members. For example, the staff of the Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSF), a German political foundation operating in Namibia, worked mostly from home, which limited their ability to offer support to partner organizations. CSOs’ implementation of projects was disrupted in other ways as well. IPPR, for example, was unable to carry out a research validation meeting in person and was forced to resort to emailing questions, which garnered few responses.

CSOs’ ability to connect, coordinate, and mobilize constituencies was constrained during the year. While many CSOs turned to online solutions, these were not always ideal. Having shifted its training and stakeholder consultation events online, the Namibia Institute for Democracy (NID) observed that it was challenging to keep participants engaged and online throughout these sessions. Grassroots and rural organizations with limited or no access to information technology and the internet struggled to remain active. Field trips organized by CIVIC +264 to allow smaller local organizations to meet and network with regional CSOs were delayed until the end of the year because of the severity of the pandemic.
CSOs’ management and operations were also undermined by limited core funding and institutional support from donors. Internal governance did not improve and in fact CSOs’ governance capacities worsened in 2021. In October, allegations surfaced that a prominent youth activist from #ShutItAllDown, which campaigns against sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), had embezzled funding provided to the movement. The activist was questioned by law enforcement officials, and the matter was eventually resolved when the funds were paid back. Such unfortunate instances underlined the fact that many CSOs continued to lack adequate administrative supervision, financial controls, and fully involved boards and trustees.

The economic and human costs of the pandemic and its restrictions burdened CSO staff. For example, because of funding constraints, ISOC and Eloolo, an agricultural organization, relied increasingly on unemployed youth and interns working on a voluntary basis. These volunteers often lacked commitment to their jobs, and necessary oversight of their work was sometimes lacking, weakening the quality of an organization’s work. CSOs reported an upsurge in mental health problems among staff, particularly younger professionals, as a result of pandemic restrictions. With counselling options in Namibia limited and usually very expensive, several CSOs found it difficult to support staff dealing with mental health issues.

Building on investments in equipment and experience gained in 2020, some CSOs were well positioned to make effective use of social media and online tools while pandemic restrictions were in effect in 2021. NID, IPPR, CIVIC +264, and NMT regularly used Microsoft Teams, Zoom, and similar platforms to hold online meetings and connect with stakeholders, government officials, and the public. NMT started to set up a dedicated podcast studio, which will be available for use by other CSOs for a fee. However, the cost of broadband connections, computer equipment, and website services remained a challenge for most of the sector. ISOC sought to ensure participation in its webinars and online meetings by offering to refund data costs.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.0**

Many CSOs experienced a slight deterioration in their financial situations in 2021, continuing the downward trend of recent years. Funding for CSOs’ core costs remained scarce, while the ailing economy meant the private sector was unable or unwilling to step in except to fund emergency public health measures related to the pandemic.

Most CSO funding originates with foreign donors, particularly Western governments and international organizations such as the United Nations (UN). However, Namibia’s classification by the World Bank as an upper middle-income country makes it ineligible for funding from many donors. In 2021, the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA), which has funded various projects in the country over the last decade, decided to exclude Namibia from future funding and focus instead on larger African countries such as South Africa and Kenya. Towards the end of 2021, Sister Namibia, which was founded in the 1980s and is one of Namibia’s foremost feminist organizations, lost its main donor and had to drastically cut costs and restructure its operations to remain financially viable. Among other steps, Sister Namibia retrenched permanent staff and rented out most of its office building.

Donors increasingly require partners to have appropriate legal status, up-to-date financials, and track records of handling significant grants. These requirements mean that donors usually direct funding to established CSOs able to show sufficient organizational and staffing capacity. Grassroots organizations with little capacity and regulatory know-how find it difficult to access funding. Donors are generally reluctant to fund voluntary associations because of their lack of financial controls and oversight. Many funders, including the US Embassy, provide small short-term grants with limited coverage of overhead costs and other institutional expenses. CSOs generally view donors as preferring to support the government rather than civil society. For example, in March 2021, the International
Monetary Fund approved $270 million in emergency fiscal support for Namibia, but the funds were primarily intended to cover government expenses and the pandemic response and did not reach CSOs.

An exception to the general curtailment of funding was increased donor support for environmental issues in 2021. For example, NDT observed an increase in funding from organizations such as the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) for small community-based organizations. Aside from environmental protection, most other fields, including human rights and the promotion of democracy, garnered less support.

The depressed local economy offered few opportunities for CSOs to diversify their funding in 2021. Government support for civil society has always been limited, but as it faced a prolonged fiscal crisis and incurred additional costs to manage the pandemic, the government offered no funding to CSOs in 2021.

Businesses, particularly big corporations and international companies, often bypass civil society and support communities directly, mainly by providing goods and consumables. Some companies, especially in the financial and extractive industries, increased their support in 2021, mostly to prop up the struggling public health sector during the mid-year wave of COVID-19 infections. Businesses generally prefer to support politically neutral causes such as sports, conservation, soup kitchens, and the arts. B2Gold, a Canadian mining company based in Namibia, is a long-term funding partner of the Save the Rhino Trust and in 2021 provided financing for the salaries of field staff monitoring the animals’ movements. The local tourism industry, which prior to the pandemic was an important source of funding for environmental CSOs, was unable to generate funds to support the sector because of persisting restrictions on international travel in 2021.

Overall, Namibian CSOs have limited options and capacities to generate income from their activities. Many CSOs serve poor communities and have limited opportunities to fundraise aggressively. Membership-based entities are few in number and rely for funding on a handful of civic-minded, well-off members of the public.

Many organizations struggle with keeping adequate, up-to-date financial records and paying for annual audits. Only a small number of CSOs publish financial information. In 2021, NID convinced its main funding partner to pay for the completion of its outstanding annual audits, which had been delayed because of a lack of funds to pay the auditors.

**ADVOCACY: 3.3**

Advocacy was moderately stronger in 2021 as CSOs successfully pressed for change on a host of issues related to the environment, corruption, and LGBTQI+ rights, in some cases raising international attention.

Direct engagements between CSOs and policymakers and legislators were limited in 2021, in part because of the severity of the COVID-19 crisis, particularly in the middle of the year. For example, CSOs such as NID, CIVIC +264, and IPPR had limited contact with the Anti-Corruption Commission, even though the commission was supposedly developing a new national strategy in consultation with stakeholders. Government consultations with civil society were mostly ad hoc, and the government often organized engagements with CSOs on very short notice, giving the impression that the consultations were a perfunctory exercise.

However, CIVIC +264 and IPPR were able to arrange three online consultations that brought together CSOs and the minister of finance to discuss national budget priorities and plans for a sovereign wealth fund. As a result of CSOs’ successful lobbying in the first consultation in February, the minister removed value-added tax from sanitary pads, which groups such as Women’s Action for Development had demanded for several years. The second and third meetings in February and September were about priorities for the national budget. Most CSOs’ suggestions were ruled out because of a lack of financing, but the spirit of the consultations was constructive and a more formalized schedule of discussions was developed for 2022. Civil society continued to engage with the African Peer
Review Mechanism (APRM), a self-monitoring mechanism for assessing national governance standards that involves government, civil society, and the private sector. However, some CSOs felt sidelined in the APRM process, especially as the government had to be lobbied to include CSO representatives on the APRM National Governing Council. Online validation workshops for the country’s APRM baseline report were held at the height of the third wave of the pandemic and thus were poorly attended.

CSOs made little progress on reforming existing legislation in 2021, especially as pandemic restrictions and infections disrupted the parliamentary schedule. CSOs did, however, advocate for open discourse on issues of high public interest and played an active role in public hearings by parliamentary committees. For example, equal-rights campaigners objected to amendments to the Combating of Domestic Violence Act, which were presented in the parliament in February. The proposed changes to the law ignored recommendations from LAC to extend the act to cover same-sex couples. The draft amendments were later withdrawn but are likely to be re-tabled in the National Assembly in 2022. Various organizations engaged in a lively debate about abortion rights at a four-day public hearing in October held by the Parliamentary Committee on Gender Equality, Social Development, and Family Affairs. Civil society was divided on the issue, with church groups opposing reform of the law and pro-choice groups such as the Voices for Choices and Rights Coalition calling for progressive reforms. CSOs engaged in subsequent regional public hearings on the issue, during which gender and pro-choice activists felt that church groups received privileged treatment.

In November, ISOC and the ACTION Coalition, which is made up of ten CSOs lobbying for better access to information, presented their views on the Access to Information Bill at a public hearing organized by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Information and Communication Technology. CSOs did not have major objections to the bill and were willing to work with it in its current form. The bill was passed in 2022.

Public protests and community activities were muted during the year, partially because of over-zealous police enforcement of pandemic restrictions. A few social movements and CSO coalitions coalesced around issue-specific causes and managed to hold protests and other events. The LGBTQI+ community and its supporters were particularly vocal concerning a court case brought against the Home Affairs Ministry by a gay couple whose twin babies born to a South African surrogate were denied citizenship by Namibian authorities. The High Court decreed in an interim ruling that the twins must be issued emergency travel documents so that they could enter Namibia. Later, the couple won a separate case in which the court ruled that their other surrogate child was eligible for Namibian citizenship. The government’s appeal of this ruling was in progress at the end of the year. Equal rights activists used social media effectively to draw international attention to the case, adding to the pressure on the government.

Environmental CSOs were active and scored several successes in 2021. CSOs opposed to oil exploration activities by the Canadian company ReconAfrica in Namibia’s northern Kavango Basin voiced concerns that the company had drilled test boreholes without adequate precautions to protect the sensitive Okavango Delta, a World Heritage wetland site. Activists alleged further that ReconAfrica planned to use controversial fracking methods. Petitions from the Women’s Leadership Center and a consortium of CSOs operating under the name Saving the Okavango’s Unique Life called for a ban on explorations and prompted a visit to the Kavango area by the Parliamentary Committee on Natural Resources. The committee thereafter raised concerns about the process for approving exploration activities. ReconAfrica’s controversial activities garnered international media attention and inspired various celebrities, in tandem with Namibian activists, to take up the cause of protecting the Kavango Basin. For example, Prince Harry, Duke of Sussex, and local environmentalist Reinhold Mangundu wrote a joint opinion article on the issue for The Washington Post, which appeared in October 2021. In another environmental case, a local interest group, the Stampriet Aquifer Uranium Mining Committee, accused a Russian-backed company, Headspring Investments, of acting outside the law while exploring for uranium. In response, the government withdrew two drilling permits issued to Headspring.

A rare victory against government abuse was scored in early April with the resignation of the defense minister. The Affirmative Repositioning (AR) movement published leaked evidence on Twitter indicating that the minister held a significant amount of money in an undeclared bank account in Hong Kong, which was allegedly linked to a controversial, decade-old arms deal between the Namibian government and a state-owned Chinese company. No further action was taken after the minister’s resignation.

The leader of AR, a former mayor of Windhoek, also launched a highly visible public campaign against the Red Line, a veterinary cordon fence banning the distribution of meat from Namibia’s northern communal areas in areas
south of the Etosha National Park to prevent the spread of livestock disease. The former mayor lodged a case in the High Court seeking to have the Red Line declared unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated the dignity of the Namibian people and was discriminatory. The case was still pending at the end of the year.

In 2021, civil society was more focused on the possibility of a new partnership policy with government. However, pandemic restrictions hindered CSOs’ efforts to reform regulations and other legal matters affecting the sector in 2021. In addition, the individual responsible for the government’s civil society desk passed away from COVID-19, and the post was not filled during the year.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.2**

CSOs’ service provision deteriorated slightly in 2021 as precarious financial positions and pandemic restrictions forced many CSOs to cut back on services.

Namibian CSOs normally offer a range of services, including outreach on health and educational issues, nutritional support, legal and administrative advice, training on issues such as environmental protection, and civic education. For some CSOs, the COVID-19 health emergency was the dominant concern of the year, turning attention away from other national issues, such as education and SGBV. For example, the Society for Family Health and other CSOs focused on health care redirected resources to fight the pandemic, thereby reducing other crucial services, such as outreach and the distribution of contraceptives. Pandemic-induced curfews and other restrictions limited CSOs’ activities, especially those that could not easily be moved online.

One exception to this trend was the work of the Shack Dwellers Federation of Namibia (SDFN), probably the most effective grassroots CSO in Namibia, which focuses primarily on serving the urban poor living in informal settlements. Using community-led approaches, SDFN continued to provide housing and run 1,036 saving groups in all fourteen regions of Namibia in 2021. RISE Namibia, a small but longstanding CSO focused on community development in more remote areas, sought to improve household food security by providing training and support for backyard food production to communities in the country’s south.

CSOs have little scope for generating income from their services, since the communities that they serve are invariably poverty stricken.

Government recognition of the role played by CSOs remained limited in 2021. Among government ministries, the Ministry of Finance takes its consultation with CSOs most seriously.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.7**

The sectoral infrastructure supporting civil society did not change in 2021.

CSOs have little support from resource centers or intermediary support organizations. The few operational CSO resource centers in Namibia include the House of Democracy, supported by HSF, which offers office space and meeting rooms to partner organizations and other groups at reduced cost. In 2021, HSF began to set up a podcast studio for use by its CSO partners. The Namibian Chamber of Environment offered space for discussions of current issues, such as green hydrogen and mining. NDT and other CSO partners are planning to establish an environmental hub for CSOs, which will include a training institute.

Namibia has hardly any local grantmaking CSOs. One of the few such organizations is the Environmental Investment Fund of Namibia, which focuses on sustainable economic development in an environmentally conscious manner. The fund’s activities are financially supported by the government and international organizations such as
the UN Development Programme and the Green Climate Fund. While the bulk of its funding targets green start-ups and sustainable, for-profit business plans, a few CSOs also benefit.

Coordination and cooperation between CSOs improved in 2021 thanks to CIVIC +264, which increasingly serves as a contact point for inquiries from the government and the private sector. In 2021, CIVIC +264 liaised on the sector’s behalf with the APRM National Governing Council and the FIC. Loose CSO coalitions were active in 2021 on a number of issues, including abortion, equal rights, and environmental protection. These coalitions focused mostly on lobbying the government and gaining media attention for their causes. Donor organizations have indicated that they would like to see more coordination and cooperation in the Namibian CSO sector but did not offer support for this purpose to groups other than CIVIC +264. A long-awaited national conference to discuss the possibility of a new umbrella body for CSOs and the form this organization should take was delayed until 2022. The conference, to be organized by CIVIC +264, will consider the best approach to coordinating civil society given the demise of the National NGO Forum (NANGOF) Trust, an umbrella body that stopped functioning several years ago.

Training opportunities were limited in 2021. IPPR’s Namibia Fact Check project offered short courses in fact checking and social media verification to civil society representatives and trainee journalists. In September, the project provided three days of training on verifying health-related information to community radio presenters with the support of the DW Akademie, a project of the German public media outlet Deutsche Welle. In November, RISE Namibia partnered with the Namibia Rural Women’s Assembly on a two-day workshop about basic bookkeeping and financial reporting. The Namibian Association of Community-Based Natural Resource Management Support Organizations (NACSO), which is made up of eight CSOs and the University of Namibia, conducted training on forestry management. Capacity building offered by donors is usually ad hoc and aimed at existing partners. Among the few opportunities of this type in 2021, HSF provided training on diversity issues to its partner CSOs.

Collaboration between CSOs and other sectors such as government and business was modest and sporadic in 2021. NACSO facilitated training on wildlife monitoring for conservancy game guards and held planning meetings with the Ministry of Environment, Forestry, and Tourism. Several civil society initiatives sought to respond to communities’ pandemic-related hardships in partnership with the private sector. For example, the charitable organization Co-Feed Namibia regularly collected and distributed donated food and other basic necessities to soup kitchens, old-age homes, orphanages, and needy households in partnership with private-sector entities, including the Lithon Foundation, a welfare organization, and Nedbank Namibia. NMT funded columns in The Namibian newspaper on COVID-related issues, which were provided by IPPR’s Fact Check project.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.6**

The public image of CSOs improved slightly in 2021 as their activities received positive media attention and their use of social media increased.

Recent years have seen a mushrooming of media outlets in Namibia, especially online publications and radio stations focused on current affairs. CSO representatives are often invited to provide commentary and analysis of political and social developments on these and other media outlets, a trend that accelerated in 2021 as the media sought informed voices on the COVID-19 virus, pandemic restrictions, and other legal and health topics. For example, staff from the Namibia Chamber of Environment, LAC, NID, and IPPR were featured regularly on current affairs programs or cited in newspaper articles, and CSO representatives became regular guests on the new Desert Radio channel. Articles by LGBTQ+ activists were frequently published by local newspapers, and IPPR’s briefing papers on economic topics were often cited in articles on the business climate published by the Namibia Media Holdings group of newspapers. CSOs were also featured regularly in international media as critical, independent...
sources of information on issues such as corruption, controversial oil exploration, and LGBTQ+ activism. The media covered CSOs’ help to communities coping with the effects of the pandemic. For example, articles were published describing Co-Feed Namibia’s partnerships with local retail outlets to provide basic supplies to affected communities; Development Workshop’s receipt of approximately $500,000 from Mobile Telecommunications Limited, Namibia’s main cellphone network, for housing and early childhood development; and a football tournament to raise money for vulnerable community members hosted by the Welwitschia Charity Foundation in Khorixas.

Positive media coverage of CSOs in 2021 contributed to favorable public perceptions of the sector. Senior governments officials, including the president, were not directly critical of civil society and instead called on citizens to avoid negativity and concentrate on positive developments. Private-sector perceptions of CSOs were mixed during the year. Some CSOs were subjected to push back from companies engaged in controversial mining developments. For example, the Canadian oil exploration company ReconAfrica sought to discredit CSOs’ criticisms of its activities.

CSOs made more and better use of social media tools and platforms in 2021, continuing a trend that started with the onset of the pandemic. Streaming presentations by CSOs became more common and were popular with the public and media, although NID noted the difficulty of retaining an audience’s interest over the course of longer online sessions. Some CSOs created their own media channels and publications, such as NMT’s monthly Ask The Experts sessions on COVID-19 and its YouthQuake newspaper insert.

Other than the discussion of a possible new umbrella body, CSOs made few attempts to self-regulate in 2021. Only a small number of CSOs publish annual reports or financial information.
Following second round presidential elections in Niger on February 21, 2021, Mohamed Bazoum, the former interior minister, succeeded Mahamdou Issoufou as president in the country’s first democratic transfer of power through an election. In accordance with the constitution, President Issoufou agreed to only serve two five-year terms. After the vote, supporters of the opposition candidate alleged fraud. Although the government cut public access to the internet in an effort to avoid the organization of protests via social media, violent protests erupted in several cities. However, observers from the Economic Community of West African States said that the election was held “under free, fair, credible and transparent conditions,” and Niger’s Constitutional Court validated the election results in March. CSOs monitored the electoral process.

The security situation in Niger deteriorated in 2021, particularly in the area around Diffa and Liptako Gourma known as the “three border zone” because it straddles the borders of Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali. Deadly attacks by Islamist groups killed hundreds of people during the year. Dozens of abductions were reported, and more than 33,000 students were unable to attend school. Improvised explosive devices and severe flooding during the summer prevented farmers from working in their fields, leaving 8 million people under pressure from or affected by food insecurity, according to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Altogether, some 3.8 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance in 2021, an increase of 65 percent over the previous year, OCHA reported. Because of the insecurity, a state of emergency was in effect throughout the year in all departments of Tillabéri and Diffa regions and in the northern area of Tahoua Region.

The COVID-19 pandemic persisted in 2021 but was effectively controlled. The government rolled out a vaccination campaign after the first shipment of vaccines arrived in April. Together with the UN Children’s Fund, the government worked to overcome widespread hesitance about the safety of the vaccine, especially in traditional communities. The government extended a state of health emergency indefinitely in April but later relaxed the most stringent restrictions, although large assemblies continued to be banned, and facemasks and social distancing were required in public places. CSOs played an important role in raising awareness about COVID-19 prevention measures.

With the steep decline in agricultural production, inflationary pressures persisted in 2021, and the prices of basic necessities, including foodstuffs, continued to rise. The World Bank predicted that Niger’s economy would grow by less than 1.5 percent in 2021 because of the insecurity and climate shocks.

The overall sustainability of the CSO sector improved slightly in 2021. Organizational capacity was slightly stronger as CSOs were able to implement more activities in the field and over internet-based platforms. Financial viability
improved slightly as funding from foreign donors increased. Advocacy also showed slight progress as CSOs achieved significant results on behalf of communities in conflict zones. The sectoral infrastructure was slightly stronger as organizations worked together more effectively in consortia, networks, and intersectoral partnerships. Other dimensions of sustainability were unchanged.

According to the Ministry of Community Development and Land Management (MDC/AT), 240 non-government organizations (NGOs), a separate legal form, were registered in 2021, of which 220 were national organizations and 20 were international organizations. In addition, 114 associations were registered, 106 of which were national and 8 international organizations. A total of approximately 3,500 NGOs and associations were registered in 2021.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.4**

The legal environment for CSOs did not change in 2021. CSOs are governed by No. Law 84-06 of 1984 on associations, as amended by Law No. 91-006 of 1991 and subsequent texts and Decree No. 92-292 of 1992 on NGOs. CSOs may register as associations, which act to benefit their members, or as NGOs, which act to benefit people other than their members. CSOs are required to register to operate. CSOs intending to work at the national level apply to municipal authorities in Niamey, the capital, which request authorization from the Ministry of the Interior, which in turn consults with MDC/AT and line ministries. NGOs working at the national level must sign implementation protocols with the minister of community development before beginning projects in the field. CSOs intending to work below the national level sign implementation protocols with their line ministries and implementation agreements with municipal, district, or regional authorities in the areas in which they will operate. International organizations register with MDC/AT and obtain accreditation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which obtains approval from the Ministry of the Interior. Registration is generally faster and easier for development organizations than for organizations focused on democracy, human rights, civic freedoms, and similar areas. The Ministry of the Interior is known for its lack of personnel to process CSO applications, which slows down the registration of organizations that need its approval. CSOs have recommended that the Ministry of the Interior create several processing centers to facilitate registration, but it has not done so. Directorates responsible for NGOs and associations operate in MDC/AT, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of the Interior.

CSOs are overseen by their line ministries, which monitor and audit their activities. The law requires CSOs to file narrative and financial reports with MDC/AT by March 31 of each year and to publish financial reports annually in the official gazette. These requirements are more stringently enforced in the case of NGOs and development associations, which may be suspended if they fail to file reports for two years and may be dissolved at any time for political or arbitrary reasons. According to MDC/AT, 115 international NGOs and 585 national NGOs filed their annual reports in 2021. During the year, the government stated its intention to begin sanctioning organizations that are not compliant with this and other requirements, such as paying taxes and signing implementation protocols. No CSO is known to have been suspended or dissolved in 2021. CSOs have legal protection against arbitrary actions by the state, including the right of appeal.

CSOs are prohibited from engaging in ethnic, regionalist, or political activities. They may freely address issues of public debate and express criticism, although organizations that criticize government actions can be subject to harassment by the central government, local governments, and tax police. CSOs sometimes self-censor about issues that could be interpreted as undermining state security and social cohesion.

Demonstrations are permitted under Law No. 2004-45 of 2004, although they must be declared in advance and may be banned if the authorities believe that they are likely to seriously disrupt public order. In 2021, the authorities banned more than a dozen demonstrations, prompting CSOs to complain that some laws and regulations are not implemented in a consistent or coherent manner. For example, the civil society coalition Turn
the Page (Tournons la page, TLP) was banned from demonstrating several times in December. TLP submitted appeals to the bans but received no response. On December 10, Human Rights Day, TLP members were arrested for “illegal gatherings” and later released. The UN special rapporteur on the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, who was in Niger on an official visit at the time, urged the government to allow public demonstrations, noting that the prohibitions of demonstrations by TLP threatened its commitment to a democratic society. The coordinator of the Tillabéri Union for Peace (Union pour la paix de Tillabéri), which was set up by Tillabéri nationals to denounce terrorism and the inadequacy of the state's response, was arrested and imprisoned on charges of defamation following a complaint by the former minister of defense. He was later released. The public prosecutor used Law No. 2019-056 of 2019 on cybercrime to arrest bloggers for forwarding WhatsApp messages or posting messages on Facebook on charges of defamation and distributing, producing, and providing information that “is intended to disrupt public order or harm human dignity.” For example, in May 2021, blogger Samira Sabou and journalist Moussa Aksar were arrested for re-posting an article alleging that a government agency was reselling drugs seized from illegal trafficking. They were both convicted in early 2022. Aksar was also convicted of defamation after publishing articles on the improper purchase of arms by the Ministry of Defense. He was fined approximately $2,250 plus damages. Altogether, the police arrested nine civil society actors in 2021.

CSOs that have implementation protocols and agreements may benefit from various tax exemptions, although the procedures for applying for them are rigid and the exemptions are difficult to obtain. Implementing regulations in accordance with the laws governing NGOs and associations require CSOs to sign a framework protocol valid for a five-year period with the government. Despite CSOs’ negotiations with the government about the content of the 2021–25 framework protocol, the new protocol and the Finance Law of 2020 removed several tax exemptions previously granted to CSOs. However, there were delays in implementing these changes in 2021. The tax authorities sometimes treat associations as profit-making companies and require them to pay registration fees and value-added tax, from which they should be exempt. Corporate and individual donors may deduct their donations to CSOs but rarely do so, usually because they are unaware of the possibility.

CSOs may offer paid services provided they use the income to support their operations and do not redistribute it among their members.

Only CSOs that report annually to MDC/AT are eligible for government support. However, state funds are distributed erratically and sometimes go to organizations that do not comply with this requirement. CSOs may respond to calls for proposals and expressions of interest from the government for centrally and locally provided services.

CSOs may receive funding from foreign donors provided the source of funding do not engage in money laundering or the financing of terrorism. The government monitors the sources of CSOs’ funding for the possible financing of terrorism. CSOs may engage in fundraising.

No lawyers in Niger specialize in CSO issues. Several organizations, such as TLP, Network to Support Local Initiatives (Réseau d'appui aux initiatives locales, RAIL), and Network of Organizations for Transparency and Budget Analysis (Réseau des organisations pour la transparence et l'analyse budgétaire, ROTAB), retain legal advisors or law firms to support them with specific cases. Nearly all lawyers are located in Niamey but travel elsewhere in the country as needed.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.9**

Organizational capacity was slightly stronger in 2021 as CSOs implemented more activities in the field and over the internet.

CSOs’ activities are usually in line with needs expressed by the communities with which they work. In 2021, with the reduction of constraints related to the pandemic, CSOs were able to work more closely with their constituents. For example, restrictions on the number of participants in training sessions were lifted, which allowed CSOs to reach a larger number of targeted beneficiaries with fieldwork and capacity building. Since Niger began to decentralize in 2004, CSOs’ activities have often been based on national and local planning documents, which define priorities and targets for interventions by CSOs and their technical and financial partners. CSOs’ beneficiaries normally participate in the design, implementation, and evaluation of their activities. Local
organizations and movements, including community-based organizations (CBOs), fadas (informal local clubs where youth congregate), foyandis (informal women’s associations), and neighborhood youth associations, are deeply rooted in their communities and typically have more participatory approaches than other types of organizations. Their understanding of their environments allows them to effectively address the immediate needs of their targeted beneficiaries and members. For example, the Framework for Dialogue on Justice and Security (Cadre de concertation pour le dialogue sur la justice et la sécurité, CCJSD), a CBO working in Niamey and Filingué, is known for its participatory approaches.

The missions of well-established CSOs are clearly defined in their founding documents. Larger CSOs rely increasingly on strategic plans to guide their activities, particularly as donors often require the plans as a condition for funding. In 2021, the Private Aid Grouping (Groupement des aides privés, GAP), with support from the Civil Society Support Program (PASOC 3) of the European Union (EU), helped about twenty newer CSOs professionalize their operations, formalize their structures, and improve their credibility by developing strategic plans and other management documents. CSOs participating in this project included the Nigerien Organization to Support Mothers and Children (Organisation nigérienne pour la promotion de la mère et enfant, ONPME), Inter-Village Association for Development (Association inter villageoise de développement)-Bereye, Mother Source of Life (Mère source de vie), Association of Youth for Civic Education (Association des jeunes pour l’éducation citoyenne, AJEC), and Volunteers for Development (Volontaires au développement, VD). CSOs sometimes revise their strategic plans to increase the impact of their activities. Few CSOs develop strategies for renewing their memberships.

Statutory and regulatory texts and management tools help guide an organization’s operations and define the roles and responsibilities of members and staff. Organizational roles and responsibilities are not always respected in practice. Boards of directors typically adhere to majority rule in their decision making, although the statutes or internal regulations may specify alternative methods of decision making if some board members are not very involved. Narrative reports and financial statements are usually presented to CSOs’ general assemblies for approval. MDC/AT and the Ministry of the Interior, as supervisory authorities, sometimes remind CSOs to hold general assemblies. Some donors include measures to avoid conflicts of interest in their partnership agreements with CSOs. Since the government stated that it would like to sanction organizations that do not comply with legal requirements such as filing annual reports and paying taxes, CSO leaders have become more aware of their responsibilities and the need to ensure better internal structures and procedures.

Nigerien CSOs maintain paid staff in key positions provided they have project funding from donors. Some CSOs rely on interns and volunteers seeking professional experience. CSO members generally also work as volunteers. Larger CSOs usually have administrative manuals describing recruitment procedures, job descriptions, pay, benefits, and promotion and training opportunities and adhere to international standards for the relationship between employees and employers. Funded CSOs are able to obtain professional services from accountants, information technology managers, lawyers, and other specialists.

CSO resources are generally insufficient to purchase modern office equipment. Small and rural CSOs usually do not have computers. Access to the internet varies but is poor in remote areas or areas in which terrorists have damaged internet facilities. Many employees rely on their personal cell phones to connect to the internet. The high cost of internet services and insufficient means to recruit qualified staff limit the online presence of many organizations. Most CSOs do not have websites, and organizations with websites do not update them regularly. In 2021, because of the pandemic and insecurity, CSOs sought to develop their capacity to use internet-based communications. Some larger organizations were able to buy equipment and hold meetings using Zoom, Microsoft Teams, Skype, and WhatsApp.
CSOs’ financial viability improved slightly in 2021 as funding levels increased, according to data provided by MDC/AT and financial reports filed by CSOs.

Nigerien CSOs receive funding mainly from foreign donors such as the EU, UN agencies, and the governments of the United States, France, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. In 2021, donors’ interests mainly focused on the security sector, emergencies such as floods and other disasters, food security, and governance. Private funders such as Oxfam, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, and Rotary Foundation also provide support. Several large, highly visible Nigerien CSOs received requests to form consortia to apply for international tenders in 2021. For example, RAIL, Niger Organization of Innovative Educators (Organisation nigérienne des éducateurs novateurs, ONEN), AID Kookari, and the Local Development Support Committee (Comité d’appui au développement local, CADEL) formed a consortium that received funding from the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) for a project to reclaim degraded land and support local economic development in Tahoua-Tillabéri and Dosso. Other consortia newly formed in 2021 include a group formed by Contribution to Rural Development (Contribution au développement rural, CDR), Onderna, and Organization to Support the Emergence of Local Initiatives for the Environment and Sustainable Development (Organisation de soutien à l’emergence d’initiatives locales en matière d’environnement et développement durable, OSEILED), which received funding from MCC, as well as a group formed by GAP, CADEL, and CDR, which received funding from PASOC 3.

In 2021, some foreign funders redirected funding originally intended for CSOs to the government so that it could meet needs caused by the pandemic and the humanitarian and security crises. For example, the French Agency for Development redirected some funding to support regional and communal governments taking part in a COVID-related project in the Tillabéri area. Some donors conditioned grants on recipients’ ability to identify other sources of funding. In 2021, for a food security project in Dogondoutchi that required communities receiving donor funding to cover 50 percent of costs, CSOs advocated to help communities obtain funding from the central government after they were unable to mobilize funds on their own. RAIL then became the implementer of the project.

The government stopped awarding grants to CSOs in 2015, when it began to direct a larger proportion of its funding to managing the country’s insecurity. The government signs service contracts with CSOs working in areas such as health care, the environment, education, and water. Organizations with such agreements in 2021 included the National Federation of Disabled Persons (Fédération nationale des personnes handicapées, FNPH), Tamala, Alliance Niger Nature (ANN), Initiative for Green Development (Initiative pour un développement vert, ID Vert), Youth Gathering for the Rebirth of Niger (Rassemblement des jeunes pour la renaissance du Niger, RJRN), and Action for the Poor (Action en faveur des populations démunies, AFPD).

CSOs sometimes receive funding from the private sector for projects in health care, education, and social action. For example, in 2021, the Bank of Africa Foundation provided school kits to SOS Children’s Villages (SOS Villages d’enfants). Sports associations receive funding from corporate social responsibility programs for sporting activities.

Membership fees and annual dues are statutorily the primary source of funding for CSOs but in reality provide little income. Some organizations, such as the Dogondoutchi Sports Association (Association sportive de Dogondoutchi) and Niamey Natives Benevolent Association (Amicale des anciens de Niamey) mobilize resources from sporting and cultural events. Many CSOs solicit cash or in-kind contributions for development activities or emergency responses. For example, in 2021, SOS Children’s Villages sought funding for their activities from individuals and other CSOs. Act for the Mentally Ill (Agir pour les malades mentaux, AMAM) and Cercle-De organized in-kind and cash collections to support vulnerable people. CSOs in Niger do not have a tradition of online fundraising.
Most large CSOs, including Karkara, CADEL, ONEN, RAIL, and SOS–Civisme, generate income by marketing intellectual services or renting rooms and vehicles. For example, CADEL rents out its vehicles and Karkara leases part of its building to other CSOs. Some CSOs active in health care, education, and microfinance, such as SOS Cancer and SongES, are developing businesses that support their public services.

Rural CSOs commonly lack computers and use accounting ledgers to manage their funds. Larger and urban CSOs often use accounting software such as Sage, Tompro, or Success. National CSOs with sufficient funding, such as CADEL, Alternative Citizen Spaces (Alternative espaces citoyens, AEC), ONEN, and AID Kookari, have qualified financial management professionals on staff or outsource such services. The sector has access to professional financial consultants for external and internal audits and other services. Some donors require regular audits.

**ADVOCACY: 4.1**

Advocacy was slightly stronger in 2021 as CSOs enjoyed some success in their work on behalf of communities in conflict zones.

In 2021, CSOs met with government officials, including the president, and trade unions on the national level to help formulate public policy and search for ways to instill social calm. CSOs also relied on mechanisms such as the Ombudsman, National Commission for Human Rights, High Authority for Combating Corruption and Related Crimes, and the courts to ensure government accountability. For example, in 2021, CSOs went to the National Commission for Human Rights with questions about human rights violations committed by security forces in the Tillabéri region and to the High Authority for Combating Corruption and Related Crimes about concerns with the organization of baccalaureate exams. CNDH then conducted its own investigations, which confirmed abuses by the security forces. In insecure areas, such as Tillabéri, Tahoua, Diffa, Agadez, and Niamey, frameworks for peacebuilding promoted exchanges between local authorities and CSOs and CBOs.

The General Code of Territorial Communities obliges local public officials to be accountable to the public and create consultative frameworks to gather feedback on their activities. Meetings between local authorities and CSOs are generally formal, especially if they focus on developing governance tools such as communal development plans and budgets. Informal forms of consultation that allow citizens to monitor the management of public affairs are also developing. For example, in Agadez in 2021, the legality of a tax collection by the police and gendarmerie was debated in a WhatsApp group and subsequently clarified by the authorities, and in Tillabéri, the mayor refuted a rumor circulating on social media about the sale of public land.

The political divide between the ruling party and the opposition often hinders CSO advocacy, in part because some government actors do not appreciate CSOs’ efforts to encourage the transparency and accountability of, for example, institutions involved in military issues. However, in 2021, CSOs advocated unsuccessfully against the redeployment in Niger of Operation Barkane and the Takouba Task Force, two anti-insurgent efforts under French leadership aimed at managing insecurity in the Sahel. In Téra in November 2021, CSOs successfully pushed the government to open an investigation into the parties responsible for the death of three persons demonstrating against the presence of foreign forces, which are sometimes suspected of complicity with terrorists. CSOs’ advocacy and demonstrations against the presence of foreign forces led the government and the French army to provide compensation to the families of registered victims.

CSOs played an important role in the mitigation of measures related to the state of emergency in Diffa and Tillabéri regions in 2021. The insecurity and emergency measures taken by national and local authorities had slowed down critical activities by local populations, including bell-pepper cultivation, fishing on Lake Chad, medical evacuations, and the use of motorcycles by youth in income-generating activities. CSO advocacy resulted in the lifting of a ban on motorcycles, the re-opening of markets, and the return of internally displaced persons to their homes.
villages in conflict zones. TLP advocated for resilient strategies that would allow students to access education in the Tillabéri region, where schools were closed because of terrorist threats.

CSOs view the laws governing the sector as outdated and have repeatedly asked MDC/AT and the Ministry of the Interior for a meeting to discuss the legal reform of the sector. However, the sector made little effort to push for a meeting in 2021.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.3**

CSOs’ service provision was stable in 2021.

CSOs provide a range of essential services in many areas, with a particular focus on education, health care, environmental protection (especially the fight against desertification), and water and sanitation. The only areas in which CSOs have limited engagement is social housing, which they consider the government’s responsibility. In 2021, CSOs conducted awareness-raising activities to help in the fight against COVID-19.

Nigerien CSOs respond well to the needs of their communities. For example, in 2021, the Community Cohesion Program in Niger (PCCN) provided young people in the Tillabéri region with three-wheeled motorcycles to get around the government’s ban on two-wheeled vehicles during the state of emergency.

Groups of CSOs financed by the MCC helped recover degraded land and re-vegetate hillsides for the benefit of grazing livestock. CSOs generally align their activities with national, regional, and communal policies and plans, including communal development plans, which are usually developed with the participation of local communities and thus reflect their needs and priorities. CSOs also seek information about community needs through tenders, social networks, decentralized educational, health-care, environmental protection and water technical services, and consultations with the communities themselves.

The goods and services provided by CSOs are accessible to all without discrimination.

CSOs generally provide their services free of charge as most of their activities are financed by technical and financial partners and co-financers. Symbolic financial contributions or the contribution of labor may be solicited from beneficiaries on a case-by-case basis. Some CSOs generate income that they use for operating costs through services such as research, diagnostic tests, or room rentals. For example, the National Association for Family Well-Being (Association nationale pour le bien-être familial, ANBEF) offers fee-based services in its clinics and children’s health centers.

Public authorities recognize the value-added of CSOs in their activity reports, audits, and public forums. For example, in the report compiled annually by MDC/AT, central and local authorities highlight CSOs’ contributions to the implementation of their policies and plans.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.0**

The sectoral infrastructure was slightly strengthened in 2021 as CSOs worked together more effectively in consortia, networks, and intersectoral partnerships.

No resource centers serve CSOs in Niger. Intermediary support organizations (ISOs) serving CSOs include Oxfam, which helps incubate young CSOs; Peace Nexus, which equips CSOs with capacities to promote peace and social cohesion; and SongES, which provides capacity building in areas such as reproductive health, association governance, and aid to children in difficult situations. In 2021, the Sahel Human Voice in Governance Activity (SHIGA) project, which is funded by USAID, supported CSO incubator centers in Niamey, Maradi, and Zinder for
CSOs lacking offices, computers, and internet connections and also provided training and small grants. The EU’s PASOC 3 program also helped strengthen CSOs’ institutional capacity in 2021.

Local grantmaking institutions such as the Tattali Iyali Foundation of the former first lady bypass CSOs to work directly with beneficiary communities. No Nigerien foundations re-grant funds to local CSOs.

CSOs’ ability to form networks, coalitions, and platforms to work together on specific issues was notably stronger in 2021. CSOs have realized that they need to be better organized to present a united front or else be seen as second-tier players. Thus organizations working in sectors such as climate change, security, governance, health care, sustainable land management, education, extractive industries, and human rights have formed sector-specific networks in recent years, which chiefly help in the search for funds. Prominent groups include ROTAB and the Collective of Organizations for the Defense of Human Rights and Democracy (Collectif des Organisations de Défense des Droits de l’Homme et de la Démocratie, CODDHD). Both on their own and with prompting from international partners, CSOs have also formed consortia to apply for funding. For example, RAIL, CADEL, ONEN, and AID Kookari are in a consortium focused on environmental issues and agricultural development; CPI, RAIL, IKRA, DAI Global, Viamo, and AEC work together on local governance; and CADEL, GAP, and ONEN cooperate on migration.

Training is available to CSOs on subjects such as financial management, fundraising, volunteer management, target-group formation, advocacy, and internal governance. Training is generally offered by ISOs according to needs expressed by CSOs. Nigerien trainers are available in all subject areas. Training is provided in both Niamey and secondary cities, sometimes in local languages.

Nigerien CSOs are well aware that intersectoral collaborations help make their interventions more professional and seek to collaborate with the government, media, and private sector. In 2021, SOS Civisme worked on security issues with the High Authority for Peacebuilding, and RAIL cooperated on security issues with the National Center for Strategic Studies and the Defense and Security Commission of the National Assembly. Most CSOs rely on government technical services to monitor the quality of their work. CSOs such as CADEL, ONEN, Karkara, and RAIL sometimes call on private microfinance institutions to help pay workers on rural worksites through service contracts. They also work in partnership with private-service providers of rental vehicles and construction, public works, and other services. Media and CSOs complement each other’s efforts to raise awareness about important topics, such as security, education, health, and sanitation. For example, in 2021, the press groups Labari, RTT, and Canal 3 worked with TLP, Network of Journalists for Education (Réseau des journalistes pour éducation RENJED), and Network of Journalists for Water and Sanitation (Réseau des journalistes pour l’eau et l’assainissement, REJEA).

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.3

CSOs’ public image was unchanged in 2021.

The relationship between media and CSOs is mainly cordial. CSOs’ activities receive extensive coverage in traditional and, increasingly, online media. Private independent media are especially important partners for CSOs. For example, in 2021, private radio and television stations such as Labari and Bonferey covered the distribution of the 2020 CSO Sustainability Index report on Niger and the Network of Journalists for Peace (Réseaux des journalistes pour la paix, R-J-SPC) published the report on its site. Online press covering CSOs include Niamey Soir, Media Niger, Nigerien Press Agency, Tamtam Info, Actu Niger, and Diaspora Niger. Community media also give visibility to CSOs’ activities and services. Coverage can be free or paid depending on whether the activity is of public interest (which entails accessible, negotiable fees and sometimes no fee at all) or commercial (which is always paid).
The public appreciates CSOs’ efforts to develop communities, especially in insecure areas, where residents are aware that the government devotes most of its resources to security. In discussions with communities during project implementation, beneficiaries testify to their satisfaction with the various services provided by CSOs.

The central government appreciates some CSOs’ contribution to the implementation of its public policies. It often does not appreciate the questioning and denunciations of its activities by certain CSOs advocating for transparency and combating corruption, but with reservations will accept information that is critical of its performance. Central and local authorities trust CSOs’ expertise. For example, in 2021, the government called on organizations such as Plan Niger, Youth Movement for Development and Citizen Education (Mouvement des jeunes pour le développement et l’éducation citoyenne, MOJEDEC), and Association of Traditional Leaders of Niger (Association des chefs traditionnels du Niger, ACTCN) to relay information to communities about measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19.

The private sector tends to see CSOs as engaged in activities that complement its own work. For example, businesses have a favorable view of CSOs that give contracts to companies for projects such as building infrastructure for sanitation and schools, as they help create jobs that drive the local economy.

CSOs promote their public image through badges, banners, movable advertising boards, social networks, t-shirts, caps, and billboards. CSOs increasingly use social media such as Facebook to raise awareness among their target audiences.

No charters or other instruments govern CSO ethics and conduct. However, many CSOs establish rules of good governance and transparency through internal mechanisms such as procedural manuals and policies on gender, security, anti-corruption, and other topics. Well-established CSOs submit their annual narrative reports to MDC/AT and publish their financial statements in the official gazette.
Since its onset in early 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic has had many adverse effects in Nigeria, including an economic recession. In April 2021, as the pandemic was abating, the federal government initiated a phased easing of lockdown restrictions. By July, the country had undergone three waves of lockdown relaxation, and people could move about freely provided they adhered to pandemic protocols. As a result, in contrast to the situation in 2020, CSOs were able to conduct physical meetings and implement a wide range of activities beyond the distribution of pandemic-relief materials.

Nigeria’s political environment was relatively peaceful in 2021, although the police used force to disperse pockets of protest by rights activists and separatist groups. Rising insecurity and economic hardship prompted anti-government protests in June and October in many major cities, including Abuja, Lagos, Ibadan, and Benin. In July, the Yoruba Nation, a separatist group seeking independence for Yoruba State, protested in Lagos, prompting the police to arrest forty-eight members of the group. Forty-seven members of the group were subsequently released after more than three weeks in detention, and one was accused of murder and refused bail. On November 6, state elections were held in Anambra State without a major outbreak of violence, and a new governor was elected.

Following the #EndSARS protests in October 2020, which demanded an end to police brutality and the dissolution of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), the National Economic Council (NEC) directed states to set up panels of inquiry to investigate cases of police brutality and human rights abuse. Based on the reports submitted by the panels, the NEC recommended that the federal and state governments compensate victims of police brutality, prosecute indicted persons, and improve the efficiency of the Nigerian police force. The report of the Lagos State panel attracted special attention because of the killing of protesters at the Lekki Toll Gate on October 20, 2020. The panel found state security agencies culpable in the killing of eleven persons and made thirty-two recommendations, of which the state accepted only eleven. The state government rejected other recommendations outright or claimed that they dealt with federal issues and thus were outside the authority of the state, adding that the report was riddled with inconsistencies and a lack of evidence. The state government’s response was condemned by several CSOs, including the Human Rights Writers of Nigeria and Youth Rights Campaign.

