2018 CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATION SUSTAINABILITY INDEX
FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
7th EDITION – NOVEMBER 2019
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Cover Photo: Participants in the Libyan Youth Leadership Academy, organized by USAID/Libya’s implementing partner International Republican Institute (IRI) on March 11–13, in partnership with Generation Democracy.

Photo Credit: International Republican Institute (IRI) for USAID/Libya
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INTRODUCTION

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is pleased to present the seventh edition of the Civil Society Organization (CSO) Sustainability Index for the Middle East and North Africa, covering developments in 2018.

This edition of the Index reports on the strength and overall viability of the CSO sectors in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Yemen, and—for the first time—Libya. The Index addresses advances and setbacks in seven key components or “dimensions” of the sustainability of civil society sectors: legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, sectoral infrastructure, and public image. The Index is intended to be a useful source of information for local and international CSOs, governments, multilateral institutions, donors, academics, and other partners and stakeholders who want to better understand and monitor key aspects of sustainability in the CSO sector.

The Index’s methodology relies on CSO practitioners and researchers, who in each country form an expert panel to assess and rate these dimensions of CSO sustainability during the year. The panel agrees on a score for each dimension, which ranges from 1 (the most enhanced level of sustainability) to 7 (the most impeded). The dimension scores are then averaged to produce an overall sustainability score for the CSO sector of a given country. An editorial committee composed of technical and regional experts reviews each panel’s scores and the corresponding narrative reports, with the aim of maintaining consistent approaches and standards to facilitate cross-country comparisons as well as assessments of trends over time.

The CSO Sustainability Index for the Middle East and North Africa complements similar publications covering other regions. The CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia assesses the civil society sectors in twenty-four countries; the CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa covers thirty-one countries, and the CSO Sustainability Index for Asia reports on developments in nine countries. In addition, the first report for Mexico is being published this year. These various editions of the CSO Sustainability Index bring the total number of countries surveyed in 2018 to seventy-two.

To further explore CSOSI’s historical data and past reports, please visit - www.csosi.org.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The CSO Sustainability Index for the Middle East and North Africa evaluates the strength and viability of the CSO sectors in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, and Yemen. This edition of the Index covers events and trends affecting CSOs in 2018. It is the first edition to include a report on Libya.

CSOs in the Middle East and North Africa faced a range of external challenges in 2018. Across much of the region, organizations operated under challenging economic conditions that both impeded their work and created new demands for their services and advocacy. In Yemen, 85 percent of the population subsisted below the poverty line—many on the brink of famine; local CSOs struggled to meet the overwhelming needs for humanitarian aid and assistance as inflation drove up the price of basic goods and services. In Egypt, austerity measures depressed the value of the Egyptian Pound and increased the cost of necessities, making it more difficult for CSOs to pay their staff and cover the costs of their activities. Jordan’s economy continued to struggle under growing public debt, a 19 percent unemployment rate, and rising costs of bread and fuel; these hardships coincided with reduced local donations to CSOs. A new income tax law that would have raised taxes for most people sparked major protests in Jordan that CSOs helped to organize and participated in.

In a number of countries, armed conflict and its side effects shaped CSOs’ ability to work and the nature of their activities. The ongoing war in Yemen constrained CSOs’ access to certain parts of the country, for instance, and exacerbated a humanitarian crisis that CSOs sought to alleviate through relief and humanitarian aid. The conflict also perpetuated political sensitivities that CSOs had to navigate when engaged in advocacy. In Libya, powerful militias continued to clash with each other and with the Islamic State, which seized control of certain areas, while governing power remained divided between two rival governments. In contrast, the security situation in Iraq improved somewhat, allowing many displaced persons to return to their homes, and CSOs to deliver aid and services to areas that were not previously accessible. As a result of the conflict in neighboring Syria, both Jordan and Lebanon continued to host large refugee populations, presenting ongoing needs for relief, health care, education, and other services by CSOs.

At the same time, political developments in a number of countries had consequences for CSOs’ independence and role in public life. In both Iraq and Lebanon, parliamentary elections resulted in a greater number of civil society representatives in elected office. Parliamentary candidates in Lebanon also explicitly adopted civil society positions and talking points, an apparent indication of civil society’s enhanced political power. In Egypt, on the other hand, authorities restricted freedom of association and assembly in the runup to the presidential election. Protests remained effectively banned, while many CSOs were compelled to campaign for the incumbent president, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, or risk harassment.

TRENDS IN CSO SUSTAINABILITY

CSO sustainability in the Middle East and North Africa remained challenged in 2018. All country scores for individual dimensions of sustainability as well as overall sustainability continued to fall in either the Sustainability Evolving or Sustainability Impeded categories.

Lebanon recorded the highest level of CSO sustainability in the region, following the pattern of prior years. The legal environment for CSOs in Lebanon deteriorated for the third year in a row, but CSOs’ advocacy and public image improved. Further, every dimension of CSO sustainability was higher in Lebanon than elsewhere in the region.

Egypt once again recorded the most impeded level of overall CSO sustainability in the region. While the scores for specific dimensions did not change, the situation for CSOs continued to be dire. Five out of seven dimensions of CSO sustainability in Egypt were categorized as Sustainability Impeded, and four of seven remained the most challenged in the region.

Iraq, Lebanon, and Morocco’s overall CSO sustainability scores remain in the Sustainability Evolving category, while Egypt, Jordan, Libya, and Yemen recorded overall scores categorized as Sustainability Impeded. Overall sustainability scores stayed the same across the region with the exception of Iraq; Iraq’s overall score improved
slightly. As discussed in greater detail below, the most dynamic dimensions for CSO sustainability in 2018 were legal environment, advocacy, and public image.

### MOUNTING LEGAL OBSTACLES

The legal environment for CSOs remained impeded in more than half the countries surveyed in this edition of the CSO Sustainability Index, and for the fourth year in a row it deteriorated further across much of the region. In four countries—Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Yemen—the legal environment grew more challenging in 2018, while in Egypt and Libya it remained extremely restricted. Governments issued new legal initiatives and undertook new practices that constrained CSOs’ formation and activities, while incidents of harassment by both the state and non-state actors increased. In Libya and Yemen, competing authorities issued separate decrees and regulations affecting CSOs, creating confusion and uncertainty among organizations.

New restrictive laws and practices affected CSOs in nearly every country in 2018. In Jordan, a number of local and international CSOs seeking to carry out trainings, public conferences, and even private meetings at hotels were informed that they needed approval from the governor before the hotel could serve as their venue—a requirement allegedly instated by security officials. The government also considered amendments to Jordan’s 2015 cybercrimes law that threatened freedom of expression online, including a broad definition of “hate speech” and criminal penalties for hate speech shared electronically. While the government withdrew the amendments in December, officials indicated that they would revise and resubmit them. A new cybercrime law enacted in Egypt authorized the state to block websites that it deemed a threat to national security, effectively sanctioning the government’s ongoing practice of blocking websites, including CSOs’ sites and news platforms.

In Yemen, the Houthi authorities in Sana’a issued a new decree that temporarily suspended registration of new organizations, and began more aggressively enforcing a second decree that required CSOs to obtain permits for each activity they carried out. CSOs in parts of Libya, meanwhile, were required to notify the government before participating in any events with international organizations. While the legal environment in Lebanon remained the most enabling in the region, CSOs’ attempts to register were increasingly complicated in 2018, and several groups of individuals reported that they were unable to legally establish new organizations. Social movements and groups working on women’s rights and the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) people in particular reported registration challenges.
Harassment of CSOs by authorities and third parties continued to be a major challenge for CSOs in nearly every country as well. In Egypt, a number of prominent civil society leaders were arrested or detained during the year, and more than eighty organizations were dissolved—some on extralegal grounds. In addition, a number of groups engaged in human rights and democracy work remained targets of a criminal investigation into their funding and registration; the assets of those groups remained frozen, while additional CSO representatives and activists were summoned for questioning in relation to the case during the year. Numerous CSOs in Yemen were raided, closed, or had their activities suspended, and at least two saw their assets frozen. Harassment was most common for Yemeni CSOs located in areas controlled by the Houthis. In Iraq, CSOs that were involved in anti-government protests were the most likely to face harassment, including the arrest of their leaders and closure of their offices. The state also failed to protect civil society leaders from attacks by non-state actors in 2018: no one was arrested or charged after three prominent human rights defenders were assassinated. CSOs in Libya, Lebanon, and Jordan also reported more incidents of security authorities visiting CSOs’ offices and events without prior notice. Lebanese CSOs working on LGBTI issues faced particularly heightened harassment, including having to cancel events and relocate conferences.

In at least three countries, uncertainty about the operative legal framework raised challenges for CSOs. In Libya, the two rival, de facto governments issued a continually changing set of decisions and regulations affecting CSOs. Similarly, in Yemen, authorities representing the internationally-recognized government and those led by the Houthi rebels issued different directives and decrees. The existence of multiple authorities charged with oversight of the sector created bureaucratic obstacles and delays for organizations throughout the country. In Egypt, meanwhile, the absence of implementing regulations for Egypt’s CSO law created a different kind of legal chaos: CSOs and officials charged with implementing the law remained uncertain as to the practical details of various provisions, including the requirements and procedural steps necessary to establish a new CSO. Very few organizations registered during the year despite the law’s requirement to do so; some groups reported that they opted not to due to confusion about the process.

LOUDER CALLS FOR CHANGE

While the legal space for CSOs grew more constrained in many countries, organizations did not stay silent. Advocacy remains the strongest dimension for CSOs across the Middle East and North Africa region: in five of seven countries (all but Egypt and Yemen), CSO advocacy scored in the Sustainability Evolving category. In 2018, the score for advocacy further improved in Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, while remaining relatively robust in Morocco and Libya.

In some cases, CSOs’ access to decisionmakers and space for advocacy activities seemed to increase in 2018. In Iraq, for instance, CSOs worked with political leaders to amend the federal electoral law, reducing the minimum age required to hold office and enabling greater youth representation in government. Likewise, in Iraqi Kurdistan CSOs worked with members of the Kurdish parliament to amend the regional demonstration law, including to revise provisions requiring prior government approval for protests and other public assemblies. These efforts helped build closer relations with key parliamentarians, strengthening the foundation for future advocacy. Iraqi CSOs also engaged in robust advocacy on rights issues, including the rights of minorities and other marginalized groups. In Jordan, a newly appointed prime minister held an unusually open and inclusive meeting with CSOs, activists, and journalists to discuss the government’s vision and policy plans. Following popular protests against Jordan’s draft income tax law, the government also organized consultations with CSOs across the country to discuss their view of the bill.

Advocacy campaigns by CSOs led to significant legal and policy successes in 2018, as well. In Lebanon, parliament approved three laws regarding anti-corruption, which CSOs had long lobbied for: the laws focused on whistleblower protections, transparency in oil and gas exploration, and electronic transactions. In addition to successfully advocating for the amendment of the federal electoral law, discussed above, Iraqi CSOs also succeeded in lobbying parliamentarians to table a draft law on cybercrimes that contained provisions that would unduly restrict freedom of expression. Restrictive amendments to Jordan’s cybercrimes law were likewise successfully—if temporarily—halted following a major CSO-led advocacy campaign against them.

Advocacy was the strongest dimension of CSO sustainability in Libya, and in 2018 CSOs helped negotiate a peace agreement between cities of Misrata and Tawergha. CSOs also successfully pressured authorities to end a ban on
women traveling alone through airports in the Eastern District. CSO advocacy remained strong in Morocco, as well, and an advocacy campaign supported by more than 1,000 associations succeeded in securing some changes to the budget law that favored certain CSOs, including an end to import taxes on equipment imported by CSOs for people with disabilities, and creation of a tax deduction for corporate donations to CSOs that work with public institutions.

On the other hand, CSOs’ ability to advocate in Egypt and Yemen remained severely constrained. Egyptian CSOs had little access to policymakers and decision-making processes, and even organizations that obtained government approval before undertaking advocacy activities were sometimes prevented from doing so. The threat of legal repercussions or extralegal harassment continued to discourage CSOs from any advocacy that criticized the state. The environment for CSOs’ advocacy remained poor in Yemen as well. With very few opportunities or mechanisms for participation and limited ability to advocate around controversial or politically sensitive issues, Yemeni CSOs advocated only rarely and only around non-controversial issues.

AN INCREASINGLY RECEPTIVE PUBLIC

While the public image of CSOs remained in the Sustainability Evolving or Sustainability Impeded categories across the region, 2018 saw indications of a warming trend in some places. Particularly in those countries where CSOs’ advocacy increased and improved—in Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan—their public image improved somewhat as well. Notably, the public image of CSOs in those three countries has consistently improved or stayed constant over the past five years.

In many cases, the perceived improvement in public perception seemed to stem from enhanced relations with the media. In Iraq, stronger relationships between CSOs and media outlets in 2018 meant more coverage of CSOs’ activities. CSOs in Jordan likewise saw increased reporting and more positive coverage of civil society activities and events, including the mass protests against the draft income tax law. The 2018 launch of Kingdom TV—an independent broadcaster in Jordan—also helped to spotlight CSOs and improve their image. In Lebanon, the media more regularly called on CSOs to provide information and expert opinions, particularly on rights issues such as gender-based violence and freedom of expression.

CSOs in several countries also saw improved relations with government officials, which contributed to a more positive public image overall. In Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan, CSOs were able to strengthen ties with various government agencies, especially by holding trainings for officials in those agencies. The federal government also issued a letter to all the provincial councils directing them to coordinate and collaborate more closely with CSOs. Lebanese CSOs saw a slight increase in opportunities to consult with the government, and more incorporation of their feedback into legal and policy proposals. While Moroccan CSOs’ public image did not improve overall, the government did recognize CSOs as potential partners in policy documents and hosted the second annual Civil Society Award to recognize local, national, and international civil society groups.

The public image of CSOs remained impeded or under attack elsewhere, however. In Egypt, which again recorded the most impeded public image score in the region, media figures continued to publicly smear CSOs, accusing them of being agents or allies of foreign governments. Egyptian media coverage generally omitted any developments that reflected well on CSOs. The same was true in Yemen, where the public image of CSOs deteriorated during the year; positive media coverage was the exception rather than the rule, and officials’ criticism of CSOs and questioning of their loyalty increased, especially in areas under Houthi control. In Libya, the media provides extensive coverage of CSOs’ activities and highlights their expertise, yet government officials and members of the public still held largely negative attitudes about CSOs. Libyan organizations—particularly those that receive foreign funding and those that do not provide tangible benefits such as humanitarian aid—struggle under negative stereotypes that can threaten their ability to work and the safety of their staff.

CONCLUSION

In 2018, CSOs in the Middle East and North Africa contended with diverse economic, political, and security challenges as well as new legal and administrative constraints. Across much of the region, they remained persistent and vocal advocates for the public, however, and in turn received greater recognition for their crucial role.
The country reports that follow provide an in-depth look at the CSO sectors in seven Middle East and North African countries. We hope this annual survey continues to capture useful trends for CSOs, governments, donors, and researchers supporting the advancement of CSO sectors.
The 2018 CSO Sustainability Index for Egypt

OVERALL CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 5.6

Overall CSO sustainability in Egypt did not change significantly in 2018. The sector continued to operate within a repressive legal environment and to endure challenges to its financial viability.

Presidential elections were held in March. A number of candidates withdrew from the race in the weeks before the election, many citing intimidation. As a result, President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi ultimately ran against a single opponent who was a vocal Al-Sisi supporter. The US State Department and other international observers noted instances of restrictions on freedom of expression and association in the weeks leading up to the elections. Many CSOs, for instance, were compelled to campaign for Al-Sisi or risked harassment by security authorities, while protests and demonstrations remained effectively prohibited. Egypt’s election commission reported that Al-Sisi won reelection by 97 percent of the vote, with only 41 percent of the electorate participating.

Some macroeconomic indicators improved in 2018, but the economic circumstances and living standards of the majority of Egyptians continued to decline. According to the World Bank and Egypt’s Cabinet of Ministers, economic growth rose from 4.2 to 5.3 percent, while unemployment declined from 12 to 9.9 percent.

Nonetheless, government austerity policies including a 2018 cut to electricity subsidies continued to affect most people, and food, medicine, gas, and other basic goods and services became more expensive and less available in 2018. Economic challenges affected many CSOs’ abilities to provide basic goods to beneficiaries, as well as to raise funds to support staff salaries and other operational costs.

The repressive political environment and increasing influence of security agencies continued to have a chilling effect on the activities of CSOs, particularly those not aligned with the government. A state of emergency remained in place, which among other things granted authorities greater power to censor the press and impose curfews. The government continued to block websites, an initiative begun in 2017, and more than 500 websites, including CSOs’ websites and news platforms, were blocked ahead of the presidential elections. A new cybercrime law enacted in August, Law No. 175 of 2018 on Anti-Cyber and Information Technology Crimes, effectively sanctioned this practice, authorizing the state to block websites that it deems threatening to national security or the economy.

Officials did not issue implementing regulations for the restrictive CSO law passed in 2017, which perpetuated a state of uncertainty across the sector. CSOs’ fields of work remained effectively subject to government control, and were dominated by the provision of basic charitable goods and services, as well as health-related and educational activities and support for entrepreneurship. In 2018, CSOs faced ongoing legal challenges in the form of rejected and belated approvals for funding and activities, resulting in delays and financial losses. On the other hand, the government provided support to CSOs working on issues that align with the government’s agenda, such as family planning and aid to people with disabilities.

As of the end of 2018, the total number of associations registered with the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MoSS) was approximately 52,000. The vast majority of these, however, are believed to be inactive or to exist only on paper. Roughly 3,400 organizations registered between 2016 and 2018, the lowest rate of registrations in the past eight years. CSO experts attribute the decline in registrations to the absence of implementing regulations for the 2017 CSO law, as well as individuals’ inability to collect the funds needed to establish new organizations.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.7**

The legal environment for CSOs remained extremely challenging in 2018. The extremely restrictive CSO law adopted in 2017—Law 70 of 2017 on Associations and Other Foundations Working in the Field of Civil Work (Law 70)—remained in force. Despite provisions requiring that regulations to guide the law’s implementation and enforcement be issued within two months of the law’s ratification, no such regulations had been issued by the end of the year. The absence of implementing regulations perpetuated uncertainty among CSOs and MoSS officials charged with implementing the law.

At the World Youth Forum held in November, President Al-Sisi stated, based on a request from a participant, that he wished to revise Law 70 and increase the space for CSOs in Egypt. After his comments—which followed intense pressure by foreign governments to repeal or revise the law—the prime minister formed a ministerial committee to prepare amendments to the law, and in December MoSS began conducting dialogue sessions with select CSOs around the country to solicit their opinions about changes to the law. Organizations not aligned or associated with the government were not included in the dialogue sessions, however. Some CSO leaders and activists remained skeptical that the government’s reform process would result in an enabling law, particularly given the harassment civil society continued to face throughout the year.

Law 70 requires all CSOs to register in order to legally engage in “civil work.” The registration process, while framed as merely “notifying” authorities of an organization’s establishment, is challenging, time-consuming, and subject to authorities’ discretion. Along with the notification, a new CSO must submit extensive personal information about its founders and other information, supply proof of physical premises, and pay a fee of up to 10,000 Egyptian Pounds (approximately $560). Establishing a foundation requires initial funds of at least 50,000 Egyptian Pounds (approximately $2,850).

Registration challenges were compounded by the lack of implementing regulations, which should provide additional guidance to organizations about the notification process and requirements. As a result of the lack of procedural clarity and high registration fees, very few organizations registered with MoSS in 2018 compared to previous years. According to CSO experts, some people that wished to form organizations decided not to do so due to confusion about the process, their inability to cover the costs, or their desire to avoid attacks and other unwanted attention from authorities. Moreover, in Sinai, where the government continued to wage a military campaign against suspected militants, new organizations were unable to register as government facilities were not functioning.

Law 70 limits CSOs’ ability to access financial resources. The law requires that Egyptian CSOs obtain approval from a special agency—comprised of government officials including representatives of the intelligence and security
apparatus—before they may receive foreign funding. The agency has extensive discretion to deny foreign funding requests. CSOs must also obtain permission from MoSS thirty days before they collect or receive donations or engage in fundraising campaigns for donations. Despite the absence of implementing regulations for Law 70 in 2018, authorities still required CSOs to obtain security clearances from MoSS—in coordination with security authorities—before receiving local or foreign funding. Under Law 70, associations are allowed to earn income—for instance by establishing social enterprises—however, this also requires prior permission from MoSS. In addition to Law 70, CSOs remained subject to Article 78 of the Penal Code, which was amended in 2014 to punish with life imprisonment anyone who receives foreign funding for a purpose deemed harmful to the national interest or national security. The vague language used in the article has created fear among CSOs that the law may be used against them for carrying out activities that the government does not agree with.

Law 70 also requires CSOs to obtain approval from MoSS in order to make any internal organizational changes such as appointing new board members or partnering with other organizations. Because the process for obtaining approval is confusing and time-consuming, however, many organizations simply do not undertake such changes, even if they could make their organizations more effective and efficient.

Local as well as foreign or international CSOs must obtain written approval from MoSS and other governmental agencies before they may implement projects or activities. It generally takes at least six months and sometimes up to one year to receive permits to carry out specific projects—delays that impede CSO operations. Permit requests may also be rejected altogether. For example, the government rejected a permit request from an organization seeking to conduct a public awareness campaign about Hepatitis C on grounds that the government was already engaged in awareness campaigns about the virus.

State abuse and harassment of CSOs and activists remained a serious challenge in 2018, particularly for organizations engaged in rights work or work that was otherwise explicitly or implicitly critical of the government. A number of pro-democracy and human rights organizations remained targets of a criminal investigation into their registration and funding, referred to as Case No. 173, or the “foreign funding case.” In December, forty-one foreign and Egyptian employees of pro-democracy organizations were acquitted in the case, overturning their 2013 convictions for receiving illegal funds from abroad and operating unlicensed organizations. Nonetheless, new CSO representatives and prominent rights activists including Esraa Abdelfattah, founder of the April 6 Youth Movement, were summoned for questioning in relation to the case. Several CSOs were forced to suspend their activities, while the heads of at least two organizations, which preferred to remain anonymous, tried to sell the organizations because they could no longer meet their obligations. In March, the women’s rights group Nazra for Feminist Studies closed its main office in Cairo, and ceased operations in Egypt’s other governorates, roughly one year after the government froze the organization’s assets and those of its founder Mozn Hassan. In many cases, organizations shared information about such events via social media; it was not reported through official news outlets. Additionally, CSOs did not always publicly report the different forms of abuse and oppression they experienced for fear of drawing more attention to themselves and creating more trouble for their organizations.

CSOs also faced dissolution in 2018, including on extralegal grounds. One government official who requested anonymity reported that eighty-one CSOs were closed down in 2018 for various reasons, including ceasing their activities, failing to prepare their annual budgets and financial reports, and being affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood or other banned political groups. For instance, El-Sayeda Khadiga Association in Port Said was closed down for not operating. Resalat Domiat Association in Damietta was closed down for an alleged affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood. Fewer CSOs were shut down on this basis in 2018 compared to prior years, but this was likely because organizations susceptible to the claim had already been closed.

A number of prominent figures in Egyptian civil society, including members of CSOs as well as opposition leaders, activists, bloggers, and journalists, were arrested or detained in 2018. In May, Egyptian authorities arrested Wael Abbas, a journalist who documented police abuse and government corruption through his Twitter account. On the basis of his news reporting, Abbas was charged with “belonging to a terrorist group,” “publishing and spreading false news,” and “using a website to spread the ideologies of a terrorist group”—namely, the Muslim Brotherhood, which is banned in Egypt. Abbas was conditionally released in December, but thirty-five other journalists remained in detention. Additionally, in May, authorities arrested Amal Fathy, an Egyptian activist and member of the April 6 Youth Movement, after she criticized the pervasiveness of sexual harassment in Cairo; she was sentenced to two years in prison. Shady El Ghazaly Harb, a rights activist, was also arrested for allegedly insulting the president, spreading false news, and being a member of the Muslim Brotherhood.
The law prohibits CSOs from carrying out any activities that are part of “the work of political parties, vocational or labor syndicates, any work of political nature, or any work that may cause harm to the national security, law and order, public morals, or public health.” Despite the prohibition on political work, during the presidential elections some organizations—particularly community-based associations—faced pressure from local authorities to campaign for Al-Sisi in their neighborhoods. Accordingly, many CSOs issued statements, hung posters, and engaged in other campaign activities to avoid disruption to their activities and having their funding rejected.

The tax framework for CSOs remained unchanged in 2018, however its implementation grew more restrictive through the government’s increased use of audits. CSOs established under Law 70 are exempt from certain taxes and stamp duties on contracts, powers of attorney, and other documents; real-estate tax for properties owned; income taxes on donations; and customs taxes. Corporate donors to CSOs receive up to a 10 percent deduction from their taxable income. In 2018, Egypt’s Tax Authority increased its scrutiny of associations’ tax documents, going back as far as 2013 to check for irregularities in paid taxes.

Some institutions, including the Gerhart Center for Philanthropy and Civic Engagement at the American University in Cairo, provide legal assistance to CSOs. Additionally, certain CSOs specialized in legal matters carry out awareness-raising activities on legal issues affecting the sector. The Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights, for instance, held roundtable discussions on Law 70 during the year. Many organizations and legal advisors who used to provide legal advice and assistance stopped operating in 2018, however, due to the increasingly restrictive environment.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.6**

The organizational capacity of CSOs in Egypt remained unchanged in 2018.

CSOs generally use indirect methods to reach their beneficiaries and new constituencies, including Facebook or other social media channels, local youth networks, or word-of-mouth. In 2018, there was a slight increase in CSOs’ outreach to marginalized communities, including women and youth. Small and newly-established CSOs were reluctant to engage in highly visible constituency-building activities or to advertise their work, in order to avoid scrutiny from government authorities.

Most CSOs do not have clearly defined missions or strategic plans. The few that do are generally well-established CSOs that work with large international donors—mainly international NGOs (INGOs)—and large national entities such as Misr El Kheir and the Egyptian Food Bank. The lack of certainty regarding implementation of Law 70 made it even more challenging for CSOs to develop long-term strategies and plans. In 2018, therefore, many organizations prioritized fundraising and navigating legal restrictions over strategic planning. Further, in the absence of implementing regulations for Law 70, as noted above, CSOs were unable to make important internal changes to, for example, their boards of directors, which further impeded their ability to strategize and be responsive.

