2019 CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATION SUSTAINABILITY INDEX

FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
8th EDITION – DECEMBER 2020
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Developed by:
United States Agency for International Development
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance
Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance

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Disclaimer: The opinions expressed herein are those of the panelists and other project researchers and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or FHI 360.
Cover Photo: As part of the USAID-supported Iraq Governance and Performance Accountability (IGPA) project, known locally as Takamul or Integration, the Iraqi Development Association organized a solid waste management awareness campaign in the Ali bin Yakteen area and souq al-Basrah al-Qadeema (Basrah Old Market), the largest market in Basrah, which is visited by thousands each day. The media, local government, and volunteers helped the campaign give away calendars with educational messages on July 1, 2019.

Photo Credit: USAID IGPA/Takamul project
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INTRODUCTION

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is pleased to present the eighth edition of the CSO Sustainability Index for the Middle East and North Africa, covering developments in 2019.

This year’s Index reports on the state of CSO sectors in eight countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), including, for the first time, Tunisia. The Index addresses both advances and setbacks in seven key components or “dimensions” of the sustainability of civil society sectors: legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, sectoral infrastructure, and public image. The Index is intended to be a useful source of information for local and international CSOs, governments, multilateral institutions, donors, academics, and other partners and stakeholders who want to better understand and monitor key aspects of sustainability in the CSO sector.

The Index’s methodology relies on CSO practitioners and researchers, who in each country form an expert panel to assess and rate these dimensions of CSO sustainability during the year. The panel agrees on a score for each dimension, which ranges from 1 (the most enhanced level of sustainability) to 7 (the most impeded). The dimension scores are then averaged to produce an overall sustainability score for the CSO sector of a given country. A Washington, DC-based editorial committee composed of technical and regional experts reviews each panel’s scores and the corresponding narrative reports, with the aim of maintaining consistent approaches and standards so as to facilitate cross-country comparisons. Further details about the methodology used to calculate scores and produce narrative reports are provided in Annex A.

The CSO Sustainability Index for the Middle East and North Africa complements similar publications covering other regions. The various regional editions of the 2019 CSO Sustainability Index assess the civil society sectors in a total of seventy-four countries, including thirty-two in Sub-Saharan Africa; twenty-four in Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia; nine in Asia; and Mexico.

A publication of this type would not be possible without the contributions of many individuals and organizations. We are especially grateful to our local implementing partners, who play the critical role of facilitating the expert panel meetings and writing the country reports. We would also like to thank the many CSO representatives and experts, USAID partners, and international donors who participate in the expert panels in each country. Their knowledge, perceptions, ideas, observations, and contributions are the foundation upon which this Index is based.

In addition, special thanks goes to Eka Imerlishvili from FHI 360, the project manager, Jennifer Stuart from ICNL, the report’s editor, and Asta Zinbo and Mariam Afrasiabi from USAID, both of whom provided critical support for this edition of the CSO Sustainability Index. A full list of acknowledgements can be found on page ii.

Happy reading,

Michael Kott
Director, Civil Society and Peace Building Department, FHI 360
December 14, 2020
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 2019 CSO Sustainability Index for the Middle East and North Africa reports on advances and setbacks in seven key dimensions affecting the sustainability of the CSO sectors in eight countries: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Yemen, and, for the first time, Tunisia.

Several themes emerge from a review of the 2019 country reports. First, the legal environments governing CSOs continued to deteriorate, with more than half of the countries included in this edition of the Index reporting increasing problems with registration and government harassment, in addition to violations of the freedom of assembly. On the positive side, organizational capacity improved in four countries (Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen), driven by advances in constituency building. The infrastructure supporting the sector also improved in four countries (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Morocco), with CSOs having more access to various support services and increasingly developing coalitions and intersectoral partnerships.

In 2019, CSOs in most of the countries covered by this edition of the Index operated in unstable environments marked by public discontent, conflict, and limited civic freedoms.

Significant protests expressing public discontent with government policies, corruption, and economic conditions were organized in a number of countries in the region during 2019. In Lebanon, thousands of people took to the streets in October to express their discontent with the country’s struggling economy. For the first time in Lebanon’s history, these public protests brought together people from all sects and regions to challenge the political elite. Demonstrations continued through the end of the year, ultimately forcing the government to resign at the end of October.

Protests in Iraq also led to a change in government. Large-scale manifestations were organized in Baghdad and the Shia-majority provinces in October 2019, with demonstrators demanding the fulfillment of basic needs such as electricity and water, passage of a new election law, organization of early elections, job creation, and an end to corruption. In response to the demonstrators’ pressure for political change, Prime Minister Mahdi submitted his resignation on November 30.

In Jordan, beginning in February 2019, hundreds of young people marched in Amman and other cities to protest the government’s economic policies and demand greater job opportunities. The protests ended following a meeting between the protesters and the Royal Hashemite Court Chief, who pledged to address the protesters’ demands and work to provide them with employment opportunities. In response, the Ministry of Labor promised to create 3,300 jobs in tourism, industry, construction, health, and agriculture.

In Egypt, rare anti-government protests were organized in several Egyptian cities beginning in September after a businessman and self-proclaimed whistleblower released a series of videos on YouTube and Facebook that alleged corruption in the military establishment. The protests were met with a crackdown by security services.

CSOs played various roles in these protests. In Iraq, informal civil society groups and human rights activists played a vital role in leading demonstrations, while formally registered CSOs played a more limited role. In Lebanon, new civil society groupings, especially women’s groups, were at the forefront of protests.

In Yemen and Libya, CSOs’ ability to operate and provide services was affected by violent conflicts. The civil war in Yemen, exacerbated by external intervention, continued in 2019, with armed clashes between the internationally recognized government and the Houthi rebel group persisting mainly in the northern areas of the country. In August, fighting also erupted in Aden and nearby cities between the internationally recognized government, which is backed by a Saudi-led coalition, and a secessionist faction backed by the United Arab Emirates. As a result of the conflict, the humanitarian situation in the country remained dire, and CSOs continued to focus on the provision of relief services, including food assistance, protection, housing, and sanitation. In Libya, armed conflict between rival authorities broke out in the capital Tripoli in April, resulting in a major economic and humanitarian crisis. The conflict and increasing divide between governmental institutions had a negative impact on the sector’s legal environment, financial viability, advocacy, and public image.

The exercise of civic freedoms has long been a challenge in the MENA region and 2019 was no exception, with several country reports noting restrictions on the freedoms of expression and the press in particular. In Iraq,
The 2019 CSO Sustainability Index for the Middle East and North Africa

freedom of the press, particularly around reporting on corruption allegations, was restricted during the year. New regulations were introduced requiring anyone accusing a government official of corruption to provide evidence of the charges or risk legal consequences, and punitive measures were taken against reporters and media outlets reporting on public corruption. In addition, thirteen TV channels were closed for “violating professional codes of conduct,” although activists and human rights defenders believe that the stations were closed because of their coverage of the anti-government demonstrations. Finally, the government shut down the internet for five days in October during the demonstrations.

In Jordan, authorities blocked access to a news website that covers political affairs and documents the arrests of activists, and an online lifestyle magazine focused on lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex audiences. In addition, the Jordan Open Source Association reported that Facebook’s live-streaming function was blocked during large protests. In Egypt, a state of emergency that was extended repeatedly throughout the year gave the authorities greater power to censor the press.

Freedom of expression, especially through social media, was also increasingly threatened in Lebanon and Morocco. In Lebanon, the authorities used various provisions of the penal code to stifle criticism of public figures, institutions and bodies, or religion. Similarly, in Morocco, several internet-based activists, journalists, and other people were arrested and sentenced to harsh penalties for “freely expressing their opinions, and daring to openly criticize the authorities and central government entities on the internet.” In addition, in the fall of 2019, a journalist known for her coverage of Hirak—a protest movement that started in 2016 to demand better socioeconomic conditions in the Rif region—was arrested, charged with having an illegal abortion and engaging in extra-marital sexual activity, and sentenced to a year in prison without the possibility of parole before eventually being released.

According to Freedom House’s Freedom in the World, Tunisia is the only country of the eight included in this edition of the Index that is considered “Free.” In line with this assessment, the inaugural report for Tunisia indicates that CSOs operated in a stable environment that was free of conflict and mass protests, although there were reports of arbitrary arrests and the disproportionate use of force during protests.

**DETERIORATING LEGAL ENVIRONMENT**

The legal environment continues to be one of the weakest dimensions of CSO sustainability in the MENA region, with half of the countries included in this edition of the Index—Egypt, Jordan, Libya, and Yemen—reporting scores that fall within the weakest category of sustainability, Sustainability Impeded. In line with a long-running global and regional trend, five of the seven returning countries in this year’s Index—Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, and Yemen—reported further deterioration in the legal environments for the CSO sector in 2019.

Obtaining legal status continues to be difficult in the region and several countries noted increased problems with registration as a contributing factor in their declining legal environments in 2019. In Lebanon, for example, the issuance of registration receipts was increasingly perceived to require personal relationships with relevant authorities. Because of the increasing difficulties in registering as a nonprofit organization, several organizations instead opted to register as nonprofit civil companies, which involves an easier process. In Iraq, the Kurdish NGO Directorate suspended its online registration service in August, while the Federal NGO Directorate rejected the registration applications of more than 200 organizations on the grounds that they did not meet legal requirements.

Armed conflicts complicated registration in Libya and Yemen in 2019. In Libya, CSOs, especially those that work on the national level, had to register under both of the rival authorities in the country after fighting broke out in Tripoli in April. Similarly, in Yemen, the ongoing conflict and existence of rival authorities meant that many organizations were forced either to register twice or to register as new organizations if they wanted to expand their activities into regions controlled by the other side.

Registration of CSOs in Morocco continued to be subject to delays and hindered by the fact that various government entities impose different requirements. CSOs in Tunisia also reported delays in the registration process.

Several reports also noted increasing government harassment, including the closure of CSOs, as an increasing problem in 2019. In Yemen, for example, the authorities in Sana’a shut down an organization and prosecuted its staff after they alleged that some Houthi leaders were involved in the prostitution business. Staff members of another CSO were detained for more than two weeks for unclear reasons, causing it to shut down its office in
In Sana’a and move to Aden. In addition, government authorities sent representatives to observe the analyses of
tenders carried out by local organizations, especially larger ones, and asserted their authority to approve new staff
members in some organizations.

Government harassment of CSOs in Morocco, specifically those working on human rights issues, also increased in
2019. Most notably, in April, the Casablanca appeals court confirmed the decision to dissolve Racines, a human
rights CSO, marking the first time Morocco has ever formally dissolved an established CSO. The organization was
initially dissolved in December 2018 after it hosted a talk show about the political situation in Morocco, an activity
that the public prosecutor’s office argued was outside the organization’s objectives.

In Lebanon, CSOs experienced difficulties with their operations during the year because of the involvement of the
intelligence agency, General Security Directorate. In addition, in one instance, a protest against sectarian armed
conflict that had been approved by a municipality was cancelled following pressure from a political party.

Freedom of assembly was also restricted in the region in 2019, with government authorities in several countries
cracking down on protesters. In Iraq, security forces and armed militias responded harshly to the peaceful
demonstrations organized in the final quarter of the year. By the end of the year, more than 500 people had been
killed, while 22,000 demonstrators were injured; in addition, 56 protesters were abducted and missing and
hundreds of others had been arbitrarily arrested. In Lebanon, security forces used excessive force and failed to
protect protesters from attacks despite the peaceful nature of the protests. Security forces also intimidated
participants by taking pictures and videos and asking for lists of attendees to events organized by CSOs. In Egypt,
the public prosecutor claimed that the authorities detained 1,000 people following the protests, although the
Egyptian Commission for Rights and Freedoms, a Cairo-based CSO, cited at least 4,433 arrests. Those arrested
were charged with aiding a terrorist group, protesting illegally, misusing the internet, undermining national security,
and using social media to spread false news. Most of those arrested were released a few weeks later. In Morocco,
individuals who attended demonstrations were subject to interrogations and legal action. In addition, in April 2019,
an appeals court in Casablanca upheld a verdict sentencing approximately fifty leaders of the Hirak movement to
up to twenty years in prison.

In contrast to the deteriorating legal environment in much of the region, the legal environment governing CSOs in
Egypt improved slightly in 2019 with the adoption of a new framework law for the sector. The new law eases
registration slightly, eliminates prison sentences that were provided for in the previous law, and allows CSOs to
establish companies and investment funds. However, Egyptian CSOs continue to operate under a highly restrictive
legal environment and Egypt continues to have the worst score in this dimension, not only among the eight
countries included in this edition of the CSO Sustainability Index, but among any of the seventy-four countries
covered globally.

CSOS STRENGTHEN TIES WITH CONSTITUENTS

The organizational capacity dimension of the CSO Sustainability Index, which measures capacity at a sector-wide
level, is notably stagnant, with most countries showing little if any change from year to year. For example,
organizational capacity has been at the same level in Jordan since 2014, in Lebanon since 2015, and in Morocco
since 2016. In 2019, however, four countries—Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen—recorded improvements in this
dimension.

All four countries noted strengthened ties with constituents as an important part of the change. In Egypt, for
example, while organizational capacity remains quite limited, CSOs were able to develop stronger relationships
with their constituents through improved outreach to marginalized communities, including women, youth, and
people with disabilities. The CSO sector in Yemen also has very limited capacity but made progress in 2019 in
constituency building, with CSOs learning how to better assess their beneficiaries’ needs. For example, many
organizations developed community bodies to help define needs and design projects.

Active organizations in Iraq also built stronger relationships with their constituencies and potential beneficiaries in
2019, using methods including local networks, community dialogue, and social media channels to reach these
audiences. In Libya, CSOs in the south slightly increased their outreach and were in closer contact with their local
communities, while in the east, CSOs started to build new constituencies and expand their outreach in Benghazi.
While organizational capacity did not change in Jordan and Lebanon, CSOs in these two countries increasingly used social media to interact with their constituencies. In Jordan, for example, most CSOs now have Facebook pages that they use to engage with their constituents and publicize their activities.

CSO sectors showed growth in other aspects of organizational capacity in 2019 as well. Egyptian CSOs, for example, had clearer missions and goals; these goals tended to be more aligned with the government’s agenda due to their inclusion in plenary sessions around development issues. Some CSOs in Iraq—primarily those with foreign funding—demonstrated increased capacity to develop internal policies and annual and strategic plans and to engage in monitoring and evaluation and proposal writing. Strategic planning capacity also increased in Yemen, while the Libyan CSO sector’s access to information and communications technology and ability to utilize it effectively improved somewhat.

Despite this notable progress, organizational capacity in the region remains quite low. Half of the countries included in this edition of the Index—Egypt, Jordan, Libya, and Morocco—still have scores that fall within the Sustainability Impeded category, while Yemen and Iraq are at the very bottom of the Sustainability Evolving category. Without more investment in capacity-building initiatives, the ability of CSO sectors to contribute meaningfully to their societies will remain muted.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE STRENGTHENED**

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector improved in half of the countries covered in this edition of the Index, providing CSOs with additional resources to improve their capacity and the effectiveness of their work. Country reports for Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Morocco all note that CSOs had access to more support services and increasingly formed coalitions and intersectoral partnerships in 2019 than in 2018.

In Egypt, the number of resource centers increased during the year. In addition, cooperation within the sector increased, as did intersectoral partnerships, particularly with the government. For example, the Ministry of Social Solidarity emphasized that it now views CSOs as its primary partners and formed several partnerships with local CSOs to help them carry out their work.

In 2019, intermediary support organizations (ISOs) in Iraq, most of which are private companies, provided more services for CSOs and reached out to more CSOs to see how they can utilize their services. In addition, the NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq provided more trainings to its 180 CSO members on topics such as financial, human resource, and project management and provided more information to CSOs about available grants and trainings.

CSOs in Jordan benefited from new capacity-building programs, including an EU-funded program focused on building CSOs’ capacity to deliver services and influence political affairs. Jordanian CSOs also increasingly formed coalitions and engaged in participatory action. For example, a new alliance of CSOs called the Tazeel Alliance was formed in 2019. The Alliance, which includes twenty-five human rights CSOs from across the country, aims to strengthen the human rights system in Jordan. In addition, new public-private partnerships, including one that will train roughly 1,000 young adults to increase private sector employment, were formed in 2019.

In Morocco, programs and entities that provide capacity-building support to CSOs were created and institutionalized, boosting the sectoral infrastructure. In 2019, the USAID-funded Civil Society Strengthening Program came to an end, but it left behind five ISOs that will continue to provide expertise, capacity building, and advocacy support for local CSOs in the future. In addition, the Social Development Agency launched a new program to promote sustainable and inclusive local development, in part by strengthening the organizational capacity of CSOs. In addition, the government and civil society have started to develop some partnerships, specifically on issues related to employment and entrepreneurship.

The existence of such support structures should help to bolster the capacity and effectiveness of the CSO sectors in these countries in the future.
TRENDS IN CSO SUSTAINABILITY

CSO sustainability in the MENA region remains somewhat limited. Five of the countries covered by this edition of the Index—Lebanon, Tunisia, Iraq, Morocco, and Jordan—have overall CSO sustainability scores that fall within the Sustainability Evolving range, while the other three—Yemen, Egypt, and Libya—have scores within the Sustainability Impeded range. However, 2019 was a relatively good year for CSO sustainability in the MENA region, with three countries—Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan—recording improvements; only Libya recorded a deterioration in its overall CSO sustainability score.

While Egypt still has one of the weakest levels of CSO sustainability among the countries covered in the Index, it recorded slight improvements in most dimensions in 2019. In August, a new law governing CSOs was ratified, contributing to improvements in the legal environment, service provision, and sectoral infrastructure. While the new law continues to prohibit engagement in certain “political” activities, CSOs aligned with the government’s agenda on the environment and climate change, rights of people with disabilities, women’s economic empowerment, and capacity building enjoyed greater space in which to advocate, driving an improvement in advocacy. CSOs’ public image and organizational capacity also improved.

Overall CSO sustainability also improved slightly in Jordan in 2019, moving it out of the Sustainability Impeded category and into the Sustainability Evolving category for the first time since 2014. Positive developments in advocacy and sectoral infrastructure drove this change. Advocacy advanced as CSOs had greater access to government officials and achieved numerous advocacy successes, while the infrastructure supporting CSOs improved with the creation of a new CSO coalition, capacity-building programs, and public-private partnerships. Financial viability, on the other hand, deteriorated with increasing competition for decreasing funds.

The overall sustainability of the CSO sector in Iraq also improved, with progress being recorded in several dimensions. CSOs enjoyed increased space to advocate for different causes and provide services, while the sector’s public image of CSOs improved as CSOs developed stronger relationships with independent media outlets and some government bodies. Organizational capacity and sectoral infrastructure also improved, as described above. At the same time, however, the sector faced new legal challenges, including increasing difficulties with registration, while financial viability deteriorated as international funding for CSOs decreased.

Lebanon continues to record the highest level of CSO sustainability among the eight countries covered in this edition of the CSO Sustainability Index. Advocacy improved as people united in unprecedented protests and CSOs engaged in several successful advocacy campaigns. CSOs’ public image was boosted by increased public awareness.
of CSO activities and media reliance on CSO expertise. At the same time, the legal environment deteriorated slightly as registration became more difficult and the authorities cracked down on the protests and CSOs’ financial viability suffered as foreign funding declined and the economic crisis weakened CSOs’ spending power.

Tunisia was included in the CSO Sustainability Index for the first time in 2019. According to its inaugural report, CSOs in Tunisia have the second highest level of sustainability in the MENA region after Lebanon. Reflecting CSOs’ robust role in policy making since the 2011 revolution, advocacy is the strongest dimension of CSO sustainability in Tunisia. CSOs have successfully positioned themselves as key players in political dynamics and are a considerable force at both local and national levels. CSOs also benefit from a largely positive public image, with the population perceiving them as a genuine contributor to community development, although many CSOs struggle to promote their activities and work. The legal framework generally supports CSOs’ diversity and pluralism, but still presents several challenges, including the complexity of registration and tax exemption procedures. Organizational capacity and financial viability within the sector are relatively fragile. The vast majority of CSOs in Tunisia have major organizational capacity issues, including limited capacity to engage in strategic planning and a lack of qualified human resources, and CSOs continue to be largely dependent on foreign funding. While local CSOs have access to many capacity-building programs, most of these programs are based in the capital and this type of support is highly dependent on the availability of foreign funding.

CSO sustainability did not change significantly in either Morocco or Yemen. In Morocco, the legal framework governing the sector deteriorated slightly as government harassment of CSOs, particularly those working on human rights issues, increased, while the sectoral infrastructure improved slightly with the creation and institutionalization of programs and entities that provide capacity-building support to CSOs. CSOs in Yemen continued to have the lowest levels of sustainability after Egypt. Despite difficult circumstances during the year, the sector’s organizational capacity and financial viability improved. At the same time, the legal environment deteriorated, especially in Houthi-controlled areas, where new constraints were imposed on CSOs’ operations, and public image worsened as smear campaigns prompted widespread hostility to CSOs’ work.

Libya was the only country covered in this edition of the CSO Sustainability Index to record a deterioration in its overall CSO sustainability, which was already very weak. The conflict that broke out in Tripoli in April had a negative impact on several dimensions of sustainability. The legal environment worsened as CSOs working on the national level had to register in both the east and west. CSOs’ financial viability deteriorated further as a result of the dire economic situation, inflation, and lack of funding opportunities in the country. CSOs engaged in fewer advocacy campaigns in 2019 as the war and split in the legislative authority and government functions made it virtually impossible to make any changes in policies or laws. The conflict spurred disinformation campaigns and hate speech that affected CSOs and tarnished the sector’s image. The only dimension recording an improvement was organizational capacity, which strengthened as a result of projects that emphasized capacity building and mentoring for new and small CSOs.

CONCLUSION

The reports that follow provide an in-depth look at the state of CSO sectors in 2019 in eight countries in the MENA region. Of course, the world has changed dramatically since the end of 2019 with the global spread of the novel coronavirus, forcing CSOs and those they serve to navigate new realities. While the pandemic affected the way some of the reports for the 2019 Index were developed, its true impact will only be clear in the reports for the 2020 edition of the Index. Given the widespread economic impact of the pandemic, dramatic declines in financial viability are anticipated that could also have a devastating impact on other dimensions of sustainability. For example, the sector’s organizational capacity could be harmed as CSOs have less funding to retain staff, pursue their missions, and reach out to their constituencies. Meanwhile, advocacy efforts in many countries have been complicated throughout 2020 by public health orders that prevent the organization of large-scale protests and demonstrations, and by legislative bodies that have been focused on pandemic-related priorities, while demand for CSOs’ services—both in terms of the health and social and economic impacts of the pandemic—have likely increased. Although the 2020 reports are likely to describe dramatically different situations, we hope that this annual survey continues to capture useful trends for CSOs, governments, donors, and researchers.
Several noteworthy events took place in Egypt in 2019. The parliament approved four extensions of the state of emergency on the grounds that the country needed a stable climate to fight terrorism and carry out investment and development programs in key sectors, including transportation and infrastructure, tourism, telecommunications, and renewable energy. The state of emergency, which was still in place at the end of 2019, gave the authorities greater power to censor the press and impose curfews in certain areas.

In April, the parliament passed amendments to the country’s 2014 Constitution, which the public approved in a national referendum two weeks later. The amendments extend presidential terms—including the president’s current term—to six years and allow President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi to contest an additional term in 2024. The amendments broaden the role of the armed forces to include “safeguarding the Constitution and democracy, maintaining the foundations of the state and its civilian nature, the gains of the people, and the rights and freedoms of the individuals.” The amendments also expand the jurisdiction of military courts by allowing the trial of civilians who commit any “attacks” against the armed forces, rather than only “direct attacks” as per the previous wording.

In August, President Sisi ratified Law 149 of 2019 Regulating the Exercise of Civil Work (commonly referred to as the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Law). The new law replaced Law 70 of 2017, which was widely criticized for being draconian. While the government claimed that the new law responded to about 80 percent of CSOs’ demands, some human rights organizations have objected to the new law because it retained many of Law 70’s restrictions on CSO formation, funding, and activities.

In September, a businessman and self-proclaimed whistleblower released a series of videos on YouTube and Facebook that alleged corruption in the military establishment. The videos prompted rare anti-government protests in several Egyptian cities, which in turn provoked a crackdown by security services. Egypt’s public prosecutor claimed that the authorities detained 1,000 people following the protests. However, the Egyptian Commission for Rights and Freedoms, a Cairo-based CSO, cited at least 4,433 arrests. Those arrested were charged with aiding a terrorist group, protesting illegally, misusing the internet, undermining national security, and using social media to spread false news. Most of those arrested were released a few weeks later.

Egypt’s economy continued to struggle in 2019 despite improvements in macroeconomic indicators. For example, gross domestic product (GDP) grew at 5.6 percent compared to 5.3 percent in 2018. The International Monetary Fund stated that Egypt’s unemployment rate declined to 8 percent in late 2019, down from 9.9 in 2018. However, this growth was not felt throughout society. According to a 2019 study by Egypt’s Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), 32.5 percent of Egyptians lived below the poverty line, defined as less than EGP 735 (approximately $47) per month, and 6.2 percent of the population lived in extreme poverty.

Overall CSO sustainability in Egypt improved in 2019. Despite continued challenges, CSOs reported slight improvements across most dimensions. The legal environment improved with the adoption of Law 149. While Law 149 continues to prohibit engagement in certain “political” activities, CSOs aligned with the government’s agenda on the environment and climate change, rights of people with disabilities, women’s economic empowerment, and capacity building enjoyed greater space in which to advocate, driving an improvement in this dimension. By removing certain restrictive barriers, Law 149 also allows the government and CSOs to develop a more cooperative relationship, leading to improvements in service provision and sectoral infrastructure. Public image improved as media coverage of CSOs was more positive and both the public and the government perceived CSOs and their impact on society more positively. CSOs’ organizational capacity improved in 2019 as CSOs developed stronger relationships with their constituents and their ability to reach their targeted goals and successfully implement activities. Financial viability was the only dimension that remained unchanged.

As of the end of 2019, a total of 57,214 associations were registered with the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MoSS), including 65 international CSOs. Of these, 3,007 associations and foundations were registered in 2019, primarily after the new NGO Law was ratified. As in prior years, the vast majority of registered organizations are believed to be inactive or to exist on paper only. MoSS data indicates that only about 2,500 registered associations, or less than 5 percent, are considered active. Data is not available about the size or focus of these organizations.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.6**

The legal environment for CSOs improved slightly in 2019 with the ratification of a new law governing CSOs. Law 149 of 2019 Regulating the Exercise of Civil Work (commonly known as the NGO Law) replaced Law 70 of 2017 on Associations and Other Foundations Working in the Area of Civil Work. The new law was published in the official gazette on August 19, 2019. According to the Law, executive regulations to guide its implementation were to be issued within six months. By year’s end, executive regulations for Law 149 had yet to be issued. In the interim, some regulations related to the operations and day-to-day work of CSOs from an earlier CSO law (Law 84 of 2002) apply, as the executive regulations for Law 70 were never issued.

CSO registration was slightly easier after the passage of the new law, leading to an increase in the number of CSOs registered during the last few months of the year. The new law allows CSOs to be established through a notification process. However, the process requires the submission of extensive documentation, including the registration document, organizational bylaws, personal information and criminal records of all board members, property contracts, receipt of registration payment, and policies and procedures related to volunteers. In addition, the law gives MoSS broad discretion to reject registration during a sixty-day waiting period.