Armed conflicts continued in the northeast in 2021 as the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) group continued to launch attacks on local communities. In March, ISWAP attacked the town of Dikwa, forcing aid workers to shelter in a bunker. In April, staff of the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Refugees had to evacuate Damasak in Borno State after an ISWAP attack. ISWAP’s attacks disrupted many CSO activities in the northeast region. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the agency’s work in
The region was disrupted by 1,157 security incidents in the first quarter of 2021 alone. In June, the leader of the Boko Haram terrorist group was killed in a clash between ISWAP and Boko Haram.

The leader of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), a separatist group in the southeast, was arrested out of the country and returned to Nigeria for trial on treasonable felony in June. Before and after his arrest, IPOB conducted violent attacks on police stations and personnel in the southeast and targeted assassinations of high-profile individuals. In the northcentral and northwest, armed gangs of bandits intensified their attacks on communities and kidnapped people for ransom. Between December 2020 and July 2021, gangs abducted more than 1,000 school children in northern Nigeria. In November, the federal government labeled the gangs operating in the region as terrorists. The federal government deployed security personnel to the troubled areas to confront the armed groups and to restore order.

Although the gross domestic product grew at a rate of 3.4 percent in 2021, according to the National Bureau of Statistics, the Nigerian economy continued to struggle. The inflation rate rose to over 15 percent, and the unemployment rate hovered above 33 percent. The huge deficit in social services amid the economic hardship continued to motivate CSOs to provide services in a wide range of sectors, including health care, education, economic development, and humanitarian relief.

Overall CSO sustainability in Nigeria improved slightly in 2021. Organizational capacity was moderately stronger as pandemic lockdowns were relaxed, allowing many CSOs to engage directly with their constituents, and a European Union (EU) capacity-building program improved the internal management of many organizations. CSOs’ financial viability improved slightly as the sector improved its fundraising capacity and financial management systems. Advocacy was moderately stronger as CSOs more effectively influenced government policies at the national and state levels. The infrastructure supporting the sector improved slightly with increased collaboration and networking among CSOs. More positive media coverage and increased public understanding of the concept of CSOs boosted the sector’s public image slightly. The legal environment deteriorated moderately as the government asserted more control over CSOs. Service provision did not change.

The CSO sector in Nigeria is diverse and in 2021 was estimated to include close to 600,000 organizations registered at different levels of government, compared to more than 500,000 organizations the previous year. Fewer than 100,000 CSOs were registered at the national level with the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC). It is difficult to gauge the number of CSOs registered at the state and local government levels since there is no central database. Many CSOs such as self-help groups operate in communities without registration.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.4**

The legal environment regulating CSO activities deteriorated moderately in 2021 as the amendments to the main law governing CSOs allowed the government to assert more control over the sector. In addition, several states required CSOs to register with state-level agencies, Twitter was banned, CSOs were harassed and intimidated, and fees and taxes were arbitrarily imposed.

The Company and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 2020 is the main law regulating CSO activities and operations at the national level. CAMA 2020 replaced CAMA 1990 and came into force on January 1, 2021. Among other provisions, the new act authorizes the state to withdraw or revoke CSO certificates arbitrarily; puts an additional reporting burden on CSOs; authorizes excessive interference by the CAC in the affairs and management of CSOs; permits warrantless searches of CSO premises; and empowers the CAC, without adequate findings or due process, to order the involuntary merger and dissolution of CSOs holding “dormant” bank accounts. In 2021, CSOs continued to resist the act and called for certain sections to be amended, especially Section 839 of Part F, which seeks to restrict CSO operations by providing for the arbitrary suspension of trustees and the appointment
of interim managers. Many CSOs were strongly critical of sections of Part F, believing that they allow the government to arbitrarily control and dissolve CSOs that it deems hostile to its agenda.

Under CAMA 2020, national-level CSOs are still required to register with the CAC. Foreign CSOs register with both the CAC and the National Planning Commission. Unlike in 2020, when the pandemic lockdown disrupted the CAC’s operations, thereby preventing some new CSOs from registering, in 2021, CSOs could access CAC services and register online with ease.

As in previous years, some government ministries, such as the federal Ministry of Women Affairs, required CSOs to register with them regardless of CAC registration. In a new trend emerging in 2021, several states, including Lagos, Jigawa, and Kwara, required CSOs to register with state-level agencies to operate in certain sectors and communities. For example, in Lagos State, CSOs working with the state’s ministries of women affairs and youth and social development were required to register with those ministries and pay fees of NGN 20,000 and NGN 70,000 (approximately $48 and $170), respectively. These CSOs must also renew their registration annually with the Lagos State Ministry of Youth and Social Development for a fee of NGN 45,000 (approximately $110). In Jigawa State, CSOs intending to implement projects at the local level were required to register with the local government and pay a fee of NGN 3,500 (approximately $8).

CSOs considered several government actions at the national level in 2021 as attempts to close civic space and stifle their operations. In June, the national government banned Twitter, which many CSOs use for advocacy purposes. The ban was introduced after Twitter deleted tweets by President Muhammadu Buhari criticizing IPOB’s violent attacks on government infrastructure, which Twitter viewed as violating its policy against hate speech. Twitter later deleted the president’s account. The Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) and 176 Nigerians filed a lawsuit with the court of Economic Community of West African States demanding that the government lift the ban, which finally happened in January 2022.

In 2021, the National Assembly introduced two new bills—the Bill for an Act to Amend the Nigerian Press Council Act and the Nigerian Broadcasting Commission (NBC) Amendment Bill—to further regulate the media in Nigeria. If passed into law, the Press Council Bill will empower the government to appoint the majority of board members of the Nigerian Press Council, opening the door to government control of the media. The NBC Bill seeks to extend the commission’s authority to online media, which could limit freedom of expression on the internet. The CSO sector, led by Media Rights Agenda, vehemently opposed the bills, which led to their suspension.

Government harassment of CSO activists and journalists continued in 2021. On June 12, the police arrested a journalist covering an anti-government protest in Lagos commemorating the 1993 elections. The journalist was later released. In July, the Department of State Security (DSS) arrested and detained five activists for twenty-nine days for wearing t-shirts with the inscription #BuhariMustGo. In September, the police used tear gas to disrupt a procession in Abuja by the Islamic Movement of Nigeria, and eight persons were allegedly killed. In October, the police assaulted protesters and used tear gas to disperse anti-government protests in Abuja, Benin, Ibadan, and Lagos. In December, the DSS raided the office of the Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Center (CISLAC) in Abuja. It was alleged that the state was not comfortable with CISLAC’s involvement in the 2021 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, which gave Nigeria a low ranking of 154 out of 180 countries.

The Finance Act 2020 came into effect on January 1, 2021. Under the new law, CSOs are still exempted from income tax on activities that are not profit-oriented. CSOs are required to pay value-added tax (VAT) on goods and services except those that are exclusively for donor-funded humanitarian projects. Because of their erroneous interpretation of the laws, governments at all levels continued in 2021 to demand that CSOs pay taxes on items that should be tax-exempt. For example, the Federal Inland Revenue Services requested that the Women Environmental Program (WEP) pay VAT that it had deducted from its contracts with other CSOs. The Borno State government also insisted that CSOs pay VAT. An amendment to the Finance Act 2020, which was signed into law on December 31, 2021, and will take effect on January 1, 2022, makes public educational institutions liable for income tax.

CSOs are legally allowed to earn income from the provision of goods and services, engage in fundraising campaigns, and compete for government contracts. CSOs may receive funds from foreign sources but must register with the Special Control Unit against Money Laundering (SCUML) to prevent terrorism financing. Few CSOs have registered with SCUML, mainly because of poor enforcement and the lack of information about registration procedures. The chief executive officer of the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit said in September
that many local CSOs do not register, report, or comply with SCUML and only sixty-four CSOs, most of them international organizations, had submitted reports to SCUML between January and August 2021.

Young and energetic lawyers continued to participate in and provide legal services to the CSO sector in 2021. CSOs in major cities also enjoyed pro bono legal services from the Legal Aid Council and several human rights organizations, including Lawyers Alert, Human Rights Law Service, and the Legal Defense and Assistance Project.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.6**

CSOs’ organizational capacity improved moderately in 2021 as pandemic lockdowns were relaxed, allowing many CSOs to engage directly with their constituents while they increased their use of technology in their work. In addition, the EU’s Agents for Citizen-Driven Transformation (EU-ACT) program, launched in 2019 and implemented by the British Council in partnership with the Nigeria Network of NGOs (NNNGO), strengthened many CSOs’ capabilities in project-cycle management, financial control and management, internal management systems, fundraising, and strategic planning. The program contributed significantly to improving the internal management of Nigerian CSOs in 2021. USAID’s $32.9 million Strengthening Civic Advocacy and Local Engagement (SCALE) program, which was launched in October 2020, also aims to strengthen the financial, management, and advocacy capacity of CSOs and business membership organizations.

CSOs usually have cordial relationship with their constituents and ensure that their activities are in line with beneficiaries’ needs. With the easing of pandemic restrictions in 2021, many CSOs resumed face-to-face engagements with their constituents. For example, YIAGA Africa trained observers in Anambra to observe the state’s election in November and, with the Independent National Electoral Commission, engaged youth in Anambra State on voter mobilization. In November and December, many CSOs, including the Tabitha Cumi Foundation, organized in-person events to mark Sixteen Days of Activism against Gender-based Violence.

Capacity-development training from donor-funded programs such as EU-ACT helped CSOs engage more effectively with their constituents through participatory approaches and other means. The Comfort Literacy Intervention and Capacity Enhancement Foundation in Lagos now integrates gender and social inclusion in its programming, and the Youth and Environmental Development Association in Kano uses inclusive approaches to target beneficiaries of its youth empowerment program. The New Century Initiative (NCI) in Enugu uses social media and other digital platforms to amplify the voice of youth and encourage them to participate in the development of their communities. In a practice that has yet to become widespread, CSOs such as the Justice Development and Peace Commission in Edo State and the Kano Civil Society Forum, which has more than eighty members, started to maintain databases of direct beneficiaries of their projects in 2021.

With the support of donor-funded programs and the relaxation of lockdown restrictions in 2021, CSOs’ ability to use their missions and strategic plans to guide their work improved slightly as they resumed project implementation. For example, in Edo State, EU-ACT trained and mentored sixteen CSOs as they developed strategic plans following organizational capacity assessments conducted under the program in 2020. ActionAid Nigeria resumed its training on strategic planning for community-based organizations (CBOs) in Enugu after putting these activities on hold in 2020.

With EU-ACT support, many CSOs developed internal policies to guide their work. For example, the Kano Civil Society Forum developed an anti-fraud policy after taking part in the program. Only large CSOs maintain active boards. While smaller organizations increasingly recognize the need to mobilize their boards, they lack the resources to maintain them, and their boards usually exist on paper only. CSOs generally take active steps to avoid conflicts of interest in line with donor guidelines.
Many CSOs maintained professional personnel practices in 2021, such as human resource policies, job descriptions, and contracts. However, the sector continued to feel the effect of inactivity and dwindling funding during the pandemic as organizations struggled to pay staff salaries and suffered high rates of staff attrition.

Large CSOs in major cities continued to have modern office equipment such as computers, a luxury that many rural CSOs cannot afford. The technical capacity of the CSO sector improved slightly in 2021 as more organizations adopted digital technologies for their work. For example, NCI used social media platforms to encourage youth to participate in community development in Enugu. The Educational Cooperation Society, Lagos State Civil Society Partnership, and Women Arise began to use mobile apps for data collection following an EU-ACT training on data literacy in May. Other CSOs continued to use social media platforms such as Facebook, WhatsApp, LinkedIn, Twitter, and Microsoft Teams. CBOs in rural settings were seen to participate more often in online trainings using their cell phones. Cybersecurity has yet to become a common issue among CSOs in Nigeria.

CSOs’ financial viability improved slightly in 2021 as CSOs were able to access funding and implement projects after pandemic-induced inactivity for most of 2020. The sector also improved its fundraising capacity and financial management systems, thanks largely to the support of donor-funded programs such as EU-ACT and USAID’s SCALE program.

CSOs continue to depend largely on foreign donors. In 2021, they received support from a diverse range of donors, including USAID, the United Kingdom’s (UK) Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office, EU, and MacArthur Foundation. However, foreign support to the CSO sector in Nigeria is gradually shrinking. For example, available data show a slight decline in US aid to Nigeria in 2021, despite the launch of the SCALE project in October 2020. The top three sectors receiving support from the United States in 2021 were humanitarian assistance, health care, and program support. Aid from the UK dropped as well, from GBP 237.3 million in 2020–21 (approximately $327.5) to GBP 112.3 million (approximately $155.6) in 2021–22. EU-ACT gave small grants to several CSOs across its focal states in 2021. The Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA) closed its office in Nigeria in 2021. Although OSIWA will continue to provide funding to Nigerian CSOs, the competition for grants is expected to become more intense.

Thanks to EU-ACT, more CSOs became more proficient at raising funds in 2021. In April, after EU-ACT provided training on fundraising to twenty-two CSOs in Kano, these organizations adopted a diverse range of funding approaches. CSOs that were able to access small grants after attending training included Smile Africa International Youth Development Initiative, based in Edo State, which accessed $20,000 from the Sankofa Initiative of West Africa; Justice Development Peace and Caritas Initiative in Edo State, which received EUR 116,000 (approximately $130,000) from Expertise France; New Century Initiative, which received a grant from the Voice Global Fund; and the Center for Advocacy in Gender and Social Inclusion (CAGSI), which was awarded a small grant from Search for Common Ground.

CSOs continued to work with governments at different levels to provide pandemic-related services in 2021. For example, Connected Development (CODE) continued to monitor the distribution of pandemic relief materials and cash. CSOs also received contracts from the government to provide services. The governments of Ekiti and Rivers states, for example, engaged the Society for Water and Sanitation to provide water sources and create awareness to end open defecation; the Lagos State government engaged the Freedom Foundation to rehabilitate communities struggling with addiction to alcohol and hard drugs; and the Enugu State Ministry of Gender and Social Development contracted Women’s Aid Collective to provide services such as legal and medical aid and food to the victims of gender-based violence. However, income from government contracts continued to be marginal compared to other sources of revenue for the sector.
There was a slight improvement in local support in 2021. The Tony Elumelu Foundation gave out $24.75 million in grants in 2021, mostly to entrepreneurs, and the Dangote Foundation disbursed NGN 3.9 billion (approximately $780,000) to youth and women in eleven states. The Aspire Coronation Trust Foundation gave out grants to twenty-five CSOs working in health care, environment, entrepreneurship, and other sectors.

CSOs increasingly engaged in crowdfunding to raise funds in 2021. Membership organizations, such as the Academic Staff Union of Universities and the Nigerian Medical Association (NMA), continued to fund their operations by collecting monthly dues from their members. Following the easing of pandemic lockdowns, CSOs were able to again earn income from social enterprises and the marketing of services and products. However, revenue from these sources was minimal compared to income from foreign partners.

Large CSOs continued to maintain sound financial management systems in 2021. Smaller and rural CSOs have started to embrace better practices thanks to donor-funded programs such as EU-ACT and SCALE and the efforts of large organizations such as ActionAid Nigeria. For example, WURO Development Concerns Nigeria developed asset registers, inventory forms, and worksheet templates and its staff gained improved knowledge of accounting procedures and the effective management of petty cash. Many CSOs found it difficult to hire or maintain highly skilled financial management staff in 2021. Large CSOs continued to produce and publish annual reports with financial statements.

**ADVOCACY: 2.6**

CSOs’ advocacy improved moderately in 2021 as CSOs more effectively influenced government policies at the national and state levels.

CSOs continued to collaborate with the government at all levels in 2021. At the national level, CODE and several other CSOs worked with the federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management, and Social Development on pandemic-related activities. In Jigawa State, the state house of assembly worked closely with the Jigawa Civil Society Forum to pass the Child Rights Protection Bill, to which the state governor assented.

CSOs participated in public hearings on appropriation bills and other legislation at the national and state levels. The Open Government Partnership continued to enhance government-CSO collaboration and communication, especially in the budgetary process. For example, the Jigawa Civil Society Forum participated actively in the state’s budgetary process by identifying priority areas for inclusion. Several CSOs, such as CODE and BudgIT, continued to use websites and social media platforms to ensure public access to information.

CSOs accomplished many advocacy successes at both the national and state levels in 2021. At the national level, advocacy by WEP and other organizations helped ensure enactment of the Climate Change Act 2021, which seeks to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and mainstream a concern for climate change into national plans and programs. As a result of efforts by the Center for Leadership, Strategy, and Development (Center LSD), CISSLAC, and other CSOs, the president assented to the long-awaited Petroleum Industry Act 2021, which seeks to provide a legal, governance, and fiscal framework for the Nigerian petroleum industry and provide for the development of oil-producing communities in the Niger-Delta region. However, CSOs’ efforts to influence the president to assent to the Electoral Act (Amendment) Bill 2021 were less successful, and the president vetoed the bill on the grounds that political parties should decide their own method of holding party primaries rather than direct primaries as contained in the bill. (The president eventually assented to the bill in 2022 after it was amended by the National Assembly). CSOs led by CODE unsuccessfully pushed for the president to assent to the Federal Audit Service Commission Bill 2021, which seeks to strengthen the Office of the Auditor General of the Federation to curb corruption in public service. CSOs also monitored government distribution of relief materials while urging the government to be transparent and accountable in its disbursement of COVID-19 donations.
At the state level, CSO advocacy led to the enactment of audit laws to ensure accountability and transparency in the use of public resources in Edo and Kaduna states. In Kogi and Nassarawa states, WEP successfully pushed for the enactment of the Youth Development Act. In Adamawa, Borno, and Kwara states, the Violence Against Persons (Prohibition) Act and Child Rights Acts were adopted thanks to advocacy by the Good Governance Team, Global Peace Initiative, and other organizations. The Jigawa Civil Society Forum influenced the government’s adoption of the Child Rights Act and enactment of the Human Rights Protection Act. In Nasarawa State, Global Peace Initiative and ActionAid Nigeria persuaded the state government to adopt UN Resolution 2250 on youth participation in peace building and to initiate the Youth Development Commission Bill, which was read for the second time in the state House of Assembly in 2021. Other advocacy successes at the state level included WEP’s efforts to ensure the initiation of the Youth Development Bill in Benue State. BudgIT provided state-by-state information on COVID-19 donations and urged citizens to hold the government accountable for its disbursement of these funds.

Among lobbying successes in 2021, efforts by Media Right Agenda, Center for Media Law and Advocacy, and other CSOs led to the suspension of the proposed Bill for an Act to Amend the Nigerian Press Council Act and the NBC Amendment Bill. If passed into law, both bills would have strengthened government control of the media sector, thereby potentially restricting individuals’ freedom of expression.

CSOs fought government regulations that could stifle their operations in 2021. In April, YIAGA Africa and other CSOs organized a stakeholder roundtable discussion on CAMA 2020 geared toward initiating an advocacy process to amend Part F of the act, which CSOs believe is overly restrictive. As a result of their efforts, the process of amending the act started in late 2021 and continued into 2022.

SERVICE PROVISION: 3.6

Service provision in the CSO sector was unchanged in 2021.

CSOs gradually began to deliver in-person services again as pandemic restrictions relaxed in 2021. CSOs typically provide a diverse range of services in sectors such as health care, the environment, education, economic development, humanitarian relief, and governance. In 2021, Global Peace Initiative provided solar-powered boreholes to communities and constructed blocks of classrooms in Nasarawa State. WEP, through its Global Community Engagement project, provided solar panels and computers to communities in Benue State. The Society for Water and Sanitation, a coalition of CSOs, facilitated the provision of water facilities to communities in Ekiti, Rivers, and Adamawa states and collaborated with the governments of Ekiti and Rivers states to provide public toilets and other facilities.

The goods and services that CSOs provided in 2021 continued to reflect the needs of their constituents and communities. Services are usually provided in response to community demands or CSOs’ own awareness of community needs. For example, the Society for Water and Sanitation provided safe drinking water in Adamawa State after an outbreak of cholera in some communities. Center LSD distributed exercise books, school bags, and sandals to schoolgirls in Adamawa State. Teach for Nigeria, a Lagos-based CSO, had to double its number of volunteer teachers in 2021 as a result of increased demand from schools. In some areas, CSO services were constrained by insecurity. For example, in the northwest and northeast, aid workers were unable to work in schools that were closed because of attacks by armed groups. In Borno State, an attack on aid facilities by terrorists resulted in a halt in activities and the evacuation of aid workers from the Norwegian Refugee Council. Responding to a new challenge, the Civil Society Action Coalition on Education for All trained teachers on providing psychosocial support to girls after the government closed down schools for eight months because of the pandemic.
CSOs typically provide services in a non-discriminatory manner and to communities beyond their members. For example, in 2021, NMA provided free medical services to communities, and the Society for Water and Sanitation provided water and raised awareness about personal hygiene to curb the spread of cholera in Adamawa State.

CSOs are legally permitted to earn income from the provision of goods and services. But since their activities are largely donor-funded, most organizations give little or no consideration to cost recovery. A few CSOs generate income by operating social enterprises that provide services for a fee. BudgIT, for example, provides paid infographic and other services.

The government at all levels continued to express gratitude for CSOs’ contributions to service provision in 2021. The level of appreciation varies from state to state. For example, the Lagos State Ministry of Education commended Prince Decson Savechild Life Foundation on its campaign against drug abuse, crime, and HIV/AIDS in schools, and the Delta State government commended and pledged to collaborate with the Fight Against Desert Encroachment on its tree-planting campaign. But in some areas, local authorities do not appreciate CSOs because they believe that their activities expose the government’s inefficiency in addressing community needs and thus threaten its legitimacy. In Borno State, the government threatened to close down camps for internally displaced peoples (IDPs) after accusing CSOs of promoting the sexual assault of inhabitants and failing to keep the camps clean.

### SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.6

CSOs’ sectoral infrastructure improved slightly in 2021. Collaboration and network building among CSOs intensified as pandemic restrictions were relaxed.

Resource centers and intermediary support organizations (ISOs) provided services online and in person in 2021. The number of in-person services increased as lockdown measures eased. Center LSD, for example, provided both online and in-person leadership and strategy trainings for a fee. Other resource centers providing services and facilitating information sharing included the Center for Democracy and Development (CDD) in Abuja and the Aminu Kano Center for Democratic Studies in Kano. The services provided by resource centers and ISOs generally meet the need of CSOs, although small rural-based CSOs usually cannot afford to pay their cost. Resource centers and ISOs earn revenue that covers a portion of their operating costs, but the amount is minimal compared to their foreign sources of support.

Local foundations that continued to support CSOs in 2021 included the Dangote Foundation, Cuppy Foundation, Tony Elumelu Foundation, and TY Danjuma Foundation. Large CSOs such as WEP continued to subgrant internationally raised funds to CBOs in rural communities.

Existing CSO coalitions continued to facilitate information sharing and capacity building in 2021. Major coalitions include NNNGO, Kano Civil Society Forum, and Jigawa Civil Society Forum. In November, the Conference of Northern States CSOs was formed to facilitate collaboration among CSOs and with the government. EU-ACT encourages CSOs to form coalitions to implement program activities, and the EU generally encourages CSOs to form consortiums when applying for grants. This requirement contributed to the emergence of many loose coalitions in 2021, which facilitated information sharing in the sector. A few coalitions, including NNNGO and Kano Civil Society Forum, were beneficiaries of the EU-ACT program and rolled out capacity-development training to their members in 2021.

Training opportunities for CSOs across the country increased in 2021 thanks to EU-ACT, which offered training in a wide range of topics, including fundraising, financial management systems, media and communications, and proposal writing. Other organizations providing training included Center LSD, which offered training services on leadership and strategy; ActionAid Nigeria, which trained CBOs in Enugu on strategic planning; WEP, which
trained CBOs on project and financial management; and NNNGO, which offered training in nonprofit management in Abuja, Ibadan, and Port Harcourt. The SCALE program as well as international organizations such as British Council also provided training on a wide range of issues, including fundraising and financial management. In addition to virtual training, donor-funded programs and large CSOs were able to organize in-person training as they were no longer restricted by lockdowns. Most training materials are in English.

CSOs continued to partner with the government at all levels, as well as media and the private sector, in 2021. For example, the Jigawa CSO Forum worked closely with the state government to create awareness about adoption of the Child Rights Act. The Royal Healthcare Foundation worked with the Enugu State Agency for Universal Health Coverage to coordinate a CSO-media advocacy partnership to press for universal health coverage in the state.

CSOs also partner frequently with the media and private sectors. For example, the Media Rights Agenda and other organizations collaborated with the media to resist the Bill for an Act to Amend the Nigerian Press Council Act and the NBC Amendment Bill. In training and experience-sharing sessions facilitated by EU-ACT, many media organizations, including the Nigerian Television Authority, News Agency of Nigeria, Africa Independent Television, and Leadership newspaper, conferred with CSOs from Kano, Sokoto, and Lagos to devise ways to work together. Similar sessions were held in Adamawa, Rivers, and Edo. Coca-Cola partnered with Karis and Eleos Hand of Hope Foundation on their women’s empowerment program, and Sterling Bank Plc, in partnership with Sterling One Foundation and NNNGO, launched free banking services for CSOs working to attain the UN Sustainable Development Goals. The Lagos Food Bank partnered with Union Bank to distribute food items to indigent and vulnerable people in the community of Mushin of Lagos State.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.6**

CSOs’ public image improved slightly in 2021 as CSOs enjoyed more positive media coverage and public understanding of the concept of CSOs improved.

Traditional media, both private and public, cover CSO activities positively. A few private media organizations have issue-specific programs and columns to which CSO practitioners are invited to offer expert analysis. For example, WEP’s activities on the environment were featured on Channels TV’s environment program in 2021, and the Center for Gender Economics contributed to Vanguard’s “Women Own” column. CSOs in Jigawa State came up with a new approach to disseminating information at no cost by calling into live radio programs to air their views and pass on information to the public. Although traditional media continued to cover CSOs’ activities positively, a few media organizations, especially publicly owned outlets, sometimes demanded money to cover them.

As a result of CSOs’ services and advocacy, the public’s perception of the sector is generally positive. There is growing understanding of the concept of CSOs, although some of the public still view them as avenues for making easy money. Because of the huge deficit in government services, especially in rural communities, many people look to CSOs to fill the gap. CSOs’ responsiveness to their needs has endeared the sector to many communities.

The federal government holds CSOs in high regard if they support its programs and policies and tends to reject organizations that criticize it. For example, it was alleged that the DSS invasion of CISLAC’s Abuja office was a response to CISLAC’s involvement in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index that gave Nigeria a low ranking in 2021. Many state governments, including in Ekiti, Kwara, and Lagos, have positive perceptions of CSOs. However, the Borno State government continued to treat international CSOs with suspicion in 2021 and threatened to close down CSO-run camps for IDPs. A few state and local government authorities appear to be apprehensive of CSOs, believing that they usurp government responsibilities in service provision and thereby delegitimize the authorities.
The private sector views CSOs largely in a positive light and readily works with them on activities of joint interest. For example, Union Bank cooperated with the Lagos Food Bank to distribute food items in communities in 2021.

CSOs across the country continued to use both traditional and online media platforms to create awareness of their activities in 2021. YIAGA Africa, CDD, and Center LSD, for example, effectively engaged with radio and television media to disseminate information about their activities. In 2021, EU-ACT trained CSOs on strategic communication, media engagement, and the use of innovative technologies and media partnerships to promote their work. As a result of this training, CSOs such as the Kano Civil Society Forum developed action plans to strengthen their media partnerships, and organizations in several other states engaged the media to raise awareness of their work or issues.

Several efforts to institute a self-regulatory framework for CSOs in Nigeria commenced in 2021. Palladium and NNNGO trained CSOs on self-regulation and internal accountability mechanisms. In collaboration with USAID’s SCALE project, EU-ACT organized an event in May for CSOs from across the country to discuss the need for a self-regulatory framework for the sector, which would include a code of conduct, standards of operation, and information services. This initiative also contributed significantly to networking and information sharing among CSOs. Large CSOs continued to publish their annual reports on their websites, and other CSOs, with donor encouragement, recognize the need to publish their annual reports as an indication of transparency and accountability.
In October and November 2021, Rwanda conducted elections for 340,000 seats in local government. The elections had been originally scheduled for February 2020 but were delayed because of the pandemic. Women constituted at least 30 percent of all candidates from village- to district-level councils, in accordance with elections guidelines. The voting was conducted in strict compliance with pandemic protocols, the National Electoral Commission reported. Rwandan CSO took part as elections observers. More than 60 percent of officials elected were women.

The government continued its anti-corruption campaign in 2021. Measures to limit corruption included the dismissal and prosecution of officials suspected of malpractice. Rwanda’s Office of the Ombudsman launched investigations following the publication of a report by Transparency International–Rwanda (TI–RW) alleging corruption in public procurement and the infrastructure sector.

The COVID-19 pandemic peaked in Rwanda in 2021. The rate of infections and fatalities climbed early in the year and surged again in July. Strict containment measures in effect for most of the year included a ban on social gatherings, a nighttime curfew, a ban on travel in and out of Kigali, and mandatory face masks in public. Withholding information related to contact tracing or COVID-19 symptoms was a punishable offense. During the third wave of the pandemic in July, the government imposed a total lockdown in Kigali and elsewhere, which lasted until August. CSOs expressed reservations about the strict measures and their enforcement. In early March 2021, the government launched a vaccination campaign after receiving its first batch of vaccines from the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access facility. By the end of the year, some 40 percent of the population had been fully vaccinated against COVID-19, according to the Ministry of Health.

The long-time government critic Paul Rusesabagina, who was arrested in 2020, was convicted and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison on eight terrorism-related charges in September 2021. Several digital media practitioners were also convicted and sentenced to prison in 2021. For example, an owner of a tabloid website and YouTube television channel was sentenced to seven years on charges including forgery and the humiliation of national authorities. Another tabloid website and YouTube television channel owner was arrested and charged with disseminating false information and misleading citizens. In September, a social commentator, Yvonne Idamange, who in February had posted videos on YouTube criticizing the government’s COVID-19 response, was found guilty on six counts, including inciting an insurrection, denigrating genocide commemorations, and spreading rumors. Idamange was sentenced to fifteen years in prison. Two bloggers were arrested for giving out food relief and organizing gatherings without prior authorization, thereby violating pandemic lockdown restrictions. They were later released. Journalists working for Voice of America, The New Times, The East African, and Bloomberg
News were briefly detained for breaching lockdown and traffic rules. The National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR) determined that these arrests resulted from violations of pandemic restrictions and did not constitute violations of the individuals’ right to freedom of expression.

The Rwandan economy grew at a rate of 11.1 percent in the first nine months of 2021 after contracting in 2020, according to the World Bank. During the same period, unemployment surged, especially among women. In response to the severe economic impact of the pandemic, the government adopted an Economic Recovery Plan that emphasized support to businesses and households to boost employment and economic growth. In March 2021, the government launched the Economic Recovery Fund to help businesses severely affected by the pandemic recover. The fund had an initial investment of RWF 100 billion (approximately $100 million).

The overall sustainability of Rwandan civil society was stable in 2021. CSOs’ organizational capacity declined moderately as lockdown restrictions prevented many organizations from reaching their constituents. CSOs’ financial viability was slightly worse as donors redirected funding and access alternative sources of income declined because of pandemic-related restrictions. CSO advocacy deteriorated slightly as the pandemic restrictions undercut community engagement and reduced the volume of advocacy activity. Service provision deteriorated slightly as restrictions on movement prevented many organizations from reaching beneficiaries with needed services. The sectoral infrastructure was slightly weakened by a lack of training opportunities and irregular access to resource centers. Civil society’s public image improved moderately as the public increasingly approved of the sector provision of services during the pandemic. The legal environment did not change.

According to Rwanda Governance Board (RGB), 1,881 domestic CSOs, 771 faith-based organizations (FBOs), and 189 international CSOs had legal status in 2021. During the year, RGB issued final operating certificates to 112 domestic CSOs and 24 FBOs and temporary certificates to 205 organizations; registered 16 international CSOs and extended the operating permits of 166 international CSOs; and returned 560 applications for more information.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.9**

The legal environment for CSOs did not change in 2021. CSOs are governed by Law No. 04/2012 on domestic non-governmental organizations (the NGO Law) and Law No. 05/2012 on international organizations. A CSO seeking to register must submit a request to RGB along with numerous other documents, including notarized statutes, a letter issued by the authorities of the district in which the organization will operate, an annual action plan detailing activities and beneficiaries, a budget identifying the funding sources, and proof of payment of a non-refundable fee of RWF 100,000 (approximately $100). District authorities are often reluctant to issue collaboration letters and may delay issuance or produce letters that are incomplete. The requirement for budgets and lists of donors can hinder registration as organizations normally start to mobilize resources only after registration is completed. International CSOs must submit detailed information about their implementation schedules, cost estimates, and the local partners that will continue their activities once their work is completed.

New laws to govern domestic and international CSOs did not progress in 2021. In 2019, CSOs submitted a position paper that effectively prevented the government from introducing draft revisions of the laws, which they feared would restrict CSO operations more than the original 2012 laws.

Other than the sentencing of media activists, no specific state harassment of civil society groups is known to have occurred in 2021.

CSOs in Rwanda are subject to all taxes imposed by the Rwanda Revenue Authority and rarely qualify for tax exemptions.
Under Article 4 of the NGO Law, CSOs may conduct income-generating activities provided they abide by the laws governing registration and commercial activities and use any profits to realize their organizational objectives. While CSOs may bid on government contracts, they often lack the capacity to do so. The law allows for CSOs to engage in fundraising and operate social enterprises.

Few lawyers specialize in legal services for CSOs. Organizations may procure the services of private legal practitioners but their fees are usually unaffordable. CSOs such as the Legal Aid Forum (LAF), Great Lakes Initiative for Human Rights and Development (GLIHD)–Rwanda, TI–RW and Collective of Leagues and Associations for the Defense of Human Rights in Rwanda (CLADHO) employ lawyers as senior managers or technical staff, although their expertise is largely in fields such as public policy and human rights. Some of these organizations have offered training to lawyers on key issues facing the sector, including media law, public interest litigation, and the invocation during court proceedings of international legal instruments that Rwanda has ratified.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.1**

CSOs’ organizational capacity declined moderately in 2021 as lockdown restrictions prevented many organizations from reaching their constituents.

Many organizations found it difficult to interact with constituencies in 2021. Some CSOs, including Ihorere Munyarwanda Organization (IMRO), which advocates for the rights of female sex workers, Tubibe Amahoro, which provides legal aid in rural Rwanda, and Rwanda Women’s Network (RWN), which runs safe spaces for victims of sexual and gender-based violence, secured collaboration letters from district officials that allowed them to reach out to beneficiaries for service delivery and advocacy. But other organizations, such as the Network for the Development of Impoverished Women (Reseau de développement des femmes pauvres, RDFP), found it difficult to secure permission to access rural areas where they intended to work with vulnerable groups. Although the organizations had collaboration letters from district officials, they were not allowed to work in some areas because of pandemic restrictions. Activities also reduced at some organizations because of donors’ suspension of funding due to the pandemic. In addition, during lockdowns, constituents were often unable to reach locations where services were provided, as any movement required advance clearance. Although the forms for requesting clearance were posted online, but most of the population does not own smart phones.

Experiences such as this caused direct contact between CSOs and their beneficiaries to greatly reduce in 2021. During the strict lockdown, in-person workshops and meetings were prohibited, forcing organizations to rely instead on virtual communications, which they continued to do during periods in which pandemic-related restrictions were eased. For smaller CSOs and organizations working in remote areas, the virtual platforms were a poor substitute for in-person meetings, as their beneficiaries often lacked access to needed devices and internet services in rural areas are limited. Smaller CSOs without access to the internet continued to rely mainly on mobile telephones and messaging apps to communicate with their beneficiaries and were less likely to maintain normal levels of communication.

At some Rwandan CSOs, including Amahoro Human Respect and IMRO, implementation plans were disrupted because of the pandemic. For example, IMRO had planned to conduct advocacy activities related to the change of legal environment for sex workers but switched to service provision such as food distribution after many of the female sex workers who are their main constituents were hit hard by the pandemic.

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The score for Organizational Capacity was recalibrated in 2018 to better reflect the situation on the ground and align it with other scores in the region. The score did not reflect a change in organizational capacity, which in 2018 remained largely the same as in 2017.
CSO boards have the primary responsibility of raising funds for their organizations. In 2021, board members at some organizations worked with management to mobilize funds, especially for the pandemic response. However, the boards of young and new organizations do not always play an active role in resource mobilization. Although some CSOs have clearly defined missions and procedures to guide their day-to-day management, they are often unable to document their activities effectively.

A decline in resources continued to contribute to a shortage of skilled human resources at Rwandan CSOs in 2021. After donors suspended some projects because of the pandemic, organizations were sometime unable to pay their staff. Most organizations depend on grants with fixed timeframes, which makes it difficult to recruit and retain highly qualified professionals. Most organizational development and capacity-building activities, including staff training, were put on hold in 2021 because of the pandemic.

Most CSO offices in Rwanda lack essential equipment and reliable internet. The scarcity of funding in 2021 undermined CSOs’ ability to meet costs such as salaries, rent, and maintenance fees. CSOs continued to embrace digital communications, and most larger organizations held online meetings with beneficiaries, donors, and government officials via MS Teams, Skype, Google Meet, and similar platforms. Local CSOs without reliable internet access relied mostly on telephones.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.8**

CSOs’ financial viability was slightly weaker in 2021 as donors redirected funding and CSOs’ ability to access alternative sources of income declined because of pandemic-related restrictions. Although no CSOs are known to have closed, many organizations operated under very tight budgets. According to TI–RW, unlike in 2020, when CSOs’ budgets had been fixed before the pandemic began, many budgets were set at reduced levels in 2021 after funds were redirected to the pandemic response.

Civil society in Rwanda depends almost entirely on funding from foreign donors. The key donors in 2021 included the United Nations (UN) Population Fund for projects in health care; the U.S. government for the pandemic response; Norwegian Peoples’ Aid (NPA) for projects in the justice sector; and Trócaire, Save the Children, Plan International, Alight, and Adventist Development and Relief Agency International for interventions targeting children and refugees. Some donors put non-pandemic-related programs on hold or revised funding agreements to fund only pandemic-related priorities. For example, NPA, the European Union, and embassies of Sweden and the Netherlands redirected resources or made new funding available to help with the pandemic response. This refocusing was a disadvantage for domestic organizations, as, in the view of Rwandan CSOs, the greater portion of such funding went to international CSOs or funded activities involved the distribution of materials or cash transfers, which international organizations could perform on their own without going through local organizations. New calls for proposals were limited in 2021. According to the Kigali International Arbitration Center, the number of calls for proposals drastically declined in 2021 compared to previous years.

Domestic sources of funding continued to be minimal in 2021. Rwanda does not have in-country philanthropic organizations, and the country’s small private sector does not offer significant support to CSOs. Local businesses sometimes contract with CSOs for hotel services to support their meetings. The RGB funds a grant program for domestic CSOs and for the period from 2019 to 2022 has allocated $25 million for sixty-five projects. The thematic areas include helping communities to recover economically from the pandemic, empowering people with disabilities, combating sexual and gender-based violence, and protecting the environment.

CSOs may conduct income-generating activities but few organizations have tried to do so, mainly because they lack funding to develop necessary skills. Among the CSOs with successful income-generating projects, the Association
of Youth for the Promotion of Human Rights and Development (Association de la jeunesse pour la promotion des droits de l’homme et le développement (AJPRODHO) operates a hotel and Caritas Rwanda rents houses.

CSOs’ financial management remained relatively weak in 2021. Aside from some established organizations, most Rwandan CSOs continued to struggle to retain qualified staff to manage large grants. Most organizations have yet to adopt financial management procedures that pass donors’ due-diligence requirements.

**ADVOCACY: 4.0²**

CSO advocacy deteriorated slightly in 2021 as pandemic restrictions undercut community engagement and reduced the volume of advocacy activity.

Civil society engages with the government through formal and informal channels. Organizations such as GLIHD–Rwanda, CLADHO, Never Again Rwanda, Health Development Initiative (HDI), and LAF are active members of sectoral working groups at their line ministries. However, in 2021, some of these groups undertook minimal activity because of the lockdown. Some CSOs organized national dialogues in 2021 that brought together government officials and CSOs to discuss topical issues. For example, the Coalition Umwana ku Isonga organized a dialogue on the rights of children, in part to ensure that children’s rights were respected during the lockdown and vulnerable girls had access to afterschool activities, safe spaces and hygiene products. Coalition Umwana Kwisona continued to follow up with the government on the implementation of the UN Child Rights Act and the African Charter on the Rights of the Child. CLADHO and other stakeholders successfully pushed the government to establish a national steering committee to fight teenage pregnancy and protect children from sexual violence.

A large number of CSOs participated in the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process in 2021. LAF members helped draft the UPR implementing roadmap, and GLIHD–Rwanda and other human rights organizations worked on the UPR monitoring roadmap. CSOs also submitted position papers and policy briefs to the parliament and line ministries and monitored implementation of UPR recommendations by the Human Rights Council and government agencies.

TI–RW focused on disseminating the Rwanda Bribery Index, its annual publication produced with support from NPA through the Public Policy Information Monitoring and Advocacy (PPIMA) project. The report found that while 50 percent of Rwandans believe that corruption to is in the country, the authorities responsible for fighting corruption should strengthen their human and technical capacity and reinforce public awareness. TI–RW also engaged with the ministries of infrastructure and finance and economic planning on developing the National Procurement Integrity Index, which would enhance integrity, transparency, and accountability in the public procurement system. PAX PRESS, a network of journalists focused on promoting peace, human rights, and democracy, conducted advocacy about access to information and raised awareness about the issue through a national policy dialogue on the access to information law.

In 2021, CLADHO advocated for gender-responsive budgeting and the inclusion of citizens’ priorities in the national budget. Gender priorities were included in the 2021 gender budget statement. Pro-Femmes Twese Hamwe commissioned an assessment of the impact of the pandemic on women and youth in informal and cross-border trade and consulted with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, the Gender Monitoring Office, and the Chamber of Women Entrepreneurs in the Private Sector Federation on more gender-inclusive policies.

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² The score for Advocacy was recalibrated in 2018 to better reflect the situation on the ground and align it with other scores in the region. The 2018 score also reflected a slight improvement in advocacy over 2017.
These and other efforts led to a promise by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning that the Emergency Recovery Plan would be revised to ensure that it better met the needs of groups at risk.

The Center for the Rule of Law Rwanda (CERULAR) advocated for a review of the 2008 law on GBV and produced a policy brief on strengthening GBV victims’ access to legal aid. HDI advocated for the revision of the law on medical professional liability insurance to allow young people to seek health-care services without the prior consent of their parents or legal guardians. HDI also advocated for legal and policy reforms to improve the rights of women, sex workers, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex people. GLIHD–Rwanda focused on legal reform to allow mid-level health providers to provide abortion services and improve access to sexual and reproductive health services by youth and marginalized groups. GLIHD–Rwanda also worked with the Ministry of Emergency, Migration Office, and Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to develop a shadow report on implementing the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in Rwanda and submitted the report to the UN CEDAW Committee. Recommendations from the CEDAW Committee will be issued in 2022. GLIHD–Rwanda pushed for a law or policy to protect human rights defenders with the Ministry of Justice, Law Reform Commission, and the parliament.

SERVICE PROVISION: 4.1

Service provision deteriorated slightly in 2021 as restrictions on movement prevented many organizations from reaching beneficiaries with needed services. As the COVID-19 pandemic became more severe in 2021, most CSOs redirected their efforts to service provision. Their services focused on the distribution of foodstuffs, hygiene equipment, and masks; sexual and reproductive health care, such as menstrual services for girls; and the provision of pro bono legal services, education, and access to water and sanitation. Organizations such as HDI, Save Generation, Empower Rwanda, and IMRO raised awareness about pandemic prevention measures and provided training in hygiene. After a rapid assessment showed that teenage pregnancies were increasing because of enforced confinement during the lockdown, RWN, Rwanda Network of People Living with HIV (RRP+) and Faith Victory Organization conducted workshops on sexual violence and GBV. RRP+ continued to help beneficiaries by operating a hotline and providing essential materials. But CSOs’ provision of medical services deteriorated as referrals from district hospitals and health centers were hampered by lockdown restrictions on movement and the resulting lack of transportation. Educational services also reduced as schools were shut down for extended periods.

CSOs in Rwanda do not charge fees to recover the cost of their services. The public views CSOs as charitable organizations that provide services for free and do not expect to pay for their services. In addition, CSOs tend not to understand the concept of cost recovery, which makes it difficult for them to negotiate cost-recovery arrangements with their funders.

The National Strategy for Transformation, the government’s seven-year program for economic development, recognizes CSOs as partners in national development. As the oversight body for CSOs, the RGB emphasizes that CSOs’ role is to support citizens and advocate on their behalf. During a retreat of civil society in 2021, the RGB reiterated the importance of civil society to the country’s development and pledged to support its work.
**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.1**

The sectoral infrastructure of CSOs in Rwanda was weakened slightly in 2021 by a lack of training opportunities and irregular access to resource centers.

Rwandan CSOs have access to very few resource centers. The Youth Association of Human Rights Promotion and Development hosts a youth center and GLIHD–Rwanda operates a library and center for human rights and strategic litigation. In 2021, pandemic restrictions largely kept CSOs from obtaining services from resource centers in 2021.

Few domestic grantmakers serve CSOs in Rwanda. With support from the Embassy of Netherlands and USAID, Legal Aid Forum (LAF) operates the Legal and Civil Society Fund, which supports CSOs that provides legal aid.