Organizations across the sector continued to lack clearly-defined, democratic governance structures. Larger, better-established CSOs continue to be more likely than smaller organizations to have strong management policies and procedures, with clear hierarchies of staff and divisions of labor.

Funding shortages mean that many CSOs struggle to retain employees. In general, staff turnover depends in part on the kind of activities CSOs engage in: an organization carrying out development activities that require special expertise, for instance, may need to invest more time and money in recruitment and training than a CSO focused on basic service delivery. CSOs’ use of volunteers likewise tends to depend on an organization’s size, financial situation, and area of work. Some organizations, such as Benaa Association in Minya Governorate, train volunteers to serve as project coordinators, thereby cutting costs.
There was some improvement in the sector’s access to technology and ability to utilize it safely in 2018. CSOs increasingly use information and communications technology (ICT) tools to help fill informational and service gaps. For example, the CSO Monazamat used online data collection systems and tablets in its work with female community leaders and health workers. Almost all surveys and other data collection tools are now digitized, and more CSOs are exploring the use of e-learning and webinars to provide education and training. Nonetheless, CSOs that are not aligned with the government face certain risks when using technology. The government continued to block websites of certain CSOs and independent news outlets. The government also blocked proxy sites and VPNs, which allow many Egyptians to access the uncensored internet, including sites that the government has blocked and content it has taken down. Herdo Training Center and other groups provided training for CSOs across the country on digital security and data protection, including safeguarding the organization’s data and that of their beneficiaries. Despite such trainings, however, a December report by Amnesty International found that dozens of human rights organizations, activists, and journalists in Egypt were the victims of a phishing campaign that specifically undermined their security strategies.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.0

CSOs’ financial viability did not change in 2018 and remained impeded. Local support for CSOs, including through the private sector’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives, increased slightly, but the process of obtaining approval for foreign funding caused funding delays and shortages, and was especially burdensome for smaller CSOs with more limited capacity.

According to experts, CSOs’ sources of funding became more concentrated and less diverse in 2018, as organizations increasingly focused on the limited sources that were likely to be approved by the government.

CSOs’ access to local funding varied across the sector in 2018, though roughly three-quarters of CSO stakeholders surveyed via an online poll said that their local funding declined or stayed the same. Local donations continued to be directed predominantly to humanitarian and charity work, such as the president’s fund for people with disabilities. There were some indications that large charity organizations were hurt by a government investigation into corruption and mismanagement of funds at the 57357 Children’s Cancer Hospital Foundation. However, another charity that operates at the national level and prefers to remain anonymous, indicated that its donations increased by 20 percent in 2018.

The government continued to provide contracts and grants to some CSOs, however these opportunities were not well publicized and few organizations knew about or benefitted from them. For example, MoSS supported the Forsa (Opportunity) youth employment training project, the Etnein Kefaya (Two are Enough) family planning project, which targeted over 1.1 million women through 100 local CSOs, and INGOs such as Plan International. CSOs that already had strong relations with MoSS were more likely to be aware of these opportunities and thus had an advantage in accessing funds.

Revenue generated through the sale of services and products to non-government clients continued to comprise a small share of CSO income. Organizations such as Banati Foundation, which cares for homeless and orphaned girls, trained their beneficiaries in handicraft production so that they could earn income by selling handmade products to the public.

A growing number of corporate entities in Egypt had CSR programs that benefitted CSOs in 2018. Banks in particular engaged in significant CSR activities as well as intersectoral partnerships. Alex Bank and MetLife, for example, collaborated with the nonprofit foundation Educate Me on a program to train and develop the professional skills of teachers in government schools. CSR Egypt, a company, holds an annual forum targeting more than 750 companies, CSO representatives, and experts in the field of social responsibility to foster CSR programs that support sustainable growth and development.
While funding from outside Egypt continued to play an important role in supporting CSOs, most CSO experts indicated that it was more difficult to obtain foreign funding in 2018 because of the challenging process of gaining approval. Eight organizations successfully applied for 2017-2018 funding from USAID for a project on small and medium enterprises (SMEs), for instance, but only two got the necessary approvals. The other organizations were forced to forfeit the funding. According to MoSS, as of November, foreign grants totaling more than 376 Egyptian Pounds (approximately $21 million) were approved by the government and received by 112 NGOs in Egypt. The NGO recipients were working in the fields of development, charity, and microfinance, and the grants went towards projects targeting child care, health care, poverty reduction, and education. No official information is available on the amount of foreign grants that the government did not approve in 2018.

CSOs recognize that their chances of obtaining approvals increase when partnering with a governmental counterpart. Most, if not all, foreign funding requests that were approved in 2018 were submitted by CSOs that partnered with a government agency or ministry. For instance, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) funded CSOs' participation in Egypt's first national anti-bullying campaign; the project was undertaken with government partners the National Council for Childhood and Motherhood (NCCM) and the Ministry of Education. As another example, the British Council provided nine grants to CSOs as part of the Social Action Project (SAP), which supports community initiatives addressing violence against women and girls.

Given the restrictions on acquiring foreign funds, many CSOs use a variety of means to raise local funds, including fundraising events and income-generating projects. Media-Arts for Development (MADEV), for instance, offers paid training courses in all aspects of media production and in the use of media as a development tool.

Under Law 70, CSOs are required to undergo annual audits. Tax officers seemingly increased their audits of CSOs in 2018, creating additional challenges for organizations. Transparency and financial management continued to be a problem for many organizations, and in response to the increased attention from the government some organizations established new financial management systems and procedures. Law 70 requires every CSO to “adhere to the standards of transparency [and] disclosure,” declare all funding sources and activities on the MoSS website, and “maintain its documents, libraries, registers and bank notices and letters in its management center.” CSOs struggled to interpret and implement these provisions in the absence of implementing regulations for the law.

ADVOCACY: 5.6

The environment for CSOs’ advocacy continued to be impeded in 2018. Organizations aligned with the government and its agenda on issues such as education, family planning, people with disabilities, and access to social services enjoyed greater space to advocate. For example, CSOs like Educate Me, a nonprofit foundation focused on education, and social enterprise Helm (Dream), which works on disability rights, were able to advocate openly in 2018. However, advocacy activities by organizations that have been critical of the state continued to be effectively prohibited.

CSOs continued to struggle to reach policy makers or participate in policy- and decision-making processes. Law 70 prohibits “any work of a political nature,” giving the government discretion to decide what kind of direct advocacy is considered “political” and thus prohibited. Law 70 requires organizations to apply for approval from the government before they may carry out data collection projects, opinion polls, or other field research. CSOs were not allowed to conduct any such field research that might result in findings critical of the government, or to spread any information that was not in coordination with the state.

In 2018, some CSOs seeking to conduct advocacy activities were prevented from doing so despite acquiring all the necessary government approvals. For instance, an organization that preferred to remain anonymous conducted a public awareness campaign about value-added tax; local MoSS officials asked the organization to stop holding
workshops, even though it had completed the necessary paperwork and obtained the required permissions. MoSS officials asked another unnamed organization that was conducting an awareness campaign about female genital mutilation to highlight efforts by the state in combating this practice.

A small number of independent human rights organizations continued to conduct advocacy on rights issues, despite the potential consequences. El Nadeem Against Violence and Torture, for instance, joined several rights organizations in a public statement condemning the practice of intentional medical neglect in Egyptian prisons. Towards the end of the year, some organizations also participated in advocacy around the proposed reform of Law 70, including by issuing statements calling for the annulment of Law 70 and adoption of a new, enabling law. Government-aligned CSOs participated in the dialogue sessions convened by the ministerial drafting committee to discuss amendments to Law 70, but organizations that had criticized the state either boycotted the sessions due to their distrust of the process or were not invited to attend.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.9**

CSOs’ service provision remained largely unchanged in 2018. CSOs continued to provide a diverse range of services, the most common being education and skill building, health, and relief services such as the provision of food and non-food items. Certain kinds of service delivery—environmental protection, democracy and governance education, gender and rights issues—remained sensitive. CSOs perceived to be opposed to the state that sought to provide services generally had their activity permit requests denied by government officials. Some, such as Nazra for Feminist Studies, were informally “flagged” by officials and subjected to harassment. To avoid these issues, some organizations, like the Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights, chose instead to focus on providing research and education online. CSOs that were supportive of the state, and particularly those that partnered with a governmental entity, were more easily able to obtain the necessary approvals, and in a timely manner.

CSOs providing services are largely unable to conduct needs assessments to gauge the needs of the populations they serve. Many lack the capacity and funding to carry out extensive assessments. Additionally, Law 70 requires prior approval and security clearances for any field research. As a result, CSOs may rely on old assessments or try to leverage social media to get a sense of their target communities and their needs.

CSOs’ abilities to meet constituents’ needs through their services vary considerably. CSOs in fragile areas such as North Sinai were overwhelmed with needs and had almost no funding or support from local or international donors. By contrast, well-funded CSOs like Resala, headquartered in Cairo, were able to provide services to many beneficiaries. Resala distributed 80,000 food packages to poor families in the first half of 2018 alone.

Many CSOs continue to provide goods and services to non-members. Mada Masr disseminates research and publications to non-members, for instance. Even though its offices are officially closed, Nazra for Feminist Studies continues to hold workshops for beneficiaries other than its members. As reported in 2017, most CSOs’ goods and services remain free of charge, such that organizations must rely on project budgets to recover the costs. In 2018, however, CSOs increasingly sought to generate income through service provision, particularly by establishing social enterprises. The Misr El Kheir Foundation, a large and well-funded CSO with close ties to the government, operates an incubator for social enterprises called Gesr (Bridge), that holds an annual competition for startups with social impact in the fields of water, food, health, energy, and education.

The government continued to demonstrate limited recognition of CSOs’ service provision. In December, the MoSS held the third annual Excellence Award Competition to recognize the importance of certain CSOs in Egypt’s sustainable development, including by highlighting successful CSO service projects and models. President Al-Sisi also noted CSOs’ significant role in development as part of his remarks at the November youth forum.
Nonetheless, the support and recognition shown in these public events were undermined by the government’s restrictions on a wide range of organizations seeking to provide goods and services to Egyptians.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.3**

The infrastructure supporting CSOs in Egypt remained largely unchanged in 2018. CSOs’ access to support organizations and resource centers did not change significantly during the year. Large international CSOs such as Save the Children conducted capacity-building workshops for smaller, local organizations, helping to build their managerial knowledge and skills. CSOs have some access to local resource centers as well, such as the Egyptian NGO Support Center, which provides training workshops and networking opportunities. Yet the demand for CSO capacity-building continued to outpace the supply.

CSOs had some access to digital services in 2018. The Egyptian NGO Support Center, for instance, advertises opportunities for funding and tenders through its Facebook page. The Professional Development Foundation (PDF) operates the Civil Society Support Center (CSSC), a portal that offers practical and theoretical training to support the efforts of Egyptian NGOs.

Cooperation within the CSO sector has historically been limited. Law 70 created additional obstacles for partnerships and even informal coordination among local CSOs and between local CSOs and foreign entities, primarily by requiring CSOs to obtain permission from MoSS before they can “cooperate with, join, affiliate with, or participate” in any civil activity with another local or foreign organization. This limitation makes cooperation within the sector challenging. Despite these obstacles, CSOs have been able to cooperate to some extent through digital platforms and events such as the Egypt CSR Forum.

CSOs also continued to benefit from the work of membership associations, which connect organizations with similar focuses and intervention areas. For instance, the Assiut Innovation Cluster brings together organizations focused on entrepreneurship and rural development in Upper Egypt, enabling its members to publicize their work and collaborate with similarly-focused partners to scale up their efforts. The Assiut Innovation Cluster also produces research and conducts workshops for the public. The Greek Campus New Assiut was established in September 2018 as an offshoot of the Assiut Innovation Cluster. It aims to create links among its network of entrepreneurship supporters and youth in Upper Egypt and to be a hub for tech-enabled startups and innovators there.

There was no significant change in the availability of training opportunities for CSOs in 2018. As CSOs increasingly rely on volunteers instead of paid staff due to funding shortages, training for volunteers has become increasingly important. For instance, the Egyptian Red Crescent, a national CSO, provides its volunteers with regular training on topics ranging from first aid to psychosocial support.

Intersectoral partnerships were increasingly active in 2018. One notable example was the collaboration between local CSOs, the Ministry of Youth and Sports (MoYS), and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), with funding from the Norwegian Embassy, to launch the Crossing Egypt Challenge—a campaign aimed at raising awareness about Egypt’s population growth. The campaign also involved private sector actors, including Fitness Pro, Polar, and Sprint Activewear. The ongoing Youth Against Sexual Harassment project was another example of intersectoral partnerships. In 2018, the project, which was commissioned by the German government in cooperation with MoYS and implemented by GIZ, partnered with local CSOs to disseminate research and conduct sexual harassment training for youth groups. 2018 also saw ongoing partnerships between CSOs and the private sector, particularly in the form of CSR. As discussed above, for example, the Egypt CSR Forum brought together CSOs and companies for the third year in a row.
Public Image: 6.0

The public image of CSOs remained unchanged overall in 2018. Coverage of CSOs during most of the year was generally negative and omitted developments that cast CSOs in a positive light. The media offered little coverage of the December acquittal of forty-one CSO workers in Case 173, for instance. Popular media figures continued to smear CSOs as foreign agents who work for the benefit of other countries and undermine Egyptian sovereignty. On one TV show, for instance, a famous host called on the Egyptian authorities to deal with Bahay el-Din Hassan, the Director of Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS), the same way a Russian spy was dealt with, referencing a nerve agent attack on a Russian intelligence agent and his daughter in the United Kingdom.

Some media outlets appeared to be newly willing to have CSO representatives and employees appear on their shows to discuss their work following President Al-Sisi’s remarks in November, in which he publicly endorsed CSOs and highlighted their role in Egypt’s development. This seemed to mark at least a small move away from the widespread media narrative in Egypt that demonizes CSOs.

Knowing that their connection to the public remains tenuous at best, CSOs have sought to build their public support through social media platforms. This has in some cases created new problems, however. Human rights defenders who used social media to amplify criticism of the government were detained and prosecuted in National Security Case 621/2018, resulting in lengthy prison sentences for some. A number of bloggers and journalists, such as Shady Abouzeid, Amal Fathy, and Shady El Ghazaly Harb, who were part of CSOs or reported positively on them, were either legally or illegally detained, further spreading the idea that CSOs cannot be trusted.

Few CSOs have adopted a code of ethics or taken formal steps to demonstrate transparency in their operations. Law 70 requires organizations to submit annual programmatic reports to the related governmental authorities. CSOs also are obliged to publish their annual budgets, activities, and funding sources on their websites. Large, well-funded CSOs tend to comply with these requirements.
**OVERALL CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.7**

The sustainability of Iraq’s CSO sector improved slightly in 2018, as improved security and greater political stability expanded the space for CSOs to operate.

Parliamentary elections were held in federal Iraq as well as in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR), in May and September respectively. The new parliaments in Baghdad and Erbil included a number of young people, some of whom were former activists or members of civil society. CSOs generally perceived the election results as a positive development.

Though most of its territory was reclaimed in 2017, Islamic State militants remained active in 2018 and carried out guerrilla attacks in several provinces. Overall, however, the security situation stabilized and improved across the country. While some 700,000 people remained displaced by the violence and live in informal settlements, many internally displaced people (IDPs) were able to return to their homes. In this context, CSOs were newly able to deliver aid and provide services in many areas affected by conflict with the Islamic State. Iraq also hosted nearly 300,000 refugees from Syria and other neighboring countries, according to the United Nations (UN), and roughly one-quarter of Iraq’s total population remained in need of humanitarian aid. In addition to providing relief to these communities, CSOs facilitated peacebuilding and reconciliation processes in the liberated areas.

Political tensions between the Government of Iraq (GoI) and the Government of Iraqi Kurdistan (KRG)—exacerbated by the 2017 Kurdish referendum on independence—eased in 2018. Reestablished dialogue and subsequent agreements between the two governments helped facilitate economic improvement in IKR, which in turn enabled more people to engage as volunteers in CSO-led activities.

CSO sustainability improved in 2018, with advances on a number of fronts. The sector’s financial viability increased slightly as foreign donors funding development activities generally maintained or increased their financial support of CSOs. CSO advocacy improved as the space for advocacy and CSOs’ engagement in campaigns expanded. The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector also improved, while CSOs benefited from greater visibility and increased media coverage, which boosted their public image. The legal environment, organizational capacity, and service provision dimensions did not change noticeably during the year.

Registered non-governmental organizations (NGOs) make up the majority of Iraqi CSOs. By December 2018, there were 4,500 NGOs registered with Iraq’s Federal NGO Directorate, up from 3,154 in 2017, while in Kurdistan, there were 4,002 NGOs registered with the NGO Directorate, up from 3,011 in 2017. However, the majority of these organizations are inactive. New policies and mechanisms to facilitate registration, discussed further below, may help explain the substantial increase in registered NGOs from 2017 to 2018. In addition to
The 2018 CSO Sustainability Index for Iraq

NGOs, the CSO sector also includes unions and syndicates. The majority of CSOs work on the provision of humanitarian aid and relief-related services.\(^a\)

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.6**

The legal environment for CSOs remained challenging in 2018. While KRG authorities continued to impose some extralegal processes and requirements on CSOs in parts of IKR, both regional and federal governments took new measures to facilitate CSOs’ legal registration and operation.

Three main laws govern CSOs in Iraq and IKR. The Law on Non-Governmental Organizations (No 12 of 2010) addresses the operation of NGOs in Iraq’s federal region. NGOs in IKR operate under the Kurdish Law on Non-Governmental Organizations (Law 1 of 2011). In addition, the Kurdish Law 18 of 1993 governs the operation of unions and syndicates in IKR. (There is no federal law for unions and syndicates.) The Federal NGO Directorate is charged with implementing Law 12, while the Kurdish NGO Directorate implements Law 1. The competencies of the two directorates include overseeing NGOs’ registration, supporting the empowerment of NGOs, and managing relations between NGOs and the government.

In Iraq, NGOs are required by law to register before they operate. NGOs in IKR legally may operate without registering, however most donors require registration as a condition of funding. NGOs that are registered in IKR must also register with the Federal NGO Directorate in Baghdad if they want to operate throughout Iraq. Additionally, following IKR’s referendum on Kurdish independence, it became mandatory in 2018 for Kurdish NGOs in Kirkuk and other disputed territories to either register with the Federal NGO Directorate or leave the area. Many Kurdish NGOs left Kirkuk and other disputed areas as a result, either because they did not want to register in Baghdad or the registration process was too burdensome.

NGOs have historically faced various challenges when seeking to register either in Baghdad or Erbil. In 2018, however, the Federal NGO Directorate and Kurdistan’s NGO Directorate both provided additional services to facilitate NGOs’ registration and make the process easier. For instance, Kurdistan’s NGO Directorate created a new online registration service that would allow NGOs to submit their documents electronically without having to visit the NGO Directorate in Erbil; the service was set to launch in early 2019. The Federal NGO Directorate in Baghdad, meanwhile, provided visa services in its office to ensure that international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) were able to register and operate more easily.

While these measures improved the registration process for many CSOs, other challenges remained. As in previous years, for instance, some organizations in IKR were asked to provide documentation beyond what is required by law, such as security forms filled out by their employees along with their employees’ photos and information about their families. Kurdistan’s NGO Directorate also directed some NGOs to renew their registration, even though the law provides that NGOs need only register once. When the Peace and Freedom Organization (PFO) sought to implement a project in 2018 to provide psychosocial support for people in Mosul, the Department of Health required the organization to complete an additional registration process. Registration for INGOs in Kurdistan continued to be more complex than for local organizations, as the process requires not only approval by Kurdistan’s NGO Directorate, but also the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Interior.

Officials’ practices in administering the laws governing CSOs remained largely unchanged in 2018. The NGO directorates in both Baghdad and Erbil have templates for NGOs to use when submitting annual financial and activity reports, and will not accept reports using different templates.

The coordination boards established by KRG in 2014 to coordinate the use of international funds and harmonize the delivery of humanitarian aid continued to create additional requirements for CSOs in 2018. For instance, all
CSOs seeking to operate in liberated areas had to obtain official permission letters from the Joint Crisis Coordination Centers (JCCC) before they could enter those areas. The organization Al-Mesalla, which is registered both in Baghdad and Erbil, had to renew its permission letter at the JCCC in Erbil every fifteen days in order to enter and operate in Mosul and the Nineveh Plains.

Some CSOs faced harassment by government officials in 2018, with those involved in public demonstrations being most likely to experience problems. CSOs that led major demonstrations in Baghdad, Basra, Sulaymaniyah, and Erbil, for instance, suffered a range of consequences. Authorities from the security and intelligence agencies closed the offices of the CSO Enough, and arrested the leaders of other organizations; other CSOs lost partnership agreements with government bodies. In general, organizations working on freedom of expression and other human rights issues, and those without connections to major political parties, tend to face the most harassment.

CSO representatives and activists are also subject to attacks by non-state actors, who often act with impunity. In 2018, for instance, three prominent human rights defenders were assassinated: Iqbal Muradi, a member of the Kurdistan Human Rights Group, was killed in Sulaymaniyah; Dr. Alaa Mashthob Abboud, journalist and member of the Society for Peace and Solidarity, was killed in Karbala; and Su’ad Al-Ali, a vocal human rights defender and a protest leader, was killed in Basra. The government did not arrest or charge a single suspect in any of these cases. Such incidents have had a chilling effect on organizations working on rights issues and other sensitive areas.

The Iraqi federal NGO law provides that organizations with a “public utility” purpose are exempt from paying income taxes, value-added tax (VAT), customs duties, and sales taxes. NGOs must apply to the Council of Ministers in order to obtain public utility status. IKR’s law by contrast grants tax and customs exemptions to all NGOs, their funds, and properties. Pursuant to Decision No. 4698 issued in November 2017, however, if the employees of an NGO in IKR fail to pay their income taxes, the NGO must pay them or face cancellation of their registration.

CSOs do not have access to lawyers trained on the laws that affect them. The lack of legal aid adds to the difficulties some organizations face when trying to register. The Reform Institute for Development (RID) in Kurdistan and Yaqeen Organization in Diyala, for instance, attempted to register but were unable to do so because they did not have sufficient legal expertise and could not afford a lawyer to assist with the process.

The organizational capacity of CSOs remained stable in 2018. The majority of the NGOs registered with GOI and KRG are not active and exist in name only. Only a small share—fewer than one-fifth—submit their annual reports to the NGO directorates, as required by law.

In many cases, organizations that receive grants from international donors also receive capacity-building training and support. For instance, the USAID-funded Al-Musharaka program, which ended in 2018, as well as the Takamul program, launched in 2017 and continuing in 2018, both included opportunities for CSOs to develop their organizational capacities.

Most active organizations seek to identify and cultivate connections with existing and potential beneficiaries. The Ronahi Organization, which was registered in Erbil in 2018, built relationships with beneficiaries through aid distribution; the organization collected donations from host communities and public authorities, which it then distributed among IDPs and refugees.

Other areas of organizational capacity remain challenged across the sector. Strategic planning remains the exception among CSOs. Generally, only organizations with many years’ experience and strong institutional structures, such as Al-Messala, PFO, and PAO, have and adhere to strategic plans.
Few CSOs formalize decision-making and other processes in their internal policies. In most cases, an organization’s director controls decision making. Only a small number of CSOs have internal policies such as those regarding transparency, corruption, and risk management. Al-Amal Association, Al-Mesalla, Barzani Charity Foundation, Public Aid Organization (PAO), and PFO are some of the organizations that had these policies in 2018. Nor have CSO widely adopted democratic processes for determining new boards of directors: Al-Amal Association, PAO, and PFO are among the very few that hold elections for this purpose. The majority of CSOs also lack clearly defined management structures or job descriptions that clearly denote responsibilities among staff members.

Staff turnover remains high at most CSOs, as employees regularly move on to other organizations that can offer better or more regular pay. Older, more well-established CSOs like Barzani Charity Foundation, PAO, Al-Amal Association, and Rwanga generally have an easier time retaining personnel, and are able to pay their staff even if they experience funding gaps. A number of informal, volunteer-based, and volunteerism-promoting groups such as Wasi Tasl, Ninewa Awalan, and Sahl Al-Taaxi were established in 2018. While no definitive numbers exist, there appeared to be more of such groups in 2018 than in prior years, particularly in areas liberated from Islamic State like Mosul and Diyala where the government was unable to adequately provide crucial public services. While operating almost exclusively on volunteer labor, many of these informal groups hope to ultimately establish formal, registered NGOs.

The majority of Iraqi CSOs do not have professional accountants, information technology (IT) managers, or media officers. On the other hand, in their day-to-day work most organizations benefit from internet access and basic modern office equipment. An estimated 50 percent of Iraqis have internet access, and accordingly many CSOs rely on social media and communications platforms such as Facebook Messenger, Viber, WhatsApp, and YouTube to raise their profiles, publicize their activities, and connect with their constituents.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.4**

The sector’s financial viability improved slightly in 2018. Funding from foreign donors served as the sole source of income for many CSOs, and donors funding development activities generally maintained or increased their financial support for CSOs in 2018. The German Development Agency GIZ, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), and the U.S. Government all provided more funds in 2018 than in 2017. INGOs like Un Ponte Per (UPP), an Italian organization, also gave grants to local CSOs in Iraq. UN Women funded the Tajdid Iraq Foundation to implement a new project providing mental health services, training, and capacity development to women in IDP camps and host communities. On the other hand, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), donor funds to INGOs and local CSOs for humanitarian aid decreased significantly, from a total of $45.6 million (including $7 million directly to local groups) in 2017 to $24.2 million (including just $3.2 million for local groups) in 2018.

Some organizations including Al-Mesalla, PAO, and PFO collect fees from their members. Membership fees generally do not contribute significantly to organizations’ revenues, however. Organizations conduct fundraising drives to collect cash and in-kind donations from their communities, as well. In 2018, for instance, a few organizations collected clothes for IDPs and refugees. In general, local donations—including religious giving, or zakat—do not constitute a major source of funding for CSOs.

As in previous years, a few organizations undertook or maintained income-generating projects that contributed to their sustainability in 2018. For example, Al-Amal Association maintained a hospital that charges its patients small fees; Aufuq Organization in Kirkuk rented out an event hall; and Civil Development Organization (CDO) operated a restaurant.
Partnerships and funding from the local private sector remained relatively constant, as well, and enjoyed by only a few organizations. For instance, the company Asia Cell supported CDO, and KAR company supported Barzani Charity Foundation. In some of these cases, the organization has a personal connection with the business or company. Neither the Iraqi federal or Kurdish governments provided support to CSOs beyond the funds given to a few select CSOs affiliated with the main political parties.