Although the vast majority of registered CSOs continue to be associations, more foundations were registered in 2019 than associations. While the fees to register a foundation are higher than those for an association, the
administrative procedures governing a foundation’s establishment are less complex. For example, a foundation does not need a separate general assembly; instead a Board of Trustees governs the organization. In addition, foundations require fewer members to register. While registration under the new NGO Law was easier, some CSOs with a prominent presence in the media were prevented from registering based on the Media and Press Law of 2018. For example, Radio Online for Divorced Women was denied registration as a CSO, and its website was blocked because it was considered a radio program and not a CSO.

A foreign or international CSO must additionally apply for and obtain an operating permit from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which authorizes its activities. Operating permits are valid for a “limited term,” determined by the minister in each permit according to the executive regulations to be issued. The maximum initial registration fee for a foreign or international CSO is EGP 50,000 (approximately $3,078), and it will increase 20 percent each time the license is renewed, up to a maximum of EGP 200,000 (approximately $12,312).

Law 149 requires all organizations doing “civil work” to register. According to Article 94, any individual who establishes or works with an unregistered or unauthorized organization is subject to a fine of no less than EGP 100,000 and no more than EGP 1 million (roughly $6,000-$61,500).

CSOs faced many operational hurdles under the new NGO Law in 2019, particularly as executive regulations had not yet been released. The law conceives of a narrow role for civil society, relegating it to the fields of “societal development” that consider “the development plans of the state and needs of the community.” As was the case with Law 84 of 2002 and Law 70 of 2017, domestic and foreign CSOs are still prohibited from pursuing “political activities” and activities that “harm” vaguely defined interests such as “national security,” “public order,” and “public morals.” Domestic CSOs are barred from conducting opinion polls and must obtain approval before carrying out field research. Prior MoSS approval is also required before CSOs may enter into any agreement or otherwise “join, affiliate, participate, or cooperate in any way” with a foreign organization or entity.

Like Law 70, the new law enables government oversight of and intervention in CSOs’ internal governance. For instance, the law requires CSOs to submit to MoSS the minutes of all board meetings and provides that MoSS may order the withdrawal of board decisions and disqualification of board member candidates. Article 30 of Law 149 also gives MoSS officials the right to inspect an association’s premises. While the officials must notify the association beforehand, if MoSS receives an “official complaint,” the officials may enter without prior notice. At the same time, however, Law 149 softens some of the stark restrictions in Law 70. For example, the law allows up to 25 percent—rather than 10 percent—of CSOs’ board of directors to be foreign residents. The law also prohibits board members from working as staff and regulates volunteer activity to ensure their compliance and protection.

With very few independent CSOs still operating, state harassment eased slightly in 2019. Law 149 dispensed with prison sentences that were provided for in Law 70, but maintains harsh penalties in the form of fines for various violations, which range from EGP 50,000 to EGP 1 million (approximately $3,000 to $60,000), and organizational leaders that fail to pay their fines are still subject to imprisonment according to the Penal Code. The new law also provides for numerous acts and omissions upon which the MoSS may suspend an organization’s activities or seek the court-ordered dissolution of the board or the whole organization. The new law replaced the security-heavy National Regulatory Agency for the Work of NGOs with a Central Unit of Civil Society Associations and Work. The Central Unit is responsible for monitoring funding from both local and foreign sources, and supervising all activities pertaining to CSOs.

Some prominent rights lawyers and activists were arrested in 2019, while others remained imprisoned or detained throughout the year. (See Advocacy section for more details.) Old charges also were used to harass CSO workers in 2019. For example, the Cairo Criminal Court postponed the hearing of three separate appeals by fourteen Egyptian human rights activists challenging travel bans against them. The cases began almost nine years ago and, as the activists’ lawyers pointed out, travel bans are legal for a maximum period of two years, so legally, the travel bans have expired.

The new NGO law retains very restrictive regulations regarding domestic and foreign funding. The law still provides the government with the right to block foreign or local CSOs from receiving or using funds, and still permits the government to dismiss CSOs’ boards and fine individuals for violating funding rules. Like Law 70, the law requires CSOs receiving foreign funding to inform the authorities in advance and wait sixty days for MoSS to approve the transaction, during which time they may not spend the funds. In contrast to Law 70, the new law states that the lack of a response during the sixty-day period may be considered approval, rather than a rejection. However, anecdotal evidence indicates that MoSS rejected some CSO funding requests beyond the sixty-day
window in 2019, generally for activities in controversial areas such as human rights and advocacy. These rejections cited the absence of executive regulations as a justification. CSOs are also required to notify MoSS when receiving or collecting donations from domestic sources. CSOs must obtain a license from MoSS to engage in fundraising activities by submitting a written request; such licenses are fairly easy to obtain.

The tax framework for CSOs remained unchanged in 2019. CSOs are exempt from certain taxes, including stamp duties on documents, real estate tax, income taxes on donations, and customs taxes. CSOs may claim exemptions for only one piece of property, while any additional premises owned are treated as commercial properties. Corporate donors to CSOs receive deductions of up to 10 percent of their taxable income. When filing lawsuits, legal and service providers working in the CSO sector must present tax forms in order to be exempted from paying large fees.

In a positive development, the new NGO Law allows CSOs to establish companies and investment funds. CSOs must invest any profits or returns in their social or charitable objectives with the approval of the minister of social solidarity.

Some legal entities provide legal assistance to CSOs, and CSOs specializing in legal matters conduct awareness-raising activities on legal issues affecting the sector. However, lawyers working in MoSS and with CSOs were unequipped to provide advice on the new law in 2019 because of the lack of executive regulations.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.5**

CSOs slightly improved their organizational capacity in 2019 as they developed stronger relationships with their constituents and their ability to reach their targeted goals and successfully implement activities increased. For the most part, the CSOs that exhibited increased capacity had missions aligned with the government’s agenda.

CSOs’ outreach to marginalized communities, including women, youth, and people with disabilities, improved in 2019. For example, some CSOs conducted extensive outreach activities that targeted women’s economic empowerment in several governorates and helped disadvantaged women to obtain IDs in collaboration with the National Council for Women. CSOs also reached out to women with disabilities, including through awareness-raising activities on their rights and protection strategies, and educated mothers on how to raise their children with different disabilities.

In 2019, CSOs had clearer missions and goals, which tended to be more aligned with the government’s agenda due to their inclusion in plenary sessions around development issues. CSOs’ strategic plans and management policies are now largely in line with the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and Egypt’s Vision 2030. Tanmiyet Watan Association, for example, added new programs in its strategy to address environmental issues and raise awareness on the protection of the environment in line with Egypt’s Vision 2030. Large, better-established organizations are more likely to have stronger management policies and procedures with clear hierarchies of staff and divisions of labor than smaller organizations.

The nature of staffing within CSOs continued to depend on CSOs’ areas of work in 2019. CSOs focused on development projects are more likely to hire staff for the duration of funded projects, while those focused on basic service delivery have more stable staffing patterns. The time and effort that CSOs allocate to training and recruitment varies based on the expertise required. As in 2018, some CSOs continue to train volunteers and recruit them to implement their projects. According to the 2018 State of the World’s Volunteerism Report published by United Nations Volunteers, in 2016, the volunteer workforce in Egypt in 2016 was 1,729,734 workers on a full-time equivalent basis. Of these, 55.3 percent were women and 44.7 percent were men. This figure appears to be modest in comparison to other countries included in the study, including other Arab countries. The
numbers reveal that volunteers represent only 2.85 percent of the total population above fifteen years old, and that men’s participation has declined in relation to that of women. However, according to some official estimates, the number of volunteers in Egypt is over 3 million based on criteria given by a representative at the Ministry of Youth and Sports. The Charities Aid Foundation’s 2019 World Giving Index indicates that an average of just 6 percent of Egyptian respondents reported volunteering in CSOs in the last ten years, placing Egypt at 121st place out of 125 countries.

In 2019, CSOs used digital technology to access information, target their outreach, and recruit employees. CSOs frequently use apps such as LinkedIn and Facebook and websites such as Wuzzuf to post job openings and screen applicants. CSOs also use Facebook, the Al-Mahrous Portal to Support Civil Society, and other sites to exchange information and communicate with their constituencies.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.0

CSO financial viability did not change in 2019. Although the new NGO Law theoretically eases CSOs’ access to financial resources, CSOs feel that the government used the absence of executive regulations as an excuse to stall and restrict funding to CSOs. This was particularly a problem for CSOs working in areas outside of the government’s national agenda and on religious, ethnic or controversial human rights agendas topics.

An online survey of approximately twenty-nine CSOs that was conducted to collect information for the CSO Sustainability Index presented mixed results about CSO funding in 2019. Approximately one-third (32 percent) of respondents reported increases in domestic funding, while 26 percent of respondents reported that domestic funding had declined and 42 percent reported seeing no change. In contrast, 42 percent of respondents reported declines in foreign funding, while 32 percent reported increases, and 26 percent reported no change. Approximately one-third (32 percent) of respondents viewed their access to multiple funding sources as having improved, while 37 percent reported that access to multiple funding sources had become more difficult, and 31 percent reported no change. The survey also indicated that 37 percent of respondents believed that their ability to raise funds had worsened, while 26 percent thought that it had improved, and 37 percent saw no change.

According to a July 2020 interview with an official from MoSS, in 2019 a total of 208 CSOs—both international and national—received 517 foreign-funded grants valued at a total value of EGP 1.016 billion (approximately $63.5 million). To support the government’s focus on climate change and youth, the European Union (EU) issued a new call for proposals in March 2019 under its thematic program “Civil Society Organizations and Local Authorities” with a budget of EUR 3 million (approximately $3.4 million). It aims to fulfill the EU’s global objective of helping CSOs engage as actors in governance and development. The Finnish Embassy in Egypt announced a call for proposals under its Local Cooperation Fund (LCF) in 2019. This fund supports civil society’s participation in Egypt’s development process with a particular focus on women’s empowerment and gender equality. Five grants with a total value of approximately EUR 340,000 were awarded in 2019.

The government continues to provide some contracts and grants to CSOs, primarily through MoSS. CSOs, primarily those working closely with the government, conducted limited fundraising activities in 2019. For example, the Dar El Orman Association raised donations for a cancer institute in Cairo after it was damaged in a terrorist attack in 2019. Once rebuilt, the center was able to provide patients with free treatment and transportation. However, CSOs do not view such donations as stable sources of income.

In order to generate steady income, in 2019, several CSOs created tourism companies while other organizations worked in microcredit. Other examples of social enterprises include Wayana for Integration and Awareness; Fambrella, which organizes activities focused on positive parenting and children’s edutainment; Edu Foundation;
Masr Topia, which works on children’s development and soft skills; Smart Careers; and INTApreneur. In addition, many other CSOs work on youth skills development and entrepreneurship.

The new law introduces more stringent financial management requirements for CSOs. For example, CSOs need to keep both electronic and hard copies of financial records, bank books, and registers of revenues and expenses, fixed assets, cash and in-kind donations, and domestic and foreign funds. These registers need to be kept in accordance with the samples to be provided in the executive regulations. However, many CSOs still lack the capacity to meet these new requirements. As was the case under the old NGO Law, CSOs are required to undergo annual external financial audits under the new law.

**ADVOCACY: 5.5**

CSO advocacy improved slightly in 2019. While Law 149 continues to prohibit engagement in certain “political” activities, CSOs aligned with the government’s agenda on the environment and climate change, rights of people with disabilities, women’s economic empowerment, and capacity building enjoyed greater space in which to advocate.

CSOs were involved in several events focused on national development in 2019. In November 2019, the League of Arab States (LAS) organized Arab Sustainability Development Week in Cairo. The event brought together 1,300 senior officials and decision makers from the government, CSOs, and private sector concerned with sustainable development issues in the Arab region to promote the adoption of the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its seventeen SDGs as part of national development strategies. Similarly, the Ministry of Planning organized a community dialogue workshop to encourage a “new plan of development” to realize Egypt’s Vision 2030. Participating CSOs were able to gain knowledge and present their perspectives.

CSOs that were not politically affiliated and whose activities aligned with government priorities were successful in reaching policy makers and participating in policy and decision-making processes in 2019. For example, CSOs such as Rise Egypt that work in the economic sector were able to continue their activities effectively. The government and CSOs carried out numerous joint initiatives to protect the environment and address climate change in 2019. For example, the Ministry of Environment, in collaboration with CSOs such as Nature Conservation Egypt and Tanmiyet Watan Association, implemented awareness-raising activities to preserve biodiversity and reduce pollution and encroachments threatening natural protectorates and the Nile River. Other joint initiatives addressed waste treatment, control of industrial pollution, and alternative uses for agricultural waste.

The National Committee against Female Genital Mutilation, which includes several CSOs working on women’s issues, conducted a campaign called “Protect her from Circumcision.” The campaign involved door-to-door canvassing, training, awareness-raising seminars and meetings, and educational and medical convoys reaching a large number of girls and women across the country. A social leadership program, which prefers to remain unnamed, promoted youth leadership. These efforts reached more than 3,000 young women and men in twenty-three governorates and resulted in the development of a network of more than 170 CSOs to develop simulation games and youth-led initiatives.

The National Coordination Committee for Preventing and Combating Illegal Migration and Trafficking in Persons (NCCPIM&TIP) worked with some CSOs to conduct a number of workshops and events to raise awareness of the problem of human trafficking and smuggling of migrants. Also, in 2019, NCCPIM&TIP launched a national campaign entitled “Together Against Trafficking in Persons” to raise awareness of the dangers of human trafficking, encourage the public to report incidents, and advocate for deterrent legal penalties.
Other CSOs—including those that were politically involved, engaged on issues not aligned with government priorities, or seeking to conduct advocacy activities—were prevented from pursuing their aims in 2019. For example, the Egyptian government blocked some news websites, some of which were affiliated with CSOs, from reporting on the September unrest. In accordance with the new NGO Law, CSOs were required to obtain security clearances from CAPMAS before conducting field research or publishing their results; this required the submission of organizational information, as well as the planned research methodology. It was easier to obtain clearance to conduct online and phone surveys. For example, one CSO conducted an online survey of youth perceptions of community participation, volunteerism, and engagement in the public sphere with around 1,000 respondents from fifteen governorates covering both urban and rural settings.

CSOs’ complaints about Law 70 led to the government’s deliberation and passage of the new NGO Law in 2019. The General Federation of Associations and Foundations, as well as some active CSOs with good connections to the government, such as Misr El-Kheir, contributed opinions and inputs during the process of drafting Law 149. However, many organizations expressed concerns that CSOs that were politically engaged or not on good terms with the government did not participate in these consultations.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.7**

CSO service provision improved moderately in 2019. According to the online survey conducted for the CSO Sustainability Index, 62 percent of respondents believed that CSOs’ capacity to provide services had improved over the past year.

CSOs provide services ranging from skill building and education to health care and the care of persons with disabilities and special needs. Educate Me Foundation signed a protocol with the Ministry of Education to support and develop education in Egypt at the national level. This protocol targets public, technical, and community schools as well as students of various backgrounds, school principals, and teachers, aiming to build the capacities of all those involved in the educational process.

The Egyptian government emphasized services to persons with disabilities in 2019. With support from MoSS, in 2019 the Nasser Social Bank created the first charitable investment fund in Egypt called “Atta’a” (Donating or Giving) to support people with disabilities. This fund’s profits and returns are invested in social and charitable ventures through a number of entities such as CSOs, government agencies, or affiliated bodies related to charitable activities. The Egyptian Association for the Advancement of Persons with Disabilities and Autism, in partnership with the National Bank of Egypt, implemented “Forsity” (My Chance), which provides autistic and mentally disabled individuals with skills to advance their employment and social integration.

CSOs improved their relationships with local government officials in 2019, thereby allowing them to better identify and serve local needs. The governors of Fayoum and Qena met with a CSO, which prefers to remain unnamed, to discuss the local population’s needs. These governors helped the organization provide its services more efficiently by helping it obtain the necessary clearances from the relevant ministries.

The new NGO Law allows CSOs to invest surplus funding in projects supporting their missions. Many service-providing CSOs now have income-generating activities to help them ensure their financial sustainability. For example, organizations such as Yadaweya train women to make handicrafts and host regular exhibitions at which they sell their work to generate income. In October 2019, the Medium, Small, and Micro Enterprises Development Agency (MSMEDA) hosted the “Our Heritage” exhibition, which featured more than 500 exhibitors, most of which were CSOs working on handicraft production.

The passage of Law 149 indicates the Egyptian government’s increased willingness to engage with and aid CSOs with their ventures. By removing certain restrictive barriers, it allows the two sectors to develop a more
cooperative relationship. In 2019, MoSS stated that CSOs are their primary partners in all projects and that it seeks to build solid partnerships with active organizations. In 2019, MoSS signed protocols with several CSOs to implement the “Hayah Karima” (Honorable Life) Initiative, which supports people living in low-income areas by bridging the development gap in villages through a number of sectors and investing in human development to bring positive change in the communities’ standard of living.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.2**

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector in Egypt improved slightly in 2019, driven by increases in partnerships between the government and CSOs. In addition, more centers now support CSOs in the implementation of their programs.

The number of resource centers increased during the year. Eleven banks opened centers to assist small and medium-sized projects, including those of CSOs, as part of the Pioneers of the Nile project, which covers fifteen governorates and will eventually open thirty centers for business development. The Professional Development Foundation’s (PDF’s) Civil Society Support Center offered several training programs to develop the capacity of CSOs in 2019. PDF also hosts the annual NGO Excellence Award, which rewards innovative Egyptian NGOs that work in human and community development. Winners receive cash prizes ranging from EGP 50,000 to 150,000 (approximately $3,000 to $9,000).

A few local grant-making organizations exist. For example, Sawiris Foundation for Social Development in partnership with Al Ahram Beverages Company and Shorouk Misr Foundation provided a combined grant of approximately EGP 6 million (approximately $371,000) to Siwa Society for Community Development and Environmental Protection to provide healthcare services, water improvement, and economic empowerment services to residents in Siwa.

Cooperation within the CSO sector increased in 2019, as organizations from different governorates with common aims joined forces and helped one another. For instance, around 300 CSOs focused on women’s rights worked together to improve women’s livelihoods and protection in accordance with the National Strategy for the Empowerment of Egyptian Women 2030, also known as the National Women’s Strategy (NWS). At one of their meetings, they reviewed the report submitted by Egypt as part of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process and stressed the importance of this process.

Large international CSOs, such as Save the Children and Plan International, continued to offer workshops to build the capacity of small local CSOs. The EU-funded program Support Civil Society Organizations, Egypt supported capacity building initiatives aimed at increasing the participation of CSOs in mitigating climate change. GIZ, the German development agency, provided local CSOs with training in project planning in the context of its Participatory Infrastructure Project (PIP). MoSS has discussed the possibility of starting an academy to increase the managerial expertise of CSOs.

The Ministry of Youth and Sports started a training program in 2019 called Your Hands Are With Us that stresses the inclusion of youth in civil society activities. This initiative aims to engage youth in planning and decision making by strengthening their leadership and project management skills, developing their planning capabilities, and enhancing their ability to monitor and innovate. By doing so, CSOs will have access to a stronger caliber of youth participants to support their initiatives.

Intersectoral partnerships increased in 2019. Most CSO projects are required to have a governmental affiliation, and the government is starting to recognize the importance of collaborating with local CSOs. In 2019, MoSS emphasized that CSOs are now seen as its primary partners and formed several partnerships with local CSOs to help them carry out their work. CSOs worked with the National Bank of Egypt on the economic empowerment of...
the disabled through a project called My Chance. Large businesses such as Vodafone, CIB, Itisalat, and Orange have nonprofit foundations that emphasize partnerships with other local and national CSOs. For example, Vodafone worked with the Egyptian National Food Bank to pack more than 5,000 food boxes and distribute them in Badrashin district in Giza governorate.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.9**

The public image of CSOs improved slightly in 2019. Media coverage of CSOs was more positive in 2019 than in previous years, and both the public and the government perceived CSOs and their impact on society more positively.

Many observers noted that the media lessened their attacks on CSOs and increased their coverage of CSOs’ events in 2019. Several articles in local online newspapers also highlighted the benefits of CSO projects. For example, an article in the national newspaper Al Ahram stressed that cooperation between government institutions and CSOs is the only way to eliminate female genital mutilation in Egypt. Media also provided extensive positive coverage of CSOs as the new NGO Law was under development. At the same time, CSOs that were not working towards the national agenda generally did not receive media coverage.

The government’s perceptions of CSOs improved in 2019 as it began to see the potential for mutually beneficial collaborations, particularly in terms of service provision and implementing Egypt’s Vision 2030. In addition to MoSS stressing the importance of partnerships with CSOs, the Ministry of Local Development also acknowledged the importance of working with CSOs to develop the first phase of the Needy Villages Reconstruction Initiative. The improved government perceptions of CSOs was reflected in the creation of Law 149.

The government’s acknowledgement of the importance of CSOs’ role helped improve public perceptions of CSOs in 2019. Sixty percent of respondents in the online survey reported that public perceptions of CSOs were better in 2019. This high level of public approval represents a turn-around from CSOs’ negative image in 2018, when the 57357 Children’s Cancer Hospital Foundation was alleged to mismanage funds and engage in corrupt practices. However, after MoSS issued a press release in December 2018 stating that the allegations against the hospital were invalid, public opinion of CSOs recovered. The public also increasingly acknowledged the positive outcomes of CSO’ work and sought CSOs’ help in implementing projects in their communities.

CSOs improved their efforts to promote their organizational image in 2019. For example, CSOs increasingly promoted their image through large media campaigns during the holy month of Ramadan and Eid Al-Adha (the feast of sacrifice). Article 67 of Law 149 requires CSOs to publish databases about their activities. This increased CSOs’ transparency and allowed the public and media to learn about their work.

According to more than 50 percent of the online survey respondents, CSOs’ efforts to self-regulate were stronger in 2019. Once the executive regulations are issued, all CSOs will be obligated to adhere to rules and regulations, including a code of ethics, and to develop policies and procedures for combating terrorism and anti-money laundering. To prepare for the release of these regulations, in 2019 CSOs took steps to develop policies and procedures and complete external financial audits.
The government of Iraq (GOI), which formed in October 2018 and was led by Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi, faced numerous challenges in 2019, including corruption and conflicts with militias and regional powers. In July, Prime Minister Mahdi issued a decree ordering militias to integrate more closely into the formal armed forces; however, this had little effect. The country also hosted a considerable number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, while the Iraqi population's basic needs were largely unmet, and unemployment was high.

In this context, large-scale protests were organized in Baghdad and the Shia-majority provinces early in October 2019. Demonstrators demanded that their basic needs—including electricity and water—be met, a new election law be passed and early elections organized, the creation of jobs, and an end to corruption. In response to the demonstrators’ demands for changes to the political system, Prime Minister Mahdi submitted his resignation on November 30, which the Iraqi Council of Representatives accepted in December 2019.

Informal civil society groups and human rights activists played a vital role in leading the demonstrations. The demonstrations were initially organized by individuals, who then formed informal and volunteer-based groups to maintain the protests. Syndicates and teachers’ unions also played an important role in the demonstrations. CSOs that are formally registered as NGOs played a more limited role. In some cases, this was because they wanted to protect their relationships with governmental institutions, which they rely on to implement their donor-funded projects. Security forces reacted harshly to the protests, with hundreds killed, thousands injured, and hundreds of arbitrary arrests. Despite this harsh response, the anti-government protests paved the way for the emergence of new social and youth movements.

The Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) is an autonomous region within Iraq governed by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Following parliamentary elections held in September 2018, the new cabinet of the KRG was established in July 2019. The elected prime minister, Masrour Barzani, was the former Chancellor of the Kurdistan Region Security Council (KRSC), leading observers to expect the new government to focus more on security and to be less supportive of independent CSOs. Soon after the formation of the KRG’s new cabinet, the Kurdish NGO Directorate promulgated several procedures that constrained the democratic space in which CSOs operate, such as requiring international NGOs to submit burdensome documentation.

The government continued to close and consolidate IDP camps and facilitate the return of IDPs to their places of origin, especially in Ninewa, throughout the year. According to the Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) cluster, a total of fifty-four camps were closed or consolidated in 2019, leaving sixty-seven camps open at the end of the year. The number of IDPs and refugees was also reduced significantly. CSOs continued to deliver aid and provide services to IDPs, refugees, and other people who were severely affected by displacement and...
conflict. CSOs were also able to diversify their services across the country and continue working on peacebuilding and social cohesion programs.

Freedom of the press was restricted during the year. In May, the Supreme Council for Combating Corruption enacted new restrictions requiring anyone who accuses a government official of corruption to provide evidence of the charges to the council within two weeks or otherwise risk legal consequences. In July, police raided the home of a reporter for the Iraqi news broadcaster INEWS in Basra after he published a report exposing misuse of public funds by a senior government official. In September, Iraqi authorities suspended the license of Al-Hurra, a regional broadcaster funded by the U.S. Agency for Global Media, for three months, claiming it did not provide evidence to support its accusations of corruption within the Sunni and Shia Muslim funding networks and for alleging that armed groups behind attacks on protesters and dissidents are connected to the government. In November, the Communications and Media Commission ordered thirteen TV channels and radio stations to close for “violating professional codes of conduct;” activists and human rights defenders believe that the stations were closed because of their coverage of the anti-government demonstrations. In addition, the government shut down the internet in October for five days to block access to social media including messaging services during the demonstrations. According to Amnesty International reports, the government continued to restrict access to the internet throughout the protests to control communication and impede the organization of the protests.

The overall sustainability of the CSO sector improved in 2019 despite new legal and financial challenges. In August, the Kurdish NGO Directorate suspended the online registration process for NGOs, while the Federal NGO Directorate in Baghdad rejected hundreds of NGO registration applications due to a lack of documentation. CSOs’ financial viability deteriorated as international funding for CSOs decreased. At the same time, CSOs enjoyed increased space to advocate for different causes and provide services. The organizational capacity, sectoral infrastructure, and public image of CSOs also improved.

Registered NGOs make up the majority of the Iraqi CSO sector, which also includes media outlets, syndicates, think tanks, and research centers, as well as unregistered, informal groups. The number of NGOs increased considerably in 2019. By December 2019, there were around 5,000 NGOs registered with Iraq’s Federal NGO Directorate, compared to 4,500 in 2018. In Kurdistan, there were 5,100 NGOs registered with the Kurdish NGO Directorate, up from 4,002 in 2018. However, the majority of NGOs registered with GOI and KRG continue to be inactive.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.7

The legal environment governing CSOs in Iraq deteriorated slightly in 2019, as CSOs were subjected to more political interventions and extralegal requirements. In addition, new measures introduced by regional and federal governments impeded CSOs from legally registering and operating.

According to Article 45 of the Iraqi Constitution, “The State shall seek to strengthen the role of civil society institutions, and to support, develop and preserve their independence in a way that is consistent with peaceful means to achieve their legitimate goals.” Law No. 12 of 2010 in Iraq and Law No. 1 of 2011 in the IKR remain the primary legal instruments governing NGOs operating in areas under the control of the GOI and KRG, respectively. According to these laws, the Federal and Kurdish NGO Directorates are responsible for registering, organizing, supervising, and monitoring NGOs. Law No. 18 of 1993 regulates syndicates and unions in IKR; no comparable law exists in Iraq’s federal region.

CSOs are required to register to operate in federal Iraq, while CSOs are able to operate in IKR without official registration. Kurdish Law No. 1 clearly states that NGOs registered by the federal government shall automatically be considered registered in IKR, but they should provide the Kurdish NGO Directorate with some information, such as the name of the NGO and its representatives, contact information, and address. In contrast, NGOs that
are registered in IKR must also register with the Federal NGO Directorate to operate in federal Iraq. Regardless of the governmental requirements, donors usually only fund registered CSOs.