Rwandan CSOs have formed a number of functioning networks. Among the major networks are Profemme Twese Hamwe, an umbrella of fifty-three CSOs working on women’s rights; a human rights alliance coordinated by GLIHD–Rwanda; an environment and climate change group coordinated by the Rwanda Climate Change and Development Network; the Rwanda Education NGO Coordination Platform; and a public-policy advocacy forum. Coalitions found it difficult to meet regularly in 2021 because of the pandemic, but towards the end of the year, their activities increased as small gatherings were allowed. In November 2021, with coordination by GLIHD–Rwanda, CSOs conducted an annual retreat focused on strengthening capacity in the justice sector and fostering meaningful engagement with the government. Participants in the retreat adopted several recommendations, including a call for CSOs to operate transparently and strengthen their governance, administration, and financial management.

Training opportunities decreased drastically in 2021 because of the lockdown. A few workshops were held virtually, including a consultative workshop on budget priorities for 2021 organized by CLADHO and a capacity-building session on sexual and reproductive health and rights organized by IMRO. The National Union of Disability Organizations offered a workshop on the National Disability Policy and the Africa Disability Protocol. Rwandan CSOs typically depend on both local and foreign consultants for training. Most training takes place in the capital, Kigali. Training materials are normally in English or the local language Kinyarwanda.

CSOs partnered productively with the government to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2021. Line ministries invited CSOs to take part in sector working groups to discuss policy issues. Media houses and members of PAX PRESS cooperated with CSOs to conduct a joint national dialogue on topics such as access to justice, health, agriculture. Interactions between CSOs and the business sector in Rwanda are rare.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.0**

Civil society’s public image improved moderately in 2021 as the public increasingly approved of the sector provision of services during the pandemic.

CSOs in Rwanda continued to enjoy positive media coverage during the year. For example, the work of TI-RW and Rwanda NGOs Forum on HIV and AIDS were featured in a number of stories.

Public perceptions of CSOs are generally positive. Public mistrust of the sector decreased markedly during the pandemic, when communities appreciated CSOs’ provision of materials such as foodstuffs and hygienic supplies. Although some people still see CSOs as avenues for making money from donors, CSOs’ activities across the country have increased public awareness and appreciation of the concept of CSOs.
The government considers CSOs its partners in development, especially in service delivery. The private sector had limited engagement with CSOs in 2021.

CSOs are increasingly interested in using the media to publicize their work and engage with their constituencies. Most CSOs have developed relationships with journalists to ensure coverage of their activities. Some CSOs have monthly radio and television programs. For example, GLIHD–Rwanda secured a slot on Flash Radio & TV to speak about current justice and human rights issues in the country.

Few CSOs make their annual reports publicly available. Some organizations share their reports with stakeholders such as the RGB and line ministries. Few CSOs in Rwanda have codes of ethics.
In early 2021, Senegal was hit by a second wave of COVID-19. The president imposed a second state of emergency on January 6, which included a nighttime curfew in the Dakar and Thiès regions, where 90 percent of cases were located. However, the virus continued to spread rapidly. On February 23, the government launched a vaccination campaign. Vaccination rates remained low because of widespread disinformation about the safety of the vaccines. The state of emergency was lifted on March 19 when the number of new cases began to decline. A third wave of the Delta variant hit Senegal in July, but the government did not declare a new state of emergency.

The Response and Solidarity Fund Against the Effects of COVID-19, founded in 2020 to strengthen the health-care system and provide financial support to Senegalese households affected by the pandemic, continued to operate in 2021. CSO representatives served on the oversight committee. In April, the committee published a report for the period April 2020–March 2021 showing that the Economic and Social Resilience Program had mobilized XOF 773.2 billion (approximately $1.4 billion) in resources. CSOs were excluded from this funding.

Spontaneous riots by young people broke out in March after opposition member Ousmane Sonko was arrested for disturbing the public order and participating in an unauthorized demonstration. At the time of his arrest, Sonko was on his way to court to face accusations of rape. The rioting plunged the country into three days of unprecedented violence. Security forces were alleged to use excessive force in quelling the protests, which resulted in about fourteen deaths, many injuries, and the arrest of scores of people. The government cited the incident in banning demonstrations because of the potential for “public order disturbances” that were “likely to compromise national security.” Human rights CSOs, including Amnesty International, African Meeting for the Defense of Human Rights (Rassemblement africain pour la défense des droits de l’homme, RADDHO), and Senegalese Human Rights League (Ligue sénégalaise des droits humains, LSDH), sought an independent investigation into the deaths, which was initiated later in the year. Sonko remained under judicial supervision and was denied permission to leave the country. Charges against him of disturbing the public disorder were dropped, but an investigation into the allegations of sexual assault was ongoing at the end of the year.

In the face of this socio-political crisis, the government established the Emergency Program for Youth Employment and Integration with XOF 450 billion (approximately $813 million) in funding over three years. The mechanism aims to respond to the concerns of Senegalese youth, particularly unemployment. Of the 65,000 new jobs promised, the program created more than 46,000 positions in less than one year. The Senegal National Youth Council (Conseil national de la jeunesse du Sénégal, CNJS) represented CSOs on the program’s steering committee.
On June 25, the National Assembly approved amendments to the Criminal Code and Code of Criminal Procedures to strengthen the fight against terrorism. CSOs criticized the laws as overly broad and liable to stifle fundamental rights. The laws define terrorism acts as, among other things, activities that “seriously disturb the public order” and “offenses linked to information and communication technologies.” Transgressions under the law are punishable by life in prison. Protests against the laws called by the Movement for the Defense of Democracy (Mouvement pour la défense de la démocratie, M2D), a coalition of CSOs and opposition groups, took place in Dakar. The police responded with tear gas, and several persons were arrested.

In 2021, the Islamic collective And Sam Djiko Yi (Together to Safeguard Values), which unites more than 125 Muslim associations, spearheaded demonstrations and gatherings to protest rights for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex persons and ask the government to increase criminal penalties for same-sex sexual activity. A bill criminalizing same-sex sexual activity and imposing criminal penalties on those who publicly fund or support such activity was presented in the legislature in December.

The COVID-19 pandemic plunged Senegal’s once robust economy into recession in 2020, but in 2021, the economy rebounded with a growth rate of 5.1 percent, thanks to public investment and an active hydrocarbon sector. Inflation was stable at 2.1 percent. The Senegalese government remained committed to rationalizing public spending and mobilizing domestic revenues to reduce its budget deficit.

Overall CSO sustainability in Senegal was stable in 2021. Organizational capacity was slightly stronger as many organizations rebuilt relationships with constituencies that had been disrupted by the pandemic or resumed implementation of their strategic plans. CSOs’ financial viability improved slightly as new funding became available and funds that had been redirected to fight COVID-19 were channeled back to customary activities. Advocacy progressed slightly as CSOs were increasingly involved in decision-making processes and served as strong advocates for the adoption of new legislation. The sectoral infrastructure improved moderately as collaboration among CSOs strengthened and sectoral and thematic coalitions consolidated. All other dimensions of sustainability were unchanged.

The Ministry of Interior has not provided data on the number of CSOs in Senegal in many years. The number of registered CSOs is estimated by the ministry to be more than 10,000 associations and 589 non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Unregistered organizations such as cultural and village associations are active on the local level.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.1**

The legal framework for CSOs did not change in 2021. Article 8 of the 2001 constitution guarantees fundamental freedoms, and Article 12 guarantees the right to freely form associations, companies, and other groups. Decree 96-103 defines associations as private nonprofit organizations whose purpose is to support Senegal’s development. The Code of Civil and Commercial Obligations specifies criteria for associations to obtain legal status and corporate purpose. Associations must have legal personality to operate, receive government and foreign funding, and open bank accounts. After two years of operation, associations may apply for NGO status, which confers eligibility for tax and customs waivers under Decree 2015-145. NGOs must submit annual reports to the administrative authorities. An interministerial commission chaired by the minister of the interior approves CSOs’ annual spending plans, investment plans, and sources of financial support, which must be traceable. In 2021, the interministerial commission met five times, but the commission overseeing agreements that foreign organization must sign with the Ministry of Interior continued the state of dormancy that began in 2018. As a result, foreign organizations were unable to renew their headquarters agreements.
On June 4, 2021, the National Assembly adopted a law related to the social solidarity economy which provides a new typology for social and environmental CSOs. The law recognizes cooperative and mutual societies, responsible entrepreneurial associations, and social enterprises as actors and stakeholders in the social solidarity economy. The law is important in that it integrates new subsectors of CSOs into the national economic system and acknowledges CSOs’ contribution to building a more resilient national economy.

On June 25, 2021, the National Assembly approved the bills amending the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure. While the government maintains that the amendments aim to “strengthen the fight against terrorism, piracy, and transnational organized crime,” CSOs and opposition parties object that this language is too vague and can be used to silence dissent.

Civic space continued to narrow with restrictions on the rights to freedom of assembly and of expression in 2021, especially for organizations that worked on governance, transparency, or political dialogue. On January 1, the president of Horizons Without Borders (Horizons sans frontières) was arrested at the Dakar airport and indicted for “disseminating false information” after he accused the government of misusing $215 million in European Union (EU) funds. He was released after several weeks in detention. Three civil society activists who used social media to urge the public to mobilize if Sonko’s parliamentary immunity was lifted were arrested, tried, and later released for disturbing the public order and committing acts “likely to compromise national security.” Human rights CSOs and international media denounced the use by security forces of teargas and live bullets during the March demonstrations, which resulted in a number of deaths.

CSOs were still required to file tax returns in 2021. However, with the approval of the Ministry of the Interior, NGOs are exempt from value-added and customs taxes under Decree 2015-145.

Legal professionals in Dakar and smaller cities help with CSOs’ legal needs. Human rights CSOs often have legal experts on their staff, who help CSOs and CSO activists, often on a pro bono basis. In 2021, Amnesty International, Senegalese Human Rights League (Ligue sénégalaise des droits de l’homme, LSDH), and African Human Rights Defense Encounter (Rencontre africain pour la défense des droits de l’homme, RADDHO) helped individuals needing legal support after the government’s March clampdown on civil society.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.1

CSOs’ organizational capacity was slightly stronger in 2021 as many organizations rebuilt relationships with constituencies that had been disrupted by the pandemic and resumed implementation of their strategic plans.

In 2020, the pandemic forced many organizations to give up planned activities and focus on emergency actions. In 2021, after pandemic-related restrictions were relaxed, CSOs were able to resume activities with their traditional beneficiaries. For example, the Center for International Studies and Cooperation (Centre d’étude et de cooperation international, CECI) supported women’s organizations as they prepared post-pandemic action plans to improve the lives of women and girls. The West African Women’s Association (Association des femmes ouest africaines, AFAO), Network of Actors and Municipalities for a Social Solidarity Economy (Réseau des acteurs et collectivités territoriales pour l’économie sociale et solidaire, RACTES), and Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO) rescheduled and adapted capacity-building activities on administrative law and negotiation for workers, local authorities, and social partners, which had been cancelled in 2020 because of the pandemic.

Most organizations were able to resume implementation of their strategic and operational plans in 2021. The NGO 3D, Pan-African Institute for Citizenship, Consumers, and Development (CICODEV Africa), and Alphadev updated their strategic plans and annual work plans to include fundraising in Africa and other international contexts. The European NGO Platform (Plateforme des ONG européennes, PFONGUE), in cooperation with the...
Platform of Non-State Actors of Senegal (Plateforme des acteurs non étatiques du Sénégal, PFAnE) and Council of NGOs in Support of Development (Conseil des ONG d’appui au développement, CONGAD), helped prepare the EU’s commitment roadmap for 2021-27, which identifies high-priority actions for the EU and its member states.

CSOs had to find new ways to implement their projects because of changes in their work environment during the pandemic. Many organizations adapted by having their staff work remotely and conducting activities online. To make this transition, CSOs had to develop staff technological skills and improve staff access to online technologies. For example, after improving its capacity in this area, LEGS-Africa was able to hold a series of webinars on oil and gas governance, with support from the Heinrich Boll Foundation and in partnership with various national and international CSOs, including Action for Environmental Justice (Action pour la justice environnementale, AJE), Women, Children, Environment (Femmes, enfance, environnement, FEE), and Environmental Research and Study Group (Groupe de recherche et d’etudes environnementales, GREEN).

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.0

CSOs’ financial viability improved slightly in 2021 as new funding became available and funds that had been redirected to fight COVID-19 were channeled back to CSOs’ customary activities.

Senegalese CSOs depend overwhelmingly on foreign funding. The main donors are the EU, its member states, the United States, Canada, Japan, and Korea. The Canadian government continued to offer funding under its six-year Women’s Voice and Leadership in Senegal project, which has a budget of XOF 2.6 billion (approximately $4.7 million). Multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN), African Development Bank, and World Bank have small civil society programs that primarily fund infrastructure projects.

In new funding awards in 2021, the EU’s Civil Society Support Program (Programme d’appui à la société civile, PASC) program, in partnership with the Ministry of Finance, awarded EUR 3.45 million (approximately $4.2 million) to a consortium of ten CSO networks and coalitions for a program focused on sustainable agriculture and food security, natural resource management, migration and youth employment, women and youth inclusion, capacity building, and transparency and budget monitoring. The consortium included PFAnE, AFAO, Citizen Network for Budgetary Transparency (Reseau citoyen pour la transparence budgétaire, RCTB), and the Youth Consortium of Senegal (Consortium jeunesse Sénégal, CJS). The award was made without a call for proposals on the basis of consortium members’ strong social anchoring, experience, and skills. The EU also awarded youth CSOs nearly EUR 2 million (approximately $2.4 million) for the Yaakaar (Youth Hope) project to create a leadership center and volunteer program and EUR 750,000 (approximately $900,000) to five girls’ organizations, coordinated by Active Solidarity (Solidarité active), for the Jaapal Ma Jaap (Together Everything is Possible) project to further the sustainable economic and social empowerment of women and girls. In addition, some CSOs were able to reprogram funding that was unused or suspended in 2020 because of the pandemic. For example, WIEGO, which had cancelled 90 percent of its activities and nearly 60 percent of its grants to other CSOs in 2020, increased its grant budget by more than 170 percent in 2021.

A few organizations have been able to diversify their funding sources, but for most organizations this is a difficult goal. Funding from state and local authorities to CSOs, especially NGOs, is low. Private-sector financial support for CSOs is almost nonexistent, as businesses tend to work directly with communities through their foundations or social responsibility programs. CSOs earn little income from producing and selling goods.
ADVOCACY: 3.4

Advocacy improved slightly in 2021 as CSOs became more involved in decision-making processes and often served as strong advocates for new legislation.

CSOs enjoyed growing credibility among decision makers and deepened their involvement in the country’s political life in 2021. The CSO platform Jammi Rewmi (Peace of the Homeland), which was set up by more than forty CSOs and civil society actors to explore avenues to peace, played a decisive role in ending the political and judicial crisis in March. In partnership with Islamic leaders and the Unitary Framework of Islam, Jammi Rewmi produced several memoranda and communiqués and organized meetings with prominent political leaders, including President Macky Sall. Jammi Rewmi submitted a list of eleven recommendations to end the crisis, including freeing all people detained for disturbing the public order or calling for insurrection during the March disturbance; initiating an independent national investigation into injuries and deaths; designating a neutral, independent head for the Senegalese human rights committee; complying with the elections calendar; and creating an inclusive mechanism to help formulate more effective youth employment policies. Some of these recommendations were implemented and resulted in an improved social climate and a more inclusive political space.

Also in response to the March violence, human rights CSOs such as Amnesty International, LSDH, and RADDHO launched the Together, Let’s Demand Justice for the Victims of the Violent Repression of the Demonstrations in Senegal campaign. The campaign was able to identify the families of the fourteen people killed, twelve of whom were shot by defense and security forces, according to human rights CSOs. The campaign demanded that a commission be formed to investigate the circumstances of the killings and sanction those responsible. However, as of December 2021, no information about the creation of the commission had been released.

CSOs participated in government-affiliated bodies such as the Forum of Litigants at the Office Against Fraud and Corruption in 2021. Publish What You Pay (Publiez ce que vous payez, PCQVP) took part in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which addresses governance issues in the extractive sector. At a meeting of the Presidential Council in December 2021, CSOs consulted with government officials on the law on local participation in the management of mining and gas resources. PCQVP, 3D, and the Observatory for Monitoring Economic Development Indicators in Africa (Observatoire de suivi des indicateurs de développement économique en Afrique, OSIDEA) submitted written proposals for managing oil and gas resources to the president, who responded that he was attentive to their suggestions. Also in the extractive sector, CSO advocacy begun in 2019 contributed to the adoption in February 2021 of Decree No. 2021-248 setting modalities for the supply and operation of the Local Content Development Support Fund.

The Senegalese Council of Women (Conseil sénégalais des femmes, COSEF), Article 19, CONGAD, PFAnE, CNJS, RCTB, and other CSOs continued to work with the government in the Open Government Partnership in 2021. CSOs’ participation in consultative bodies was sometimes hampered by the absence of an access to information law, the unwillingness of state bodies to take their suggestions into account, the poor functioning of consultative frameworks at the local and sectoral levels, and CSOs’ own lack of technical capacity, especially in smaller organizations.

Through its Jokkale program, PFONGUE facilitated working groups of national and international CSOs to analyze national priorities for economic and social recovery after COVID-19. The working groups produced analyses with recommendations, which they submitted to local, national, and international authorities. In the health sector, thirty groups, including women’s and youth CSOs, journalists’ organizations, and religious, community, and private-sector organizations, created the Coalition of CSOs for the Repositioning of Family Planning in Senegal (Coalition des organisations de la société civile pour le repositionnement de la planification familiale au Sénégal, COSCP/PF). The
The 2021 CSO Sustainability Index for Senegal

The 2021 CSO Sustainability Index for Senegal

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.7**

CSOs’ service provision was unchanged in 2021. CSOs normally offer services in a broad range of areas, including education, literacy, and youth employment. Although the pandemic forced many organizations to turn from their planned activities to emergency services in 2020, most CSOs were able to return to the activities outlined in their approved action plans in 2021. For example, the Federation of Senegalese Women’s Associations (Fédération des associations des femmes du Sénégal, FAFS) resumed offering information and awareness training on malaria prevention and conducted 850 home visits in five targeted communities in 2021. The Coalition of Organizations in Synergy for the Defense of Public Education (Coalition des organisations en synergie pour la défense de l’éducation publique, COSYDEP) relaunched its programs to support CSOs working in education and, in a consortium with 3D under the USAID-funded Kawral (Unity) program, sought to fulfill local educational priorities using resources derived mainly from mining companies.

CSOs offer services tailored to constituents’ needs. For example, in 2021, Amnesty International, LSDH, RADDHO, and other organizations provided legal services to the families of victims of the violence in March. In the youth sector, CJNS set up a leadership center and volunteer training under the Yaakaar program, and five women’s organizations initiated activities to empower girls and women economically and socially under the Jaapal ma Jap program. In cooperation with Fundación Musol, 3D trained 100 women farmers from four villages in Kanel Department in agricultural techniques adapted to climate change.

CSOs generally provide goods and services without regard to race, gender, ethnic group, or other factors. Membership associations often seek to provide goods and services to people other than their own members. Only a few organizations try to recover their operating costs by charging fees.

In its Senegal Horizon 2035 development strategy, the government recognizes civil society as an important partner in building the country.
SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.3

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector improved moderately in 2021 as collaboration among CSOs strengthened and sectoral and thematic coalitions consolidated.

Among local grantmakers, Palladium, with support from USAID, continued to implement a funding mechanism that supported a network of more than twenty local CSOs working on health advocacy, including small CSOs and community-based organizations (CBOs).

The waning of the COVID-19 pandemic accelerated CSOs’ efforts to create platforms that would allow them to combine efforts, pool resources, and coordinate interventions for maximum effect. This trend increased CSOs’ impact with large-scale activities and made it easier for CSOs to consult with the government about public policies. For example, eleven national CSOs formed a consortium that obtained a grant for a four-year project under the EU’s PASC program. Their successful effort signaled the emergence of more structured, competent, independent, and credible CSO networks able to work in formal partnerships to transfer skills and capitalize on good practices. PFONGUE supported international CSOs as they prepared and implemented a collective bargaining agreement for their sphere of activity in Senegal. This “social pact,” which culminated with inclusive negotiations with many institutional and individual stakeholders, incorporated domestic and international collective bargaining standards. In the area of health, thirty CSOs established COSCP/PF to promote respect for the right to sexual and reproductive health, especially through family planning. Youth platforms focused on entrepreneurship, employability, and citizenship emerged after the events of March 2021 and included CJS, a collaborative platform formed by some thirty youth organizations. The NGO Partnership Framework (Cadre de partenariat des faitières des ONG, CAPFONGUE) was launched during the pandemic and brought together CONAD, PFONGUE, International NGOs Based in Senegal (ONGIS), and other groups to discuss development issues. In 2021, CAPFONGUE held a broad consultation about updating the EU’s commitment roadmap for 2021-27.

CSOs had access to various training opportunities in 2021. CICODEV Africa strengthened the ability of grassroots organizations in Kaffrine, Kaolack, Fatick, Thiès, and Sédiou regions to work with the government on developing endogenous health-financing mechanisms. The Network of Associations for Community Well-Being (Réseau d’associations pour le bien-être communautaire, RABEC) continued to offer training services through a digital platform in partnership with the Dakar Municipal Development Fund and the Quebec entrepreneurship school. The training focused on topics such as leadership, financial inclusion, and accounting. The Empower the Capacities of Local Non-State Actors and Vulnerable Communities for Climate Action and Resilience project, launched in March 2021 by the Global Green Growth Initiative in cooperation with the Open Society Initiative for West Africa, provided training and capacity building to 100 CSOs.

CSOs’ partnerships with the government and media continued to develop in 2021. For example, ten CSO networks and coalitions partnered on sectoral governance with the ministries of budget and finance, agriculture, mining, oil and gas, youth, and other areas under the EU’s PASC program. Several organizations produce television or radio programs in collaboration with press outlets. Such shows include 3D’s Focus On, which explores budget transparency, and COSYDEP’s In Class, which focuses on education and training.
PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.6

CSOs’ public image did not change in 2021. CSO activities receive ample coverage on state and private media.

The public generally appreciates and trusts CSOs thanks to their efforts to identify communities’ needs, manage their concerns, and improve living conditions. People also recognize that CSOs seek to defend human rights, advance the public interest, and generate innovative ideas.

The government has a largely favorable opinion of CSOs, particularly Senegal’s many youth and women’s organizations, which it sees as contributing positively to the country’s development. Public institutions also welcome, for the most part, CSOs’ role in helping them become more transparent, responsible, and inclusive in their decision-making processes. However, during the events of March 2021, the government saw more confrontational CSOs, such as Y’en a Marre, Noo Lank, and FRAPP-France dégage, as taking sides in the Sonko affair and overly partisan. At the same time, the government regarded CSOs and civil society actors belonging to the Jammi Rewmi platform as constructive players in so far as they helped mediate an end to the crisis.

The CSO charter drafted by national CSOs in 2018 remains in the idea stage and has yet to promote the sector’s credibility and sustainability in any concrete way. CSOs produce narrative and financial reports for their financial partners but rarely for public consumption.
Despite the ongoing challenge of the COVID-19 pandemic, Sierra Leone experienced renewed hope for national unity in 2021 when the country qualified for the Africa Cup of Nations football tournament for the first time in almost twenty-five years. The euphoria and display of national colors awakened a sense of patriotism that helped overcome the ill effects of the country’s recent history of partisanship and ethnic division.

An uptick in COVID-19 infections in June caused the government to reintroduce measures to prevent the spread of the virus, including mandatory masking, a ban on public gatherings, testing of travelers in and out of the country, and closure of all places of worship. The measures, which spurred public tensions, were in place until October.

After international partners donated COVID-19 vaccines to Sierra Leone, the government launched a free vaccination campaign in March. Despite a strong public-relations effort, many people refused to take the vaccine because of fear of its effects. Nevertheless, Sierra Leone was able to keep the number of infections and deaths fairly low in comparison to other countries in the region. For part of the year, the salaries and allowances of health-care staff and volunteers fighting the pandemic remained unpaid, leading to peaceful strike actions. The government pledged to settle the payment arrears but did not do so by the end of the year.

Political tensions were heightened when the state auditor general and a deputy were indefinitely suspended in November on allegations of professional misconduct. The suspensions occurred just weeks before the release of the 2020 Annual Audit Report on the government’s handling of public funds. The report included allegations of financial misappropriation, including in the Office of the President. The Sierra Leone Association of Journalists (SLAJ), Sierra Leone Bar Association, Budget Advocacy Network (BAN), 50/50 Group of Sierra Leone, International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions, and other organizations released statements condemning the suspensions, and the issue was widely covered by international media. In July, based on a recommendation of the Commission of Inquiry investigating the activities of the previous administration, the government began to confiscate assets illegally accumulated by former government officials. Several people appealed the confiscations unsuccessfully.

Sierra Leone continued to make huge strides on its U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation scorecard, again passing the control-of-corruption indicator. Despite many international accolades, some citizens remain unimpressed by the government’s efforts to fight corruption and accused the Anti-Corruption Commission of mostly targeting opposition politicians, teachers, and lower-level civil servants while protecting senior government officials.

The year saw rancor in the national parliament, including the arrest and intimidation of opposition members who opposed tabling the Mid-Term Population and Housing Census Bill, alleging that due process had not been
followed. Politicians and government officials continued to intimidate CSO leaders and activists with social media attacks and public shaming on national television. Some politicians sought to discredit CSO leaders by pitting them against each other on issues of national interest, including the mid-term census.

Sierra Leone’s economy continued to decline in 2021. The prices of essential items such as food and fuel increased, and in August, the government announced the redenomination of the national currency, the leone, causing panic in the business community.

Overall CSO sustainability in Sierra Leone was unchanged in 2021. Advocacy improved moderately as CSOs’ cooperation with the government, policy advocacy initiatives, and lobbying efforts reached an all-time high for recent years. CSOs’ public image was slightly better as positive reporting by the media cemented public trust in the sector. The sector’s financial viability deteriorated moderately as international donors reduced their funding, especially for programs uninvolved in the pandemic response. The other dimensions of sustainability did not change.

Available data on registered CSOs remained inconsistent and fragmented in 2021. Most CSOs register with the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) as companies limited by guarantee, but the CAC does not disaggregate CSOs in its registry of companies limited by guarantee. The Ministry of Planning and Economic Development (MOPED) reported 171 newly registered domestic and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), a separate legal category, and said that 210 existing NGOs had renewed their registrations. The Sierra Leone Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (SLANGO) reported more than 200 registered domestic and international NGOs. The Ministry of Social Welfare, other ministries, and local councils that register CSOs do not release data on their numbers. An unknown number of unregistered organizations also operate.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.9**

The legal environment for CSOs in Sierra Leone was unchanged in 2021.

The laws governing CSO registration remain unfavorable and contradictory in 2021. CSOs are governed by the Development Cooperation Framework (DCF), which was introduced in 2019 and fully implemented in 2020. Most CSOs register with the CAC as companies limited by guarantee, since its requirements are fairly simple. Although the registration process is more cumbersome, some organizations register as NGOs with MOPED because NGO status establishes eligibility for tax waivers. To receive tax benefits, NGOs must also register with SLANGO, the umbrella organization that oversees the activities of local and international NGOs. CSOs are also required to register with all government agencies with which they will work and local councils in each of their geographic areas of operation. Unregistered organizations operate freely, but without legal status they may not interact formally with other entities.

All CSOs were required to re-register annually with their line ministries until 2021, when the government eliminated this obligation. CSOs must now only sign annual service-level agreements with their line ministries. Recently established CSOs just starting operations and CSOs without projects are not expected to sign agreements, although they should do so if they secure funding.

MOPED sent a letter to the Civil Society Forum, a newly created body composed of national and district-level CSOs, to solicit feedback on the government’s implementation of the DCF in 2021. The Civil Society Forum responded that the implementation of the DCF was not favorable to CSOs. The policy contains a number of provisions that CSOs find problematic. For example, new organizations must have four paid employees, which is difficult when they still have no funded projects. They must have readily identifiable offices, which can make human rights defenders easy to target. The DCF also requires CSOs to align their work with government priorities, thereby positioning them to serve as the government’s implementing partners, although they often have their own
programmatic goals and obtain funds from external donors independently. Regardless of their size and type of organization, CSOs are required to allocate at least 70 percent of their budgets to direct program costs and may spend no more than 30 percent on indirect costs. The DCF limits CSOs to working in no more than two sectors, which many CSO leaders believe is meant to hinder their operations. The Civil Society Forum called on MOPED to initiate a review of the DCF, which did not happen in 2021.

Civic freedoms continued to be under stress in 2021. The Public Order Act of 1965 requires citizens to notify the police of plans to assemble or protest, but the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) insists that permission to assemble or protest must be obtained in advance, which gives the police the opportunity to deny such requests. Spontaneous protests without prior approval can meet with stiff, highhanded police reactions. For example, the police beat up students from the Institute of Public Administration and Management (IPAM), including stripping, wounding, and arresting a woman student, while they spontaneously protested the omission of their names from a list of graduating students. Members of the Save Black Johnson Beach Campaign, which seeks to prevent the confiscation of land so that it can be leased to a Chinese company intending to construct a fishing harbor, complained they were intimidated from delivering a petition to the government by threats of arrest if they did so without police approval.

CSOs’ right to freedom of expression was also undermined in 2021. Political party supporters confiscated the mobile phones of election observers from the National Election Watch (NEW) while they reported on election violence during by-elections in Koinadugu District. After human rights defenders released a report implicating state officials and the paramount chief of the Sahn Malen Chiefdom in the leasing of community land to the Socfin Company for palm-oil production, community members were threatened. The Market Women Association faced high levels of harassment from government officials who believed that some of its members did not support the government. The officials interfered in the association’s leadership by forcefully installing new market chairladies, which caused tensions and divided the association’s members. Cyberbullying and verbal attacks on CSOs by state officials and their supporters also increased in 2021, creating fear and causing some CSO leaders to keep silent on issues of public concern.

Only NGOs may apply for tax waivers on import duties, which are awarded on a discretionary basis and do not go to organizations that are critical of the government. Otherwise, CSOs do not receive tax exemptions.

CSOs may accept foreign funding. A government policy was introduced in 2021 that required all funds coming to CSOs from donors outside of Sierra Leone to go through the Central Bank. Implementation of the policy was halted after encountering resistance from CSOs.

CSOs may fundraise locally and generate funds through business activities provided they use the income for development purposes, which can include but are not limited to humanitarian activities. CSOs may bid on government contracts.

CSOs have access to legal services from organizations such as the Institute for Legal Research and Advocacy for Justice (ILRAJ). Civil society activists who are lawyers provide pro bono services to CSOs.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.7**

CSOs’ organizational capacity was stable in 2021. CSOs maintained relationships with their partners and constituents throughout the pandemic. However, many CSOs were unable to engage with beneficiaries as actively as they would have liked because of pandemic-related restrictions and a lack of funding for their normal activities. Some organizations worked outside of their usual areas of activity to provide pandemic-related services to the communities in which they work. For example, the Human Right Defenders Network (HRDN) and Campaign for Good Governance (CGG) provided some communities with sanitation and hygiene materials.

Only a handful of larger CSOs and coalitions organize their interventions through careful and thorough strategic-planning processes. WASHNet Sierra Leone, NEW, BAN, CGG, ILRAJ, Institute for Governance Reform (IGR), and Center for Accountability and Rule of Law (CARL) are among the few CSOs with defined missions and strategic plans. Their plans normally include structures and processes that allow these organizations to engage effectively on national issues across the country. However, in 2021, given the scramble for resources and shrinking
civic space, most CSOs found it difficult to plan with confidence. For example, NEW members resorted to monitoring by-elections voluntarily and with minimal support as project funding elapsed in 2021.

Young and growing CSOs usually lack defined management structures and are led by a single individual who doubles as founder and executive officer. Many young organizations folded in 2021, since they still lacked the structures, capacity, and funding to survive in the unfavorable pandemic context. More established organizations, such as CARL, Rainbow Initiative, Community Empowerment and Development Agency, Network Movement for Justice and Development, and Women Against Violence and Exploitation in Society, were more stable and had functioning internal structures, including boards whose members have term limits and who contribute expertise and energy to their organizations. However, in most organizations with boards, the individuals who are elected to the boards have no idea about their organization’s area of work and expect to receive benefits for their board service.

CSOs' growth and sustainability continued to be hindered by their difficulty in retaining professional talent in 2021. Well-trained professionals are often poached by donors and international organizations, which essentially turns local CSOs into incubators for nurturing young university graduates. After gaining experience, the young graduates move on to international organizations, which offer better pay and benefits. Funding challenges render local CSOs unable to recruit permanent staff, and most employees are hired on a contractual basis when project funding become available. The constant turnover in staff means that CSOs find themselves in the unproductive situation of continually training new employees. At some organizations, staff members end up as volunteers when project cycles come to an end. This is the case at HRDN, for example, which has agreements with its staff that they will be paid when projects are available and will work as volunteers when projects are lacking. This arrangement induced most of HRDN's core staff to leave the organization in 2021 and join international organizations offering regular pay. To compensate for its loss of staff, HRDN was able to recruit volunteers to support its work.

Most organizations lack sufficient resources to purchase office facilities. A number of CSOs struggled with rising rents in 2021, which are mostly quoted in dollars and became very expensive after the devaluation of the leone. Many CSO employees continued to work remotely because of the pandemic. However, only a few organizations had sufficient technical equipment, expertise, and support to do this effectively, and many staff members used their personal telephones and laptops to access the internet. Irish Aid helped HRDN acquire computers, modems, and training to enhance the capacity of its members in 2021. Women’s groups have requested training in basic technology to feel included in this new way of doing business, and they often rely on colleagues for instruction. Because the costs of maintaining websites are high, many CSOs use social media, especially WhatsApp, Facebook, and Twitter, to showcase their work or advocate. CSOs are aware of cybersecurity threats but have little or no resources for the equipment or software needed to prevent it.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.9**

CSOs’ financial viability deteriorated moderately in 2021 as funding from international donors decreased, especially for programs not focused on the pandemic response.

Only a small group of international partners support CSOs in Sierra Leone. The major funders are the European Union (EU); USAID; United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office; German Agency for International Cooperation; Irish Aid; various United Nations (UN) agencies; Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA); and National Endowment for Democracy. In 2021, many donors continued to prioritize efforts to curb the pandemic. Several foundations, such as the Brighter Futures Foundation, Caritas Sierra Leone, and Healey International Relief Foundation, focused on livelihoods and food distribution. A strong campaign by CSOs for enactment of the Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment Bill attracted support from Irish Aid, Trócaire, and UN Women. An EU program offering EUR 3.9 million (approximately $4.7 million) to local councils included
funding for CSOs to monitor the local projects. The UK government significantly cut its funding in 2021, and except for commitments to fund projects in health care, education, and energy, its support for CSOs was largely shut down. OSIWA also cut direct funding for CSOs in Sierra Leone. Many CSOs reported that they received no funding at all in 2021 as their donors shifted funds to the pandemic response or reduced their grant budgets.

During the year, the government began to review arrangements that allow international funders to serve as implementing partners for the government and thus compete for funding with local CSOs. For example, the World Food Program and UN International Children’s Emergency Fund are implementing partners for the government’s school feeding program in nine districts.

After winning such grants, international organizations usually subcontract to Sierra Leonean organizations to implement project activities. This arrangement undermines institution building at domestic CSOs, since administrative costs must be kept low and funding is insufficient to hire highly qualified staff. To help ensure their long-term sustainability, domestic CSOs would prefer to be given direct responsibility for project implementation. In undertaking the review, the government committed to ensuring that international organizations empower Sierra Leonean CSOs.

The government prefers to work with CSOs that are not critical of its performance. Such organizations may obtain grants or contracts and are often nominated to serve on government committees. For example, Caritas Sierra Leone takes part in the government’s school feeding program. The government did not provide funding to CSOs for pandemic-related activities in 2021.

Only a few businesses, such as mining and betting companies, have corporate social responsibility programs. These programs tend to focus on infrastructure projects, scholarships for children, or loans to entrepreneurs and rarely support the work of CSOs.

CSOs generally lack skills to diversify their funding. They do not usually seek to raise funds from their constituents, as most organizations believe that they should support the needy rather than the other way around. In 2021, fundraising was difficult as pandemic restrictions prevented CSOs from organizing special events. Several organizations sought to use crowdfunding to raise funds. For example, the Sick Pickin Foundation used GoFundMe to raise funds for sick children but reportedly obtained little income from this approach. The Sick Pickin Foundation also placed charity boxes in strategic locations such as banks and supermarkets and solicited contributions on the street. Membership-based organizations, such as the Sierra Leone Teachers Union (SLTU) and Market Women Association, continued to raise funds from membership dues in 2021. The Market Women Association claimed that it raised less funding from its members in 2021 because they had fewer sales.

Some organizations have businesses that generate funds to reinvest into nonprofit activities. For example, the 50/50 Group, CDHR, MADAM, and SLTU own office facilities that they rent out for meetings. But in general, the public views CSOs as charities offering free services, and their efforts to raise funds through commercial ventures are met with disapproval.

CSOs’ financial management was constant in 2021. Although organizations adhere to basic standards of financial management to meet funders’ expectations, they struggle to retain financial professionals. Donors do not fund administrative costs such as annual audits, although they are usually a requirement for continuing partnerships. In 2021, for the first time, MOPED selected about fifty-five organizations to be audited by the Audit Service Sierra Leone as part of the country’s annual audit.
ADVOCACY: 3.3

CSOs’ most important achievement in 2021 was in the field of advocacy, which improved moderately. Most national and community-based organizations (CBOs) engage in advocacy, and their cooperation with the government, policy advocacy initiatives, and lobbying efforts reached an all-time high for recent years.

CSOs and the government were able to work together closely on a number of activities thanks to direct communication and improved access. For example, the second government-CSO dialogue on decentralized service delivery took place in Port Loko City, with CSOs kicking off the event. In mid-2021, the parliament and CSOs met to lay the foundation for a consultative dialogue that would overcome a snag that their working relationship hit in 2020. The discussion was fruitful and resulted in a communiqué that outlined measures for an improved relationship.

The year saw an increase in joint policy initiatives involving CSOs, the administration, and the parliament. Perhaps the most important success was the introduction in the parliament of the Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment Bill, which culminated twenty years of effort by women’s organizations, including CGG, 50/50 Group, Women’s Forum, and Manor River Union Women Peace Network. The passage of the Anti-Human Trafficking Act was similarly the result of sustained effort by CSOs. BAN, 50/50 Group, and Search for Common Ground campaigned for gender-sensitive budgeting by local councils, which helped prompt the recruitment of gender desk officers in all local councils in Sierra Leone. A consortium of CSOs composed of CARL, Trócaire, Caritas Sierra Leone, Rainbow Initiative, and other organizations successfully lobbied for a budget allocation for the SLP’s family support unit, which deals with sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and had struggled with meagre resources.

Green Scenery intensified its advocacy on land rights in partnership with the Malen Affected Land Owners Association (MALOA) in 2021. In February, the president visited Sahn Malen Chiefdom to talk with key stakeholders, including MALOA, about a long-standing controversy over community land leased to the Socfin Company for palm-oil production. The government committed to resolving the conflict through a series of specific actions. In May, after years of advocacy by Green Scenery and MALOA, Socfin acted on community concerns and abandoned its practice of dumping waste chemicals near farmland and streams.

AdvocAid, CARL, ILRAJ, and other organizations worked successfully with the government to abolish the death penalty in 2021, thereby improving the country’s human rights record. During the Universal Periodic Review in 2021, the government considered CSOs’ positions and accepted recommendations put forward by HRDN and other organizations. Most recommendations submitted by the election observation mission, whose members included NEW and international groups such as the EU, African Union, and Carter Center, were accepted by the Electoral Commission and Political Parties Registration Commission.

CGG, CARL, ActionAid Sierra Leone, and other CSOs urged the government to continue the Constitutional Review Process, which had been on hold since 2017. In December 2021, the government released a whitepaper with recommendations for a new constitution. The proposals included separating the offices of the attorney general and minister of justice, which CSOs such as CGG, CARL, IGR, and 50/50 Group had recommended for years.

Legal Link, SLAJ, and other CSOs lobbied the Ministry of Information and Communications and the parliament to revise the 2021 Cyber Crime Bill, which lacked references to basic human rights tenets and protection standards. The end result was the improved Cyber Security and Crimes Act 2021. CSOs also cooperated with the government to push for passage of the Land Rights Bill, which, when passed, will reduce the powers of paramount chiefs. BAN and other organizations successfully urged that the country’s tax base be expanded to include the informal sector and engaged with the Ministry of Finance for greater accountability on foreign aid.
Advocacy on behalf of the CSO sector, led by CARL, HRDN, Society for Democratic Initiatives, and other organizations, resulted in MOPED’s agreement to put together a committee to review the DCF. The committee is expected to propose recommendations that will create a better operating environment for CSOs by reducing the bureaucracy involved in registration and limiting the government’s ability to micro-manage CSOs.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.9**

Service provision was stable in 2021.

CSOs provide a wide range of services in the social sectors, especially health care, agriculture, and education. For example, the Rural and Development Agency based in Bo District constructs and supports peripheral health-care units in remote communities; the SEND Foundation constructs schools, provides learning materials, and runs a school feeding program in the eastern region; and ActionAid Sierra Leone supports education in various districts. In 2021, CSOs continued to fight against COVID-19, particularly by raising awareness about the importance of vaccinations. Most organizations found it difficult in 2021 to obtain financial support for activities that were not related to COVID-19. Exceptionally, Caritas Sierra Leone was able to secure funds from the German Embassy to provide food and non-food items to families suffering after disastrous fires in Susan’s Bay.

CSOs seek to respond to community needs. However, in 2021, as they continued to face increased demands for their services, most CSOs lacked the resources to meet the full scope of needs, especially in education, health care, social enterprises, and youth employment. A growing number of CSOs would like to offer education to communities so that they can learn to advocate for themselves, but funding for this sort of training and technical assistance has been unavailable.

NEW, CARL, IGR, and several other organizations regularly publish reports, newsletters, and policy briefs that reach large audiences via email and social media.

CSOs do not generally seek to recover the cost of their work. Beneficiaries expect services to be free of charge and feel exploited if they must pay for them.

The government publicly recognized CSOs’ contributions in 2021. For example, Caritas Sierra Leone was cited by the vice president for its efforts to curb the pandemic and respond to the fire disaster. The Ministry of Finance applauded a campaign by BAN and other partners to cancel the country’s debt, while the Ministry of Gender expressed appreciation for the work of women’s groups on the Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment Bill.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.2**

The infrastructure supporting Sierra Leone’s CSOs remained the same in 2021.

Apart from an outmoded facility equipped with out-of-date materials on human rights hosted by the Port Loko District Human Right Committee, few resource centers exist. A handful of organizations publish reports in their areas of expertise and distribute them electronically on social media.

There are no local grantmaking institutions in Sierra Leone. A few international CSOs, including Trócaire, Catholic Relief Services, and some UN agencies, redistribute donor funding to their partners or provide activity-based funding to CSOs and CBOs.

CSO networks and coalitions are mostly thematic, with like-minded organizations forming consortia to work in areas such as health care, education, governance, fiscal management, human rights, and elections. The West Africa Network for Peacebuilding-Sierra Leone leads a network of organizations focused on peace and security; HRDN’s
members are well known for documenting human rights violations; BAN is trusted for its members’ expertise in budgeting and financial management; and NEW remains the biggest national network, with 400 NGOs, CSOs, CBOs, and faith-based organizations working on election observation. A growing number of platforms are concerned with the rights of women, the disabled, and the aged. Most networks offered only training to their members in 2021 as funding for other services was not available. Tensions and competition sometimes emerge between networks working in similar spaces. No one organization serves as the recognized public mouthpiece for the entire sector. Many organizations view SLANGO as representing the interests of the government rather than CSOs. The Civil Society Forum is a newly created space for discussing and building consensus on issues related to domestic CSOs. The forum was pioneered by MOPED and is modelled on the NGO Forum, a channel that represents the views of international CSOs.

Few training opportunities were available in 2021. In partnership with the Leading Change Network, OSIWA hosted an online workshop and a regional meeting in Accra, Ghana, on women’s empowerment, political participation, and the protection of rights-based activists. Urgent Action Fund provided training to help women human rights defenders promote mental well-being in the sector. Frontline Defenders conducted a needs assessment of human rights defenders and used it to roll out various training components for individuals and organizations. The West Africa Civil Society Institute provided technical capacity strengthening to five environmental and conservation organizations with support from the Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund. Most training is held in the capital or online.

CSOs continued to form partnerships with the government, businesses, and the media in 2021. Radio Democracy partnered with the Asmaa James Foundation and LAWYERS to raise awareness of rape and sexual violence against children. Their efforts led to the establishment in 2021 of one-stop centers for SGBV victims and the Sexual Offenses Model Court. SLAJ worked with CARL on the Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes Act. Many CSOs worked actively with the government on the response to COVID-19.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.0**

CSOs’ public image improved slightly in 2021 as the media’s positive reporting on CSOs cemented trust in the sector.

Media coverage of CSOs was mostly positive in 2021 and focused on their activities and achievements. CSOs’ frequent presence in media such as African Young Voices Television, Radio Democracy, and Epic Radio 99 assured them of a role in setting the national agenda. Electronic and social media provided much more coverage of CSOs than print media. Some media outlets, including the state public broadcaster, provide little space for dissenting views and gave scant coverage to CSOs that were critical of the government in 2021.

Public perceptions of CSOs remained positive in 2021. Communities appreciate CSOs’ contributions. For example, available data shows that services provided by Rainbow Initiative, such as free medical care for victims of SGBV, are valued by both recipients and their communities. The public is usually able to distinguish between
credible and rogue organizations as well as those supported by the political machinery. The public welcomes CSOs’ impartial, nonpartisan views on issues of national concern, such as the mid-term census in 2021.