Most CSOs continue to have difficulty with the management of their finances and do not have sound financial management systems in place. Older organizations are generally more successful at developing their financial systems, as they are more likely to have the funds and support from foreign donors to do so. CSOs rarely audit their financial accounts, nor do they regularly publish annual reports or statements unless so required by foreign donors.

**ADVOCACY: 3.5**

CSOs continued to advocate for a range of issues, with the space for advocacy and CSOs’ engagement in campaigns expanding compared to prior years. In one campaign, CSOs including Al-Amal Association, Tammuz Organization for Social Development, and PFO successfully worked with political leaders to amend Iraq’s federal electoral law to reduce the minimum age required to hold office to twenty-five. This campaign aimed to ensure that youth are represented in the Iraqi Representative Council. The amendments to the electoral law were adopted in mid-May, before the elections took place.

Kurdish CSOs including the Kurdish Institute for Elections, Stop Organization, Reform Institute for Development, and PFO, collaborated with members of the Kurdish parliament and decision makers in an effort to amend the regional demonstration law. Among other desired changes, the CSOs sought to amend provisions requiring advance approval from the government and security forces before individuals could gather and demonstrate. While parliament did not amend the law in 2018, the campaign succeeded in building a strong coalition and fostering cooperative relations with key parliamentarians. Organizations also advocated around issues of government practice and implementation. For instance, some CSOs campaigned for the government to fully implement the Kurdistan region’s access to information law. PFO continued a signature collection campaign in IKR, first begun in 2017, to urge the government to implement laws related to freedom of expression.

Certain CSOs continued to advocate around the rights of minority and marginalized groups in Iraq and IKR. For example, projects such as We Are All Citizens (led by PAX and its partners), and the Minority Coalition (led by the US Institute of Peace in partnership with local NGOs) were ongoing in 2018, and included advocacy for increased civic participation by minorities as well as youth and women. Participants in the We Are All Citizens project also produced a draft law on the protection of minorities’ rights in Iraq, though it had not been passed by the end of the year.

CSOs also lobbied decision makers to stop restrictive draft laws from being passed by the Iraqi Representative Council. For instance, the Iraqi Observatory for Human Rights and the Iraqi Network for Social Media successfully helped to table a draft law on cybercrimes, which contained provisions that would unduly restrict freedom of expression. Civil society efforts also continued to target a problematic domestic violence draft law that lacked sufficient protections for women and girls; among other things, the draft law would permit the marriage of girls as young as age nine. In 2018, CSOs including Baghdad Women Association, Iraqi Women’s Journalist Forum, and Al-Mesalla joined a campaign to prevent the passage of the draft law by the Iraqi Representative Council.

Beyond direct advocacy and lobbying efforts, CSOs also engaged in public information campaigns. For instance, the organizations Metro Center, PFO, and Stop each issued a report about access to information in IKR, the status of freedom of expression, and violations taking place against journalists and media outlets. The organizations
disseminated the reports widely to other CSOs, media outlets, members of parliament, activists, journalists, and academics.

As in prior years, organizations that engaged in advocacy—particularly those who advocated around sensitive issues such as women’s rights and freedom of expression—faced instances of threats and harassment. CSOs persisted in such advocacy efforts nonetheless.

CSOs continued to use social media in advocacy and awareness-raising campaigns to educate the public on issues ranging from women’s rights, minority rights, civil and political rights, and the environment. For instance, the Iraqi Social Forum and Kurdistan Social Forum both use social media as part of their advocacy and awareness-raising campaigns, and the Facebook page Yalla, run by a group of Kurdish youth, has become a very well-known social media platform for raising awareness on issues including women’s rights, freedom of expression, the right to access information, environmental protection, and education. Most social campaigns are not financially supported, and instead rely on volunteer labor.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.5**

CSOs continued to provide a variety of goods and services in 2018. While the majority of organizations work on humanitarian and relief services, a number of CSOs also provide services related to longer-term development. CSOs’ provision of services in the liberated areas helped facilitate the return of IDPs to their homes.

Local CSOs use a variety of tools to ensure that the goods and services they provide meet the needs of their constituencies and target beneficiaries. Some organizations use Participatory Rural Appraisals (PRA), others use baseline research and community dialogues, and sometimes organizations collaborate with private companies to carry out assessments. Many local CSOs’ service provision targets vulnerable populations. In Diyala province, Yaqeen Organization provides basic assistance and other services for blind individuals.

In 2018, the priorities of some international donors shifted from supporting relief and humanitarian projects to longer-term, traditional development projects. Some donors also sought to support projects related to post-conflict reconciliation. For instance, PAX and UPP supported local CSO partners in Mosul and Nineveh plain, including PFO, Al-Mesalla, Water Keeper Organization, Solidarity Center, Maluma Center, Tammuz Organization for Social Development, Masarat, and Mauja Organization, to implement peacebuilding and reconciliation projects, including the delivery of training and capacity-building services. Such projects were more common in 2018, after the liberation of Mosul.

The law allows CSOs to generate income for their nonprofit purposes, however the common public understanding is that CSOs exist to help people and not to make money, so most organizations provide their goods and services for free. PAO at one point provided health services for people in Kalar and charged a token fee, but found that the fee discouraged peoples’ use of the services. In most cases, donors’ funds cover the cost of CSOs’ goods and services, so that beneficiaries do not have to pay for them.

Iraq ranked 168 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index. The high level of corruption within different parts of government limits the state’s ability to provide basic services, which increases the public’s demand for services provided by CSOs. At the same time, some CSOs were involved in corruption cases in 2018, however the organizations’ names were not reported publicly.

Government entities generally—but particularly the ministries of education, health, and municipality—have positive relationships with CSOs that provide goods and services, and appreciate the role such CSOs play. For example, the Ministry of Education in the Kurdistan region publicly recognized and lauded efforts by PAO and the Minority Alliance (an alliance of CSOs) as part of their partnership with the ministry. The organizations worked with the
ministry on efforts ranging from changing public school curricula, providing informal education, and awareness-raising campaigns.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.1**

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector improved slightly in 2018. While there is still a lack of local resource centers and local grant-making organizations, a number of international organizations provided support and resources for their local partners. International organizations like PAX, NPA, UPP, and USAID, for instance, regularly share information with local CSOs about available grants and trainings. The NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq (NCCI), which was established by the Iraqi government, provides similar information and resources to CSOs.

Various networks and alliances of CSOs, including the Iraqi Civil Society Solidarity Initiative (ICSSI), Minority Alliance, and Al-Raqeeb Network, were active in 2018. In addition, the Iraqi Social Forum and Kurdistan Social Forum convened CSOs working on issues such as the environment, women’s rights, IDPs and refugees, and minorities. Some of these networks provide support for local NGOs. For instance, ICSSI provides financial and non-financial supports to local NGOs like Al-Mesalla and Solidarity Center.

Local CSOs benefit from trainings organized by international partners. For example, in 2018, NPA organized various trainings for its local partner CSOs on monitoring and evaluation processes. The supply of trainings is insufficient to meet demand, however. The majority of trainings take place in major cities like Erbil and Baghdad, where most trainers live; training sessions are rarely organized outside of such cities. Security concerns also mean that it is not possible to organize trainings in some areas. For instance, Al-Mesalla was not able to organize a training in Diyala province because no trainers were willing to travel there because of the security situation. Most training materials are available in Arabic but few are available in Kurdish.

CSOs continued to engage in partnerships with other sectors in 2018. CSOs collaborated with the Ministries of Labor and Social Affairs in Baghdad, for instance, to draft and pass a law for social insurance for workers. CSOs like Al-Amal Association, Tammuz Organization for Social Development, and PFO also worked with lawmakers in 2018 to amend the Iraqi election law, in order to lower the minimum age of candidates to twenty-five. NPA carried out a project with its local partners in nine provinces that focused on partnerships between CSOs and local authorities.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.9**

The image of the CSO sector improved slightly in 2018, particularly among the media and the public. Stronger relationships with media outlets helped CSOs to have greater visibility and increased media coverage. Some organizations also have their own media outlets, which allows them to cover not only their own activities, but also the activities of other CSOs. For instance, Zang Organization in Halbja, Women Empowerment Organization in Erbil, and PFO have their own radio stations.

The public perception of CSOs also improved due to the positive role organizations have played in social cohesion, peacebuilding, and reconciliation. In general, people residing in disputed areas have a more positive perception of CSOs than those in other parts of the country, because the CSOs have provided services to them and played a vital role in rebuilding their communities after they were liberated from Islamic State. According to research conducted in 2018 by Al-Mesalla and PFO, for instance, people in Diyala province trusted CSOs more than the
government and political parties to facilitate peace. The quantity and quality of CSOs’ activities also generally improved and increased in 2018, as the security and political situation enabled CSOs to carry out more activities while donors required that the activities were carefully designed and monitored for effectiveness; these developments helped improve the sector’s reputation as well.

Some CSOs were also able to develop stronger relationships with government entities, particularly by offering trainings. For instance, Al-Amal Association trained employees of the Ministry of Education in Baghdad, PAO trained employees of the NGOs Directorate in IKR, and RID trained employees of the IKR’s Commission of Integrity. In December, the Iraqi government issued a letter to the provincial council in each province, directing the local authorities to develop strategies to coordinate and collaborate more closely with CSOs. The letter, which noted that CSO-government cooperation would aid transparency and counter corruption, helped pave the way for CSOs to work more closely with the local authorities to implement projects and conduct activities in the future.

Both the IKR and federal NGO laws require that registered NGOs submit annual reports to their respective NGO Directorates. However, fewer than 500 organizations submitted reports to both the Kurdistan and Federal NGO Directorates in 2018.
Economic challenges, political volatility, and security concerns shaped the landscape for CSOs in Jordan in 2018. Despite new and ongoing obstacles, however, the overall sustainability of the CSO sector remained constant. Two dimensions—legal environment and financial viability—deteriorated during the year, while another two—advocacy and public image—improved.

Jordanians faced increasingly difficult economic conditions during the year. Unemployment was nearly 19 percent, according to the Department of Statistics. At the same time, the price of fuel increased and government subsidies for bread were removed, nearly doubling its price. By late 2018, gross public debt had risen by 4.2 percent from the prior year, according to the Ministry of Finance, reaching more than 95 percent of the country’s gross domestic product. These economic challenges reduced local funding for CSOs, especially from the private sector.

The key crossing between Jordan and Syria was reopened in October, raising hopes that returning refugees would ease the strain on the country’s infrastructure and economy, however, the change appeared to have little immediate impact. The continued presence of large refugee communities meant an ongoing need for CSOs to provide support to refugee and displaced populations.

In this context, the government’s proposal of a new income tax law—part of an International Monetary Fund program to offset the country’s budget deficit and avoid deepening crisis—sparked widespread public protests. The draft law, issued in May, would have increased taxes for most people while exempting the unemployed and extremely destitute. Jordanians gathered in large numbers in streets and public areas—despite legal restrictions on protests—to call for withdrawal of the draft law and dissolution of the government. Trade and labor associations helped organize some of the protests—reportedly even larger than protests witnessed in Jordan during the Arab Uprisings in 2011—while members of other CSOs took part. Labor groups also called for a nationwide strike to protest the draft law. Following eight straight days of protests in May, the prime minister submitted his resignation.

A new prime minister, Omar Razzaz, was sworn in soon after, promising to address Jordanians’ concerns and to withdraw the controversial draft income tax law. Nonetheless, the government introduced an amended version that remained extremely unpopular, which parliament approved in November amidst ongoing protests; it was published into law in December.

CSOs and activists also played a leading role in advocating against the government’s proposed amendments to Jordan’s 2015 law on cybercrimes, expressing concerns that the amendments would potentially restrict freedom of expression online. The government withdrew the amendments in December, but indicated that they would be revised and a new draft resubmitted to parliament.
Jordan experienced a terrorist attack and a series of natural disasters during the year. A bombing in August targeted security patrols in Fuheis. Arrests following the attack targeted what the government called a “terrorist cell” in Salt suspected of involvement. CSOs perceived an increase in security controls on their activities after the incident. In October, twenty-one people—mostly schoolchildren on a field trip—were killed in a flash flood near the Dead Sea. The Minister of Education and the Minister of Tourism submitted their resignations following the tragedy. Another flash flood struck the center and the south of the country in November, killing thirteen. The events exacerbated public distrust of the government and anger over officials’ perceived mismanagement of flood threats.

The majority of CSOs in Jordan are registered as societies under the Law on Societies (Law 51 of 2008). At the end of 2018, there were 6,051 societies registered with the Ministry of Social Development (MoSD), up from 5,718 the year before. Other CSOs register under Labor Law 8 of 1996, which along with union-specific laws regulates the work of trade unions and employers’ associations, or as civil companies under the Companies Law 22 of 1997 and the Regulation for Non-Profit Companies 73 of 2010. In 2018, the Ministry of Trade and Industry and Supply oversaw 1,143 registered civil, not-for-profit companies, and fifteen trade unions were registered with the Ministry of Labor. There are also approximately ten Royal Non-Governmental Organizations (RINGOs), which are established by special laws based on royal decrees and parliamentary endorsement, rather than registering with a particular ministry. RINGOs enjoy special access to government funding not available to other CSOs, and as a result tend to have strong organizational capacities.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.5**

The legal environment governing CSOs in Jordan, which was already impeded, deteriorated slightly in 2018 as CSOs faced increased constraints on their funding and registration.

Law 51 of 2008 remains the primary law governing most CSOs’ formation, registration, funding, and activities. Contrary to international standards, Law 51 provides that all societies must register with the Registry Council within MoSD in order to operate legally in Jordan. Informal, unregistered associations continue to be prohibited. According to the law, MoSD must respond within sixty days of receiving a registration application, or else the society is registered by default. In practice, however, organizations may have to wait a year or more to obtain confirmation of their registration. During 2018, 623 societies were registered—an increase from 467 in 2017. Nonetheless, CSOs perceived the delays and other administrative challenges to registration to be a bigger issue in 2018 than previously.

Under Law 51, societies must report to particular ministries according to their purpose. Charities report to MoSD, while cultural associations as well as youth and sports clubs report to the Ministry of Culture and Youth. A number of organizations involved in human rights and consumer and environmental protection report to the Ministry of Interior. Every registered society must submit to its relevant ministry an annual action plan; an annual report about its accomplishments and activities in the previous year; financial statements about its funding, revenues, and expenditures; and a budget approved by a certified auditor.

Law 51 provides that any society may be dissolved if it fails to conduct activities or any other work for one year or longer. A total of 290 CSOs were dissolved in 2018, though no information is available on how many dissolved voluntarily and how many were dissolved by the government.

Implementation of the laws affecting CSOs created more challenges for organizations in 2018. Certain provisions of Law 51 use vague terms that enable officials to interpret the law and impose restrictions arbitrarily. For instance, Law 51 prohibits organizations from receiving foreign funding that “violate[s] public order or morals.” In 2018, authorities also introduced new processes and procedures that impeded CSOs’ operations. For example, CSOs were newly required to obtain permits for specific activities and events. Several local and international
organizations reported that hotels—allegedly at the request of security officials—required the organizations to obtain letters of approval from the governor prior to holding trainings, private meetings, or public conferences. In forty-two reported cases, the governor denied the requests for approval, without providing an explanation, forcing the CSOs to cancel or relocate events. The organizations involved in such incidents declined to be identified out of fear of repercussions.

Security agencies also interfered in the work of CSOs, for example by increasing the number of approvals required to carry out events outside Amman, and requiring CSOs to notify the head of the governorate where events were planned to take place. In some cases, security and intelligence officials attended CSO events without identifying themselves or remotely surveilled organizations’ public meetings.

CSOs continued to face legal and administrative obstacles when trying to obtain funding. A 1957 regulation requires CSOs to obtain approval from MoSD before they may collect donations from the public. In addition, they may only conduct public fundraising in the country twice a year. In order to receive funding from outside of Jordan or from a non-Jordanian, Law 51 likewise requires organizations to apply for and obtain approval from the Council of Ministers. While the law requires the Council of Ministers to provide a response to the foreign funding request within thirty days, the deadline is rarely followed. In 2018, MoSD instituted a new, automated system for CSOs to submit and track their funding requests. However, delays in receiving responses continued. By the end of August, MoSD had received more than 5,700 applications but approved only 190 of them. Delays in the ministry’s approval may result in a foreign donor withdrawing the funding or requiring the CSO to implement funded projects within shorter periods of time, affecting their value or impact.

Some funding requests may also require approval from the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, the Ministry of Political Development, and the Ministry of Interior (MoI). In some cases, the General Intelligence Directorate within MoI summons a CSO’s representatives to question them about the funding. Receipt of funding to be used in activities for Syrian refugees requires additional permission from the Jordan Response Information System for the Syria Crisis (JORISS).

The government pursued charges against CSOs and activists for alleged foreign funding violations. Jordan’s public prosecutor brought charges against Nidal Mansour, the director of the Center for Defending Freedom of Journalists (CDFJ), on grounds of improperly receiving foreign funding and other financial irregularities. Mansour was convicted in June and sentenced to a year in prison, but an appeals court overturned the verdict in November.

Potential new legal constraints on CSOs’ speech and expression online also emerged in 2018. The government considered draft amendments to Jordan’s 2015 cybercrime law that raised significant concerns among CSOs and activists about their potential impact on freedom of expression online. The amendments introduced a vague and overly broad definition of “hate speech,” for instance, which could be applied to internet communication regardless of whether it was intended to incite hatred or harm or pose a threat. The amendments also proposed criminal penalties for hate speech, which would have made it possible for authorities to detain for up to one month anyone suspected of disseminating hate speech online. Some CSOs feared that this measure would be used to target government opponents, activists, and human rights defenders. While the government withdrew the draft amendments in December, officials pledged to revise and resubmit them to parliament in subsequent weeks. Even in the absence of the restrictive cybercrime law amendments, several activists were arrested for opinions shared on social media in 2018, such as comments on government corruption.

As noted above, Jordan adopted a new income tax law in 2018. Tax exemptions are limited and only granted to orphanages, associations for people with disabilities, and associations that have obtained status as “public interest” organizations. Other CSOs are not categorically exempt from paying taxes, and are subject to sales tax and tax on certain forms of income-generating activities. Sadaqa, a Jordanian CSO supported by the International Labor Organization (ILO) to advance gender equality in the workplace, reviewed the new tax bill and issued a legal paper arguing that the government should provide more enabling tax benefits for CSOs and tax incentives for CSO employers who offer certain benefits.

The law does not limit CSOs’ ability to earn income by providing goods and services. Many organizations charge nominal fees for the services they provide, such as trainings and health services. CSOs are also allowed to compete for government contracts. MoSD, for instance, has contracts with the Justice Center to provide legal services for caregivers; the Princess Taghrid Institute, a RINGO, to provide shelter to the poor; and Al Aman Fund to provide education and vocational training services. The ministry also has contracts with CSOs to staff centers for people with disabilities.

The 2018 CSO Sustainability Index for Jordan
It remained difficult for CSOs to access lawyers trained in the CSO legal framework. A decline in foreign funding in 2018 further limited the availability of legal services throughout the country because many of the programs providing such services rely directly or indirectly on foreign funds.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.4**

The organizational capacity of CSOs remained unchanged in 2018.

CSOs generally have clearly defined constituencies. In 2018, trade and labor unions were particularly successful in building their grassroots support and reaching constituencies beyond their memberships. Unions managed, for instance, to successfully organize a general strike across the country to protest the new income tax bill, with the participation of most union members as well as other supporters. Other kinds of CSOs expanded their support by working through other organizations. For example, the CSO Ahel helps train other groups on community outreach and organizing, and the National Campaign for Students’ Rights (Thab7toona) built the capacity of participating CSOs to be leading advocates for college and university students.

The organizational capacity of CSOs often correlates to their size and location. Larger organizations, particularly those located in Amman, tend to have greater organizational capacities than smaller organizations outside the capital. Most large organizations, for instance, have five-year strategic plans and clearly defined missions. In contrast, a smaller organization may only have a mission or a general vision, and is less likely to define its objectives and link them to its own sustainable development goals. Smaller organizations also tend to lack technical skills in reporting, preparation of project proposals, and legal experience. Even those organizations that have strategic plans have difficulty implementing them, however, due to the constant efforts they must devote to fundraising.

Both Law 51 and the Regulation for Non-Profit Companies require organizations to have governing bodies and general assemblies. CSOs registered under Law 51 are also required to appoint a legal advisor as well as an auditor, and the roles of these persons must be clear. For many CSOs, internal management depends on particular individuals rather than a team. Further, many small associations—particularly outside Amman—are composed primarily of family members or friends, making conflicts of interest more likely to arise. CSOs generally also lack strong policies and procedures regarding the hiring of women, minorities, and people with disabilities.

In 2018, some international donors stopped funding projects in Jordan altogether, while others reduced their grantmaking, leading to the loss of many jobs in the CSO sector. Larger organizations were better able to weather these challenges, and continue to be more likely to be able to afford full-time staff including specialized professionals such as information technology (IT) managers and accountants. Insufficient funding led some CSOs to restructure their operations and alter their activities in order to sustain themselves. For instance, CSOs that had been focused on providing relief services to refugee populations shifted to working on the longer-term needs of such communities, such as economic and educational empowerment. The decline in foreign funding in 2018 also contributed to a reduction in the modernization of basic office equipment and software within the CSO sector.

While most CSOs have basic technology such as computers and software, internet access, and cell phones, CSO staff would benefit from training and the development of skills in the use of certain office and financial management applications.
FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.4

The financial viability of the CSO sector declined in 2018, with reductions in both local and foreign sources of funding.

CSOs of all sizes continued to lack diversity in their funding sources. Local funding for CSOs—particularly from the private sector—declined in 2018 in tandem with Jordan’s growing economic challenges. Private sector funding tends to go primarily to RINGOs, and not to organizations involved in rights issues or advocacy activities. Some churches and other religious institutions, including Caritas Jordan and the Islamic Center, provide funds to CSOs. The royal court also provides some funding to small CSOs through royal initiatives to finance development programs and services. In 2018 these included, for instance, CSOs’ installation of solar panels and income-generating projects.

The government offers very limited financial support to certain CSOs to cover their basic costs. The majority of RINGOs receive more government funding than other CSOs. There are no official figures on the amount of government funding that goes to CSOs, but it is believed to have declined in 2018.

Foreign funding for CSOs declined sharply in 2018. While no official numbers exist, CSOs across the sector indicated that major international donors including the European Union (EU), Oxfam, and UK Aid Direct decreased their support for CSO-led initiatives in Jordan. Large CSOs and those located in Amman continued to receive the largest share of foreign funds. Experts believe this is because such organizations are better able to demonstrate sufficient capacity to implement projects and to satisfy donors’ requirements around governance and transparency.

Some CSOs continued to receive funds through membership fees. CSOs involved in service delivery may also charge nominal fees for the services they provide.

All CSOs are required by law to submit financial and administrative reports to the ministries to which they report. Large organizations also submit financial reports to their boards of directors and donors.

ADVOCACY: 4.9

CSO advocacy improved in 2018 as CSOs engaged in numerous advocacy campaigns and achieved some successes.

Organizations are generally able to communicate with law and policy makers at all levels of government. Beginning in mid-2018, CSOs’ access to lawmakers and decisionmakers increased somewhat under the newly appointed government of Prime Minister Razzaz. In December, for instance, Razzaz met with CSO representatives as well as activists and journalists to discuss the government’s vision for the coming two years. During the meeting, Himam (a coalition of CSOs) and other rights organizations lobbied for the withdrawal of the draft amendments to the cybercrimes law, and brought to the prime minister’s attention the difficulties faced by CSOs in obtaining funding approvals. CSOs also used the meeting to discuss other priorities, including expanding the role of youth and women in public life, enhancing human rights and freedoms, and ending
administrative detention. In an example of more formalized communication, following protests against the draft income tax law, the government organized meetings in all governorates with representatives of local CSOs to discuss their views of the bill.

One of the most significant and visible advocacy campaigns by CSOs in 2018 focused on the income tax law. Formal organizations worked together with informal social movements to protest the deeply unpopular drafts of the law. Labor unions such as the Jordanian Engineers Association and Jordan Medical Association were particularly successful in organizing demonstrations and a nationwide strike to protest the draft, while other CSOs organized social media campaigns. Nonetheless, the role of formal organizations was somewhat limited, which some in civil society indicated was due to CSOs’ inability to form effective coalitions.

Rights-focused CSOs played a leading role in advocating against restrictive draft amendments to Jordan’s 2015 cybercrime law. Both Jordanian organizations like Transparency International - Jordan and international groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch criticized the proposed amendments for their potential to infringe on freedom of expression online. Following a CSO-led campaign that included a social media drive demanding withdrawal of the amendments, dissemination of legal analyses highlighting the amendments’ deficiencies, and the meeting with the prime minister discussed above, the government withdrew the amendments in December.

CSOs also engaged in lobbying and advocacy around gender issues in Jordan’s labor laws. CSOs Ahel and Sadaqa among others, in partnership with the ILO, advocated for amendments to the labor laws that would address maternity and paternity leave, childcare at the workplace, and pay equity. Committees in both houses of parliament had approved some of the amendments by the end of 2018. Additionally, in September, the Minister of Planning and International Cooperation pledged that the country would take concrete action to end pay inequity between men and women.

CSOs also actively engaged in a campaign to regain ownership of the Baqoura and Ghumar territories, which Jordan had leased to Israel as part of the 1994 peace treaty. Trade unions and other CSOs launched a campaign and large-scale protests to end the special land arrangement. The campaign was ultimately successful, and King Abdullah II decided in October to return the territories to Jordanian control.

CSOs engaged in other initiatives to shape public policy and legislation, including a movement to protest increasing fuel prices, called Park and Turn Off, and one to protest the growing cost of electricity. These movements were largely led by informal groups through social media. Some CSOs carried out robust advocacy at the local level, among the governorates and municipalities, as well. For instance, the Jordan branch of the Sisterhood is Global Institute (SIGI-Jordan) launched awareness-raising campaigns about underage marriage in communities in the Northern governorates of Jordan, where early marriage is the most common.