In 2019, NGOs faced numerous challenges when seeking to register both in Baghdad and Erbil. Without providing a reason, the Kurdish NGO Directorate suspended its online registration service in August 2019. The Federal NGO Directorate rejected the registration applications of more than 200 NGOs in 2019 on the grounds that the NGOs did not meet the requirements of Federal Law No. 12. In addition, the Federal NGO Directorate publicly announced a list of the names of more than 150 NGOs, warning them to complete their applications, or else their requests would be rejected.

In 2019, the NGO Directorates in Baghdad and Erbil asked national and international organizations to submit activity and financial reports in order to renew their administrative orders—an annual procedure under which registered NGOs verify that they are active—despite the fact that renewing an administrative order is not a legal requirement according to either Federal Law No. 12 or Kurdish Law No. 1. “Renewing an administrative order” also became a precondition to opening a bank account in the Kurdistan region. As a result, several organizations, including Christian Aid and PAX, were not able to open bank accounts. In addition, the Kurdish NGO Directorate issued a special order in October 2019 requiring international organizations to submit several documents, some of which were bureaucratically burdensome. For example, international organizations are now required to write their activity reports in Kurdish, submit a list of their board members, and submit documents in hard copy.

In 2019, both the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Center (JCMC) of the GOI and the Joint Crisis Coordination Centers (JCCC) of KRG continued to ask CSOs to obtain and renew on a monthly basis letters authorizing them to move and transfer personnel and supplies to and from areas liberated from the control of the Islamic State in 2017. However, in response to the demonstrations and political instability in the country, at the beginning of December 2019, the National Operation Center (NOC), a GOI body, ceased authorizing JCMC to issue such access letters. By the end of the year, the national government had still not established new procedures. As a result, CSOs could not receive national level authorizations to move personnel and supplies within the country.

Violations committed against CSOs and human right activists were more severe in 2019 than in previous years. CSOs and activists that led or participated in public demonstrations in Baghdad and southern governorates faced various forms of harassment. Security forces and unknown armed groups (militias) responded harshly to peaceful demonstrations organized in the final quarter of the year. By the end of the year, more than 500 persons had been killed (including the assassinations of 33 activists), while 22,000 demonstrators were injured, 56 protesters abducted and missing, and hundreds of others arbitrarily arrested. As in previous years, CSOs and their members were subject to security checks in 2019. Security forces, armed groups, and militias regularly asked CSOs, especially in Nineveh Province, to provide information about their staff, projects, and donors.

NGOs are legally allowed to compete for government contracts, receive foreign funding, and engage in fundraising campaigns. Neither Federal Law No. 12 nor Kurdish Law No. 1 clearly specify whether registered NGOs can generate income for their nonprofit purposes. In practice, NGOs are not prevented from generating income, although few do so.

Tax policies affecting CSOs remained unchanged in 2019. In federal Iraq, only NGOs with a “public utility” purpose are exempt from income tax, value-added tax (VAT), customs duties, and sales tax. NGOs must apply to the Council of Ministers to obtain public utility status. NGOs in IKR are not required to pay tax on their income or property. According to representatives of the Kurdish NGO Directorate, this policy has led some private companies to request registration as NGOs. NGOs in IKR are obliged to pay income tax for their employees every three months if the employees fail to do so; failure to do so may result in cancellation of their registration.

CSOs generally do not have access to legal experts or lawyers trained on the laws that affect them. As a result, many organizations both in federal Iraq and IKR were unable to either submit all required documents or complete their registration process in 2019.
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.8

The organizational capacity of CSOs improved slightly in 2019, as some CSOs—primarily those with foreign funding—demonstrated increased capacity to develop internal policies and annual and strategic plans and to engage in monitoring and evaluation and proposal writing. In addition, more established organizations provided capacity-building support to other organizations. For instance, the Women Rehabilitation Organization (WRO) organized capacity-building trainings in 2018 and early 2019 for eight national NGOs on topics such as gender programming, donor relations, institutional capacity, and advocacy. Some local NGOs, such as Al-Amal Association and Reform Institute for Development (RID), provided small grants for other NGOs, which enabled them to organize activities. CSOs with partnerships with international actors or memberships in international networks also had greater opportunities to develop their capacity. For example, Malteser International (MI), Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, and Internnews organized capacity-building training for their partners.

Active organizations made progress in building stronger relationships with their constituencies and potential beneficiaries in 2019. CSOs used both direct and indirect methods, including local networks, community dialogue, and social media channels, to ensure that they reach their beneficiaries. Many CSOs utilized Facebook not only to advertise their work, but also to recruit new members and volunteers. For example, Riyada Organization for Capacity Building in Mosul launched an online form to recruit more youth volunteers, both males and females.

In general, only experienced organizations have clearly defined missions and five-year strategic plans. Due to unexpected incidents, even older organizations that already had strategic plans had to review and revise them in 2019. For example, as tensions between the US and Iran escalated and anti-U.S. sentiment in Iraq grew, CSOs working with US-based organizations had to incorporate mitigation measures to ensure their safety. Small CSOs may have missions or general visions, but not strategic goals. Only a few CSOs had internal policies related to corruption, transparency, gender, and risk management in 2019. These included Civil Development Organization (CDO), Iraqi Institution for Development (IID), People’s Development Organization (PDO), Public Aid Organization (PAO), Peace and Freedom Organization (PFO), and Harikar.

Most CSOs continue to lack clearly defined democratic governance structures. However, more established CSOs tend to have strong management policies and procedures, with separate boards and clear divisions of labor. Only a few organizations like PFO and PAO have general assemblies to elect new board members and appoint executive directors.

Most CSOs have difficulties retaining their personnel and paying their staff when they experience gaps in their funding. However, more established organizations like Al-Amal Association, Barzani Charity Organizations, Harikar, and Rwanga Foundation are able to maintain key staff between funded projects, both because they have savings and because they receive financial support from political parties that allow them to cover these expenses. Most CSOs continue to lack technical and professional staff, especially professional accountants, media officers, safety and security officers, and information technology (IT) managers.

In 2019, the number of voluntary-based CSOs considerably increased. During the demonstrations in the central and southern provinces in Iraq, like-minded individuals came together, resulting in the development of many informal groups, including Shebabuna in Kerbala, Khaima Al-Watan and Shabab Al-Taghair in Baghdad, and Shabab Iraq Al-Gadid in Al-Diwaniyah.

Most CSOs use basic technology, such as computers and software, and have internet access, which allows them to utilize social media, particularly Facebook, and other communications platforms to stay connected with their constituencies. CSOs also use social media to advertise training and employment opportunities.
FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.5

CSOs’ financial viability deteriorated in 2019 as international funding for CSOs decreased slightly.

CSOs continued to depend largely on international financial support in 2019. While some new projects started in 2019, many long-term projects supported by international donors ended during the year. These include projects funded by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Diyala province and World Vision in Mosul, the Active Citizenship Program supported by the British Council in Baghdad, and a long-term project funded by Care in Duhok and Mosul.

Some CSOs—primarily charity organizations affiliated with Islamic political parties, such as Bakhshin Organization, which is affiliated with the Islamic Group Party in IKR—are able to obtain local donations. In August 2019, however, the Federal NGO Directorate announced that NGOs should inform the Directorate before launching any donation collection campaigns and that the Directorate will then decide how to monitor these campaigns. This may restrict CSOs’ efforts to diversify their sources of income in the future.

As in previous years, the governments in Baghdad and Erbil only provide financial support to a few select CSOs affiliated with the main political parties. Affiliated organizations, including Barzani Charity Foundation and Rwanga Foundation, also receive most of the international funding.

Some CSOs continue to collect memberships fees. However, membership fees generally do not contribute considerably to organizational revenues. Some CSOs charged nominal fees for the services they provided in 2019. For example, Youth Activity Developing Center (YADC) Ranya and Legal Platform Organization for Justice (LPOJ) charged participants of trainings focused on developing the legal, scientific, academic, language, and leadership skills of youth.

In general, CSOs struggle to raise funds from private companies. However, some CSOs received funds from private companies to organize their activities in 2019. For example, Rwanga Foundation received funds from Fastlink and the Iraqi Red Crescent Society (IRCS) obtained financial support from Asia Cell. To some extent, such funding depends on personal connections.

Most organizations continue to have poor financial management capabilities. In a few cases, CSOs with financial management systems failed to comply completely with these systems in 2019 because political instability caused banks to limit the deposit and withdrawal of money. CSOs generally have contingency plans to deal with such situations, but in some cases, these limits resulted in delays in CSOs’ work. CSOs rarely undergo external account audits and only produce and publish annual reports or statements when required by donors.

ADVOCACY: 3.3

CSO advocacy improved in 2019. Despite constant threats, CSOs and human rights activists persisted in their advocacy attempts and several advocacy campaigns achieved outstanding successes in 2019. Most notably, anti-government protests forced Prime Minister Mahdi to step down. After protesters rejected a candidate proposed by the Al-Fath bloc in parliament, which includes leaders associated with the Iran-supported paramilitary Popular Mobilization Forces, the Sairoon bloc of parliament announcement that it waived its responsibility to nominate a prime minister and that the decision should instead be made by the “street.” While the protesters refused to nominate a candidate, they did publish a list of criteria that the nominee should meet. After the anti-government protests, CSOs such as Iraqi Social Forum (ISF), the Iraqi Civil Society Solidarity Initiative (ICSSI), Sports against Violence, and PFO launched online and offline campaigns and published reports to address violations committed
against peaceful demonstrators. Youth activists played a vital role in demanding GOI to free people detained during the protests.

At the international level, CSOs submitted more than twenty shadow reports to the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) as a part of the Universal Periodical Review (UPR) process in 2019. For example, a group of women’s organizations submitted a report in March 2019 focused on women’s rights in Iraq, while a group of five human rights CSOs, including the Iraqi Observatory for Human Rights and ICSSI, submitted a joint report on human rights and freedom of expression. PFO and a group of other CSOs submitted two reports focused on social and economic rights and freedom of expression. These reports assessed the state of human rights in the country over the past four years and proposed recommendations for improvements in the future.

In 2019, CSOs continued to carry out advocacy campaigns to promote the legal rights of minority and marginalized groups. PFO worked closely with local authorities in Mosul Province and federal authorities in Baghdad to amend Iraq’s Law No. 20, entitled Compensating the Victims of Military Operations, Military Mistakes and Terrorist Actions, to help victims receive compensation by opening new branches of the relevant governmental institutions in Mosul governorate. The Council of Representatives of Iraq passed this amendment in December 2019. In November 2019, twenty-five organizations led by the Jiyan Foundation for Human Rights formed the Coalition for Just Reparation (C4JR) to promote comprehensive reparations for survivors and victims of crimes perpetrated during the Islamic State conflict in Iraq. Nadia Initiative (NI) advocated to ensure that the rights of Yazidis were legally protected and prioritized by the Iraqi government.

CSOs also developed and submitted several proposals to amend other laws in 2019. For example, a group of women’s organizations led by PDO and Emma Organization for Human Development drafted a law to amend Iraq’s personal status law in order to give women the right to have their child’s name under their mother’s name rather than only their father’s name. However, after the political demonstrations, the government’s priorities changed, and these groups were unable to submit the draft to the Council of Representatives. Women’s CSOs, with the support of international actors, also continued to push for an anti-domestic violence law. However, these efforts were blocked by religious parties in the Council of Representatives. Aran Organization in IKR prepared and submitted a draft law to amend the political party law in IKR to prevent interference by political parties in government issues. The recommendations were submitted to the IKR parliament but were not passed in 2019. In addition, the Kurdish Institute for Elections submitted a list of amendments to the decentralization laws to the IKR parliament. In addition, a group of organizations in IKR, including Chamk and PDO, worked closely with IKR’s parliament and legislators to pass a law regulating commercial advertisements. Consequently, Law No. 4 of 2019, entitled Commercial Advertising in the Kurdistan Region, was adopted in December 2019.

As in prior years, CSOs explored opportunities to communicate with governmental actors to improve government practices. For example, the Alliance of Iraqi Minorities (AIM), which consists of eighteen NGOs, worked closely with the Ministry of Education to change textbooks to represent minorities better. CSOs coordinated with the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs in IKR to amend the retirement and social security law.

CSOs increasingly utilize social networks to strategically engage and mobilize the public around their advocacy initiatives. In reaction to the Turkish attack on the Kurds in Syria in October, for example, CSOs and activists in IKR and abroad launched a social media campaign to boycott Turkish products in IKR and Iraq. Several Facebook pages, including Boycott Turkey, which garnered more than ten thousand followers in a few weeks, were created for this purpose. Kokar in Kirkuk used its Facebook page to educate the public on the environment and the protection of natural resources. For the most part, CSOs do not have financial support for their online campaigns, and instead rely on volunteer labor.
SERVICE PROVISION: 4.4

CSO service provision improved slightly in 2019. CSOs provide a variety of social, health, environmental, legal, and educational services. CSOs increasingly focus on youth and women’s empowerment. Hundreds of organizations including Riyada Organization for Capacity Building, Al-Mesalla, IID, Masarat, Al-Amal Association, and Baghdad Women Association organized training and capacity-building opportunities for youth and community members to help them initiate and actively participate in peace-building, social cohesion, and decision-making processes. Women’s organizations such as Emma, PDO, Baghdad Women Association, and Women Empowerment Organization (WEO) educated women on their social, economic, and political rights, while Internews launched a project in partnership with Metro Center, Awan Organization, and PFO with a focus on media and gender. CSOs continued to provide educational and other services to IDPs and refugees, although the scale of such services decreased in 2019 as several camps closed.

Donors and international organizations increasingly support CSO research activities. For instance, in 2019, MI, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), Internews, and Novact all provided support to their local partners to conduct research on social cohesion, conflict, violent extremism, media, gender, and other topics.

Local CSOs use a variety of tools to ensure that the goods and services they provide meet the needs of their constituencies and target beneficiaries. Such methods include baseline research, community dialogue, Participatory Rapid Appraisals (PRA), assessments, and meetings with local authorities. In order to avoid discrimination and meet donor requirements, CSOs take measures to ensure that people benefit equally from their goods and services. Nevertheless, CSO programs—particularly development programs—focus mostly on urban areas rather than rural areas.

While CSOs are legally allowed to generate income for their nonprofit purposes, most CSO services are provided for free, as donors generally cover the costs of CSOs’ goods and services. However, some organizations generate modest income through their provision of services. For instance, YADC and LPOJ charge participants nominal fees for the trainings they offer.

At the end of October, the Council of Representatives of Iraq decided to abolish the provincial councils, not including those in the IKR provinces. Therefore, CSOs faced difficulties communicating with officials regarding their services. Generally speaking, however, governmental institutions, such as the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Culture, and Ministry of Health, as well as the municipalities, recognize and appreciate the role of CSOs in service provision. For instance, in 2019, ministries and governmental bodies provided letters of appreciation to the National Center for Human Rights, WEO, Green Desert Organization, and Sada Baghdad Group, among hundreds of other CSOs, and publicly acknowledged the role of CSOs in helping the government to provide various services.

SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.0

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector improved slightly in 2019 as intermediary support organizations (ISOs) provided more services for CSOs.

Most ISOs and local resource centers, such as Mselect and Strategic Edge, are private companies that financially benefit from the trainings they provide for CSOs. In 2019, ISOs reached out to more CSOs to see how they can utilize their services. Although CSOs still need organizational management and skill development for their employees, few local CSOs can afford the costs of services provided by the ISOs and local resource centers. Instead, CSOs continue to rely primarily on their international partners both for training and information about
available grants. For instance, International Organization for Migration (IOM), Internews, MI, PAX, and NPA all organized trainings for their partners and shared information about valuable resources, including various reports and information on workshop and funding opportunities. The trainings provided by these international organizations focused on proposal writing, program management, advocacy, monitoring and evaluation, financial management, and risk assessment and security management. In addition, the NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq (NCCI), which counts 180 national and international NGOs among its members, organized more trainings for its members in 2019 on topics such as financial, human resource, and project management. NCCI also provided more information to CSOs about available grants and trainings.

Several local organizations re-grant international donor funds to other CSOs to address locally identified needs and projects. For example, with funding from NPA, in 2019, RID provided small grants to other local organizations to organize some roundtables and workshops in IKR focused on good governance and citizen participation in the decision-making process.

Small towns generally lack facilities, such as hotels, training halls, or even big restaurants, and some trainers are not willing to travel large distances for training sessions. As a result, most trainings are organized in big cities, particularly Baghdad and Erbil. Most training materials are available in Arabic, but not in the Kurdish language.

Older and more well-established networks and alliances continued to be active in 2019. Networks and coalitions covering the entire country include AIM, ICSSI, and Coalition 1325. The Kurdistan Social Forum (KSF) works in IKR, while ISF works in the southern and central provinces. Several networks were established in 2019, such as C4JR, Iraq Peace and Reconciliation Working Group (IPRWG), and Ninewa Peace and Reconciliation Working Group (PRWG). These networks and alliances work on issues related to minorities, peacebuilding, women rights, good governance, and transitional justice.

CSOs continued to form partnerships with other sectors in 2019. CSOs worked closely with the Ministry of Youth and Culture in Erbil and Baghdad on topics such as social cohesion, peacebuilding, developing leadership skills, and journalism. Several CSOs had activities in partnership with local authorities and provincial councils. For example, Stop Organization coordinated with the municipality in Erbil to educate citizens on water usage and the protection of water resources. In 2019, Freedom Ambassadors Network, which unites twenty-five organizations, built stronger relationships between NGOs, universities, media networks, and unions to foster common goals and to work on joint programs and projects.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.8**

The public image of the CSO sector improved slightly in 2019. NGOs developed a stronger relationship with independent media outlets, providing them with more opportunities to increase their public visibility. CSO representatives participated in more TV and radio programs during the year and independent media outlets regularly consulted and quoted CSOs on stories related to freedom of expression, domestic violence, child abuse, the rights of women, minorities, prisons, and the rule of law and good governance. In addition, journalists and media representatives increasingly attended CSO activities. Some organizations have journalists as members and utilized their personal connections to increase coverage of their activities. Media outlets that are affiliated with the government and the main political parties, however, continue to be less open to such collaboration with CSOs, particularly those that criticize the government or political parties. In addition, some NGOs criticize journalists in the central and southern provinces for requesting money in order to cover their activities.

Some CSOs have their own media outlets, allowing them to increase public awareness of their activities. For instance, PDO and Kurdish Institute for Elections have their own online newspapers, while Zang Organization in
Halabja, WEO in Erbil, and PFO have their own radio stations. Almost all CSOs have Facebook pages that gain an increasing number of followers.

No public opinion polls or surveys were done in 2019 on the public perception of CSOs. However, the public perception of CSOs is generally thought to be positive, as they play a vital role in providing goods and services to people. In particular, the public continued to consider CSOs to be valuable service providers in areas liberated from Islamic State control and within the IDP and refugee camps. According to research conducted in 2018 by RID and PFO, individuals in Dyala province trust CSOs more than the government or political parties. However, as Iran-US tensions escalated and anti-U.S. sentiment in Iraq grew in 2019, the public accused some CSOs of working with the Americans.

Notwithstanding the tensions between the government and civic actors involved in the demonstrations, CSOs and government bodies developed stronger relationships in 2019, driving an improvement in government perceptions of CSOs. CSOs offered trainings for mayors and employees of the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health, and Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research. For instance, Spark organization trained employees of the Ministry of Higher Education in IKR on preventing violent extremism and IID trained teachers on the same subject in Mosul. The government particularly appreciates CSOs’ contributions in the fields of education and health. For example, WEO, PFO, IID, and other organizations post letters of appreciation from government officials on their social media accounts.

Only experienced organizations have adopted code of ethics, generally to meet donor requirements. Only a few large organizations publish annual reports.
Jordan continued to face significant economic pressures and political challenges in 2019. Economic growth remained slow, with the World Bank reporting a growth rate of around 2 percent, while unemployment hit a record high of 19.2 percent. Regional instability continued to hurt trade and investment as well as internal stability and security. The “Deal of the Century,” a plan to address the conflict between Israel and Palestine that was introduced by US President Donald Trump in 2019,

strained Jordan’s relationship with Israel and several other regional and international powers. Concern over the possible annexation of the Jordan Valley by Israel also heightened tensions between the two countries.

In February, the governments of Jordan and the United Kingdom (UK) co-hosted an international economic conference in London to support investment, growth, and jobs in Jordan. The London Conference convened senior government officials, development and financial organizations, and high-level investors and businesspeople from over sixty countries. One outcome of the conference, the Five-Year Reform Matrix, comprises a set of prioritized and sequenced deep structural reforms that would create an environment for the private sector to lead the growth and job creation process. Other key focus areas of the conference included securing international support to aid Jordan’s repayment of its foreign debt and attracting private investment.

Jordan continues to host a large population of refugees. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the number of registered refugees in Jordan in 2019 reached 744,795, with Syria being the predominant country of origin. It is estimated that thousands more refugees reside in Jordan but are not registered. Eighty-three percent of registered refugees in Jordan live in urban areas. The refugee population continues to place significant pressure on government services including education, health, and municipal-governed services, as well as infrastructure and natural resources. A sub-sector of CSOs continues to focus on serving refugee populations because of the availability of funding for this work. Meanwhile, many Jordanians feel deprived of opportunities to achieve sustainable development.

Beginning in February 2019, hundreds of young people marched in Amman and other cities across the country to protest the government’s economic policies and demand greater job opportunities. In June, Jordan’s government, led by Prime Minister Omar al-Razzaz, secured a $1.2 billion loan from the World Bank for debt repayment,

1 Economic aspects of the Deal of the Century were announced at a conference held in Bahrain in June. The plan is based on an “economy first” approach to revive the moribund Israeli-Palestinian peace process and includes 179 infrastructure and business projects in target countries, as well as a global investment fund to lift the Palestinian and neighboring Arab state economies. Protests against the plan were organized in Jordan even before this conference took place.
The 2019 CSO Sustainability Index for Jordan

despite the fact that the economic and political reforms required by the Bank sparked widespread public protests in 2018. The government simultaneously enacted a series of decisions to help residents and ease the impact of the austerity measures required alongside the loan, such as pledging not to cut water and electricity to households that fell behind on utility payments.

Overall CSO sustainability improved slightly in 2019, driven by positive developments in advocacy and sectoral infrastructure. Advocacy advanced as CSOs had greater access to government officials and achieved numerous advocacy successes. The infrastructure supporting CSOs improved in 2019 with the creation of a new CSO coalition, capacity-building programs, and public-private partnerships. Financial viability, on the other hand, deteriorated with increasing competition for decreasing funds.

At the end of 2019, there were 6,800 societies registered with the Ministry of Social Development (MoSD). Some organizations register as civil, non-profit companies with the Company Control Department of the Ministry of Industry Trade and Supplies (MOITS) to avoid the obstacles presented by Law 51. According to data from 2015, there were around 600 civil, non-profit companies registered at MOITS. There are also approximately 10 Royal Non-Governmental Organizations (RNGOs) that are established by special laws based on royal decrees and parliamentary endorsement, rather than registering with a particular ministry. RNGOs enjoy special access to government funding not available to other CSOs, and as a result tend to have strong organizational capacities.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.5

The legal environment for CSOs remained challenging in 2019. The Law on Societies (Law 51 of 2008) is the primary law governing the registration and operation of local and foreign organizations in Jordan. Under Law 51, all societies must register with the Registry Council within MoSD in order to operate lawfully. Other CSOs register under Labor Law 8 of 1996, which along with union-specific laws regulates the work of trade unions and employers’ associations, or as civil companies under the Companies Law 22 of 1997 and the Regulation for Non-Profit Companies 73 of 2010. Informal, unregistered organizations are prohibited.

The registration process for societies under Law 51 continued to be lengthy in 2019. Coalitions and alliances have particular difficulty registering due to vague provisions in this law. For instance, Article 24 of Law 51 explicitly states that “No society may be a member of another society,” while also stating that “Two or more societies may form a coalition to implement a shared program which aims to realize such societies’ goals and purposes.” Himam, one of the largest coalitions of CSOs in the country, was initially denied registration in 2019. Himam was able to correct the problems with its application, which was then sent to the Council of Ministers for final approval in accordance with the law; the application continued to await final approval at the time of writing.

Law 51 imposes many requirements on CSOs that restrict their ability to operate. CSOs are required, for example, to inform MoSD of all general assembly meetings and provide copies of all decisions issued by the general assembly to the relevant ministry.

MoSD has the right to legally intervene in CSO activities. In 2019, MoSD formed fifty-two “verification committees” to confirm the legal existence of all registered societies and monitor their work. The committees sent warnings to 601 societies to resume their activities, resolve financial violations, or initiate administrative elections. The verification committees also appointed temporary supervision committees to oversee the work of seventy-one societies and ensure that they resolve their issues. Ultimately, the verification committees dissolved 210 societies either upon their request or due to administrative and financial violations according to legal provisions.
CSOs and activists continued to face some state harassment in 2019. More individuals were detained for exercising their right to free expression in 2019 than in 2018. For example, dozens of activists and journalists who were covering the sit-in of detainees’ families in front of the National Center of Human Rights (NCHR) were arrested. In addition, an activist from Dhiban who started a hunger strike in May was convicted and sentenced to two years in prison for insulting the king. The court later reduced the sentence to one year. A legal aid organization reported that lawyers were harassed for their work on cases of abuse by security forces or illegal arrests and threatened with disbarment by the Jordanian Bar Association.

The Public Gatherings Law does not require organizers to obtain government permission to hold public meetings or demonstrations. According to Human Rights Watch, however, in 2019, “organizations and venues continued to seek permission from the Interior Ministry or General Intelligence Department to host public meetings and events. In some cases in 2019, security authorities cancelled public events without explanation.” Journalists for Human Rights (JHR) documented eighteen instances in 2019 in which the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and governors rejected proposed activities.

There were also instances in which the freedom of expression was restricted in 2019. In March, authorities blocked access to a news website created by Jordanian expatriates that covers political affairs and documents arrests of activists. Authorities also continued to block the website of an online lifestyle magazine focused on lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) audiences on the grounds that it was an unlicensed publication. In addition, the Jordan Open Source Association reported evidence of Facebook’s live-streaming function being blocked during large protests.

According to the Regulations regarding the Collection of Charitable Donations, No. 1, 1957 as amended, societies may only carry out public collections of donations twice a year, and only after obtaining approval from MoSD. CSOs registered under either Law 51 or the Companies Law also must obtain approval from the Council of Ministers to receive funding from outside of Jordan or from a non-Jordanian. While the law requires the Council to provide a response within thirty days, officials rarely abide by the deadline and organizations often face long delays before receiving decisions on their funding requests.

In June, the government announced a decision to require branches of foreign organizations to obtain approval from the government prior to receiving funds from their headquarters. The decision was reversed in July.

In December, the government approved new procedures for the foreign funding approval process for local CSOs that are more detailed and allow requests to be tracked. According to the new procedures, CSO funding requests will be reviewed by a joint committee consisting of representatives from MoSD and MOITS, and other ministries, such as the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC) and MoI. The process uses a new electronic platform that the government pledged would be fully operational within two months. Twenty-five applications had been referred to the joint committee by the end of 2019. The joint committee agreed to meet weekly prior to cabinet sessions, so that the committee’s recommendations on foreign funding requests can be submitted to the cabinet without delay. The committee also pledged to alert project organizers about similar projects to avoid duplication of efforts. If the committee thinks an application should be rejected, it should still refer the application with its recommendation to the cabinet for its final decision. Decisions must be made within thirty working days of filing a request. The procedures newly provide that CSOs can appeal the decision within two working days.