Government and business perceptions of CSOs continued to be mixed in 2021. Both sectors rely on CSOs because of citizens’ trust in them. While politicians applaud CSOs’ efforts if their interests are served, they tend to tar CSOs as members of the opposition if they are critical of government actions. Some politicians seek to pit CSO leaders against each other to divide and weaken civic space. Businesses shy away from funding CSOs to avoid the perception that they support CSOs’ criticism of the government or CSOs’ promotion of good governance and rights-based approaches.

CSOs continued in 2021 to engage with the media to promote their activities, showcase their work, and build a positive public image. Citizen’s Advocacy Network, Christian Legal Link, Forward Sierra Leone, and ILRAJ regularly used social media such as WhatsApp and Facebook to tell their stories and set the agenda for public discourse. Some organizations maintained healthy, mutually beneficial relationships with journalists, with CSOs providing the content and media practitioners packaging it for public consumption. Smaller and rural organizations sometimes displayed banners and sign boards and participate in radio talk shows to heighten their visibility.

Self-regulation is missing in the CSO sector in Sierra Leone, mainly because of the lack of an overarching, functioning umbrella body. Some networks, coalitions, and consortiums have codes of ethics with guidelines for their member organizations. For example, the members of the National Civil Society Coalition, NEW, and BAN sign on to codes of ethics that are robustly monitored and have mandatory penalties, including the removal of members that flout the rules. In 2021, the majority of CSOs did not produce annual reports. The few that did publish reports did so electronically as printing hard copies can be quite expensive.
Throughout 2021, South Africa remained under the national state of disaster declared on March 15, 2020, when the first cases of the COVID-19 virus were reported in the country. Despite restrictions on movement and public assembly, South Africa experienced the worst civil unrest since before the country became a democracy in 1994. The unrest was fueled largely by the withdrawal of relief funds, ongoing pandemic restrictions, increasing poverty, and anger over corruption and unemployment. In July, after former president Jacob Zuma was imprisoned for refusing to appear at the Zondo Commission investigating state capture and corruption, protests broke out in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal, leading to widespread looting and violence. In response, the government deployed armed forces, and more than 330 people died during the protests. The total economic loss caused by the unrest was estimated at ZAR 50 billion (approximately $3.5 billion), according to Statistics South Africa. The looting was condemned by several CSOs, including Amnesty International and Business Unity South Africa.

In November 2021, South Africa held generally peaceful local government elections. Voter turnout was exceptionally low, and the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), received less than 50 percent of the vote for the first time since the beginning of multiparty democracy. CSOs such as Defend our Democracy, Ahmed Kathrada Foundation, Media Monitoring Africa, and Organization Undoing Tax Abuse (OUTA) requested that the country’s security agencies be on high alert during the elections and called on other CSOs to register as election observers.

South Africa continued to suffer from the COVID-19 pandemic in 2021. In late November, South African scientists discovered the new, highly infectious Omicron strain of COVID-19, which caused many countries to reinstate bans on travel from South Africa and other countries in the region. The National Department of Health began a COVID-19 vaccination program in February, first for health care workers and later for the entire population. Despite government and CSO campaigns urging people to get vaccinated, only one third of South Africa’s adult population was fully vaccinated by the end of the year.

Criticism mounted of the government’s COVID-19 social-distress relief grants, which were intended to help households suffering financially because of the pandemic. The grants fell far below the estimated national food poverty line, and after they ended in April 2021, food insecurity increased. School-aged children were especially hard hit, both because of problems with the National School Nutrition Program and because of children’s inability to return to school. The fifth wave of the National Income Dynamics Study–Coronavirus Rapid Mobile Survey estimated that 750,000 South African children dropped out of school or did not return to school in 2021, the highest drop-out rate in twenty years. The relaxation of COVID-19 control measures during the year allowed children to finally return to school in person.
After almost two years of pandemic-related lockdowns and constraints, South Africa’s gross domestic product increased by 4.9 percent in 2021, returning to the economic growth rate of 2017, according to Statistics South Africa. The consumer price index increased to 5.9 in December 2021, also the highest since 2017. The unemployment rate, including people who had stopped looking for work, stood at 46.6 percent, compared to 43.1 percent in 2020. Job losses were reported in almost all sectors except the informal sector, with women more affected than men. The country continued to experience frequent load shedding, as Eskom, the national power producer, struggled to generate adequate power.

The overall sustainability of CSOs in South Africa remained unchanged in 2021. Advocacy improved slightly as CSOs were more involved in policy making and stood up for the most vulnerable. Service delivery improved slightly as CSOs played a major role in responding to the unrest in July and continued to provide pandemic-related services. The legal environment deteriorated slightly because of media threats and state harassment of organizations and activists. The financial viability of CSOs continued its decline as corporate social investment (CSI) spending went down. CSOs’ organizational capacity, sectoral infrastructure, and public image were stable.

The number of registered CSOs increased in 2021. As of September 2021, 248,902 CSOs were registered with the Nonprofit Organizations (NPO) Directorate in the Department of Social Development (DSD), up from 230,000 in October 2020. The number of public benefit organizations (PBOs) listed on the South African Revenue Service (SARS) website saw a major increase from nearly 25,700 in March 2021 to 62,993 by the end of September 2021. Developmental needs related to COVID-19 and the year’s civil unrest, along with increased population growth and increased service-delivery needs, were probably behind the increase.

### LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 3.3

![Legal Environment Graph]

The legal environment for South African CSOs deteriorated slightly since 2020, largely because of incidents of state harassment and threats to media.

The 1997 NPO Act provides a stable legal framework for the sector. CSOs are not required to register but must do so to receive government funding. Most CSOs register as voluntary associations under the NPO Act or as nonprofit companies (NPCs) under the Companies Act. Individual organizations may register as both NPOs and NPCs, although most smaller organizations lack the administrative and financial capacity to do so. NPC registration has the advantage of allowing funders to claim tax benefits. CSOs register at no cost either online or in person at DSD offices. Registration usually takes about two months. In a somewhat more complex process, CSOs may also register as nonprofit trusts with the master of the Supreme Court under the Trust Property Control Act. The NPO Act requires registered organizations to submit audited financial reports and narrative reports annually to the NPO Directorate.

In 2021, DSD reintroduced the Know Your NPO Status campaign to help CSOs comply with their legal obligations. Many observers saw this campaign not as an educational effort but as a way to deregister non-compliant CSOs from the DSD database. While it is not publicly known how many organizations were deregistered in 2021, the number was probably in the thousands.

After many delays, DSD started to amend the NPO Act in 2021. Recommendations regarding the registration of foreign CSOs aroused concern that the DSD was aiming to control foreign philanthropy and limit CSOs’ ability to accept funds from foreign donors. As a way to address issues arising from Financial Action Task Force (FATF) requirements and United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions related to identifying entities and persons engaged in money laundering and terrorist activities, the DSD recommended that CSO boards have a minimum of six members rather than leaving the number up to individual organizations. CSOs feared that this number might be difficult to achieve. The CSO sector was invited to comment on the recommended changes by October 2021, which was later extended to February 2022. Organizations such as Inyathelo: The South African Institute for...
Advancement, NGO Law, Equal Education, National Coalition for Social Services, and Media Monitoring Africa monitored the proposed reforms closely.

CSOs in South Africa operate freely. However, despite a 2018 Constitutional Court ruling affirming citizens’ right to protest, the ban on public gatherings imposed during the pandemic in 2020 remained in effect through most of 2021. Some organizations and activists experienced harassment. For example, protesters demonstrating against the activities of the Ikwezi Mining Kliprand Colliery were arrested in KwaZulu-Natal in March 2021. In March, the South African Police Force used excessive force to disperse students at the University of the Witwatersrand protesting the exclusion of students with historic debt, killing one bystander. Increased threats to whistle blowers and trade union leaders were also noted, including the assassination in August of a key witness in an investigation into the corrupt procurement of personal protective equipment and the death, also in August, of a leader of the National Union of Metalworkers during a labor dispute. Because of these trends, the CIVICUS Monitor downgraded South Africa’s civic space from “narrowed” to “obstructed” in 2021. News media also came under increased pressure during the year. The phone of a News24 journalist covering discontent in the police force in February was found to be bugged. Journalists covering incidents of unrest in July were attacked and intimidated by demonstrators and looters, and four community radio stations were looted and damaged. Police detained a Newsroom Afrika journalist who was covering local government elections in November on accusations of distracting an election official. He was freed after an outcry from the South Africa National Editors’ Forum.

CSOs may register with SARS for refunds of value-added tax paid on goods and services. The SARS website provides clear information on the process for obtaining refunds. CSOs registered as PBOs receive preferential tax treatment and are allowed to accept tax-deductible donations if the donations are used for specified activities. PBOs must submit annual financial reports to SARS to maintain their tax-exempt status. A number of CSOs report that SARS is very slow in providing PBO certificates.

CSOs have access to a range of legal services. For example, the public-interest law center Section27 advances human rights in South Africa; the Charities Aid Foundation (CAF) Southern Africa works with LegalWise, a company offering legal insurance, to provide legal services to CSOs; and the Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa has a database of law clinics and attorneys providing pro bono assistance. These clinics include the Legal Resource Center, Lawyers for Human Rights, and Legal Aid South Africa. A number of organizations, such as the foundation DGMT, assist CSOs with the registration process. Some corporations, including Werksmans, Bowman, and Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyer, offer pro bono legal or financial services to individual CSOs.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.0**

The organizational capacity of CSOs stabilized in 2021 after a moderate decline in 2020.

CSOs generally have good working relationships with their constituencies. In the lead-up to local government elections in 2021, the Triangle Project partnered with other CSOs, such as Equal Education and My Vote Counts, to host workshops aimed at engaging community members in the electoral process. The COVID-19 Front built constituencies by linking civil society actors and building relationships among various stakeholders. The group also worked with the National Economic Development and Labor Council’s Community Trust and Civil Society Forum to expand the reach of services related to COVID-19. Many CSOs, including the Imbumba Foundation, Gift of the Givers, and Afrika Tikkun, engaged regularly with their constituencies on social media.

Some CSOs, such as Lesedi la Batho and FoodForward SA, rely increasingly on clearly defined strategic plans and display clearly stated missions and visions on their websites and in their annual reports. At the same time, CSOs generally use the data collected through monitoring and evaluation for required reports to funders and their boards rather than for strategic planning and program revision. The CSO sector’s capacity for monitoring and
evaluation decreased slightly in 2021, with 70 percent of CSOs reporting that they had full-time internal staff dedicated to this task, compared to 79 percent in 2020, according to the Trialogue Business in Society Handbook 2021. Nevertheless, 95 percent of CSOs reported that they measured the outcomes of some of their interventions and 49 percent measured the outcomes of all of their interventions. In 2021, Nation Builder launched guidelines developed in collaboration with ninety-five organizations and funders to provide CSOs with standards and best practices for reporting on the impact of their work.

All CSO board members serve on a voluntary basis. Inyathelo, which provides governance training to CSO boards, reports that board members often do not understand their role and engage in operational functions instead of oversight. Board members sometimes offer effective assistance with their organizations’ risk management but fail to evaluate their own performance.

Staffing remains a major concern at many CSOs. CSOs have experienced reductions in budgets for staff as donors have reduced their core funding. CSO employees are increasingly paid less and enjoy fewer benefits, and CSOs report that they lack adequate financial and administrative capacity to attend to staff wellness. Several reports indicated that CSOs’ staff were experiencing high levels of stress and anxiety in 2021 because of extreme fatigue caused by virtual working conditions and increased anxiety after the July civil unrest. CSOs often make use of professional consultants in monitoring and evaluation, communications, and audits. Health Justice Initiative, Ipas South Africa, and other organizations use consultants to assist with the development of strategic plans.

More than 70 percent of private businesses, including Standard Bank and the Discovery insurance company, encourage their staff to volunteer for CSOs, according to the Trialogue Business in Society Handbook 2021. CSOs sometimes complain that these volunteer services do not always serve their needs. Because of the pandemic, some corporate volunteer programs were on hold in 2021, while other businesses, such as the Nal’ibali Reading program, introduced online volunteering initiatives or moved existing volunteer programs online. The For Good virtual volunteering platform supported various organizations through donation collection drives, virtual fundraising, and volunteering opportunities. At the same time, only 14 percent of CSOs had budgets to manage volunteers and volunteer programs in 2021, a reduction of 4 percent from 2020, according to the Trialogue Business in Society Handbook 2021.

In 2021, despite high costs and disruptions caused by frequent load shedding, CSOs continued to use social media and other digital platforms to facilitate their work and disseminate information. For example, the Seriti Institute continued to host its Seriti Talks on topics such as COVID-19 vaccination mandates, early childhood development, and food security on Zoom, which enabled more individuals and CSOs to take part. CSOs reported that they increasingly worked online, and some organizations installed wi-fi in their centers and offices for beneficiaries to access.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.9**

CSOs’ financial viability declined in 2021 for the fifth year in a row, largely because of the civil unrest and South Africa’s general economic decline. An October 2021 report from Epic Africa stated that 60 percent of CSOs reported a loss of funding in 2021 because of COVID-19. This data is somewhat contradicted by the Trialogue Business in Society Handbook 2021, which found that only 11 percent of CSOs said that their income decreased in 2021 (compared to nearly 72 percent in 2020), while 56 percent of CSOs reported that their income increased. However, the number of CSOs with no cash reserves increased from one third in 2020 to more than half in 2021. Only 21 percent of NPOs had more than six months’ operating costs in reserve, compared to 34 percent in 2020, the Trialogue Business in Society Handbook 2021 reported.
Foreign funding for CSOs continued to decrease in 2021. For example, UK Aid’s overall budget for South Africa shrank from GBP 26.3 million (approximately $34.7 million) in 2020–21 to GBP 15.4 million (approximately $20.5 million) in 2021–22. USAID funding for South Africa decreased from $403 million in 2020 to $272 million in 2021, of which $251 million was for HIV/AIDS-related interventions, $34 million for COVID-19 control measures, and $15 million for tuberculosis-related interventions. Foreign funding continued to be directed largely to the COVID-19 pandemic response in 2021.

The government launched several new funding initiatives benefitting CSOs in 2021. In February, the government worked with the private sector to create the Gender-Based Violence and Femicide Response Fund, to which South African businesses and global philanthropies pledged more than ZAR 128 million (approximately $9 million). Of this amount, ZAR 69 million (approximately $4.9 million) was dispersed to 110 CSOs focused on protecting and achieving justice for victims of gender-based violence (GBV). The Solidarity Fund, a nonprofit organization established in 2020 with contributions from corporations, individuals, and other groups to respond to pandemic-related needs, supported, for example, the GBV response of the National Shelter Movement of South Africa and Gift of the Givers. The Solidarity Fund set up an additional fund, the Humanitarian Crisis Relief Fund, to provide emergency relief after the civil unrest. In November, the government launched the Social Employment Fund, valued at ZAR 800 million (approximately $56 million), to support CSOs helping to create job opportunities, promote food security and health care, and provide educational services.

The private sector continued to provide substantial support to CSOs in 2021. Fifty-three percent of all CSI went to CSOs, amounting to 28 percent of the sector’s total income in 2021, according to the Trialogue Business Handbook 2021. Almost three quarters of organizations reported that they received corporate funding. At the same time, almost 50 percent of companies reported that they decreased CSI in 2021, which overall fell by 4 percent to ZAR 10.3 billion (approximately $720 million). A sharp decline was evident in CSI support for educational services, which fell from 50 percent of the total amount in 2020 to 39 percent in 2021, according to the Trialogue Business Handbook 2021. The private sector encourages employees to donate money to their CSI funds and other sources of funding for CSOs. For example, employees and board members of the Industrial Development Corporation donated funds to the Solidarity Fund. The number of corporate entities making non-cash contributions to CSOs, including goods, products, services, and volunteer time, increased in 2021.

In spite of a rough financial year, individuals continued to contribute to CSOs in 2021. About 11 percent of the sector’s total funding in 2021 was from individuals, a slight decline from 14 percent in 2020. According to CAF Southern Africa, 47 percent of South Africans report that they donate money, goods, or services to CSOs and religious organizations.

Because of the sector’s weakening financial viability, CSOs are seeking to diversify their funding sources. Almost 48 percent of CSOs engage in some type of income-generating activity, despite the fact that more than half of organizations lack full-time staff devoted to fundraising, according to the Trialogue Business Handbook 2021. CSOs typically rely on digital fundraising campaigns, the sale of products and services, and mail and telephone calls to raise additional funds. For example, the Lockdown Collection, whose Vulnerable Artist Fund assists young artists, raises funds by selling art, collecting donations, and hosting art auctions. Imbumba Foundation provides CSOs with paid consulting services on financial management.

All registered NPOs must submit annual audited financial reports to the NPO Directorate to maintain their active registration. Larger CSOs often enlist the help of professional auditing firms to assist with financial reporting. Smaller CSOs often rely on the financial skills of their board members. DSD reported in late 2021 that more than 50 percent of organizations were not compliant with the financial reporting requirement and it would start phased deregistration of non-compliant organizations.

**ADVOCACY: 2.6**

CSO advocacy improved in 2021 for the fourth year in a row as CSOs were more involved in policy making and stood up for the most vulnerable.

The government recognizes the importance of engaging with CSOs, and policymakers often request input from them on pending legislation and legislative reform. For example, in 2021, DSD asked CSOs for comments during public hearings on the Children’s Amendment Bill, which would improve child protection services, foster care, and...
adoption services and ensure that migrant children receive services. The government also consulted with CSOs to inform decision making on the extension of social and economic support to individuals affected by the pandemic. The Social Housing Regulatory Association, for example, briefed the Portfolio Committee on Human Settlements on rental relief for social-housing beneficiaries affected by COVID-19. However, CSOs are not always invited to be part of policy-making processes, and in some instances, CSOs that are not funded by government departments such as DSD are deliberately excluded.

Although Equal Education, Equal Education Law Center, Section 27, and two school governing bodies won a High Court case to force the government to provide meals to children covered by the National School Nutrition Program, many students still did not receive school meals in 2021. In July, the same applicants filed another application with the High Court to ensure the government’s adherence to the 2020 court order. A settlement agreement was reached that requires provincial education departments to draft new plans and report monthly on progress on implementation. CSOs such as Zero Dropout Campaign urged the Department of Basic Education to develop effective catch-up plans after students lost almost a year of schooling between 2020 and 2021.

South African CSOs are very active on issues related to the rights of women and sexual minorities. In September 2021, following advocacy by Sonke Gender Justice and other organizations, the parliament passed three GBV-related bills to strengthen the rights of women and children. In November, the Human Rights Institute of South Africa, Women’s Legal Center, and Sisonke National Sex Workers Movement advocated at the UN Human Rights Committee for the equal implementation of the national minimum wage, the de-stigmatization of sex work, and the protection of land and property rights of women. Female-led trade unions, the Women’s Legal Center, and other CSOs successfully urged the government to ratify the International Labor Organization Violence and Harassment Convention 2019 (No. 190) in 2021.

In March 2021, Human Rights Watch filed a submission with the Department of Home Affairs to address a draft policy that would not allow individuals to change their sex or gender on the national identity system. CSOs in partnership with the European Union worked with the government to review policies on the protection of transgender and intersex persons in November 2021.

Environmental advocacy increased in 2021 as the National Business Initiative, C40Cities, and World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) worked towards “net zero by 2050” to ensure South Africa’s adherence to the Paris Agreement. In a significant victory for environmental protection, CSOs such as Greenpeace Africa and Natural Justice and small, local organizations such as the Border Deep Sea Angling Association and Kei Mouth Ski Boat Club successfully advocated to prevent the Shell Corporation from conducting seismic surveys off the South African Eastern Cape coast. The Wilderness Foundation Africa had regular briefings with parliamentarians on environmental topics such as greening the economy and wildlife trade.

In November, Black Sash, Cry of the Excluded, and other CSOs protested outside the parliament building in favor of a basic income grant. Section 27, together with Blind SA, asked for the Copyright Act of 1978 to be declared unconstitutional, as it prevents copyright-protected products to be translated into braille or certain electronic formats without the permission of the producer. Media Monitoring Africa and the International Commission of Jurists asked to be declared friends of the court in this case.

CSOs also followed up on policy changes that they had influenced in the past. For example, at the end of 2021, My Vote Counts and OUTA declared their concern that only three political parties had declared their donations under changes to the Political Party Funding Bill, which was promulgated in February 2021 and came into effect in April 2021 after advocacy by many CSOs. Section 27 successfully sued the Department of Basic Education a second time to ensure that all schools in Limpopo were provided with proper sanitation facilities.

In addition, the Active Citizens Movement wrote to the deputy chief justice heading the judicial commission of inquiry into state capture asking that whistle blowers be better protected and proposing amendments to the
Protected Disclosures Act of 2000 to provide legal protection and access to specialized courts for whistleblowers. The Civil Society Working Group on State Capture offered a platform for engaging, strengthening, and overseeing the Zondo Commission and made several evidence-based submissions. Similarly, the Parliamentary Monitoring Group, a partnership between Black Sash, Human Rights Committee, and Idasa, provided current information on committee proceedings and parliamentary activity. Various CSOs, including the Inclusive Society Institute and Helen Suzman Foundation, worked on changes to the electoral system. The Asivikelane Initiative, which emerged during the COVID-19 lockdown, is a novel local government outgrowth focused on service delivery and budget monitoring processes that offers CSOs and informal settlements the ability to work together with local municipalities.

After DSD began to work on the NPO Amendment Act in October 2021, Media Monitoring Africa, Inyathelo, and other CSOs actively engaged with the sector to ensure wide participation in providing comments on the draft bill. They established a working group to represent the sector during the amendment process and regularly communicated with DSD, including making a successful request to extend the date for comments on the bill. Inyathelo and other CSOs hosted a webinar for CSOs on the proposed bill.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.1**

CSO service provision improved slightly in 2021 as the sector played a major role in responding to the unrest in July and continued to provide pandemic-related services. More than two-thirds of CSOs work in education, health care, and social welfare and continued to provide services in those areas in 2021, according to the Trialogue Business Handbook 2021. Twenty-nine percent of CSOs reported that they worked in food security or agriculture, an increase of 9 percent from 2020. Fifty-four percent of CSOs reported that the demand for their services increased in 2021.

As in 2020, many CSOs adapted their programs and interventions to deal with the pandemic. While 28 percent of CSOs scaled down their operations, only 5 percent put programs on hold because of COVID-19, the Trialogue Business Handbook 2021 reported. Programs continuing from 2020 included the Community Response program of the Seriti Institute, which focused on strengthening food resilience and reducing food insecurity, and the Seriti Partner program, which helped communities transition from relief to resilience with support from the 11th Hour Project, FoodForward SA, Meal SA, Social Justice Initiative, WWF Nedbank Green Trust, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, UN Development Programme, and local CSOs.

Some CSOs also adjusted their programming because of the civil unrest. Afrika Tikkun helped rebuild township economies after the unrest by launching the #RevivingTownshipEconomies campaign. Some CSOs could not deliver services during the unrest. For example, the warehouse of FoodForward SA in KwaZulu-Natal was vandalized and looted, cutting food supplies for 1,200 smaller CSOs that normally deliver 4 million meals per month to the poor.

During the holidays at the end of the year, a number of CSOs provided additional food parcels, soup kitchen services, and meals to the homeless in the Western Cape. Organizations such as Ladles of Love expanded the number of weekly soup kitchens in cooperation with Hope Exchange. CSOs providing emergency response services, such as TEARS Foundation, increased their services to GBV victims. With the help of First for Women, a private insurance company, TEARS Foundation appointed additional staff members to provide mobile services to victims of GBV.

The government recognized the value of CSOs’ work at various events in 2021. During an online event in July 2021, President Cyril Ramaphosa, in consultation with South African political party leaders and other sectors, acknowledged the government’s partnerships with civil society in developing society-wide responses and curbing
The 2021 CSO Sustainability Index for South Africa

President Cyril Ramaphosa expressed appreciation for CSOs’ contribution to sustaining livelihoods at the launch of the Social Employment Fund in November. He thanked CSOs for their additional support. The president also expressed appreciation for CSOs’ contribution to sustaining livelihoods at the launch of the Social Employment Fund in November.

SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 3.6

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector was stable in 2021.

Several resource centers provide services to CSOs. Inyathelo provides advisory services, training, and other support in areas such as financial management and fundraising. The National Institute of Community Development and Management offers training on organizational development and social entrepreneurship. The Sustainable Development Network provides training to CSOs across sub-Saharan Africa on such topics as monitoring and evaluation, project management, financial management, and resource mobilization.

South Africa has a number of local grantmaking organizations providing support to CSOs. They include the Mergon Early Childhood Development Foundation, Joint Gender Fund of the Hlanganisa Institute for Development, Open Society Foundation for South Africa, and Solidarity Fund. The Funding Practice Alliance, a CSO partnership, works to transform the relationship between CSOs and grantmakers through research on CSO sustainability and the dissemination of information. Inyathelo regularly publicizes funding opportunities online and provides strategic-planning resources to CSOs.

South African CSOs commonly create sectoral networks of support. For example, the National Association of Social Change Entities in Education (NASCEE), a member-led, member-driven organization, builds networks of CSOs working in education across the country and provides training and other learning opportunities to its partners with funding from the Education, Training, and Development Practices Sector Education Training Authority. The Southern African Food Lab and various community action networks engage with local networks to create linkages and deliver services. The Cape Town Together community action network, which was established in 2020 to respond to the pandemic, remained active in 2021, with more than fifty networks assisting with food relief and other social services. Shukumisa is a coalition of over sixty CSOs that cooperate to combat sexual violence and GBV.

CSOs had access to various training opportunities in 2021. The Bertha Center for Social Innovation and Entrepreneurship at the University of Cape Town helped community action networks expand their services and work more closely with various government departments. Tshikululu, Sonke Gender Justice, and Media Monitoring Africa provided training to other CSOs, often at no cost as the training was supported through grant awards. Inyathelo provided a free nonprofit clinic on mentorship and training, and Trialogue provided training on monitoring and evaluation, strategic planning, and report writing. NASCEE provided training on monitoring and evaluation and research skills. The African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes provided twelve women-led CSOs with capacity building on conflict management, mediation, and facilitation. Training and Resources in Early Education provided training to rural-based early childhood development centers in KwaZulu-Natal, along with networking opportunities, access to educational resources, and individual support. However, many smaller CSOs struggled to access online training because of data costs, and training opportunities were limited for rural CSOs.

Significant collaboration between CSOs and the private sector continued in 2021. The Trialogue Business in Society Handbook 2021 reported that 55 percent of corporations believe that their collaboration with CSOs improved during the year. After the July unrest, Tiger Brands, a food manufacturer, collaborated with CSOs such as SA Harvest, Food Forward, and Gift of the Givers to provide food parcels to vulnerable households. The Industrial Development Corporation spent more than ZAR 11 million (approximately $785,000) to support soup kitchens, women’s shelters, and Thuthuzela Care Centers assisting victims of sexual assault. AVBOB, a funeral
home, created a disaster relief fund to help CSOs and small, medium-sized, and micro-enterprises rebuild their organizations.

Some CSOs have active agreements with government departments and work directly with them. For example, in 2021, the Imbumba Foundation partnered with the Mpumalanga Department of Education to provide sanitary supplies to school-aged girls. FoodForward SA partnered with the Western Cape Department of Health and the Pick n Pay Feed the Nation Foundation to provide food hampers to vulnerable people in the Western Cape. This project was later nationalized. Nation Builder reported that CSO-government partnerships created during the COVID-19 lockdown in 2020 were maintained and improved in 2021. In Hillbrow, for example, MES, a social development organization, worked with the government to deliver essentials to people in need. Similarly, the KwaZulu-Natal government convened with labor unions and CSOs to intensify comprehensive responses to the July unrest. Since October 2021, in an effort to increase COVID-19 vaccination efforts, the government led Yooma Vaccination Weekends together with civil society and other sectors.

CSOs also worked with media to publicize critical issues. Imbumba, for example, established strategic partnerships with media houses such as ENews Channel Africa and the South Africa Broadcasting Corporation to promote its work and create awareness of the plight of girls. The Unrest Business Recovery Support, which was established in 2021 and funded by the Industrial Development Corporation, provided financial relief to small businesses and informal traders in Gauteng. The Imbumba Foundation launched the Rise food-parcel relief campaign and partnered with other organizations to mobilize resources. Doctors Without Borders, Humanitarian Development Alliance SA, and Abahlali baseMjondolo responded to the July unrest by distributing food donations to communities. The Solidarity Fund also provided food parcels.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.5**

CSOs' public image was unchanged in 2021.

During the year, the media reported positively on CSOs' emergency responses, medical assistance, and food services during the civil unrest. They also reported on the efforts of doctors and scientists working for various CSOs to fight the COVID-19 pandemic. The work of the Imbumba Foundation was covered by eNCA, SABC, and Media24. South African media coverage of the sector was boosted by the work of GroundUp and New Frame media, which intentionally foreground communities and those who work with them. The Seriti Institute’s work in early childhood development was widely covered, especially by the Mail & Guardian. The Daily Maverick continued its “Maverick Citizen” feature, which focuses on marginalized and underprivileged communities.

Public perceptions of CSOs continued to be positive in 2021. The 2022 Edelman Trust Barometer indicated that public trust in the CSO sector increased from 60 percent in 2020 to 63 percent in 2021. The South African Reconciliation Barometer similarly reported that the public trusts CSOs to assist in time of crisis. The public increasingly expects the government to recognize and support the work of CSOs, according to a 2021 study by CAF Southern Africa. At the policy level, the government clearly recognizes CSOs as development partners but does not always include them in development planning processes, according to a study by Mwauche and Flanigan.

The private sector recognizes that CSOs are at the forefront of providing support to communities and actively seeks to work with them.

The Trialogue Business in Society Handbook 2021 reported that 75 percent of all CSOs have at least one full-time or part-time employee to manage communications. CSOs, joined by members of the public, promote their work and needs on social media, especially Facebook and Twitter. CSOs actively build relationships with newsrooms to garner publicity.
CSOs usually operate in an ethical, compliant way. More than 200 CSOs subscribe to the Independent Code of Governance for Non-Profit Organisations in South Africa, which was created by a group of CSOs in 2021. CIVICUS’s Legitimacy, Transparency, and Accountability program produced a guide to self-regulation and established a community of practice to help CSOs become more transparent and accountable. Since 2021, CSOs can also validate their work on the Validate4Good website supported by CAF Southern Africa. The website provides CSOs with guidance on complying with the requirements of national and international donors. The Service Dining Rooms, which ensure food security for the homeless in Cape Town, created a guide of standard operating practices to ensure compliant operations. Journalists typically adhere to the Voluntary Code of Ethics and Conduct for South African Print and Online Media, and the fact-checking organization Africa Check ensures that the media and CSO sectors are held accountable for what they publish.

Most CSOs publish their annual reports on their websites if they maintain them. Organizations registered with DSD must submit their reports annually to maintain their registration. According to DSD, almost 60 percent of CSOs registered as NPOs are not compliant with the NPO Act of 2020 and have not submitted annual or financial reports within nine months of the end of their financial year. DSD says it does not know how many of these CSO are dormant or simply not complying.
After South Sudanese president Salva Kiir Mayardit and vice president and leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO) Dr. Riek Machar signed the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) in September 2018, the main parties to the agreement dragged their feet in implementing the agreement’s provisions. At the start of 2021, appointments had yet to be made to the country’s two legislative bodies, the Reconstituted Transitional National Legislative Assembly (RTNLA) and the Council of States, and to transitional state legislative assemblies, county legislative councils, and various independent commissions and specialized committees. Other severely delayed reforms included the graduation and deployment of a unified army and the formation of a hybrid court to investigate genocide, war crimes, and other serious crimes under international law. Despite myriad tactical delays, the parties to the agreement were finally forced by internal and international pressure to reconstitute the RTNLA, which formally opened on September 2.

Public frustration with the slow implementation of R-ARCSS was widespread in 2021. In July, the People’s Coalition for Civic Action (PCCA), founded by the executive directors of Sudd Institute (SI), Responsive Governance (RG), Okay Africa Foundation (OAF), and, to a lesser extent, the Foundation for Democracy and Accountable Governance (FODAG), issued a declaration condemning the government for failing to implement the agreement. The group called for peaceful protests throughout the country urging the government to step down on August 30. The move was bitterly opposed by the government, which responded by deploying the army, police, National Security Service (NSS), and Criminal Investigations Department armed with tanks and artillery and authorized to shoot anyone who ventured to protest. Internet services were disrupted on the day of the protests. In Juba, PCCA leaders were pursued by the government, and some were arrested, investigated, and later released on bail while others went into hiding, where they remained through the end of the year.

Violations of the December 2017 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement continued in 2021. Immediately after the government approved the establishment of the Hybrid War Crimes Court in January, clashes erupted between militias from the Kiir-aligned Dinka Padang people and Machar-aligned Nuer communities in Maban County. The Sudan People’s Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO) and the government’s South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF) repeatedly fought throughout the months and accused each other of attacking civilians. Violent inter-communal conflicts persisted throughout the year and led to hundreds of deaths, property theft and looting, and the displacement of many thousands of women, children, and elderly. Clashes between the SSPDF and the National Salvation Front (NAS), a militant rebel group, also continued in 2021, including in NAS-controlled areas in Lainya and Wonduruba.
Because of lower oil exports and disrupted agricultural production, the South Sudanese economy contracted by an estimated 5.4 percent in fiscal year 2020–21. The country’s humanitarian assistance needs remained dire. In addition to the intractable conflict, chronic flooding from May through November 2021 was reported to be the worst since the early 1960s. According to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), more than 1.7 million people were internally displaced by conflict and climate change and another 2.3 million people were refugees in neighboring states in 2021. OCHA estimated that some 8.3 million people, or more than two-thirds of the population, needed some form of humanitarian assistance and protection as the country faced its highest levels of food insecurity and malnutrition since independence in 2011. About 80 percent of the population remained under the international poverty line in 2021, according to the World Bank.

The spread of the COVID-19 virus was fairly contained for much of 2021 as a lockdown from 2020 continued until May 2021. After a spike in cases late in the year, a partial lockdown with limitations on social gatherings introduced at the end of December. Medical personnel treated patients in Juba and across the country while surveillance teams tracked cases. A vaccination campaign began in April 2021, and CSOs helped raise awareness about the importance of getting vaccinated. However, only about 1.4 percent of the population was totally vaccinated by the end of the year, according to the World Health Organization.

South Sudan’s overall CSO sustainability deteriorated slightly in 2021, with negative developments reported in five dimensions. The legal environment deteriorated as the government delayed renewing CSO operating licenses, shut down and froze the bank accounts of several organizations, and arbitrarily arrested or expelled CSO activists and journalists. The sector’s organizational capacity worsened slightly after three especially vibrant advocacy organizations were shut down for an indefinite period and a number of smaller grassroots CSOs were reduced to “briefcase” organizations because of a lack of funding. CSOs’ financial viability deteriorated slightly in 2021 as funding from foreign donors declined. Advocacy was slightly more impeded as several advocacy organizations stopped operating after their offices were closed. Service provision deteriorated slightly as insecurity caused donors to shift funding in some areas. CSOs’ public image was the only dimension recording an improvement, as public views of the sector improved despite the shrinking of civic space. The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector was unchanged.

The exact number of CSOs operating in South Sudan is unknown. The CSO regulatory body, the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) in the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management, keeps track of the number of organizations operating legally but does not publish the information.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 7.0**

The legal environment for South Sudan’s CSOs deteriorated moderately in 2021 as the government delayed renewals of CSO operating licenses, shut down or froze the bank accounts of several organizations, and arbitrarily arrested or expelled CSO activists and journalists. However, the score shows no change from 2020 as in that year South Sudan’s score for this dimension was already at 7.0, the poorest possible score.

The main laws governing CSOs in South Sudan are the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Act 2016 and Relief and Rehabilitation Act 2016. Every year all CSOs must obtain operational licenses from the RRC to maintain their legal status. The registration and renewal process can be bureaucratic and difficult, especially for organizations accused of inappropriate advocacy on politically sensitive issues. For example, the Community Empowerment for Progress Organization (CEPO) encountered a delay in renewing its operating license in 2021 after it engaged in outspoken advocacy on political and security issues, including the implementation of R-ARCSS. In some states, CSOs must renew their operating licenses locally even if they have done so at the national level. The pandemic lockdown and other restrictions in
2021 further complicated registration processes. For example, issuance of an operational license to Women Training and Promotion (WOTAP) was delayed because of the lockdown.

Civic space continued to be extremely constricted in 2021 as the security services arrested or detained political leaders, civil society activists, and journalists and shut down CSOs. On May 5, 2021, the NSS detained a civil society leader who had accused Jonglei State authorities of selling food donated to flood victims. He was charged with defamation and released on bail on the condition that he refrain from accusing government officials again. On July 3, the NSS detained a news anchor from the state-owned South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation after he allegedly refused to read presidential decrees announcing appointments to constitutional posts. The journalist was released on July 4, rearrested the following day, and held for two weeks without being charged, according to the U.S. Department of State 2021 Human Rights Report for South Sudan. On August 2, the NSS arrested the former governor of Northern Bahr el Ghazal State after he signed the PCCA declaration. He was eventually charged with insurgency, causing disaffection among police or defense forces, publishing or communicating false statements prejudicial to South Sudan, and undermining the authority of or insulting the president and remained in detention without being tried through the end of the year. The NSS also detained two SI employees and closed the office, which was not allowed to reopen until November 2021. On August 27, after Radio Jonglei in Bor announced that the PCCA protest would be taking place on August 30, the NSS detained three Jonglei employees and shut down the station, which later re-opened. Altogether, the authorities arrested fourteen persons in relation to the planned PCCA protest, according to the U.S. State Department report. The Central Bank of South Sudan ordered the bank accounts of FODAG, RG, and OAF and the personal bank accounts of their executive directors frozen. The offices of the three organizations remained closed through the end of the year, and the executive directors went into exile. SI later reopened. On September 30, the NSS detained Oxfam International’s country director, a Sudanese national, without charges and refused to allow him to access legal counsel or consular visits. Several days later he was deported without charges or any explanation regarding his detention.

It is mandatory for all CSOs operating in the county to pay taxes to National Revenue Authority at both the national and state levels. CSOs are exempted from duties on imports of electronic equipment, such as radio equipment, because they are viewed as benefitting the South Sudanese people. All CSO employees must pay personal income tax.

The law allows CSOs to engage in income-generating activities provided all income is used to further their organizational objectives. CSOs do not compete for government contracts. CSOs may freely access foreign funding.

CSOs in South Sudan can access legal aid by hiring legal consultants or relying on staff legal experts. These legal practitioners follow up on court cases if journalists or CSO activists are arrested. However, there is generally insufficient supply to meet the demand for legal services by CSOs and CSO activists.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.4**

CSOs’ organizational capacity worsened slightly in 2021 after three especially vibrant advocacy organizations were shut down indefinitely, reducing the number of organizations operating in the country and putting their staff out of work. These closures undermined advocacy and service-provision in thematic and geographic areas in which the organizations operated. In addition, because of a lack of funding, a number of smaller grassroots CSOs were reduced to being “briefcase” organizations without offices and active programs and thus found it harder to push for governance and security reforms or respond to communities in need.

CSOs in South Sudan normally have close relationships with their beneficiaries. But in 2021, some organizations had trouble meeting with their constituents because of bureaucratic obstacles, such as the need to obtain approvals for meetings from the Ministry of Health and security.
clearances from the NSS. In addition, the deteriorating financial situations of smaller, shrunken, and briefcase CSOs meant that they were unable to meet the needs of beneficiaries such as flood-affected victims or even to carry out assessments. Nevertheless, a few well-established CSOs expanded their constituencies in 2021. For example, CEPO worked to promote trust and confidence-building between the civilians and the military in Central Equatoria and Western Bhar el Ghazal states with support from the South Sudan Reconciliation, Stabilization, and Resilience Trust Fund (South Sudan RSRTF), an interagency pooled fund to build peace and stability. Some CSOs expanded their humanitarian assistance. The Organization for Children Harmony (TOCH), for example, delivered humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs) affected by intercommunal conflicts in Tonj in 2021.

South Sudanese CSOs are dedicated to achieving their missions despite the country’s insecurity and shrinking civic space. The executive director of the Organization for Non-Violence and Development (ONAD), who was arrested in 2020 after his organization demanded accountability for government spending, stated in 2021 that “we are here to stay because this is our country where we were born,” adding that South Sudan’s CSOs follow their visions, missions, and values because they believe it is right for the country. In 2021, ONAD and the South Sudan Democratic Engagement Monitoring and Observation Program (SSUDEMOP) engaged in planning around constitutional reform and the elections as part of their missions to establish democracy and good governance in South Sudan.

CSOs’ management structures typically include a board of directors, general assembly, and staff. Operations are guided by an organization’s constitution, which specifies rules such as term limits for board members. In 2021, ONAD adhered to the terms of its constitution by electing new board members and re-electing the secretary general to manage daily operations. Board members often include members who work for government institutions. Some boards meet quarterly to approve plans and evaluate the implementation of activities. The boards, staff, members, and volunteers of vibrant organizations sometimes help their organizations raise funds from sources other than foreign donors. For example, ONAD has committed board members, staff, and volunteers who pay registration and monthly membership fees to the organization to support its work.

South Sudanese CSOs are increasingly run by professionals whose capacities have been built through years of experience in advocacy, governance, project proposal and management, humanitarian service provision, and related areas. Most CSOs have tools such as human resource policies to guide the recruitment of staff. When hiring staff, CSOs usually follow defined procedures, such as establishing the salaries and responsibilities of open positions, posting advertisements, and conducting interviews. Larger organizations often provide staff with training. For example, Human Right Defenders organized internal training for CEPO project officers and finance and logistics managers on physical and digital security.

Most CSOs based in Juba have well-equipped offices with desktop and laptop computers, scanners, printers, and other modern equipment. CSOs based in Juba have access to 4G internet connections, which enable them to communicate and share information over platforms such as Facebook, WhatsApp, Twitter, LinkedIn, and Snapchat. They usually have well-trained technicians able to keep their computer systems up to date. Outside of Juba or states in which UN agencies and international CSOs are present, internet coverage is very poor. Some CSOs share office spaces with vibrant local organizations or international CSOs to ensure better internet access.

In a sign of their persistence in establishing themselves despite funding difficulties and, in some instances, difficult access to work areas, several vibrant CSOs were able to sustain or even expand their facilities in 2021. ONAD completed the construction of new offices in Juba and was finally able to move out of rented premises. TOCH, which initially operated out of tukul thatched houses, realized its dream of owning a concrete building, opening a new building block in Warrap Town, Tonj North County, Warrap State, in September. CSOs used monthly subscription fees, consultancy fees, savings, and fundraising strategies to pay for the construction of their new offices. Donors sometimes help CSOs meet other expensive but important infrastructural needs. For example, in 2021, Norwegian People’s Aid donated two hardtop Land Cruisers to the Christian Agency for Peace and Development (CAPaD) in Juba to help its implementation of projects in other parts of the country.
Financial Viability: 6.6

CSOs’ financial viability deteriorated slightly in 2021 as local organizations experienced difficulties in accessing donor funding.

South Sudanese CSOs are funded primarily by foreign donors. In 2021, the main donors were the United States, Norway, United Kingdom, and China. Foreign organizations still obtain the bulk of foreign funds. Among the main international CSOs receiving funding in 2021 were Catholic Relief Services, Norwegian Refugee Council, Save the Children, Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development, World Vision, and Medair. Certain donors, such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM), German Agency for International Cooperation, and UN Development Programme (UNDP), sometimes implement projects directly without contracting with local CSOs, mainly in areas such as health care and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH).

Local CSOs are thus deprived of opportunities to improve their capacity to handle large projects and significant amounts of funding, although many of them are experienced and competent organizations. South Sudanese CSOs view donors as appreciating and making use of their connections in national and state governments while lacking confidence in their capacity to manage large grants. Donors are often seen as offering local organizations small amounts that are enough to keep them from dying out but insufficient to help them develop. Many local CSOs deliver social and humanitarian services as subgrantees of international organizations. For example, in 2021, the RSRTF Triple Nexus project funded several new consortia combining international and local CSOs. In many consortia, the international partners take the lion’s share of the funding and dominate top positions. Local CSOs are often allocated minimal resources and can experience delays in the release of funds.

Larger projects implemented by local CSOs are usually funded by the UN agencies. For example, in 2021, WOTAP implemented a livelihoods project supported by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the Christian Agency for Peace and Development (CAPaD) raised awareness about electoral laws and the organization of elections with support from the UN Population Fund and USAID. Most South Sudanese CSOs implement smaller projects to sustain themselves. When several local organizations were shut down by the government in 2021, donors withdrew their funding from those organizations.

The government does not fund CSOs, except for a few organizations that it owns or controls or, in rare cases, organizations that propose unusual projects that offer real hope of positive change. The government generally does not provide funding to outspoken or independently minded organizations.

Some CSOs generate income through activities such as selling artwork or beads or operating village savings and loan associations. CSOs can also generate resources through savings, loans, staff contributions, and in-kind and cash contributions from benevolent individuals, who are often the founders or board members. Some organizations raise funds by hosting social gatherings, sporting events, or cultural events, which bring together prominent individuals to contribute to a cause with broad public impact. Organizations sometimes receive cash contributions from churches or CSO networks. Several organizations have employees who generate personal income through consultancies resulting from work connections and pay 10 percent of their consulting income back to their CSOs.