Beyond their advocacy related to the draft amendments to cybercrime law, CSOs were not involved in significant efforts to improve the legal framework affecting CSOs.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.7**

CSOs’ service provision remained stable in 2018. More than 760,000 Syrian and 67,000 Iraqi refugees resided in Jordan in late 2018, according to the UN Refugee Agency, and CSOs continued providing critical services to these populations. During the year many CSOs shifted their services for refugees from short-term relief to long-term services with a greater focus on economic empowerment, health, and education.

CSOs increasingly provide less-traditional services, such as educating communities about renewable energy and installing solar panels. CSOs also provide legal services and in 2018 played a significant role in defending individuals who were arrested during protests against the income tax bill.

The services provided by CSOs continue to respond to donors’ agendas, and often do not reflect local communities’ needs. For instance, the need to create job opportunities for youth is one of the most pressing needs in all governorates, however, only a small share of CSO services focus on training for employment. For instance, the program Passport to Success, supported by the International Youth Foundation, offers life and job skills training, career guidance, and entrepreneurship support for young people.
The government sometimes contracts with CSOs for services. For example, in 2018, the Ministry of Development signed an agreement with Sakeena Association and Princess Taghrid Institute for Development and Training, under which the CSOs would help orphans who were leaving homes supervised by the Ministry to transition to independent living arrangements.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.0**

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector remained weak and did not improve in 2018.

CSOs benefit somewhat from the services of intermediary support organizations (ISOs), which primarily comprise large RINGOs, such as King Hussein Foundation, the Noor Al Hussein Foundation, the Jordan River Foundation, the Jordanian Hashemite Fund, the King Abdullah Fund for Development, and the Crown Prince Foundation. The support role of RINGOs diminished somewhat in 2018 along with the decline in foreign funding on which RINGOs heavily rely. Nonetheless, RINGOs continued to provide support to local groups in 2018, such as training for the employees of small CSOs on project implementation. In Jordan, smaller organizations tend to be better placed to identify target groups in local communities, and may help link these groups to ISOs and other large CSOs that have the funds and capacity to assist them.

CSO coalitions remained rare in 2018, with organizations tending instead to work together on an ad hoc, time-limited basis. As one example, a group of seventy organizations including local CSOs, INGOs, and donors, convened in February to work together to build the advocacy capacity of national, local, and community-based groups in Jordan. ACTED organized the meeting, called the Advocacy and Civil Society Forum, and the participants agreed on necessary steps to strengthen local advocacy, though it is unclear how many remained engaged throughout the year. No significant new alliances or coalitions formed during the year, nor were existing coalitions especially active. The seventeen CSO members of Himam, which was established in 2015, meet periodically to coordinate their positions and activities to enhance democratic values, human rights, and sustainable development and to empower and support CSOs.

CSOs also rarely engage in intersectoral partnerships with the private sector, government, or media, despite the potential benefits such partnerships provide. The impact of economic challenges on the private sector in 2018, in particular, limited businesses’ ability to support and partner with CSOs.

While CSOs receive funding primarily from international donors or the government, there are a few local grant-making organizations that provide resources to CSOs. These grant-makers are largely RINGOs, and often receive their grant-making funds from foreign and international donors. Most grants that they provide go to local organizations that focus on economic empowerment and fighting poverty.
No umbrella organization provides the overall sector with information or facilitates dialogue across issue areas. A knowledge platform called Share-Net, however, created by Jordan’s Higher Population Council, provides CSOs with access to information relevant to sexual and reproductive health. Share-Net updated its website platform in 2018 to include links to research centers and academic institutions, as well as a database of studies and research in the fields of population, development, and family planning.

CSOs’ access to training declined in 2018, as the foreign funds that largely support such training decreased. In one rare example, the Jordan River Foundation, through the Tamkeenoha initiative funded by the Royal Hashemite Court, held a training for the Allan Charitable Society in Balqa. The training aimed to build the capacity of the Society’s governing body, including through training on financial and project management.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.5**

The public image of civil society improved slightly in 2018, as CSOs’ activities received greater and more positive media coverage. Both private and public media provided significant coverage of events involving CSOs during the year, including the protests against the draft income tax law as well as the government’s meetings with CSO representatives and activists. Special broadcasting time was dedicated to these events, and media outlets generally portrayed CSOs’ involvement in a positive light. An important development in media coverage of CSOs in 2018 was the launch of Kingdom TV, an independent channel that devotes substantial time to human rights issues and includes programs featuring social dialogue. Kingdom TV regularly hosts CSO representatives and discusses issues of interest for CSOs. The news website 7iber and Al-Ghad Newspaper also cover social issues more than other outlets. On the other hand, some media channels help distort the image of CSOs by presenting critical views of the sector. In addition, some journalists do not have sufficient expertise on CSO issues, which can lead to inaccuracies in their coverage, like using the wrong terminology.

Although media remains an important change agent in Jordan, most organizations do not have a coherent strategy to engage the media to advance their objectives. Some CSOs intentionally build relationships with journalists and other media figures in order to increase coverage of their activities. Some CSOs pay for coverage by private media, which attracts a wider viewership. CSOs increasingly turn to social media to cover their activities and events that affect them, as well as to promote their image.

The public perception of CSOs remained mixed in 2018. The public generally holds a high opinion of well-known RINGOs like Tkiyet Um Ali and Al Hussein Cancer Center. On the other hand, some portion of the public continues to be concerned that CSOs implement foreign agendas or misuse the funds they receive.

The government likewise has a mixed approach to supporting and regulating the CSO sector. In 2018, the government registered hundreds of new CSOs. Yet officials exert control over CSOs’ activities by requiring activity permits, and arrested activists for posts shared on social media that did not align with the government’s position. CSOs enjoy a relatively stronger relationship with the private sector, though businesses tend to be more supportive of RINGOs than other kinds of organizations.

CSOs have not adopted a single code of conduct across the sector. In 2018, however, the civil society coalition Himam prepared a code of conduct to govern the sector and distributed it among its member organizations.
In 2018, Lebanese civil society contended with parliamentary elections, the ongoing needs of Syrian and other refugee communities, and continued restrictions on freedom of expression.

Voters elected a new parliament in May 2018. The elections, originally slated for 2013 but postponed several times, were the first to be based on Lebanon’s new electoral law, adopted in 2017. While the electoral results did not reflect major changes, the list of 976 registered candidates included an unprecedented 113 women—eighty-six of whom made it onto candidate lists—and a significant number of civil society representatives. Civil society also played a significant role in monitoring the elections. The Supervising Commission for Electoral Campaigns included Sylvana Lakkis, the founder of the Lebanese Physical Handicapped Union, as the representative of civil society.

CSOs observed violations of the electoral law that included candidates’ unlimited spending and an imbalance of media appearances for different candidates.

Lebanon continued to host a massive refugee population. In the absence of significant relief efforts by the government, local CSOs continued to play a substantial role in providing relief and assistance to refugee communities in areas including health care, education, and job training. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), roughly 950,000 registered Syrian refugees resided in Lebanon in December 2018, a slight decline from 2017. However, the government continued to estimate the total number of refugees—registered and undocumented—as more than 1.5 million, in a country with a total population of 6.8 million. In 2018, the government developed a new policy aiming to facilitate the return of Syrian refugees to Syria, despite concerns expressed by local CSOs as well as UNHCR about the risks they would face upon their return.

Civil society reported continued challenges to freedom of expression in Lebanon. Reporters Without Borders indicated that Lebanon’s global ranking for 2018 declined with regard to freedom of the press, to 101 out of 180. Maharat documented thirty-six separate violations of expressive rights, including arrests and criminal investigations of CSOs or activists based on expressive acts, and the imposition of harsh penalties—particularly for online posts that criticized public officials. In response to the rising number of such incidents, civil society actors and activists organized a spontaneous public protest in July called Against Suppression to advocate against constraints on freedom of expression.

The overall sustainability of Lebanon’s civil society sector remained stable in 2018, though CSOs faced growing legal hurdles and harassment. Despite such challenges and the slow pace of reform, CSOs increasingly influenced the public debate in 2018, and successfully mobilized more voices around their various causes. CSOs’ increasing prominence in the public eye and their influence on public discourse also improved their public image.
The CSO sector in Lebanon is diverse, and includes groups that deliver humanitarian aid, provide relief in conflict zones and after natural disasters, advocate around public policies, monitor elections, and lead grassroots cultural and political movements. Mirroring Lebanon’s social divisions, many CSOs are organized along sectarian lines and have political affiliations. It is difficult to ascertain the total size of the CSO sector in Lebanon: Experts indicate that in 2018 there were around 14,000 organizations registered with the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities, however this number includes associative entities other than CSOs, such as political parties, clubs, and residential building committees. CSOs register with other ministries as well, according to the nature of their organizational objectives; these ministries include the Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Youth and Sports, and Ministry of Labor. None of the ministries regularly publish the number of CSOs they have registered.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.2**

The legal environment for CSOs continued to deteriorate in 2018, due largely to the government’s restrictive practices and harassment of CSOs. The Ottoman-era Law on Associations is the primary law regulating CSOs in Lebanon; it governs all kinds of organizations including political movements, unions, and syndicates. The law is relatively enabling on paper, but its provisions often become more complicated in practice. For instance, the law creates a straightforward process by which individuals seeking to establish a CSO must only notify the Ministry of Interior of the new organization’s establishment. Under the law, the Ministry must formally acknowledge the new organization by giving the founders a registration receipt, which allows them to prove the organization’s legal status to third parties, for instance in order to open bank accounts and apply for grants. The law prohibits “secret” organizations, though in practice the government does not prosecute undeclared, informal groups. As noted above, CSOs may register with other ministries, but the law does not clearly specify which kinds of organizations register with which ministry.

Despite the enabling nature of the law regarding establishment, CSOs regularly face significant delays in completing the notification process and obtaining receipts. The process has become more complicated in recent years, as the Ministry of Interior has begun requiring that relevant ministries as well as General Security review each new CSO’s notification before a receipt may be issued. In 2018, several groups of individuals reported that they were unable to legally establish CSOs. For example, Beirut Madinati, a social and political movement, submitted its notification documents in 2018 but did not receive a receipt. The process for forming a syndicate or union is even more complicated, and requires approval by the Council of Ministers.

CSOs that work on certain issues or toward certain objectives face particular difficulties becoming legally established. Groups such as Helem, which works on the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals, for instance, continued to await its notification receipt, which it filed for in 2008. The Ministry of Interior may also require changes in a CSO’s name and mission during the notification process. A CSO seeking to notify the state of its establishment in 2018 was forced to change its name from Lebanese Women in Decision Making to Lebanese Women Towards Decision Making before it received its notification receipt.

CSOs experienced increased harassment by state officials around their activities in 2018, with those organizations working on gender and sexuality facing the most overt challenges. After the Arab Foundation for Freedom and Equality (AFFE) carried out an online campaign in 2018 around sexual health, for instance, prosecutors referred the organization to the Cybercrime Bureau, which initiated an investigation of the organization. When AFFE tried to organize a regional conference on gender and sexuality entitled “Nadwa”—the eighth time the conference was to be hosted in Beirut—General Security asked the organizers to cancel the event and pressured the hotel that had planned to host it not to do so. The conference was ultimately moved to another hotel, but eight of the conference participants were barred from entering Lebanon. Organizers of Beirut Pride, an event to celebrate LGBT rights, likewise had to cancel the event after an organizer was arrested. The organizer, Hadi Damien, was
compelled to sign a pledge that he would cancel all subsequent Pride events or face criminal prosecution for promoting “debauchery” and “harming morality.” As a result of these events, some organizations working on LGBT issues—which prefer to remain anonymous—have begun moving their activities to other countries.

In 2018, numerous organizations received unscheduled visits from officials affiliated with General Security who conducted inspections and requested lists of the CSOs’ personnel. Such incidents appeared to be more frequent in 2018 than in prior years. Local CSOs such as Mosaic and AFFE, both working on gender and sexuality, the Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections (LADE), which works on elections and democracy, and Skeyes, working on protection of journalists, all received unannounced visits. Certain international NGOs (INGOs)—which preferred to remain anonymous—also reported unannounced visits.

While the law provides CSOs with exemptions from paying value-added tax (VAT), few organizations benefit from this exemption. Obtaining the exemption requires a special audit and can take up to three years. As such, generally only large and resourceful organizations have the capacity to undertake the process. Many donors including the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) agencies do not cover VAT in their grants, meaning that CSOs must cover these costs. Individuals and corporations may deduct donations made to CSOs from their overall revenue, according to Decree 144/59.

The law does not restrict CSOs’ ability to solicit and receive foreign funding, nor are there legal limitations on CSOs’ ability to conduct public fundraising. All such funds must be used to support not-for-profit activities that advance the CSOs’ missions. The law also allows CSOs to provide services for profit, and organizations increasingly do so in order to collect additional funds. These funds are considered donations, however, and must likewise support not-for-profit, mission-advancing activities.

CSOs have access to some legal expertise and assistance, but only a limited number of lawyers are sufficiently familiar with the laws and regulations that affect CSOs. The increasing complications around CSOs’ legal formation have heightened the demand for such services.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.0**

CSOs’ organizational capacity remained stable in 2018. Over the years, organizations have benefitted from exposure to training as well as the requirements of international donors related to CSOs’ internal strategies and policies. At the same time, these requirements may also create additional burdens on CSOs, particularly smaller organizations.

Most CSOs have clearly identified constituencies. CSOs maintain contact with existing constituents and try to seek out new beneficiaries and supporters through social media and other communications mechanisms. More than three-quarters of the population in Lebanon has access to the internet, according to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and CSOs leverage its use through social media such as Facebook to notify constituents of events and activities, and raise awareness about relevant news and research. Well-established, active CSOs are considered key resources on certain topics, whether for information or support, and are likely to be sought out by constituents for that reason. This is the case for organizations working on gender-based violence, torture, LGBT issues, freedom of expression, the interests of Syrian and other refugee communities, and other issues.

Few CSOs have long-term strategies. Instead, most are more focused on short-term objectives. CSOs located outside Beirut are especially likely to lack specific missions and long-term strategies.

Most active CSOs have well-established organizational structures and policies. To some extent, INGOs and donors have helped local CSOs develop their internal capacities by requiring CSOs’ policies to meet certain standards in order to qualify for grants. For small organizations, however, this may create new challenges. One
donor, for instance, asked a local CSO—which preferred to remain anonymous—to develop dozens of internal policies, requiring the CSO to seek assistance from experts on financial administration, monitoring and evaluation, and human resources. Meeting such requirements may be time-consuming and resource intensive, particularly as most major donors do not include overhead in their grants to local CSOs.

Many organizations continue to struggle with good governance. For instance, the law requires that a controller from the Ministry of Interior be present when a CSO elects its board of directors. Some organizations bribe the controller, however, and do not hold legitimate elections. There have also been instances in which CSOs present fraudulent budgets, and falsely claim that they have spent all project funds on activities, while reserving some funds for other organizational or personal use. Most CSOs provide only a minimal role for their boards of directors. It is also rare for CSOs to register with the social security department, or declare the actual salaries of their employees. In general, CSOs face no legal repercussions for their failure to practice good governance.

Maintaining full-time, qualified staff is a challenge for many CSOs. Most organizations recruit and hire staff based on project-specific funding; those personnel may be released once the project is completed. Rapid staff turnover makes it difficult for many organizations to build institutional memory. Due to staffing challenges, CSOs continue to rely heavily on volunteer labor. While high unemployment rates in Lebanon contribute to large numbers of potential volunteers, organizations are usually forced to provide a small stipend or other incentives in order to make such positions attractive. LADE, for instance, struggled to attract volunteers to monitor parliamentary elections in 2018, and had to offer transportation fees and food in order to engage sufficient volunteers.

CSOs acknowledge the importance of information and communications technologies (ICT) in their work and take advantage of technology to the extent their resources allow. In 2018, there were growing concerns about CSOs’ digital security, due to perceived surveillance of online activity by the government as well as CSOs’ vulnerability to hackers. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and mobile security firm Lookout reported in January 2018, for instance, that a major surveillance operation had been traced to a building belonging to Lebanese General Security, and that it targeted a wide range of entities and individuals including activists and journalists. Yet CSOs faced a shortage of experts familiar with the particular ICT risks CSOs face and the sometimes sensitive nature of their work.

The financial viability of CSOs remained unchanged in 2018. CSOs continue to rely primarily on foreign funding, and struggle to diversify their funding sources. Lebanon’s Syria Refugee Response and Resilience Plan (3RP), much of which is channeled through INGOs and local CSOs, remained underfunded. At the end of the year, just over $1.1 billion in funds had been granted, according to the Financial Tracking Service, while over $2.3 billion were required for the year. The US, Germany, EU, and United Kingdom remained the largest state donors to the 3RP.

As in 2017, donors’ priorities affected CSOs’ access to funds. There appeared to be greater donor interest in supporting CSO activities related to women’s rights, for instance, but less interest in activities related to freedom of expression, media rights, and transparency. In at least one case, a donor also redirected funds that had already been granted. The donor had funded a local CSO to train journalists covering conflict zones, but then asked the CSO—which preferred to remain unnamed—to cancel the project and conduct a training on social media instead. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) stopped grants to CSOs focused on supporting Palestinian students, following the end of US funding to the Agency and its resulting funding shortfall in 2018. In general, donor funds that were disbursed tended to be short- rather than long-term, and based on specific projects. This pattern of funding makes it difficult for CSOs to plan ahead and limits their overall financial viability.
In some cases in 2018, donors gave grants to INGOs that partnered with local CSOs, but the local groups felt that these arrangements often left them doing the bulk of the work while the INGO kept most of the funds to cover their overhead costs.

Funding for CSOs is built into the budgets of both national and municipal governments in Lebanon, however this support is significantly less than that provided by foreign donors. The 2018 national budget included roughly the same level of support to CSOs as the 2017 budget: over $8 million from the Ministry of Social Affairs, more than $3 million from the Ministry of Youth and Sports, as well as roughly $500,000 from the Ministry of Culture—all for projects to be implemented by CSOs or in partnership with CSOs. Similarly, municipalities’ budgets include funds to support local CSOs. The process of allocating these public funds is not transparent, however, and the funds primarily go to politically-affiliated groups, which undermines CSOs’ independence.

Local donations and other sources of local funding remained a small share of most CSOs’ overall funding. Religious organizations tend to rely more heavily on local donations through religious philanthropy, such as zakat. To facilitate fundraising from individuals, a growing number of CSOs in 2018 used online crowdfunding platforms. Zoomal, for example, allows CSOs to seek direct support for their activities, including by committing individual donors to support them through small recurring donations. This fundraising tactic is particularly effective for CSOs seeking to support specific projects that elicit sympathy, such as aid to children with cancer.

A few CSOs also support themselves through income-generating projects, though this is not common. For instance, Arcenciel, a development-focused CSO, earns income through eco-friendly restaurants. Anta Akhi, a group that supports adults with physical and mental disabilities, sells sweets and handicrafts. Lebanon Mountain Trail, which works to preserve natural areas in Lebanon, charges for tours and trips.

Donations from the private sector seemed to increase somewhat in 2018. Local private entities such as banks and companies as well as international philanthropists supported CSO activities around causes ranging from the environment, to women’s rights, to childhood cancer. A fuel provider in the Bekaa donated fuel to support an activity undertaken by World Vision.

CSOs that receive support from foreign donors generally have stronger financial management systems, because they are subject to donors’ requirements in this regard. CSOs sometimes publish their narrative reports, but they rarely share their financial reports with anyone other than donors.

**ADVOCACY: 3.4**

CSO-led advocacy increased in 2018. Advocacy efforts by civil society influenced the public debate and official rhetoric, even if they did not always result in significant reforms.

CSOs enjoy relatively open channels of communication with local and national government officials, but their access does not necessarily lead to substantive results. Organizations are especially likely to communicate and collaborate with government officials when they are offering expertise or services to support public administrations. In addition, most of the draft laws under parliamentary consideration in 2018 were presented by civil society, with the support of a sponsoring parliamentarian. Such instances of collaboration are ad hoc, however, and not institutionalized. Decision-making processes do not require consultation with CSOs or other members of the public, and parliamentary committees’ discussion of draft laws are held behind closed doors. Even the CSOs involved in the drafting of legislative proposals do not have access to committee meetings except in very rare cases.

In 2018, CSOs advocated against perceived assaults on freedom of expression in Lebanon. The unprecedented numbers of people subject to investigations over social media posts and other attacks on expression galvanized civil society to engage in a mass public protest called Against Suppression in July 2018. Three of the individual
organizers of the protest were subsequently summoned for investigation, but CSOs and activists waged a large social media campaign that ultimately succeeded in pressuring authorities to drop all charges against them. In addition, the Lebanese Internet Governance Forum (LIGF) that convened in November focused on freedom of expression. Among other outcomes, the Forum recommended adoption of a media law drafted by Maharat and former parliamentarian Ghassan Moukheiber in 2010, in order to provide greater protections for activists and journalists expressing their opinions both online and off. The head of Parliament’s Administration and Justice Committee pledged to take up the law, though he did not do so before the year’s end.

Civil society advocacy and outreach appeared to have more political power in 2018. During parliamentary elections, for instance, many candidates and politicians—sensing its political popularity—adopted the same discourse as civil society. To an unprecedented extent, candidates used similar slogans and talking points around women’s rights, for instance, as well as transparency and anti-corruption. In another example, after a CSO coalition focused on waste management waged a campaign against plans to install incinerators, many politicians became more careful when speaking about waste issues. Certain political parties also included civil society actors on their lists of candidates, though some CSOs feared this would politicize the sector. At the same time, campaigns for greater representation of women in political life by CSOs such as LADE, Women in Front, and Maharat were reflected positively in the highest number of female candidates in Lebanon’s history. While the candidate lists included eighty-six women, however, only six women were elected, reflecting the need for more work in this area.

Some past advocacy efforts by CSOs appeared to bear fruit in 2018, particularly in the area of women’s rights and domestic abuse. For example, CSOs such as Kafa Violence & Exploitation and Aabaa—longtime advocates for gender equality—successfully engaged the Internal Security Forces (ISF) on its response to victims of gender-based violence. In 2018, the two organizations trained thousands of ISF officers on sensitization, as well as measures to ensure victims’ access to protections provided by law in cases of rape, sexual abuse and assault, and human trafficking. In addition, the Ministry of Women’s Affairs adopted new strategies to combat gender-based violence, following advocacy by CSOs, included taking the necessary measures to ensure wider protection including reforming laws, awareness, and sensitization.

In September 2018, the parliament approved three laws related to anti-corruption, which were long sought by CSOs including Skeyes, Maharat, Lebanese Transparency Association (LTA), LADE, Act for Human Rights (ALEF), and Legal Agenda. The laws focused on whistleblower protection, transparency in oil and gas exploration, and e-transactions. Nonetheless, parliament failed to adopt a law creating a national anti-corruption entity, which is needed to supervise the implementation of the three 2018 laws as well as the 2017 law on access to information.

CSOs that have long advocated for LGBT rights likewise saw some progress in 2018. Certain court orders have provided support for their cause. A notable Court of Appeal decision in July 2018 invalidated Penal Code Article 534, which effectively prohibits same-sex conduct, and stated that homosexuality is not a crime—the first time a higher court had done so. Additionally, for the first time a traditional political party, Kataeb, endorsed LGBT rights; the party’s electoral platform included the cancellation of Article 534.

Other than the freedom of expression issues discussed above, CSOs did not engage in any significant advocacy efforts around the legal and regulatory framework for the CSO sector.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.4**

CSOs in Lebanon continued to provide a diverse range of services in 2018, include services related to health, sanitation, education, media, legal assistance, social cohesion, and technical assistance.

Donors frequently help local service-providing CSOs develop methods for assessing the needs of local communities. For instance, many international donors require needs assessments or other kinds of data collection as part of the service projects they support. Particularly at the local level, needs assessments through surveys, focus groups, and other field information-gathering increasingly became a prerequisite for service provision projects in 2018. These measures are undertaken prior to project design, and increase the responsiveness to community needs of CSOs’ services.

Local authorities acknowledge the support of CSOs and frequently seek additional support that sometimes exceeds the capacities of CSOs. For instance, a CSO worked with a municipality to fix irrigation channels in a
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The municipality recognized the value of the CSOs’ contribution and asked the organization to extend the scope of the project to the entire city; however, the organization was unable to do this as it lacked the needed capacity.

Some CSOs provide goods and services to individuals beyond their members. In certain cases, CSOs work with ministries and other government entities to serve specific beneficiaries, such as working with the ministry of education to serve public schools. Most of the time, CSOs offer their services including workshops and publications to others. These services are usually open to the public and published on the websites of relevant CSOs.

In some areas of service provision, CSOs encounter obstacles related to a lack of coordination. For example, in the Bekaa—a region that hosts hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees—a number of CSOs provide refugee relief services, but their activities are sometimes duplicative or otherwise ill-coordinated despite donors’ attempts to harmonize efforts. Further, the organizations assessing needs in the Bekaa refugees camps do not always collect relevant information such as whether a target recipient has disabilities; the aid provided to refugees with disabilities may not be in line with their needs as a result. A CSO may offer a wheelchair or a bed, for example, when the disabled person cannot use one and has other, higher priority needs. UNHCR has organized meetings to better coordinate aid-providing CSOs, but these are viewed as a formality and not effective in addressing substantive issues in service provision.

SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 3.8

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector in Lebanon remained stable in 2018. Several intermediary support organizations (ISOs) continued to provide some support to CSOs in 2018. Beyond Reform and Development (BRD), for instance, provides services to CSOs such as policy research, public management consulting, and capacity development, however its services are prohibitively expensive for most local organizations. Lebanon Support provides mentoring to fledging CSOs on issues ranging from organizational management to web development. Since 2006, Lebanon Support has run an online platform called Daleel Madani, which allows CSOs that are registered as platform members to post resources, find out about calls for proposals, and advertise job openings, among other things. CSOs also have access to private sector sources of organizational support through companies such as Quick Solutions that can help organizations develop and implement specific projects. ISOs generally do not provide grants to organizations, however; local grant-making to CSOs is limited to religious entities and political parties.

The CSO sector in Lebanon continues to lack an umbrella organization or network that facilitates information-sharing among organizations. However, the number of CSO coalitions grew in 2018, as organizations working on issues ranging from women and youth to the environment and waste management formed networks and alliances to increase their impact. Organizations increasingly use common advocacy messages and work within coalitions, as well. In some cases, CSOs have formed coalitions in response to donor requirements. The USAID-funded Baladi Cap program, for instance, supports thematic coalitions of CSOs in order to foster civic advocacy and increase citizen participation on issues such as the environment, good governance, and human rights. Other coalitions are

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more organic, with CSOs that work in similar fields taking the initiative to coordinate their work. For instance, the coalition Kulluna Watani ("We are all one country") succeeded in building networks among civil society and CSOs all over Lebanon in the runup to the 2018 elections, which helped lead to the candidacy and election of civil society representatives.