The law allows CSOs to earn income through the provision of goods and services and to compete for government contracts.

CSO taxation did not change in 2019. Tax exemptions are limited and only granted to orphanages, associations for people with disabilities, and associations that have obtained status as “public interest” organizations. However, CSOs sometimes have problems obtaining these exemptions. In 2019, for example, some CSOs faced difficulties getting tariff exemptions on medical equipment for people with disabilities in 2019. Other CSOs are not categorically exempt from paying taxes and are subject to sales tax and tax on certain forms of income-generating activities.

Given the legal challenges that CSOs face, it was increasingly important for CSOs to have access to legal expertise and aid in 2019. Few lawyers, however, are trained in CSO legal issues.
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.4

CSOs’ organizational capacity remained unchanged in 2019. In general, large CSOs and RNGOs have significant organizational capacities and internal structures, including bylaws and management boards. Most large organizations are based in Amman and some have branches in other governorates. Medium and small organizations, on the other hand, have much more limited capacities.

Many organizations have clearly identified constituencies. Certain types of organizations, including labor unions and community-based organizations (CBOs), are better able to develop grassroots constituencies. The Islamic Charity Center Society, for instance, has a horizontal structure that has allowed it to identify and meet grassroots needs and to develop close relationships with its constituencies. This has also enabled it to garner local financial support. Other organizations, however, lack the tools to communicate effectively with local communities or ensure that their activities are responsive to community needs. However, CSOs’ interaction with their constituencies has been enhanced by their increased use of social media and other communications technologies. Most CSOs have Facebook pages, for instance, which they use to engage with their constituents and publicize their activities.

Organizations have varying levels of capacity to develop and adhere to strategic plans and missions. Large organizations are more likely than small ones to have long-term strategies and clear missions. Small organizations with strategic plans often lack the resources to implement them.

CSOs form internal governance structures, including governing bodies and general assemblies, according to their organizational statutes as well as requirements set out in Law 51 and the Regulation for Non-Profit Companies. In practice, however, the roles and responsibilities of organizations’ managerial bodies are not always clear. Family associations, in particular, struggle with conflicts of interest as they often fail to delineate roles and responsibilities clearly.

Employment in CSOs is not always sustainable, as jobs often depend on short-term project funding. Frequent turnover affects the productivity of employees and organizations. Some organizations do not provide employees with basic rights, such as social security or health insurance, despite the fact that these are required by law, and some do not offer them job titles or job descriptions. CSOs registered under Law 51 must appoint a legal advisor, which constitutes an undue financial burden on many organizations. The ability of organizations to recruit volunteers remains weak. According to the Charities Aid Foundation’s 2019 World Giving Index, the average percentage of Jordanian respondents who reported volunteering in CSOs in the last ten years is just 7 percent, placing Jordan at 116th out of 125 countries.

Due to the high cost of internet access and maintenance of equipment, funding challenges made it more difficult for organizations to leverage the use of technology in 2019. Most organizations promote their activities on social media platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp, and a few have their own websites.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.5

CSOs’ financial viability deteriorated in 2019, as limited foreign funding and the economic challenges facing the private sector led to greater competition among CSOs for funding.

The lack of financial diversification continues to be a key issue facing CSOs. Most organizations rely on funding from one or two sources, at least one of which is usually a foreign donor. Only a small share of CSOs—predominantly large CSOs and RNGOs—are able to diversify their sources of income.
Foreign funding for CSOs was limited in 2019. The entry of foreign and international organizations in Jordan, particularly in response to the Syrian crisis, has increased competition as they also compete for funding that previously went exclusively to local organizations. In 2019, a significant level of foreign funding continued to target activities related to the Syrian crisis, although the overall amount of this funding decreased. While organizations receiving foreign funding have traditionally been concentrated in the capital Amman and areas hosting camps for Syrian refugees, many donors are now investing in other areas of the country. CSOs continued to struggle to get approval for foreign funding in 2019. As of September 24, the government had only approved 75 of the 149 applications for foreign funding it had received. CSO and government experts anticipate that the government’s new procedure for approving foreign funding, adopted in December, will facilitate CSO’s access to funding sources and decrease delays in project activities.

Private sector funding for CSOs decreased in 2019 due to companies’ establishment of platforms, such as the Zain Platform for Creativity (ZINC) and similar efforts by UMNIAH and Orange, which aim to foster startups and other entrepreneurial endeavors in Jordan. These initiatives partially replaced the companies’ social responsibility grants to CSOs. However, some companies do still award funds to CSOs. For example, Arab Potash Co. has established a specialized association to manage its corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs, which awards grants to CSOs for projects in the fields of health, water, and the environment, with a geographic focus on the company’s working zone in the south. Companies do not coordinate their CSR efforts, however, and many focus on the same activities, such as the distribution of charity food packages during the month of Ramadan.

Smaller organizations collect donations to diversify their funding sources. During Ramadan and other religious holidays, some provide services for the poor and other relief activities in order to raise funds. Larger organizations, including RNGOs such as Takiyat Um Ali and the King Hussein Cancer Foundation, also engage in local fundraising efforts to support their charity and humanitarian assistance activities. By law, CSOs may apply for up to two licenses a year to organize fundraising events, such as bazaars, though these do not attract substantial funding.

Some CSOs collect membership fees, while others CSOs charge fees for health and social services, training, and legal consultancy to help offset their operational costs.

Only large and medium organizations have sound financial management systems. Small organizations, which make up a majority of Jordanian CSOs, lack such systems because they are expensive and require them to train their employees to use them effectively.

**ADVOCACY: 4.8**

CSOs’ advocacy improved in 2019, as organizations had greater access to government officials and achieved numerous advocacy successes.

Cooperation between CSOs and the government on human rights issues improved during the year. The office of the Prime Minister reinstated the position of Government Coordinator for Human Rights, which had remained empty under the previous government. The Coordinator regularly holds meetings with CSOs and conveys relevant observations to the Council of Ministers. In addition, the Coordinator is responsible for coordinating the reports of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) before the United Nations. In 2019, the government endorsed 149 UPR recommendations after they were reviewed by the permanent human rights committee at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates. These recommendations pertained to the status of women, child rights, the status of people with disabilities, torture, judicial prosecution, administrative detainment, and freedom of speech, the press, and opinion. Further, a circular issued by the prime minister in April requested relevant ministries and institutions to implement the recommendations of the Comprehensive Report on Human Rights. In 2019, the prime minister...
also reappointed members of the National Center for Human Rights (NCHR), many of whom are CSO representatives.

Several advocacy campaigns were successful in 2019. For instance, public school teachers protested to demand higher wages. Security services tried to interrupt the protests by stopping buses carrying the teachers to and from the protest locations and used tear gas to disperse protesters. Following these security interventions, the Teachers’ Union called for a strike in September, which lasted for one month, making it the country’s longest public sector strike. The Union ultimately negotiated an agreement with the government to increase public teachers’ salaries by 35 to 60 percent starting in 2020.

Mass protests were organized in February 2019 with unemployed young people marching to Amman from cities around the country to demand employment in the public sector or in large factories. The protests ended following a meeting between the protesters and the Royal Hashemite Court Chief, who pledged to address the protesters’ demands and work to provide them with employment opportunities. In response, the Ministry of Labor announced that 3,300 jobs in tourism, industry, construction, health, and agriculture will be made available.

In August, CSOs, rights advocates, party officials, and families of detainees protested in front of the House of Representatives against the growing numbers of individuals detained for exercising their right to free expression. Activists, trade unionists, lawmakers and others also protested the implementation of an agreement between Jordan’s national power company and an Israeli-American gas consortium aimed at importing gas from Israel. These groups launched the National Campaign Against Gas Agreement with the Zionist Entity. The campaign held various activities in the governorates and collected hundreds of signatures demanding that Prime Minister Al-Razzaz cancel the agreement. Despite the protests, imports began in January 2020. Soon thereafter, Jordan’s parliament unanimously adopted a draft law to ban imports of Israeli gas.

CSOs also engaged in advocacy related to people with disabilities. In March, CSOs organized public discussions on inclusive workspaces, and developed a manual for public and private sector employers to encourage employment of persons with disabilities. The Accessible Jordan campaign successfully advocated for the provision of accessible buses for people with disabilities.

Other campaigns had mixed results. Widespread protests in 2018 successfully led the government to withdraw amendments to Jordan’s cybercrime law that would have unduly restricted freedom of expression online. In 2019, however, the government introduced and enacted new amendments. While the government claims that the amendments are aimed at combating hate speech, they introduce new restrictions on online freedom of expression. For example, the proposed amendments define the offense of hate speech in an overly broad manner and impose harsh penalties ranging from fines to prison terms for those who publish or republish what is considered hate speech online. The government did not engage with CSOs or other stakeholders who opposed the amendments.

Other CSO campaigns were less successful. Some struggled with a lack of coordination and networking among CSOs, a lack of cooperation by the government, and the lack of community mobilization. Others failed to undertake sufficient research prior to designing and launching campaigns, exhibited poor planning, or failed to sustain follow-up efforts. For instance, in November women’s groups organized a protest called Taliat (Enough) near the Prime Ministry to call for better legal and social protections for women victims of domestic violence. The protest was organized in response to an incident in Jerash in which a husband reportedly gouged the eyes of his wife following a domestic dispute. However, no follow-up activities were organized after the protest. While the Accessible Jordan campaign successfully advocated for the provision of accessible buses for people with disabilities, this had little impact due to the lack of sidewalks necessary for people with disabilities to reach these buses. These examples highlight the fact that some CSOs can organize and advocate, but they still need to learn skills in long-term planning, research, and prioritization to achieve their desired outcomes.
Women’s CSOs have long lobbied members of parliament to adopt amendments to the Personal Status Law to end child marriage, specify the minimum age for marriage without exceptions, and ensure full equality between women and men in marriage, divorce, and inheritance. However, in 2019, parliament maintained the marriage age in exceptional cases at sixteen and rejected provisions that would give children whose mothers died the right to inherit from their maternal grandparents, while giving children whose fathers died the right to inherit from their paternal grandparents. Other CSOs intensified their lobbying in 2019 to introduce laws protecting widows and to establish official programs to alleviate illiteracy and poverty among widows, which are widespread problems. In addition, CSOs previously lobbied in favor of the use of DNA testing to prove paternity. As a result, in 2019, the family lineage of nearly 100 children without family ties was verified and they were given to their families.

In May 2019, parliament adopted amendments to the Labor Law that impact wages, overtime, paternity leave, annual leave, childcare, retirement, and the resolution of wage disputes. Fifty CSOs and unions launched a campaign to further amend the Labor Law, arguing that some of these changes are unconstitutional and do not provide workers with adequate rights to organize and engage in collective negotiations.

During the year, the government increasingly communicated with CSOs to resolve obstacles that they face in their work, which resulted in the introduction of important new measures, including the new regulations for foreign funding, and the appointment of a new director of the Companies Control department, a secretary general for associations’ registry, members of the NCHR, and the Government Coordinator for Human Rights.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.7**

CSOs’ provision of goods and services improved in 2019. During the year, CSOs provided a range of services, including both short-term relief services as well as long-term services such as economic empowerment, health, and education. CSOs continued to provide services to address the needs of Syrian refugees, such as job training, education, health-care, and legal advisory services. CSOs increasingly provided non-traditional services, as well. For example, CSOs installed solar panels with subsidies from the government-supported Installation of Solar Panels and Solar Heaters program.

Several CSOs provide legal services to help resolve issues related to crime, domestic violence, and exploitation in the workplace; they also raise awareness of these issues and promote legal empowerment. In 2019, the Jordanian Bar Association referred forty-one lawyers to the disciplinary board for contracting with legal assistance centers. This move sparked massive controversy, and these centers advocated for the development of a legal aid system that guarantees everyone’s right to an effective remedy.

CSOs’ services remain largely dependent on donors’ agendas and requirements, and do not always reflect the needs of local communities. For instance, while various organizations provide job training, the trainings do not always align with actual employment opportunities in the labor market. As a result, they do little to address Jordan’s high unemployment rate.

CSOs provide their services to local communities without discrimination. However, most CSOs are not effective at marketing their services to other groups such as other CSOs and academia.

CSOs still rarely conduct their own needs assessments when designing services. Most CSO services are designed in response to donors’ agendas and priorities. In addition, CSOs still rarely conduct impact assessments of their projects.

As in past years, the government occasionally contracted with CSOs for goods and services in 2019. For instance, MoSD continued to contract with the Sakeena Charity for Social Support to help orphans enroll in academic and vocational educational institutions. MoSD also provides funds to the Princess Taghrid Institute for Development
and Training to aid orphans transitioning to independent living. The government continued to contract with Al Aman Fund for the Future of Orphans to provide young male and female orphans with the opportunity to complete their higher education in universities and colleges or receive vocational education.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.9**

The infrastructure supporting CSOs improved in 2019 with the creation of a new CSO coalition, capacity-building programs, and public-private partnerships.

Intermediary support organizations (ISOs) provide a range of technical, financial, training, evaluation, and consultancy services to CSOs throughout the country. Many of these ISOs, including Noor Al Hussein Foundation, King Hussein Foundation, King Abdullah Fund for Development, and Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human Development (JOHUD), are RNGOs. Other organizations such as Abdul Hamid Shoman Foundation also serve as ISOs. These organizations provide small grants, financed by local and foreign funds or government grants from MoPIC to other CSOs. In 2019, the Union of Charitable Societies began offering specialized training courses for CSOs on topics like financial management, strategic planning, and human resources.

Several new programs were initiated in 2019 that focus on building the capacity of CSOs. In 2019, ACTED launched a program to strengthen the institutional capacity of the Mafraq CBO Union (MCU) and, indirectly, CBOs in Mafraq. With funding from the European Union (EU), Expertise France launched a program to improve access to and the quality of social services for vulnerable groups by building CSOs’ capacity to deliver services and influence political affairs. In September, the Center for Strategic Studies of the University of Jordan hosted a conference to present the findings of a CSO needs assessment conducted earlier in the year as part of the Qararuna project, co-funded by the EU and the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation. The program aims to strengthen the participation of civil society in the political process. A follow up training program to build the capacities of over 200 Jordanian CSOs is planned.

With encouragement from donors, CSOs increasingly form coalitions and engage in participatory action for specific projects. A new alliance of CSOs, called the Tazeez Alliance, was formed in 2019. The Alliance includes twenty-five human rights CSOs from across the country, including the Awareness Center for Human Rights, Manara for Social Justice and Human Rights, Tatheer Association for Human Rights, and the Arab Bridge Center for Human Rights and Development. Tazeez aims to strengthen the human rights system in Jordan through collective action. Himam, which unites thirteen CBO members, is another example of an effective coalition. In the past three years, it has gained the government’s trust and has therefore been able to convey the most important issues facing CSOs to the government. In addition, Himam has become a reliable source of information for private media outlets on issues such as labor rights and women’s rights. However, as mentioned earlier, it faced registration challenges in 2019.

New public-private partnerships were formed in 2019. Spurred by the high unemployment rate, the Luminus Technical College in collaboration with the Ministry of Labor, Khedmet Watan, and UNICEF launched the Training for Employment Program. The program aims to increase private sector employment and provided training for roughly 1,000 young men and women in programs such as Advanced Coding, Digital Fabrication, Complete Media Production, Welding and Metalworking, Computerized Interior Design, and Hotel and Restaurant Management. Also in 2019, MoSD, the Companies Control Department, and MOITS announced the program “Enhancing partnership and dialogue between the public sector and Civil Society,” which is designed to encourage and promote government-CSO collaboration. Twenty-seven Jordanian CSOs participated in the program.
CSOs’ public image was unchanged in 2019. Media coverage of CSOs’ activities improved somewhat as compared to previous years, as both private and public media outlets provided wide coverage of CSO events. For instance, the teachers’ strike received daily coverage for an entire month. However, coverage of the strikes in the public media was largely negative, concentrating on aspects like the strike’s impact on the continuity of the education process. Mass media and social media platforms also covered unions’ and CSO representatives’ expressions of solidarity with the Teachers’ Union. In 2019, some private media outlets, such as Al-Mamlaka Channel, Roya TV, Al Ghad Newspaper, and 7iber magazine, provided more coverage of issues raised by CSOs, including human rights. A growing number of journalists appeared to publicly embrace human rights. However, there is still a need for journalists to develop their expertise on certain rights issues, such as those related to gender and people with disabilities.

The public has a mixed perception of the role of CSOs in Jordan. Many people have a positive perception of certain large, charitable organizations, such as Tkiyet Um Ali and King Hussein Cancer Center. Some other CSOs, however, are perceived negatively based on the view that they work to advance foreign agendas, misuse grant funds for personal purposes, or are otherwise corrupt. Charitable societies, especially those based in villages, face this kind of negative perception less often.

The government’s perception of CSOs improved slightly in 2019, with more openness to CSO opinions. Some CSO representatives were also appointed to the NCHR. The private sector considers CSOs as an important agent to access local communities.

CSOs continue to rely on social media platforms to promote their activities and events, and to improve their image, particularly given the platforms’ low cost and ability to reach broad populations. However, some human rights activists faced obstacles with social media use, for instance experiencing internet interruptions while livestreaming from demonstrations.

CSOs submit annual management and financial reports to supervising ministries. Larger organizations periodically submit management and financial reports to their boards of directors, as well.
Several events greatly affected civic space in Lebanon in 2019. On the economic front, the banking sector was in crisis as the Lebanese pound rapidly lost value and the country was unable to pay down steep public debts. Growth in gross domestic product (GDP) dropped to unprecedented lows, and in October banks closed to prevent depositors from withdrawing cash from their foreign-currency bank accounts. In the last months of 2019, two exchange rates were in place: the official rate and a market rate that was approximately 25 percent higher. This caused the value of CSOs’ foreign currency accounts to plummet and prevented organizations from accessing the funds in their foreign-currency accounts for a period of time.

During the financial crisis, the government came under intense criticism for lacking political vision, failing to introduce necessary reforms, and refusing to communicate transparently. In response, according to the 2019 Human Rights Watch (HRW) report *There is a Price to Pay: The Criminalization of Peaceful Speech in Lebanon*, powerful political and religious figures used criminal defamation laws to silence journalists, activists, and other critics of government policies and corruption. The President of Lebanon issued a circular on September 30 reminding the public of articles in the Penal Code that criminalize the dissemination of information harmful to the country’s financial reputation. On October 3, former Prime Minister Saad Hariri stressed the need to increase penalties on media outlets that did not report the news responsibly.

A turning point came on October 17, when thousands of people took to the streets to express their discontent with the dysfunctional economy. For the first time in Lebanon’s history, public protests united people from all sectors and regions in challenging the political elite. A 2020 report published by the Maharat Foundation titled *Monitoring Freedom of Expression and Media* called the uprising a “revolution” for exceeding prevailing limits on freedom of expression and breaking through the barrier of fear of prosecution. Criticism of leaders’ inefficiency and corruption became commonplace, but in many cases was met with excessive force by security forces. CSO members were among the protesters that were subject to the use of excessive force by security forces during the protests. Riot police and other security forces including the parliament police and the Lebanese Army used teargas, water cannons, and rubber bullets on crowds, and incidents of protesters being beaten indiscriminately were captured on video. Despite this harassment, protests continued through the end of the year. In response to the protests, the government resigned on October 29, and the parliament requested former Minister of Education Hassan Diab to form a new government on December 19.

A notable characteristic of the uprising was the emergence of new civil society groupings, especially women’s groups, which were at the forefront of the protests. The lead role of women in political organization, civic engagement, and advocacy for gender justice was highlighted in a report from United Nations (UN) Women titled...
Understanding the Role of Women and the Feminist Actors in Lebanon’s 2019 Protests. Activists for the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual, and intersex (LGBTI) populations were also visible in the streets. Women’s rights advocates and women journalists encountered considerable bias and threats, and LGBTI activists were the targets of homophobic statements, especially on the internet. Widespread disinformation, including photos and videos taken out of context and fake photos, spread largely through WhatsApp with an aim to delegitimize the protests and intimidate people from participating in them.

The overall sustainability of the CSO sector in Lebanon did not change in 2019. However, several dimensions recorded change. The legal environment deteriorated slightly as registration became more difficult and the authorities cracked down on the protests. CSOs’ financial viability also suffered as foreign funding declined, while the economic crisis weakened CSOs’ spending power. At the same time, advocacy improved as the Lebanese people united in unprecedented protests and CSOs engaged in several successful advocacy campaigns. CSOs’ public image was boosted by increased public awareness of CSO activities and media reliance on CSO expertise. CSOs’ organizational capacity, service provision, and sectoral infrastructure were stable.

The CSO sector in Lebanon is diverse and able to respond to the needs of various constituencies, ranging from the provision of humanitarian aid to advocacy. CSO groups have extensive expertise in fields related to public policy and human rights. There is no accurate, up to date data on the size of the CSO sector in Lebanon. The latest official data from the Ministry of Interior indicated that there were 8,311 CSOs registered in 2015. Based on this number, experts and researchers estimate that there were between 8,500 and 14,000 CSOs in 2019, including those registered in other ministries. CSOs work at varying levels of effectiveness, with many seemingly established only for electoral or financial benefits. At a session of the Council of Ministers in May 2019, some ministers discussed the existence of fake CSOs in the country. Several media reports covered the debate, calling on the government to conduct an assessment of existing CSOs, especially those benefiting from public funds. However, no concrete steps were taken in this regard in 2019.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.3**

The legal environment governing CSOs continued to deteriorate in 2019 as the process for registering CSOs became more difficult. In theory, the 1909 law on nonprofit organizations allows CSOs to register by notifying the government of their establishment. While most CSOs notify the Ministry of Interior of their establishment, others notify the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Youth and Sports. The ministry must formally acknowledge a new organization by giving its founders a registration receipt, which allows them to prove the organization’s legal status to third parties. No data is available about the number of CSOs that applied for or received registration receipts in 2019. The issuance of registration receipts seemed to increasingly require personal relationships with relevant authorities. For example, the women’s organization Fiftyfifty, whose founder had previously worked with the minister of interior, received its receipt, while the human rights organization Almoursila, which did not have such ties, did not. Further indicating that decisions increasingly depend on the discretionary decision of the authorities is the fact that the political movements Beirut Madinati and Sabaa received receipts, but a CSO focused on people with disabilities did not. The minister of interior granted a receipt to a club of judges one day before leaving office in late January 2019, a decision that some viewed as a political move to irk politicians who were opposed to the judges club. In light of the increasing difficulties registering as a nonprofit organization, several organizations, including Seeds for Legal Initiatives, Gherbal, and Mosaique, opted to register as nonprofit civil companies with the Civil Companies Register at the Court of First Instance, which involves an easier process.

Banks introduced new procedures and capital controls in 2019 without legal authority, which made it nearly impossible for CSOs to open new bank accounts. For example, the organization Shababeek, which serves refugee
Palestinian youth, was unable to open a bank account even though it had received its notification receipt. In addition, banks continue to comply with the Central Bank’s directive on fighting money laundering and terrorism financing, which requires CSOs to undergo extensive screening in order to open and maintain bank accounts.

CSOs also experienced difficulties with their operations during the year because of the involvement of the intelligence agency, General Security. For example, a CSO working on alternative political frameworks in Mount Lebanon, which prefers to remain unnamed, was informed when trying to open a bank account that a case had been filed against it with General Security. After repeated attempts to obtain information, the CSO, which was registered in 2016 but did not receive funding until 2019, finally learned that it had been accused of circulating large amounts of suspicious funds, having suspicious political relationships, and possessing electronic equipment and sensitive files, even though it had not yet received any funds when the case was filed. The organization was required to turn over to General Security photos of its activities and the telephone numbers of participants, while the founder was subject to frequent interrogations, and her personal premises were searched. The case had not been resolved by the end of the year.

CSOs must submit on an annual basis the previous year’s budget along with a forecast for the coming year to the ministries of interior and finance; a dedicated individual must then follow up with the ministries. CSOs are obliged to obtain a registration number from the Ministry of Finance and present their statements of account. Civil companies have to submit their statements within two months of their establishment or are barred from operating. In accordance with a ministry decision issued in late November, the Ministry of Interior began to demand more detailed information about sources of funding and activities, which many CSOs viewed as intrusive, particularly as the law does not provide for this level of interference. One CSO founder stated that the organization was requested to leave a bribe of LBP 50,000 (approximately $33) when presenting its yearly budget, so that the file would be accepted.

Excessive force was used against activists, including CSOs, during the autumn protests. Seven UN human rights experts confirmed in a statement on November 26 that Lebanon’s security forces used excessive force and failed to protect protesters from attacks despite the peaceful nature of the protests. Security forces also took pictures and videos and asked for lists of attendees to events organized by CSOs, further intimidating participants. In addition, the authorities failed to protect the protesters. Rioters attacked protest sites in many areas, destroying tents in which public debates were conducted, without any follow-up by the authorities.

CSOs were also harassed in less violent ways during the year. A silent protest against sectarian armed conflict in a mountain village, which had been approved by the municipality, was called off after the area’s main political party successfully pushed for its cancellation. CSOs working with students found it more difficult to obtain access to public schools from the Ministry of Education without the backing of powerful elites. CSOs working with refugees, including those providing medical services, faced new obstacles in their work, as local communities sought to stop projects that did not benefit them directly.

Nonprofit organizations do not have profits and therefore are exempt from profit taxes. While the law allows civil companies to have surplus that would be taxed, in practice, they are asked not to list any surplus. While the law allows CSOs to apply for exemptions from value-added tax (VAT), primarily only large CSOs benefit from this provision since the exemption requires a special audit and can take up to three years to receive. Individuals and corporations may deduct donations made to CSOs from their overall revenues from their taxable amount.

The law does not restrict CSOs’ ability to solicit and receive foreign funding, conduct public fundraising, or charge for services. All funds received must be used on activities supporting the organizations’ missions. A new rule in 2019 obliges CSOs to pay VAT on consultancy services that they provide outside of Lebanon, as if the services were exported products. The laws for social enterprises are complicated and do not encourage their establishment.

There is little legal knowledge about CSOs in Lebanon, and no lawyers specialize in CSO-related law. Public officials, including at the Ministry of Interior, often lack sufficient knowledge of CSOs. Given the lack of clear guidelines, a number of lawyers have reportedly suggested that bribery is the only recourse. During the protests, a committee of lawyers defended detained protesters on a pro bono basis.
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.0

CSOs’ organizational capacity did not change in 2019. Many CSOs, especially those located or operating in rural and secluded areas, continue to struggle to enhance their internal structures, regulations, and procedures.

CSOs are able to identify their constituencies but are often unable to respond to constituencies’ needs because of limited funding. CSOs increasingly use traditional and social media to reach their constituencies. Foreign donors sometimes impose their own priorities, while domestic CSOs prefer to engage in participatory approaches to designing interventions. In addition, there have been instances in which foreign donors have taken advantage of CSOs’ ties to local constituencies for their own purposes. For example, in 2019, a CSO reported that a donor had asked it to send a survey to a group of its beneficiaries without being able to see it in advance.

Some larger CSOs have clear strategic plans developed through donors’ efforts to build their capacity. The plans tend to improve organizations’ competitiveness in attracting international funding. Strategic planning is not common among smaller CSOs because they lack resources to allocate to planning processes. Organizations sometimes follow funding trends rather than their own missions.

CSOs are legally required to have boards of directors, but boards play a minimal role in small organizations. Small CSOs generally lack the capacity to manage projects as their teams are generally too small to adopt complex management approaches. A growing number of CSOs develop internal policies in order to meet donor requirements, although their implementation sometimes lags behind.