Most large organizations undergo annual internal and external audits and provide annual training to their financial management staff to upgrade their knowledge and skills. However, high levels of corruption in government institutions have been imitated by individuals working for international and domestic organizations and have undermined donors’ trust in South Sudanese CSOs. Although many local CSOs have sound financial policies and management systems, corruption does exist and is often the result of individual malpractice.
ADVOCACY: 4.7

CSO advocacy was slightly more impeded in 2021 as several advocacy organizations stopped operating after their offices were closed and activists were arrested or expelled from the country. Following the failed PCCA effort, the government’s crackdown on civil society caused some CSOs to self-censor or to suspend their advocacy activities.

Advocacy is a major strength of South Sudanese CSOs. In recent years, many organizations have advocated for the public interest with patience, neutrality, and impartiality. OAF and SSuDEMOP, for example, represented civil society on the National Constitution Amendment Committee. Other organizations, including CEPO, ONAD, CAPaD, TOCH, Gender Empowerment for South Sudan Organization (GESSO), and WOTAP, continued to advocate for a variety of important causes. CEPO, for example, issued public statements and conducted many meetings to push for the release of the news anchor detained after allegedly refusing to read a presidential decree on the air. As a result of CEPO’s efforts, the government released the journalist after one week. CEPO also issued a press release demanding the release or trial of the former governor of Northern Bahr el Ghazal State, who remained in detention at the end of the year. CAPaD raised awareness about the electoral laws and the electoral process. Most organizations relied on advocacy tools such as meetings, phone calls, letter writing, petitions, press releases and press conferences, and seminars.

CSOs made several attempts to initiate the review and amendment of the National Security Act 2016, which gives powers to NSS to arrest anyone without a warrant. For example, the South Sudan Law Society held meetings with government officials to urge reform of the act. Little progress was made as the amendment process was delayed in the Ministry of Justice.

In November 2021, the South Sudan Youth Organizations Coalition, in partnership with CAPaD, held a roundtable in Juba with members of the RTNLA and the Youth and Sports, Justice, and Constitutional Affairs ministries to discuss the status of the Youth Enterprise Development Fund, whose formation is stipulated in R-ARCSS. Meeting participants agreed that both the government and the international community needed to ensure the fund’s establishment to help South Sudanese youth develop into productive citizens. However, funding for the Youth Enterprise Development Fund was not provided during the year.

TOCH field offices in Kuajok, Tonj North, Tonj South, and Yirol joined other partners in November to observe the Sixteen Days of Activism against Gender-Based Violence [GBV] under the theme “Take Action, Be Accountable: End Violence Against Women and Girls.” The celebrations attracted a large number of people.

There was no known effort to reform the NGO Act 2016 in 2021.

SERVICE PROVISION: 4.9

Service provision deteriorated slightly in 2021. South Sudanese CSOs deliver a broad range of services in areas such as health care, shelter, education, nutrition, agriculture, peace building, civilian protection, and environmental conservation. In 2021, CSOs such as Support for Peace Education and Development Program, CEPO, WOTAP, and ONAD raised awareness about the importance of getting vaccinated. Many local CSOs partner with international organizations to deliver social and humanitarian services. For example, with support from the IOM, CEPO implemented projects focused on peace building and the rehabilitation of boreholes and health centers in Luri and Lokiliri payams in Juba County in 2021. However, CSO service provision declined slightly in 2021 because of insecurity, shifts in funding, and the shrinking of civic space. For example, WOTAP’s agricultural project was affected by reduced funding from FAO, which supports the project.
South Sudanese CSOs are dedicated to meeting the needs of their communities. For example, TOCH works to serve needy communities in several localities. As the co-chair of a GBV working group in Warrap and Lakes states, TOCH coordinates the activities of various partners in collaboration with the Ministry of Gender, Child, and Social Welfare. In October, TOCH handed over a newly constructed women’s and girls’ friendly space in Pagaru Payam, Yirol East County, Lakes State, which was completed with support from the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development and Trócaire. In Warrup State, TOCH provided WASH services to local communities and helped reduce water shortages in the area.

CSOs often reach large audiences with their services and other activities. For example, in 2021, CAPaD and Daystar University, a Christian institution based in Kenya, signed a memorandum of understanding to establish higher educational, mentorship, and capacity-development programs for young people in South Sudan.

National, state, and local government authorities often acknowledge the services provided by CSOs. For example, the county commissioner of Yirol East County publicly lauded TOCH at the handover of the newly constructed women and girls’ friendly space in October. The opening of TOCH’s new office building in Tonj North County, Warrup State, was also attended by government officials.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.6**

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector remained unchanged in 2021.

DI and local user committees continued to operate resource centers in various localities in 2021. These centers provide CSOs and other users with access to power, the internet, meeting facilities, libraries, and training. At the Civic Engagement Center in Wau, Woman Training and Promotion Association continued to implement small-scale activities with support from DI under the Systems to Uphold the Credibility and Constitutionality of Elections in South Sudan program, which is funded by USAID.

National-level CSO networks and alliances include the Civil Society Alliance, Civil Society Network, Civil Society Facility, Women’s Monthly Forum, and Steward Women. These groupings, whose members are usually located in Juba, come together to protect each other during the process of nation building and development. They support each other when threatened and compete for grants together. They also issue joint statements, as when nearly all networks condemned the government for threatening freedom of expression when a bishop and several activists were arrested in Yei during the August unrest.

Capacity-building training and refreshment workshops continued in 2021, although they were fewer in number because of the lockdowns. Oxfam, Cordaid, UNDP, and Democracy International (DI) trained CSO staff across the country in areas such as governance, leadership, project proposal writing, human resource management, and procurement and financial management. ACROSS organized several trainings for CSOs on stress, trauma healing, and management in 2021. South Sudan has local experts who are successful in their fields and often consulted by the government and international organizations because of their up-to-date information on national events. These experts are hired at both the national and local levels to deliver social and technical services.
CSOs partnered with the government in 2021 mainly to provide humanitarian assistance or push for security sector and economic reforms. CSOs cooperate with media houses and sometimes conduct trainings for journalists. For example, the South Sudan Media Authority in cooperation with the Association for Media Development in South Sudan and Union of Journalists in South Sudan conducted several awareness-raising sessions for activists and journalists supported by UNDP and other partners in 2021. The topics included journalistic ethics and lobbying and advocacy for implementation of R-ARCSS. CSOs sometimes partner with private-sector institutions such as chambers of commerce on issues of public interest.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.5

CSOs’ public image improved slightly in 2021 as CSOs enjoyed improved media coverage and the public increasingly embraced CSOs’ work.

CSOs’ media coverage improves yearly, and 2021 was no exception. Vocal national CSOs such as South Sudanese Network for Democracy and Elections, SSuDEMO, Smile Again Africa Development Organization, CEPO, TOCH, and ONAD were covered daily as they advocated for the civil and political rights of the South Sudanese people. CSOs often communicate through broadcasters such as South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation, Eye Radio, Miraya FM, Bakhita Radio, and Sama FM, and newspapers such as Juba Monitor, Dawn, Alwatan, Almugif, and Citizen. For example, when a journalist in Jonglei was arrested and detained by the NSS after criticizing state government officials for selling food meant for flood victims, CSOs immediately issued statements of condemnation over Eye Radio, Miraya FM, Voice of America, and other outlets. As a government-controlled media house, the South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation covers CSOs only when they work together on projects and strictly avoids publicizing any CSO statements that are critical of government actions.

The public considers CSOs its eyes, ears, and voice. Communities rely on the sector to speak out on its behalf about issues that they may be afraid to discuss. They also turn to CSOs for help with decision making. Grassroots, faith-based, business, and educational communities embrace the ideas and programs of CSOs in South Sudan and support organizations working in their midst. During broadcast call-in shows, roundtable discussions, and public debates, the public often expresses appreciation for CSOs’ work. Most people understand the role of CSOs, although some people confuse them with journalists or the opposition.

Government perceptions of CSOs are determined by the nature of events. If CSOs support the government, they are considered good partners, but if they disagree with the government, they are considered Western spies. The government knows that CSOs play a neutral, transformative role in building South Sudan and intentionally threatens or intimidates them only if such actions are to its benefit. Otherwise, the government consults with CSO on difficult issues because their advice is often sensitive and constructive.

South Sudanese CSOs are relatively good at public relations in the sense that they know how to promote their image through media coverage and have productive relationships with journalists and media houses. Many CSOs and FBOs use FM radio, Facebook, Twitter, and newspapers constructively. For example, CSOs’ collaborative media campaign urging the government to honor its commitment to put women in government resulted in more women appointed into ministerial positions at the national and state levels.

CSOs usually issue narrative and financial reports either yearly, occasionally, or after the expiration date of their board of directors. Many CSOs have written standards of conduct for their employees.
Sudan faced a complex and divided political situation in 2021. On February 8, the government replaced most of the Cabinet of Ministers with new ministers, including several from the Sudan Revolutionary Front, in fulfillment of the Juba Peace Agreement signed in October 2020. Political observers commented that this reshuffling of the cabinet to include members of the armed groups exacerbated pre-existing differences among the civilian elements of the transitional government and resulted in a split in the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition, which led the movement that overthrew President Omar al-Bashir in 2019 and served as the counterpart to the civilian-military partnership governing the transitional period.

On October 25, 2021, Sudan’s fragile transition to democracy came under siege when the military unilaterally seized power, deposing the government of Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdouk, violating the Transitional Constitutional Declaration of 2019, and unraveling the gains of the first two years of transition after thirty years of authoritarian rule. The move was met with international condemnation, and development assistance amounting to $2 billion and commitments to debt relief were suspended, triggering a relapse in the economy. The implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement came to a standstill, and rampant insecurity coupled with peripheral intercommunal conflicts steadily increased. Street protests broke out, and long-held political norms were disrupted by new and unfamiliar forms of civilian resistance. For example, resistance committees and pro-democracy movements sometimes called for demonstrations and at the very last minute called them off, leaving police and security forces fully mobilized but without any protests to break up or oppress.

The fragmentation extended to Sudanese civil society, undermining its ability to play an active role in realizing progress towards the long-sought transition to democracy. Divisions in the sector were evident in the differing reactions to the military coup and the subsequent agreement on November 21, 2021, reinstating the civilian prime minister. Many informal or traditional forms of civil society, including tribal leaders and faith-based groups, welcomed the agreement and were even represented at the signing ceremony. But revolutionary civil society movements and pro-democracy groups, such as resistance committees, the Sudan Professional Association (SPA), and other alliances and networks that had sprung up during or after the 2019 revolution, opposed the agreement as treasonous to the values and aspirations of the revolution. A third group composed of formal and state-regulated CSOs had mixed reactions, with the majority seeing the agreement as the most viable way forward and best possible outcome given the situation.

The United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) reported an upsurge in violence in the Darfur and Kordofan regions in 2021. The conflict mostly involved disputes over resources.
between nomads and farmers and displaced many thousands of people. According to OCHA, 8.9 million people in Sudan were targeted for humanitarian assistance in 2021, an increase of 800,000 from 2020.

Cases of COVID-19 rose in 2021, with over 46,988 cases reported as of December 2021, according to the World Health Organization. The World Bank projected that Sudan’s economy would contract by 4.1 percent in fiscal year 2020-21, mainly because of the pandemic and a decline in oil revenues. Sudan’s Central Bureau of Statistics reported that the inflation rate averaged about 360 percent in 2021, up from 163 percent in 2020. The Central Bank sharply devalued the Sudanese pound in February 2021.

As civic space came under increased repression in the months following the military takeover in 2021, CSO sustainability deteriorated across six dimensions. The legal environment regressed moderately with the revival of restrictive measures and the assertion by security services of renewed control over CSOs’ operations. CSOs’ organizational capacity deteriorated slightly as rising prices and the country’s economic decline undermined operational functions such as staff retention, internet connectivity, and travel. The sector’s financial viability suffered moderately as the country’s economy collapsed. Advocacy deteriorated slightly as the cabinet shuffle, military coup, and imposition of emergency laws derailed collaboration between CSOs and policy makers. Sudan’s economic collapse and the decline in donor funding after the coup caused CSO service provision to deteriorate. Public perceptions of the sector were slightly worse as some organizations were perceived to be affiliated with political parties and thus contributing to the country’s polarization. Only the sectoral infrastructure showed slight improvement as increasing confidence in the sector led donors to invest in technical assistance and other forms of support.

Statistics on the size of the sector are largely unavailable, but previous estimates put the number of registered non-governmental organizations (NGOs), a distinct legal form, at upwards of 6,000. However, a September 2021 mapping of Sudanese CSOs published by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) suggests a figure of 4,385 registered NGOs but highlights that a significant number of these were inactive. Sudanese civil society is segmented into three distinct groups: revolutionary civil society movements and groups, which sprang up during or after the 2019 revolution; formal, state-regulated organizations, more broadly referred to as NGOs, which are usually registered and have licenses to operate; and informal or traditional forms of civil society, such as traditional or native administrative bodies, tribal leaders, and faith-based groups, which existed before independence. The traditional groups are the largest segment of civil society, followed by revolutionary civil society movements and, finally, formal, state-regulated NGOs.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.6**

The legal environment for CSOs deteriorated moderately in 2021 as the cabinet shuffle and military takeover derailed the process of reforming laws and procedures affecting civil society. The legal environment also failed to protect peaceful assembly rights by, for example, allowing security authorities to use excessive force with impunity.

CSOs register under various laws, depending on their purpose and activities. NGOs register under the Sudan Voluntary and Humanitarian Works Act (SVHWA) of 2006, the main law governing formal and licensed organizations in the country. SVHWA includes stringent, restrictive provisions, but its implementation eased after the 2019 revolution. Training centers register under the Sudan National Training Law of 2010, and trade unions register under the Trade Unions Act of 2010, which has been temporarily suspended since the December 2018 revolution. The process for registering CSOs under the SVHWA continues to be cumbersome and pose unjustifiable barriers to registration, such as the requirement that organizations obtain handwritten signatures from all members.
Registration and operating licenses are issued by the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), the main oversight body for NGOs. The licenses are valid for only one year and renewable with the submission of performance reports and audited financial statements. In contrast to previous years, a greater number of organizations and networks were able to register or reregister in early 2021. However, in the second half of the year, a newly appointed general registrar at the HAC delayed renewing the registration of several organizations, because he wanted to personally review and verify the existence and operations of every organization registered under the law. The Committee for Dismantling the June 30th Regime and Removing Empowerment, which was set up after the revolution, continued to fulfill its mandate of dissolving and appropriating the assets of organizations affiliated with the former regime. For example, in April, the committee dissolved the Islamic Dawah Organization, and confiscated its assets. The law under which the Sudanese Red Crescent Society was registered was similarly revoked, and a steering committee was formed to run the institution. International organizations raised concerns about the government’s efforts to dissolve humanitarian organizations or bring them under its control. In 2021, there was only one case (which remained unresolved) in which a CSO resorted to the court to challenge its closure and dissolution by the Committee for Dismantling the June 30th Regime and Removing Empowerment.

In February 2021, the outgoing minister of social development issued a new set of regulations that replaced regulations in place since 2016. The new regulations maintained extensive, existing constraints on NGOs and added new ones, including additional requirements for NGO members, more complicated registration procedures, and individual liability for legal violations by an organization. The new regulations were widely condemned by civil society. Rumors circulated that the outgoing minister intentionally left these bad regulations behind to retaliate for her expulsion from office and set the stage for a bad relationship between the new government and civil society. In March, the incoming minister revoked the new regulations and reinstated the old regulations.

However, the incoming Cabinet of Ministers had other priorities with negative implications for civil society. For example, the new minister of social development formed a committee to reform the SVHWA, disregarding all of the work accomplished by a joint civil society-government committee formed under his predecessor. There were several reports that steering committees formed by trade unionists after the revolution to temporarily oversee trade unions until a new law could be put into place were dissolved or replaced by government-imposed committees. These new committees were resisted by the unions and condemned by international labor bodies.

After the military coup, HAC security officials began to reassert their control over the operations of organizations both in Khartoum and, even more, in conflict areas where relief operations were underway. For example, mandatory travel permits for the staff of international CSOs, which had been downgraded to travel notifications, were reinstated. In Red Sea State, NGOs visiting areas outside of the state capital, Port Sudan, had to get clearance from military intelligence in addition to other state institutions such as the HAC.

On several occasions, the authorities used force to disperse peaceful demonstrators. For example, on April 6, a commemoration in front of the Council of Ministers marking the violent dispersal of a peaceful sit-in one year earlier was dispersed by police and security using excessive force. In June 2021, a peaceful vigil in front of the Kober prison organized by families of the leaders of the former regime was disbanded, and twenty-five persons were arrested. On June 30, large crowds marched peacefully in most cities of Sudan in memory of the martyrs of the revolution. The marches were described by media as peaceful and state-sponsored, but one person died and dozens were injured, according to the Sudan Tribune. Most casualties and deaths were the result of security personnel’s heavy-handed response.

According to the SVHWA, registered organizations are eligible for exemptions on customs duties on imported goods. These exemptions are granted on a case-by-case basis after a lengthy bureaucratic process involving both the HAC and the Ministry of Finance. All tax exemptions for CSOs, except those of a few organizations and UN agencies, were rescinded in February 2021 by the incoming minister of finance. For the rest of the year, hardly any CSOs were able to obtain tax exemptions for any items imported from abroad.

The laws generally hamper CSOs’ access to resources. To receive funds from any source, CSOs registered under the SVHWA must obtain the prior consent of the minister of finance. The law prohibits CSOs from generating revenue from the sale of services or goods. CSOs also continued to struggle to acquire access to foreign currencies as a policy of the Central Bank of Sudan restricted their access to their foreign-currency accounts.

Few lawyers in the capital city of Khartoum have expertise on CSOs and there are almost none in states outside of the capital.
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.7

CSOs’ organizational capacity deteriorated slightly in 2021 as rising prices and Sudan’s continuing economic decline undermined operational functions such as staff retention, internet connectivity, travel, and engagement with target populations. Organizations in the states were more affected than those in Khartoum.

Constituency building among traditional and informal CSOs remained strong in 2021. Formal CSOs were constrained by their centralized organizational structures, which put them at a disadvantage in reaching out to and building relationships with constituencies who were sometimes spread out across distant locations. This challenge was exacerbated by the country’s increasingly restricted civic space, unconducive legal environment, and rising prices for fuel and other commodities. Unions were unable to convene their membership assemblies, which usually serve as the forum for elections and discussion of constituency issues. COVID-19 had a minimal impact on relationships with constituencies, as there were no restrictions on travel or in-person meetings in 2021.

More formal, regulated CSOs tend to have strategic plans and mission statements. Informal and post-revolutionary groups often do not. CSOs often diverge from their strategic plans and priorities to respond to funding opportunities, which are limited and provide essential income for meeting operational costs. In 2021, CSOs rarely reviewed their strategic plans to try to adapt them to the volatile environment prevailing throughout the year.

Governance and internal management systems are more developed in larger national CSOs headquartered in Khartoum and the more formal types of organizations. Informal groups and pro-revolutionary youth groups have larger and more active constituency bases but struggle to establish formal, well-documented forms of governance and internal management systems.

The continued deterioration of Sudan’s economy in 2021, combined with the military takeover, the suspension of international development assistance, and the subsequent shrinking of civic space, undermined CSOs’ ability to retain qualified staff. Many qualified staff, especially at national organizations, either left to join higher-paying international organizations or left the country altogether in search of opportunities elsewhere. This was true even of staff who had returned to Sudan to serve their country after the revolution. Staff departures often left remaining staff with the burden of putting in extra hours to make up for gaps in personnel or simply reneging on some commitments.

The gains made by the civil society sector in using digital technology, which was triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic, gradually reversed in 2021, largely because of reduced funding and the increasing cost of equipment and services. Technological solutions available online were beyond the means of national CSOs, both because they were priced in foreign currencies and because Sudan continued to be under sanctions that restrict access to goods and services from international firms.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.4

CSOs’ financial viability deteriorated moderately in 2022, driven by the country’s overall economic collapse, which was exacerbated by the suspension of foreign assistance in the wake of the October 25 military coup.

CSOs’ access to multiple and diverse sources of funding remained limited in 2021. Most in-country funding available for CSOs comes from international organizations and bilateral and multilateral institutions, such as the European Union, USAID, the United Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Development Office, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, and Japanese International Cooperation Agency. Several diplomatic missions, including those of the Czech Republic (operating out of Egypt) and Canada, have small grants programs that CSOs can apply for. Following the military coup, a lot of these funding opportunities were either...
 downsized or temporarily suspended, forcing CSOs to look for alternative sources of funding or to begin to phase out of some of their projects earlier than anticipated.

The limited funding available is mostly captured by the formal state-regulated NGOs, which are headquartered in Khartoum and have more developed organizational capacity and proposal writing skills than informal and post-revolutionary segments of civil society.

As Sudan’s economy deteriorated in 2021, the private sector was hardest hit, and corporate giving and corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs were downsized. Other local sources of support, such as contributions from wealthy individuals and people making smaller charitable contributions, also dwindled. For example, a local charity that provides the poor with burial rituals for their deceased and cemetery upkeep complained of its inability to service its target group, saying that it had been forced to significantly cut back its portfolio of cemeteries and services because of rising prices.

CSOs registered under the SVHWA are prohibited from earning income from their programs and services. Fundraising is extremely limited, and CSOs’ ability to raise funds from their constituencies and members is nearly nonexistent. A nationwide survey of over 270 organizations carried out between November 2020 and April 2021 by NDI’s Sudan office found that only approximately 10 percent of organizations were able to cover their operational costs from membership fees.

Organizations registered under the HAC must submit audited financial statements for the fiscal year to renew their registration annually. Although this is required of all organizations, irrespective of whether they have state-level or national-level registration, it is more stringently enforced with national CSOs registered in Khartoum. Consequently, the financial management systems and controls of state-level CSOs tend to be less robust than those of their national counterparts. The NDI mapping of Sudanese CSOs published in 2021 found that “very few organizations use clear indicators for measuring the strength of their financial management systems, and practices may be somewhat ad hoc.”

**ADVOCACY: 4.5**

The CSO sector’s ability to influence public opinion and public policy regressed slightly in 2021. The deterioration was caused largely by the government reshuffle in February, in which several officials having civilian or civil society backgrounds were replaced with representatives from the armed groups that were signatories to the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement. After the change-over, advocacy efforts on issues related to civic space begun under the replaced officials were discontinued. These efforts included reform of the civil society law, the press and publications law, and the access to information law. The military coup in October and the imposition of emergency laws further derailed collaboration between CSOs and policy makers and dealt a blow to the increasingly assertive CSO sector. Government ministers who had embarked on the reform of various pieces of legislation in close consultation with civil society—including officials at the Ministry of Justice, which throughout much of 2021 consulted often with CSOs in formulating laws such as the National
Human Rights Commission Act of 2021, the Anti-Corruption National Commission Law, and draft laws on elections and the formation of a constitution—were toppled from office.

Advocacy efforts and initiatives in 2021 were carried out mainly by more formal CSOs and pro-revolutionary and pro-democracy social movements formed in 2018. For example, in Red Sea State, the Beja Youth Group sought to increase its participation in the state government ministries and constitutional positions by submitting petitions to the governor and staging sit-ins in front of government offices. After the government reshuffle in February failed to observe the required quota for women as stipulated in the Transitional Constitutional Decree, the Gidamiya (Forward) campaign launched by the Guardians Initiative filed a challenge in the Constitutional Court and wrote a letter to the prime minister. However, the absence of a functioning Constitutional Court and the military coup of October 2021 rendered the campaign ineffective.

CSOs made some effort to push for the reform of the laws governing the CSO sector. For example, the Haqaq Tasharik (Your Right to Participate) campaign, which was carried out by a network of CSOs from Darfur and the Eastern region in February and March 2021, called for more inclusive democratic reform processes with a focus on reform of the SVHWA. The campaign lasted several weeks and created greater awareness among CSOs and government officials outside of Khartoum of the problems with the current civil society law and the need for its reform. NGOs also successfully advocated against the changes to the 2016 regulations introduced by the Minister of Social Development in February 2021, which they saw as extremely negative. Their advocacy efforts were successful and resulted in a reversal of the changes and reintroduction of the old regulations by the incoming minister.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 5.2**

CSOs’ ability to provide services and goods deteriorated in 2021 as the economy collapsed and funding opportunities declined after the military coup.

The CSO sector provides services in a variety of fields, including basic social services such as health, education, relief, housing, water, and energy, as well as livelihoods improvement, environmental protection, and governance and civic education. They also build community resilience and strengthen conflict-resolution mechanisms. Youth, women, and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the states and conflict areas of Blue Nile, South Kordofan, and Darfur are the main beneficiaries of CSO services. Goods and services delivered as part of humanitarian aid and relief efforts in 2021 were informed by a multi-sector needs assessment carried out by OCHA in conjunction with REACH, IMPACT Initiatives, ACTED, the UN Institute for Training and Research, and the Sudanese humanitarian community. The assessment focused on the needs of non-displaced persons, IDPs, and refugee households across multiple sectors, including food security, health care, and education, in all of Sudan’s eighteen states. In 2021, many organizations in rural areas had to downsize their operations as run-away inflation caused budgetary shortfalls, leaving, for example, primary health-care centers and infirmaries understaffed and short of medicinal supplies. The hike in prices, especially of fuel, also impeded CSOs’ work.

CSOs provide non-humanitarian relief goods and informational services that benefit other CSOs and community-based organizations as well as the public. In 2021, for example, the Sudan Civic Space 2020 annual report published by the Sudanese Development Initiative (SUDIA) assessed civic space by examining four fundamental pillars: freedom of information and expression, rights of association and assembly, non-discrimination and inclusion, and citizen participation. The report served as a record and a monitor of civic space in Sudan during this critical phase of the country’s transition to democracy. It also provided the government and other stakeholders with recommendations for protecting and enabling civic space.
Legal restrictions prevent CSOs from recovering the costs of the services that they provide. However, cooperatives and village-based service committees, such as water-management committees, are allowed to recover some costs by charging small user fees. Government bodies, primarily at the local level, are appreciative of CSOs' efforts and sometimes recognize them through in-kind contributions and discounts that might help in service provision. These include leasing drilling equipment at subsidized prices and providing labor or engineering services at below-market costs.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.1**

The infrastructural support available to the Sudanese CSO sector improved slightly in 2021 as assorted actors, including donors, the government, and civil society itself, were increasingly confident that CSOs have an important role to play in the transitional period and the long-term democratic transformation of the state. The confidence was especially pronounced in the first part of the year. Donors made funding available to several intermediary support organizations (ISOs) that provide governance- and human-rights-related services and technical assistance to CSOs. In the wake of the coup and the suspension of financial assistance to the government, donors also considered diverting some of their allocated funding to Sudan to these ISOs to help strengthen the civil society sector.

ISOs and CSO resource centers are few in number and located mostly in Khartoum. The British Council in Khartoum provides high-quality financial and monitoring and evaluation support services to its CSO partners. Other national ISOs in Khartoum, such as Partners for Development Services, AlTareeq, and Erada, act more as consultancy firms, providing paid training or support services based on demand. Several resource centers are located in the Darfur region, where there is a considerable CSO emergency and humanitarian presence. These centers include Nujum Al-Ghad (Future Stars), which was founded in early 2021 in Al-Fashir, the capital of North Darfur State.

Private foundations and CSR programs set up by family-owned business, such as the Haggar Foundation, COFTEA, and the DAL Group, provide some support to CSOs in the form of grants or in-kind materials. They are accessible both to national CSOs and community-based groups. Some local CSOs also provide small grants to communities alongside the projects that they implement. The national organization SUDIA provides micro-grants that are administered by communities and respond to basic community needs in areas targeted by the organization.

The year witnessed a flurry of networking activity. Newly established networks include the Sudan NGO Forum, an independent body established in July 2021 to facilitate cooperation and coordination among its member organizations, and the Darfur Network for Peacebuilding and Development. The Framework for Peace Mechanism is an informal platform of civil society representatives working for a peaceful, nonviolent process of democratic transformation by sharing information and stimulating ideas for projects. The Rakiza Democracy Forum is spearheaded by the national youth organization Waey (Awareness) and funded by the U.S. Institute of Peace. The forum has chapters in several states and localities. Efforts to reconstitute and improve the governance of the Sudan Council of Voluntary Associations (SCOVA), which was disbanded after the 2018 revolution, were also initiated.

Complimentary training and capacity development opportunities for CSOs were made available through programs funded by international donors. Training opportunities covered areas such as networking and advocacy, proposal writing and project cycle management, financial management and reporting, and monitoring and evaluation.

There were few examples of successful CSO partnerships with the government or businesses in 2021. However, intersectoral partnerships between CSOs and the media were common, especially among CSOs working to promote the democratic transformation through public education and awareness-raising programs. For example,
the Al-alaq Center for Press Services partnered with radio stations to produce and broadcast country-wide educational programs on gender, human rights, constitution-making, and other civic issues.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.0**

Public perceptions of the CSO sector deteriorated slightly in 2021 for several reasons. First, in the politically charged environment preceding the military takeover in October, some civil society actors and organizations were perceived as affiliated with political parties and thus contributing to polarization in the government. Second, divisions in civil society about the coup made CSOs seem fragmented and politicized. Third, social media was used to manipulate public opinion of CSOs by painting them as foreign agents or corrupt organizations existing solely to further their own interests.

Media coverage of CSOs also diminished in 2021, especially after the military coup, when several independent radio stations that had dedicated airtime for CSOs were shut down. AlHadatha, a daily newspaper that had promoted CSOs’ work on the democratic transition, closed voluntarily, citing its inability to carry on in the oppressive environment after the coup. Some journalists and media professionals were critical of CSOs and collaborated with them grudgingly, citing CSOs’ narrow interest in using the media as a mouthpiece to promote their own programs rather than also championing journalists and the media sector more broadly.

CSOs try to actively promote their image in the public domain. For example, Al-Khatim Adlan Center for Enlightenment has advertising space on the Omdurman national radio station during peak hours. However, such efforts are often blunted by several issues. Most CSOs lack good communication skills and capacity, which results in inconsistent or confusing messaging. CSOs occasionally fail to communicate the breadth and impact of their work effectively and consistently. Limited resources and the high cost of communicating through mass media channels, such as television and radio, leaves CSOs relying on social media and word of mouth as their principal communication channels, which renders them accessible to only a very small segment of the population.

In 2021, the post-coup rulers positively regarded some segments of civil society, especially the informal or traditional forms, but held negative opinions about other CSOs, especially those representing the pro-democracy or pro-revolutionary segments of civil society. Public perceptions of CSOs deteriorated in 2021 largely on the back of the perceived failure of the sector to leverage its close relationship with the government into improving the latter’s performance during the transitional period. With the political turmoil and the public’s increasingly negative perceptions of CSOs, the business community distanced itself from the CSO community in 2021.

Little progress was made on efforts to self-regulate and establish a code of conduct to promote greater transparency and accountability in 2021.
At the beginning of 2021, the oppression unleashed during Tanzania’s 2020 elections continued to be felt. Opposition parties were suppressed, and the media and CSO were muzzled as laws constraining their operations were strictly implemented. However, civic space opened up with the swearing-in of the country’s first woman president, Samia Suluhu Hassan, two days after President John Magufuli died on March 17. Like Zanzibar’s president Hussein Mwinyi, who was elected in October 2020, President Samia introduced a more consultative leadership style. She met with CSOs, the private sector, and political and religious groups and expressed commitment to addressing their concerns. In 2021, she attended the first-ever National NGO Forum, where she made a commitment to support the sector, acknowledging the important role it plays in the country’s development. Government ministries also struck a much friendlier tone in acknowledging CSOs’ contributions and calling for closer collaboration.

After the Magufuli government suspended testing and failed to report data about COVID-19 for most of 2020, Tanzania’s new government resumed cooperation on the pandemic with the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2021. Following recommendations of the national COVID-19 task force, vaccinations were offered in 550 health centers and hospitals around the country, while the president led a campaign to overcome widespread public hesitation about the safety of the vaccine. On July 21, the government banned unnecessary public assemblies and encouraged social distancing, video conferencing, the wearing of masks, and the use of sanitizers and hand washing.

The World Bank estimated that Tanzania’s real gross domestic product grew by 4.3 percent in 2021. The autonomous region of Zanzibar also reported improved economic growth, especially in the service sector, which accounts for nearly 50 percent of its tourism-driven economy. The country’s poverty rate stood at 27 percent and employment returned to pre-pandemic levels, the World Bank reported. In April 2021, Tanzania launched its Third National Development Plan 2020/21-2025/26, which focuses on building a competitive industrial economy for human development. CSOs were consulted during the development of the plan.

CSOs’ overall sustainability improved in 2021. The legal environment was slightly enhanced by the government’s loose implementation of laws affecting the sector and decreased harassment of CSOs. Organizational capacities were slightly stronger as CSOs adapted to the pandemic situation and expanded their use of virtual platforms and digital tools. Advocacy was slightly more effective thanks to the opening up of civic space under the new governments in Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar. The sectoral infrastructure was slightly stronger with the revitalization of the National Council of Non-Governmental Organizations (NACONGO) and the expanded reach of training opportunities. The sector’s public image was polished by CSOs’ growing media presence and the government’s more positive attitude toward the sector. The other dimensions of sustainability did not change.
The Ministry of Health, Community Development, Gender, Elderly, and Children, which has primary oversight of NGOs, reported that 11,411 NGOs were registered as of April 2021. Of this number, 4,000 organizations were verified as active and had submitted annual reports to the NGO Registrar. Using the newly established online registration system, 1,217 new organizations registered as NGOs in 2021. In Zanzibar, 2,600 NGOs were registered as of December 2021.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.6**

CSOs’ legal environment improved slightly in 2021 as the laws affecting CSOs were more loosely implemented and state harassment decreased.

CSOs in Tanzania mainland register under the Trusteehip Incorporation Act CAP 317 of 2002, Societies Act CAP 335 of 2002, or NGO Act of 2002. According to the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 3) Act of 2019, organizations registered as companies, trusteehips, or societies and operating as NGOs had to re-register under the NGO Act by August 31, 2021. The Ministry of Health, Community Development, Gender, Elderly, and Children website stated in 2021 that a total of 158 organizations operating as NGOs had failed to re-register and were recommended for removal from the NGO register.

Registration procedures have been fairly straightforward and easy since the government introduced an online registration portal in 2020. Registration fees are generally considered fair. CSOs are required to submit quarterly reports, annual activity reports, and annual audited financial reports; publish their sources of funding biannually; and submit funding contracts and declare the receipt of funds exceeding TZS 20 million (approximately $8,600) to the NGO Registrar. CSOs must reapply for registration every ten years.

In Zanzibar, CSOs register under the Societies Act No. 6 of 1995 or the Companies Act No. 15 of 2013. CSOs in Zanzibar are overseen by the Special Department in the President’s Office of Regional Administration and Local Government (PO-RALG). Online registration of NGOs was introduced in 2018. A draft law to govern NGOs that was presented in the House of Representatives in 2020 was under review by the Zanzibar Law Reform Commission in 2021. CSOs were consulted during the bill’s review processes.

In 2021, CSOs continued to be constrained by various laws, including the Statistics Act of 2016, Online Content Regulations of 2020, and Media Services Act of 2016. However, these laws were more leniently applied under the new president. For example, the new government lifted bans imposed in 2020 on the newspapers *MwanaHalisi*, *Tanzania Daima*, *Mawio*, and *Mseto*. The bank accounts of the Tanzania Human Rights Defenders Coalition (THRDC), which were frozen in 2020 based on allegations that the organization had failed to submit donor contracts to the government, were unfrozen in 2021.

There is no distinction between the taxation of CSOs and private-sector entities. The nonprofit sector is required to pay many different taxes and levies, including a 30 percent corporate tax, a 10 percent withholding tax on rent, a skills development levy, resident and non-resident withholding taxes on services, a stamp duty, value-added tax, and customs duties. The law provides tax exemptions to religious and charitable organizations, but CSOs are rarely able to obtain these exemptions because of a lack of instructions to regional tax managers and CSOs’ own lack of understanding of the application process, which is cumbersome and bureaucratic. In July 2021, the president indicated the government’s willingness to waive taxes for faith-based organizations (FBOs) in recognition of the services that they provide to communities. In September, the president similarly called on tax authorities to address the taxation of NGOs, though no changes were affected during the year. In Zanzibar, under the Finance (Public Revenue Management) Act, CSOs are eligible for tax exemptions on assistance projects funded by foreign governments and multilateral agencies, but red tape and the lack of consistent procedures denies CSOs such exemptions in practice.
CSOs may compete for private-sector and government contracts but rarely do so because of a lack of capacity and awareness. Under the Finance Act of 2019, funding from corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs, private foundations, and local CSOs is centralized with local government authorities, which then contribute 10 percent of the funding to poverty reduction and entrepreneurial initiatives. CSOs may raise funds from national and international donors, conduct fundraising campaigns, and charge fees for their products and services. Under the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendment) Act No. 14/2020 in Zanzibar, local governments must allocate portions of their budgets to women, people with disabilities, and youth groups.

The ability of CSOs to pursue their legal interests varies at national, regional, and district levels. National CSOs are able to seek legal redress in domestic and regional forums and through dialogue with state actors. They are served by experienced members of the Tanganyika Law Society and Zanzibar Law Society and a pool of human rights lawyers hosted by THRDC and other organizations with a legal focus. Rural, regional, and district CSOs have limited access to these resources.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.4**

CSOs’ organizational capacity improved slightly in 2021 as they adapted to the pandemic situation and more effectively used virtual platforms and digital tools. In particular, CSOs were able to use digital technologies to mobilize constituencies to take part in their programs.

Most national and well-established CSOs used both virtual and physical means to reach more constituencies in 2021, especially after the loosening of pandemic measures and civic constraints. Women in Law and Development in Africa (WiLDAF) Tanzania launched its Sixteen Days of Activism Against Gender-Based Violence (GBV) campaign with 1,250 people present and the prime minister officiating. In addition, a caravan visited five institutions of higher learning to raise awareness about GBV. In October, Tanzania Women Lawyers Association (TAWLA), We Effect, International Development Law Organization (IDLO), International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), Legal Service Facility (LSF), and Tanzania Revenue Authority reached grassroots communities in Mandela Moshi with the Stand Up for Her Land Fun Run. WiLDAF Tanzania, TAWLA, and the Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) also conducted online workshops and other events to raise awareness about women’s and human rights, and ActionAid Tanzania established the Global Platform hub to help address young people’s needs.

CSOs usually abide by their missions and visions. Established CSOs at the international, national, and regional levels develop and implement multi-year strategic plans. For example, World Vision has a country strategy for 2021–25, and the Policy Forum and Women Fund Trust have strategic plans for 2021–24. Because of the pandemic, the Foundation for Civil Society (FCS) operated with a transitional plan in 2021. Local grantmaking organizations such as FCS and LSF help some grantees prepare strategic plans to strengthen their organizations. District and newly established CSOs rely on their constitutions to guide their interventions. The NGO Registrar has issued a sample constitution for use in registration that limits an organization’s scope of operations.

CSOs are legally required to have governance structures in place at the time of registration. Established national CSOs, such as LHRC, FCS, LSF, and THRDC, have well-developed and integrated internal management and operating procedures, clear lines of accountability, and a division of roles between the board of directors and management. However, most CSOs lack guidelines for assessing potential board members’ qualifications, which limits the diversification of knowledge and skills on the board. Small and medium-sized organizations usually have insufficient capacity and funding to support fully functioning governance structures and defined operational procedures.

Other than large, well-funded national organizations, many CSOs are unable to maintain full-time permanent staff because of funding constraints. They rely instead on interns and new graduates, who volunteer because they need
work experience. Other CSOs incubate their staff in capacity-development programs to hold onto them until funding becomes available to pay them. Some national and regional organizations needing expertise in specialized fields and with sufficient funding rely on part-time consultancy services.

Many CSOs have yet to fully incorporate digital technologies into their operations, mainly because of unstable internet connections and insufficient funding to acquire modern equipment and develop staff skills. However, in 2021, an increasing number of organizations used free digital platforms such as Survey Monkey, mWater, and Google Docs. Urban and well-established CSOs used social media effectively and relied on Zoom for virtual meetings. Some national CSOs have developed their own mobile and web applications for community outreach and information dissemination. These include the Bunge Forum app of Tangible Initiatives for Local Development (TIFLD), which facilitates contact between members of parliament and their constituents; the Lawyer Environmental Action Team’s Mazingira app, which enables public reporting on environmental mismanagement; and WiLDAF Tanzania’s GBV Taarifa app, which provides links to GBV support and protection mechanisms. During the Sixteen Days of Activism Against Gender-Based Violence in 2021, TIFLD led twelve national CSOs in exhibiting these and other digital tools to the public. Twaweza conducted a mobile telephone survey in Kigoma under its Sauti za Wananchi project, which it uses to inform policy makers about public needs.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.1

The sector’s financial viability remained unchanged in 2021.

CSOs depend on both foreign and domestic donor funding. In 2021, major foreign donors included USAID, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), the United Kingdom’s Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office, various UN agencies, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. The Kizazi Kipya project, which is funded by the U.S. President’s Emergency Fund for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and led by Pact Tanzania, disbursed more than $23 million to forty-five CSOs from October 2020 to September 2021. The Malala Fund set up operations in Tanzania in 2021 and is expected to support girls’ education. DANIDA, a major funder of CSOs working in access to justice and governance, provided funding of TZS 1.6 billion (approximately $690,000) to FCS to supplement its sustainable development programs and $2.4 million to LSF for its access to justice program. The Danish government announced that its embassy in Tanzania would close in 2024 as it refocused its strategy for international cooperation.

Most district and regional CSOs depend on donor funding regranted by local grantmaking organizations, including FCS, LSF, Tanzania Media Foundation, and Women Fund Tanzania Trust. Most local grantmakers received less donor funding in 2021, causing their levels of grantmaking to decline. As a result, fewer organizations received support. For example, FCS funded only eighty CSOs rather than the 150 organizations it had planned to support during the year. Most CSOs receive funding for projects of less than one year’s duration, with little support for institutional growth.

CSOs do not receive funding from the central or local governments. The Finance Act 2019 limits CSOs’ access to corporate funding by directing businesses and their philanthropic entities to channel CSR funding through local government authorities. However, some national CSOs were able to diversify their funding with corporate support in 2021. For example, the Dorice Mollel Foundation, which helps premature babies, received funds from Vodacom and the Segal Foundation. CRDB Bank launched a call for proposals for CSOs working on climate change.

CSOs’ capacity to fundraise is still limited. Among a handful of major fundraising events in 2021 was a dinner gala organized by TAWLA to raise funds to improve access to justice by women and children in Dodoma. CSOs, the
international community, and the private sector organized a concert to raise money to support the GBV programs of six organizations. A few CSOs generate income by selling products and services or operating registered social enterprises. For example, FCS runs the FCS Trust, which offers training and technical support for a small fee. Jumuiya ya Kuhifadhi Msitu wa Jozani Zanzibar, which works to preserve the Jozani forest, receives some income from forest tourism fees. Panje in Zanzibar offers paid swimming lessons to local communities. A few CSOs, including LHRC and TAMWA Zanzibar, rent out office space and conference rooms to meet help administrative costs.

Donors as well as the legal requirements for financial transparency have helped strengthen CSOs’ financial systems in recent years. Regional and district organizations with donor-funded projects use donor-funded audit services. Local grantmakers do not cover full-fledged program and financial audits. Some well-established CSOs hire financial officers, and CSOs’ accounting departments are often strengthened by donors’ provision of database and accounting software that help track the use of resources. Most district and regional CSOs lack sound financial management systems and find the cost of independent audits prohibitive.

ADVOCACY: 3.9

CSO advocacy improved in 2021 as the new governments in Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar consulted more frequently with CSOs and showed a more positive acknowledgement of the sector’s contributions.

After Tanzania’s new president took office in 2021, CSOs were able to meet with her directly to share their concerns about their operating environment and rights. Between June and September, the president met with youth and youth organizations, Catholic bishops from the Tanzania Episcopal Conference, women’s organizations, the Tanganika Law Society and Tanzania Women Judges Association, and a group of CSO leaders. For the first time ever, the president officiated over the annual NGO Forum on September 29-30, 2021, where she committed to working with CSOs.

CSOs were appointed to several government technical committees in 2021. For example, the head of WiLDAF Tanzania was a member of the presidential democracy taskforce, which is to advise the government on political party operations and civic participation. The Tanzania Education Network (TENMET) was a member of the government’s educational working group.

CSOs also continued to participate in legislative processes by analyzing bills and taking part in public hearings. For example, TIFLD, Twaweza, LHRC, and nine other organizations jointly analyzed and contributed to the Miscellaneous Amendments Act No. 4 of 2021, which amended thirteen laws, including the Universal Communication Service Access Act and the Electronic Postal Communication Act. After the president stated her commitment to freedom of the media in an address in April, CSO and media representatives worked with the new ministry of information, communication, and ICT to review media laws.

CSOs continued to engage in legal advocacy in 2021. LHRC, for example, filed cases concerning election laws and a levy on mobile money transactions. However, as in previous years, the government continued to present bills under certificates of urgency, which limited CSOs’ ability to contribute to them effectively.

In other advocacy action, in March, LHRC, THRDC, Save the Children, and 150 other organizations submitted the stakeholders’ report to the Universal Periodic Review mechanism of the UN Human Rights Council. The report urged the country to improve its human rights record, including amending the laws on freedom of association and the media. The international African Defenders coalition coordinated thirteen CSOs from across Africa to issue a press statement during the Tanzanian president’s visit to Kenya in May. The group called for the release of all human rights defenders, journalists, and political prisoners still held in detention in Tanzania. In June, THRDC
launched a guide to coordinate CSOs’ contribution to the implementation of the Third National Development Plan. In November, the government issued a circular allowing girls who had dropped out of school because of pregnancy to return to school, successfully culminating years of advocacy by organizations such as Msichana Initiative, LHRC, Twaweza, Haki Elimu, and TENMET.