Some CSO coalitions are built around short-term interests and are unlikely to be sustained over time. On the other hand, coalitions that are overbroad in their goals are also less likely to be efficient and effective, compared to those with narrow and specific goals such as the CSO coalition around waste management. A coalition broadly focused on numerous rights issues was unable to sustain itself in 2018, for instance, while a coalition formed by CSOs working on freedom of expression that includes Skeyes, Social Media Exchange (SMEX), Legal Agenda, Maharat, ALEF, and others along with international organizations continued to meet and discuss joint efforts throughout the year.

Partnerships between CSOs and the government or public sectors remain rare in Lebanon, although there are some examples. Parliamentary committees and ministries occasionally solicit the views and research of CSOs related to policy issues. In 2018, the Ministry of Administrative Reform, for example, conducted consultation meetings with civil society actors while drafting a national strategy for digital transformation. CSOs also worked across sector lines during November’s LIGF, the annual meeting of a multistakeholder platform that included the public and private sectors, academia, and CSOs such as Maharat, SMEX, Internet Society, and Beirut Bar.

Local CSOs partner with INGOs in some cases, but many local groups feel that these partnerships do not help to develop their capacity. Local groups also indicate that partnerships with international organizations may lead them to deliver activities without any impact or real change. INGOs also tend to work with the same local CSOs repeatedly, leaving out smaller and more nascent organizations.

Most CSOs in Lebanon have access to training opportunities. Programs such as Baladi Cap provide organizational capacity-building to CSOs, for instance. Abaad, a group that supports women’s rights, provides training to CSOs as well. While trainings are often expensive, many are paid for or subsidized by large CSOs or INGOs in order to make them more accessible to smaller organizations. As another indication of collaboration among CSOs, in 2018 CSOs increasingly circulated training announcements among the sector to increase knowledge about training opportunities. In a training organized by AFFE, 70 percent of participants were referred by other CSOs.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.8

The public image of civil society and CSOs improved slightly in 2018, due in part to CSOs’ increasing prominence in the public eye and their influence on public discourse. Their improved profile has led political parties to engage more actively and openly with civil society members and try to include them in their meetings.

Some CSOs have established themselves as human rights experts and are consulted in the event of potential rights violations. The media regularly consults and quotes organizations such as Kafa, Abaad, and RDFL, for instance, on stories related to gender-based violence, child marriage, and custody issues. Stories related to freedom of expression often feature quotes and background information from Maharat and Skeyes. In 2018, the media referred to the research and reports released by LADE on transparent electoral processes.

Coverage by traditional media (such as TV, radio, and print) of CSOs and CSOs’ causes has increased. CSOs have helped to increase media attention of their activities and causes by pushing stories on these topics via social media. Once such stories have garnered broad public attention on social media, it makes it difficult for traditional media to ignore them. This was the case, for instance, with the cancellation of Beirut Pride events, when traditional media covered the cancellation only after CSOs’ widespread criticism of the move on social media. On the other hand,
media coverage of the elections tended to disregard the views of civic actors and civil society representatives in favor of wealthy and high-ranking political leaders.

CSOs acknowledge the importance of media and as noted above many use their websites and social media platforms to bring more attention to their causes. Few CSOs publish annual reports, however, mainly due to lack of resources.

Some communities continue to distrust CSOs and accuse them of being corrupt or following foreign agendas. In the Bekaa, for instance, CSOs are not perceived as serving the community, but rather as profit-seeking and self-interested. As a result, unregistered groups of Lebanese and Syrian individuals that have formed to carry out activities in the Bekaa are generally trusted more than formal CSOs.

In 2018, CSOs working on certain rights issues also faced opposition from religious authorities. The Catholic Media Center as well as Aloulama’ Al Mouslimoun (Muslim Scholars) issued statements and Facebook posts in 2018 calling on authorities to stop activities organized by CSOs supporting LGBT rights, such as Helem, Proud, and AFFE. Notably, when such incidents occurred in 2018, groups whose activities were cancelled received relatively sympathetic media coverage and general solidarity among the civil society sector.

The government recognizes CSOs’ role in service provision as well as their expertise, in some cases. For instance, parliamentary committees may solicit and even incorporate feedback and comments from CSOs with regard to legal or policy proposals. However collaboration remains somewhat superficial and opportunities for CSOs to engage in meaningful consultation are rare.
CSOs are generally considered a new phenomenon in Libya. After dissolving or suspending most organizations that had been active during the monarchy, the authoritarian regime of Muammar Gaddafi (1969-2011) violently suppressed nearly all independent civic activities in the country. A very small number of organizations were allowed to operate but only in areas unrelated to political or legal work, and only under the close surveillance of the security services. The government also established politically-affiliated youth associations and unions whose goal was to spread the ideology of the regime. Law 19/2001 on the organization and registration of CSOs, passed in 2001, cemented the state’s control over the formation and activities of different types of associations. Apart from the Libyan Public Scouts, Girl Guide Movement, and the Libyan Red Crescent, no large nationally active or influential organizations operated during the Gaddafi era.

After the Libyan revolution and Gaddafi’s fall in 2011, by contrast, a large portion of the public turned to civil society to support the country’s transition. Article 15 of the 2011 Constitutional Declaration, which outlined Libya’s transition to a constitutional democracy, guaranteed Libyans’ freedom to form CSOs and effectively nullified the restrictive provisions of Law 19/2001 regarding CSOs’ formation and registration. The Civil Society Commission (CSC) was established in Benghazi in 2011, and by 2014 more than 4,000 CSOs had been formed and registered with the CSC. Most organizations sought to address the pressing needs of the time, especially humanitarian relief, but a few CSOs focused on the country’s political development, including aspects of democratization, transitional justice, and human rights. Many international agencies and organizations, ranging from multilateral groups such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the European Union (EU) to bilateral missions from the United States, United Kingdom, and elsewhere, began offering support to Libyan civil society in the form of capacity-building programs, political and cultural outreach, and grants programs. This support helped Libya’s CSO sector to develop and strengthen in the post-revolution period.

In 2014, political power in Libya split between two rival parliaments and their associated governments—the General National Congress (GNC) based in Tripoli, and the House of Representatives and its associated government based in Tobruk and al-Bayda, respectively. With the outbreak of violent clashes that accompanied this division, many international organizations departed, which had an impact on funding for local CSOs. Many organizations were unable to survive the sharp decline in international funding.

International organizations gradually returned to Libya after the signing of the Libyan Political Agreement in December 2015 and the formation of the Government of National Accord (GNA) in 2016. Local CSOs also began to recover.
State capacity in Libya continued to be weak in 2018, complicating CSOs’ efforts to respond to the country’s many needs. Authorities in Tobruk and al-Bayda maintained their respective claims to Libya’s legitimate government, but the divided and dysfunctional institutions were unable to control crime and violence. Powerful militias and other armed groups including the Islamic State clashed with one another and seized control of certain areas.

The country’s economy, largely reliant on oil, continued to suffer as a result of the poor security situation and attacks on oil facilities. Nearly one-third of Libyans were living below the poverty line, and approximately 170,000 were internally displaced at the end of 2018 according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Meager resources and weak infrastructure were stressed further by the estimated 670,000 migrants living in Libya, many blocked from leaving and attempting to reach Europe through the Mediterranean.

In that context, CSOs’ overall sustainability in Libya in 2018 was impeded. The legal environment for CSOs was unstable and complex, given the lack of a comprehensive law governing the sector. CSOs’ organizational capacity was low, as most organizations lacked experience. CSOs’ financial viability was the weakest dimension of sustainability because of inconsistent and narrowly focused funding flows. The sector’s strongest dimension was advocacy, with CSOs achieving several notable successes during the year. CSOs’ services were related mostly to humanitarian assistance and suffered from a lack of diversification. The sectoral infrastructure offered some support to organizations but was undermined by the lack of local training opportunities. Finally, CSOs’ public image was mixed, with generous media coverage offset by pervasively negative public opinion.

According to both the Tripoli- and Benghazi-based CSCs, there were approximately 5,400 established CSOs in Libya in late 2018. There are no official figures as to how many of these organizations are operational, nor is there information about informal CSOs that have not registered with the CSC. As of 2016, according to the CSCs, roughly two-fifths of registered CSOs were based in Tripoli, one-fifth in Benghazi, and the rest are spread elsewhere in the country. Likewise, as of 2016, 14 percent of CSOs were focused on charitable work, 12 percent on social services, 10 percent on art and culture, and another 10 percent on law and human rights.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.4**

The legal environment for CSOs in Libya is unstable, incomplete, and complex. While the Constitutional Declaration affirms the freedom of association for political and civil society groups, no alternative law has been approved to replace Law 19/2001, despite the submission of many proposals. Thus the only legal framework for CSOs is the changing set of regulations and decisions issued by the two rival, de facto executive authorities governing the country: the GNA, which is based in the West and is recognized internationally; and the Interim Government, which is located in the eastern city of Al Bayda, is recognized by the Libyan parliament, and governs areas under the control of the Libyan National Army led by Khalifa Hafter. The respective governments have increasingly established parallel agencies, including two separate CSCs—one reporting to the GNA and located in Tripoli, and one reporting to the government in the East and located in Benghazi, which was the location of the original headquarters of the united CSC.

The political division has significantly affected the legal environment for CSOs. CSOs registered outside of areas controlled by the Interim Government are prohibited from working in those areas without first registering with the CSC in Benghazi, which is possible only if they establish branches in the East and obtain the approval of the security authorities. In some cases, this means that organizations must report to both CSCs, each of which has different rules and regulations.

On the other hand, since the establishment of the CSCs, domestic CSOs have not experienced major difficulties with their registrations. CSOs are not required to register, but registration is practically necessary in order for organizations to open bank accounts, hold public events, and apply for foreign funding. The registration process is not complicated. Applications may be submitted and registration certificates issued either through the website of the Benghazi-based CSC, or via paper forms to the CSC in Tripoli. An organization must have ten founding members if registering with the Benghazi-based CSC, but only three if registering in Tripoli. As of 2018, all

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1 The House of Representatives, based in Tobruk since 2014 because of the security conditions in Benghazi, moved to Benghazi in 2019. The government that is associated with the House of Representatives—referred to as the “Interim Government” in this report—is based in Al-Bayda. The Government of National Accord (GNA) is associated with the Presidential Council and the High Council of State, both of which are based in Tripoli.
found members must submit criminal record certificates; any person who has been convicted of a crime and served a sentence may not form a CSO, although he or she may be a non-founding member of an organization.

The registration of international organizations is somewhat more difficult, as it requires separate registration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In Tripoli and other areas under the control of the GNA, this process is generally only successful if the organization works with an agent who has good connections to the Ministry. International organizations must register separately to work in Benghazi and areas under the control of the Libyan National Army.

Regulations allow CSOs to receive funds from both internal and external sources. To receive foreign funding, organizations must notify the CSC of incoming funds, their purpose, and their source; the CSC then has seven days to object to the funds. In practice, the CSC very rarely objects to funding notifications and the process does not restrict donors’ ability to support Libyan organizations. Challenges, if any, more often come from the security and intelligence authorities, who may be suspicious about the influence of foreign donors displaying their names or logos on materials.

In February 2018, the Tripoli-based CSC issued new regulations, according to which CSOs were required to notify it before participating in any meetings or trainings with international organizations, whether inside or outside of Libya. However, few if any organizations complied with this requirement, and those that failed to do so faced no repercussions. The validity of these new regulations is still being discussed and, faced with unified criticism from international partners, the Tripoli-based CSC has promised to review them.

CSOs in Libya are sometimes subject to harassment from security forces, other government authorities, and armed groups. While not common, such incidents are disruptive and have a dampening effect on organizations’ desire to organize events and activities. For instance, in 2018 internal security officials arrived unannounced at a peacebuilding training in Subrata organized by a local CSO; the security authorities took the participants’ list from the event, and one week later the head of the CSO that organized the event was called for investigation. In June, a local CSO was working for UNHCR to profile and register refugees in Tripoli, when militias detained members of its staff for more than nine hours; officials from the CSC had to intervene to have the staff members released. Both organizations prefer to remain anonymous.

According to the relevant regulations, CSOs are exempted from some taxes, such as registration tax, income tax, and stamp tax. There is also a judicial decision that exempts organizations from private taxes, though authorities are not aware of the decision so it has not been applied in practice. A CSO may submit an application for reimbursement of certain taxes it has paid, such as those on imports, but the application procedure is long and complicated and CSOs rarely undertake it unless the amounts involved are significant. In general, the tax authority lacks awareness of the procedures and regulations governing CSOs.

Only a small number of lawyers specialize in the work of CSOs. Their services are generally available to CSOs in both the eastern and western parts of the country, and are most often provided for a fee. Lawyers associated with the Benghazi-based CSC are also available to help CSOs, and offer their services pro bono. There are also very few legal advisors who assist international organizations.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.8**

The organizational capacity of Libyan CSOs is generally very weak. Before 2011, virtually no CSOs were allowed to operate in the country. While hundreds of new organizations have formed and registered since 2011, only a few have developed strong internal capacities. Those CSOs with more capacity tend to have substantive experience and have had exposure to training offered by international organizations.

The few CSOs with higher organizational capacities are mostly located in the main cities, such as Tripoli, Benghazi, and Misrata, and tend to focus on a range of development issues, from industrial and agricultural assistance to human rights and law reform. Such organizations include H2O, Jusoor (“Bridges”), 360, He’ia Tubarmij (“She Programs”) for Women Support and Empowerment, Libyan Development Organization, Tanarout, Amazonat Libya, Hexa Connection, Moomken (“It Is Possible”) Organization for Awareness and Media, the Dialogue and Debate Association (DDA), Life Makers, Sajal (“Debate”), and the Fezzan Group. CSOs focused on relief efforts, by contrast, tend to operate at a somewhat reduced organizational capacity. Such CSOs include the Association of Friends of the Mentally Disabled, Benghazi Hope Foundation, and Hands of Goodwill.
Few organizations have strong internal management, monitoring, and decision-making systems. Many organizations tend to be built around one or two individuals and lack defined management structures.

A small number of CSOs implement projects that are not relevant to their visions or overarching objectives, in order to increase their ability to access funding. For instance, a CSO that used to work exclusively on humanitarian aid now works on the environment and sustainable development, data collection, and conflict management, among other topics. Organizations that adhere to their visions and objectives may have a smaller pool of possible funds.

All CSOs have difficulty with strategic planning; their capacity to develop, implement, and evaluate strategic plans remains weak, despite the large number of capacity-building courses, including sessions on effective planning, offered by international organizations. Even organizations with relatively high capacity remain dependent on donors and regularly revise their strategic objectives to meet donors’ agendas.

Government regulations related to CSOs’ internal governance are not always reflected in CSOs’ organizational systems. Certain provisions, for instance, stipulate a mandatory number of founding members, require rules for organizing general assemblies and boards of directors, and provide requirements for CSOs’ internal statutes. While in theory these should encourage organizations to adopt strong internal statutes and structures, they are not regularly followed in practice. Most CSO founders, for instance, do not develop statutes that are in line with their organizations’ overall objectives. Some merely copy the models offered for advisory purposes by the CSC, even though they are allowed to make changes to them. It is also very rare for CSOs to report to the CSC new CSO members or changes in CSOs’ boards of directors, as required by organizational statutes and procedures.

CSOs also struggle to build their organizational capacities due to weak human resources and low staff commitment. Working for CSOs is considered by many to be a supplement to other work—a good use of spare time—and many workers contribute to CSOs on a volunteer basis.

Few CSOs have websites or email; CSOs in the South, for instance, have little if any access to the internet. Nonetheless, a growing number of organizations have computers and basic office software.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.9**

CSOs in Libya face serious challenges with regard to their financial viability. Poorly managed organizations that depend on only one or two staff members cannot normally obtain funding and often end up suspending or ceasing their operations. CSOs’ financial struggles have been exacerbated by a liquidity crisis that began in 2016, making Libyan currency scarce. A few CSOs that receive foreign funding have navigated this challenge through special arrangements with banks to liquidize their foreign currency, however it remains a barrier for most recipients of foreign funds. Few CSOs manage their funds in a transparent and balanced manner.

Foreign funding is a primary source of support for many local CSOs. Organizations such as Sheikh Al-Taher Al-Zawi, Hands of Goodwill, Kafa’a, and others, for instance, provide humanitarian services including aid distribution, monitoring, and transportation with support from international organizations. However, many international organizations that fund local groups in Libya, such as UNDP, EU, ACTED, and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), have international staff that are based in Tunis. As a result, smaller Libyan CSOs have fewer opportunities to present their skills and activities to donors in person and thus have a harder time accessing funding from them. Many donors also prefer to transfer donations to bank accounts in Tunisia or elsewhere outside Libya, which smaller organizations are less likely to have.

Changes in the priorities and goals of international organizations can also make it difficult for local CSOs specialized in specific areas to obtain funding. For example, Hexa Connection, which focuses on cyber-protection and the use of technology in development projects, was not able to obtain sufficient funding in 2018. In addition, international organizations prefer to work with CSOs that have professional financial management capacity rather than new organizations that could have problems managing grants. The applications for larger grants also require a high degree of internal organization as well as English-language competency, which few domestic CSOs have.

Overall, neither registered nor informal CSOs have access to much domestic funding. Larger, more established organizations working in humanitarian aid and relief usually receive the largest share of what little domestic funding there is from private companies and individuals.
Religious giving, whether from the government-managed Zakat Fund, from businesses, or from individuals, tends to favor charitable aid or religious developments. Such donations usually go to relief organizations helping the poor, the displaced, and others in need rather than to projects aimed at establishing schools or carrying out other development projects. In general, relief organizations are most active during periods in which communities donate, such as Ramadan, Eid al-Fitr, and Eid al-Adha, and cut back on their activities during the rest of the year.

There are some examples of corporate support for CSO development projects. For instance, in Misrata, the state-owned Iron and Steel Company and private Al-Naseem Food Industries both fund CSOs to carry out development projects. Libyan Airlines and Al-Madar telecommunication companies also finance CSOs’ development projects in Tripoli. Funding from local companies requires direct personal relationships with company officials or owners, and the level of cooperation varies.

State funding for CSOs is almost entirely non-existent, apart from the funding provided through public companies. However, obtaining funding from these organizations is very difficult and often requires personal connections.

A few CSOs have been able to establish their own income-generating activities. For example, Moomken created a physical co-working space for joint work with other entrepreneurs, and the Jusoor Foundation has a women’s work space and leases event halls; these initiatives generate income that the organizations use to fund other projects. Similarly, the Amani Charity Association in Benghazi has a clinic providing treatment to citizens for nominal fees, which helps finance its humanitarian and service work.

Most local CSOs have poor financial resource management capabilities. Few have internal policies or standard operating procedures for finance staff, for instance, or carry out audits.

**ADVOCACY: 4.9**

Advocacy is the strongest dimension of CSO sustainability in Libya. Since participation in civic action exploded in 2011, CSO advocacy has achieved notable successes despite the lack of a unified government and ongoing threats from armed militias and security agencies across the country. For example, in 2014, an alliance of CSOs led by La-La Itamde (“No to the Extension”) successfully called for holding elections for the General National Congress—Libya’s legislative authority from 2012 to 2014—on schedule, despite political differences on their legality. Also in 2014, the Tripoli Youth Movement brought together CSOs, unions, and independent activists to advocate for an end to the war in Tripoli, and in 2017, the Postpone to Amend movement succeeded in pressing the Constitutional Assembly to change the draft constitution to lower the minimum age for presidential candidates from forty to thirty-five.

CSOs’ strong advocacy efforts continued in 2018. The Referendum First movement, formed by a group of CSOs from across Libya including H20 and DDA, pressured the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and the GNA in Tripoli to prioritize a referendum on the proposed draft Constitution before presidential and legislative elections could take place.

Also in 2018, local CSOs in Benghazi used social media to pressure security officials to rescind the ban on women traveling without a mahram (male guardian) through Eastern District airports. CSOs including DDA pushed forward a peace process between the cities of Misrata and Tawergha, which resulted in the signing of a reconciliation agreement in June 2018. On the insistence of CSOs, three members of the signing committee were young civil society representatives from both cities.

In the absence of a functional, unified government, CSOs advocate to a variety of entities, including administrative bodies, international stakeholders, and local authorities. In 2018, CSOs pressured the Central Bank, for instance, to develop rules for e-payment. The tenuous or outright dangerous security situation leads most CSOs to censor themselves rather than advocate around controversial topics. In general, CSOs engaging in advocacy are most effective when they combine forces as a coalition or network, or coordinate visible public events.
**SERVICE PROVISION: 5.4**

CSO service provision is weak. Compared to the number of organizations registered with the CSC, the availability and level of CSO services is quite modest. There is little diversity in the services that CSOs offer, with most service organizations focusing on humanitarian assistance. Organizations such as Sheikh al-Taher al-Zawi (STACO), Hands of Goodwill, Kafa’a, Benghazi Hope, and Believer Aid rely on local funding or subcontracting with organizations such as IOM, UNHCR, and the World Food Programme (WFP) to deliver assistance. CSOs’ services for migrants include health care and food distribution, including at detention centers. Services for internally displaced persons include the erection of shelters, food distribution, and child care. The Libyan government generally does not fund such service provision.

Only a handful of organizations—such as Jusoor, H2O, Moomken, Elham (“Inspiration”), and DDA—actively provide services beyond humanitarian aid and relief, in areas such as civic learning, research, education, health, and psychological support. These organizations remain rare examples of diverse service providers.

In emergency situations, when goods and services are desperately needed, the response of more established organizations such as the Libyan Red Crescent and Libyan Scout Movement is generally more robust than that of newer CSOs. This disparity was evident during clashes in Tripoli in September and October 2018, for instance, when the Red Crescent and Libyan Scouts quickly established shelters and other support for displaced populations, while other relief organizations responded less effectively.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.8**

The infrastructure supporting civil society in Libya is not strong. Intermediary support organizations (ISOs), such as the Libyan CSO Incubator, the Libyan Civil Initiative, and One Libya Foundation, flourished between 2011 and 2014 but ceased operations by 2017 because their founders left the country—either directly or indirectly as a result of the conflict. Since then, ISOs have been virtually non-existent in Libya. The Tripoli-based CSC hosted a CSO support center, but it did not provide any tangible support and the Presidential Council canceled it in 2018 without justification. Some Libyans have gone abroad and run organizations such as Lawyers for Justice in Libya that support Libyan CSOs from outside the country.

Some large local organizations seek to support smaller groups. For example, H2O allows other organizations to use its facilities, such as training rooms, free of charge, and in 2018 it provided modest grants to fund smaller CSOs’ efforts to raise public awareness about the Constitution. Moomken also makes its facilities available to other organizations for training programs and workshops, and has provided training and advice to CSOs in the Nafusa Mountain, west coast, and Sirte regions. DDA supported several organizations in Al-Jufra and other areas of the central region in 2018 with free training and material assistance. These mentor organizations build smaller CSOs’ capacities in areas including grant writing, financial management, project management, and reporting—in some cases enabling them to successfully raise funds and secure partnerships with international organizations.

Libyan CSOs tend to form alliances around short-term goals and projects rather than long-term strategic objectives. For example, in 2016 several organizations attempted to establish an informal network called Let Your Voice Be Heard, but throughout 2018 the network faced internal conflicts over how to select its leadership, leading to its ultimate dismantling during the year. Inter-Peace Organization supervises the Peaceful Change Initiative (PCI) Network, which has been relatively successful in carrying out joint peacebuilding work in different regions, but is also challenged by inefficiency and poor communication among network members. On the other hand, alliances to implement short-term projects have found some success. Examples from 2018 include the partnership between the DDA and Voice of Amazigh Youth to implement a reconciliation forum in the city of Zuwarah and the alliance between the Foundation of Shag’aaf and H2O to conduct a campaign to raise awareness about the Constitution.

Most training and capacity-building programs are held in Tunisia, which increases their cost and draws funds away from the projects and staff of local organizations in Libya. A few international organizations have attempted to implement civil society support programs in-country. For instance, UNDP funded projects throughout Libya to support CSOs’ capacity in peacebuilding activities. In 2018, the Libyan Transitional Initiative—a project led by Chemonics and funded by USAID—partnered with the Libyan CSO Irada Organization to carry out capacity-
building activities in the southern region of the country. The International Republican Institute (IRI) introduced a similar series of programs in the western region and city of Sirte.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.5

CSOs have a mixed public image in Libya. Regardless of their size, CSOs receive a great deal of media attention. The significant expansion of the number of local TV and radio channels and the size of their reporting teams since the revolution has resulted in greater coverage of CSOs’ work, even in remote areas. Many staff at local channels have or had some affiliation with local CSOs—whether as members, staff, or volunteers—and are more likely to include CSOs’ perspectives and coverage of CSOs’ activities. Some channels, including state-owned networks such as the Official Libyan Channel, even have special programs focusing on the work of civil society. The Evening Show on Channel 218 and other programs devote considerable airtime to hosting discussions with CSO representatives and independent activists about various public interest issues. For example, in 2018 Libyan Free Channel and Channel 218 invited the executive director of H2O to talk about the draft Constitution, and several channels hosted representatives of Ro’ya (“Vision”) to talk about important astronomical events.

By contrast, public perceptions of CSOs in Libya can still be very negative. While the public views organizations providing relief and humanitarian services positively because they bring clear and tangible benefits, CSOs working on training, awareness raising, human rights, hobby clubs, and other fields often have a negative public image, since the services they provide are less visible and regarded as immaterial. Negative stereotypes and hate speech, including insults and slander, often occur in response to images of CSOs’ events and campaigns that show a mixing of both genders. Since 2015, when most international organizations withdrew, CSO staff have attended trainings and other programs in Tunisia, which has increased negative perceptions of local organizations since they are perceived as enjoying the benefits of travel and residency outside of Libya without providing local communities with tangible goods and services. In addition, the public accuses CSO staff who travel of revealing the country’s secrets. Public hostility is exacerbated when local CSOs receive grants from international organizations to carry out projects in Libya, since the public believes that they benefit unfairly from grants given in foreign currencies, whose value is doubled when converted into the local currency.