In general, CSOs’ main source of funding is project based, which only allows organizations to hire staff for limited periods. CSOs find that donors’ limits on allowable budgets for human resources, usually about 30 percent of overall costs, is a major impediment to their operations. For example, Menara, a drug rehabilitation center supported by volunteers, closed its office in 2019 because its donor would only cover the salary of one staff person. Most grants to small or local CSOs are seed funding, which hinders these organizations’ ability to hire staff despite their need for human resources to meet complex reporting and documentation requirements. CSOs have begun to ask donors to allocate more to administrative costs, such as at least 3 percent for contingencies or overhead in budget lines that do not show the names of staff, and to report on the achievement of deliverables rather than individual budget lines.

Volunteering is becoming popular but is still not self-sustaining. According to the Charities Aid Foundation’s 2019 World Giving Index, which reports on giving trends over the past decade, an average of 10 percent of respondents in Lebanon have taken part in volunteer activities over the past ten years. Volunteers prefer to engage in humanitarian and social work rather than work on administrative tasks.

CSOs have limited access to technology because of their lack of resources. Lebanon’s internet infrastructure is still poor, and the internet speeds tend to be very slow. This undermines CSOs that want to use digital technologies effectively, including for uploading videos. CSOs continued to be concerned in 2019 about digital security, including fears that the government is surveilling their online activity and their vulnerability to hackers.
The volume of foreign aid flowing to Lebanon continues to increase. According to the UN Lebanon Aid Tracking reports, total disbursed funds from government donors to national entities, UN agencies, NGOs, and other actors increased from $259.7 million in the first three months of 2018 to $334.5 million in the same period in 2019. The bulk of this support is still focused on mitigating the impact of the Syrian crisis. Despite this increase in the availability of foreign funding and the CSO sector’s heavy reliance on such funding, CSOs’ financial viability deteriorated in 2019 as the number of organizations competing for these funds has increased. In addition, Lebanon’s deteriorating economy in 2019 caused the value of CSOs’ foreign currency accounts to plummet, and for a period, organizations were unable to access funds from their foreign currency accounts.

Local CSOs complain that there is a lack of transparency on the part of international donors. CSOs suspect that donors select project implementers in advance and that public calls for proposals are only a formality. They also complain that donor-driven interventions do not always appreciate the efforts of local CSOs, thereby undermining their work. For example, a Lebanese organization implemented an activity with the municipality of Baysour with funding from the UN Development Programme (UNDP). When the program ended, a consulting firm evaluated the work but did not even meet with the local CSO, signaling that its work was considered unimportant.

International donors sometimes fund organizations founded by politicians or their family members, which have powerful political connections and do not charge for overhead. International donors often work with municipalities that fully control the selection of partners, which can be limited to its supporters. During the protests, CSOs were more sensitive about accepting foreign funds because of increasing accusations that they were implementing embassies’ agendas. Small CSOs tend to partner with larger CSOs to apply for projects.

Partnerships between international and local CSOs continue to be problematic. Local CSOs often feel that their international partners do not treat them as equals. In addition, some local CSOs complain of micro-management by their international partners. Local CSOs also report that international CSOs are more focused on conducting activities rather than achieving real impact. In some cases, however, international organizations provide their local partners with capacity-building support and treat them as equal partners in the design and implementation of activities.

CSOs have been slow to seek other sources of funding and receive few local funds. Only CSOs working on charitable causes such as children with cancer successfully raise public donations. Because of weak oversight, private companies do not have robust financial and auditing systems and prefer not to declare their profits, inhibiting the development of a culture of corporate philanthropy. Only banks and big corporations, as well as some medium-sized companies, tend to have corporate social responsibility programs, but these tend to benefit their relatives or personal interests. Many politicians and powerful businesspeople have established nonprofit organizations through their wives or other people from their inner circles. They provide support from their businesses to these organizations and deduct the amount of the donations from their businesses’ profits.

Some CSOs try to generate revenue, for example by offering consultancies or media production services of videos, infographics, and other products. However, these efforts generate little income, particularly in light of the deteriorating economic situation in 2019, which impeded potential clients from seeking paid services.

Civil companies must appoint auditors, while in nonprofit organizations, the financial officers can present annual financial documents to the authorities. Larger CSOs rely on international donors to guide them through their financial management systems. Most CSOs are not aware of other resources to help with their financial management, such as online instructions in Arabic for preparing financial reports.
ADVOCACY: 3.2

CSOs’ advocacy efforts improved moderately in 2019. In the last three months of the year, for the first time in Lebanon’s history, people from all different religious backgrounds across the country took to the streets to demand their rights. As part of the protests, civil society groups organized public discussions and debates with experts, especially in economic fields. According to a UNDP mapping of the demands of fifty-seven CSOs, political movements, and professional organizations at the peak of the protests (October 17-28), the most important areas of concern included economic inclusion, government accountability, social justice, economic growth, access to basic services, and the rule of law.

CSOs also engaged in advocacy efforts earlier in 2019. Despite the absence of institutionalized joint decision-making processes, parliamentary committees and ministries engaged in participatory processes with CSOs or invited CSOs to attend their sessions. CSOs were asked to provide expertise in the drafting of laws, although the requests were sometimes merely a formality. The Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reforms launched a plan to implement the access to information law through a participatory process that included open consultations with stakeholders, including CSOs. International pressure from embassies and groups such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and UNDP helped push reforms that included government engagement with CSOs. However, state actors did not always facilitate access to information by CSOs in 2019. For example, the follow-up and accountability committee for the Litani River, which monitors the implementation of related policies and laws, was unable to access relevant information. In addition, the committee could not access the Litani River to conduct its own monitoring except by force, as it is a closed area.

CSOs successfully advocated for the protection of fundamental freedoms in 2019. The Mashroul Leila band, whose leader is openly gay and which advocates for equality and non-discrimination, was scheduled to play at the Byblos festival in August. The Catholic Media Center pressured the festival organizers to cancel the performance and a concerted smear campaign was organized that accused band members of satanism, blasphemy, and anti-Christian sentiment. The performance was ultimately canceled, allegedly to maintain security and prevent bloodshed. Eleven CSOs jointly filed a request with the prosecutor asking for an immediate investigation into the individuals who had initiated the campaign against the band. However, no investigation had taken place at the time of writing this report.

CSOs also engaged in other joint advocacy campaigns during the year. Environmental CSOs in the Bisri Dam coalition opposed the dam’s construction as many studies concluded that it would cause significant damage to the environment and is not efficient. The coalition raised public awareness of the fact that the government approved the dam’s construction without conducting an environmental assessment. The coalition’s work was visible in environment-related demands during the autumn protests. The alternative journalism union, which serves as a counterweight to the editors’ and journalists’ unions, which mainly represent the interests of media owners and politicians, was the leading voice calling for the protection of journalists during the protests and the socio-economic protection of media institutions, which were struggling to pay journalists. The election of the new head of the Beirut Bar Association in November 2019 was considered a win for advocacy organizations, as he comes from a civil society background. In the spring of 2019, environmental CSOs also conducted a media campaign and organized sessions with local communities to raise awareness on the danger of forest fires. This helped protect targeted areas, although there were still several huge fires in other regions across the country.

Peaceful protests were held in February to call for the recognition of civil marriages, in addition to religious marriages, in Lebanon. The movement also called for the legal age for marriage to be raised, demanded equal inheritance rights, and opposed domestic violence and all types of discriminations. Feminist groups and women’s rights CSOs, including Kafa, Lebanese Democratic Women’s Gathering (RDFL), and Abaad, played a key role in these protests and worked on draft laws addressing these issues. In response to the protests, the minister of
interior stated that she is not against a law for civil marriage. However, this statement was met with harsh criticism from Dar al-Fatwa, the official body for the Sunni branch of Islam in Lebanon, opposing civil marriage.

Despite these successes, networking and coalition-building for greater social impact is generally still weak. For example, CSOs working on governance issues in the oil and gas sector were unable to form a coalition, thereby impeding Lebanon from joining the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Some established coalitions lack democratic leadership. For example, three individuals dominate a coalition of 185 organizations supporting women’s political engagement. Another challenge for coalition-based advocacy is that clear mechanisms for discussion and decision making are lacking, making small CSOs feel marginalized as a result. For example, at a conference for women’s organizations, the leading organizations decided to draft an action plan and ruled that organizations that did not want to commit to it would have to withdraw. This dynamic particularly affected CSOs in rural areas, as there are many different approaches to women’s issues depending on local cultures.

The reach and impact of CSO advocacy campaigns do not always reach the grassroots level. For example, even though a law was passed years ago that criminalizes honor crimes in response to CSO advocacy, the practice continues as certain segments of society still believe that actions to protect the honor of families are justified. In addition, many advocacy and awareness campaigns now rely on social media, but access to social media can be limited, particularly among women in rural areas.

Structural issues also dissuade advocacy in Lebanon. In particular, the freedom of expression is increasingly threatened, especially through social media. In 2019, there were several cases in which activists were targeted after criticizing public figures or the performance of institutions and bodies or expressing sarcastic opinions against them or in issues related to religion. The authorities used provisions of the penal code related to insulting public institutions, disturbance of public peace, stirring religious strife, endangering the integrity of Lebanon and its external relations, insulting public officials, and other texts related to blasphemy to stifle such criticism. Activists have been called for investigations by different security bodies including the cybercrime bureau, Lebanese Army intelligence, and General Security, and some have even been prosecuted in military courts.

In light of such incidents, significant efforts were made to protect the freedom of expression online and offline in 2019. A coalition of local and international organizations including Maharat, Skeyes, Smex, Legal Agenda, Amnesty, HRW, Alef, and Map advocated for the parliamentary committee of justice and administration, which was discussing the media law, to adopt concrete reforms to ensure wider protection. In general, however, despite ongoing restrictions on civic spaces, CSOs did not focus on changing existing laws in this area in 2019, because they see the problem as lying mainly in implementation rather than the legal framework.

SERVICE PROVISION: 3.4

CSOs in Lebanon continued to provide diverse goods and services in 2019. Although remaining at about the same level as in the previous year, CSO service provision is expected to become more difficult in the future as the effects of the financial crisis become more pronounced.

Service provision usually depends on donors’ agendas. For example, CSOs sometimes compete for projects in refugee camps simply to earn income even when the expectations are unrealistic. CSOs can also be frustrated by donors’ expectations that larger numbers of CSOs become involved as project implementers without corresponding increases in funding. In 2019, for example, one donor was pleased that with $600,000 it was able to reach thirty to forty CSOs, rather than the eight to ten organizations previously targeted. In such a situation, CSOs feel the quality of services suffers even as the numbers confirm the success of the program. Services funded by donors are not always aligned with community needs. For example, CSOs fear that some donors’ programs are directed towards naturalizing refugees and integrating them into Lebanese society, whereas many municipalities are not inclusive or receptive to such efforts and feel that their own needs should come first.
CSOs usually publish resources, notices of training opportunities, and publications on their websites, where they are publicly accessible. For the most part, CSOs—with the exception of religious CSOs and those that are politically affiliated—provide their services without discrimination.

Some CSOs earn income by marketing services and products. For example, several organizations rent out their training facilities. A few CSOs offer paid training sessions and consultancy services, but they had few paying customers in 2019 because of the financial crisis. The legal framework does not encourage social entrepreneurship, and most CSOs do not have the resources and experience to engage in market analysis.

The discussion of the 2019 budget in May 2019 included a debate on funding for the Ministry of Social Affairs to support CSOs working on social needs such as those of people with disabilities. The minister of social affairs objected to the proposed decrease in his ministry’s budget by LBP 3 billion (approximately $2 million), which would have threatened CSOs’ ability to continue supporting marginalized groups and individuals. Ultimately, when the budget was adopted in July 2019, it included an increase in funding for the Ministry of Social Affairs of LBP 35 billion (approximately $23 million) for CSOs working on social needs. CSOs were invited to sign contracts with the ministry in December 2019.

The government also recognizes the expertise of CSOs in service provision and relies on CSOs, especially in areas where public institutions lack needed skills, such as reviewing curriculum in the education field, legal assistance during the drafting of laws, or technical assistance to municipalities to collect data or improve good governance. Since the protests, however, a lack of trust has developed between the government and civil society.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 3.8**

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector did not change in 2019. CSOs continue to have access to a range of facilities and intermediary support organizations (ISOs) that support their development. The SMART Center supports the development of new CSOs, including their missions, visions, internal policies, and registration as civil companies with the Ministry of Justice. In 2019, the SMART Center offered workshops addressing ten different aspects of organizational capacity. Beyond Reform and Development (BRD) continued to offer services to CSOs in areas such as policy research, public management consulting, and capacity development. Lebanon Support mentored fledgling CSOs on issues ranging from organizational management to web development and continued to operate an online platform called Daleel Madani, which allows organizations to post resources, find out about calls for proposals, and advertise job openings. In addition, in 2019, Lebanon Support organized Daleed Madani Goes on Tour, a series of meetings with CSOs to assess their needs and capacities and improve networking in the sector. Catholic Relief Services works with its partners to develop their organizational capacity to a level that allows them to successfully compete for and manage grant awards and develop financial and administrative systems to promote internal good governance, transparency, accountability and planning.

Several capacity-building programs, including some MEPI programs, ended in 2019, while others were launched. For example, in March, Expertise France, l’Agence Française de Développement (AFD), and the Danish International Development Agency (Danida) launched a call to select Lebanese CSOs to be partners in the SHABAKE project, which aims to strengthen capacities to both prevent and manage crises and effectively respond to vulnerable communities’ needs. The program will also reinforce the networking capacities of local CSOs and facilitate their access to international funding. As part of a program launched by Bioforce and its local partner North Leda in partnership with Oxfam in 2018, twenty-five CSOs in Tripoli were trained in April on the Taking-the-Lead Methodology and received technical assistance in context analysis, organizational self-assessment, and action planning.
While these and other donor-supported programs help CSOs build their capacity, some capacity-building programs remain unknown to local CSOs, especially small and emerging organizations. Communication can be a major impediment, as most support is offered in English. However, a few international organizations, such as Hivos and Oxfam, help small CSOs write proposals in Arabic and then translate them. Several projects offer capacity building through local offices of the Ministry of Social Affairs, although there are concerns that the selection of participants is biased. Some local CSOs, especially small emerging ones, require further support and capacity building in order to prepare financial reports that meet complicated donor requirements. However, such training is not always available or does not fulfill their needs. Instead, these CSOs would prefer specific and tailored training combined with technical on-the-job assistance to be able to prepare their financial reports accurately.

There are still no local organizations that provide grants from either locally raised funds or by re-granting international donor funds to local CSOs to address locally identified needs and projects.

CSOs increasingly form coalitions with specific goals. Examples of such coalitions include the Litani River committee, the Bisri Dam coalition, and coalitions addressing waste management and the freedom of expression.

CSOs regularly share information with each other. While there are local experts and consultants in various fields, there is no platform to find this expertise. Furthermore, it is difficult to assess the competency of alleged experts in specific areas. Therefore, CSOs rely on each other to identify experts, which increases demand for the services of a small number of experts and allows them to increase their fees.

CSO partnerships with the government exist, especially at the legislative level, where CSOs engage with parliamentary committees discussing law proposals. However, such partnerships are still not institutionalized and the extent to which CSOs are allowed to participate in discussions depends on the openness of the head of individual committees. CSOs report that sometimes their engagement is just a formality. The Lebanon Internet Governance Forum, a multistakeholder platform focused on internet governance issues, was supposed to take place in November 2019, but was canceled because of the protests. However, the Lebanese Multistakeholder Advisory Group (LMAG) organized public consultation meetings on internet governance throughout the year to engage with more ministry, civil society, academia, and private sector representatives. The media, especially alternative media platforms, began to approach CSOs about partnerships in 2019.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.6

The public image of the civil society sector improved moderately in 2019, especially during the protests during the last two months of the year, when the public was more aware of their activities and media relied on their expertise.

Whereas in previous years, CSOs struggled to access the media, in 2019 media reached out to CSOs for their expertise. For example, many media outlets contacted the founder of a new CSO, Seeds for Legal Initiatives, for comments on legal matters. Almost all television stations provided live coverage of the protests and civil society actors across Lebanon had an easier time accessing media, even on political issues, during the protests. For example, the political talk show Vision 2030 on LBCI provided space for emerging groups and young experts, including women, to engage in evidence-based discussions on current issues, while previously, political talk shows served primarily as platforms for politicians to make political statements. The exception was small local CSOs, which the media tended not to cover unless they received payment or had personal relationships with an organization.

The public increasingly empathized with the work of CSOs in 2019. The public regarded CSOs as experts in publicly debated topics and appreciated it when they offered concrete data related to their fields of expertise. Organizational reputations continued to influence public perceptions of CSOs. For example, some communities,
especially in Hezbollah-controlled areas, are suspicious of CSOs that accept foreign funding but will cooperate with organizations that they trust.

Both the government and businesses view CSOs as experts in their fields. The government increasingly engages with CSO experts as they have greater access to international actors and embassies. However, as CSOs have become more engaged in political life, including as candidates in the 2018 elections and vocal critics of economic, social, environmental, and other policies in 2019, politicians and political party members increasingly view them as rivals rather than partners.

CSOs improved their work with journalists in 2019. For example, on International Women’s Day in March, Noun Tadamon, a small CSO, designed an event in schools to honor women cleaners. Al Jadeed TV, a major television station, came to the schools to film the event for its news bulletins. CSOs have become experts in social media and used it extensively in 2019, particularly during the protests. CSOs use Facebook to reach broader constituencies and WhatsApp to reach out to their narrower constituencies. Some CSOs use Twitter to reach decision makers and journalists. However, Twitter is not widely used by the public.

Many organizations publish reports of their activities online, but few compile annual reports, since they lack the financial resources to pay staff to do this work. Some CSOs have internal policies that might include codes of conduct, but this depends on the size and structure of individual organizations.
CSOs in Libya operated in a context marked by war, humanitarian crisis, and a deteriorating economy in 2019. The situation in the country at the beginning of the year was somewhat stable due in part to some economic reforms that were implemented during the last quarter of 2018. International efforts resulted in calls for a national conference to be held in April 2019 to reconcile the rival de facto authorities: the Government of National Accord (GNA), which is based in the west and is recognized internationally; and the Interim Government, which is located in the eastern city of Al Bayda.

However, the situation deteriorated dramatically beginning in April, when the eastern Libyan Arab Army Forces (LAAF), with the approval of the House of Representatives (HoR), launched an offensive on the capital Tripoli, which was governed by the GNA. This attack deepened the fractures between the authorities in the east and west, leading the members of the HoR from the west to boycott the HoR’s session and form a new parliament in Tripoli.

The war also caused a major economic and humanitarian crisis. More than 1,000 people had been killed in the conflict by the end of the year, including around 300 civilians, and more than 100,000 were displaced in and around Tripoli. In addition, the war complicated the delivery of basic services, manifesting in prolonged power cuts, a cash crisis, and food insecurity. According to the World Bank, oil production declined, and gross domestic product (GDP) growth slowed down to around 5.5 percent in 2019 from an average of 17.3 percent in 2017-2018. Living standards of the majority of Libyans continued to decline.

Overall CSO sustainability deteriorated slightly in 2019, as the conflict had a negative impact on the sector’s legal environment, financial viability, advocacy, and public image. The legal environment worsened as CSOs working on the national level had to navigate duelling regimes and their distinct processes, including complex registration processes in both the east and west. CSOs’ financial viability deteriorated further as a result of the dire economic situation, inflation, and lack of funding opportunities in the country. CSOs engaged in fewer advocacy campaigns in 2019 as the war and government split made it virtually impossible to make any changes in policies or laws. The conflict spurred disinformation campaigns and hate speech that affected CSOs and tarnished the sector’s image. The only dimension recording an improvement was organizational capacity, which strengthened as a result of

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1 The Interim Government, based in Al-Bayda, is associated with the House of Representatives (HoR). The HoR is based in Tobruk because of security conditions in Benghazi. The internationally-recognized Government of National Accord is associated with the High Council of State, both of which are based in Tripoli.
projects that emphasized capacity building and mentoring for new and small CSOs. CSO service provision and sectoral infrastructure remained largely unchanged.

CSOs register with and report to two separate Civil Society Commission (CSCs)—one under the GNA and located in Tripoli, and one under the government in the east and located in Benghazi. According to a publicly released report issued in 2019 by the CSC in Benghazi, a total of 5,415 CSOs were registered throughout the country. Of these, 37 percent were based in Tripoli, 20 percent in Benghazi, and 3.4 percent in Sabha. According to the report, the most common areas of work for CSOs are charity work (14.52 percent), social development (11.83 percent), and law reform and human rights (9.39 percent).

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.5**

The legal environment for CSOs worsened slightly in 2019. The 2019 conflict exacerbated the political division in the country and increased confusion as CSOs now have to navigate the administrative processes of two rival governments, including registering with and reporting to both of the CSCs.

The 2011 Constitutional Declaration guarantees Libyans’ freedom to form CSOs and effectively annulled the restrictive provisions that had previously regulated CSOs’ formation and registration. However, with the exception of a few executive regulations and decrees issued by the rival executive authorities, no alternative law has been adopted to govern the sector. In practice, therefore, the provisions of the restrictive 2001 Law 19/2001, which cemented the state’s control over the formation and activities of different types of associations, continue to be in place. When there are conflicts between the regulations and the provisions of Law 19/2001, the law prevails. This situation has created confusion about the legal position of CSOs operating in the country.

CSOs must register to operate, organize activities, and receive funds and donations. The armed conflict that started in 2019 complicated the registration process for CSOs, especially those that work on the national level. These organizations now need to register with both the CSCs under the GNA and the Interim Government. International NGOs (INGOs) also must register with both authorities.

CSOs in the eastern region are now obliged to obtain security approvals from the Interim Government. Registered CSOs also must submit reports to the rival authorities which imposes additional burdens and risks on them.

The GNA issued Decree No. 286-2018 in March 2018. In 2019, the decree continued to complicate CSOs’ registration process, restrict their activities, and effectively subject them to government control when receiving financial aid and opening bank accounts. According to Decree 286-2018, CSOs registering under the GNA need a minimum of ten members and must submit extensive documentation, including criminal record certificates and national number certificates, which can involve lengthy administrative procedures to obtain. Article 27 of Decree 286-2018 prohibits any calls for violence or discrimination based on language or ethnicity. Experts consider the vagueness of this language problematic. In particular, they fear it may be used to restrict the work of CSOs promoting and protecting the rights of ethnic groups, including those advocating for languages such as Amazigh, Tebu, and Tuareg to be considered official languages along with Arabic. Historically, the use of these languages was severely restricted by the previous regime.

The unclear legal situation for CSOs in the country opens the door for different interpretations of other laws and legal provisions that were in force during the previous regime and restricted fundamental freedoms and human rights. For example, Article 208 of the Libyan Penal Code stipulates that if a Libyan citizen established or joined an international association without permission, he or she may be sentenced to imprisonment. Other articles in the Penal Code use ambiguous language that can be interpreted to restrict the work of CSOs in Libya. While the war...
seems to have shifted the authorities’ attention to more immediate priorities, including the armed clashes, until these laws are amended or dissolved, they continue to present a risk.

Government harassment of CSOs did not change in 2019. While not a common occurrence, CSOs are sometimes subject to harassment from government authorities, security forces, and other armed groups. For example, in December 2019, a Libyan activist was arrested after attending an event in Tunis; he was interrogated for two weeks before being released. In another incident, security forces protecting a hotel interrogated the project manager of a CSO organizing a women’s event in the hotel. When the same group organized another event in a different hotel, security forces asked for the full list of attendees with contact information and also interrogated the project manager. Threats, including death threats, were made against numerous human rights defenders and political activists. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) reported that at least three activists have sought refuge abroad.

During the conflict in 2019, some CSOs and activists were criticized and accused of supporting the rival government and parties in the conflict. As a result, many organizations practiced self-censorship to protect their safety and ensure the continuity of their work.

In 2018, CSOs in the western region were allowed to accept funds from local and foreign donors but they had to notify the CSC. This condition changed with the issuance of Decree 286-2018, which requires a CSO to obtain approval from the CSC before receiving any funds. The decree, however, fails to establish clear conditions for refusing to grant this permission. The CSC has the right to dissolve a CSO if it does not comply with this requirement. Although there are no known examples of CSOs being denied funding in 2019, this requirement poses a serious threat to CSOs’ work in the western region. CSOs in other regions of the country do not experience any limitations on their right to receive funding. No changes were made to the taxation of CSOs in 2019, and CSOs are still exempt from taxes.

Local legal capacity did not change in 2019. Only a small number of lawyers specialize in the work of CSOs. While their services are available to CSOs in both the eastern and western parts of the country, the few legal experts that exist are very expensive and mostly work with INGOs.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.7

In general, the organizational capacity of Libyan CSOs is weak and only those few CSOs that have worked directly in partnership with INGOs or benefited from capacity development and training offered by INGOs and donors have developed strong organizational capacities. This includes groups such as Moomken, Fezzan Libya Group, Jusoor Center, Shaik Taher Azzawi Charity Organization (STACO), H2O, and Dialogue and Debate Association (DDA), among others. Unlike most CSOs in the country, these organizations have full-time employees, proper organizational structures, and have been operational for over five years.

While still limited, the organizational capacity of CSOs improved slightly in 2019. Several projects implemented during the year emphasized capacity building and mentoring for new and small CSOs, thereby increasing the capacity of many organizations, mainly in rural areas. For example, after participating in several projects focused on strengthening the organizational capacity of women’s CSOs in the south, the Women’s Libyan Union in the South (WLUS) was able to become the local partner for the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) in Sabha and received support from many other INGOs. Similarly, after benefiting from capacity-building support from Democracy Reporting International, Tracks Organization for Peace and Development in Zawya was able to receive funds from the International Organization for Migration (IOM), UNFPA, and other projects.
CSOs generally use Facebook and other social media platforms to reach their beneficiaries and new constituencies. In 2019, CSOs in the south slightly increased their outreach and were in closer contact with their local communities. CSOs in the south also noted that municipal councils increasingly sought CSO assistance and formed partnerships to support the community, as well as women and youth. In the east, CSOs started to build new constituencies and expand their outreach in Benghazi. For example, the organization Tanmia 360 held a large cultural exhibition in Benghazi funded by Chemonics and organized several youth programs.

Most CSOs do not have clearly defined strategic frameworks or short and long-term plans. Instead, they respond to donors’ often shifting priorities and requirements in order to get support and funding. The few organizations that do have clear strategies are experienced and well-established CSOs that work with INGOs and international donors and receive core funding such as STACO, DDA, Fezzan Libya Group, Jusoor, Tanmia 360, Moomken, and H2O. Most newly established CSOs do not have experience in developing clear visions, missions, and action plans. The lack of stability and the ongoing war has also made it more challenging for CSOs to develop long-term visions and plans.

Organizations across the sector continue to lack democratic governance structures. The few experienced CSOs that are supported by foreign donors generally have clearly-defined internal governance structures and written policies and procedures. In many CSOs that have separate general assemblies and boards of directors, the two bodies do not meet or consult with each other regularly. Annual meetings with members are usually not held or not recorded.