At the local level, members of the Women Land Forum conducted awareness-raising campaigns and trained community members on women’s land rights in five wards in Arumeru District. Twaweza, in collaboration with the Pangani coastal paralegal association and experts in theater and arts from the University of Dar es Salaam, prepared short films on the construction of eight wells to help relieve a water shortage and the enactment of bylaws to prevent children from attending night events where they are vulnerable to violence and abuse. The films were screened in Pangani District before an audience of 2,442 community members.

In Zanzibar, CSOs took part in consultations on the NGO Bill presented in the House of Representatives in 2020. The consultations in 2021 were conducted by the NGO Registrar and, later, by ANGOZA, PACSO, and the Zanzibar Think Tank. At the end of the year, the bill was being reviewed by the Zanzibar Law Reform Commission before it is presented for the second time in the House of Representatives. There was no initiative to amend laws governing the sector in Tanzania mainland, despite their shortcomings, in 2021.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.5**

CSO service provision did not change in 2021. CSOs continued to provide goods and services in areas such as health care, social protection, agriculture, water, and education. They often fill in gaps in services for marginalized populations and people in emerging humanitarian crises. For example, the Mkapa Foundation, Management and Development for Health, Public Health Foundation, and many FBOs focused on providing health-care services. WaterAid and Amref Health Africa in Tanzania undertook projects to improve access to water, hygiene, and sanitation. World Vision, Agape AIDS Control Program Shinyanga, and the Network Against Female Genital Mutilation helped fulfill basic needs for girls’ education, food, and shelter among vulnerable groups. TAMWA Zanzibar, People Development Forum, and other organizations empowered communities to undertake spice, vegetable, and fruit farming in Pemba with support from the European Union. In July 2021, Save the Children started a program to ensure safe, clean schools in Zanzibar by distributing 5,000-liter water tanks to twenty-eight schools in Unguja and Pemba. CSOs also continued to implement hygiene programs to support girls’ education. For example, Agri Thamani distributed sanitary pads to 1,800 girls in Bukoba. CSOs were not involved in the pandemic response in 2021, as the Magufuli government’s denial of the disease and refusal to implement prevention measures in line with WHO protocols hindered CSOs’ ability to raise funds for pandemic-related services.

The goods and service provided by CSOs reflect community needs as determined through reports, research, community needs assessments, lessons learned from previous programs, and emerging issues. CSOs normally provide goods and services to all members of targeted communities. A few CSOs, such as the Economic and Social Research Foundation, Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA), HakiElimu, and Twaweza, distribute publications, research reports, and expert analysis to broad audiences.

Most CSOs do not charge fees for their goods and services because they are funded by grants. Some organizations charge minimal fees to cover costs such as stationery that paralegals use when providing legal aid. It is not common for CSOs to have social enterprises, as most organizations lack the capacity to register and manage multiple entities and cover additional tax obligations.

In contrast to previous years, when CSOs’ efforts were denigrated because of government’s view of them as troublemakers and puppets of capitalists, the central and local governments recognized CSOs’ contributions in
2021. In July, President Samia indicated the government’s willingness to waive taxes for FBOs in recognition of the services that they provide. President Mwinyi of Zanzibar recognized CSOs’ role in the fight against GBV and issued awards to FCS and other organizations during the launch of a GBV database. The NGO Registrar voiced appreciation for CSOs’ contribution to the country’s development during CSO Week in October, and the deputy minister of community development, gender, women, children, and special groups called for CSOs and the government to improve tracking of CSOs’ development work. Local government officials also acknowledged CSOs’ efforts, including the Feed the Future project in Iringa and Mbeya regions, implemented by DAI in partnership with Pathfinder International, SNV, and Khangarue Media with funding from USAID, and World Vision’s project in Tanga Region to improve communities’ livelihoods.

SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.0

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector was slightly stronger in 2021 as NACONGO, the national body responsible for the regulation and governance of the NGO sector, was revitalized and the reach of training opportunities expanded through the use of digital tools.

The FCS Resource Centre in Dodoma and the Zanzibar NGO Resource Centre in Unguja continued to provide grassroots organizations and youth with information about the CSO sector and compliance obligations in 2021. Libraries housed in the offices of national CSOs, such as the Tanzania Gender Networking Program, REPOA, HakiElimu, and LHRC, do not specifically serve CSOs but contain materials that they can use and distribute to their communities.

Local grantmaking organizations include FCS, LSF, and the Women Fund Tanzania Trust. They obtain their funding from various sources, including bilateral donors, foundations, and the diaspora. They mainly support projects focused on governance issues, such as social accountability, social inclusion, or the economic empowerment of marginalized groups. As their funding decreased in 2021, these funders were able to support fewer organizations.

CSO networks and coalitions facilitate information sharing on national issues such as legal reform. Leading coalitions include the Tanzania Education Network/Mtandao wa Elimu Tanzania, which focuses on advocacy related to the return of pregnant girls to school, and the Tanzania Coalition against Child Labor and Trafficking, which in 2021 coordinated its members’ engagement in the National Anti-Trafficking in Persons Plan of Action 2021-24. A WhatsApp group connects the executive directors of more than 200 organizations across the country. Sixteen organizations worked together to host CSO Week in October, which brought together more than 150 CSOs from Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar. NACONGO, which was established under the NGO Act to promote capacity development, information sharing, and networking among CSOs, was notably more active in 2021. CSO representatives to NACONGO were elected at the district, regional, and national levels. The representatives met to address issues related to the sector and propose recommendations to strengthen it. In cooperation with the Office of the Registrar of NGOs, the council also coordinated the National NGO Forum, which was attended by the president. These developments helped revitalize NACONGO’s legitimacy in the eyes of the sector.

CSO training is usually self-initiated to address internal gaps in organizational capacity. In 2021, the use of digital tools such as Zoom and Microsoft Teams for training increased, allowing national, regional, and district CSOs to take part. WiLDAF trained the Women Directors Forum on feminism and gender equality, while Tangible Initiative for Local Development (TIFL) trained women executive directors on the use of digital tools and platforms to advance women-led CSOs. Funding partners also offered training in 2021. FCS trained district and regional CSOs on local resource mobilization and, with Search for Common Ground, offered training on peacebuilding to CSOs, religious leaders, and local government authorities. International organizations such as Save the Children, FHI 360, and ActionAid Tanzania as well as the Kizazi Kipya project funded by PEPFAR provided technical support and training to their grassroots partners in 2021. Some academic institutions, including the Institute of Finance
Management and the Training Center for Development Cooperation, offer paid specialized training, but most CSOs cannot tap into such opportunities because of limited funding for human resource development.

CSOs increased their collaboration with other sectors in 2021. For example, Norwegian Church Aid, Life Water International, Farm Africa, Farm Radio, Agriculture Council of Tanzania, and Green World had memoranda of understanding with PO-RALG to ensure the smooth implementation of programs at regional and district levels. In media partnerships, Twaweza established a strategic partnership with the Tanzania Editors Forum and the Chanzo Initiative to advance media advocacy. CSOs’ engagement with the private sector is not systematic. In 2021, CRDB Bank PLC became an accredited member of the Green Climate Fund, which collaborates with CSOs working on climate change.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.8

CSOs’ public image advanced slightly in 2021 as the government assumed a more positive attitude toward the sector and CSOs’ presence in mainstream and digital media improved.

CSOs had a growing presence in mainstream media in 2021 as media laws were more loosely enforced and censorship relaxed. For example, FCS and Tanzania Youth Vision Association were consulted by media on their views on the 2021/22 national budget. Twaweza sponsored content about community issues in Mbongwe, Maswa, and Pangani districts on the Nukta online news site, which offers discounts to nonprofit organization. Girl Effect contributed content on reproductive health rights to Tujibebe, a program that airs weekly on Clouds FM radio, and Iringa NGOs Network partnered with Nuru FM community radio to raise awareness about women’s land rights. The media does not distinguish between public service announcements and corporate advertising and CSOs must pay for coverage. However, CSOs obtain free slots on radio and television during commemorative events, such as Women’s Day, Zero Tolerance to Female Genital Mutilation Day, and National Law Day.

Public perceptions of CSOs are generally positive because communities receive direct support from them. The government’s perception of CSOs improved in 2021 after the new president identified herself with the sector. Ministers and permanent secretaries were more accessible for consultations and officiating of CSO programs, and both central and local government officials became more receptive to collaborating with CSOs. CSOs’ engagement with the private sector is limited because of a lack of common understanding on areas for collaboration.

CSOs continued to use digital media for advocacy and public outreach in 2021. Changing demographics and growing digitalization contributed to CSOs’ increased online presence. For example, HakiElimu’s Twitter account, which shares report findings and news on education, has 146,600 followers. Regional and district CSOs’ dissemination of information is usually ad hoc and project based because of insufficient funding to hire information officers. CSOs often develop relationships with individual journalists by building their capacity to report on specific areas, who then go on to cover their activities. For example, in May 2021, THRDC trained journalists on human rights standards for reporting.

Financial reporting and transparency are legal requirements. National CSOs publish details of their work and their annual reports on their websites and social media. Larger, more established CSOs such as Twaweza publish reports in newspapers. Other leading CSOs distribute their reports at special events. International organizations such as Plan International produce promotional materials presenting data on the impact of their work.

To improve CSO self-regulation, district, regional, and national representatives were elected to NACONGO in July 2021. The election took place in response to the minister of community development, gender, women, children, and special groups’ direction and is anticipated to strengthen coordination within the NGO sector.
With a controversial election in January, followed by severe restrictions on social and economic activity as a result of a surge of infections from COVID-19 in the spring, CSOs in Uganda had a difficult year in 2021. Setting the tone was the indefinite suspension on February 3 of the Democratic Governance Facility (DGF), a five-year governance program funded by a consortium of European donors. Civil society was further constrained by a pandemic lockdown that started in June and the suspension of fifty-four CSOs in August. These events left CSOs grappling with a declining human rights situation, a national health crisis, crippling pandemic prevention measures, and hostile posturing by the state. Many CSOs found themselves caught in an existential struggle for survival as state-led crackdowns and financial constraints grounded their operations for a significant portion of the year.

General elections took place in Uganda on January 14. During and after the election period, the popular opposition candidate Robert Kyagulanyi (also known as Bobi Wine) remained under house arrest for allegedly violating pandemic restrictions. Security forces used tear gas and live bullets to break up pre-election protests in late 2020 and early 2021, killing a number of protesters and bystanders. During his campaign, incumbent president Yoweri Museveni claimed that portions of the opposition were funded by foreign entities seeking to destabilize the country. The United States and European Union (EU) did not send observers to the elections because of reservations about the electoral process. On the eve of the elections, the government shut down the internet for a week, restricted foreign media coverage, intimidated local press, and prevented domestic coalitions such as National Elections Watch Uganda (NEW-U) from monitoring the polling. Museveni was elected to his sixth term with 59 percent of the vote in a process that opposition and international sources claimed was riddled with fraud.

When opposition actors sought to challenge the election results, reports of missing persons abducted by plain-clothed operatives rose to a frequency last seen in the era of Idi Amin. Several reports by human rights group indicated that there were numerous cases of disappearances by government authorities. Local media and opposition political parties reported that the military and police used unmarked vehicles, known locally as “drones,” to kidnap hundreds of supporters of Kyagulanyi’s National Unity Party (NUP) in the periods before, during, and after the elections and detained them without charges at unidentified locations. On March 4, the NUP released a list of 423 supporters who had gone missing after abductions by security agencies. These reports were collaborated by the Uganda Human Rights Commission in its 24th Annual Report on the State of Human Rights and Freedoms in Uganda in 2021.

On February 3, the government shut down DGF for “financ[ing] activities and organizations designed to subvert [the] Government under the guise of improving governance.” Most of the fifty-four CSOs suspended in August were advocacy organizations. An assessment conducted by the Uganda National NGO Forum (UNNGOF) found
that most of these organizations worked in political, religious, and environmental fields. For example, the Africa Institute for Energy Governance (AFIEGO) was involved in legal action to stop a $10 billion oil project because of environmental concerns, and several other local CSOs on the list were involved in the promotion of the rights of people affected by a crude oil development project and the Save Bugoma Forest Campaign. The assessment also revealed that three of the suspended organizations were involved in observing the January 2021 elections.

The upsurge of COVID-19 infections in March 2021 created the biggest health crisis since Uganda’s first case of the virus was recorded in March 2020. In June, the government imposed a forty-two-day lockdown that grounded private and public transport and closed schools, churches, recreation centers, and large shopping malls, bringing socio-economic life to a standstill. Although the hard lockdown was eased in successive phases in July and September, the constraints on public gatherings and economic activity continued. The police were reported to beat some persons while enforcing lockdown restrictions. During the lockdown, the government did not recognize CSOs as essential workers, thereby denying them exemptions from restrictions on movement and considerably reducing the sector’s ability to serve populations affected by COVID-19. By the end of the year, many children had missed up to two years of schooling, according to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which noted that the lockdown also disrupted the continuity of essential health-care, nutrition, and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) services.

The pandemic lockdown caused Uganda’s economy to continue to lag in 2021. Household incomes fell while the rate of unemployment increased, especially in the informal sector, according to the World Bank. The bank estimated that Uganda’s economic growth rate would reach 3.3 percent in 2021, up from the contraction of 1.1 percent in 2020. Uganda continued to host more than 1.47 million refugees and asylum seekers, mostly from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and South Sudan, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

The sustainability of the CSO sector deteriorated moderately in 2021 as six of seven dimensions recorded a decline. The legal environment was weakened moderately by the government’s increased enforcement of regulatory obligations and its harassment of CSOs that reported critically on the management of the 2021 elections. Organizational capacity deteriorated significantly as DGF’s suspension and pandemic-related restrictions on movement and public gatherings impeded CSO operations. CSOs’ financial viability worsened moderately as the suspension of DGF deprived a number of organizations of needed funding. The sector’s ability to engage in advocacy was moderately constrained by the tense political climate and the government’s hostility towards advocacy CSOs. CSOs’ service provision deteriorated extremely as restrictions on travel and assembly and CSOs’ classification as “non-essential” workers severely limited their ability to provide services. CSOs’ public image was damaged slightly by the ruling party’s negative rhetoric about the sector, which influenced public perceptions. Only the sectoral infrastructure did not change.

According to the list of validated organizations published on the website of the National Bureau for Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO Bureau), the number of NGOs permitted to operate in Uganda totaled 2,255 in mid-2022. The substantial reduction from the 13,000 NGOs reported in 2020 results from the strict enforcement of compliance laws, whereby CSOs that lacked bureau-issued certificates of registration and valid operating permits were struck from the national registry of validated NGOs.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.1**

The legal environment for CSOs worsened moderately in 2021 with the government’s more intense enforcement of registration and reporting obligations and its harassment of CSOs that reported critically on the management of the 2021 elections.

The contraction of space for civic activity in Uganda, which has been underway for the past six to eight years, reached a new intensity in 2021. Although there were no changes in the regulatory framework, the government increased its enforcement of CSOs’ licensing and reporting obligations. The NGO Bureau had previously emphasized educating CSOs about their obligations to encourage compliance, but as the 2021 election cycle approached, compliance was weaponized to harass organizations that displeased the state. For example, in August 2021, the operations of fifty-four CSOs were halted by the NGO Bureau. Disregarding due process, none of the affected CSOs was given notice of its suspension or the right to a fair hearing prior to the public announcement of the suspension. Most suspensions lasted into 2022, and while it is known that the suspensions of some organizations were lifted, no official communication or public notice to this effect was issued. These developments...
caused CSOs to suspect that the law’s registration and reporting compliance mechanism was part of a premeditated strategy to clamp down on organizations whose work displeased the state. The suspensions were seen as a warning shot to the sector, and some advocacy CSOs backed down from critical stances to escape reprisal.

The contraction of civic space was particularly intense at the time of the elections. The bank accounts of CSOs engaging in election monitoring were frozen. During and after the election period, activists and CSOs workers were illegally arrested and detained, seemingly to prevent the flow of information on polling and vote counting. The state’s shutdown of the internet significantly impeded access to information and prevented CSOs and members of the public from monitoring the electoral process. Multiple and significant human rights abuses went undocumented as reports could be received only by telephone, making it hard for CSOs to build a credible evidential case for advocacy. Media houses were effectively gagged by Uganda Communications Commission (UCC) guidelines developed without stakeholder consultation, which in effect threatened them with closure if the state was not happy with their broadcasts. Journalists were beaten, pepper-sprayed, and shot at for documenting violence commissioned by the state. On the pretext of acting in the interest of national security, security forces subjected hundreds of political activists and human rights defenders to incommunicado detention and torture. Security functionaries justified these never-before-seen measures by claiming to have intelligence that CSOs were planning to use the election as a lever to create an “Arab spring”-type event in Uganda but offered no evidence for this claim.

Registration requirements did not change in 2021. Under the NGO Act 2016, CSOs must first incorporate with the Uganda Registration Services Bureau as companies limited by guarantee before applying for registration and operating permits from the NGO Bureau. To register with the bureau, CSOs must obtain letters of recommendation from their line ministries and the districts in which they are headquartered and subsequently enter into memoranda of understanding with the local government of every district or municipality in which they will operate. CSOs must also register with the Financial Intelligence Authority. Operating permits are normally renewed annually, and the NGO Bureau may revoke them at its discretion. Most CSOs were formed under the old regulatory system and must re-register under the new system established by the NGO Act 2016. This process can take anywhere from two to seven months because of bureaucratic delays and the tendency of government officials to extort bribes for expediting the process. Community-based organizations (CBOs) register with district authorities through the district NGO monitoring committees. Charges are sometimes imposed by district officials at every step of the registration process and are often determined arbitrarily despite the provision of a fees schedule in the law.

Registered organizations must file annual returns with the NGO Bureau, Financial Intelligence Authority, and Uganda Registration Services Bureau. CSOs’ administrative and financial resources are strained as organizations must account to three separate government offices asking for the same information in different formats. Moreover, CSOs based in districts other than Kampala must send representatives to the capital to submit the required documentation and then wait for a response. CBOs file returns with district and sub-country NGO monitoring committees.

Although the legal framework for financing did not change and CSOs are free to mobilize financial resources from foreign donors, there was a noticeable shift in state policy towards foreign funding in 2021. One of the government’s conditions for reopening DGF was state representation on the advisory board that selects projects for funding. The condition had no legal basis and suggested a negative shift in the state’s position on foreign funding. The Financial Intelligence Authority requires Ugandan banks to enforce a wide range of verification measures regarding funds coming into CSOs’ accounts from external sources and has discretionary power to halt transactions on suspicions of money-laundering or terrorism financing. That power was used in December 2020 to halt transactions on the accounts of CSOs conducting election-monitoring activities, including UNNGOF and the Uganda Women’s Network (UWONET). The instruction to halt transactions was withdrawn in February 2021.
after the Electoral Commission declared that President Museveni had been elected to another term. Draft guidelines on the management of development assistance, which were leaked to the media in 2021 but have yet to be operationalized, threaten to further constrain CSOs’ ability to seek, receive, and use foreign funding. Among other provisions, the guidelines require development assistance to be “in line” with government priorities, require development projects and programs to have prior government approval and be supervised by and “implemented together with” government ministries, and require projects and programs financed by development partners to be “reported and appropriated” by the parliament for budgetary purposes.

CSOs are free to participate in calls for bids on projects in which the government is the lead implementer. Under the NGO Act, CSOs may operate businesses, with proceeds taxed under the rules for private businesses. Few CSOs take advantage of this opportunity, mainly because of the widespread belief that nonprofit organizations are prohibited from operating businesses. Some CSOs have registered as social enterprises, which enables them to generate income that can be used to fund their missions.

Tax policies for CSOs remained unchanged in 2021. CSOs must pay value-added tax on imported goods and purchases as well as pay-as-you-earn tax on staff salaries. A CSO may apply for a tax exemption by obtaining a recommendation from the NGO Bureau, a tax assessment from Uganda Revenue Authority, and a recommendation letter from its line ministry showing that any tax revenue lost because of the exemption will be recovered in-kind through services provided by the applicant organization. CSOs report that the application process is overly bureaucratic and riddled with delays, which discourages many organizations from applying. In 2021, an international CSO said that it received notice of approval of its application for a two-year tax exemption only two months before its expiration date because of delays by the authorities at every stage of the application process.

Legal services for CSOs became more available with the contraction of civic activity in 2021. When Chapter Four Uganda, the leading provider of legal support to CSOs, was suspended in August 2021, CSOs were forced to find alternative providers of legal services to represent them in court actions. This trend generated new interest in nonprofit law and contributed to growth in the pool of legal practitioners available to the sector. In response to the government’s increased use of compliance to clamp down on advocacy CSOs, some organizations, such as UNNGOF, Chapter Four Uganda, and Defenders Protection Initiative, organized compliance clinics to increase CSOs’ regulatory compliance. In the clinics, legal practitioners unpacked the complex web of regulatory obligations and helped CSOs understand their legal rights and obligations.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.3**

The CSO sector’s organizational capacity deteriorated significantly in 2021 as DGF’s suspension and pandemic prevention measures, especially restrictions on movement and public gatherings, impeded CSO operations.

The government’s refusal to recognize CSOs as essential workers meant that they could not conduct activities requiring physical contact with constituents in 2021. Some CSOs, especially national organizations with well-trained staff and advanced technological competence, were able to adjust their operations to meet the evolving needs of constituents by moving their activities and workshops to alternative formats. These CSOs often coordinated field operations and shared documents through WhatsApp groups and even telephone calls. UNNGOF, for example conducted its annual general assembly online and moved dialogues typically held in hotels to online platforms. However, the use of digital communications was limited to well-resourced organizations, and at the local and subnational level, where the majority of CSOs operate, organizations had little capacity to use online tools and consequently did not adapt as well. In addition, compliance with government-issued standard operating procedures for public gatherings and CSO conferences required CSOs’
budgets to include the distribution of personal protective equipment. For CSOs with small operational budgets, especially at the local level, compliance with this rule strained their organizational resources.

Most CSOs have mission statements, objectives, and strategic plans and seek to follow them. However, needs arising from the pandemic, coupled with pandemic-related restrictions, forced CSOs to implement activities unrelated to their missions or to suspend operations altogether. For example, in many communities, pandemic prevention measures strained livelihoods and increased the incidence of domestic violence, rape, hunger, and other socio-economic problems. Responding to these conditions sometimes required CSOs to deviate from their stated goals, missions, and objectives. The Lira NGO Forum, Kitara CSO Network, and other advocacy organizations became involved in providing food relief and psychosocial support during lockdowns, and social rights organizations such as Transcultural Psychosocial Organization disseminated COVID-19 information and distributed personal protective equipment and other equipment. The Women Probono Initiative, which advances justice for women and girls, was able to obtain a movement permit and helped bail out people arrested for flouting curfew restrictions. However, many organizations had to suspend their operations and thus their strategic plans in 2021.

Most CSOs have functioning governance and management structures. For example, professional associations such as the Uganda Law Society, savings and credit cooperatives, and other membership-based organizations regularly conduct annual general assemblies to gather feedback from members or elect new leaders. Good succession management was exhibited by UNNGOF, whose general assembly appointed a new board in 2020, which in turn appointed a new executive director to steer the organization through the development of a new five-year plan in 2021.

The economic crisis created by pandemic measures triggered a brain drain out of the CSO sector. In some organizations, staffing cuts were necessitated by funding cuts after DGF was closed and the de-prioritization of activities outside of the pandemic response. In other cases, skilled personnel migrated to the private sector or started businesses to improve their financial position during the crisis, thereby affecting staffing quality in the sector. To compensate for staffing gaps, the remaining staff at most organizations took on additional responsibilities. This trend created a new problem as reports of staff burnout and clinical depression became more common across the sector. CSO leaders were thrust into new territory as they had to adjust to external pressures and at the same time integrate mental health management into their responsibilities.

CSOs with relatively big grants, stable organizational structures, and well-integrated digital technologies were able to navigate the crises in 2021 by using remote-working and virtual conferencing applications to cut costs and maintain staff and core operations. For example, the Center for Constitutional Governance broadcast topical dialogues and press conferences on its YouTube channel, Civic Space TV, to keep its advocacy work going, and CivSource Africa, an intermediary support organization (ISO) that tracks local giving, relied on telecommunication and online meetings to generate reports on local giving. These organizations, however, constitute a minority in the sector. At most organizations, technology penetration is low, and in 2021, their use of internet-based technology was limited to attending meetings convened by better-resourced organizations. The degree to which CSOs are aware of the need for cybersecurity is unknown.

### FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.4

CSOs’ financial viability deteriorated moderately in 2021 as the suspension of DGF deprived a number of organizations of needed funding.

The large majority of CSOs depend on foreign sources of funding. The suspension of DGF in February 2021 was estimated in news reports to amount to a $140 million loss for the sector, considerably disrupting CSO activity as hundreds of projects funded by the foundation ground to a halt. DGF’s closure undermined the operations of not only seventy-eight grantee organizations but hundreds of CBOs receiving sub-grants for activities funded by DGF.

The national government offers no direct funding to CSOs and excluded CSOs from its pandemic response programs in 2021. Local governments sometimes outsource service delivery in sectors such as health care, agriculture, and refugee support to local CSOs. Overall, government contracts are a minor source of viable funding for CSOs.

CSOs often serve as conduits for corporate giving to communities, especially if they operate service-delivery facilities such as health-care centers and schools. For example, Covenant Global Ministries works to improve
access to and quality of education and help Uganda’s communities to achieve their goals by operating schools in Ibanda District. The organization has also been able to provide key services such as water to communities within the district.

According to CivSource Africa, individual donations to charitable organizations continued to rise in 2021 in response to emergencies caused by the pandemic. This trend was also reflected in growing support for nascent online crowdsourcing initiatives such as Dolphin Fund and Akabbo, which tap into traditions of collective solidarity and provide alternative methods of gathering funding for humanitarian work. In addition, some CSOs benefitted from community goodwill, although it is not possible to assess the monetary value of such support.

For example, the Public Affairs Center (PAC) Uganda was hosted by its stationery service provider after failing to make rent payments, and Radio Pacis, a community-based station, gave the West Nile Regional CSO Network free airtime to engage citizens after public gatherings were banned. Anti-corruption campaigns such as those organized by the Western Ankole Civil Society Forum (WACSO) and Kitara CSO Network were kept going by community members who offered space in their yards for meetings and donated time and food items to help CBOs coordinate campaign activities.

CSOs’ revenue generation from commercial activities remained low in 2021. Although the NGO Act 2016 empowers CSOs to engage in commercial activity to finance their programming, few CSOs took advantage of this opportunity, in part because of the economic decline caused by the pandemic. Organizational weaknesses, such as the lack of competent staff, also prevented many CSOs from embracing commercial activity as an alternative source of income. A 2021 study on property acquisition and NGO sustainability by CivSource Africa found that Ugandan CSOs with commercially viable assets like buildings and event premises were less susceptible to funding shocks because they can generate income through property rental. There was no observable change in property acquisition as a strategy for CSO sustainability in 2021.

Donors’ increased emphasis on sophisticated financial reporting has contributed to CSOs’ embrace of quality control systems such as the Quality Assurance Mechanism (QuAM) of the Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations (DENIVA). In 2021, financial management was incidentally boosted by the government’s use of regulatory obligations to crack down on CSOs. As CSOs sought to bolster their defenses against state clampdowns, they increasingly engaged professional accountants and auditors to align their financial records and management systems with the standards required by the law.

**ADVOCACY: 3.8**

CSO advocacy deteriorated moderately in 2021. While there is a robust framework for CSO participation in decision-making processes at all levels, the sector’s ability to influence public policy was constrained by the tense political climate and the government’s hostile view of advocacy CSOs.

Despite several notable victories, the year was difficult for CSO advocacy. Hostilities between the state and the CSO sector posed the biggest hurdle. The government’s use of incommunicado detention, torture, telephone threats, suppression of the press, and other legal and extralegal measures at the time of the elections maimed advocacy organizations. After the elections, the government weaponized regulatory compliance to muzzle CSOs speaking up against the political situation. Many CSOs doing advocacy work went underground or abandoned advocacy work altogether. Such was the level of intimidation that some CSO leaders and political activists, including individuals from Chapter Four Uganda and the Forum for Democratic Change, were forced to flee into exile after receiving death threats. In addition, pandemic-related restrictions on movement and the government’s refusal to recognize CSO actors as essential workers impeded access to committee hearings during lockdowns. Even when movement restrictions were lifted, restrictions on public gatherings meant that committees were not sitting at full capacity, so CSOs did not have full access to decision-makers.
CSOs have several avenues of access to government decision making. The government’s Guide to Policy Development and Management in Uganda recognizes CSOs as key stakeholders in development. CSOs have representation on the board of the National Development Plan (NDP) III, the national sub-committee on evaluation in the prime minister’s office, sectoral working groups at the ministerial level, local government committees, and parliamentary committees. Given that 2021 was an election year, these platforms engaged in limited activity during the year. In addition, some advocacy CSOs experienced resistance in advancing their causes because of views among government officials that they aimed to undermine the president.

CSO advocacy in Uganda is typically conducted through theme-based coalitions. For example, the Civil Society Budget Advocacy Group works on advocacy related to fiscal policy; UWONET coordinates advocacy on women’s rights; and the National Coalition for Human Rights Defenders Uganda spearheads human rights advocacy. Despite tensions with the government, these organizations continued to conduct public and behind-the-scenes advocacy in 2021 and were able to score some victories. For example, CSOs had advocated for the removal of the highly unpopular Over-the-Top Tax since its introduction in 2018, as it was seen to target mass-communication on social media by requiring users to pay a daily tax. The tax was removed in 2021. The women’s movement led by the Uganda Women Parliamentary Association succeeded in obtaining passage of the Succession Amendment Bill 2021 and Employment Amendment Bill 2021, which aim to protect women from victimization after the death of a spouse and from sexual violence and harassment in the workplace and had been stalled for years. In the oil and gas sector, CSOs’ concerns about community and environmental protection were included in regulations and standards for extractive industries in Uganda adopted in 2021, which allowed the government to begin oil extraction. All of these victories were the result of years of sustained advocacy.

CSOs continued in 2021 to promote a more favorable legal and regulatory framework for the sector. Chapter Four Uganda and several other organizations helped increase awareness of the registration process and enhance the legal capacity of smaller CSOs. Working with the Human Rights Center Uganda and UNNGOF, the NGO Bureau attempted to create more awareness of the NGO regulatory framework by continuing to carry out regional reflection meetings and organizing quarterly dialogues with the minister of internal affairs. CSO leaders have advocated for a one-stop registration and reporting center to ease the compliance burden but these efforts have yet to yield fruit.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.8**

CSOs’ service provision showed extreme deterioration in 2021 as restrictions on travel and assembly combined with CSOs’ classification as “non-essential” workers severely limited their ability to provide services.

CSOs in Uganda normally provide services in a diverse range of fields, including community development, human rights, health care, education, emergency response, democracy and governance, economic development, environmental protection, food and security, WASH, conflict resolution, and women, youth, children, and the disabled. However, in 2021, the government classified work in the majority of these fields as “non-essential” and curtailed CSOs’ provision of services in these areas by refusing to grant exemptions to restrictions on travel. Only CSOs providing health-care, relief, and emergency...
services were able to continue operations at somewhat normal levels. But the dramatic increase in the death rate from COVID-19 in the spring had a tremendous psychological impact on workers throughout the sector. Among the dead were the colleagues, friends, and relatives of CSO staff. The country’s health-care system was overwhelmed, and as CSO workers were increasingly reluctant to risk exposure to the virus, the sector’s capacity to respond to the crisis was reduced.

The tensions around the elections in January also affected service-providing CSOs as the government moved to prevent the flow of information, detained and harassed CSO leaders and workers, and disrupted communications with an internet shutdown. The disruption spread to the wider civil society when DGF was closed in February 2021. Hundreds of service-providing CSOs implementing activities funded by DGF, either as primary beneficiaries or implementing partners, were forced to suspend scheduled activities as a result of the fund’s closure. The organizations forced to stop services included legal aid service providers such as Uganda Law Society and the Legal Aid Service Providers’ Network.

CSOs operating at the community level were less affected by movement restrictions because their beneficiaries are generally within walking distance. Some organizations like PAC Uganda, Kick Corruption Out of Uganda, and Lira NGO Forum used the crisis to improve their ability to respond to community needs by adopting strategies such as community immersion, or sending representatives to live with communities, and the use of low-cost technologies such as megaphones to disseminate information about the pandemic.

Opportunities for cost-recovery and income generation were thwarted by the multiple crises in 2021. CSOs were unable to ask communities to share costs when the country was in economic crisis. Some CSOs were able to compensate for shocks in the funding environment by obtaining non-monetary support from community members for service-related activities such as meetings, dialogues, and information dissemination.

Local governments recognized and appreciated the contribution of service-providing CSOs because their capacity to respond to the crisis was limited. At the national level, tensions in the political climate saw advocacy CSOs vilified as enemies in public remarks by top-ranking government officials. These hostilities extended to service-providing CSOs after enforcement of regulatory obligations was cranked up.

### SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.3

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector did not change in 2021.

ISOs improve the effectiveness of CSOs by providing services and physical infrastructures for meetings, training programs, and the dissemination of research and information on relevant thematic concerns. Most ISOs exist as national, regional, and thematic networks. The most active ISOs include UNNGOF, UWONET, Defend Defenders, Coalition for HRDs [Human Rights Defenders], Kitara CSO Network, Lira NGO Forum, Western Ankore CSO Forum, and advisory firms such as CivSource Africa. These organizations provide leadership in advocacy campaigns, technical assistance in regulatory compliance and corporate governance, and capacity building in project design management. In 2021, CSOs’ access to ISOs was weakened by restrictions on movement and public gatherings. Because many CSOs were required to work remotely when their operations were classified as non-essential, most ISOs switched to providing online services, which were constrained by high data costs and limited competence in using digital technology. UNNGOF, for example, used Zoom to convene NGO leaders, but unreliable networks, data costs, the lack of smartphones, and other deficiencies often reduced attendance to fewer people than targeted.

The nascent local grantmaking sector grew slightly in 2021. The Zishaye Grassroots Fund, which supports grassroots initiatives, and the Kuonyesha Fund, which promotes diversity in the arts, continued to function in 2021. Interest rose in crowdfunding platforms such as the Dolphin Fund, Ujasiri Fund, and Akabbo, thereby

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demonstrating the potential for local fundraising to become a viable source of support. Although funding flows from these initiatives have yet to gain significant momentum, they represent a growing trend of seeking funding for local needs from the community itself.

Cooperation in the sector increased in reaction to the government’s crackdown on CSOs, and national networks and coalitions were the rallying points for mobilizing the sector’s response. UNNGOF joined forces with DENIVA and Chapter Four Uganda to revitalize QuAM and conduct governance and regulatory compliance health checks to reduce CSOs’ vulnerability to suspensions and de-registration. UNNGOF also partnered with CivSource Africa to offer an online platform for dialogue and the sharing of experiences in fundraising, compliance, resilience, personal and organizational security, and simply coping. While these sessions helped CSO leaders rethink their approaches to organizational financing and work culture, their impact on the sector was limited.

Other training and technical support in 2021 included new initiatives such as USAID’s Civil Society Strengthening Activity, which helped improve the organizational competence of some CSOs through compliance clinics and training in strategic advocacy. However, the number of CSOs benefiting from such initiatives represented a small percentage of the sector. Most training and technical support was offered online in 2021 because of pandemic restrictions, but the majority of CSOs are not tech-savvy and were consequently excluded from online support.

Despite the difficulties in the operating environment, CSOs continued to partner with the government, private sector, and media to achieve common objectives in 2021. For instance, health-care organizations such as Mildmay Uganda were partners in the state’s pandemic response and received donations from corporations to enhance their community outreach programs. CSOs partnered with national and district COVID-19 task forces to provide technical and material support in executing the state’s pandemic response. For example, the Uganda Red Cross, Transcultural Psychosocial Organization, World Vision International, Lira NGO Forum, Kitara CSO Network, and other organizations donated foodstuffs, personal protective equipment, and hand-washing facilities to the taskforces. In sectors such as oil and gas, CSOs served as intermediaries between oil companies and communities and participated in the multi-stakeholder group that drafted the regulations and standards for extraction industries.

Media houses regularly invited CSOs to contribute to topical debates on their most-watched programs, thereby allowing the sector to take part in public dialogue. Government planning authorities and departments as well as parliamentary committees continued to invite CSOs to meetings.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.2**

The public image of CSOs declined slightly in 2021 as the ruling party’s negative rhetoric about the sector damaged public perceptions.

Media coverage of the sector was somewhat better than in previous years. CSO leaders were regularly invited to take part in public debates about the pandemic and other topics at the center of political, social, and economic life. Their presence, however, was constrained by the threat of reprisal by the Uganda Communications Commission, which caused media anchors to avoid content that was critical of the state. This tendency alienated both the media and CSOs from the public as people felt that media coverage did not reflect the realities they were experiencing on the ground.

In general, citizens felt abandoned in their hour of greatest need and consequently became disaffected with both the government and the CSO sector. As citizens grappled with the socio-economic crisis created by prevention measures, they interpreted CSOs’ focus on raising alarms about government attacks on the sector as inward-looking and blind to the public’s plight. The public perceived CSOs as more concerned about their perks and relationship with donors such as DGF than the needs of a public in crisis. The sector’s public image was also muddied by the government’s refusal to recognize CSOs as essential workers, thereby cutting them off from populations that were worst affected by the pandemic. These trends made it easier for people to accept the government’s claims that CSOs were foreign agents.
Relations between CSOs and the private sector did not change in 2021. Commercial links between CSOs and businesses were unconstrained, although the diminution of public life during the pandemic lowered the volume of transactions between the two sectors. Because of the pandemic, most CSOs were not fully operational, which reduced the business sector’s income from common expenses such as rent, stationery, and conference facilities. Some business owners were patient with CSOs that could not raise funds for rent, such as WACSOF and the Pallisa CSO Network. In other cases, good relationships with service providers gave organizations such as PAC Uganda access to alternative working space when they could no longer afford rent. At the macro level, however, the government’s portrayal of CSOs as “enemies of the state” impacted relationships between CSOs and large corporations. Corporate support for CSOs through corporate social responsibility programs remained low because large businesses feared that this could antagonize their relations with the state.

Government perception of CSOs continued to distinguish between advocacy and service-providing organizations in 2021. In public media and official documents such as the NDP III, government officials recognized service-providing CSOs as valuable partners that supplement the government’s development agenda. These same government officials, however, took an adversarial stance towards advocacy CSOs, whose criticism of corruption and the management of public affairs was interpreted as an attack on the government and therefore a threat to its survival. They often accused the sector of being equally corrupt and non-transparent.

To promote a better image for the sector, CSOs held joint media talk shows with government officials to increase awareness about the pandemic along with coping and recovery mechanisms. Organizations such as CivSource Africa championed the reporting of local giving to document the way in which citizen philanthropy was helping to address challenges raised by the pandemic.

In response to government rhetoric against the sector, umbrella CSOs pushed for an improvement in self-regulation in 2021. UNNGOF, for example, conducted compliance and governance health checks for eleven regional advocacy networks. It also conducted door-to-door compliance clinics to improve CSOs’ internal governance and regulatory compliance and the legitimacy and credibility of 115 organizations. Aware of low interest in QuAM, UNNGOF joined forces with DENIVA in November 2021 to create a roadmap for strengthening QuAM and sharing success stories of CSOs improved by its use.
Democratic space shrunk in Zambia in 2021 as general elections approached on August 12. As the ruling party, the Patriotic Front (PF), sought to consolidate its position and gain political leverage in the period leading up to the elections, the authorities became increasingly intolerant of divergent views. The authorities used the Public Order Act and pandemic-related restrictions to constrain freedoms of assembly and speech, especially for members of opposition political parties. For instance, opposition presidential candidates were regularly prevented from campaigning while the ruling party’s presidential candidate and other senior party officials were allowed to campaign freely. Incidents of politically sanctioned violence by ruling party cadres became common, and some CSOs accused of supporting the opposition were harassed and intimidated by PF supporters. In May, the government enacted the Electoral Process (Amendment) Act 2021 to penalize the announcement and declaration of election results without lawful authority. Although there were no prosecutions under this provision in 2021, CSOs viewed it as an unreasonable restriction on open and transparent elections and harmful to activities that could enhance the credibility of the electoral process, such as parallel voter tabulation. On Election Day, the government restricted access to social networks such as Facebook and WhatsApp, thereby preventing election monitors from transmitting election results from polling stations to independent tabulation centers. The PF went into the elections unstable and fragmented and lost to the United Party for National Development (UPND), whose head, Hakainde Hichilema, became president. The Electoral Commission’s management of the elections was criticized by both international monitors and the UPND.

Zambia remained vulnerable to COVID-19 in 2021. The government launched a vaccination campaign in April, but many people were reluctant to take the vaccine. A third wave of infections in the late spring led to a sharp rise in the number of confirmed cases and fatalities. The authorities reintroduced restrictions such as rotational shifts for public service workers, closure of schools and colleges, and a ban on public events likely to attract large audiences. Toward the end of the year, as the spread of virus slowed, most restrictions were lifted, although masking and social distancing requirements continued. CSOs performed few direct interventions to help stop the pandemic. Most organizations adjusted to working on virtual platforms, especially during the peak of the third wave in June.

After contracting by 2.8 percent in 2020 the Zambian economy was expected to grow by 3.3 percent in 2021, according to the World Bank. However, the economy continued to be strained by the volatile price of copper, Zambia’s main export, as well as low productivity, high national debt, and pandemic-related slowdowns. Other economic challenges included a sharp decline in the value of the kwacha, the national currency, as well as rising inflation and high unemployment. As a result of these challenges, poverty and inequality increased, and many people lacked access to social services.
CSOs’ overall sustainability improved slightly in 2021. The legal environment improved moderately as the PF government demonstrated its commitment to repealing and replacing the NGO Act of 2009. Service provision improved moderately as CSOs expanded their work into several new areas. The sectoral infrastructure improved slightly as local funding and training opportunities increased. CSOs’ public image showed slight improvement as their involvement in election-related activities garnered positive media coverage and smaller CSOs took steps to improve their public visibility. The other dimensions of sustainability did not change.

Because CSOs register through various agencies, official data on the number of organizations is difficult to obtain. A 2019 study on CSOs in Zambia by the Southern African Institute for Policy and Research in collaboration with the Zambia Governance Foundation estimated that there were about 12,000 CSOs. According to the Office of the Registrar for NGOs in the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services, 1,655 non-government organizations (NGOs), a distinct legal form, were cumulatively registered under the NGO Act as of 2021, of which 264 organizations were newly registered during the year.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.7**

CSOs’ legal environment improved moderately in 2021 as the PF government demonstrated its commitment to repeal and replace the NGO Act of 2009 during the eight months that it was in power.

CSOs in Zambia continued to register under three laws: the Societies Act Cap 119, the Companies Act No. 10 of 2017, and the NGO Act No. 16 of 2009. The majority of organizations register as NGOs, which are formed for purposes of serving the public benefit. Organizations acting as NGOs that are registered under different laws must re-register under the NGO Act, although they may wait to do so after the current NGO Act is repealed. Except for organizations in rural areas, which must travel to provincial centers to register, the registration process was easy and accessible in 2021. Under the current laws, CSOs are permitted to conduct preparatory activities for their operations once their applications are submitted. No CSO was reported to be dissolved during the year.

All NGOs in the country are overseen by the NGO Board in accordance with the NGO Act. The NGO Board consists of government, private-sector, civil society, church, and disability-sector representatives appointed by the government. Societies are overseen by the Registrar of Societies, and companies are supervised by the Patents and Companies Registration Authority.

The NGO Act of 2009 has yet to be repealed, despite pledges by successive governments since 2011 to reform the law. From January to August 2021, the PF government worked with CSOs on the repeal process. The new government that came into power in August had little time to take concrete steps to repeal the act during the year (although showed a willingness to do so in the following year). During 2021, the Office of the Registrar for NGOs worked with the Council of NGOs, Zambia Council for Social Development, and other stakeholders to raise awareness about issues of terrorist financing and a 2020 amendment to the NGO Act that enables the NGO Board to implement measures to protect the sector from financial abuse by terrorist organizations and individuals.

The 1955 Public Order Act, which regulates assemblies and other activities in public spaces, has long been a concern for CSOs, political parties, professional associations, and unions. Many stakeholders view enforcement of the act as a pretext for intimidating and harassing organizations and suppressing freedoms of assembly and association, especially when exercised by groups that express dissenting views. In 2021, the government used its discretionary powers under Section 57 of the Public Order Act to arrest and detain members of the Resident Doctors Association of Zambia for staging a peaceful assembly to air a number of grievances, including the government’s failure to pay their salaries and allowances. After taking part in a ten-day go-slow movement, the association president was informed that his employment contract was terminated and his medical license was suspended because of his long absenteeism. Following his dismissal, the association president sued the government.

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In September, the Lusaka High Court ordered the Health Professional Council of Zambia to restore his license and awarded him damages amounting to ZMW 101,000 (approximately $4,500) for loss of income and legal costs. The new government expressed its commitment to review the Public Order Act through genuine stakeholder engagement, and public consultations were planned for across the country in 2022.

The Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes Act, which was fully enacted in March 2021, allows the authorities to monitor and intercept communications and gives arbitrary powers to the minister of home affairs to prosecute and fine or imprison individuals who have engaged in communications deemed as posing a threat to national security or people’s economic and social well-being. The act imposes penalties of two years to life in prison for offenses ranging from hate speech to the possession of pornography. Although the act contains progressive provisions, such as those concerning cyber security and children, CSOs fear that it is likely to infringe on internet use and citizens’ ability to hold the government accountable. No CSOs were charged under the act in 2021.