Government officials who deal with CSOs, such as employees of the security services and state-owned banks, can share negative attitudes towards Libyan CSOs and their employees. Local CSO staff are also sometimes verbally accused of working as informants and collaborators, which can pose a direct threat to their lives and subject them to intense familial and social pressure. Understanding that governmental and security sector distrust of CSOs may stem from a lack of understanding about what civil society does, organizations including H2O, DDA, and Moomken are undertaking efforts to establish more direct channels of communication with officials in order to explain CSOs’ work and its goals.

Most CSOs communicate extensively on social networking sites, which make it easy for them to spread information about their work with a wide range of the public. These efforts help to educate the public about CSOs’ activities, and attract potential donors as well as volunteers; when used effectively, social media marketing generally helps contribute to CSOs’ positive image.

CSOs have taken some steps towards self-regulation. Many organizations have internal codes of conduct, which provide for the obligations and rights of employees and volunteers, as well as aspects of good governance. However there is no code of conduct for the CSO sector as a whole. Some organizations share their financial reports with the tax authority, and some prepare annual reports and share them with the CSC; however, this is not common across the sector.
The 2018 CSO Sustainability Index for Morocco

MOROCCO

OVERALL CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.7

CSO sustainability in Morocco did not change significantly in 2018. The only dimension of sustainability that changed in 2018 was the legal environment, which deteriorated as CSOs faced ongoing difficulties with registration and state harassment of CSOs and activists increased.

Economic growth in Morocco slowed to 3 percent in 2018 and is expected to be just 2.7 percent in 2019. The unemployment rate was 9.8 percent of the working-age population in 2018. Unemployment disproportionately affects young people, with unemployment among fifteen to twenty-four-year-olds reaching 26 percent. Economic problems, specifically rising prices and decreased purchasing power, have galvanized society, leading to a significant social media campaign in April 2018 to boycott businesses such as Centrale Danone (dairy products), Sidi Ali (mineral water), and Afriquia (fuel).

In October, Morocco’s king renewed his call to “re-evaluate the national development model,” giving the government three months to suggest a new strategy to address inequality in the country. In 2017 and in August 2018, the king dismissed multiple ministers, including Mohammed Boussaid, Minister of the Economy and Finance, in an effort to require accountability.

Updated data about the size of the CSO sector in Morocco is not available. According to the latest data from the Ministry of the Interior, there were about 130,000 CSOs in Morocco in 2016, of which about 229 are recognized as benefiting the public good. In an interview in 2017, Moulay Ismail Alaoui, president of the National Dialogue on Civil Society and Constitutional Prerogatives, which ended in 2015, estimated that there were between 140,000 and 150,000 associations in Morocco. There are also more than 20,000 cooperatives, of which more than 2,600 are 100 percent female cooperatives. These cooperatives, governed by Law No. 112-12 of 2014, are an essential source of employment, especially in Morocco’s disadvantaged areas. Most CSOs in Morocco focus on social services, sustainable development, and supporting the professional sector. Few organizations are focused on human rights. The regions with the greatest number of CSOs are Casablanca-Settat (19,562 associations) and Sous-Massa (15,879).

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.7

The legal environment governing civil society in Morocco deteriorated slightly in 2018, as CSOs faced ongoing difficulties with registration and state harassment of CSOs and activists increased.
The 2018 CSO Sustainability Index for Morocco

Morocco’s 2011 constitution acknowledges the role of civil society and provides for its participation in the development and monitoring of public policies. Article 12 of the constitution guarantees the freedoms of expression and assembly. In practice, however, the government does not always protect these freedoms.

CSOs are regulated by two texts that predate the constitution: Dahir (royal decree) on the Right to Create Associations (1-58-376 of 1958), as amended, and the Application Decree to Implement Decree 1-58-376 (2-04-969 of 2005), which governs the formation of CSOs. Foundations are not subject to a separate law or regulation; they are treated the same as other CSOs and are governed by the same laws. Cooperatives are governed by Law No. 112-12, which took effect in 2015; the law provides for a simple registration procedure and facilitates the creation and operation of cooperatives.

CSOs must formally notify the government of their establishment. On paper, the notification process is relatively enabling, but in practice it functions much like a registration system because the government must effectively approve the notification. First, a CSO submits a statement declaring its creation to the local territorial government. Decree 2-04-969 specifies that the authorities must send a notification receipt to the CSO within sixty days. The receipt allows a CSO to prove its legal establishment and complete financial transactions such as receiving grants or other funding. However, as in previous years, in 2018 CSOs did not always receive their receipts by the stated deadlines. For instance, nine Amazigh (native Berber) organizations that had been denied registration in 2017 continued to be refused registration in 2018.

In addition, the authorities sometimes impose conditions that are not specified by law, and may refuse to provide associations with their receipts, or even to receive their declarations. This means that associations cannot conduct activities or even convene their members.

CSOs can apply for public benefit status in order to receive tax benefits and qualify for government funding. The application process is cumbersome and requires CSOs to provide extensive, certified documentation. At the time of writing, just 229 CSOs had this status. The Secretary General of the Government publishes the list of associations acknowledged as benefiting the public. Foundations, as well as sports federations authorized under Article 17 of Law No. 06-87 on physical education and sports, are automatically acknowledged as benefiting the public.

Targeted harassment of CSOs and activists increased in 2018, particularly in response to expressive acts. For instance, on December 26, the Casablanca Court of First Instance issued a decision dissolving the Racines (“roots”) association, a CSO that promotes culture, the arts, and civic engagement. The justification for the court’s decision was that the organization had “undermined state institutions and the Islamic religion” by participating in a public activity where people criticized the King of Morocco and other state officials. In June, fifty protesters and journalists who had participated in or supported protests that took place in Morocco’s northern Rif region in 2017 received prison sentences of up to twenty years; while the charges differed, all appeared politically motivated. Many CSOs called for these rulings to be overturned, claiming they were a result of “grossly unfair” trials. The Anfass Democratic Movement called on members of parliament to grant these prisoners amnesty and a royal pardon. The Moroccan Association of Human Rights (AMDH) denounced the sentencing as undemocratic and “sham justice.”

There were a few signs of potential improvement in the legal framework, but these had little practical impact on CSOs in 2018. The government introduced a draft law to make it easier for CSOs to engage in public fundraising, as well as a separate draft law that would allow CSOs to raise funds through “crowdfunding” online.

CSOs can engage in public fundraising, but they need to obtain permission unless they have public benefit status, in which case they are allowed to fundraise once per year without obtaining a license. CSOs are able to receive funding from the government, as well as international organizations and individuals. All international funding must be reported to the Secretariat General of the Government (SGG) within thirty days of receipt, along with
information about the objectives of the project to be funded and the donor’s country of origin and contact information.

CSOs can collect fees through the sale of certain goods. However, there is no successful model for the establishment of social enterprises by nonprofit organizations.

Only public benefit CSOs receive exemptions from income and value-added taxes. All other CSOs must pay registration fees, revenue stamps, and other taxes. CSOs generally pay import taxes, though the budget law passed by parliament in 2018 eliminated the import taxes for CSOs importing equipment for persons with disabilities. The same law newly provides a tax deduction for donations to CSOs that have partnerships with the government to launch public interest projects. Individuals and legal entities otherwise do not receive any tax benefits for donating to CSOs.

Although attorneys are trained in CSO law, no attorneys work closely with CSOs or specialize in CSO law.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.1**

CSOs’ organizational capacity did not change significantly in 2018.

The majority of CSOs serve local populations in specific urban or rural communities, while the remaining organizations address broader societal issues, such as poverty or human rights. In general, CSOs strive to involve individual beneficiaries and target communities as much as possible when designing and conducting projects in order to better meet the needs of the groups they serve and enhance the sustainability of their work. Some CSOs use efficiency and effectiveness indicators to measure expected project results against actual results; they also conduct project evaluations. Very few CSOs have monitoring and evaluation systems that assess organizational performance, however.

As in 2017, most CSOs continue to lack strategies that define their missions and highlight their successes. In general, large CSOs and those that receive funding from foreign donors are more likely to develop strategic plans. For instance, Bayti, a large professional association that fights violence against children, has an organizational strategy. Recent USAID grantees including the Moroccan Association of Solidarity and Development (AMSED), Association Ennakhil, White Dove Association for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Alternative Citizen Movement (ALCI), and Forum Ezzahra for Moroccan Women also have strategic plans that they developed with USAID support.

The management of CSOs remains underdeveloped. According to statistics from Morocco’s High Commission for Planning (HCP), in 2017 a vast majority (95.9 percent) of CSOs were run only by an executive committee, 1.1 percent were run by a board of directors elected at a regular meeting, and 3 percent had both a board of directors and an executive committee.

HCP also reports that seven out of ten associations do not have employees, and only 11 percent rely on paid staff to run their activities. On average, according to HCP, associations have eight volunteers. Nationwide CSOs may have much larger pools of volunteers. For example, the Prometheus Institute for Democracy and Human Rights has a network of more than 120 volunteers. CSOs struggle with staff turnover and generally lack the resources to train new staff effectively.

CSOs often lack funding to obtain or upgrade their office equipment and technology, which limits their operations and development. Despite this, CSOs continue to increase their use of information and communication technology including social networks, as a tool for good governance, communication, and internal and external information sharing. The degree to which CSOs use technology depends on a CSO’s sphere of activity. For example, CSOs—especially those involved in digital advocacy campaigns—regularly use social networks to communicate about their...
activities. The Prometheus Institute has promoted many podcasts on social media, and sponsored posts on its Facebook page sometimes are viewed more than 200,000 times.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.6**

CSOs’ financial viability did not change in 2018 and continues to be highly constrained. According to the Economic, Social, and Environmental Council’s *Status and Vitality of Association Life* report, approximately eight out of ten associations say that they have difficulty securing financing and raising funds.

Government funding remains an important source of funding for some CSOs. However, most organizations do not get more than $500 to 1,000 per year from the government, and most government funding goes to CSOs working in social services. The Ministry of Solidarity, Social Development, Equality and Family and the National Human Development Initiative (INDH, which is part of the Ministry of the Interior) are among the largest distributors of government funds in Morocco. Since its founding in 2005, INDH has mobilized more than 43 billion dirhams (approximately $4.5 billion) to fund projects that have affected 10.4 million beneficiaries. INDH funds projects across the country focused on fundamental rights, including economic, social, cultural, civic and political rights. Government funding is not always allocated to CSOs in an equitable and transparent manner, however. Instead, it tends to be distributed among organizations involved in traditional development activities, as opposed to political or rights-related work.

International funding is crucial for many CSOs. Total donor funds are estimated at more than 6 billion MAD (approximately $627.6 million) for all CSOs in Morocco. In 2018, the Moucharaka Mouwatina program, a two-year European Union (EU) funded program with a budget of more than MAD 165 million (approximately $17.3 million), was launched. It aims to improve CSOs’ institutional and legal environment, and to promote their involvement in identifying, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating public policies. The Moucharaka Mouwatina program launched a portal (charaka-association.ma) to improve governance, transparency of public funding, the development of civil society partnerships, and equal access to government funding for all CSOs.

While international funding often entails requirements that help CSOs improve their capacity, funding is usually granted for specific projects, and therefore does not allow CSOs to pursue their missions more generally. Also, foreign funding involves significant administrative, financial, and ethical burdens. A large percentage of international funding also goes to foreign intermediaries rather than local organizations. For example, the EU and other large funders allocate funding to other international organizations, such as Oxfam and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, which in turn seek local CSOs as implementing partners. According to a study conducted on the status of civil society as part of the Moucharaka Mouwatina program, this approach has often pigeonholed local CSOs as short-term service providers, rather than supporting them to become full, self-sufficient partners.

CSOs work with the private sector on programs focused on entrepreneurship, startups, employability and youth employment, but companies rarely offer financial support to CSOs. A report from the governmental Economic, Social, and Environmental Council on corporate social responsibility (CSR) recommends that CSOs include CSR in their strategic visions and work. By choosing CSR as a development framework, CSOs would have the opportunity to manage their entities more sustainably, improve their credibility, and strengthen their actions through high-impact initiatives, specifically by creating shared value.

No social enterprises, cooperatives, or collectives that generate their own income existed in Morocco in 2018. However, some efforts have been taken to develop a model that allows CSOs to be financially self-sufficient by earning income from their activities. A 2018 study by the Ministry of Tourism, Craft Industry, Air Transport and Social Economy, in partnership with the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), on the social
and solidarity economy has been done, as has related legal work regarding legislation and rules, as well as a draft legal framework.

The government hosted its second Civil Society Award to acknowledge civil society’s contributions and to promote and encourage CSOs’ creative initiatives benefiting Moroccan society. Four CSOs were recognized for their contributions: Aicha for Community and Environmental Development and Achourouk for the Deaf both won awards for local organizations, while AMSED in Rabat and the Moroccan Association for Consumer Protection and Guidance in Kenitra won for national organizations. These four winning CSOs shared 480,000 dirhams ($48,000). Two civil society leaders—Abdeljalil Cherkaoui and Bidaouia Belkamel—were also honored for their service to society.

According to a 2016 study conducted by the Ministry of Solidarity, Social Development, Equality and Family, more than half of public institutions have difficulty finding association partners that can sign service contracts with the government. This difficulty is specifically related to the lack or weakness of human resources among CSOs, and to the financial resources needed to form partnerships.

Small CSOs tend to have simple accounting systems that allow them to monitor income and expenses through daily entries in their cash journals and bank journals. CSOs that receive international funding tend to have more solid, transparent, and effective financial systems because they must comply with donor requirements, for example, to undergo external account audits and produce reports. Any support CSOs receive may be audited by the Court of Accounts at the national level, or by the regional Courts of Accounts.

**ADVOCACY: 3.8**

CSOs continued robust advocacy efforts in 2018, including campaigns focused on the legal environment for civil society.

The constitution and several organic laws provide for the right of CSOs and citizens to advocate and otherwise participate in governance by submitting petitions and motions to elected councils. In 2018, CSOs and citizens filed three petitions, which require the signatures of 5,000 registered voters: a petition by residents of Outat El Haj regarding a hydropower facility in the Chouk A1 ARD valley in Boulemane province; a petition signed by sixty organizations from the Drâa Tafilalet region demanding the GMT+1 time zone be used in the educational system and in all government departments and offices; and a petition submitted by the Center for Social Rights and Strategic Development of Casablanca to designate Arabic as the sole official language.

After significant public debate, Morocco decided to maintain the GMT+1 time zone. Many advocacy projects stop once a memorandum or petition has been submitted.

On the other hand, the process for submitting motions continued to be opaque, and no motions were submitted in 2018. According to this process, 25,000 registered voters must first sign a petition, then drafters must form a committee of nine citizens to submit the motion to the parliament and ensure that the recommendations are monitored. A majority of parliamentary groups must adopt the motion in order for it to proceed. If the government has been developing a draft law on the same issue, a commission will be formed to focus on the government’s proposal first. However, the parliament’s work is not transparent, leaving the public without information about subsequent action and unable to meaningfully exercise their democratic rights as specified by the 2011 constitution.

CSOs increasingly use social networks in a professional and strategic manner to raise awareness and mobilize the public around their advocacy topics. For example, in 2017 the Prometheus Institute advocated for the inclusion of young people’s demands in the government’s plans. In addition to submitting recommendations to multiple political parties, an advocacy campaign was launched on social media. In July, the prime minister and minister in charge of
relations with the parliament and civil society also inaugurated e-participation.ma, an electronic platform for civic participation. This platform improves citizen participation in preparing, executing, and evaluating public policies by facilitating the right to submit petitions, motions, and public consultations.

In 2018, there was a dramatic increase in advocacy actions in territorial collectives, decentralized public entities that have some authority over their territories. For example, the Prometheus Institute launched an advocacy project in 2018 to improve youth access to cultural spaces in the Yaacoub Al Mansour neighborhood in Rabat. These advocacy initiatives did not have visible consequences.

CSOs’ efforts to eliminate the practice of child marriage in Morocco continued in 2018. The Sim-Sim citizenship association, the Association of Amazighite Women’s Voices, and the Adala association for the right to an equitable trial prepared a new proposed law that aims to modify and amend the family code in order to ban child marriage. This draft law, along with an educational video, were submitted to NOUCHARIK.MA, an online advocacy platform, to mobilize support and collect as many signatures as possible.

In another successful ongoing campaign in 2018, a coalition of CSOs advocated for new public policies for the mountainous regions of Morocco. The Civil Coalition for Mountains (CCM) developed a draft law to reinforce the mountain residents’ right to development and address the shortfall in services available to them. During 2018, CCM members publicized the proposal in press conferences and other forums and presented it to political party leaders and three cabinet ministers. A government spokesperson explicitly cited the CCM’s role and pledged that the government would create a plan to address development in the mountainous areas.

CSO advocacy also aimed to improve the legal environment for the sector. In 2018, a campaign called the Movement of Initiatives to Reform Morocco’s Association Laws (MIRLA), supported by more than 1,000 associations, undertook wide-ranging advocacy efforts focused on the legal and regulatory environment for CSOs in Morocco. The movement, which is led by ALCI, White Dove, AMSED, Association Ennakhil, and Forum Ezzahra, emphasized the importance of a differentiated tax policy for associations and businesses, more widespread exemptions from registration fees and stamps for associations, the promulgation of a law on volunteerism, and review of the status of “public donations.” The campaign succeeded in securing enabling changes to Morocco’s budget law in 2018, including the elimination of import taxes for CSOs importing equipment for persons with disabilities, and provisions allowing businesses to deduct donations to CSOs that work with public institutions.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.5**

There were no major changes in service provision in 2018.

CSOs in Morocco provide a variety of social, educational, and health services. They have also created education and service provision programs on issues such as sexually-transmitted diseases (STDs), AIDS, sterility, pregnancy, and abortion. The Moroccan Association for Family Planning (AMPF), which was founded in 1971, plays a key role in family planning and sexual and reproductive health. CSOs including the Moroccan Association to Prevent Violence Against Women (AMVEF) offer local services to protect women from violence. Microcredit associations such as Amana, Attawfiq, and Al Baraka provide loans, primarily to women and the most economically disadvantaged.

CSOs are important drivers of inclusion and social solidarity. Associations offer integrated local services to the population. They are based on core values and are motivated primarily by public interest. The extent to which CSOs can respond to their target populations’ needs are limited by their ability to identify these needs properly, their expertise in the area of focus, and the availability of human and financial resources.

CSOs rarely receive revenue from sales, due to their nonprofit nature.
The government acknowledges CSOs’ essential role in society and is undertaking several initiatives in recognition of this. For example, the framework project on the social economy undertaken by the Ministry of Tourism, Craft Industry, Air Transport and Social Economy would allow CSOs to generate their own revenue in order to increase their financial viability.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.9**

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector did not change in 2018.

Intermediary support organizations (ISOs) and resource centers provide services such as grant distribution, advocacy, training, and consulting services. Examples of ISOs include Tannia.ma, AMSED, Association Ennakhil, ALCI, and Forum Ezzahra. These organizations function as resource centers for other CSOs in areas including organizational development and technical capacity building. A few ISOs and resource centers, including Tannia.ma, operate nationally, but they are primarily active in urban areas.

A few foundations, such as the Bouaabd Foundation, are recognized as benefiting the public good and provide seed funding to local CSOs. The Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Residing Abroad offers small grants to CSOs to provide services in areas such as housing, health, education, and transportation.

The culture of CSO networks is not sufficiently established in Morocco, and networks have no legal status. Moroccan CSOs rarely join together to create synergies, networks, and stakeholder coalitions that can pool their individual efforts to influence decision makers. Discussion spaces have largely been dominated by networks and coalitions at the national level, steered by so-called national associations that work with their subsidiaries or branches at the regional level, such as the Democratic Association of Moroccan Women (ADFM), which promotes women’s rights and gender equality.

Agreements between Moroccan CSOs and international CSOs often provide for the transfer and building of capacity. International NGOs work closely with their local partners over the long term, by mentoring, coaching, assisting them with support related to financial management, activity planning, reporting, and project management. The Moucharaka Mouwatina program has observed that the capacity-building approaches used to date in most CSO support programs have focused primarily on project implementation and fundraising, specifically the ability to respond to various calls for proposals. These efforts have often been led by trainers who are removed from the reality on the ground, either because the trainers are not Moroccan and do not understand the Moroccan context, or because they do not have civil society expertise.

There are also central government initiatives such as the Takwia (“strengthening”) program, which aims to strengthen the skills of local associations and to improve their level of professionalism. This program is implemented in partnership with the Social Development Agency (ADS) and the Provincial Human Development Committees (CPDH).

In 2018, the public sector organized a series of specialized trainings on advocacy for CSOs at the national and local levels. For example, the Ministry for Relations with Parliament and Civil Society, along with the Fkh Tétouani Foundation, launched an advocacy training program in the Rabat-Salé-Kénitra region. An internet platform launched in 2017 by the Ministry for Relations with Parliament and Civil Society offers participatory democracy trainings to CSOs. These trainings aim to educate association stakeholders about their role in driving participatory democracy, improving citizens’ and associations’ commitment to this system, and spreading understanding of the techniques and skills needed to activate those methods.
A study on the status of civil society conducted through the Moucharaka Mouwatina program showed that collaboration between CSOs and research institutions is weak, and the academic world is one of the major limits on CSO capacity-building in Morocco.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.3

CSOs’ public image did not change in 2018. Media coverage of CSOs is often focused on trending topics; as a result, some CSOs have trouble getting coverage of their issues, even when they are in the public interest. Coverage of CSOs in state-run media outlets like Al Oula TV is mixed. CSOs aligned with government positions or institutions such as INDH receive largely positive coverage, while the situation is different for human rights CSOs. For example, AMDH is frequently accused of representing radical views. Online journalists, who are often more informed about the issues important to CSOs, have become key contacts for CSOs and key supporters of CSO causes.

The government, the private sector, and the public have different perceptions of various types of CSOs: those that provide services or are aligned with the government are perceived more positively than those that work on human rights or question the central government’s policies. Politicians and government officials claim to be the only entities authorized to speak on behalf of citizens and to defend their rights, because they have been democratically elected. Some groups say that “CSO” is not a synonym for “society” or “defender of the public interest,” but that CSOs represent only one segment of society.

The government has indicated in several policy documents that it is open to partnerships with CSOs. This is a sign of the government’s recognition of civil society’s social development efforts. In 2018, the government hosted the second annual Civil Society Award to recognize local, national, and international organizations’ role. AMDH refused to attend the award ceremony because of the repression of CSOs in 2018, however. In an open letter to the minister delegate to the head of government for relations with the parliament and civil society, AMDH explained: “Before valuing associations’ work, it is first necessary to allow them to work and express themselves freely.”

The private sector is progressively increasing its partnerships with CSOs, specifically in the area of employability and entrepreneurship.

CSOs recognize the value of improving their media relations skills to expand media coverage and have positive follow-up of the events that they organize. The practice of institutional communications has become widespread, with photos and information about activities being published on social media. In addition, most CSOs struggle to hire permanent communications directors to design effective communications strategies, and to manage their image and identity in a professional manner.

A limited number of well-funded organizations and international CSOs in Morocco publish annual reports. CSOs do not have codes of ethics.
The overall sustainability of CSOs in Yemen remained impeded in 2018. Civil war persisted between the internationally recognized government led by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi on one side and the Houthi rebels, or Ansar Allah, on the other. By early 2018, the Hadi government and its forces controlled roughly four-fifths of the country’s territory, much of which is sparsely populated but includes the cities of Aden, Hadramout, Althalea, and Marib. The Houthis exerted control over some of the most populous cities, in the north-central part of the country: Sana’a, Ibb, Thamar, Saddah, and Hajjah. Some cities, such as Taiz and Hudaydah, remained violently contested between the two sides. A multinational coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) continued its aerial and ground offensive on Houthi-controlled areas.

The war affected nearly every aspect of life in Yemen. No part of the country was immune to the humanitarian crisis exacerbated by the conflict, which was the worst in the world and continued to worsen in 2018. The United Nations (UN) estimated late in the year that roughly 85 percent of the population—some 24 million Yemenis—required humanitarian assistance. Over 14 million were categorized by the UN as “severely food-insecure”—the last increment on the hunger measurement scale before a determination of famine. According to the UN and the World Bank, around 80 percent of Yemenis were living in poverty in 2018, up from just over 50 percent in 2014.

The city of Hudaydah witnessed violent clashes in 2018 that led a large wave of residents to flee to nearby cities. CSOs sought to provide relief to the wave of internally displaced people (IDPs) and others in need. Further, factories on which many people depended for their incomes were destroyed in the clashes, and many businesses closed as their owners fled the city. Many CSOs in Hudaydah temporarily suspended their activities while others moved to other cities. In Taiz, the other contested city and the third-largest in Yemen, urban infrastructure remained almost completely destroyed and basic services were not available. CSOs in Taiz faced an unpredictable environment that depended largely on which part of the city they operated in.

In other Yemeni cities, such as Marib and Hadramout, the operating environment for CSOs stabilized somewhat. In general, however, the existence of multiple governing authorities charged with regulating CSOs created bureaucratic obstacles and delays for organizations across the country. Additionally, CSOs remained subject to harassment and other interference by armed groups aligned with both sides of the conflict.

Yemen’s economy remained extremely weak. The World Bank estimated in 2018 that over one-third of businesses had closed and roughly eight million Yemenis had lost their jobs since 2015. While the national gross domestic product (GDP) increased by roughly 3 percent, the value of the Yemeni rial dropped by 35 percent against the US dollar according to the Studies and Economic Media Center. Inflation increased the prices of basic goods, exacerbating the suffering of citizens and creating financial difficulties for CSOs as well. The Hadi government and
international partners adopted a series of corrective measures that helped reduce the inflation rate by the end of 2018.

In late 2018, Yemen’s Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (MOSAL) estimated that approximately 13,200 CSOs are registered throughout Yemen. This includes active organizations as well as those that had gone inactive.

While sectoral sustainability remained stable overall in 2018, there was a moderate decline in the legal environment as authorities adopted restrictive measures and practices, particularly in Sana’a. The sector’s public image also deteriorated as officials across the country waged negative public campaigns against CSOs. At the same time, the organizational capacity of CSOs improved slightly as organizations sought to meet donor requirements regarding their institutional policies, systems, and strategies. The financial viability of CSOs also improved somewhat as a result of CSOs’ growing expertise in attracting and managing foreign funding. Other dimensions of CSO sustainability remained unchanged. The political environment continued to make it too risky for CSOs to engage in lobbying or other advocacy around sensitive issues. CSOs continued to respond to the needs of local constituencies by providing services such as humanitarian aid and relief, development and community services, research, public opinion polling, and work to protect vulnerable groups in society. There was an ongoing shortage of entities able to provide CSOs with training and technical support, and CSO coalitions were rare.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.5**

The legal environment for CSOs in Yemen deteriorated further in 2018. In addition to ongoing harassment of CSOs and their representatives, authorities in some areas issued new, repressive decrees, while elsewhere oversight by newly-established official entities created confusion and bureaucratic delays.