Most CSOs struggle to maintain full-time paid staff as a result of irregular and insufficient funding. Highly experienced staff generally prefer to work in INGOs that provide more stability, as well as competitive compensation and benefits. Inflation increased the cost of professional services in 2019. As a result, many CSOs were unable to afford the professional services of accountants or lawyers. A CSO’s use of volunteers tends to depend on its size and activities, with CSOs that implement large-scale projects or work in different locations of the country generally engaging more volunteers. Most humanitarian relief and service-providing CSOs depend on volunteers in their projects. Some organizations, such as H2O and Moomken in Tripoli and Tanmia 360 in Benghazi, train volunteers to serve in projects, thereby cultivating skilled teams and cutting costs.

The sector’s access to information and communications technology (ICT) and ability to utilize it effectively improved somewhat in 2019. The internet provider Libyana expanded its 4G service in the southern region of the country. In addition, a project funded by the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) and implemented by IOM through its local partners H2O and Moomken focused on strengthening the capacity of CSOs in the south, including by increasing their internet connectivity and ICT skills. As a result of these initiatives, many CSOs in the south including Fezzan Libya Group increasingly used ICT tools to help fill informational and service gaps. In general, CSOs increasingly use email and mobile applications like WhatsApp and Facebook for communication. CSOs in rural areas mainly rely on these tools to be in contact with local CSOs and INGOs.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.0**

CSOs’ financial viability is impeded and deteriorated further in 2019 as the dire economic situation, inflation, and lack of funding opportunities in the country affected the ability of many CSOs to cover staff salaries and other operational costs.

CSOs have limited access to diverse financial resources. International donors continue to be a critical source of funding for CSOs in the country, as there is generally a lack of local philanthropic foundations and local funds, and few public companies. In 2019, as in previous years, only the few experienced CSOs in the country, including Moomken, H2O, Fezzan Libya Group, and Network for Democracy Development, received long-term financial support, while other CSOs only received small, short-term grants from INGOs.
The main foreign donors in Libya include the European Delegation, USAID, the German Embassy, and the United Kingdom’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO). In addition, many INGOs and United Nations (UN) agencies receive direct support from diplomatic missions to Libya, including those from the Netherlands, Germany, Canada, Sweden, Denmark, and France. In response to the war in Tripoli in 2019, international donor priorities, as well as funding, shifted to projects responding to the humanitarian crisis, reducing support for CSOs that work on other activities like promoting democracy, technology, and economic development. For example, after the municipal council elections were postponed due to the ongoing armed conflict, some projects focused on election activities were suspended, although others, including those funded by USAID, continued with a focus on training. CSOs in rural areas that were not affected by the conflict particularly struggled to access funding from international donors in 2019. CSOs in the south, on the other hand, were not affected due to the many ongoing long-term international programs in the region. These programs focus mainly on the provision of basic goods and services with support from the World Food Program (WFP), IOM, and UN Development Programme (UNDP). Projects in Tripoli encountered many operational challenges in 2019. Due to the war in the city, for example, many projects, such as those supported through small grants awarded by the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI), were suspended during the year.

The role of local funding in financing CSOs’ activities continues to be limited. A few major local telecommunication companies provide support to CSOs, but they do not utilize open processes. Instead, CSOs need personal relationships to access these sources of funding. Furthermore, these companies’ rules and procedures are not practical for most CSOs as the money allocated is generally received only after activities are implemented. The government did not offer any funding to CSOs in 2019 except that provided through public companies. CSOs rarely engage in fundraising or philanthropic efforts focused on their constituencies. CSOs also rarely collect membership dues or use crowdfunding. The small amount of local donations during the year was directed to humanitarian and charity work to support internally displaced persons (IDPs) and other disadvantaged people.

CSOs generate minimal revenue through income-generating activities, although some CSOs like Libya Youth Center and Moomken in Tripoli rent rooms for training events or meetings to generate revenues. However, the cash crisis and security issues made such activities less viable in 2019; consequently, revenue earned in this manner only comprised a small share of CSOs’ income during the year. The government still does not contract with CSOs to provide services.

Financial management continued to be a problem for many organizations in 2019. Anti-money laundering regulations require CSOs to receive approval from the Banking Control Department in the Central Bank of Libya in order to open bank accounts; as a result, few CSOs have bank accounts in the country. In addition, few organizations have internal policies or standard operating procedures for financial processes. CSOs are required by the current rules to undergo annual audits by certified external auditors. However, certified accountants have increased their professional fees due to the economic crisis and inflation, making it more difficult for CSOs to prepare proper annual financial statements.

**ADVOCACY: 5.0**

CSO advocacy deteriorated slightly in 2019. CSOs engaged in fewer advocacy campaigns in 2019 as the armed conflict in Tripoli and split in the legislative authority and government functions made it virtually impossible to make any changes in policies or laws. CSO advocacy work during the year focused largely on less overtly political issues that were of largely universal acceptance, such as ending early marriage or promoting access to university or municipal facilities by persons with disabilities (PWDs).

CSOs still struggle with the lack of clear processes to advocate for policy and law reforms. For example, many CSOs do not know that draft laws must be reviewed and approved by the Department of Law at the Ministry of Justice before being submitted to legislators in order to ensure their compliance with current legislation. In addition, most CSOs have no direct lines of communication with policymakers and those that do rely on personal relationships.

CSOs still do not have clear mechanisms to monitor the government’s work or hold it accountable. There were no impactful lobbying initiatives in 2019 due to the conflict, political division, and the dysfunctional legislative authority.
While CSOs did not organize any major advocacy campaigns in 2019, women’s CSOs were able to form advocacy coalitions. For example, with funding from USAID and support from the National Democratic Institute (NDI), CSOs formed the Not Before 18 coalition to advocate against child marriage and to reform the Libyan Family Law. In 2019, they organized media campaigns and meetings with different stakeholders in pursuit of their objectives. NDI also supported the formation of the 30% Quota, a coalition that promotes women’s political inclusion through the introduction of a 30 percent quota system in all leadership positions. In 2019, the coalition organized meetings with governmental institutions including the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Culture to advocate for and promote the quota system in their administrations. With funding from the British government, eight women’s empowerment CSOs formed the coalition You are Pioneer to change gender stereotypes by promoting success stories of Libyan women. These campaigns, however, did not lead to any policy changes in 2019.

The Wussoul (Access) campaign promoted the rights of people with disabilities to access government buildings and educational institutions in 2019. As a result of these efforts, the Municipality of Zawya issued a decision obliging public and private institutions within its jurisdiction to guarantee access for people with disabilities. On the International Day of People with Disabilities, the GNA’s Minister of Education issued a circular requesting all of the ministry’s affiliates to facilitate access for persons with disabilities to all educational facilities.

CSOs utilize social media in some advocacy campaigns. For example, with the participation of CSOs including Fezzan Libya Group, Tanarout, South Peace Organization for Development, Ideas Drivers, Council of the Voice of Libyan Youth, and H2O, as well as many activists and artists, the Bedaya Campaign relied on social media to raise public awareness about civic participation, combat hate speech, and promote tolerance among Libyans.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 5.4**

CSOs’ service provision remained stable in 2019. Mainly as a result of the conflict in Tripoli, CSOs were unable to operate in certain locations or engage in certain types of projects in 2019. However, CSOs in other regions managed to provide services and expand their outreach.

The services most commonly provided by CSOs include the provision of humanitarian assistance, and skill-building, awareness, and education services. In 2019, the role of CSOs in humanitarian relief and the provision of basic charitable goods and services increased, mainly in the southern region and areas directly affected by the armed conflict, as the government has proven unable to provide sufficient support to impacted Libyan during this crisis. Thousands of people were displaced after the conflict erupted south of Tripoli in April 2019. Local CSOs such as the Libyan Red Crescent and Libyan Scouts helped rescue these IDPs and guide them to shelters. In addition, many local CSOs supported mainly women and children in shelters, while CSOs like Elissafa, Al Bayan, and Libyan Psychosocial Support provided psychological assistance to people in shelters in collaboration with the UN Children’s Fund and UNFPA. In May, INGOs like IOM and WFP started to work with IDPs more systematically through local partners, most notably STACO.
The 2019 CSO Sustainability Index for Libya

Service-providing CSOs generally are unable to conduct professional needs assessments. Instead, donors and international implementers are more likely to determine beneficiary needs. Many CSOs provide data collection and analysis services to INGOs and often work as service providers instead of local partners.

Most CSOs do not discriminate in the provision of services. However, the services provided by most CSOs are not available to non-Libyans living in Libya. Only a few projects designed by IOM target refugees and migrants; these projects mostly focus on economic empowerment and microfinance.

Most services provided by CSOs are made available for free and are extended to non-members. Decree 286-2018 prohibits CSOs from providing services for profit. While current regulations are unclear on the ways that CSOs can offer services and goods for fees, a few experienced organizations have been able to continue renting training and meeting space and delivering training programs for reasonable fees. However, the war and resulting economic crisis made it more difficult for these organizations to generate any meaningful income through such services in 2019.

The GNA sometimes recognizes the value of CSO services through public statements. For example, the National Anti-Corruption Authority recognized the work of the Libyan Institution for Investigative Journalism (LIFIJ) and signed a memorandum of understanding that enables LIFIJ to work as a whistleblower and submit official complaints to the authorities. However, public policies do not generally recognize the role of CSO services.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.8**

The infrastructure supporting CSOs in Libya remained unchanged in 2019.

As in 2018, the CSC in Benghazi was considered the only resource center in the country in 2019. However, few CSOs are aware of its advisory role, possibly because it is also the registration and monitoring authority. In 2019, the CSC in Benghazi started an initiative in the east of the country to build the capacity of women’s CSOs, with support from the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

A few larger organizations continued to provide space to smaller CSOs in 2019. In the south, the National Fezzan Caucus continued to provide support and space to small organizations in Sabha, in the west, through its democracy resources center, which is supported by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). Moomken offered its facilities for trainings and workshops to CSOs at a discounted fee, while H2O continued to provide meeting space to CSOs for free. In addition, Jusoor made its LEAP space available to women’s CSOs for workshops and meetings at no cost.

Cooperation within the CSO sector was enhanced slightly in 2019 as women’s CSOs formed coalitions and networks with support from international donors including USAID, the British government, and UNWomen. However, most of these networks were online initiatives and failed to reach beyond their members and founders, limiting their potential impact and effectiveness.

In 2019, IOM and UNDP offered many training and capacity-building programs to build the managerial knowledge and skills of CSOs in the southern region; however, the training was conducted by other local CSOs and not experienced professionals. Other programs implemented by IOM focused on CSOs in Benghazi. The demand for CSO capacity building continued to outpace the supply, especially in regions that were not within the focus areas of international donors.

There are no local grantmaking organizations or intersectoral partnerships in Libya.
The CSO sector’s public image deteriorated moderately in 2019. The government, private sector, and public all have a generally negative perception of CSOs’ activities and work in Libya. The conflict spurred disinformation campaigns and hate speech that affected CSOs and further tarnished the sector’s image. In particular, these campaigns accused CSOs that work with international donors and INGOs of promoting foreign agendas. Several CSOs working on women’s empowerment were systematically attacked on social media platforms for conspiring against conservative morals. For example, the Tamazight Women’s Movement was the subject of a smear campaign after its co-founder made a statement at the UN Security Council that highlighted violence against women during the conflict. At the same time, small and service-providing CSOs were accused of benefiting from the crisis in the country. Such campaigns are possible because the public does not have a clear concept of CSOs’ role in society. CSOs had limited ability to respond to these attacks or to promote their work during the year. Instead, many CSOs practice censorship and work with a low profile in order to manage their operations without risking their safety.

The negative perception of CSOs also extended to the government and business actors. CSOs were not invited to meetings or contacted to participate in any initiatives in 2019. Although the government relies on CSOs to manage many services and relief activities, it generally does not trust CSOs as they get funding from international sources.

In the beginning of 2019, there was a slight improvement in the media coverage of CSO activities. However, this coverage was limited to reporting on CSO events and did not include any analysis of the work conducted by CSOs or provide any support to their causes and campaigns. After April 2019, media coverage focused on the war, and interest in CSO news and reports decreased. Newly established TV and radio stations demonstrated more interest in CSOs, but this was still insignificant compared to their coverage of other events and news. Women’s CSOs found the coverage of their work during most of the year to be generally negative and to underestimate the efforts of CSOs working on women’s causes. For instance, one popular TV channel hosted a talk show about women that shared negative stereotypes about women’s causes.

Given the problems with traditional media coverage, CSOs depended largely on social media platforms to gain public support and highlight their work and activities in 2019. Occasionally, CSOs also relied on personal relationships with journalists to get coverage on their work. Few CSOs have designated media and communication staff. As a result, most CSOs have inadequate media coverage which makes it difficult for them to build or reinforce a positive public image.

Measures to enhance transparency are generally non-existent among CSOs in Libya. Only a few organizations have internal rules and codes of conduct. CSOs generally do not publish annual reports or summaries of their activities, mainly to avoid any risk to their personal safety.
During his Throne Day speech on July 30, 2019, King Mohammed V of Morocco announced the establishment of a new “independent” committee in charge of developing a new roadmap for national development. Among other responsibilities, the committee is tasked with assessing the needs in and making recommendations to improve a large range of sectors such as education, agriculture, health, investment, and taxation. The thirty-five members of the committee come from different backgrounds and include several CSO representatives.

Restrictions on the media increased in Morocco in 2019. Lawsuits against associations, the media, journalists, content creators, artists, YouTubers, and bloggers who freely express their opinions and openly criticize the government became more common. Most notably, in the fall of 2019, Hajar Raissouni, a journalist for the independent news website Akhbar al-Youm known for her coverage of Hirak, a protest movement that started in 2016 to demand better socioeconomic conditions in the Rif region, was arrested and charged with having an illegal abortion and engaging in extra-marital sexual activity. She was sentenced to a year in prison without the possibility of parole. According to a letter she sent from prison, Raissouni was interrogated about her articles as well as other staff at the newspaper. Following a campaign both on and offline led by civil society representatives, Raissouni and those who were convicted with her, including her fiancé and medical staff, were pardoned.

In June 2018, approximately fifty leaders of the Hirak movement were sentenced to up to twenty years in prison. In April 2019, an appeals court in Casablanca upheld these verdicts. In July 2019, the Inter-Ministerial Delegate for Human Rights presented a report on the 2017 Hirak movement, in which he rejected “all accusations made against the security forces regarding the violation of human rights in the region during the period of tension.” In a press release, the Moroccan Coalition of Human Rights Organizations, which unites twenty-one human rights associations, rejected the “fraud and distortion of facts or rhetoric to overturn data.”

Studies show that Morocco’s youth are not very engaged in politics and public life. According to a 2018 World Bank report, only 6 percent of young people belong to a CSO, and 1.3 percent are affiliated with a political party. While young people have been exploring informal models of organizing and working together, including lectures and debates in public spaces and street theater, they tend to lack a big-picture vision, specialized expertise, and strategies to influence public opinions and policies.

Morocco is a member of the Open Government Partnership (OGP), a multinational platform aimed at increasing transparency, equity, integrity, and participatory democracy. Morocco’s current OGP action plan covers the period between August 2018 and August 2020 and contains eighteen commitments in five essential areas: budget transparency, access to information, integrity, anti-corruption, and citizen participation. CSOs are heavily engaged in the OGP process through a civil society forum that allows all interested CSOs to engage in discussions. The
forum also conducts parallel evaluation of the implementation of the OGP action plan. By the end of 2019, more than halfway through the current action plan, little progress had been made on these commitments.

Overall CSO sustainability did not change in 2019. The legal framework governing CSOs deteriorated slightly as government harassment of CSOs, particularly those working on human rights issues, increased. At the same time, the sectoral infrastructure improved slightly with the creation and institutionalization of programs and entities that provide capacity-building support to CSOs. There were no significant changes in the other dimensions of CSO sustainability.

Civil society in Morocco has expanded considerably over the past decade. In a statement made in January 2020, the government state that the number of registered associations had reached approximately 209,000, up from just 20,000 in 2011. Most associations work at the local level and focus on social, cultural, and environmental issues. Approximately 1.4 percent of associations focus on human rights. According to the most recent data from the Office of Development Cooperation, there were 15,735 cooperatives at the end of 2015. Civil society’s contribution to the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) was about 1 percent in 2019, according to an official statement by the minister for parliament-civil society relations, during a meeting in April on “Civil society’s contributions to a new development model.”

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.8**

The legal framework for CSOs’ operations deteriorated slightly in 2019 as government harassment of CSOs, particularly those working on human rights issues, increased.

Morocco’s 2011 constitution acknowledges the role of civil society and its right to participate in public policy-making processes. Associations and foundations are regulated by Dahir (royal decree) on the Right to Create Associations (1-58:376 of 1958), as amended, and Application Decree No. 2-04-969 of 2005 on the Implementation of Decree No. 1-58-376 governing the formation of CSOs. Cooperatives are governed by Law No. 112-12, and the Dahir of July 16, 1957 governs professional unions.

Dahir 1-58-376 does not effectively support the broad range of CSOs being formed, specifically associations that focus on advocacy and human rights. In April, the minister for relations with parliament and civil society participated in the colloquium on “Civil society’s contributions to a new development model.” During this event, he emphasized the need to reform the legal framework as it does not meet the needs of CSOs, especially with regards to taxation, the status of foundations, access to public funding, public benefit status, and the status of volunteers.

In 2019, the government continued to work on a draft law on unions; the much-delayed draft has been in progress since 2009. However, unions including the Democratic Labor Confederation and the Moroccan Labor Union protested the draft bill, which seeks to restrict strikes and other labor freedoms and was produced without consulting them.

To gain legal status, CSOs must formally notify the government of their establishment. On paper, the notification process is relatively enabling, but in practice it functions much like a registration system because the government must effectively approve the notification. The Ministry of the Interior is the line ministry for CSOs. As in previous years, in 2019 some CSOs never received receipts approving their establishment, or it took more than the official sixty-day period to receive them. In addition, the notification process is hindered by the fact that various government entities impose different requirements, such as the number of copies of the application and supporting documents that must be submitted. Additionally, in some cases, local authorities ask CSOs to provide additional documents that are not required by law.
In several cases, CSOs’ requests for approval of legal status are denied. For example, the Morocco Association for Taxation of Transactions and Citizen Action has had its application to renew its legal status denied since 2004 without explanation. In some cases, these denials seem to be based on the individual preferences of the city, zone, prefecture, or officials involved.

Government harassment of CSOs, specifically those working on human rights issues, increased in 2019. In late January 2019, 200 people including Moroccan and international activists, journalists, and academic personalities signed a petition condemning the Moroccan authorities’ decision to dissolve Racines, a Moroccan human rights CSO. Racines had been dissolved in December 2018 after it hosted a talk show in its Casablanca office to discuss the political situation in Morocco, with the public prosecutor’s office arguing that Racines had implemented an activity outside its objectives. The prosecutor’s motion also highlighted political comments made by journalist Omar Radi, a guest on the program, in which he accused the interior ministry of “corruption” in managing the National Human Development Initiative (INDH). The petition attracted international and media attention and ultimately was signed by more than 6,000 people. In April, the Casablanca appeals court confirmed the decision to dissolve Racines, marking the first time Morocco has ever formally dissolved an established CSO.

The freedom of assembly was threatened in 2019, with cases of individuals who attended demonstrations subject to interrogations and legal action. For example, Rachid Sidi Baba was arrested in December 2019 following his call for a demonstration against investors from the Gulf states who improperly exploit resources in the Tata region. He was sentenced to six months in prison without the possibility of parole, and a fine of MAD 5,000 (approximately US $500).

Following years of advocacy efforts by CSOs, Law 31-13 on the right of access to information was passed in late 2018 and came into effect on March 12, 2019. The law requires public administrations, elected officials, and public service institutions to grant citizens access to information, either at the latter’s request or by publishing it. Administrative bodies have until March 12, 2020, to upgrade their systems and prepare for the full enforcement of the law. As of December 2019, thirty complaints had been filed for lack of or unsatisfactory response from administrations.

Dahir 1-58-376 states that CSOs can apply for public benefit status in order to receive tax benefits and qualify for government funding. The application process is cumbersome and requires CSOs to provide extensive, certified documentation. In addition, the authorities can grant this status at their discretion. Only a few CSOs that tend to have political connections, including the Moroccan Red Crescent and the Taher Sebti Institute, have been able to earn this status. According to a list published by the General Secretary of Government (SGG) in March 2020, two new organizations were granted public benefit status in 2019, bringing the total to 231. Sports federations that are authorized under Article 17 of Law 06-87 on physical education and sports automatically receive public benefit status.

CSOs have limited understanding of their tax rights and obligations. While CSOs are exempt from income (profit) tax, all CSOs are required to keep accounting records and to submit financial reports to the Moroccan General Tax Administration at the end of each fiscal year. Like all employers, CSOs are subject to source withholding of income tax from salaries or compensation paid to third parties, such as experts and trainers. Taxes paid late are subject to a 10 percent penalty, plus 5 percent for the first month late, and 0.50 percent for each subsequent full or partial month late. Only services provided by nonprofit associations with public benefit status are exempt from value-added tax (VAT). Due to CSOs advocacy efforts supported by USAID, the 2019 budget law included a provision exempting CSOs serving people with disabilities from custom taxes on imported equipment.

Tax regulations are sometimes applied inconsistently. For example, in 2019, a program of the Prometheus Institute supporting rural high-school girls in three disadvantaged communities had to pay a 30 percent tax on teachers’ salaries, while the rate for private and for-profit schools offering the same services is 17.5 percent.

CSOs can collect donations from the public but need to obtain permission from the SGG in advance. CSOs that have public benefit status are allowed to collect donations once per year without obtaining a license. CSOs are able to receive funding from the government, as well as international organizations and individuals. All international funding must be reported to the SGG within thirty days of receipt, along with information about the objectives of the project to be funded and the donor’s country of origin and contact information. CSOs may earn income from the provision of goods and services. As specified in Article 1 of Dahir 1-58-376, CSOs must invest any profits in their organizational activities and may not redistribute them to members.
Morocco has few attorneys trained in CSO-related laws, and legal services tend to be expensive. As a result, the majority of CSOs lack access to high-quality legal advice.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.1**

CSOs' organizational capacity did not change in 2019. Most Moroccan CSOs remain institutionally fragile and many registered organizations exist only on paper. CSOs commonly operate in inadequate offices, have staff who are only moderately qualified, and have lackluster communications capabilities. In addition, governance tends to be weak, and many CSOs only operate because of the commitment of their founding members and volunteers. CSOs also often lack technical skills and expertise related to the areas in which they work. Most CSOs lack financial autonomy, remaining reliant on either government or international funding. While some Moroccan CSOs have enhanced their organizational capacities over the past years, mainly thanks to international and national partnerships, many rural-based CSOs still require tailored technical assistance to upgrade their management systems and procedures.

CSOs rarely restrict their projects to one clearly defined set of beneficiaries, but instead identify target audiences for each project they implement. Many CSOs have integrated community needs assessments and participatory approaches into their work. Many CSOs are committed to being open to all stakeholders, and to involving their beneficiaries in all phases of a project, from design to evaluation, through participatory approaches.

Very few CSOs have clear strategic visions to which they adhere. Many prioritize donor-funded projects over their own strategic plans.

CSO governance did not change notably in 2019. According to the most recent data from the High Commission for Planning (HCP) in 2017, the vast majority (95.9 percent) of CSOs were managed only by an executive committee, while just 1.1 percent had a board of directors elected in a regular meeting, and 3 percent had both a board of directors and an executive committee. When they exist, boards of directors typically identify and plan projects, which staff members then implement. There is almost no turnover in association governance, which results in a high degree of entrenched authority. Periodic meetings of association memberships help ensure visibility, transparency, and information sharing. Associations are legally required to have internal regulations and bylaws in order to obtain legal status. However, not all CSOs have written policies or properly implement such policies if they have them.

Many CSOs have problems with staff turnover as employees leave when they find better-paying jobs with more job security. Donors do not usually allocate sufficient funding to operating expenses, and CSO project managers' salaries remain low. Although volunteers are CSOs' primary human resource, they receive no social protections such as pensions or medical coverage and have no formal legal status. A new law on volunteerism is in draft form, but CSOs are concerned about its slow progress through the legislature.

CSOs typically have office space and internet access. However, CSOs do not routinely update their office or computer equipment. CSOs generally use social networks to communicate about their activities rather than to pursue advocacy actions or to create attractive online content, such as educational podcasts, infographics, or promotional videos, on current events and other topics.
CSOs’ financial viability was stable in 2019. CSOs continue to have limited fundraising capabilities, thereby affecting their ability to diversify their funding and ensure their financial sustainability.

CSOs’ main donor is the central government. According to a speech by the minister for parliament-civil society relations in February, the central government contributes 80 percent of CSOs’ financial resources, mainly to organizations involved in development activities. Organizations involved in democracy and human rights generally do not receive government funds. A portal (charaka-association.ma) created in 2018 by the Moucharaka Mouwatina program, which is funded by the European Union (EU) and seeks to strengthen Moroccan CSOs’ contributions to the rule of law, democracy, and development, provides CSOs with information about government funding.

INDH, which is part of the Ministry of the Interior, is one of the largest distributors of government funds in Morocco. The budget for the third phase of INDH (2019-2023) is approximately MAD 18 billion (approximately $1.88 billion), of which MAD 4 billion (approximately $415 million) is being allocated for the development of infrastructure and basic services in the country’s least well-off areas. Many reports have pointed out shortcomings in the INDH funding system, primarily related to the monitoring of funds given to local CSOs.

Many CSOs receive international funding, which is generally project-based. Foreign funders rarely offer institutional or long-term support to ensure that a CSO’s work is sustainable. In 2019, Moroccan CSOs reported to the SGG international support of more than MAD 315 million (approximately $32.8 million), a significant increase over the past two years. This funding was distributed to 200 CSOs—twenty-eight of which have public benefit status—that submitted statements to the SGG. International CSOs and programs receive a significant portion of international funding, since local CSOs still have limited ability to absorb these funds.

The 2018–20 Moucharaka Mowatina program issued two calls for projects in 2019. The project offered grants to CSOs focused on youth, gender equality, and the environment.

CSOs collaborate with the private sector on programs primarily dealing with employability and young people entering the workforce, but private-sector corporations rarely provide financial support to CSOs. A 2016 report on corporate social responsibility (CSR) from the Economic, Social, and Environmental Council recommended that CSOs include CSR in their strategic visions and their work. By choosing CSR as a development framework, CSOs will improve their sustainable management, credibility, and the impact of activities that create shared value.

CSOs increasingly use social media to collect donations. CSOs rarely provide services to government entities or local businesses or sell goods and services. In a rare example of a successful revenue-generating project, the Fès division of the Moroccan Family Planning Association (AMPF) operates a small bakery managed by women who have completed an association-provided bakery training program.

CSOs generally maintain simple accounting records, with specific measures depending on donors’ financial and accounting procedures. Government oversight bodies and donors sometimes order audits of programs they fund.
**ADVOCACY: 3.8**

CSO advocacy did not change in 2019. Although the constitution and various laws recognize civil society’s right to participate in legislative and policy processes, participatory democratic processes remain weak in Morocco.

CSOs and citizens have the right to submit both motions and petitions to elected councils. Organic Law 64-14 of 2016 defines legislative motions as “any initiative submitted by citizens…with the goal of participating in a legislative initiative.” The process of filing a motion is opaque and requires the signatures of 25,000 registered voters. The motion’s authors must then form a nine-member commission to file the motion with parliament and ensure that its recommendations are followed.