The Data Protection Bill and Electronic Communication and Transaction Bill were enacted on March 23, 2021. The Data Protection Act provides a system for the use and protection of personal data. The Electronic Communication and Transaction Act provides for a safe and effective environment for electronic transactions, such as secure electronic signatures and the electronic filing of documents by public authorities. Most CSOs saw these pieces of legislation as progressive, and their main concern was only that the maximum jail sentence of two years for disclosure of sensitive personal data was too harsh.

CSOs’ operating conditions were tense and restrictive in 2021. Because it was an election year, relations between the government and CSOs, media, and opposition parties were highly inimical. During the election period, the authorities blocked or disrupted opposition party meetings and sanctioned violence by political cadres targeting dissenting civil society and media voices. In June, for example, PF party cadres set fire to a radio station in Chiengi District in Luapula Province, a PF stronghold, after it broadcast coverage of opposition activities. Most CSOs and media houses remained resilient and visible during this period, although they occasionally engaged in self-censorship.

CSOs are eligible for exemptions on excise duties, value-added tax, and income tax on the recommendation of line ministries or other government offices that confirm the public benefit nature of CSOs’ activities and at the discretion of the minister of finance. Although most international CSOs apply for and receive these exemptions, most local CSOs are unaware of this provision.

CSOs may undertake fundraising activities and accept foreign funding. CSOs may engage in income-generating activities provided they register as businesses. Social enterprises are allowed but uncommon.

Private lawyers are available in Zambia, but their fees are beyond what most CSOs can afford. The Human Rights Commission, an independent government body, and a few private foundations such as Chapter One Foundation, a local CSO that promotes and protects human rights, constitutionalism, and social justice through strategic litigation and advocacy, have lawyers on staff who are familiar with the legal framework for CSOs and offer subsidized legal assistance. The president of the Resident Doctors Association of Zambia was represented in court by Chapter One Foundation. Since most legal counsel is based in Lusaka and other large cities, CSOs in remote parts of the country have trouble accessing their services.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.6

Although they continued to have insufficient resources to invest in institutional sustainability, Zambian CSOs were organizationally stable in 2021.

CSOs’ capacity to engage with their constituencies made notable progress in 2021. Most organizations were unable to visit their constituents because of pandemic restrictions, especially during the third wave of infections starting in late spring. Realizing that the pandemic was likely to be prolonged, several national-level CSOs embarked on or strengthened their networking and social-media use to reach targeted audiences without physically meeting. For example, some CSOs working on climate change and environmental management, such as WASH Forum, NGOCC, and Women for Change (WfC), procured better equipment for teleconferencing and online meetings so that they could continue to implement activities. Among the few organizations directly engaged in the pandemic response, the Churches Health Association of Zambia (CHAZ) and Planned Parenthood Association of Zambia enhanced their service-delivery processes by, for example, collaborating with local health
workers and regularly checking the temperatures of participants during meetings. CSOs working on the elections also engaged more intensively with their constituents, since it was an election year and funding for election-related activities was easily accessible.

Only a few CSOs, including Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (C SPR) and the Center for Trade Policy and Development (CTPD), are known to have undertaken formal strategic planning processes in 2021. Most organizations lacked the funds to hire external consultants to guide their planning processes, although some CSOs undertook strategic planning on their own. At the national level, several CSOs working on election-related activities, such as the Zambia National Council for the Catholic Laity (ZNCCCL), Churches Coalition Monitoring Group (CCMG), and Center for Young Leaders in Africa (CYLA), had sufficient funding to undertake organizational reviews and restructuring to improve their performance. Otherwise, external reviews and evaluations of activities were not common because of a lack of resources.

Most larger national-level CSOs have clear institutional profiles and structured management and governance systems. In 2021, organizations such as WfC, CYLA, CSPR, Zambia National Women’s Lobby (ZNWL), Jesuit Center for Theological Reflection (JCTR), Young Women in Action (YWA), and Law Association of Zambia generally had sufficient funding to adhere to internal governance processes, such as regular board meetings and general assemblies. Smaller CSOs often found it difficult to develop and document their institutional structures and hold annual general meetings and board meetings. Without adequate funding for staffing and planned activities, smaller CSOs often put governance processes behind other more immediate concerns.

Large CSOs tended to have relatively qualified personal and clear divisions of labor in 2021. Smaller and newer CSOs often found it difficult to hire qualified staff because of funding shortages. CSOs that were not able to afford qualified human resources tended to rely on unpaid interns and volunteers. The World Giving Index for 2022, which reports data from 2021, ranks Zambia as fourth in the world in volunteering, with 43 percent of respondents saying that they had volunteered in the previous month (a jump from 28 percent the year before).

Most CSOs were able to maintain facilities such as offices and computers in 2021. Aside from a few well-funded organizations, most organizations were unable to invest in large purchases for their operations because of a lack of donor support for that purpose. Some CSOs pooled their resources to use them more efficiently. For instance, Consumer Unity Trust Society (CUTS) International Lusaka and CSPR continued to share office and conference spaces to cut expenses. The Alliance for Community Action and Fighting Inequality Alliance also shared offices in 2021.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.1**

Although still challenging, the sector’s financial viability was stable in 2021.

International donors are the primary source of funding for Zambia’s CSOs. In 2021, both national and regional CSOs received funding from a wide range of international agencies and foreign governments. For instance, sixteen CSOs, mainly at the national level, received funding for voter education, election monitoring, the tracking of election results, and training for political actors and parties from the multi-donor-funded Democracy Strengthening in Zambia program, which is implemented by the United Nations Development Programme. The United States and European Union (EU) provided funding for activities involving election monitoring, the tracking of election results, and advocacy on political reforms. EU member states such as Finland and Sweden supported projects on women’s leadership and economic empowerment and the prevention of gender-based violence (GBV), which were implemented by Women in Law and Development in Africa (WiLDAF), Zambia Open Community Schools (ZOCS), National Legal Clinic for Women, NGOCC, ZNWL, and other organizations. Diakonia funded projects on socio-economic justice and gender equity, while the German government supported CSOs working on access to justice and accountability in the justice system. Norwegian Church Aid, Hivos, Oxfam-Zambia, Save the
levels of donor support were largely unchanged in 2021. Most organizations were able to retain their funders from the previous year and thus had stable funding for their programs and other activities. CSPR reported that its funding increased by 53 percent over 2020. WfC reported that it received three-quarters of all funds applied for in 2021 and was able to implement most of its planned activities, including interventions in remote areas of the country. Few CSOs had funding specifically for pandemic-related interventions but many mainstreamed such activities into their regular projects.

Locally sourced funding for CSOs is scarce. CSOs rarely seek government contracts. Some service-providing CSOs, such as those that run shelters for survivors of GBV, sometimes receive small grants from the government to supplement their efforts. Declines in membership meant that income from membership fees was lower at many organizations. For example, Caritas Zambia, the Anti-Voter Apathy Project (AVAP), Zambia Center for Inter-Party Dialogue (ZCID), and Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP) were unable to collect members’ dues because their members are mostly smaller organizations unable to raise revenue during the year. Corporate social responsibility funding is rarely available to Zambian CSOs. Large multi-national corporations generally use their discretionary funding to donate directly to public institutions such as schools and health centers.

Social-entrepreneurial initiatives were minimal in 2021, although a few organizations such as CSPR were able to generate income from consultancies.

Most CSOs conduct annual audits, as they are a standard donor requirement. CSOs that could not afford to hire established audit firms in 2021 opted to use individual chartered accountants instead, which helped give them the credibility needed to attract funds.

**ADVOCACY: 3.2**

CSO advocacy remained stable in 2021. Although the government became more intolerant of dissenting views and CSOs did not always show unified positions on the reform of critical laws, they worked effectively on several important advocacy issues.

CSOs continued to cooperate with the government on policy and development issues in 2021. CSPR, for example, worked with the Ministry of National Development Planning to formulate the Eighth National Development Program and with the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services to monitor social protection programs around the country. CUTS International Lusaka and CSPR continued to sit on the national steering committee of the Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) for the Cooperative Development and Sustainability project implemented by the Ministry of Commerce, Trade, and Industry. CSOs such as NGOCC, Caritas Zambia, and JCTR continued to sit on various cluster advisory committees of the National Development Coordinating Committee.
Many CSOs at the national and local levels concentrated on election-related advocacy during the year. Operation Young Vote (OYV), AVAP, and CCMG sought to ensure credible, free, and fair elections through election monitoring and parallel voter tabulation. NGOCC and its members called for a gender-sensitive election process, and OYV and YWA demanded an electoral system inclusive of young people. Several CSOs, including Chapter One Foundation, Transparency International Zambia (TIZ), CTPD, CSRPR, and Caritas Zambia, encouraged candidates to engage in issues-based campaigns and provided them with opportunities to interact with the public through call-in television programs, radio discussions, and televised debates. TIZ advocated for a political party financing law that would compel political parties to disclose the sources of campaign funds to ensure they avoid the kind of debt that can be shifted to the public budget in the event that they join the government. In the lead-up to the elections, other CSOs, such as CCMG, ZAFOD, and CYLA, also lobbied actively for key electoral reforms, including checks and balances in voter registration, accreditation processes, and election observation efforts.

CSOs engaged in a wide range of other issues, although most of their efforts did not yield definitive outcomes as policy makers were focused mainly on the elections. The CSO Debt Coalition, JCTR, CSRPR, CUTS International Lusaka, CTPD, and other organizations sought to help resolve Zambia’s national debt crisis. One of their efforts was to confer with some of the country’s lenders, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which helped induce the government to commit to disclosing the actual value of public debt and begin negotiations about debt restructuring. Another outcome of their work was that the government agreed to start the process of repealing the Loans and Guarantees (Authorization) Act of 1969 to give the parliament the authority to approve public debt before it is contracted.

CSRPR, CHAZ, Zambia National Educational Coalition (ZANEC), Forum for African Women Educationist in Zambia (FAWEZA), and WASH Forum, along with international CSOs such as World Vision, Save the Children, and Plan International, demanded progress in the implementation of decentralized service provision, especially in low-income communities. NGOCC, ZNWL, YWA, and other organizations continued to demand the establishment of a gender equality and equity commission and effective implementation of the Gender Equity and Equality Act No. 22 of 2015. CSOs such as the Governance, Electoral, Advocacy, and Research Services Initiative called for expansion of Zambia’s Bill of Rights to include enforceable economic, social, and cultural rights so that the public has a strong legal basis for demanding better government accountability in development. CYLA, OYV, and the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) focused on ensuring quality long-term employment opportunities for youth.

The Community Technology Development Trust, Zambia Alliance for Agroecology and Biodiversity, Climate Smart Agriculture Alliance Zambia, Zambia Alliance for Women, and other organizations advocated for policies that would allow them to track the compliance of commercial and business groups with environmental regulations. These organizations also sought to increase public financing related to climate change. JCTR, ZCTU, Economic Association of Zambia, and CUTS International Lusaka called for socio-economic justice and access to affordable basic supplies such as food and energy.

CSOs put in considerable work on laws affecting the legal framework for the sector in 2021, although they were not always unified in their positions and some CSOs remained mute on the matter. Organizations such as the GEARS Initiative called for repeal of the Public Order Act, arguing that in its current form it deters full citizen participation in public affairs. Also of concern to CSOs was the Access to Information Bill, which has been on the government’s list for reform since 2002. In 2021, the government made several pledges to present the bill to the parliament but dragged its feet as the elections approached. CSOs were unsuccessful in persuading the government to reform the bill so that citizens could access information needed to hold the government accountable.

Chapter One Foundation, Alliance for Community Action, Bloggers of Zambia, GEARS Initiative, and People’s Action for Accountability and Good Governance in Zambia unsuccessfully challenged the newly enacted Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes Act of 2021 in the High Court for Zambia in April 2021. They argued that the new law contains provisions that threaten the right to freedom of expression and sought to have the act declared unconstitutional.

CSOs led by ActionAid Zambia (AAZ) and NGOCC continued to engage with the government to expedite the process of repealing the NGO Act of 2009. They held consultative meetings with the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Community Development and agreed on a draft bill to repeal and replace the controversial act.
SERVICE PROVISION: 4.3

Service provision improved moderately in 2021 as CSOs continued to provide a wide range of services, including in several new areas.

CSOs provided many services in 2021. For instance, FAWEZA, ZANEC, ZOCS, Council of Churches in Zambia (CCZ), and CAMFED provided educational services, particularly for young children in poorer communities. CHAZ, CCZ, NGOCC, and Women with Disabilities offered health care, skills, and empowerment services to young, vulnerable, and marginalized communities in remote areas. The WASH Forum increased access to clean water and decent sanitation facilities in poor and low-income communities. WfC fostered improved public service delivery in Kalomo and Zimba districts, helped prevent GBV in Petauke District and Luapula, and supported girls and boys in school and encouraged resilience to climate change in Mumbwa District. Some CSOs, such as WfC, FODEP, ZCID, and Caritas Zambia, could not provide their full range of planned counseling and other services in 2021 because of inadequate financial or human resources.

In 2021, the EU-funded Zambia Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries project was launched to strengthen fisheries management and governance and protect livelihoods in three provinces. The project is implemented by a consortium of AAZ, Keepers Zambia Foundation, and Zambia Social Forum. The focus on fisheries was new for Zambian CSOs. Another notable development in 2021 was CSOs’ growing focus on providing legal services to various audiences. For instance, Chapter One Foundation, WiLDAF, Legal Clinic for Women, and Paralegal Network provided access-to-justice and litigation services to civil society activists who in some instances were arrested for conducting peaceful protests or expressing their opinions on governance matters. The National Legal Aid Clinic for Women and WiLDAF continued to provide legal services to vulnerable and marginalized women with support from the governments of Finland and Sweden.

Zambian CSOs seek to meet the needs of their communities. For example, NGOCC and WfC provided adult education and skills training to women in peri-urban and rural areas in 2021. They also helped return several young girls to school after early marriages, provided reproductive services to mothers and young women, and raised awareness about healthy lifestyles among women and girls. NGOCC and some of its member organizations, such as the Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA), implemented activities to prevent GBV with funding from the governments of Denmark, Finland, and Sweden. Other CSOs, such as Caritas Zambia, Alliance for Community Action, and FODEP, conducted awareness raising about citizens’ electoral rights, encouraging women and young people around the country not only to register to vote but to use their votes to decide who would lead the country into the future.

CSOs in Zambia often provide services to clients beyond their membership. For example, the Economic Association of Zambia, a membership-based organization, typically invites the public to its discussions of economic topics. Organizations such as the YWCA that offer counseling to survivors of GBV provide their services without discrimination.

CSOs in Zambia provide most services on a charitable basis and do not seek to recover their costs. A few CSOs have established social enterprises to supplement their incomes. For example, the YWCA and Caritas Zambia operate lodges to raise funds for their charitable programs, and CSPR provides consultancy services to raise unrestricted funding for its operations.

The government appreciates that CSOs contribute to the public well-being and recognizes them in public statements and with funding support. For instance, the government provides small grants to several CSOs involved in the health-care and social-welfare sectors in recognition of their services.
SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.8

The sectoral infrastructure for CSOs improved slightly in 2021 as local funding and training opportunities increased.

CSOs continued to be served by resource centers maintained by NGOCC, ZNWL and JCTR, which, among other services, provide information on funding opportunities and stock research reports on various topics. No new resource centers were created in 2021. The Zambia Governance Foundation continued to distribute a newsletter with information about activities, innovations, and developments in the Zambian CSO sector.

International CSOs such as AAZ, World Vision, Oxfam, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Hivos, and Norwegian Church Aid have local offices in Zambia that funded locally identified projects in 2021. Domestic organizations such as CHAZ, WaterAid Zambia, CSPR, and NGOCC sub-granted foreign funds. Taken together, these locally based grantmakers made more funding available in 2021 than in previous years. OSISA, for example, provided funding to CSPR to subgrant to local CSOs for projects on debt advocacy. Other areas for subgrants included gender, climate justice, debt advocacy, policy formulation, the environment, water and sanitation, justice, and the construction of community facilities such as water access points, classroom blocks, and sanitation infrastructure. Funding was also available for local CSOs to raise awareness about electoral processes, monitor elections, and advocate for the taxation of mining companies.

Zambian CSOs worked through networks and coalitions to implement activities and share limited resources in 2021. For example, the CSO Debt Alliance continued to promote accountable, transparent, and participatory national debt management with funding from OSISA, Oxfam-Zambia, and the National Democratic Institute. The alliance also supported the Copper for Development Campaign, which aims to ensure that revenues from copper mining benefit local communities. Both the alliance and the campaign were launched in 2020.

CSOs have access to a range of training opportunities from civil society and the government. For example, in 2021, CSOs participating in the national planning and budgeting processes received training from CSPR, CTPD, and JCTR on subjects such as national budgeting processes, gender-responsive budgeting, and public debt advocacy. Several donor-funded, government-implemented projects also offered training to CSOs.

CSOs participated in a number of partnerships with the government and private sector in 2021. CUTS International Lusaka and CSPR sat on the national steering committee of the EIF project, which also has members from government ministries and the private sector. CSPR, NGOCC, Caritas, and other organizations continued to sit on selected cluster advisory groups of the National Development Coordinating Committee.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.0

CSOs’ public image showed slight improvement as their involvement in election-related activities garnered positive media coverage and boosted the public view of the sector, while smaller organizations took steps to improve their visibility.

CSOs’ relations with media were good in 2021, both before and after the elections. Both public and private media, but especially the latter, sought CSOs’ views often during the year, especially on the new government’s ambitious first national budget. Diamond TV, for example, provided spaces in which governance-related topics were discussed by CSO experts and activists.

Public views of CSOs improved as communities saw the sector as providing alternative channels for obtaining information and expressing their concerns about the elections. For example, the public applauded CSOs that sponsored public debates in which election candidates aired their views. At the same time, the public viewed some
organizations as captured by partisan interests. For example, CSOs that in 2020 were opposed to enactment of Bill 10, a proposed constitutional amendment that would have increased the powers of the president, were still seen as aligned to the opposition while those that supported the bill were seen as pro-PF. CSOs that provided social services such as health care, education, water, and interventions in cases of domestic violence enjoyed high levels of public support.

Before the elections, the ruling elite had negative opinions of CSOs engaged in public accountability and treated them harshly, with many reports of intimidation and harassment. After the new UPND government came into power, it was unclear whether it would embrace CSOs as development partners. Although higher-level government representation at CSO functions was rare, the Ministry of Finance and National Planning started to invite CSOs to its meetings and briefings, which was a positive sign.

Most private-sector actors have positive views of CSOs involved in service delivery. Various business associations have spoken highly of CSOs that look after the vulnerable. Such statements may reflect the ability of service-delivery CSOs, in contrast to advocacy CSOs, to procure goods.

In 2021, many CSOs significantly improved their visibility by using billboards, placards, and social media to inform the public about their mandates, activities, and target groups. For the first time, even smaller CSOs were seen with backdrop banners, and a few of them developed and launched basic websites.

Most CSOs produce annual program and financial reports, including audits. However, few organizations share their reports with the public. Most CSOs follow individual codes of conduct. In 2021, the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services, working with the Council of NGOs and in consultation with organizations across the country, finalized its Standards and Guidelines for NGOs. By the end of 2021, the document was awaiting printing and dissemination.
The Zimbabwean government continued its apparent efforts to shrink civic space in 2021 with a myriad of carefully woven strategies. In April, the parliament passed the Constitutional Amendment (No. 2) Act, which, among other provisions, authorizes the president to appoint senior judges and replaces the direct election of the vice president with appointment by the president. CSOs protested these changes as they represented a dangerous expansion of presidential powers and threatened the independence of the judiciary. Despite a spirited advocacy campaign resulting in widespread public rejection of the proposed amendment, President Emmerson Mnangagwa signed it into law on May 7, 2021. Threats against CSOs escalated following an unsuccessful court challenge of the amendment filed by the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Young Lawyers Association of Zimbabwe (YLAZ), and Law Society of Zimbabwe.

The United States and the European Union (EU) extended restrictive measures against Zimbabwean government entities and other individuals in March 2021. US sanctions targeted senior government officials and other individuals and organizations involved in undermining Zimbabwe’s democratic processes and institutions, human rights abuses, and public corruption. In extending the sanctions, the United States cited the government’s “absence of progress on the most fundamental reforms needed to ensure the rule of law, democratic governance, and the protection of human rights.”

The first half of 2021 witnessed a surge in infections and deaths from COVID-19. A nationwide lockdown restricted intercity travel and closed all borders to non-commercial traffic entering or leaving Zimbabwe. The government continued to weaponize pandemic lockdown restrictions, most notably by curtailing public gatherings by any group other than the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) party, which continued to hold meetings in violation of COVID-19 containment protocols. In February, the government began a vaccination campaign that reached about 23 percent of the population by the end of the year. CSOs complied with COVID-19 restrictions, and most organizations had to rely on online platforms and media to convene meetings and relay information. Pandemic-related restrictions were relaxed in the last quarter of the year.

Zimbabwe’s economy continued to face challenges in 2021, although the World Bank estimated that it would rebound from a 6.2 percent contraction in 2020. Contributing to the improved economic outlook were a good agricultural season and strong local industrial production and export growth. Food security improved significantly, although extreme poverty rates in urban areas remained high. Social welfare assistance programs funded mostly by donor agencies helped mitigate the plight of struggling households but had limited coverage.

Overall CSO sustainability deteriorated slightly in 2021. The legal environment deteriorated moderately as the government proposed or passed new legislation injurious to civil society, sought to intimidate CSOs, and took
measures to interfere with CSOs’ operations beyond those permitted by law. The sector’s financial viability weakened slightly as donor funding decreased or was channeled to fighting the pandemic. Advocacy declined slightly because of reduced funding and pandemic-induced restrictions, which impeded CSOs’ efforts to meet with government officials. The sectoral infrastructure deteriorated significantly as decreased funding and pandemic-related restrictions reduced access to training and capacity development. CSOs’ public image was slightly weaker because of negative media coverage by state-owned media. Organizational capacity and service provision were unchanged.

The National Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (NANGO) has not published official data on the size of the CSO sector since 2016. In that year, NANGO reported 993 private voluntary organizations (PVOs) registered in Zimbabwe. Trusts and common-law organizations known as universitas were estimated at more than 5,000. According to informal data from NANGO, a total 1,264 CSOs were registered in 2021, with the number of active organization estimated at about 800.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.9**

The legal environment for CSOs deteriorated moderately in 2021 as the government proposed or passed new legislation injurious to civil society, sought to intimidate and silence CSOs, especially those seeking to hold it to account, and took measures to interfere with CSOs’ operations beyond those permitted by law.

While CSOs are not legally obliged to register before beginning operations, most organizations find it difficult to function without official registration. In particular, organizations must have legal personality to access formal banking channels, receive funding, and conform to corporate governance standards. Most CSOs register as trusts with the Office of the Registrar of Deeds, which grants trust deeds that spell out an organization’s operational mandate. The process of registering as a trust is somewhat expensive as an organization must secure the services of a legally registered lawyer to lodge the application for registration and pay a fee to the Registrar of Deeds. These costs present a barrier to registration for some organizations. In 2021, the registration of new trusts was effectively suspended, and most applications remained unprocessed without explanation.

CSOs may also form as associations, which requires only that a group of people craft and adopt a constitution, or as common-law universitas, which obtain legal personality “because they exist.” Universitas tend to run into hurdles with local authorities, and for ease of operation, including financial inclusion, many universitas eventually register as trusts. CSOs may also register with the Ministry of Social Welfare as PVOs, which find it easier than other types of CSOs to enter into memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with local authorities. In addition, some donors prefer to cooperate with PVOs rather than trusts. However, PVOs face more requirements, such as publication of their annual reports and audits, which many organizations fear will expose them to government interference.

Although not a legal requirement, local government officials often oblige organizations to sign MOUs before allowing them to operate in particular districts. The tenure and terms of the memoranda are not standardized across the country, which causes difficulties for CSOs that operate in multiple districts or provinces. Some district councils require CSOs to pay for MOUs. For example, Seke District charges CSOs $100 to conclude memoranda. CSOs and community-based organizations (CBOs) that lack memoranda are prone to interference from the police. For example, the police selectively apply a provision of the Maintenance of Peace and Order Act of 2019 saying that persons intending to hold a public meeting must notify the police in advance. The organizations requested to obtain police clearance before holding events are generally perceived to be anti-government, while pro-government organizations do not encounter this obligation. In 2021, several CSOs and CBOs were unable to operate after their MOUs were recalled or left unrenewed on the grounds that the organizations had not passed
security clearances at the district or provincial level. During the year, several government officials threatened to deregister specific organizations but did not do so.

In preparation for the introduction of the PVO Amendment Bill in 2021, the government began an unofficial audit of all CSOs and sought to obtain details about all operating CSOs, including names of their staff members. The PVO Amendment Bill was presented in the parliament in November 2021. The bill poses a major threat to CSOs. On its face, the bill seeks to comply with Recommendation 8 of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism and terrorist activities. However, the bill brings CSOs under tighter government control by imposing penalties on organizations that engage in what is vaguely referred to as “political lobbying” and by extending the definition of PVO to include trusts and universitas. The bill allows the government to revoke the registration or replace the leadership of PVOs identified as being at “high risk” of “vulnerable” to terrorism abuse. In December, the United Nations (UN) special rapporteurs on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, the promotion and protection of the rights to freedom of opinion and expression, the situation of human rights defenders, and the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism sent a joint letter to the president expressing their concern that the law would have “grave consequences for the exercise of civil and political rights, including the right to freedom of association” in Zimbabwe. CSOs also responded to the bill with various advocacy initiatives.

Although the bill did not become law in 2021, the government started to enforce some of its provisions unofficially. For example, many CSOs and CBOs working outside of major cities reported that they were required to seek MOU before beginning operations and had to submit work plans and other information about operational issues to the offices of provincial development coordinators (PDCs). For example, in June, the Harare PDC demanded that all CSOs submit their work plans to his office and later announced a blanket ban on hundreds of CSOs that had not complied with this directive. The Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition (CiZC) and Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum challenged the ban in the High Court, which ruled in September that the ban was unlawful. Similar demands were made by PDCs in Masvingo and Mashonaland Central provinces. In Mutasa District, according to the online newspaper NewZimbabwe, the PDC ordered the organization Connect to cease operations for “engaging in politics.”

The Data Protection Act (formerly known as the Cyber Security and Data Protection Bill) was enacted in December 2021 and further restricted civic space in Zimbabwe. The law regulates access to information, the protection of privacy of information, and the processing of data. While the act can be useful in combating cybersecurity crimes, it also provides the state with grounds for infringing on the privacy of citizens, human rights defenders, and CSOs. CSOs heavily criticized the bill and conducted advocacy against its enactment. The Postal and Telecommunications (Telecommunications Traffic Monitoring System) Regulations passed in 2021 will also have significant impact on freedom of expression. The regulations allow the government to monitor telecommunications traffic by requiring service providers to submit call records and other information on a monthly basis.

 Freedoms of assembly and expression continued to be restricted in 2021. In March, a well-known youth activist was accused of mobilizing vendors to revolt against the police and was sentenced to fourteen months in prison on charges of inciting public violence and resisting arrest. Ten journalists and nine members of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) Alliance were arrested for attending a Zimbabwe Electoral Commission meeting in Harare in March. Three MDC Alliance women youth leaders, including a legislator, were briefly detained by suspected state security agents and subjected to sexual violence and torture during their detention. They were eventually released on bail, and the matter was still before the courts at the end of the year. In March, four university students participating in a peaceful protest organized by the Zimbabwe National Students Union were arrested and charged with participating in a gathering with intent to cause public violence. In June, the director of the Chitungwiza Residents Trust was detained for six days after mobilizing citizens and voicing concern about the state-sanctioned illegal demolition of vending stalls in Greater Harare. Forty war veterans were detained for four days after they tried to petition the president regarding low pensions and deteriorating standards of living.

CSOs are taxed like other entities and do not receive exemptions. CSO employees who earn their incomes in foreign currencies have pay-as-you-earn tax deducted in those currencies.

CSOs may engage in fundraising campaigns and receive foreign assistance. The government often demonizes CSOs that accept foreign funding as puppets of foreign governments and agents of illegal regime change, especially if they
work in the democracy and governance sector. While CSOs may compete for government tenders, they are rarely successful unless they are sympathetic to or have formal or informal links to the government.

CSOs may obtain free legal services from other CSOs, notably the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) and Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum. Public interest litigation is performed by Veritas, Law Society of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe NGO Human Rights Forum, and YLAZ.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.6**

CSOs’ organizational capacity was unchanged in 2021.

Pandemic-related restrictions affecting CSO programming continued to be alternately reimposed and eased throughout the year. Most CSOs were unable to carry out all of their usual activities or convene face-to-face meetings with community members. CSOs working in urban settings were generally able to shift to online engagements, but organizations in rural areas were often unable to do so because of poor internet connections. The operations of some CSOs and CBOs, such as the Institute for Young Women Development (IYWD) and Legal Resources Foundation (LRF) working in Mashonaland Central were impaired when their memoranda of understanding were recalled or left unrenewed by local officials.

CSOs have generally close relationships with their beneficiaries. These relationships are forged through the services provided by CSOs, with humanitarian organizations and CSOs that provide direct livelihoods-linked services having stronger community acceptance and buy-in. Advocacy organizations tend to create strong relationships in communities in which they are involved in issues that attract national or international attention, such as the large-scale evacuation of communities around Chisumbanje in Chpinge at the behest of the Green Fuel company. Most CSOs involved in the more political aspects of human rights have smaller footprints, especially in communities in which the ruling party exercises tight control.

While most organizations have boards in place, many CSOs lack internal regulatory frameworks that would bind them to specific standards. Only a portion of organizations have boards that are constituted democratically via elections. Board oversight can be weak, especially as trusted individuals often sit on multiple boards because of fears of infiltration by state security agents. This situation can create conflicts of interest, since board members may work for organizations that compete with the organizations on whose boards they sit. In 2021, governance processes at some organizations were compromised when the pandemic forced employees to work from home, thereby weakening the segregation of authorities and other normal governance practices. Declines in funding, especially for institutional support, board training, policy updates, and strategic planning, also undermined board leadership in 2021.

Decreased funding undermined CSOs’ ability to attract and retain skilled personnel in 2021. Staff turnover was high at many organizations, especially CBOs, which face the perennial threat of losing key personnel to more established domestic and international CSOs. Organizations such as NANGO, Savanna Trust, and CiZC experienced high staff turnover in 2021.

Declines in funding limited CSOs’ ability to acquire modern office equipment in 2021. The country’s weak telecommunications and power infrastructure limited access to the internet in marginalized areas. Acutely affected by this situation were organizations in areas such as Gwanda, where daily power outages affect cellphone reception and internet access. Data costs for telecommunications were prohibitively high for most CSOs and beneficiaries, although well-funded CSOs, such as Veritas Zimbabwe, Coalition for Debt and Development (ZIMCODD), and Zimbabwe Institute, were able to adapt to the pandemic using digital means.
CSOs’ financial viability deteriorated slightly in 2021 as many donors shifted funding from development assistance to the pandemic response. A significant number of CSOs receive their funding from foreign donors. Many CSOs believe that “donor fatigue” is setting in in Zimbabwe, particularly regarding advocacy focused on democracy, human rights, and governance. A significant portion of the foreign funding available to CSOs in 2021 focused on the pandemic. Most CSOs were asked by donors to realign their existing budgets to accommodate pandemic responses. Funding opportunities were usually biased towards established CSOs working on a national scale over more localized CSOs and CBOs. The major funding partners in 2021 continued to be USAID, the EU, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Danish Church Aid, Embassy of the Netherlands, other foreign embassies, and multilateral institutions such as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and World Food Program. The onset of the pandemic in 2020 saw a significant increase in cooperation between the government and bilateral and multilateral partners, which had deteriorated in recent decades. This trend continued in 2021, forcing CSOs to compete against the government for donor resources. Bilateral institutions, traditionally the most important source of funding for CSOs, also shifted significant amounts of funding to multi-donor trust funds such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. These organizations in turn channeled resources to fight the pandemic through frameworks that involved the government but excluded most local CSOs. As a result, organizations with working relationships with the government were able to remain operational and were likely to attract funding. But CSOs that did not carry out programs directly related to the pandemic, such as CiZC, National Youth Development Trust (NYDT), and Community Tolerance Reconciliation and Development Trust, saw a marked decline in their funding. CSOs in Zimbabwe rarely receive funding from private foundations, which are few in number and prefer to support beneficiaries directly. CSOs do not generally seek funding from the government because of the hostile relationship between the two sectors. Some pro-government or government-aligned CSOs reportedly receive government funding and other forms of government support clandestinely through an opaque system with limited accountability. For instance, so-called yellow unions seeking to undermine the genuine labor movement have proliferated recently, are close to the government, and represent some of the most critical sectors, such as the civil service and students’ movements. Other CSOs receiving government funding include organizations working on sexual and reproductive health issues, which receive grants from the National AIDS Council, and CSOs active in climate change. Some Zimbabwean CSOs benefited from other sources of income in 2021. A few organizations, such as Kudzimurana Trust Soup Kitchen in Chitungwiza and the Citizens Initiative, have experimented successfully with alternative funding models such as crowdfunding. With the support of the American Friends Service Committee, the Integrated Development and Empowerment Trust and Basilwizi Trust based in Binga have interwoven paid livelihoods programs into their advocacy programming, which contribute to their financial viability. Organizations such as ZimRights, Media Center, and Southern Africa Political Economy Series (SAPES) Trust continued to rent space for meetings and press conferences in 2021, although pandemic restrictions limited these opportunities. Other CSOs, such as the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions and Zimbabwe Union of Journalists, relied on more traditional sources of income, such as subscriptions from members or affiliates. However, the poor economy and the growing prominence of the informal labor sector have undercut the viability of subscriptions to support CSOs’ operations. Most organizations have sound financial management systems to guide their disbursements and expenditures. A significant majority of CSOs have qualified financial management staff. Organizations lacking financial staff and systems rely on organizations with more developed financial procedures to handle their finances until they are able
to do so on their own. Many CSOs carry out regular audits, usually annually, which encourages confidence in their financial management. The financial management systems of smaller local organizations with less access to funding are not as developed as those of larger organizations, many of which have handled USAID or EU funds, which is considered a key mark of sound financial management.

**ADVOCACY: 4.1**

CSO advocacy regressed slightly in 2021 as pandemic-induced restrictions reduced CSO’s access to government officials and limited their ability to travel and organize on the community level. In addition, most advocacy organizations experienced decreased levels of funding, which weakened the effectiveness of their work on key issues.

CSOs often find the government unresponsive to their advocacy efforts. However, some CSOs were able to forge relatively fruitful working relationships with government institutions in 2021. For example, the Women of Zimbabwe Arise engaged the government on reopening the Gukurahundi conversations about the military’s massacre of an estimated 20,000 people in Matebeleland in the early 1980s. CSOs continued to work closely with constitutional commissions such as the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC) and the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission. For example, IYWD invited the ZHRC to a meeting in March to discuss problems facing young women in Mashonaland Central. On the local level, CSOs worked effectively with village heads, local leaders, and government officials. For example, VISET met with traditional leaders and government officials in Goromonzi District to discuss the challenges faced by the informal sector. Residents’ associations and youth and women’s organizations conducted community meetings and projects on local governance and social accountability.

CSOs continued to raise public awareness about government accountability in 2021. Open Party Zimbabwe and Veritas continued to publish multi-media content about parliamentary proceedings, and the National Association of Youth Organizations (NAYO) raised awareness about citizens’ rights under the constitution. ZIMCODD’s efforts to raise public awareness about the government’s lack of transparency and accountability on matters of public finance effectively informed narratives about government corruption in the mainstream media. The Zimbabwe Peace Project conducted a campaign to stop evictions in the Dinde community in Hwange, where people were pushed from their ancestral homes by a Chinese company. A group of twenty-five Matebeleland CSOs collaborated on EkhayaVote 2023, a voter mobilization campaign. LRF, Women’s Coalition in Zimbabwe, and a resident of Masvingo mounted legal action to compel apostolic churches to publish messages against child marriage at their shrines. The Coalition on Wetlands Protection collaborated to petition the City of Harare to stop construction in the Cleveland Catchment Area.

CSOs continued to meet with parliamentary committees to influence policy and draft legislation in 2021. IYWD submitted the Model Gender Equality Bill to parliamentary portfolio committees, relevant ministries, and the Zimbabwe Gender Commission. NAYO petitioned the parliament to drop or suspend the proposed reintroduction of a national youth service because of its earlier involvement in politically motivated violence. IYWD and the Combined Residents Trust petitioned the parliament about the Provincial and Metropolitan Councils Administration Bill in an effort to compel the government to fully implement devolution as provided for in the constitution. Typically, the government did not respond to many CSO advocacy actions.

CSOs pushed actively for an improved legal framework for the sector in 2021. CSOs responded to the PVO Amendment Bill introduced in November with various advocacy initiatives, including engagement with parliamentary committees and government ministries to seek the bill’s withdrawal or watering down. CiZC urged FATF to work with the government and civil society to forge a more favorable framework for regulating civil society in line with FATF recommendations. NANGO produced an alternative text to the PVO Bill that borrowed
from a document that it had produced in 2004. At the end of the year, a broad coalition of CSOs known as the Civil Society Coordinating Committee on the PVO Bill was working on another alternative bill produced by Veritas. The PVO Amendment Bill is expected to be presented to the parliament once it resumes sittings, which were suspended in 2021 because of the pandemic.

CSOs also advocated against enactment of the Data Protection Bill. For example, the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA)–Zimbabwe wrote to the president to implore him not to sign the bill into law and produced analytical pieces to inform the public about its negative implications. A significant achievement in 2021 was CSOs’ successful court challenge to the effort of the Harare Metropolitan Province PDC to ban CSOs that did not submit workplans and budgets. The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum and CiZC challenged the ban in an urgent High Court application, and in September, the High Court ruled that the ban was unconstitutional and set it aside.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.3**

CSO service provision was unchanged in 2021.

CSOs’ services are varied and diversified. Their focus ranges from education, health care, and livelihoods to governance, energy, and environmental protection. In 2021, CSOs such as the Amalgamated Rural Teachers Union played a significant role in promoting the COVID-19 vaccination drive in partnership with the government and some churches. CSOs also provided personal protective equipment and pandemic-related services in rural and hard-to-reach areas. For example, Bulawayo-based CSOs, such as NYDT and the Zimbabwe Christian Alliance, worked with churches to distribute food and equipment in disadvantaged communities in Matebeleland. Some organizations provided health services to communities and social assistance to vulnerable groups, while other CSOs conducted capacity building related to the elections, the constitution, and gender-based violence. For example, VlSET conducted workshops on entrepreneurship for vendors, and ZLHR, YLAZ, and other organizations took on litigation on behalf of human rights defenders and ordinary citizens.

Most CSOs conduct needs assessments to decide on the interventions to make in their communities. For example, the Buhera Residents Association responded to the community’s need for internet services for school children by constructing four information hubs. Because of economic hardship and extreme poverty, some communities tend to prioritize immediate food assistance over programs focused on socio-political rights.

CSOs’ services are generally offered without discrimination and often extend to beneficiaries beyond their members.

CSOs sometimes distribute or market publications or other goods and services to academia, government, businesses, and religious institutions. For example, ZLHR distributes the *Legal Monitor* and CiZC produces two online publications, the *Crisis Report* and *ZimBriefing*.

CSOs generally do not seek to recover costs by charging fees or marketing goods and services. Most publications and training workshops are offered free of charge to targeted beneficiaries.

The government tends to recognize the contributions of international organizations, such as the World Food Program, UNICEF, and Oxfam, which work mainly in humanitarian relief, education, and health care. The government usually refers to domestic CSOs in a negative way, especially if they are trade unions, certain churches, or residents’ associations or focus on human rights, democracy, and governance.
SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.2

The infrastructure supporting Zimbabwe’s CSOs deteriorated significantly in 2021 as reduced funding and pandemic restrictions limited access to training and capacity development.

CSOs had access to fewer training opportunities in 2021. The closure of PACT Zimbabwe's projects in September 2021 and the shutdown of its offices later in the year caused a notable gap in training, especially since most other donors fund activity-based training rather than organizational development and institutional support. The limited training that was offered was accessible mainly through virtual platforms because of COVID-19 restrictions, which excluded many CBOs unable to afford needed equipment or located in regions with poor internet access. Among the training that took place in 2021, Pact Zimbabwe provided training on social accountability, and the Southern African Parliamentary Support Trust conducted training on petitioning the parliament. The Savanna Trust convened the annual Southern Africa theater camp for artists and trained artists on using virtual platforms. MISA–Zimbabwe trained CSOs on the Data Protection Bill.

Local grantmaking organizations include the Youth Empowerment and Transformation Trust (YETT), whose funding base shrank in 2021. The impact was felt most heavily by CBOs, which rely on YETT for funding for their work.

CSOs continued to work together through many consortiums and partnerships to achieve common aims in 2021. An important purpose of collaboration is often fundraising. Otherwise, the Zimbabwean CSO sector is very competitive, with some CSOs choosing to compete rather than collaborate. As a result, coalitions are poor at providing their members with services such as information, mentoring, and training.

Partnerships between civil society and government mainly take the form of MOUs, which allow CSOs to operate in particular districts. However, these memoranda were often under strain in 2021 as CSO-government relations grew increasingly tense. CSOs cooperated with the government on the pandemic response by distributing information and equipment. CSOs working in the health and humanitarian sectors sometimes form partnerships with the government to provide services through government facilities, such as clinics, hospitals, and schools. The government is actively involved in the design and implementation of such projects.

In 2021, the CSO sector continued to cooperate with most independent media houses, which provide an alternative to government-owned sources of information. The private sector is generally reluctant to partner openly with CSOs because it fears a backlash from the government, which tightly controls corporate operating conditions. In 2021, CSOs working in health care, such as PSI and the Adult Rape Clinic, fostered a number of collaborations with the private sector, primarily to procure drugs and equipment. CSOs working in livelihoods collaborated with borehole drilling companies to provide water to communities.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.5

CSOs’ public image deteriorated slightly in 2021 as a result of the government’s consistently negative messaging about the sector.

Private media, including online outlets, covered CSOs’ activities positively in 2021. For instance, NewsDay, a local private daily newspaper, published a story in November about the efforts of the German organization Welthungerhilfe to provide housing to more than 900 Gweru households. Another article in NewsDay in November covered CSOs’ youth empowerment programs and noted that 120 youths in Midlands Province had been empowered by the Midlands AIDS Service Organization.
State-owned media’s traditional hostility to pro-democratic institutions and individuals intensified in 2021. State-owned media published negative stories calling certain organizations rogue, bad apples, or agents of regime change that were “delving into politics.” In many instances, misinformation about CSOs and individual activists was spread deliberately. Service-providing CSOs are usually not attacked.

The public supports CSOs’ work and sees them as responding directly to community needs. The public generally sympathizes with CSOs when they are attacked by the government. The private sector can be hesitant to work with CSOs because it fears that it will suffer reprisals if perceived by the government as supporting civil society’s alleged “regime-change” agenda.

While pandemic restrictions were in force, CSOs relied on their websites and social media such as WhatsApp, Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube to engage their constituencies. CSOs in urban areas are better able to inform the public about their activities than those in rural areas, where communications costs are high and internet service is limited.

Through NANGO, CSOs drafted a framework for self-regulation as part of their response to the PVO Bill introduced by the government in 2021. Larger CSOs such as the Savanna Trust publish annual reports and distribute them to their members, funding partners, and other stakeholders.
ANNEX A: CSO SUSTAINABILITY INDEX METHODOLOGY

INSTRUCTIONS FOR CSOSI IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS

I. INTRODUCTION

USAID’s Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index (the Index or CSOSI) reports annually on the strength and overall viability of CSO sectors in Africa, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, and Mexico. The CSO Sustainability Index is a tool developed by USAID to assess the strength and overall viability of CSO sectors in countries around the world. By analyzing seven dimensions that are critical to sectoral sustainability, the Index highlights both strengths and constraints in CSO development. The Index allows for comparisons both across countries and over time. Initially developed in 1997 for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, the CSOSI is a valued tool and methodology used by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), governments, donors, academics, and others to better understand the sustainability of the civil society sector.

USAID is continually striving to ensure the cross-national comparability of the Index scores and to improve the reliability and validity of measurements, adequate standardization of units and definitions, local ownership of the Index, transparency of the process of Index compilation, and representative composition of panels delivering the scores.

Beginning with the 2017 Index and for the following four years, FHI 360 and the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) are managing the coordination and editing of the CSOSI. A senior staff member from both FHI 360 and ICNL will serve on the Editorial Committee as will one or more senior USAID/Washington officials. FHI 360 will provide small grants to local CSOs to implement the CSOSI methodology in the country, while ICNL will be primarily responsible for editing the reports. Local Implementing Partners (IPs) play an essential role in developing the CSO SI and need a combination of research, convening, and advocacy skills for carrying out a high-quality CSOSI.

Local Implementing Partners should please remember:

• Panels must include a diverse range of civil society representatives.
• Panelists should formulate initial scores for dimensions and justifications individually and in advance of the Panel Meeting.
• Discuss each indicator and dimension at the Panel Meeting and provide justification for the proposed score for each dimension.
• Compare the score for each dimension with last year’s score to ensure that the direction of change reflects developments during the year being assessed.
• Note changes to any indicators and dimensions in the country report to justify proposed score changes.
• The Editorial Committee will request additional information if the scores are not supported by the report. If adequate information is not provided, the EC has the right to adjust the scores accordingly.
II. METHODOLOGY FOR THE IMPLEMENTER

The following steps should be followed by the IP to assemble the Expert Panel that will meet in person to discuss the status of civil society over the reporting year, determine scores, and prepare a country report for the 2021 Civil Society Organization (CSO) Sustainability Index.