The Law on Associations and Foundations (Law 1 of 2001) and its executive regulations comprise the primary legal instruments governing CSOs. Law 1 generally provides for an enabling environment for CSOs; however, MOSAL’s implementation of the law and creation of new regulations creates obstacles for CSOs in practice.

In 2018, the Houthi authorities in Sana’a issued and more aggressively implemented decrees that impose requirements and constraints on CSOs beyond those provided for in Law 1. Of particular note, a new decree suspended the registration of new organizations and the renewal of existing organizations’ registration and operating licenses until further notice. As a result, many CSOs stopped their activities as they could not get activity permits, while other CSOs moved their activities to cities under control of the Hadi government. Some CSOs were unable to receive funding as their donors require grantees to have current licenses. After approximately three months during which all registrations and renewals were suspended, MOSAL started renewing the licenses again, but began consistently requiring organizations to share all their financial data during the renewal process—a requirement that had been only partially enforced in prior years. Many organizations were reluctant to share information about non-Yemeni funders for fear of being blackmailed.

Authorities in Sana’a also began more aggressively enforcing a second decree—issued late in 2017—requiring CSOs to obtain official permits for each activity they carried out, including discrete training courses and workshops. The decree was circulated to hotels and companies, and prohibited them from hosting any activity that had not received a permit. The permits could take up to several months to be issued, and were generally difficult to obtain unless they were for activities related to humanitarian relief. Many organizations were forced to suspend their activities because they were unable to obtain the requisite permits.

A large number of CSOs faced state harassment in 2018 and some were forced to close down or change locations. Internal security forces and the authorities that govern CSOs do not always communicate or act in concert, increasing the likelihood of harassment on the basis of security concerns, misinformation, or corrupt practices.
Houthi forces raided or closed numerous CSOs, and froze the bank accounts and other assets of at least two organizations. They also suspended the activities of Al-Awn Foundation several times; the Foundation relocated some of its projects to Aden because of the suspensions as well as threats that the organization had received. Authorities detained the founder, executive director, and chairperson of Mwatana, an organization that had openly criticized human rights conditions in Yemen. Hudaydah authorities also suspended the Gender Project implemented by Hudaydah Girls Social Development Foundation, even though the Foundation had obtained the necessary permits. The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung office in Sana’a likewise had its activities suspended and ultimately moved most of its programming to Taiz and Aden.

In general, CSOs operating in Hadramout and Marib faced fewer restrictions and less harassment than those in other parts of the country, though obstacles remained. In Marib, for instance, organizations that were not aligned with the Islah political party tended to face greater legal and practical challenges. In both cities, organizations were also forced to contend with multiple entities regulating their activities, each often requiring personal connections and bribes.

According to the law, CSOs may freely receive funding from Yemeni individuals or entities. If a CSO wishes to raise local funds through a fundraising campaign, it must notify the government. CSOs must also notify the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) before receiving funds from foreign individuals or entities; the notification must contain detailed information about the source and purpose of the funding. CSOs are legally able to earn income through business activities in order to support their missions.

Under the law, CSOs are granted certain tax and customs exemptions, however, enforcement is inconsistent in part due to officials’ lack of knowledge of the law. As a result, CSOs cannot always access the exemptions in practice. Authorities in Sana’a strengthened enforcement of the tax law provisions that require CSOs to pay payroll taxes for permanent staff. The same authorities sometimes require organizations to pay bribes to complete the tax payment process in a timely manner. CSOs outside Sana’a do not have to pay wage taxes, even though they are provided for by law.

CSOs continue to lack legal support, as few local lawyers have experience or expertise around the laws governing CSOs. The few that are familiar with the CSO legal environment and able to help organizations navigate legal issues are mostly located in Yemen’s cities and charge high fees for their services.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.1

Organizational capacity across the sector improved slightly in 2018. CSOs improved their ability to identify their beneficiaries’ needs and organizations sought to meet donor criteria regarding their institutional policies, systems, and strategies.

CSOs were somewhat better able to identify potential beneficiaries and their needs in 2018, partly as a result of training received in prior years. The Hudaydah Girls Social Development Foundation, the Youth Leadership Development Foundation, and Yemeni Women’s Union, along with many other organizations, have adopted the Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability and Learning (MEAL) system to help them identify the needs of target populations. In Ibb, the Yemeni Development Network for NGOs (YDN) formed community committees to implement needs assessment surveys. Authorities in Sana’a, however, restricted CSOs’ ability to carry out their own surveys and required organizations to only use official surveys when seeking to identify beneficiaries’ needs.

Most CSOs do not adopt long-term strategies. Al-Tanweer Development Foundation in Ibb, YDN in Sana’a, and Al-Awn Foundation for Development and the Social Development Association in Hadramout are among the few that adopted strategic plans in 2018 to help them achieve their goals.
Foreign donors and international NGOs (INGOs) undertook new projects to help local CSOs build their organizational capacities in 2018. Oxfam and the German development agency GIZ, for instance, helped local partners develop and refine their internal procedures and work flow in order to make them more efficient and productive. Participating organizations included Bader Foundation in Sana’a, Generations Without Qat in Taiz, Wedyan Association for Society Development in Aden, and Al Namaa Foundation in Hajjah. Such projects were noteworthy in 2018, as they had been suspended in prior years due to the conflict. The Social Fund for Development (SFD), an independent government body tasked with implementing government- and donor-funded development programs, also implemented several capacity-building activities for community councils in several governorates.

Donors’ requirements have also helped prompt local CSOs to improve aspects of their organizational capacity. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), for instance, has for many years required its partners to demonstrate high standards of organizational capacity in areas such as their financial systems, human resources policies, and monitoring and evaluation. Many local CSOs have worked to improve their capacities in order to qualify for OCHA funding, particularly as other funding sources have dried up.

Internal management structures and practices vary across the sector, but clear delineation of duties and responsibilities continued to be a challenge for many CSOs. In organizations that have boards of directors or trustees, the board often exceeds its role and interferes in the executive work of the organization. Nonetheless, there were increased efforts by CSOs in 2018 to improve the performance of their directors. With support from GIZ, Resonate! Yemen designed a governance guide for community-based organizations and trained more than one hundred CSOs from several governorates on how to improve their boards’ performance. Nahda Makers in Aden also restructured its board of trustees to ensure better governance, as did several other organizations.

CSOs continue to struggle to hire and retain long-term, professional staff, as successful employees often move to international organizations that tend to pay higher salaries. Most staff members of local CSOs are hired to implement ongoing projects under temporary contracts that end once the projects conclude. Many CSOs have only a few permanent staff, while the overwhelming majority rely on the services of volunteers. In 2018, a group established the Bank of Volunteers, whose members provide volunteer management services to the CSO sector.

Many CSOs in both cities and rural areas use solar energy systems to access electricity and the internet. Some CSOs have been able to modernize their office equipment, as well, drawing on support for overhead costs that is generally included in funded development projects. For instance, development organizations Resonate! Yemen, Bridges Foundation, Yemen Peace School (YPS), Rowad Foundation, Tomorrow Makers Foundation, and Nahda Makers were all able to upgrade their office equipment and workplaces in 2018. CSOs frequently utilize social media—particularly Facebook—to communicate with beneficiaries and promote their projects and activities. They also use social media to advertise training and employment opportunities.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.7**

CSOs’ financial viability improved slightly in 2018. Many organizations remained heavily dependent on foreign funding, and 2018 generally saw greater donor support for CSOs’ development activities, as compared to humanitarian relief, than in 2017. Some organizations also cited capacity-building programs they had participated in over the past three years as enhancing their ability to apply for and win foreign grants. While Yemen’s economy remained in crisis, a few organizations were also able to raise funds through donations and earned-income projects.

Most CSOs have not successfully diversified their funding sources, and many CSOs rely entirely on foreign funding to support their services and products. Such funding tends to support short-term projects rather than long-term programs, and most often goes to INGOs that may or may not engage local CSOs as partners.
Nonetheless, local CSOs’ access to donor funds appeared to increase in 2018. Tamdeen Shabab Foundation, the Sustainable Development Foundation, Al-Ataa for Relief and Development, and the Yemeni Women Union all received significant foreign donor funding. Al-Awn Foundation for Development reported that its local partners were more successful at soliciting international funds in 2018. International support for CSOs appeared to increase in certain areas such as Hadramout, where GIZ, the Berghof Foundation, and other donors began funding local CSO initiatives. Issues for which funding had largely disappeared over the past few years—ranging from microenterprises to women’s participation—began to receive funding again as donors expanded their focus beyond relief efforts. Despite this shift, foreign funding remains largely focused on humanitarian relief efforts and development activities that address effects of the war and economic crisis.

While providing crucial support to the sector, some international donors lack mechanisms to coordinate their efforts, and services and other activities may be duplicative. In Hadramout, for example, both UNDP and the King Salman Center have repeatedly supported fishermen and supplied boats from the international market, rather than local boatmakers, negatively impacting local industry.

CSOs continue to seek funding from local private sector donors, though the private sector’s ability to support civil society remains extremely limited. In Ibb, the Kingdom of Sheba Foundation received sufficient funds from the private sector to support humanitarian convoys to Tahita and IDPs from Hudaydah. Organizations in Taiz were likewise able to raise funds from shop owners and other small-scale businesspeople to support their activities. In Sana’a, Allulwah Foundation repaired a water well with support from Yemen Mobile. Nonetheless, the private sector’s ability to provide support declined compared to the previous year, due to broader economic hardship. Further, private entities suspended their support for some CSOs in Hadramout, like the Youth Initiative Foundation and Matn Foundation. In Hudaydah, where conflict erupted in mid-2018, private sector support for CSOs was greatly reduced as many businesses ceased operations and in some cases were destroyed.

Despite Yemen’s weak economy, the slight recovery towards the end of 2018 helped to boost the results of some CSOs’ earned-income projects. The Khadija Foundation for Development in Ibb, and Rowad Foundation and Yemen House for Music and Art in Sana’a started income-generating projects in 2018, including providing venues and logistical support services for workshops, training, and conferences. In Hudaydah, on the other hand, some organizations such as Hudaydah Girls Social Development Foundation and Abu Musa Ashaari Association had to close earned-income projects because of the conflict.

There was also a slight improvement in CSOs’ ability to secure funds through local fundraising in 2018. The Hadramout Cancer Foundation received significant donations at a charitable carnival it organized to highlight the services the Foundation provides to cancer patients. Al Amal Foundation and the Social Development Association both organized bazaars to market their products and collect donations. Khadija Foundation in Ibb also organized bazaars in Yarim and Ibb to market its products.

CSOs receiving funds from donors such as Oxfam and GIZ were subject to those donors’ requirements regarding financial management. This contributed to a slight improvement in some CSOs’ capacity to manage their financial resources. Donor requirements prompted some organizations, for instance, to adopt computerized systems to track their finances. Such organizations included Al-Atta for Relief and Development, Yemen Al-Khair Relief & Development Foundation, and National Foundation for Development and Humanitarian Response (NFDHR).

**ADVOCACY: 5.1**

CSO advocacy did not change in 2018. Space and mechanisms for CSOs to participate in public decision making continue to be exceedingly rare, and CSOs’ ability to advocate to government stakeholders—particularly around sensitive issues—remains very weak. While CSOs establish alliance to facilitate service delivery, very few alliances are created to advocate for legal or policy changes.

Yemen’s state institutions are fragmented, which makes them less able to effectively engage the public in decision and policy making. CSOs’ access to policymakers varies from one governorate to another. CSOs in Marib, for instance, have somewhat greater and more regular access to local government leaders than organizations in other cities. In 2018, several organizations including Resonate! Yemen, Afaq Shababia, Partners-Yemen, and Youth Without Borders explored opportunities to communicate with national and local authorities in order to improve the delivery of public goods and services. These efforts achieved only modest results, however. Youth Without
Borders, for instance, advocated directly to the governor on how to enhance transparency and improve the performance of the executive services office in Taiz; the governor responded positively and encouraged such efforts, but made few concrete improvements.

As in 2017, CSOs continued to carry out advocacy campaigns seeking to influence both public opinion and government decision making. A network of CSOs including the Studies & Economic Media Center in Taiz carried out a campaign, for instance, called Bring Me Back My School, which called for increased public funds for schools as well as the elimination of political parties’ and armed groups’ control over certain schools. The Civil Network for Advocacy and Peace in Hadramout carried out a successful campaign for the withdrawal of security authorities from a juvenile house the Network used to run. Also in Hadramout, a group of CSOs waged a campaign to reopen Al Rayyan Airport, which was closed by foreign allies in the course of the war. Authorities had forced the CSOs to call off a similar advocacy campaign in 2017, but the environment for advocacy in Hadramout improved in 2018.

Certain CSOs, such as Political Development Forum and Yemeni Women Pact, participated in parallel (“Track II”) peace negotiations during the year as consultants to the UN envoy. In general, however, CSOs remained unable to advocate on controversial or politically sensitive issues. CSOs in areas of Yemen under control of the internationally-recognized government did not call for the reopening of Sana’a airport (likewise closed by foreign forces allied to the government), for instance, nor did they advocate for the release of detainees. Meanwhile, CSOs in areas under the control of Ansar Allah did not advocate for the reopening of land passages to Taiz or for an end to arbitrary measures by officials.

There were also no significant advocacy efforts by CSOs to change the legal or regulatory environment for CSOs in 2018.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.8**

CSO service provision did not change significantly in 2018. CSOs continued to respond to the needs of local constituencies, providing goods and services such as humanitarian aid and relief, development and community services, research, public opinion polling, and work to protect vulnerable groups in society.

Although CSO service provision continued to be dominated by relief services, CSOs increasingly provided development-oriented goods and services in 2018, along with the increase in donor support for such activities. These included services and training to improve livelihoods, initiatives to support microenterprises, activities to promote economic empowerment for vulnerable groups, and promotion of community peace projects. CSOs involved in development service provision included the YDN, Tamdeen Shabab Foundation, and Akon Foundation for Rights and Freedoms. In Marib, the number of CSOs providing new development and rights services increased as a result of the enabling environment there. By contrast, in Hudaydah, the outbreak of conflict in mid-2018 meant that most CSOs engaged in service provision were providing relief services.

The increase in CSOs’ development services meant that CSO service provision generally was more responsive to citizens’ needs in 2018. The Yemen Microfinance Network launched a project to support small businesses that
were damaged by the war to help increase families’ income. The All Girls Foundation for Development organized economic empowerment activities for women and helped them to produce and market their products at bazaars. New entities were created to respond to the needs of local individuals and organizations. For example, the first peacebuilding and conflict mitigation foundation in Hadramout, Bena’a Wa Salam Foundation, was established. At the same time, however, CSOs reported that Houthi authorities had stalled and in some instances prevented CSOs from carrying out needs assessments for humanitarian relief, limiting the responsiveness of their services.

Interference by authorities and armed groups as well as corruption continued to challenge CSOs’ provision of relief and other services in some cases. Some authorities, officials, and militias on the ground interfered in CSOs’ efforts to plan and distribute humanitarian assistance, for instance. Amnesty International’s 2018 report *Stranglehold: Coalition and Huthi [sic] Obstacles Compound Yemen’s Humanitarian Crisis*, highlighted these difficulties. For instance, authorities often delayed approval for the movement of goods and CSO staff, forcing CSOs to wait for up to two months to deliver essential aid. In other cases, Houthi authorities used their influence to control where, how, by whom, and to whom aid was delivered.

The Hadi government increasingly recognized the value of services provided by CSOs in 2018. In Hadramout, for example, the government held an event to honor several CSOs for their contributions to the alleviation of suffering, and gave the organizations honorary trophies. In Marib, the governor issued a circular that directed authorities to cooperate with local organizations. On the other hand, there has been no significant improvement in the government’s assessment of CSO service provision in the rest of Yemen’s governorates.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.1**

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector remained weak in 2018. For several years, CSOs with expertise in providing technical support to organizations have instead focused on providing relief services to individuals as a way to secure operational expenses. At the same time, some organizations lacking specialized expertise filled this role and provided technical support to their partners.

Training opportunities for CSOs increased in some cities in 2018. In Hadramout, for example, trainers from new organizations like Salam wa Bena began to provide training on peace-building activities and conflict resolution. A number of groups continued to provide training and technical support in Sana’a. International Youth Council-Yemen trained several organizations on program management; Resonate! Yemen trained several CSOs on how to hold community hearings; Partners-Yemen trained facilitators on managing community dialogue and preventing violence among young people; and the Yemen Microfinance Network held a training for its members from several governorates on how to design effective strategic plans to help the organizations cope with volatile working circumstances.

As in 2017, some CSOs produced technical guides and training resources on various topics to help improve the efficiency of CSOs’ work. The SDF issued several guides, including on anti-corruption, monitoring and evaluation, and how to implement community-led initiatives to solve community problems. Youth Without Borders in Taiz issued a guide to field surveys. Attanweer Foundation in Ibb issued a guide on community accountability.

There are few local grant-making organizations in Yemen. Organizations generally receive funds from foreign or local sources, and then use them to carry out their own activities. Local CSOs do not grant donor funds unless they have agreed with donors to do so, often in partnership with other organizations. The Yemen Women’s Union, with support from the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), awarded small grants to ten initiatives as part of the project Combat Gender-Based Violence. Resonate! Yemen provided small grants to local CSOs to implement community accountability activities.
Although all sectors remained aware of the importance of collaborative efforts, the economic and security situation in Yemen continues to cripple intersectoral partnerships, especially as the public sector remains divided between the internationally-recognized government and Ansar Allah authorities.

CSOs still form alliances to implement joint activities. These alliances often come together under the umbrella of relief services provision, such as I’itilaf Al-Khair in Hadramout. Alliances are rarely formed for sensitive human rights or humanitarian issues.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.9**

The public perception of CSOs declined slightly in 2018, particularly in areas controlled by Ansar Allah.

Official media provides coverage of CSOs’ activities only in rare cases and usually only for specific organizations—namely those that work in humanitarian relief as well as those with connections to media outlets. In Hadramout, by way of exception, official media began to cover CSO activities in 2018. The Yemen and Aden television channels covered and supported CSOs’ campaign to reopen Al-Rayyan airport, as did the official radio stations in Hadramout.

By contrast, CSOs in areas under Ansar Allah control sought to avoid media coverage of their activities, as they are increasingly criticized and smeared by public officials. Organizations tend not to describe their activities even on their websites or social media accounts in order to avoid unwanted attention from authorities. Al-Awn Foundation asked its partners not to publicize any of the Foundations’ activities after authorities partially suspended its activities in Sana’a. Yemen Nama’a Network in Sana’a was interrogated about its activities in Marib after the media covered its activities.

Government perceptions of CSOs likewise vary across the country. In Taiz, the local council authorities held an event to honor community activists and other CSOs. The authorities also mourned the death of the activist Reham al-Badr; they posted her photographs in public places and also held an event for her forty-day death memorial. In Marib and Hadramout, government officials seem to have a similarly more positive perception of and relationship with CSOs.

Elsewhere, however, inflammatory rhetoric against CSOs increased, and officials increasingly accused CSOs—especially those working in human rights and community development—of being aligned with foreign governments. While there were no recorded instances of CSOs being suspended or closed as a result of this rhetoric, a rise in such speech coincided with increasingly restrictive practices by authorities in the areas under Ansar Allah control.

Media and official rhetoric influenced the public’s perception of CSOs, turning it increasingly negative in 2018. CSOs continued to use social media to try and improve their public image, particularly through outreach to their beneficiaries, awareness raising, and advertisement of their permitted, noncontroversial activities.

The increasing restrictions and extortion that CSOs often face from authorities has prompted many to be less disciplined about transparency in their operations. Few organizations publish annual reports on their activities, and if they do, they often withhold some information.
ANNEX A: CSO SUSTAINABILITY INDEX METHODOLOGY

INSTRUCTIONS FOR CSOSI IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS

2018 CSO SUSTAINABILITY INDEX

I. INTRODUCTION

USAID’s Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index (the Index or CSOSI) reports annually on the strength and overall viability of CSO sectors in Africa, Asia, Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, and Mexico. The CSO Sustainability Index is a tool developed by USAID to assess the strength and overall viability of CSO sectors in countries around the world. By analyzing seven dimensions that are critical to sectoral sustainability, the Index highlights both strengths and constraints in CSO development. The Index allows for comparisons both across countries and over time. Initially developed in 1997 for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, the CSO SI is a valued tool and methodology used by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), governments, donors, academics and others to better understand the sustainability of the civil society sector. USAID is continually striving to ensure the cross-national comparability of the Index scores, and to improve the reliability and validity of measurements, adequate standardization of units and definitions, local ownership of the Index, transparency of the process of Index compilation, and representative composition of panels delivering the scores.

Beginning with the 2017 Index and for the following four years, FHI 360 and the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) are managing the coordination and editing of the CSOSI. A senior staff member from both FHI 360 and ICNL will serve on the Editorial Committee as will one or more senior USAID/Washington officials. FHI 360 will provide small grants to local CSOs to implement the CSOSI methodology in country, while ICNL will be primarily responsible for editing the reports. Local Implementing Partners (IPs) play an essential role in developing the CSO SI and need a combination of research, convening, and advocacy skills for carrying out a high quality CSOSI.

Local Implementing Partners should please remember:

- Panels must include a diverse range of civil society representatives.
- Panelists should formulate initial scores for dimensions and justifications individually and in advance of the Panel Meeting.
- Discuss each indicator and dimension at the Panel Meeting and provide justification for the proposed score for each dimension.
- Compare the score for each dimension with last year’s score to ensure that the direction of change reflects developments during the year being assessed.
- Note changes to any indicators and dimensions in the country report to justify proposed score changes.
- The Editorial Committee will request additional information if the scores are not supported by the report. If adequate information is not provided, the EC has the right to adjust the scores accordingly.
II. METHODOLOGY FOR THE IMPLEMENTER

The following steps should be followed by the IP to assemble the Expert Panel that will meet in person to discuss the status of civil society over the reporting year, determine scores, and prepare a country report for the 2018 Civil Society Organization (CSO) Sustainability Index.

I. Select Panel Experts. Carefully select a group of at least 8-10 civil society representatives to serve as panel experts. Panel members must include representatives of a diverse range of CSOs and other stakeholders, such as:

- CSO support centers, resource centers or intermediary support organizations (ISOs);
- CSOs, community-based organizations (CBOs), and faith-based organizations (FBOs) involved in a range of service delivery and/or advocacy activities;
- CSOs involved in local and national level government oversight/watchdog/advocacy activities;
- Academia with expertise related to civil society and CSO sustainability;
- CSO partners from government, business or media;
- Think tanks working in the area of civil society development;
- Member associations such as cooperatives, lawyers’ associations and natural resources users’ groups;
- Representatives of diverse geographic areas and population groups, e.g., minorities;
- International donors who support civil society and CSOs; and
- Other local partners.

It is important that the Panel members be able to assess a wide spectrum of CSO activities in various sectors ranging from democracy, human rights and governance reforms to the delivery of basic services to constituencies. CSOs represented on the panel must include both those whose work is heavily focused on advocacy and social service delivery. To the extent possible, panels should include representatives of both rural and urban parts of the country, as well as women’s groups, minority populations, and other marginalized groups, as well as sub-sectors such as women’s rights, community-based development, civic education, microfinance, environment, human rights, and youth. The Panel should to the extent possible include an equal representation of men and women. If two or more representatives of the same CSO participate in the Panel, they can only cast one vote. It is recommended that at least 70 percent of the Expert Panel be nationals of the country that is being rated.

In some instances, it may be appropriate to select a larger group in order to better reflect the diversity and breadth of the civil society sector in the country. For countries where regional differences are significant, implementers should incorporate, to the greatest extent possible, differing regional perspectives. If financial constraints do not allow for in-person regional representation, alternative, low cost options, including emailing scores/comments, teleconferencing/Skype, may be used.
If there is a USAID Mission in the country, a USAID representative must be invited to attend the panel. USAID representatives that attend are welcome to provide some words of introduction to open the event, as it is funded by USAID, and they are welcome to observe and participate in the discussion. However, they will not have the ability to cast their vote in terms of scores.

Please submit to FHI 360 for approval the list of the Panel members who you plan to invite at least two weeks before the meeting is scheduled to occur using the form provided in Annex A. It is the responsibility of the IP to ensure that the panel composition, and the resulting score and narrative, are sufficiently representative of a cross-section of civil society and include the perspectives of various types of stakeholders from different sectors and different areas of the country.

2. Prepare the Panel meeting. Ensure that panel members understand the objectives of the Panel, including developing a consensus-based rating for each of the seven dimensions of civil society sustainability covered by the Index and articulating a justification or explanation for each rating consistent with the methodology described below. We encourage you to hold a brief orientation session for the panelists prior to the panel discussion. This is particularly important for new panelists, but is also useful to update all panelists on methodology and process changes. Some partners choose to hold a formal training session with panel members, reviewing the methodology document and instructions. Other partners provide a more general discussion about the objectives of the exercise and process to the panelists.

The overall goal of the Index is to track and compare progress in the sector over time, increasing the ability of local entities to undertake self-assessment and analysis. To ensure a common understanding of what is being assessed, the convener shall provide a definition of civil society to the panel members. The CSOSI uses the enclosed definition to ensure the report addresses a broad swath of civil society. In order to allow adequate time to prepare for the panel, distribute the instructions, rating description documents and a copy of the previous year’s country chapter to the members of the Expert Panel a minimum of three days before convening the Panel so that they may develop their initial scores for each dimension before meeting with the other panel members. It is critical to emphasize the importance of developing their scores and justifications before attending the panel. It is also important to remind panel members that the scores should reflect developments during the 2018 calendar year (January 1, 2018, through December 31, 2018). We also recommend you encourage panelists to think of concrete examples that illustrate trends, since this information will be crucial to justifying their proposed scores.

Lastly, it is highly recommended to compile and send to panelists data and information sources to guide them as they score. Recommendations of information sources are listed below under #4.