Law 44-14 of 2016 defines a petition as “any written request that includes demands, proposals, or recommendations, sent by citizens who reside in Morocco or in other countries, to the appropriate government entity in order to take appropriate measures, in compliance with Morocco’s constitution and the law, and in compliance with procedures set forth in this organic law.” The process for filing a petition is also complex and opaque, and insufficient guidance and training has prevented the practice from being fully embraced. From 2017 to 2019, only seventy petitions were submitted to 1,500 municipalities, and only five petitions were submitted to the parliament. All petitions submitted to the parliament so far have been found to be inadmissible because of procedural and formatting errors. In December 2019, a national petition to establish a cancer prevention and treatment fund was launched and received more than the minimum 5,000 valid signatures of registered voters required by law. In 2019, the Association of Life and Earth Science Teachers (AESVT), with support from the USAID-funded Civil Society Strengthening Program (CSSP), convinced the municipal council in Fes to consider a petition on new waste management policies.

On the local level, municipalities are free to define their own participatory practices. In 2019, many regions, including Tangiers-Tetouan-Al Huceima and Fes-Meknes, created consultative councils that allow various local actors to participate in regional decision-making processes on issues that affect them.

In December, during the first National Conference on Advanced Regionalization, representatives of regional and local governments adopted a set of twelve recommendations, two of which focus specifically on civil society inclusion in the political process. One of these recommends “strengthening the capacities of local and regional authorities in terms of participatory democracy mechanisms and communication with citizens and civil society,” and the other focuses on “strengthening regions’ openness to citizens and civil society to enable them to contribute to inclusive regional development.”

The government has created three committees to more fully involve civil society in the work of the OGP. These committees include representatives from government entities as well as CSOs, such as the Alternative Citizen Movement (Mouvement Alternatives Citoyennes, ALCI) and Transparency.

In 2019, Moroccan CSOs conducted advocacy campaigns in several areas, including children’s and women’s issues, culture, education, health care, and social and economic development. One successful advocacy action in 2019 was an initiative led by three local CSOs—the Moroccan Association for Multiple Sclerosis in Rabat, Association Al Hanae in Fes, and the Association for Sclerosis Patients in the North of Morocco in Tetouan—with financial support from the Multiple Sclerosis International Federation. These CSOs successfully advocated for the introduction of an amendment to the 2020 budget law that exempts medicines for multiple sclerosis cases from import taxes. At the same time, there were no public debates in 2019 on several key issues, such as the decision to maintain daylight savings time throughout the entire year, which greatly affects students’ schedules and transportation, and Law 44-18 on mandatory military service for young people, which was adopted and promulgated without public input.
An online campaign opposed Article 9 of the 2020 Law on Finance, which prohibits the enforcement of legal rulings against the government. Prometheus Institute denounced the provision, arguing that it was an unconstitutional violation of citizens’ rights. Despite this, the provision was eventually adopted.

In 2019, the USAID-funded CSSP organized a high-level conference on the participation of civil society in drafting the 2020 budget law. The conference was attended by CSO representatives as well as high-level officials. This is an important development as local governments and the national government lack knowledge and expertise in this area.

The arrest of Hajar Raissouni inspired 490 personalities both in and outside of Morocco to sign a manifesto calling for the reform of “obsolete” Moroccan laws. The manifesto was published in Morocco on September 2, 2019, and on the front page of Le Monde on September 24.

In 2019, Association for Citizen Initiative (l’Association Initiative Citoyenne, AIC), Morocco Alternatives Forum (Forum des Alternatives Maroc, FMAS), and French Media Development Agency (Agence française de développement medias, CFI) launched the first CSO mobile radio project in Morocco. During an eighteen-month tour, the project will encourage women to participate in public debates, expand the national dialogue on women’s rights, and strengthen advocacy on women’s issues.

Of concern during 2019 was the large number of arrests of internet-based activists, including bloggers, rappers, journalists, and people simply expressing their opinions, some of which are described in the legal environment section. According to the criminal code, they were sentenced to harsh penalties for “freely expressing their opinions, and daring to openly criticize the authorities and central government entities on the internet.” These lawsuits often resulted in heavy prison terms or fines and perpetuated a climate of fear and self-censorship.

CSOs advocated for tax justice in advance of the third national conference on taxation in May. USAID-supported CSOs issued a press release and addressed letters to the Ministry of Finance and the committee in charge of this conference promoting a tailored taxation system and enhanced taxation equity for CSOs. However, these recommendations were not addressed at the conference, as CSOs were excluded from participating in it. In addition, the CSO Movement for Tax Justice, spearheaded by Oxfam Morocco, issued a press release denouncing CSOs’ lack of involvement in the conference, the marginalization of actors known for their tax-justice activism, and the contradiction between the ambitious title of the event (“Tax Equity”) and its actual focus.

SERVICE PROVISION: 4.5

CSOs’ service provision did not change in 2019. CSOs deliver a variety of services in areas such as culture, legal aid, sports, health care, and education. CSOs also provide services to assist and represent vulnerable and underserved communities. For example, Association SOS provides shelter, education, and vocational training services to orphans. The range of services provided by CSOs in Morocco grows every year, and now also includes capacity building, employment, and the prevention of violent extremism. While many CSOs still adjust their services to the agendas of international and national donors, a growing number of CSOs now specialize in two or three areas of intervention. Service-providing CSOs are generally local organizations formed to respond to clearly defined needs of the most disadvantaged people in specific geographic areas. Most CSOs serve the population at large rather than only their members. Cooperatives offer services only to members and supporters.

The evaluation of social impact has become a pressing concern for Moroccan civil society. As such, CSOs increasingly develop and distribute questionnaires and create monitoring reports and dashboards to evaluate the impact of their activities. Such evaluations also make it possible to identify corrective actions to adjust field
activities and to capitalize on experience in order to apply the lessons learned to other areas. However, CSOs still often lack the necessary human or financial resources to conduct evaluations.

Most CSO services are provided for free. A few associations, mostly in the health, vocational training, and preschool education sectors, offer goods and services to the public for a fee. Organizations such as microcredit associations and resource centers such as Tanmia also conduct income-generating activities.

The government acknowledges CSOs’ essential role in society. In 2019, the government presented the third annual civil society prizes for innovative contributions and initiatives. Tafitouit Ait Yacoub in Beni Mellal received first prize for its efforts to transport students in rural areas. The second prize was awarded to Douar Ouled Yahia in Marrakesh, which works on social and cultural development, and the association of handicapped persons in Zagora. The Bayti association in Casablanca received third prize for its work with needy children.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.8**

The sectoral infrastructure improved slightly in 2019 with the creation and institutionalization of programs and entities that provide capacity-building support to CSOs.

In 2019, the USAID-funded CSSP, which was implemented by Counterpart International and the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), closed. During the program, five CSOs—ALCI, White Dove Association for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Tetouan, Forum Ezzahra for Moroccan Women in Rabat, Ennakhil Association in Marrakech, and the Moroccan Association of Solidarity and Development (Association Marocaine De Solidarité Et De Développement, AMSED) in Rabat—became intermediary support organizations (ISOs), providing expertise, capacity building, and advocacy support for local CSOs. These organizations will continue to provide support to other CSOs in the future.

A few foundations that have public benefit status, such as the Bouaabid Foundation, provide seed funding to local associations. The Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans abroad offers small amounts of funding to CSOs to offer services such as lodging, health, education, and transportation.

Networking is still not firmly rooted in the Moroccan CSO culture. Networks lack legal status, and their missions are often poorly defined. CSOs rarely work together in stakeholder groups or coalitions to influence decision-makers. One successful example of networking is the national network Association Space, which was founded to strengthen civil society and create synergies between various associations at the national level, and to work on cross-disciplinary topics and common strategies to create a local and transparent form of democracy in light of society’s actual needs.

In June 2019, the Social Development Agency (Agence de développement social, ADS), a government agency, launched a flagship social program called Irtikae, which promotes sustainable and inclusive local development, in part by strengthening the organizational capacity of CSOs. The online social innovation platform Es.Maroc.org provided free online training in project monitoring, project communication strategies, and fundraising methods for about twenty Moroccan associations in 2019.

A series of trainings for civil society were held in 2019 as part of the OGP, specifically related to the “citizen participation” commitment. These trainings facilitated and promoted citizen participation through an understanding of the legal framework for participatory democracy, along with the process and techniques for exercising this right related to submitting legislative motions, petitions, and advocacy.

In general, partnerships between CSOs and government actors continue to be weak, in part because of a lack of transparency and access to information and perceptions of diverging interests. The lack of coordination leads to
frequent duplication of effort in projects proposed by CSOs and local governments. Although INDH is meant to coordinate projects among multiple actors, including the central government, local municipalities, CSOs, and the private sector, implementation of this goal is difficult, because of the poor flow of information and the fact that the various stakeholders have positioned themselves as competitors. However, the government and civil society have started to develop some partnerships, specifically on issues related to employment and entrepreneurship. For example, the Moroccan government signed nineteen partnership agreements with CSOs to fight child labor and protect women’s rights in the workplace. Additionally, civil society conducted many projects related to job creation and entrepreneurship in coordination with private research firms.

In 2019, Prometheus Institute organized a series of trainings for journalists. The trainings focused on preparation of the central government budget and the ways in which journalists can monitor and evaluate public finances and the implementation of public policy.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.3

CSOs’ public image did not change in 2019.

CSOs are well-represented in both traditional media and on social media. Public perceptions of CSOs depend on the types of CSO and their focus. In rural and peri-urban areas, local CSOs offer basic social services that meet specific public needs and most beneficiaries appreciate the quality and flexibility of CSOs’ work. On the other hand, there is often public distrust of CSOs focused on democracy and human rights. The suspicions and doubts that previously characterized public perceptions of CSOs are slowly fading as CSOs increasingly communicate with their constituencies through different platforms, including social media and in-person meetings.

The relationship between local authorities and civil society has been impacted by many factors, including the promotion of local participatory democracy as a principle of local government management. While civil society has increasingly become a partner to the local government in local actions, in some cases their interests diverge. As the central government is sometimes unable to fulfill its mission, specifically the provision of basic services to meet social needs, civil society has become increasingly involved in such efforts and sometimes even influences local public policies.

The CSO media sector in Morocco is very dynamic. The UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and its Moroccan partner, the Morocco Alternatives Forum, host a regional platform for CSO radio stations called E-Joussour. CSOs effectively use social media to publicize their work. For example, the Facebook page of Prometheus Institute has more than 23,000 subscribers, 46 percent of whom are 18-24 years old and 33 percent of whom are 25-34 years old. Facebook is the organization’s preferred means of communicating with young people and soliciting their opinions.
In January 2011, a popular uprising in Tunisia protesting corruption, poverty, and political repression in the country forced long-time President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali to step down. Known as the Jasmine Revolution, these events represented a critical turning point in Tunisian history and led to a flourishing of the freedoms of speech, expression, and assembly, as well as the liberation of civil society, all of which had been strictly controlled under the previous regime. In the eight years since the revolution, civil society has played a critical role in the process of institutionalizing democracy in the country, including in the development of the 2014 constitution, which includes expansive human rights protections.

Despite public discourse that favors partnerships with CSOs, the government has attempted to oppress civil society repeatedly since 2014, endangering the strategic position that the sector has assumed in the public sphere. Tunisia has been under a state of emergency since a terrorist attack in 2015. In 2019, there was an increase in violence and social movements. A report published by the Tunisian Forum for Social and Economic Rights (FTDES) mapped 1,986 protest movements in the third quarter of 2019, as well as an increasing rate of violence. In the face of this economic, political, and social turmoil, the government is seeking stability, while cracking down on criticism and reducing transparency. According to Human Rights Watch, “Tunisian authorities continued to prosecute peaceful expression on the basis of repressive articles in the penal code and other codes.” In addition, Tunisian authorities continue to prosecute civilians in military courts based on articles in the code of military justice that prohibit the defamation of the army.

Tunisia’s first municipal elections took place in 2018. The elections institutionalized the decentralization process, one of the pillars in the country’s democratic transition. In 2019, the country’s second legislative and presidential elections since the revolution were organized. In July, Tunisia’s first democratically elected president, Beji Caid Essebsi, died. As a result, the presidential elections were moved from November to September. Kais Saied, a socially conservative constitutional law professor with no political experience, was elected president in the run-off election in October. In the October parliamentary elections, no party or alliance obtained enough seats to form a parliamentary majority. Parliament eventually approved a new coalition government in February 2020 after months of negotiations.

Civic involvement in the public sphere increased sharply in the post-revolution period. While the number of political parties also increased, people were more inclined to engage in CSOs, which played a bigger role in the revolution than parties. This translated into a dramatic increase in the number of CSOs, with approximately 9,000 new organizations formed in the three years following the revolution, more than doubling the number of CSOs in the country. According to the Center for Information, Training, Studies, and Documentation on Associations
A total of 22,211 CSOs were registered as of 2019, although only 3,000 to 4,000 of these are estimated to be active.

Associations, which are regulated by Decree 2011-88, are the most common form of CSOs in Tunisia. Their areas of activity include traditional fields focused on service delivery, such as education and health services, as well as new fields that emerged after the revolution, such as human rights, governance, and accountability. Other forms of CSOs include sports associations, which are regulated by Organic Law 1995-11 from February 6, 1995; micro-finance institutions, which are governed by Decree 2011-117 from November 5, 2011; and unions or occupational associations, which are subject to the Labor Code. According to IFEDA, the largest share of CSOs are cultural associations (19.76 percent) and schools (19.59 percent), followed by sports associations (12 percent). IFEDA reports that the biggest concentration of associations is in the capital of Tunis, with the remainder of CSOs spread fairly evenly among other regions.

Although the legal framework supports CSOs’ diversity and pluralism, CSOs face several challenges with the legal framework, including the complexity of registration and tax exemption procedures. The vast majority of CSOs in Tunisia have significant organizational capacity issues, including limited capacity to engage in strategic planning and a lack of qualified human resources. CSOs are largely dependent on foreign funding, while public funding is very limited. Advocacy is the strongest dimension of CSO sustainability in Tunisia. CSOs are a considerable force in political dynamics at both local and national levels. While local CSOs have access to many capacity-building programs, the majority of these programs are based in the capital and this type of support is highly dependent on the availability of foreign funding. CSOs frequently form coalitions; however, these coalitions are generally informal and often temporary. In general, CSOs benefit from a positive public image, with the population perceiving them as a meaningful contributor to community development, although many CSOs struggle to promote their activities and work.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.0**

The legal environment for CSOs in Tunisia generally supports a diverse civil society. Articles 35 and 49 of the Tunisian Constitution and Decree 2011-88 on the organization of associations ensure the freedom of association, including the right of citizens to join CSOs and carry out activities. Decree 2011-88 also recognizes CSOs’ independence. There are, however, many discrepancies between the legal framework on paper and its implementation.

Decree 2011-88 establishes a declaration (notification) regime instead of an authorization (registration) regime, meaning that a CSO simply needs to declare its existence to gain legal status. In practice, however, a CSO needs a receipt acknowledging their formation to open a bank account and operate fully. While the decree sets a deadline of thirty days for the issuance of a receipt, delays of three months to one year are common. Delays are generally attributed to the limited resources of the General Direction of Associations, which often demands additional documents and changes to CSOs’ statutes. Moreover, some CSOs have faced resistance from the administration when trying to shift or adjust their objectives, for example, from the fight against corruption to good governance more broadly. Registration challenges are amplified by the lack of implementing regulations and guidance to organizations. In a survey conducted by the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law on the State of Civic Freedoms in North Africa and the Middle East in 2018, approximately one-fifth (18 percent) of CSOs in Tunisia describe access to the registration office as time-consuming and costly. This is mainly due to the fact that groups that are not based in Tunis need to travel to the capital to follow up on their submissions to the General Direction of Associations.

CSOs face several operational challenges and constraints after they are created. Some of these challenges stem from the fact that the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) assessed the nonprofit organizations (NPO) sector in Tunisia as being at high risk of money laundering and terrorist financing, leading to the introduction of more restrictive administrative procedures. In May 2018, the Tunisian Financial Analysis Commission issued Decision 2018-12, which obligates CSOs to address risks of money laundering and the financing of terrorism and declare suspicious operations. Moreover, in 2018, the Central Bank issued a circular requesting banking and financial

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1 Referred to as schools by IFEDA, these associations were created by the Ministry of Education, are led by school directors, and are primarily an instrument to fund schools.
institutions to ensure enhanced vigilance over associations, particularly in the identification of persons acting on their behalf and the analysis of related transactions. As a result of these policies, many CSOs encounter problems when trying to open bank accounts. At the same time, CSOs with bank accounts can be asked at any moment to provide documentation, such as copies of contracts with donors and proof of transfer orders.

Decree 2011-88 assigns responsibility for monitoring CSOs to the secretary general of the government through the General Direction of Associations. However, this office lacks the human, financial, and technical resources to fulfill this function, as noted by the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association following his field visit to Tunisia in September 2018. The rapporteur noted that the effective implementation of Decree 2011-88 requires an administration with better resources to apply the content of the law. In particular, he noted the need for the General Direction of Associations to have branches in different regions of the country.

CSOs are protected from the possibility of being dissolved by the state for political or arbitrary reasons. Decree 2011-88 states that an association’s activity can only be suspended by the President of the First Instance Court of Tunis, and that such a suspension cannot exceed thirty days. An association can be dissolved by a judgment of the First Instance Court of Tunis at the request of the secretary general of the government or any interested party. However, dissolution can only take place if the association has not ceased the infraction after being formally notified, its activity has been suspended, and other legal remedies have been exhausted.

There have been examples of the government trying to shut down CSOs. For example, in 2016, the government attempted to shut down Shams, an organization promoting the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals. A lower court rejected that ruling in February 2016. The government appealed the decision but lost again at the Court of Appeals of Tunis in May 2019. In February 2020, the Court of Cassation definitively rejected the government’s bid to shut down Shams.

Some associations were suspended in 2019 in relation to the ongoing fight against terrorism and state of emergency in the country. In January 2019, for example, a Koranic school called Ibn Omran in the region of Regueb in the governorate of Sidi Bouzid, which is registered as an association, was closed by the police and its director arrested for suspicious activities.

CSOs have legal recourse to contest government decisions, and a growing number of CSOs are initiating legal procedures against the state, thereby creating case law. Some CSOs have had their cases rejected because they were not linked to their organizational mandates.

The right to peaceful assembly continues to be regulated by Law 1969-4, which was adopted in 1969. Although CSOs continue to organize protests, there are reports of arbitrary arrests and the disproportionate use of force during these events, as noted in the preliminary observations of the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.

The legal framework does not limit CSOs’ access to resources. Decree 2011-88 specifies four types of resources accessible to associations: membership fees; public funding; donations and legacies of national or foreign origin; and income resulting from associations’ property, activities, and projects. Public funding is regulated by Decree 2013-5183, issued on November 18, 2013, which outlines “criteria, procedures and conditions for public funding for associations.” An association must publish information regarding the source, value, and purpose of any donations or grants received from foreign sources in print media and on its website, if it has one, within a month of the decision to request or accept funding. In addition, it must inform the secretary general of the government by registered letter in the same timeframe.

All associations created in accordance with the provisions of Decree 2011-88, as well as associations created in accordance with earlier legislation, are eligible for exemptions from value-added tax (VAT). However, to access the exemptions, a CSO must present documents relating to its work, including donation agreements, to the competent tax control office. This process is very complicated and time-consuming and subjects CSOs to greater risks of financial sanctions and financial controls. As a result, many CSOs prefer to pay VAT instead of applying for the exemption.

The number of lawyers and notarial bailiffs familiar with the laws and regulatory framework affecting CSOs is very limited. Some CSOs have developed thematic training programs and information sessions for lawyers focused on areas such as justice, human rights, and human trafficking. While these programs are not specific to the CSO legal framework, they provide lawyers opportunities to become familiar with the civil society sector.
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.8

Organizational capacity within the Tunisian CSO sector varies greatly. A few organizations working on advocacy, accountability, and gender issues, including I WATCH, Beity, and Kawakibi Democracy Transition Center, as well as some organizations based in the regions, such as WeYouth, Gabes Action, Twiza, and Djerba Insolite, have relatively strong organizational capacities, thanks largely to technical assistance provided by donors over the past few years. In general, however, CSOs’ organizational capacity is weak and characterized by the absence of clear management strategies and internal governance structures.

At the local level, CSOs tend to direct their work towards their communities and local authorities. CSOs are able to clearly identify potential constituents and beneficiaries through tools such as stakeholder mapping and analysis and simple brainstorming meetings.

CSOs generally have stated missions and visions, although these are often overly broad, and CSOs frequently adjust them to reflect the agendas of donors in order to ensure their sustainability. The number of CSOs with strategic plans is very limited. Although there is not a direct correlation between the size or degree of maturity of a SO and the existence of a clear and concise strategic framework, organizations with strategic plans are more likely to be located in greater Tunis and include CSOs such as Kawakibi, Shanti, Bawsla, Lawyers without Borders, Mawjoudin-We Exist, Mobdiun – Creative Youth, Creative Collective, Damj Association, Aswat Nissa, and Tawhida Ben Cheikh association.

Generally, only international NGOs (INGOs) with offices in Tunisia have strong internal management structures or policies, guidelines, and procedures based on good governance, including human resources manuals or policies regarding internal audits. Local Tunisian organizations, on the other hand, tend to face serious internal governance issues. Some CSOs rely on specific individuals to make all decisions. These people generally do not have extensive management experience or knowledge and do not work to transfer expertise or skills to others in the organization. As a result, when they decide to leave the organization, there is no one prepared to take over these responsibilities.

Some CSOs have a volunteer-based approach, while others recruit professionals or adopt hybrid models based both on volunteers and permanent staff. For instance, the Tunisian Youth Impact association has around thirty volunteers but no permanent paid staff, while Shanti relies on paid staff. According to Jamaity, a platform for civil society in Tunisia, 1,450 job offers were available to civil society actors in 2019.

CSOs depend on funding to obtain or upgrade their office equipment and technology, which limits their development. Staff often end up using their own equipment for work. Internet access is generally available in the greater Tunis area, but less so in rural areas. Despite this, CSOs increasingly use social media networks, primarily Facebook, to increase the visibility of their activities and ensure public access to information about their work. For example, CSOs targeting youth, including WeYouth, Youth Activists Association, Tunisian Youth Impact, Mobdiun, and Belfan-With Art, regularly use social networks to inform the public about upcoming events and use videos and live podcasts to keep their beneficiaries updated on their work.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.9

CSOs’ financial viability is weak. Many CSOs struggle to carry out their missions or ensure their sustainability because of a lack of funding. CSOs’ lack of sound internal governance structures, fundraising expertise, and income-generating activities further threaten their financial viability.

CSOs in Tunisia benefit from a variety of forms of financing. Foreign funding continues to be the most significant source of funding but has been declining in recent years. CSOs can access public funds but this accounts for a small percentage of the sector’s overall funding and has also been declining recently. Very limited financial support is available from individuals; this funding is focused mostly on artistic and sports activities.

According to a 2014 study about public support for CSOs in Tunisia conducted by the Kawakibi Democracy Transition Center, public bodies, including ministries, directions, municipalities, public enterprises, and semi-public enterprises, allocated more than DT 120,000 (approximately $44,000) to CSOs in 2014. Only 10 percent of this amount was distributed among associations, while the majority of these funds benefited sports associations, mutual
associations of civil servants, and other national groups such as the Tunisian Union of Social Solidarity (UTSS), National Union of Tunisian Women (UNFT), Tunisian Scouts, and Tunisian Union of Aid to the Mentally Impaired (UTAIM). The process of receiving public funds is complicated and requires the submission of a significant amount of paperwork. Moreover, information about funding is not made available publicly and the decision-making process is not transparent. As a result, these funds are not accessible to all CSOs, especially smaller organizations with limited capacity and experience. In addition, the selection process and criteria are unclear, and CSOs must take initiative to verify if they were selected to receive funding.

Foreign donors—including international bodies, embassies and bilateral cooperation agencies, INGOs, and foundations—represent an important source of funding for Tunisian CSOs. However, foreign funding is unable to meet the full needs of CSOs, which prevents associations from specializing and developing expertise on specific topics. In addition, the majority of funds are received by CSOs with expertise in proposal writing, while smaller organizations have few funding opportunities.

According to Jamaity’s database of technical and financial partners, approximately 200 international organizations and funders were active in Tunisia in 2019. Key donors include the European Union (EU) and the U.S. government through USAID, the State Department, and the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). Fifty-eight foreign-funded, project-based funding opportunities were published on Jamaity’s platform in 2019. These funds cover various themes, including human rights (25.2 percent), economic and social development (12.6 percent), the environment (9.9 percent), culture (9 percent), governance (8.1 percent), employment and entrepreneurship (6.3 percent), the fight against extremism and security (4.5 percent), science and technology (2.7 percent), decentralization (2.7 percent), and education (1.8 percent). No calls for proposals were focused on organizational development in 2019.

While CSOs can mobilize resources in the form of donations, legacies of national or foreign origin, and income resulting from their property, activities, and projects, no data is available about the extent to which CSOs are able to do so in practice. Anecdotal evidence, however, indicates that most CSOs are not able to obtain private donations, especially from private enterprises, although a few are able to mobilize individual donations, generally to help and assist in social cases.

The financial management of a CSO depends on its level of maturity and development. Small CSOs tend to have basic financial management systems, while more developed organizations have more sophisticated systems and greater access to professional financial services.

Associations, as well as political parties and other NPOs, are subject to specific accounting standards outlined in an order issued by the Minister of Finance on February 13, 2018. According to Decree 2011-88, if an association’s annual financial resources exceed DT 100,000 (approximately $36,000), it must appoint a commissioner to conduct an external audit. Decree 2011-88 obligates CSOs to publish their financial statements and audit reports either in a written media outlet or on the association’s website within one month of the date of approval of the latest document. The Court of Audit will examine the accounts and assess the management of associations that received public funding.

Advocacy is the strongest dimension of CSO sustainability in Tunisia. After the 2011 revolution, civil society had a significant amount of power through the High Authority for the Achievement of the Objectives of the Revolution, which included representatives of twenty-eight CSOs. Civil society continued to play a critical role in policy making until the constitution was adopted in 2014. Since then, however, civil society’s advocacy role has decreased somewhat, largely because of the government’s approach to fighting terrorism and money laundering. However, the legal framework continues to support a participatory approach to decision making, giving CSOs legitimacy and a framework to intervene in the law- and policy-making processes, and CSOs continue to advocate for a range of issues through various campaigns.

Article 139 of the constitution foresees that local authorities adopt instruments of participatory democracy to guarantee the participation of citizens and civil society. Organic Law 2018-29, relating to the Code of Local Authorities, lays out procedures for the effective participation of all citizens and civil society during the various stages of the preparation, planning, monitoring, and evaluation of land management programs, including measures to inform citizens and civil society about planned projects. Article 28 of this law stipulates that the adoption of
development programs must incorporate mechanisms of participatory democracy. According to Article 35, municipal and regional councils can decide to organize public meetings to consult with citizens prior to the following decisions: revision of local fees, the signature of cooperation agreements and partnerships, participation in the creation of public companies, the conclusion of cooperation agreements with central authorities, the management of public goods, and the funding of associations and management of donations, in addition to others. The Urban Development and Local Governance Program (PDUGL), participatory development of municipal investment and community plans, local development councils, regional development advisory committees, and participatory budgeting are some of the instruments that have been put in place to translate these principles into practice.

Article 30 of Law 2018-29 requires local authorities to keep registers of the CSOs that have requested to participate on the local level. In addition, local authorities must keep special registers in which notices and questions from citizens and civil society, as well as the answers to these questions, are provided. These registers can be kept in electronic format. In accordance with this law, local authorities take all the necessary measures to inform citizens and CSOs when they are developing public policies and development programs and use the necessary resources to guarantee their participation. However, the effectiveness of these methodologies depends on local factors, such as the members of municipal councils, political dynamics, and local technical and financial resources.