I. Select Panel Experts. Carefully select a group of at least 8-10 civil society representatives to serve as panel experts. Panel members must include representatives of a diverse range of CSOs and other stakeholders, such as:

- CSO support centers, resource centers, or intermediary support organizations (ISOs);
- CSOs, community-based organizations (CBOs), and faith-based organizations (FBOs) involved in a range of service delivery and/or advocacy activities;
- CSOs involved in local and national level government oversight/watchdog/advocacy activities;
- Academia with expertise related to civil society and CSO sustainability;
- CSO partners from government, business, or media;
- Think tanks working in the area of civil society development;
- Member associations such as cooperatives, lawyers’ associations, and natural resources users’ groups;
- Representatives of diverse geographic areas and population groups, e.g., minorities;
- International donors who support civil society and CSOs; and
- Other local partners.

It is important that the Panel members be able to assess a wide spectrum of CSO activities in various sectors ranging from democracy, human rights, and governance reforms to the delivery of basic services to constituencies. CSOs represented on the panel must include those whose work is heavily focused on advocacy and social service delivery. To the extent possible, panels should include representatives of both rural and urban parts of the country, as well as women’s groups, minority populations, and other marginalized groups, as well as sub-sectors such as women’s rights, community-based development, civic education, microfinance, environment, human rights, and youth. The Panel should to the extent possible include an equal representation of men and women. If two or more representatives of the same CSO participate in the Panel, they can only cast one vote. It is recommended that at least 70 percent of the Expert Panel be nationals of the country that is being rated.

In countries experiencing civil war, individuals should be brought from areas controlled by each of the regimes if possible. If not, individuals from the other regime’s territory should at least be contacted, to incorporate their local perspective.

In some instances, it may be appropriate to select a larger group in order to better reflect the diversity and breadth of the civil society sector in the country. For countries where regional differences are significant,
implementers should incorporate, to the greatest extent possible, differing regional perspectives. If financial constraints do not allow for in-person regional representation, alternative, low-cost options, including emailing scores/comments, and teleconferencing/Skype, may be used.

If there is a USAID Mission in the country, a USAID representative must be invited to attend the panel. USAID representatives that attend are welcome to provide some words of introduction to open the event, as it is funded by USAID, and they are welcome to observe and participate in the discussion. However, they will not have the ability to cast their vote in terms of scores.

Please submit to FHI 360 for approval the list of the Panel members whom you plan to invite at least two weeks before the meeting is scheduled to occur using the form provided in Annex A. It is the responsibility of the IP to ensure that the panel composition, and the resulting score and narrative, are sufficiently representative of a cross-section of civil society and include the perspectives of various types of stakeholders from different sectors and different areas of the country.

2. Prepare the Panel meeting. Ensure that panel members understand the objectives of the Panel, including developing a consensus-based rating for each of the seven dimensions of civil society sustainability covered by the Index and articulating a justification or explanation for each rating consistent with the methodology described below. We encourage you to hold a brief orientation session for the panelists prior to the panel discussion. This is particularly important for new panelists but is also useful to update all panelists on methodology and process changes. Some partners choose to hold a formal training session with panel members, reviewing the methodology document and instructions. Other partners provide a more general discussion about the objectives of the exercise and process to the panelists.

The overall goal of the Index is to track and compare progress in the sector over time, increasing the ability of local entities to undertake self-assessment and analysis. To ensure a common understanding of what is being assessed, the convener shall provide a definition of civil society to the panel members. The CSOSI uses the enclosed definition to ensure the report addresses a broad swath of civil society.

In order to allow adequate time to prepare for the panel, distribute the instructions, rating description documents, and a copy of the previous year’s country chapter to the members of the Expert Panel a minimum of three days before convening the Panel so that they may develop their initial scores for each dimension before meeting with the other panel members. It is critical to emphasize the importance of developing their scores and justifications before attending the panel. It is also important to remind panel members that the scores should reflect developments during the 2021 calendar year (January 1, 2021, through December 31, 2021).

We also recommend you encourage panelists to think of concrete examples that illustrate trends since this information will be crucial to justifying their proposed scores. In countries with closing civic space, the IP should take initiative to ensure that expert panel members do not self-censor themselves, including by taking whatever measures possible to build trust. The confidentiality of all members must be ensured and participants must be protected against retaliation; to this end, the IP can choose to enforce Chatham House Rules.

Lastly, it is highly recommended to compile and send to panelists data and information sources to guide them as they score. Recommendations for information sources are listed below under #4.
We are very interested in using the preparation of this year’s Index to track lessons learned for use in improving the monitoring process in upcoming years. We would appreciate implementers recording and submitting any observations they might have that will increase the usefulness of this important tool. In addition, we will solicit feedback through regional debriefs and will continue to maintain an online forum where IPs can share best practices, ask questions, and submit their comments or suggestions. These methods will be supplemented by brief satisfaction surveys that will be used to help evaluate the success of methodological and process innovations.

3. Convene a meeting of the CSO Expert Panel.

3.a. We do not require panelists to score individual indicators but only overall dimensions. For each dimension, allow each panel member to share his or her initial score and justification with the rest of the group. (Note: If two or more representatives of the same CSO participate in the Panel, only one vote can be cast on their behalf.) Although scoring will not take place at the indicator level, please be sure that panel members discuss each indicator within each dimension of the CSOSI and provide evidence-based, country-relevant examples of recent or historical conditions, policies, and events within each of the dimension narratives. Please take notes on the discussion of each indicator and dimension, detailing the justification for all dimension scores, in the template provided. These notes must be submitted to FHI 360 with the first draft of the narratives (they do not have to be translated into English if not originally written in English).

At the end of the discussion of each dimension, allow panel members to adjust their scores if desired. Then, for each dimension, eliminate the highest score and the lowest score (if there are two or more of the highest or lowest scores, only eliminate one of them) and average the remaining scores together to come up with a single score for each dimension. Calculate the average or arithmetic mean 1 of these scores for a preliminary score for the dimension. Please keep all scores on record, making sure that personal attribution cannot be made to individual panel members. Use a table similar to the one provided below to track panel members’ scores without personal attribution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel Member</th>
<th>Legal Environment</th>
<th>Organizational Capacity</th>
<th>Financial Viability</th>
<th>Advocacy</th>
<th>Service Provision</th>
<th>Sectoral Infrastructure</th>
<th>Public Image</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<td>3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

3. b. Once a score is determined for a dimension, please have panel members compare the proposed score with last year’s score to ensure that the direction and magnitude of the change reflect developments during the year. For example, if an improved score is proposed, this should be based on concrete positive developments during the year that are noted in the report. On the other hand, if the situation worsened during the year, this should be reflected in a worse score (i.e., a higher number on the 1-7 scale).

Please note that for countries where a democratic revolution took place in the previous year, the panelists should be conscious to avoid scoring based on post-revolution euphoria. The score-change framework should be closely followed to avoid panelists scoring based on anticipated changes, rather than the actual level of change thus far.

A change of 0.1 should generally be used to reflect modest changes in a dimension. Larger differences may be warranted if there are more significant changes in the sector. The evidence to support the scoring change must always be discussed by the panel and documented in the dimension narrative. See CSOSI Codebook – Instructions for Expert Panel Members for more details about this scoring scale.

In addition, for each dimension score, review the relevant description of that dimension in “CSOSI Codebook – Tiers and Scores: A Closer Look.” Discuss with the group whether the score for a country matches that rating description. For example, a score of 2.3 in organizational capacity would mean that the civil society sector is in the

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1 Arithmetic mean is the sum of all scores divided by the total number of scores.
“Sustainability Enhanced” phase. Please read the “Sustainability Enhanced” section for Organizational Capacity in “Ratings: A Closer Look” to ensure that this accurately describes the civil society environment.

If the panel does not feel that the proposed score is accurate after these two reviews, please note this when submitting proposed scores in your narrative report, and the Editorial Committee will discuss whether one or more scores need to be reset with a new baseline. Ultimately, each score should reflect a consensus among group members.

3. c. Discuss each of the seven dimensions of the Index and score them in a similar manner. Once all seven dimensions have been scored, average the final dimension scores together to get the overall CSO sustainability score. Please submit the table with the scores from the individual panelists together with the narrative report. Panelists should be designated numerically.

3. d. Please remind the group at this stage that reports will be reviewed by an Editorial Committee (EC). The Editorial Committee will ensure that all scores are adequately supported and may ask for additional evidence to support a score. If adequate information is not provided, the EC may adjust the scores.

4. Prepare a draft country report. The report should focus on developments over the calendar year 2021 (January 1, 2021, through December 31, 2021).

The draft report should begin with an overview statement and a brief discussion of the current state of sustainability of the civil society sector with regard to each dimension. In the overview statement, please include an estimated number of registered and active CSOs, as well as a description of the primary fields and geographic areas in which CSOs operate. Also include a brief overview of any key political, economic, or social developments in the country that impacted the CSO sector during the year. If this information is not provided, the editor will request it in subsequent rounds, which will require additional work from you.

The report should then include sections on each dimension. Each of these sections should begin with a summary of the reasons for any score changes during the year. For example, if a better score is proposed, the basis for this improvement should be clearly stated upfront. These sections should include a discussion of both accomplishments and strengths in that dimension, as well as obstacles to sustainability and weaknesses that impact the operations of a broad range of CSOs. Each indicator within each dimension should be addressed in the report.

The report should be written based on the Panel members’ discussion and input, as well as a review of other sources of information about the CSO sector including but not limited to analytical studies of the sector, statistical data, public opinion polls, and other relevant third-party data. Some international sources of information and data that should be considered include the following:

- CIVICUS Monitor - https://monitor.civicus.org/
- World Giving Index - https://www.cafonline.org/about-us/publications
- Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) - https://www.v-dem.net/
- Media Sustainability Index - https://www.irex.org/projects/media-sustainability-index-msi
- Nations in Transit - https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/nations-transit#.Vdugbq5FOh1
- ICNL Civic Freedom Monitor - https://www.icnl.org/resources/civic-freedom-monitor
- Afro-Barometer - http://www.afrobarometer.org/

Please limit the draft reports to a maximum of ten pages in English. Please keep in mind that we rely on implementers to ensure that reports are an appropriate length and are well written.
While the individual country reports for the 2021 CSO Sustainability Index must be brief, implementers may write longer reports for their own use to more fully describe the substance of the panel meetings. Longer reports may include additional country context information or examples and could be used for a variety of purposes, including advocacy initiatives, research, informing project designs, etc.

Please include a list of the experts who served on the panel using the form provided. This will be for our reference only and will not be made public. Also, please remember to provide the individual panelists’ ratings for each dimension (with the names replaced by numbers).

Submit the draft country reports with rankings via email to FHI 360 by the date indicated in your grant’s Project Description.

5. Initial edits of the country report. Within a few weeks of receiving your draft report, FHI 360 and its partner, ICNL, will send you a revised version of your report that has been edited for grammar, style, and content. As necessary, the editors will request additional information to ensure that the report is complete and/or to clarify statements in the report. Please request any clarification needed from the editor as soon as possible, then submit your revised report by the deadline indicated.

6. Editorial Committee review. In Washington, an Editorial Committee (EC) will review the scores and revised draft country reports. The EC consists of representatives from USAID, FHI 360, ICNL, and at least one regional expert well-versed in the issues and dynamics affecting civil society in the region. A USAID representative chairs the EC. If the EC determines that the panel’s scores are not adequately supported by the country report, particularly in comparison to the previous year’s scores and the scores and reports of other countries in the region, the EC may request that the scores be adjusted, thereby ensuring comparability over time and among countries, or request that additional information be provided to support the panel’s scores. Further description of the EC is included in the following section, “The Role of the Editorial Committee.”

7. Additional report revision. After the EC meets, the editor will send a revised report that indicates the EC’s recommended scores, and where further supporting evidence or clarification is required. Within the draft, boxes will be added where you will note whether you accept the revised scores or where you can provide further evidence to support the original proposed score.

The report should be revised and returned to the editor within the allotted timeframe. The project editor will continue to be in contact with you to discuss any outstanding questions and clarifications regarding the scoring and the report’s content. Your organization will be responsible for responding to all outstanding comments from the EC, as communicated by the project editor until the report is approved and accepted by USAID.

8. Dissemination and promotion of the final reports. After the reports are approved by USAID and final formatting is conducted, the country reports will be grouped into regional reports. Each Implementing Partner will be responsible for promoting both the final, published country report and the regional report. Your organization will conduct activities to promote the Index’s use and visibility. This may include organizing a local public event, panel discussion, or workshop and making the report available electronically by web posting or creating a social network page for the country report and through the other methods described in your Use and Visibility Plan. Documentation that you have conducted these activities as described in that Plan must be submitted to FHI 360 before it will authorize the final payment.
III. THE ROLE OF THE EDITORIAL COMMITTEE

As an important step in the CSO Sustainability Index process, all country reports are reviewed and discussed by an Editorial Committee composed of regional and sector experts in Washington, DC, and an expert based in the region. This committee is chaired by a USAID Democracy Specialist and includes rotating members from USAID (past members have included experts from regional bureaus, the USAID Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance’s Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DCHA/DRG), the USAID Bureau for Economic Growth, Education and the Environment’s Local Solutions Office, and USAID Democracy, Human Rights and Governance foreign service officers). The committee also includes civil society experts from FHI 360 and ICNL.

The Editorial Committee has three main roles. It reviews all reports and scores to ensure that narratives are adequate and compelling from the standpoint of supporting the proposed score and to determine if the proposed change in score is supported by the narrative. A compelling narrative demonstrates that a score results from the evidence of systematic and widespread cases and is not based on one or two individual cases. For example, a country environment characterized by a growing number of CSOs with strong financial management systems that raise funds locally from diverse sources is a compelling justification for an elevated financial viability score. A country in which one or two large CSOs now have the ability to raise funds from diverse sources is not. The Editorial Committee also checks that scores for each dimension meet the criteria described in “Ratings: A Closer Look,” to ensure that scores and narratives accurately reflect the actual stage of CSO sector development. Finally, the Editorial Committee considers a country’s score in relation to the proposed scores in other countries, providing a regional perspective that ensures comparability of scores across all countries.

CSOs are encouraged to remind their panels from the outset that the Editorial Committee may ask for further clarification of scores and may modify scores, where appropriate. **While implementing partners will have the chance to dispute these modifications by providing more evidence for the scores the panel proposed, the USAID Chair of the EC will ultimately have the final say on all scores.** However, by asking panels to compare their scores with last year’s scores and “Ratings: A Closer Look” (which is essentially what the Editorial Committee does), it is hoped that there will be few differences between proposed scores and final scores. Ensuring that the narrative section for each dimension includes adequate explanations for all scores will also limit the need for the Editorial Committee to ask for further clarification.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR CSOSI EXPERT PANEL MEMBERS

INTRODUCTION

USAID’s Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index (the Index or CSOSI) is a tool developed by USAID to assess overall viability of civil society organizations (CSOs) in a particular country. By analyzing seven dimensions that are critical to sectoral sustainability on an annual basis, the Index highlights both strengths and constraints in CSO development.

The Index allows for comparisons both across countries and over time. Initially developed in 1997 for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, the CSOSI is a valued tool and methodology used by CSOs, governments, donors, academics, and others to better understand the opportunities, challenges, and sustainability of the civil society sector in a particular country or region. In 2021 the CSOSI was implemented in 73 countries.

For the period of 2017-2022, FHI 360 and the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) are managing the coordination and editing of the CSOSI. To develop the Index each year, FHI 360 provides small grants and technical support to local CSOs who serve as Implementing Partners (IPs) responsible for leading the in-country process to prepare the annual country report, using the CSOSI methodology. ICNL oversees the editing of the country reports once they are drafted by IPs. A senior staff member from both FHI 360 and ICNL serves on an Editorial Committee that reviews all reports, as do one or more senior USAID/Washington officials.

The Expert Panel (EP) members for whom this Codebook is designed participate in in-country panel discussions on the seven dimensions of sustainability covered by the Index. The IP convenes these panel discussions annually to assess the situation of civil society in their countries and determine scores based on an objective analysis of the factual evidence.

The CSOSI management team is continually striving to ensure the cross-country and cross-year comparability of the Index’s scores, as well as to improve the reliability and validity of measurements, standardization of definitions, local ownership of the Index, and transparency of the Index’s methodology and processes.

Therefore, FHI 360 has created this Codebook to inform and guide expert panel members through the scoring process. The Codebook provides definitions of the key concepts used to assess the overall strength and sustainability of the civil society sector in a given country, explains the scoring process, and standardizes the scale to be used when proposing score changes.

This document is the first part of the Codebook, providing an overview of the concepts and processes that guide the expert panel members’ role in the CSOSI’s methodology. The second part of the Codebook provides descriptions, or vignettes, of each score for each dimension, to standardize expert panel members’ understanding of the scoring scale and to assist them in ensuring that scores are accurate.
CSOSI METHODOLOGY
The CSOSI measures the sustainability of each country’s CSO sector based on the CSOSI’s seven dimensions: legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, sectoral infrastructure, and public image. Its seven-point scoring scale used not only by CSOSI, but also variety of well-known reviews such as Freedom House in its publications “Nations in Transit” and “Freedom in the World.”

The IP in each country leads the process of organizing and convening a diverse and representative panel of CSO experts. EPs discuss the level of change during the year being assessed in each of the seven dimensions and determine proposed scores for each dimension. The IP then drafts narratives that document the rationale for each score. The scores are organized into three basic “tiers” representing the level of viability of the civil society sector: Sustainability Impeded; Sustainability Evolving; and Sustainability Enhanced. All scores and narratives are then reviewed by a Washington, D.C.-based Editorial Committee (EC) for consistency, completeness, and methodological adherence, assisted by regional civil society experts. The graph below summarizes the approach and process.

Definition of Concepts
The overall goal of the Index is to track progress or regression in the CSO sector over time, increasing the ability of local entities to undertake self-assessment and analysis. To ensure a common understanding of what is being assessed, panel members need a shared understanding of the key concepts underlying their assessment.

Civil Society Organization
Civil society organizations are defined:

“...As any organizations, whether formal or informal, that are not part of the apparatus of government, that do not distribute profits to their directors or operators, that are self-governing, and in which participation is a matter of free choice. Both member-serving and public-serving organizations are included. Embraced within this definition, therefore, are private, not-for-profit health providers, schools, advocacy groups, social service agencies, anti-poverty groups, development agencies, professional associations, community-based organizations, unions, religious bodies, recreation organizations, cultural institutions, and many more.”

This definition of CSO includes informal, unregistered groups and movements, but to be included in the CSOSI, the movement must possess the structure and continuity to be distinguished from a single gathering of individuals.

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and from personal or family relationships. In many countries political parties and private companies establish and support CSOs, but these entities are usually either public, for-profit, or not self-governing.

Civil Society Sector
The CSOSI defines the CSO sector to include all of the following: non-governmental organizations (focused on advocacy, oversight, or service provision), social movements, community-based organizations and faith-based organizations, trade and labor unions, women’s groups, youth groups, resource centers and intermediary support organizations, research institutes and think tanks, professional associations, cooperatives, and natural resource users’ groups, recreational organizations, cultural institutions, social enterprises, and informal movements, networks, and campaigns.

Throughout the report, please address differences between these different types of CSOs and note where trends and developments have affected specific types of CSOs.

Seven Dimensions of Sustainability
The CSOSI measures sustainability across seven dimensions by analyzing a series of indicators related to each dimension. (see Scoring: Dimensions and Indicators, provided as Annex A, for the full list of questions to guide your analysis of each indicator):

1- **LEGAL ENVIRONMENT**: The legal and regulatory environment governing the CSO sector and its implementation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registration</th>
<th>Legal procedures to formalize the existence of a CSO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operation</td>
<td>The enforcement of the laws and its effects on CSOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Harassment</td>
<td>Abuses committed against CSOs and their members by state institutions and groups acting on behalf of the state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxation</td>
<td>Tax policies that affect CSOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Resources</td>
<td>Legal opportunities for CSOs to mobilize financial resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Legal Capacity</td>
<td>Availability and quality of legal expertise for CSOs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2- **ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY**: The internal capacity of the CSO sector to pursue its goals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency Building</th>
<th>Relationships with individuals or groups affected by or interested in issues on which CSOs work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Planning</td>
<td>Organizational goals and priorities for a set timeframe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Management</td>
<td>Structures and processes to guide the work of CSOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO Staffing</td>
<td>Quality and management of human resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Advancement</td>
<td>Access to and use of technology</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3- **FINANCIAL VIABILITY**: The CSO sector’s access to various sources of financial support

| Diversification | Access to multiple sources of funding |
| Local Support   | Domestic sources of funding and resources                                                    |
| Foreign Support | Foreign sources of funding and resources                                                     |
| Fundraising     | CSOs’ capacity to raise funds                                                              |
| Earned Income   | Revenue generated from the sale of products and services                                    |
| Financial Management Systems | Processes, procedures and tools to manage financial resources and operations. |

4- **ADVOCACY**: The CSO sector’s ability to influence public opinion and public policy

| Cooperation with Local and Central Government | Access to government decision-making processes |
| Policy Advocacy Initiatives | Initiatives to shape the public agenda, public opinion, or legislation |
| Lobbying Efforts | Engagement with lawmakers to directly influence the legislative process |
| Advocacy for CSO Law Reform | Initiatives to promote a more favorable legal and regulatory framework for the CSO sector |

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The 2021 CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa
5- SERVICE PROVISION: The CSO sector’s ability to provide goods and services

| Range of Goods and Services – Variety of goods and services offered |
| Responsiveness to the Community – Extent to which goods and services address local needs |
| Clientele and beneficiaries – People, organizations and communities who utilize or benefit from CSOs’ services and goods |
| Cost Recovery – Capacity to generate revenue through service provision |
| Government Recognition and Support – Government appreciation for CSO service provision |

6- SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: Support services available to the CSO sector

| Intermediary Support Organizations (ISOs) and CSO Resource Centers – Organizations and programs that provide CSOs with training and other support services |
| Local Grant-Making Organizations – Local institutions, organizations, or programs providing financial resources to CSOs |
| CSO Networks and Coalitions – Cooperation within the CSO sector |
| Training – Training opportunities available to CSOs |
| Intersectoral Partnerships – Collaboration between CSOs and other sectors |

7- PUBLIC IMAGE: Society’s perception of the CSO sector

| Media Coverage – Presence of CSOs and their activities in the media (print, television, radio, and online) |
| Public Perception of CSOs – Reputation among the larger population |
| Government/Business Perception of CSOs – Reputation with the government and business sector |
| Public Relations – Efforts to promote organizational image and activities |
| Self-Regulation – Actions taken to increase accountability and transparency |

How to Score

The CSO Sustainability Index uses a seven-point scale from 1 to 7. **Lower numbers indicate more robust levels of CSO sustainability.** These characteristics and levels are drawn from empirical observations of the sector’s development in the country, rather than a causal theory of development. Given the complex nature of civil society sectors, many contradictory developments may be taking place simultaneously. The levels of sustainability are organized into three broad clusters:

- **Sustainability Enhanced** (1 to 3) - the highest level of sustainability, corresponds to a score between 1.0 and 3.0;
- **Sustainability Evolving** (3.1 to 5) - corresponds to a score between 3.1 and 5.0;
- **Sustainability Impeded** (5.1 to 7) – the lowest level of sustainability, corresponds to a score between 5.1 and 7.0.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sustainability Enhanced</th>
<th>Sustainability Evolving</th>
<th>Sustainability Impeded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0 – 3.0</td>
<td>3.1 – 5.0</td>
<td>5.1 – 7.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scoring Process:

The primary role of the EP is to provide an assessment of the CSO environment based on the seven dimensions mentioned above. During the panel discussion, panel members are tasked with analyzing each dimension and any recent developments, identifying and discussing initial scores for each dimension, including their evidence for these scores, and determining their final proposed scores for each dimension. The overall score for the country will be an average of these seven scores.

3 The ‘Sustainability Evolving’ categorization does not assume a direct or forward trajectory. Dimension and Overall Sustainability scores that fall within this category may represent both improvements and regressions.

4 NOTE: For countries in which the CSOSI is being implemented for the first time, the below scoring process does not apply. Instead, please refer to the document Scoring Process for Setting Country Baselines. For countries discussing baseline score recalibration, please use the Recalibration Guidance Sheet.
Each expert panel member is asked to follow the steps below:

**Step 1:** Please start by reviewing last year’s report and other sources of information about sectoral developments from the last year of which you are aware related to each dimension and its indicators. Then, based on the evidence, rate each dimension on the scale from 1 to 7, with a score of 1 indicating a very advanced civil society sector with a high level of sustainability, and a score of 7 indicating a fragile, unsustainable sector with a low level of development. Fractional scores to one decimal place are encouraged. See “Scoring based on Level of Change” on page 6 below for guidance on how to determine proposed scores.

When rating each dimension, please remember to consider each indicator carefully and make note of any specific, country-relevant examples of recent or historical conditions, policies, or events that you used as a basis for determining this score.

**Step 2:** Review your proposed score for each dimension to ensure that it makes sense in comparison to last year’s score and narrative. Please carefully consider the importance of any developments and weigh more heavily those changes that have had an impact at the sector level, especially in cases when there have been both positive and negative changes. In determining the level of change, including the incremental change over the past year, look at the evidence of change, the various factors over the year being assessed that led to those changes (events, policies, laws, etc.), the durability of the change and the extent to which the change impacts the sector as a whole.

**Step 3:** Once you have scores for each dimension, average these seven scores together to arrive at an overall CSO sustainability score and provide all these scores to the IP before you attend the expert panel discussion.

**Step 4:** Attend the EP discussion. Listen to other experts describe the justification for their scores. After discussing each indicator in a dimension, you will have the opportunity to revise your proposed score. Should the panel achieve consensus regarding the scores, the consensus scores will be the panel’s final proposed scores. If consensus is not reached among the panelists, the IP will average the panelists’ scores, removing one instance of the highest and lowest scores each, to arrive at the final scores that will be proposed to the EC.

It is very important that the discussion includes specific examples and information that can be used to justify the Expert Panelist’s scores. Therefore, please come prepared to share specific evidence to support trends you have noted during the year. If adequate supporting information is not provided, the EC has the right to adjust the scores accordingly, to ensure objectivity and methodological consistency in scoring.
**Important Note:** In countries with disputed territories or areas (e.g., self-declared states, breakaway states, partially recognized states, declared people’s republics, proto-states, or territories annexed by another country’s government), panelists should score based only on the area under the national government’s control. However, these territories’ contexts should be discussed, to be referenced briefly in the introduction of the country report.

In countries experiencing civil war (political and armed movements that administer parts of the country, regions governed by alternative ruling bodies), panelists should balance the situation in each of the territories when determining all scores and discuss trends and developments under each regime.

In countries where a great deal of regional autonomy is recognized (e.g., Iraqi Kurdistan), expert panelists should take those areas into account when scoring and compiling examples, and IPs should ensure the situation in those areas are well-integrated into the scoring decisions and narrative report.

For countries with closing civic space, sufficient data and information sources should be discussed to both acknowledge the changes in civic space and consider its impacts on dimensions. The panelists should respond to published sources and present their evidence to ensure the balance between positive and negative developments affecting civil society in their country. To avoid self-censorship and ensure the confidentiality of and non-retaliation against any expert panel member, the IP could choose to enforce the Chatham House Rule. When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed.

In countries where a democratic revolution took place in the previous year, the panelists should still closely follow the score-change framework when determining the new dimension-level scores to justify the changes, avoiding exaggerated score increases that may be due to a post-revolution feeling of euphoria. The proposed scores should always measure the actual changes thus far and not anticipated impacts in the near future.

**Scoring Based on Level of Change**

The level of change in a dimension from one year to the next is determined by assessing the impact of multiple factors including new policies and laws, changes in implementation of existing policies and laws, various organization-level achievements and setbacks, changes in funding levels and patterns, as well as contextual political, economic, and social developments. While individual examples may seem impactful on their own, ultimately a sector’s long-term sustainability only changes gradually over time as the implications of these positive or negative developments begin to be felt and their long-term effects take hold. Therefore, dimension-level score changes each year should not in normal circumstances exceed a 0.5-point change from the previous year.\(^5\)

When determining what weight to give different trends and developments in how they affect the scores, consider the relative scope of the changes and the duration of their impacts. Those trends and developments that will have larger and longer-term impacts on the sector as a whole should be weighted more heavily compared to those that affect only limited parts of the sector and are more likely to change from year to year. For example, a demonstrated increased capability to mobilize domestic resources (e.g., through corporate philanthropy or crowdfunding) broadly witnessed throughout the sector, or a new mechanism for long-term funding of CSOs (e.g., through a basket fund or a tax designation mechanism) would signal a longer-term change in a sector’s financial viability than a one-year increase in donor funding to CSOs such as during a year of national elections or following an emergency.

In determining how the level of change in the dimension of sustainability should translate into a change in score, the following scale can be used to assist expert panel members’ decision-making:

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\(^5\) Note: This scale has been adjusted for the 2018 CSOSI to more accurately reflect the scale at which trends and developments should impact a score given the definitions of the scoring scale above.
**What was the overall impact of the change(s) on the dimension?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deterioration</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Impact Factor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cataclysmic deterioration</strong></td>
<td>Trends and developments have had a completely transformative negative effect on at least one or two indicators in the dimension and significantly affected other dimensions as well.</td>
<td>0.5 or greater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example: Legal Environment – A law has banned all international CSOs and their affiliates from the country, as part of the government’s systematic crackdown on civil society organizations.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Extreme deterioration</strong></td>
<td>Trends and developments have had very important negative effects on at least one or two indicators in the dimension.</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example: Organizational Capacity – Economic depression and instability have led donor basket funds to close abruptly, leaving many major CSOs without funding for their activities. Outreach efforts to constituencies have been halted due to funding shortages and many major CSOs have lost their well-qualified staff members.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Significant deterioration</strong></td>
<td>Trends and developments have had important negative effects on at least one or two indicators in the dimension.</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example: Public Image – The government conducts a relentless media campaign to discredit the image of CSOs by calling them agents of foreign actors seeking to destabilize the country. At the same time, the government intimidates media outlets and threatens them with retaliation should they partner with or cover CSO activities without prior approval by the government.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Moderate deterioration</strong></td>
<td>Trends and developments have had a somewhat negative impact in at least one or two indicators in the dimension.</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example: Legal Environment – In an effort to increase public revenue, the government has decided to increase fees by 100% for some types of government services, including CSO registration renewal fees, which were already very high according to many CSOs. As a result, some CSOs, particularly community-based organizations (CBOs), had to delay or suspend their activities.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Slight deterioration</strong></td>
<td>Trends or developments have had a slightly negative impact on at least one or two indicators in the dimension.</td>
<td>0.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Example: Legal Environment – The government has decided that CSOs should submit their financial statement and annual activity report to the registration agency every year. This may have a long-term positive effect but in the short term, it has increased bureaucratic hurdles and the possibility of harassment by overzealous government officials.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>No Change</strong></td>
<td>The country has not encountered any significant trends or developments in the dimension or developments have been both positive and negative in equal measure.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Slight improvement</strong></td>
<td>Trends or developments have had a slightly positive impact on at least one or two indicators in the dimension.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Example: Legal Environment – To facilitate CSO registration, particularly for those in rural areas, the government has decided its registration agency will allow the agency to take applications locally and process registration directly at the district level. Now, CSOs in rural areas are not required to travel to the capital to apply. However, this measure is accompanied with a small increase in the registration fee.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improvement</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Score</td>
</tr>
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<td>------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</table>
| **Moderate improvement:** | Trends and developments have had a somewhat positive impact in at least one or two indicators in the dimension.  
Example: Service Provision – To improve the effectiveness of public service delivery, the central government has decided that at least 10% of local government contracts for basic service delivery will be set aside for CSOs. The law is lacking in specificity, particularly around the application process, but it reinforces CSOs' image as credible partners. | 0.2   |
| **Significant improvement:** | Trends and developments have had important positive effects on at least one or two indicators in the dimension.  
Example: Public Image – There has been a net increase of CSO partnerships with businesses. CSOs have also agreed to and published a general code of conduct for the sector, reinforcing a positive trend of greater transparency and accountability. | 0.3   |
| **Extreme improvement:** | Trends and developments have had very important positive effects on several indicators in the dimension.  
Example: Organizational Capacity – The government and international donors have launched a five-year multi-million-dollar basket fund to support CSO-led activities and to strengthen CSO capacity, with a special focus on skills training for CSO staff members, particularly those from CBOs. | 0.4   |
| **Transformative improvement:** | Trends and developments have had a completely transformative positive effect on at least one or two indicators in the dimension and will potentially affect other dimensions as well.  
Example: Legal Environment – A nonviolent revolution that toppled an authoritarian regime and installed a more democratic regime has produced sudden political and legal changes that will protect basic freedoms and human rights. | 0.5 or greater |
INSTRUCTIONS FOR BASELINE RECALIBRATION

BACKGROUND
To enhance its methodology, the Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index (CSOSI) incorporated several activities into its annual process. These activities respond directly to the methodological issues identified through consultations conducted with stakeholders in 2018 and 2019.

One of these activities to strengthen the CSOSI methodology is to reset dimension-level scores which are not accurate, either because their baseline scores were inaccurate or because they have not moved significantly enough over time to reflect structural changes in the sector’s sustainability. The goal of resetting these scores is to improve the cross-country comparability of scores and to increase the analytical usefulness of the CSOSI to its target audiences.

There are two scenarios in which a score can be recalibrated:

- Scenario 1 - FHI 360 informs the Implementing Partner (IP) about the dimension score(s) that the Editorial Committee (EC) has flagged for needing recalibration
- Scenario 2 - A majority of expert panelists flag the score for recalibration at the panel discussion.

Scenario 1: EC recommended recalibration

Instructions

1. Inform participating expert panel members about the scores flagged for recalibration – When the IP sends the expert panelists the annual CSOSI package of relevant materials, it also communicates to them the purpose of baseline score recalibration and the dimension scores that have been selected by the EC, in consultation with regional experts, for recalibration.

2. To determine the new score(s), use Sustainability Categories and Scores – A Closer Look and a comparison to other scores in the region – Instead of using the scoring guidance whereby proposed scores are determined by analyzing the level of change from the previous year, the scores identified for recalibration are determined by analyzing where they should fall on the one-to-seven scoring scale, as well as a comparison with the other countries’ CSOSI scores for that dimension in the same region. The expert panelists should review the vignettes and illustrative examples in Sustainability Categories and Scores – A Closer Look to familiarize themselves with how various levels of CSO sustainability should correspond to the CSOSI’s scoring spectrum. Scores should be proposed to the tenth decimal point based on how well they match the descriptions of the various full-point scores listed in this codebook. To help narrow proposed scores to the tenth decimal point, experts can review other countries’ scores listed for that dimension in the most recent CSOSI regional report.

3. Discuss evidence for recalibrated scores, as well as trends and developments in the past year that led to improvements and deterioration in the dimension – The narrative report should be drafted the same as in the other dimensions, reviewing the current situation and discussing what has changed over the previous year. A note will be included in the final report that clarifies that the new score for that dimension is based on a recalibration and should not be compared with the previous year’s score to make assertions about improvement or deterioration.

4. Prepare and submit a recalibration justification note to FHI 360 – To justify a proposed baseline recalibration, or to disagree with the EC’s recommendation to recalibrate a score, the IP should prepare a justification note to be sent to FHI 360. The note should summarize the panel members’ decision to accept or reject a requested recalibration. It should also outline the evidence and examples provided by the panelists related to each and every dimension being recalibrated, justifying the new score specifically in relation to the vignettes in Sustainability Categories and Scores – A Closer Look.

5. The Editorial Committee will decide to accept or reject the proposed score – As with scoring decisions based on the level of change, the EC will make a final decision on the proposed baseline recalibration. If EC rejects the proposed new score, it will propose an alternative score for the dimension.
Scenario 2: Expert Panel (EP) recommended recalibration

Instructions

1. **Inform participating expert panel members about the changes in methodology regarding recalibration** – When the IP sends the expert panelists the annual CSOSI package of relevant materials, it also communicates to them the purpose and the process of optional baseline score recalibration. If expert panel members believe that one or more dimension-level scores are significantly out of place, they should attend the panel discussion about a proposed score recalibration, bringing supporting evidence for the score(s) to be recalibrated.

2. **To determine the new score(s), use Sustainability Categories and Scores – A Closer Look and a comparison to other scores in the region** – Instead of using the scoring guidance whereby proposed scores are determined by analyzing the level of change from the previous year, the scores identified for recalibration are determined by analyzing where they should fall on the one-to-seven scoring scale, as well as a comparison with the other countries’ CSOSI scores for that dimension in the same region. Expert panelists that want to propose a recalibration should review the vignettes and illustrative examples in Sustainability Categories and Scores – A Closer Look for the relevant dimension(s), to familiarize themselves with how various levels of CSO sustainability should correspond to the CSOSI’s scoring spectrum. Scores should be proposed to the tenth decimal point based on how well they match the descriptions of the various full-point scores listed in this codebook. To help narrow proposed scores to the tenth decimal point, experts can review other countries’ scores listed for that dimension in the most recent CSOSI regional report.

3. **Discuss evidence for recalibrated scores, as well as trends and developments in the past year that led to improvements and deterioration in the dimension** – If a majority of expert panelists want to recalibrate a score, the dimension(s) should be discussed in the context of what the recalibrated score should be. The narrative report should be drafted the same as in the other dimensions, reviewing the current situation and discussing what has changed over the previous year. A note will be included in the final report that clarifies that the new score for that dimension is based on a recalibration and should not be compared with the previous year’s score to make assertions about improvement or deterioration.

4. **Prepare and submit a recalibration justification note to FHI 360** – To justify a proposed baseline recalibration, the IP should prepare a justification note to be sent to FHI 360. The note should summarize the panel members’ decision. It should also outline the evidence and examples provided by the panelists related to each and every dimension being recalibrated, justifying the new score specifically in relation to the vignettes in Sustainability Categories and Scores – A Closer Look.

5. **The Editorial Committee will decide to accept or reject the proposed recalibration** – As with scoring decisions based on the level of change, the EC will make a final decision on the proposed baseline recalibration. If EC rejects the proposed new score, it will propose a score for the dimension(s).

**Tips**

If FHI 360 informs the IP that certain dimension scores have been identified for recalibration by the EC, the IP should communicate with the expert panelists which dimensions have been selected for baseline recalibration at least one week in advance of the panel discussion. This advance notification will give the panelists an opportunity to prepare evidence about the status quo in the country under this dimension to inform their selection of a new baseline score.

If the local EP decides to recalibrate the score unprompted by the EC, the IP should ensure that the panelists present evidence during the panel discussion to justify the change and include it in the recalibration justification note.

In either case, the IP should be prepared to respond to the EC’s questions about the justifications for recalibrated scores.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR ELECTRONIC QUESTIONNAIRE

BACKGROUND
To enhance its methodology, the Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index (CSOSI) has incorporated several activities into its annual process. These activities respond directly to the methodological issues identified through the feedback and consultation process conducted with project stakeholders in 2018 and 2019.

One of these activities to enhance the methodology’s implementation is to disseminate an electronic questionnaire or e-questionnaire to a larger group of individuals. The questionnaire allows a larger, more diverse group of individuals to contribute their perspectives and insights on the CSOSI dimensions, strengthening the representativeness and inclusiveness of the process and data, enhancing Expert Panel (EP) deliberations, and providing Implementing Partners (IPs) more evidence to improve report quality. Dissemination of the questionnaire also helps to improve the visibility of the IP and Index and foster engagement with stakeholders who are the most likely to subsequently use the Index when completed.

Instructions

- **Identify approximately 50 participants to whom to send the questionnaire** – The IP selects individuals who will expand the scope and diversity of inputs into the process. The selected individuals should include representatives of or specialists in specific sub-sectors of civil society organizations (CSOs), such as labor unions, capacity-building organizations, organizations representing marginalized and vulnerable groups, informal movements, community-based organizations, faith-based organizations, intermediary support organizations, resource centers, and research institutes. Emphasis should be placed on selecting individuals who are in other localities of the country and those located in rural areas. The objective is for the IP to select a group of people who would add new perspectives on various aspects of the sector on which the in-person panelists might not have deep expertise, as well as individuals who have broad knowledge but would be unable or available to attend the in-person panel discussion. FHI 360 and the local USAID Mission may request additions to the list of questionnaire recipients from their own network of contacts.

- **Design your e-questionnaire** – Look at the mandatory and optional questions shared by FHI 360 to design an e-questionnaire that best responds to the needs of the civil society sector in your country. You can translate the e-questionnaire into the principal local language(s) of the country. The country-specific questionnaire should be brief and should take no more than 10-15 minutes to complete.

- **Disseminate the electronic questionnaire to your selected additional participants** – The IPs can disseminate the electronic questionnaire on the online platforms of their choice or consult with FHI 360 on setting up the e-questionnaire on SurveyMonkey, to be distributed to the IP’s selected additional participants. The IP can use snowball sampling to disseminate the questionnaire to both increase the number of responses as well as to diversify them. To reach larger audiences, the IP can work with local CSO umbrella organizations to tap into their mailing lists, social media pages, and other sector-specific online platforms to share the questionnaire link. The IP should ask the additional participants to complete the questionnaire within a period of two weeks or less.

- **Compile analysis of the questionnaire’s results** – After the e-questionnaire deadline that the IP identified has expired, the IP compiles the quantitative and qualitative data received. In cases when FHI 360 supported the IPs to set up the e-questionnaire on SurveyMonkey’s CSOSI account, FHI 360 collects the electronic questionnaire results and submits them to the IP.

- **Incorporate the findings into the panel discussion** – Statistics and examples that are raised through the questionnaire responses should be presented to the in-person panel to serve as an additional data source for the scoring process and the discussion around the relevant indicators. When responses are not conclusive or do not align with the experts’ opinions, the IP should still present them at the panel discussion for the panelists’ consideration.

- **Write the conclusions reached into the narrative report** – While panels should analyze the questionnaire results and use them to inform their discussions, the e-questionnaire responses do not directly translate into scoring decisions. The data received from the electronic questionnaire should be incorporated into the narrative report in the same way that the expert panelists’ insights are incorporated.
-- justifying scores, sharing without attribution to a particular individual, or reference to the questionnaire. Instead, the inputs should simply be mentioned where relevant as evidence of what has changed positively or negatively in ways that affected the sustainability of the CSO sector in the relevant year. Anecdotal evidence, specific examples, and references to events through open-ended questions may provide IPs necessary data to strengthen their narrative reports.

**Tips**

- When selecting additional participants, please keep the following points in mind:
  - Sending the e-questionnaire to people with whom you already have a working relationship may increase the response rate, so consider sharing it with organizations and individuals in other areas of the country with whom you have worked;
  - Sharing the e-questionnaire with donor agencies operating in your country and allowing them to propose individuals to receive the e-questionnaire can be a useful way of reaching new experts and perspectives outside of your own organization’s network;
  - Sharing the e-questionnaire with civil society networks and allowing them to forward it to their member organizations’ leaders, or other experts with whom they work, is a useful way of maximizing circulation outside of your network;
  - When sending out the e-questionnaire, it may be useful to commit to sending participants a copy of last year’s final country and regional reports, so they feel a sense of participation in the larger process of developing the CSOSI;
  - When preparing your distribution list, consider whether the situation in the country is such that individuals may try to manipulate the e-questionnaire results. If that is a possibility, consider steps to target distribution, and establish specific time frames or other measures to address the concern.
- When disseminating an e-questionnaire, inform your audience about the survey deadline, and send a reminder a few days before the last day.
- As a best practice, the IP can compile a written overview of the conclusions and evidence of the additional participants and send it to the EP members before the panel discussion, so they can review it. If a written overview is sent out before the panel discussion, the IP can ask the expert panelists at the discussion which findings stood out most to them, to spur discussion.
- When e-questionnaire findings are not conclusive, the IP should ask the expert panelists to analyze the results to better understand the data.
- Pay special attention to geography – if your country has breakaway regions, is experiencing a civil war, or has regions’ that may be unrepresented or marginalized, make extra efforts to reach people in all the relevant areas.
- Convincing the participants that their inputs are confidential is key to obtaining a high participation rate and meaningful findings. Especially in countries where self-censorship might be an issue, be very clear that only your organization and FHI 360 will see their inputs, and no comments made will be personally attributed under any circumstances.
- The IPs can use any online platform of their choice to disseminate the electronic questionnaire. In the past, FHI 360 used SurveyMonkey while some other IPs reported using Google Forms.
- The IPs should take relevant measures to ensure data privacy.
## ANNEX B: STATISTICAL DATA

### 2021 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA SCORES

To further explore CSOSI's historical data and past reports, please visit [www.csosi.org](http://www.csosi.org).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>CSO Sustainability</th>
<th>Legal Environment</th>
<th>Organizational Capacity</th>
<th>Financial Viability</th>
<th>Advocacy</th>
<th>Service Provision</th>
<th>Sectoral Infrastructure</th>
<th>Public Image</th>
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COUNTRIES RANKED BY SCORE

Legal Environment

Organizational Capacity

Financial Viability

Advocacy

SUSTAINABILITY ENHANCED

SUSTAINABILITY EVOLVING

South Africa 3.3
Burkina Faso 3.5
Ghana 3.7
Botswana 3.9
Namibia 3.9
Mali 4.2
Kenya 4.5
Zambia 4.7
Madagascar 4.8
Cameroon 4.9
Rwanda 4.9
Benin 5.0
Liberia 5.0

SUSTAINABILITY IMPERILED

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Ethiopia 5.3
Guinea 5.3
Côte d’Ivoire 5.4
Niger 5.4
Nigeria 5.4
Malawi 5.5
DRC 5.6
Tanzania 5.6
Sierra Leone 5.9
Angola 6.0
Uganda 6.1
Gabon 6.4
Sudan 6.6
Burundi 6.7
Zimbabwe 6.9
South Sudan 7.0

The 2021 CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa
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COUNTRIES RANKED BY SCORE

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**SUSTAINABILITY EVOLVING**

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