We are very interested in using the preparation of this year’s Index to track lessons learned for use in improving the monitoring process in upcoming years. In addition, we will solicit feedback through regional debrief meetings, and will create an online forum where IPs can share best practices, ask questions, and submit their comments or suggestions. These methods will be supplemented by brief satisfaction surveys that will be used to help evaluate the success of methodological and process innovations.

**Definition of CSO:**

Civil society organizations are defined “broadly as any organizations, whether formal or informal, that are not part of the apparatus of government, that do not distribute profits to their directors or operators, that are self-governing, and in which participation is a matter of free choice. Both member-serving and public-serving organizations are included. Embraced within this definition, therefore, are private, not-for-profit health providers, schools, advocacy groups, social service agencies, anti-poverty groups, development agencies, professional associations, community-based organizations, unions, religious bodies, recreation organizations, cultural institutions, and many more.”

3. Convene a meeting of the CSO Expert Panel.

3.a. We do not require panelists to score individual indicators but only overall dimensions. For each dimension, allow each panel member to share his or her initial score and justification with the rest of the group. (Note: If two or more representatives of the same CSO participate in the Panel, only one vote can be cast on their behalf.) Although scoring will not take place at the indicator level, please be sure that panel members discuss each indicator within each dimension of the CSOSI and provide evidence-based, country-relevant examples of recent or historical conditions, policies, and events within each of the dimension narratives. Please take notes on the discussion of each indicator and dimension, detailing the justification for all dimension scores, in the template provided. These notes must be submitted to FHI 360 with the first draft of the narratives (they do not have to be translated to English if not originally written in English).

At the end of the discussion of each dimension, allow panel members to adjust their scores, if desired. Then, for each dimension, eliminate the highest score and the lowest score (if there are two or more of the highest or lowest scores, only eliminate one of them) and average the remaining scores together to come up with a single score for each dimension. Calculate the average or arithmetic mean^1 of these scores for a preliminary score for the dimension. Please keep all scores on record, making sure that personal attribution cannot be made to individual panel members. Use a table similar to the one provided below to track panel members’ scores without personal attribution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel Member</th>
<th>Legal Environment</th>
<th>Organizational Capacity</th>
<th>Financial Viability</th>
<th>Advocacy</th>
<th>Service Provision</th>
<th>Sectoral Infrastructure</th>
<th>Public Image</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

3.b. Once a score is determined for a dimension, please have panel members compare the proposed score with last year’s score to ensure that the direction and magnitude of the change reflects developments during the year. For example, if an improved score is proposed, this should be based on concrete positive developments during the year that are noted in the report. On the other hand, if the situation worsened during the year, this should be reflected in a worse score (i.e. a higher number on the 1-7 scale).

A change of 0.1 should generally be used to reflect modest changes in a dimension. Larger differences may be warranted if there are more significant changes in the sector. The evidence to support the scoring change must always be discussed by the panel and documented in the dimension narrative. See CSOSI Codebook – Instructions for Expert Panel Members for more details about this scoring scale.

In addition, for each dimension score, review the relevant description of that dimension in “CSOSI Codebook – Tiers and Scores: A Closer Look.” Discuss with the group whether the score for a country matches that rating description. For example, a score of 2.3 in organizational capacity would mean that the civil society sector is in the “Sustainability Enhanced” phase. Please read the “Sustainability Enhanced” section for Organizational Capacity in “Ratings: A Closer Look” to ensure that this accurately describes the civil society environment.

If the panel does not feel that the proposed score is accurate after these two reviews, please note this when submitting proposed scores in your narrative report, and the Editorial Committee will discuss whether one or more scores needs to be reset with a new baseline. Ultimately, each score should reflect consensus among group members.

3.c. Discuss each of the seven dimensions of the Index and score them in a similar manner. Once all seven dimensions have been scored, average the final dimension scores together to get the overall CSO sustainability score. Please submit the table with the scores from the individual panelists together with the narrative report. Panelists should be designated numerically.

^1 Arithmetic mean is the sum of all scores divided by the total number of scores.
3.d. Please remind the group at this stage that reports will be reviewed by an Editorial Committee (EC) in Washington, D.C. The Editorial Committee will ensure that all scores are adequately supported and may ask for additional evidence to support a score. If adequate information is not provided, the EC may adjust the scores.

4. Prepare a draft country report. The report should focus on developments over the calendar year 2018 (January 1, 2018, through December 31, 2018).

The draft report should begin with an overview statement and a brief discussion of the current state of sustainability of the civil society sector with regard to each dimension. In the overview statement, please include an estimated number of registered and active CSOs, as well as a description of the primary fields and geographic areas in which CSOs operate. Also include a brief overview of any key political, economic, or social developments in the country that impacted the CSO sector during the year. If this information is not provided, the editor will request it in subsequent rounds, which will require additional work from you.

The report should then include sections on each dimension. Each of these sections should begin with a summary of the reasons for any score changes during the year. For example, if a better score is proposed, the basis for this improvement should be clearly stated up front. These sections should include a discussion of both accomplishments and strengths in that dimension, as well as obstacles to sustainability and weaknesses that impact the operations of a broad range of CSOs. Each indicator within each dimension should be addressed in the report.

The report should be written based on the Panel members’ discussion and input, as well as a review of other sources of information about the CSO sector including but not limited to analytical studies of the sector, statistical data, public opinion polls and other relevant third-party data. Some international sources of information and data that should be considered include the following:

- CIVICUS Monitor - [https://monitor.civicus.org/](https://monitor.civicus.org/)
- World Giving Index - [https://www.caonline.org/about-us/publications](https://www.caonline.org/about-us/publications)
- Varities of Democracy (V-Dem) - [https://www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/analysis/](https://www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/analysis/)
- Media Sustainability Index - [https://www.irex.org/projects/media-sustainability-index-msi](https://www.irex.org/projects/media-sustainability-index-msi)
- Nations in Transit - [https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/nations-transit#.Vdugbq5FOh1](https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/nations-transit#.Vdugbq5FOh1)
- ITUC Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights: [https://survey.ituc-csi.org/](https://survey.ituc-csi.org/)
- U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report: [https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/](https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/)
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: [https://carnegieendowment.org/regions](https://carnegieendowment.org/regions)

Please limit the draft reports to a maximum of ten pages in English. Please keep in mind that we rely on implementers to ensure that reports are an appropriate length and are well written.

While the individual country reports for the 2018 CSO Sustainability Index must be brief, implementers may write longer reports for their own use to more fully describe the substance of the panel meetings. Longer reports may include additional country context information or examples and could be used for a variety of purposes, including advocacy initiatives, research, informing project designs, etc.

Please include a list of the experts who served on the panel using the form provided. This will be for our reference only and will not be made public. Also, please remember to provide the individual panelists’ ratings for each dimension (with the names replaced by numbers).

Submit the draft country reports with rankings via email to FHI 360 by the date indicated in your grant’s Project Description.

5. Initial edits of the country report. Within a few weeks of receiving your draft report, FHI 360 and its partner, ICNL, will send you a revised version of your report that has been edited for grammar, style and content.
As necessary, the editors will request additional information to ensure that the report is complete and/or to clarify statements in the report. Please request any clarification needed from the editor as soon as possible, then submit your revised report by the deadline indicated.

6. Editorial Committee review. In Washington, an Editorial Committee (EC) will review the scores and revised draft country reports. The EC consists of representatives from USAID, FHI 360, ICNL, and at least one regional expert well versed in the issues and dynamics affecting civil society in the region. A USAID representative chairs the EC. If the EC determines that the panel’s scores are not adequately supported by the country report, particularly in comparison to the previous year’s scores and the scores and reports of other countries in the region, the EC may request that the scores be adjusted, thereby ensuring comparability over time and among countries, or request that additional information be provided to support the panel’s scores. Further description of the EC is included in the following section, “The Role of the Editorial Committee.”

7. Additional report revision. After the EC meets, the editor will send a revised report that indicates the EC’s recommended scores, and where further supporting evidence or clarification is required. Within the draft, boxes will be added where you will note whether you accept the revised scores or where you can provide further evidence to support the original proposed score.

The report should be revised and returned to the editor within the allotted timeframe. The project editor will continue to be in contact with you to discuss any outstanding questions and clarifications regarding the scoring and the report’s content. Your organization will be responsible for responding to all outstanding comments from the EC, as communicated by the project editor, until the report is approved and accepted by USAID.

8. Dissemination and promotion of the final reports. After the reports are approved by USAID and final formatting is conducted, the country reports will be grouped into regional reports. Each Implementing Partner will be responsible for promoting both the final, published country report and the regional report. Your organization will conduct activities to promote the Index’s use and its visibility. This may include organizing a local public event, panel discussion, or workshop and by making the report available electronically by web posting or creating a social network page for the country report and through the other methods described in your Use and Visibility Plan. Documentation that you have conducted these activities as described in that Plan must be submitted to FHI 360 before it will authorize the final payment.

III. THE ROLE OF THE EDITORIAL COMMITTEE

As an important step in the CSO Sustainability Index process, all country reports are reviewed and discussed by an Editorial Committee composed of regional and sector experts in Washington, DC, and an expert based in the region. This committee is chaired by a USAID Democracy Specialist and includes rotating members from USAID (past members have included experts from regional bureaus, the USAID Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance’s Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DCHA/DRG), the USAID Bureau for Economic Growth, Education and the Environment’s Local Solutions Office, and USAID Democracy, Human Rights and Governance foreign service officers). The committee also includes civil society experts from FHI 360 and ICNL.

The Editorial Committee has three main roles. It reviews all reports and scores to ensure that narratives are adequate and compelling from the standpoint of supporting the proposed score and to determine if the proposed change in score is supported by the narrative. A compelling narrative demonstrates that a score results from evidence of systematic and widespread cases and is not based on one or two individual cases. For example, a country environment characterized by a growing number of CSOs with strong financial management systems that raise funds locally from diverse sources is a compelling justification for an elevated financial viability score. A country in which one or two large CSOs now have the ability to raise funds from diverse sources is not. The Editorial Committee also checks that scores for each dimension meet the criteria described in “Ratings: A Closer Look,” to ensure that scores and narratives accurately reflect the actual stage of CSO sector development. Finally, the Editorial Committee considers a country’s score in relation to the proposed scores in other countries, providing a regional perspective that ensures comparability of scores across all countries.
CSOs are encouraged to remind their panels from the outset that the Editorial Committee may ask for further clarification of scores and may modify scores, where appropriate. **While implementing partners will have the chance to dispute these modifications by providing more evidence for the scores the panel proposed, the USAID Chair of the EC will ultimately have the final say on all scores.** However, by asking panels to compare their scores with last year’s scores and “Ratings: A Closer Look” (which is essentially what the Editorial Committee does), it is hoped that there will be few differences between proposed scores and final scores. Ensuring that the narrative section for each dimension includes adequate explanations for all scores will also limit the need for the Editorial Committee to ask for further clarification.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR CSOSI EXPERT PANEL MEMBERS

Introduction

USAID’s Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index (the Index or CSOSI) is a tool developed by USAID to assess the strength and overall viability of the CSO sectors. By analyzing seven dimensions that are critical to sectoral sustainability on an annual basis, the Index highlights both strengths and constraints in CSO development.

The Index allows for comparisons both across countries and over time. Initially developed in 1997 for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, the CSOSI is a valued tool and methodology used by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), governments, donors, academics and others to better understand the sustainability of the civil society sector. In 2018 the CSOSI was implemented in 72 countries.

Beginning with the 2017 Index and for the following four years, FHI 360 and the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) are managing the coordination and editing of the CSOSI. To develop the Index each year, FHI 360 provides small grants to local CSOs to serve as implementing Partners (IPs) that implement the CSOSI methodology in country. ICNL is primarily responsible for editing the country reports once they are drafted by IPs. A senior staff member from both FHI 360 and ICNL serves on an Editorial Committee that reviews all reports, as do one or more senior USAID/Washington officials.

The expert panel members for whom this Codebook is designed participate in in-country panel discussions on the seven dimensions of sustainability covered by the Index. The IP convenes these panel discussions annually to assess the situation of civil society in their countries and determine scores based on an objective analysis of the factual evidence.

The CSOSI team is continually striving to ensure the cross-country and cross-year comparability of the Index’s scores, as well as to improve the reliability and validity of measurements, standardization of definitions, local ownership of the Index, and transparency of the Index’s methodology and processes.

Therefore, FHI 360 has created this Codebook to inform and guide expert panel members through the scoring process. The Codebook provides definitions of the key concepts used to assess the overall strength and sustainability of the civil society sector in a given country, explains the scoring process, and standardizes the scale to be used when proposing score changes.

This is the first part of the Codebook, providing an overview of the concepts and processes that guide the expert panel members’ role in the CSOSI’s methodology. The second part of the Codebook provides descriptions, or vignettes, of each score for each dimension, to standardize expert panel members’ understanding of the scoring scale and to assist them in ensuring that scores are accurate.

CSOSI Methodology

The CSOSI measures the sustainability of each country’s CSO sector based on the CSOSI’s seven dimensions: legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, sectoral infrastructure, and public image. Its seven-point scoring scale mirrors those used by Freedom House in its publications “Nations in Transit” and “Freedom in the World.”

The Implementing Partner (IP) in each country leads the process of organizing and convening a diverse and representative panel of CSO experts. Expert panels discuss the level of change during the year being assessed in each of the seven dimensions and determine proposed scores for each dimension. The scores are organized into three basic “tiers” representing the level of viability of the civil society sector: Sustainability Impeded, Sustainability Evolving, and Sustainability Enhanced. All scores and narratives are then reviewed by a Washington, D.C.-based Editorial Committee (EC), assisted by regional civil society experts. The graph below summarizes the approach and process.
**Definition of Concepts**

The overall goal of the Index is to track progress or regression in the CSO sector over time, increasing the ability of local entities to undertake self-assessment and analysis. To ensure a common understanding of what is being assessed, panel members need a shared understanding of the key concepts underlying their assessment.

**Civil Society Organization**

Civil society organizations are defined:

“...As any organizations, whether formal or informal, that are not part of the apparatus of government, that do not distribute profits to their directors or operators, that are self-governing, and in which participation is a matter of free choice. Both member-serving and public-serving organizations are included. Embraced within this definition, therefore, are private, not-for-profit health providers, schools, advocacy groups, social service agencies, anti-poverty groups, development agencies, professional associations, community-based organizations, unions, religious bodies, recreation organizations, cultural institutions, and many more.”

This definition of CSO includes informal, unregistered groups and movements, but to be included in the CSOSI, the movement must possess the structure and continuity to be distinguished from a single gathering of individuals and from personal or family relationships. In many countries political parties and private companies establish and support CSOs, but these entities are usually either public, for-profit, or not self-governing.

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## Seven Dimensions of Sustainability

The CSOSI measures sustainability across seven dimensions by analyzing a series of indicators related to each dimension.

### 1. **LEGAL ENVIRONMENT:** The legal and regulatory environment governing the CSO sector and its implementation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Registration</td>
<td>Legal procedures to formalize the existence of a CSO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation</td>
<td>The enforcement of the laws and its effects on CSOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Harassment</td>
<td>Abuses committed against CSOs and their members by state institutions and groups acting on behalf of the state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxation</td>
<td>Tax policies that affect CSOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Resources</td>
<td>Legal opportunities for CSOs to mobilize financial resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Legal Capacity</td>
<td>Availability and quality of legal expertise for CSOs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2. **ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY:** The internal capacity of the CSO sector to pursue its goals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constituency Building</td>
<td>Relationships with individuals or groups affected by or interested in issues on which CSOs work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Planning</td>
<td>Organizational goals and priorities for a set timeframe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Management</td>
<td>Structures and processes to guide the work of CSOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO Staffing</td>
<td>Quality and management of human resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Advancement</td>
<td>Access to and use of technology</td>
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### 3. **FINANCIAL VIABILITY:** The CSO sector’s access to various sources of financial support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diversification</td>
<td>Access to multiple sources of funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Support</td>
<td>Domestic sources of funding and resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Support</td>
<td>Foreign sources of funding and resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundraising</td>
<td>CSOs’ capacity to raise funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earned Income</td>
<td>Revenue generated from the sale of products and services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Management Systems</td>
<td>Processes, procedures and tools to manage financial resources and operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4. **ADVOCACY:** The CSO sector’s ability to influence public opinion and public policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation with Local and Central Government</td>
<td>Access to government decision-making processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Advocacy Initiatives</td>
<td>Initiatives to shape the public agenda, public opinion, or legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobbying Efforts</td>
<td>Engagement with lawmakers to directly influence the legislative process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy for CSO Law Reform</td>
<td>Initiatives to promote a more favorable legal and regulatory framework for the CSO sector</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5. **SERVICE PROVISION:** The CSO sector’s ability to provide goods and services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Range of Goods and Services</td>
<td>Variety of goods and services offered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness to the Community</td>
<td>Extent to which goods and services address local needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituencies and Clientele</td>
<td>People, organizations and communities who utilize or benefit from CSOs’ services and goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost Recovery</td>
<td>Capacity to generate revenue through service provision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Recognition and Support</td>
<td>Government appreciation for CSO service provision</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 6. **SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE:** Support services available to the CSO sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intermediary Support Organizations</td>
<td>Organizations and programs that provide CSOs with training and other support services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Grant Making Organizations</td>
<td>Local institutions, organizations or programs providing financial resources to CSOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO Coalitions</td>
<td>Cooperation within the CSO sector</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The 2018 CSO Sustainability Index for the Middle East and North Africa

How to Score

The CSO Sustainability Index uses a seven-point scale from 1 to 7. **Lower numbers indicate more robust levels of CSO sustainability.** These characteristics and levels are drawn from empirical observations of the sector’s development in the region, rather than a causal theory of development. Given the decentralized nature of civil society sectors, many contradictory developments may be taking place simultaneously. The levels of sustainability are organized into three broad clusters:

- **Sustainability Enhanced (1 to 3)** - the highest level of sustainability, corresponds to a score between 1.0 and 3.0;
- **Sustainability Evolving** (3.1 to 5) - corresponds to a score between 3.1 and 5.0;
- **Sustainability Impeded (5.1 to 7)** – the lowest level of sustainability, corresponds to a score between 5.1 and 7.0.

### Scoring Process

The primary role of the expert panel is to provide an assessment of the CSO environment based on the seven dimensions mentioned above. During the panel discussion, panel members are tasked with discussing their initial scores for each dimension, including their evidence for these scores, and determining their final proposed scores for each dimension. The overall score for the country will be an average of these seven scores. Below are the steps to be followed by members of the expert panel:

**Step 1:** Please start by reviewing last year’s report and other sources of information about sectoral developments from the last year of which you are aware. Then, rate each dimension on the following scale from 1 to 7, with a score of 1 indicating a very advanced civil society sector with a high level of sustainability, and a score of 7 indicating a fragile, unsustainable sector with a low level of development. Fractional scores to one decimal place are encouraged. See “Scoring based on Level of Change” on page 8 below for guidance on how to determine proposed scores.

When rating each dimension, please remember to consider each indicator carefully and make note of any specific, country-relevant examples of recent or historical conditions, policies, or events that you used as a basis for determining this score.

**Step 2:** Review your proposed score for each dimension to ensure that it makes sense in comparison to last year’s score given the weight of the impact the developments will have at the sector level and the scoring guidance.

---

4 The ‘Sustainability Evolving’ categorization does not assume a direct or forward trajectory. Dimension and Overall Sustainability scores that fall within this category may represent both improvements and regressions.
below. In determining the level of change, look at the evidence of change and the various factors over the year being assessed that led to those changes (events, policies, laws, etc.).

**Step 3:** Once you have scores for each dimension, average these seven scores together to arrive at an overall CSO sustainability score and provide all these scores to the Implementing Partner before you attend the Expert Panel discussion.

**Step 4:** Attend the Expert Panel discussion. Listen to other experts describe the justification for their scores. After discussing each indicator in a dimension, you will have the opportunity to revise your proposed score. The Implementing Partner will use the consensus score as the final proposed score. If consensus is not reached during the discussion, the Implementing Partner will average the Expert Panelists’ scores, removing one instance of the highest and lowest scores, to arrive at the final scores that will be proposed to the Editorial Committee.

It is very important that the discussion includes specific examples and information that can be used to justify the Expert Panelist’s scores. Therefore, please come prepared to share specific evidence of examples to support trends you have noted during the year. **If adequate information is not provided, the Editorial Committee has the right to adjust the scores accordingly.**

**Scoring Based on Level of Change**

The level of change in a dimension from one year to the next is determined by assessing the impact of multiple factors including new policies and laws, changes in implementation of existing policies and laws, various organization-level achievements and setbacks, changes in funding levels and patterns, as well as contextual political, economic, and social developments. While individual examples may seem impactful on their own, ultimately a sector’s long-term sustainability only changes gradually over time as the implications of these positive or negative developments begin to be felt and their long-term effects take hold. Therefore, dimension-level score changes each year should not in normal circumstances exceed a 0.5-point change from the previous year\(^5\).

When determining what weight to give different trends and developments in how they affect the scores, consider the relative scope of the changes and the duration of their impacts. Those trends and developments that will have larger and longer-term impacts on the sector as a whole should be weighted more heavily compared to those that affect only limited parts of the sector and are more likely to change from year to year. For example, a demonstrated increased capability to mobilize domestic resources (e.g. through corporate philanthropy or crowdfunding), or a new mechanism for long-term funding of CSOs (e.g. through a basket fund or a tax designation mechanism) would signal a longer-term change in a sector’s financial viability than a one-year increase in donor funding to CSOs conducting work around national elections.

In determining how the level of change in the dimension of sustainability should translate into a change in score, the following scale can be used to assist expert panel members’ decision making:

**What was the overall impact of the change(s) on the dimension?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deterioration</th>
<th>Cataclysmic deterioration: Trends and developments have had a completely transformative negative effect on at least one or two indicators in the dimension and significantly affected other dimensions as well.</th>
<th>0.5 or greater</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Example: Legal Environment – A law has banned all international CSOs and their affiliates from the country, as part of the government’s systematic crackdown on civil society organizations.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^5\) **Note:** This scale has been adjusted for the 2018 CSOSI to more accurately reflect the scale at which trends and developments should impact a score given the definitions of the scoring scale above.
### Extreme deterioration
Trends and developments have had very important negative effects on at least one or two indicators in the dimension.

Example: Organizational Capacity – Economic depression and instability have led donor basket funds to close abruptly, leaving many major CSOs without funding for their activities. Outreach efforts to constituencies have been halted due to funding shortages and many major CSOs have lost their well-qualified staff members.

0.4

### Significant deterioration
Trends and developments have had important negative effects on at least one or two indicators in the dimension.

Example: Public Image – The government conducts a relentless media campaign to discredit the image of CSOs by calling them agents of foreign actors seeking to destabilize the country. At the same, the government intimidates media outlets and threatens them with retaliation should they partner with or cover CSO activities without prior approval by the government.

0.3

### Moderate deterioration
Trends and developments have had a somewhat negative impact in at least one or two indicators in the dimension.

Example: Legal Environment – In an effort to increase public revenue, the government has decided to increase fees by 100% for some types of government services, including CSO registration renewal fees, which were already very high according to many CSOs. As a result, some CSOs, particularly community-based organizations (CBOs), had to delay or suspend their activities.

0.2

### Slight deterioration
Trends or developments have had a slightly negative impact on at least one or two indicators in the dimension.

Example: Legal Environment – The government has decided that CSOs should submit their financial statement and annual activity report to the registration agency every year. This may have a long-term positive effect but in the short-term it has increased bureaucratic hurdles and the possibility of harassment by overzealous government officials.

0.1

### No Change
The country has not encountered any significant trends or developments in the dimension or developments have been both positive and negative in equal measure.

0

### Improvement

#### Slight improvement
Trends or developments have had a slightly positive impact on at least one or two indicators in the dimension.

Example: Legal Environment – To facilitate CSO registration, particularly for those in rural areas, the government has decided its registration agency will allow the agency to take applications locally and process registration directly at the district level. Now, CSOs in rural areas are not required to travel to the capital to apply. However, this measure is accompanied with a small increase in the registration fee.

0.1

#### Moderate improvement
Trends and developments have had a somewhat positive impact in at least one or two indicators in the dimension.

0.2
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example: Service Provision – To improve the effectiveness of public service delivery, the central government has decided that at least 10% of local government contracts for basic service delivery will be set aside for CSOs. The law is lacking in specificity, particularly around the application process, but it reinforces CSOs' image as credible partners.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Significant improvement:</strong> Trends and developments have had important positive effects on at least one or two indicators in the dimension.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example: Public Image – There has been a net increase of CSO partnerships with businesses. CSOs have also agreed to and published a general code of conduct for the sector, reinforcing a positive trend of greater transparency and accountability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Extreme improvement:</strong> Trends and developments have had very important positive effects on several indicators in the dimension.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example: Organizational Capacity – The government and international donors have launched a five-year multi-million dollar basket funds to support CSO-led activities and to strengthen CSO capacity, with a special focus on skills training for CSO staff members, particularly those from CBOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transformative improvement:</strong> Trends and developments have had a completely transformative positive effect on at least one or two indicators in the dimension and will potentially affect other dimensions as well.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example: Legal Environment – A nonviolent revolution that toppled an authoritarian regime and installed a more democratic regime has produced sudden political and legal changes that will protect basic freedoms and human rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5 or greater</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## ANNEX B: STATISTICAL DATA

### 2018 MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA SCORES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>CSO Sustainability</th>
<th>Legal Environment</th>
<th>Organizational Capacity</th>
<th>Financial Viability</th>
<th>Advocacy</th>
<th>Service Provision</th>
<th>Sectoral Infrastructure</th>
<th>Public Image</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## COUNTRIES RANKED BY SCORE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service Provision</th>
<th>Sectoral Infrastructure</th>
<th>Public Image</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUSTAINABILITY ENHANCED</strong></td>
<td><strong>SUSTAINABILITY ENHANCED</strong></td>
<td><strong>SUSTAINABILITY ENHANCED</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon: 3.4</td>
<td>Lebanon: 3.8</td>
<td>Lebanon: 3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq: 4.5</td>
<td>Egypt: 4.3</td>
<td>Morocco: 4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco: 4.5</td>
<td>Morocco: 4.9</td>
<td>Jordan: 4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan: 4.7</td>
<td>Jordan: 5.0</td>
<td>Iraq: 4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen: 4.8</td>
<td>Yemen: 5.1</td>
<td>Yemen: 4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt: 4.9</td>
<td>Libya: 5.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX C: REGIONAL MAP