At the national level, governmental order Number 328-2018, issued on May 29, 2018, mandates the organization of public consultations for all public institutions, public enterprises, and local authorities. In 2019, for example, the Ministry of Local Affairs and Environment organized four regional consultations on the draft of a government decree establishing procedures and modalities of participatory democracy. Although not stated in the law, CSOs regularly make contributions in parliamentary commissions within the Assembly of the Representatives of the People.

While CSOs are well positioned to engage in decision-making processes, the government—especially at the national level—does not yet consider them to be true partners. As a result, CSOs are rarely able to make real impact through their advocacy. Often, even if they succeed in getting legal texts changed, these new provisions are not implemented properly.

CSOs have created issue-based coalitions to effectively implement many advocacy campaigns. In 2019, the Coalition of Transitional Justice, led by Lawyers without Borders and comprised of twenty-seven organizations, advocated to get the Truth and Dignity Commission to publish its report. Once published, the coalition asked the government to publish the list of Martyrs and Injured of the Revolution in the official journal. Also in 2019, Tunisian CSOs and INGOs created the (Civil) Alliance for Security and Liberties (ASL) to mobilize and advocate for a democratic state with public policies that serve citizens and guarantee peace, equality, and respect for human rights. Members of the alliance include Lawyers without Borders, Jamaity, FTDES, Mobdiun, Psychologues du Mondes (PDM), Al Bawsala, Solidar, and the World Organization Against Torture (OMCT). In December 2019, the alliance organized the National Congress of Violent Extremism Prevention Strategies in Tunisia, in which a policy paper written by members of the alliance called “Multisectoral reform to prevent violent extremism” was presented.

CSOs were actively involved in the electoral process during 2019. On January 4, 2019, a group of CSOs called for the election of a new president of the election commission, which had been unfilled for over six months, and renewal of half of its council members, as elections had not taken place for two years. A few days later, the acting president gathered the heads of parliamentary blocs to set a date for a plenary session to hold a vote, which took place a month later.

On June 18, 2019, CSOs organized a large rally to advocate against the adoption of changes to the electoral law that would establish a three percent electoral threshold for representation in parliament and strict criteria for candidates, among other things. Despite this advocacy, the Assembly of the Representatives of the People adopted the changes to the electoral law the same day. However, the controversial amendments were never promulgated as the president did not sign them.

In the run-up to the presidential and parliamentary elections, CSOs such as Mourakiboun, I WATCH, and the Tunisian Association for Elections for Integrity and Democracy (ATIDE) organized voter education campaigns. These groups also actively monitored election campaigns, including their funding and media impartiality, and
deployed observers in all voting centers around the country during the voting process. After the election, these organizations published reports on the electoral proceedings.

In 2019, Jamaity, Lawyers without Borders, and Kawakibi Center for Democratic Transition participated in a working group with the Tunisian Commission for Financial Analysis, the Central Bank, the National Commission for the Fight against Terrorism and Money Laundering, and the General Direction of Associations that conducted an evaluation to reassess the nonprofit sector on the occasion of the next FATF report for Tunisia. The working group received training from the Green Acre group on the methodology of assessing the risk of NPOs in financing terrorism.

A working group made up of Tunisian CSOs and INGOs based in Tunisia monitors the freedom of association in Tunisia, particularly efforts to restrict this freedom by amending Decree 2011-88. In 2019, this working group followed up on a 2017 monitoring report on the implementation of the Human Rights Council’s recommendations on the Universal Periodic Review and developed proposals to amend the draft law on the state of emergency to protect fundamental freedoms.

### SERVICE PROVISION: 5.0

CSOs’ service provision remains largely underdeveloped. Although CSOs support the Tunisian government’s efforts to address citizens’ needs, the lack of resources, multiplicity of areas of intervention, and growing demands make it difficult for CSOs to contribute meaningfully in this sphere.

CSOs provide two main types of services. First, CSOs engage in short-term philanthropic activities to address needs related to natural disasters and other emergencies, as well as other events, such as the start of the school year. For example, Thala Solidaire provides school supplies for families in need in the region of Kasserine. Second, CSOs implement mid-term projects that address economic, social, environmental, and cultural challenges. In general, these services are funded through donor-supported programs and target specific groups of beneficiaries in certain regions. For example, human rights CSOs have successfully established and manage fifteen listening centers and shelters for women victims of violence, two of which are co-managed with the Ministry of Women, Family, Childhood, and Seniors. One of these—the Sidi Ali Azzouz Center in Tunis—is managed by Beity and was the first center to offer emergency accommodation, socio-economic integration for women victims of violence, and cultural activities for children. Similarly, Voix de l’enfant association in Monastir manages a center that offers services for single mothers and ex-prisoners, and a shelter for children born out of wedlock.

Some CSOs in Tunisia provide services to members and non-members alike, while others focus on specific, targeted audiences. Within the framework of some projects funded by foreign organizations, some CSOs provide direct support to municipalities to support their efforts to develop and expand their services, especially in internal regions. In December 2019, for example, the Association of Environment for Sustainable Development and the municipality of El Guettar (Gafsa governorate), in partnership with the German International Cooperation Agency (GIZ), launched a household waste sorting project aimed at reducing the amount of garbage transferred to landfills.

A few CSOs support other organizations by offering training events or workshops on various themes to help them increase their efficiency. In general, CSOs provide their services without discrimination with regards to race, gender, ethnicity, or sexual orientation. Before implementing programs, most CSOs conduct analyses to identify needs and target their work.

Some CSOs generate income through the provision of services. For example, Amal association provides catering services with food prepared by single women to generate financial resources for its other activities.

The government acknowledges the value that CSOs can add in the provision and monitoring of basic social services through its public statements.

### SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.5

The infrastructure supporting CSOs in Tunisia is tightly linked with the priorities of international technical and financial partners. CSOs frequently form coalitions to address common interests.
According to Jamaity, Tunisian CSOs benefited from thirty-two technical support programs in 2019, including two new projects that were launched during the year to build the capacity of Tunisian CSOs that work with communities and vulnerable citizens. With funding from the U.S. Department of State, the Building Local Associations for Development and Innovation (BLADI) project is implemented by Amideast in partnership with Jamaity and Shanti, while the new phase of Obroz is implemented by the British Council in partnership with Shanti. Both projects provide support to CSOs to develop their organizational capacities in areas such as project design and implementation, communication, and monitoring and evaluation. In addition, international CSOs such as Lawyers without Borders, European Committee for Training and Agriculture, and Médecins du Monde offer capacity-building programs for small, local CSOs. Technical and financial partners generally try to make assistance available in all regions of the country and not just in the capital.

CSOs also receive support from IFEDA, which was created by Decree 2000-688 to monitor associative dynamics, conduct research, provide networking opportunities, and support the development of policies and programs that support civic space. IFEDA provides technical support to CSOs related to administrative and financial management, public funding mechanisms, strategic planning, human rights, participatory approaches, and leadership. However, the demand for CSO capacity-building programs continues to outpace the supply due to the growing number of CSOs and the limited capacities—human, financial, and technical—of IFEDA. Moreover, IFEDA is based in the capital, which limits the possibilities for CSOs outside of Tunis to access these opportunities.

Other national organizations also act as resource centers for CSOs. For example, Shanti offers technical support and coaching for CSOs, Lab’ess offers incubation, tailored coaching, and funding, and Jamaity operates a platform with information about civil society, including active associations, technical and financial partners, funding and training opportunities, news, events, and other resources. These organizations engage Tunisian trainers to provide such support. Some national organizations also distribute funds to other CSOs. For example, through the EU-funded IAssist program, I WATCH has allocated DT 600,000 (approximately $217,000) in grants to local CSOs since 2018.

Cooperation within the CSO sector is common especially among CSOs focused on human rights issues. Decree 2011-88 allows CSOs to create formal networks; however, the majority of coalitions are informal. For example, according to a mapping study conducted by Jamaity, 93 percent of the human rights coalitions in Tunisia are informal. Due to the lack of resources, CSO coalitions tend to be temporary and focused on a common objective or cause. However, some human rights coalitions develop more strategic partnerships. These include the Tunisian Coalition Against the Death Penalty, the National Coalition for Equality in Inheritance, and the National Associative Coalition against Violence against Women. Limited funding and donors’ thematic priorities create some competitiveness among CSOs.

CSOs frequently partner and cooperate with the government and media actors to achieve common objectives. For example, the Tunisian Association for Management and Social Stability (TAMSS), Terre d’Asile, the Tunisian League for Human Rights, and the Tunisian Council for Refugees coordinate their interventions with the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Social Affairs, the National Authority to Combat Trafficking in Persons, and the National Office for Family and Population to ensure better access to rights for migrants. The success of such coordination has increased the awareness of the importance of such partnerships among various actors.

Municipalities commonly ask community-based organizations to intervene and collaborate with them to respond to community needs. For example, in Gabes, local authorities urged Soutcom association to provide services to local citizens. In 2019, Soutcom signed seven partnership agreements with public institutions to implement activities related to education, health, and youth inclusion and served approximately 500 women and youth.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.4**

Traditional media channels are increasingly interested in covering CSOs’ activities, although the level of media coverage still depends on an outlet’s editorial line, as well as ongoing events. National CSOs working on advocacy have more opportunities to appear on TV shows, mainly those focusing on political issues or controversial subjects. In the 2019 elections, Mourakiboun and ATIDE, both of which were monitoring the electoral process, were frequently invited to provide updates on TV. On the local level, CSOs attract more coverage from local radio stations.
Alternative media emerged in the first few years following the revolution. For example, Nawaat produces information, background analysis, and investigations that are disseminated through an online journal. In recent years, donors have shown interest in funding media created by civil society, including radio shows and magazines.

CSOs generally have a positive image among the public. They are perceived as a source of assistance and contributor to community development. This positive image is bolstered by the fact that people have trust issues towards the government and the political sphere. However, CSOs’ image is often affected by the way the media covers them, as well as the reputation of members. For example, if a CSO member belonged to a terrorist group or was accused of financial corruption, the entire association comes under suspicion for the same activities. In addition, public institutions often take advantage of CSOs’ activities to appear in the media and bolster their image. This has resulted in a slight loss of credibility of CSOs in recent years compared to the years immediately following the revolution.

Despite government efforts to institutionalize the relationship with CSOs, the degree of CSO-government collaboration depends on the individuals within the administration. Many officials perceive civil society actors as competitors for power and threats to the stability of the state.

CSOs’ efforts to promote their causes vary according to their capacities. Many large, national CSOs like I WATCH and Al Bawsala have developed a good image and have a large reach; these groups mainly conduct advocacy campaigns. Organizations including BBC Media Action, Article 19, and the National Union of Tunisian Journalists (SNJT) have developed training programs for journalists to reinforce the media’s role in boosting civil society efforts and to raise awareness of their causes. Despite these efforts, large, national organizations are often subject to smear campaigns such as accusations that they are associated with a certain political party or of funding terrorism and money laundering. Small and local associations lack the expertise and capacity to effectively promote their work. Although these local organizations tend to have better understanding of community needs, they often fail to promote their efforts. CSOs are primarily reliant on social media, especially Facebook, to promote their visibility.

Decree 2011-88 requires organizations to submit annual narrative and financial reports to the governmental authorities. Few CSOs adopt codes of ethics.
The civil war in Yemen continued in 2019. Armed clashes between the internationally recognized government, which is backed by a Saudi-led coalition, and the Houthi rebel group, known as Ansar Allah, persisted mainly in the northern areas of the country. While the internationally recognized government controlled most of the country, including Aden, Houthi rebels seized a significant portion of Yemen’s populous northern region, including the cities of Sana’a, Ibb, and Amran. In August 2019, fighting erupted in Aden and nearby cities between the internationally recognized government and the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a secessionist faction backed by the United Arab Emirates.

Yemen’s humanitarian situation continued to be the worst in the world in 2019. The Yemeni economy continued to deteriorate as severe inflation increased commodity and consumer prices. Oil production slowed considerably, and the health system relied almost entirely on donor assistance. Since it escalated in 2015, the conflict has forced 3.34 million people out of their houses most of whom are living in displaced person camps. According to the United Nations (UN), of the country’s 29 million people, 80 percent, or 24 million, needed some form of humanitarian or protection assistance in 2019 and 14.3 million are in acute need.

All CSOs in Yemen continued to experience harassment and abuse by armed groups in 2019. In areas under the control of the internationally recognized government, the operating environment improved as government institutions began to support CSOs. In areas controlled by the Houthi rebels, where the greatest number of organizations operate, both international and domestic CSOs faced greater constraints after the National Authority for Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Response (NAMCHA) imposed complex new procedures.

The overall sustainability of Yemeni CSOs did not change in 2019. Organizational capacity in the sector improved, especially in the areas of strategic planning and relationships with beneficiaries. CSOs’ financial viability was also stronger as they mobilized resources from more diverse sources of funding. At the same time, the legal environment deteriorated, especially in Houthi-controlled areas, where new constraints were imposed on CSOs’ operations. CSOs’ public image worsened as smear campaigns prompted widespread hostility to their work, including a bombing attack in Al-Dhalea. CSO advocacy, service provision, and sectoral infrastructure were unchanged.

1 In November 2019, the Houthi authorities change the name of NAMCHA to the Supreme Council for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and International Cooperation (SCMCHA).
No recent official statistics are available on the number of CSOs operating in Yemen. However, in late 2018, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (MOSAL) estimated that approximately 13,200 CSOs were registered in the country. This figure included both active and inactive organizations.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.7**

The legal environment for CSOs in Yemen continued to deteriorate in 2019 as CSOs faced increased restrictions from governmental authorities as well as armed groups.

Law 1 of 2001 on Associations and Foundations and Executive Regulations 129 of 2004 comprise the primary legal instruments governing CSOs in Yemen. Their implementation is overseen by MOSAL, which supervises the work of local organizations. Ministerial Resolution 211 of 2011 regulates cooperation between the government and all international organizations and agencies operating in Yemen, including the UN. The resolution is enforced by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC). Both MOSAL and MoPIC have branch offices in all governorates to facilitate their operations.

Governmental oversight of the work of international and local organizations has been worsening since 2016. In Aden, the responsibilities of the MOSAL head office and the MOSAL branch office overlap. As a result, CSOs must obtain separate licenses from the two offices to operate in Aden and nearby cities, which has impeded their registration, re-registration, and operations.

In 2019, MoPIC, which also moved to Aden, resumed its oversight of international organizations. MoPIC’s sudden resumption of duties posed obstacles for domestic organizations in Aden, as the ministry required them to sign agreements with it if they received support from international donors. MoPIC also required CSOs to share project budgets and action plans and sometimes amended items on these documents or changed CSOs’ areas of intervention.

MOSAL’s and MoPIC’s ability to supervise organizations in Houthis-controlled areas declined significantly after the authorities in Sana’a established NAMCHA in late 2018. NAMCHA adopted strict policies to supervise CSOs. Combined with the requirements of MOSAL and MoPIC, this greatly increased the administrative burden on CSOs. Many organizations were forced either to register twice or to register as new organizations if they wanted to expand their activities into regions controlled by the other side. For example, the First Organization Depression Restrictions (FODR), which was registered and had its main office in Sana’a, was forced to register with MOSAL as a new organization to obtain an activity permit for a project in Hadramout.

In early November 2019, NAMCHA was restructured into the Supreme Council for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance and International Cooperation (SCMCHA). As a presidential body, SCMCHA has significantly more power. After SCMCHA’s establishment, CSOs operating solely in Houthis-controlled areas faced even more obstacles as strict new policies were introduced to control domestic and international organizations. For example, the requirements for obtaining activity permits became more complicated, with the documentation required and the review process frequently changing and often taking months to complete. Delays in obtaining permits caused many domestic and international organizations, including Yemen Peace School (YPS) and Search for Common Ground (SCG), to move their activities to areas outside of Houthis control. The Awam Foundation had to postpone an activity for several months because SCMCHA refused to grant it permission to carry out a consultative meeting with youth. CARE International canceled a project in Amran and Sana’a because it was unable to obtain an activity permit, and the Yemeni Food Bank temporarily suspended operations because it was unable to obtain permits. Many international organizations were not able to renew their licenses, while the Awam Foundation was unable to renew its licenses after its founders were accused of being affiliated with certain political parties.
In December 2019, SCMCHA issued a circular stating that organizations could not carry out training activities, workshops, or even meetings in their offices without obtaining permits first. SCMCHA also required CSOs to submit comprehensive reports on all trainings, meetings, and workshops attended outside of the country. Also in December, the SCMCHA office in Ibb issued a circular instructing organizations to separate men from women in all training and awareness activities, as well as during in-house staff meetings. SCMCHA also more stringently requested to see project budgets implemented by local and international organizations in 2019. In some cases, the agency changed items or insisted that specific local organizations work as implementing partners in order to receive approval for project budgets. Although some of these circulars are still not completely implemented on the ground, they reflect the authorities’ negative attitudes towards CSOs and assistance programs. SCMCHA also restricted the types of activities organizations could undertake. For example, activities associated with peace building, gender equality, family planning, human rights, and monitoring and evaluation were frequently denied.

CSOs experienced a high degree of harassment in 2019. The authorities in Sana’a shut down the Anti-Human Trafficking Organization and prosecuted its staff after they publicized the fact that some Houthi leaders were involved in the prostitution business. Saferworld staff members were detained for more than two weeks for reasons that were unclear; as a result, it shut down its office in Sana’a and moved to Aden. The authorities in Sana’a forced organizations to celebrate the Prophet’s birthday by placing congratulatory posters outside of their offices. SCMCHA sent representatives to observe the analyses of tenders carried out by local organizations, especially larger ones, and asserted its authority to approve new staff members in some organizations.

While organizations in areas under the internationally recognized government operated in a better legal environment, they experienced harassment by armed groups in 2019. The staff of Oxfam, International Rescue Committee, and Mercy Corps in Al-Dali city were threatened at gunpoint, and the building of the Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED) was bombed. All four organizations suspended their work and left the city, as did other organizations.

In Mukalla, the authorities stopped a workshop organized by the National Democratic Institute on the impact of the closing of the airport. Organizations in Taiz, where there is excellent communication between CSOs and governmental institutions, enjoyed a much more stable environment.

In 2017, authorities in Sana’a began to collect payroll taxes from local organizations and in 2019, required international organizations to pay them as well. Although this procedure is consistent with the provisions of the tax law, the authorities in other governorates do not require organizations to pay payroll taxes. The Law on Associations and Foundations grants customs exemptions to CSOs, enables them to conduct commercial activities to support their operations, and allows them to collect donations after prior coordination with relevant authorities. In 2019, the authorities forced Tamdeen Youth Foundation (TYF) to stop a donation campaign in Sana’a, allegedly for security and political reasons. The government does not usually contract with CSOs to implement procurements or other contracts.

Few lawyers specialize in CSO-related laws. Those that are available are located in Sana’a.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.0**

Despite the great challenges faced by CSOs in 2019, organizational capacity in the sector improved slightly during the year, especially in the areas of strategic planning and relationships with beneficiaries. The more stable situation in cities such as Marib, Ibb, and Sana’a likely contributed to organizations’ increased interest in developing their internal capabilities.

In Aden and neighboring governorates, the number of CSOs qualifying for partnerships with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) increased from three in 2018 to sixteen in 2019, reflecting a general improvement in the sector’s capacity. Similarly, the number of organizations based in Aden, Hadramout, and Marib that worked with international organizations increased in 2019, as international organizations found that they no longer needed to look only among organizations based in Sana’a to find qualified partners. Organizations
such as Alf Ba Civilian & Coexistence Foundation, Abyan Youth, SOS Center, Ma’rib Dam, and Ma’rib Girls also implemented projects in direct partnerships with donors for the first time.

Several years’ accumulated experience in relief work has helped CSOs learn to better assess their beneficiaries’ needs. In addition, the improved security situation in 2019 enabled local organizations to take on a larger role in identifying community needs. While in previous years, donors communicated with beneficiaries and then assigned the implementation of activities to local CSOs, in 2019 CSOs such as Nahda Makers Organization (NMO), Alf Ba Civilian & Coexistence Foundation, and Islah Society in Aden contacted beneficiaries to determine their needs directly. Many organizations, including SCG, TYF, and Partners Yemen, developed community bodies to help define needs and design projects. For example, in Hadramout, Peace and Building Foundation conducted sessions with returnees from Al-Mahara to identify their basic needs. The Social Fund for Development (SFD) observed an increase in the number of organizations requesting data from its community frameworks to help identify communities’ needs. The UN World Food Program instructed its local and international partners to form community frameworks and implemented an awareness raising campaign on the importance of engaging communities in identifying their needs.

CSOs in Yemen generally have two governing bodies. In foundations, founders hold the main governing role, with the board of trustees playing a secondary role. In community-based organizations, the general assembly is the main governing body, followed by the executive committee.

Local organizations strategically developed their internal capacities and structures in an effort to meet donor requirements and expand their services in 2019. Newer organizations, such as NMO and TYF, adopted monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning (MEAL) systems. Mwatana Organization in Sana’a contracted with a consulting company to develop its overall organizational structure, while Al-Hikma Association in Aden developed financial policies and a procurement system, which helped it obtain contracts with international organizations.

During the year, local CSOs continued to encounter major challenges in retaining staff, which often take better paying jobs with more benefits in international organizations. Because most organizations rely on project-based budgets, they are unable to retain staff after projects conclude. However, several organizations, including NMO, TYF, and National Foundation for Development and Humanitarian Response (NFDHR), reported a slight improvement in attracting professional staff from other organizations in 2019.

CSOs’ use of technology did not change notably in 2019, although several CSOs were able to adopt fiber optic internet services. Some CSOs, such as Gusoor Organization for Peace and Co-existence, Sheba Youth, and TYF in Sana’a and the Youth Without Borders in Taiz, continued to modernize their infrastructure and workplaces in 2019. In Marib, CSOs faced severe difficulties in obtaining internet service because of the poor telecommunications infrastructure. Many CSOs use solar energy or power generators to ensure electricity supplies, given the deterioration of electricity services in many cities.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.6**

CSOs’ financial viability improved slightly in 2019. While financial viability deteriorated remarkably in 2015 due to the escalated conflict at that time, the sector has recovered slightly every year since then.

CSOs continued to be heavily dependent on foreign funding in 2019. Donors increasingly financed development-oriented services, such as building infrastructure, enhancing the participation of women and youth, and strengthening economic resilience, enabling many organizations focused on peace and community development to access more funding than in previous years.
CSOs’ ability to mobilize external resources also improved slightly in 2019, and a number of organizations now have a wide network of international funders based both in and outside of Yemen. Many CSOs accessed increased foreign funding from both international NGOs and UN agencies operating in Yemen and outside of Yemen in 2019. Among these are Sheba Youth, TYF, Yemeni Women’s Union, and Youth Leadership Development Foundation in Sana’a; Youth Without Borders and Improve Your Society Organization (IYSO) in Taiz; Abyan Youth Foundation, NMO, and Field Medical Foundation (FMF) in Aden; Marib Dam Foundation and Islah Charitable Society in Marib; and Khadija Foundation for Development (KFD) in Ibb. Some CSOs formed coalitions to mobilize resources. For example, FMF, Life Makers Meeting Place Foundation, and Nama Foundation formed a coalition to mobilize resources and implement activities.

At the same time, many charitable CSOs founded by the private sector, including Al-Hikma Association, Hayel Saeed Charitable Foundation, and Alkhir Charitable Foundation, turned to international funding to support their services due to the challenges the private sector faces in financing charitable work.

In 2019, a slight improvement was evident in CSOs’ ability to mobilize funding from local sources. In Marib, the Islah Charitable Society received funds from local businesses. Partners Yemen obtained funding from a variety of stakeholders, including the local authorities, individuals, businesses, and international NGOs, for service projects. TYF financed a project to build schools in the cities of Sharab and Habashi Mount with the help of local households and businesses. However, CSOs’ fundraising ability remained modest, mainly because of the population’s limited ability to donate funds.

Some CSOs have created income-generating projects to cover a portion of their operating expenses. For example, in 2019 Youth Leadership Development Foundation opened a café in Sana’a and the Youth Without Borders in Taiz outfitted rooms to rent for training sessions and workshops. The Special Services Center in Aden established a childcare center, Gusoor Organization for Peace and Co-existence established a for-profit training center, and Firdous Cooperative Society in Aden operated a sewing and crafts training center.

Some CSOs have improved their ability to manage funds, which has helped them attract more funds from donors. For example, Youth Without Borders began using QuickBooks in 2019 to better manage its financial resources. TYF, Alf Ba Civilian & Coexistence Foundation, NMO, and KFD also made major improvements in their financial management systems in 2019.

**ADVOCACY: 5.1**

CSO advocacy did not change in 2019. The space for expressing opinions publicly continued to be limited in all cities and cooperation with government institutions remained weak. CSOs’ participation in public policy making continues to be very weak. The public sector is fragmented and ill-equipped to engage the public in policy-making processes. Nevertheless, CSOs attempted to work with government institutions and local authorities to help resolve service-related issues in 2019. In Taiz, where the authorities are relatively responsive, Youth Without Borders and CARE worked with local authorities on activities aimed at normalizing security conditions and improving service provision. In Ibb, Wma Foundation helped local authorities solve problems related to service provision, and in Aden, Alf Ba Civilian & Coexistence Foundation engaged in joint planning with the authorities. In general, CSOs’ communication with the local authorities occurs through informal channels, including personal interactions.

As in the previous year, CSOs continued to implement campaigns on social issues in 2019. A group of CSOs in Aden, including the Yemen Center for Human Rights Studies and Alf Ba Civilian & Coexistence Foundation,
implemented numerous campaigns related to weapons-carrying and stopping armed clashes and arrests, but kept their role in these campaigns under the radar because of their fear of harassment. In Marib, Marib Dam Foundation conducted campaigns to open Nehm Road and encouraged police cars to drive at legal speeds. Bin Habrish Foundation for Development in Seiyun carried out hearings with the district attorney on the spread of weapons in the city. Partners Yemen, Shaba Youth, and TYF implemented a campaign to pressure warring parties to open the road to Taiz. A large group of organizations, mainly international NGOs, carried out a massive joint campaign on social media demanding the release of a community activist working for Saferworld who was arrested in Sana’a; she was released after being held for two weeks.

However, CSOs remained unable to advocate for core issues, such as the exploitation by people in power of the trade of oil derivatives, restrictions on exports and imports, and the opening of airports and roads, as these issues are sensitive and involved in the current conflict. In Hadramout, the authorities stopped a campaign to reopen Al-Rayyan Airport, because it had been covered by Al-Jazeera, which the authorities view as hostile to their interests. The authorities are also sensitive to the concept of lobbying, and CSOs increasingly avoid such activities so as not to run into difficulties.

CSOs are no longer able to advocate effectively for legislative reform, as it is very difficult to amend legislation since the parliament has stopped performing its duties. In 2019, CSOs also found it difficult to pressure the authorities to improve the legal environment governing the sector, which has grown increasingly complicated since the outbreak of war.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.8**

Despite the slight improvements in CSOs’ organizational capacity and financial viability, service provision did not improve in terms of either diversity or geographical coverage in 2019. Relief services, including food assistance, protection, housing, and sanitation, continued to be the dominant area of service provision in 2019. However, some CSOs providing relief services also began to provide services in development areas, such as the construction of water tanks and the restoration of schools and service facilities. In a new project area, NMO, which has specialized in relief, rebuilt thirty houses in Al-Khokha. TYF and Alatta for Relief built water tanks in Hudaydah, Hajjah, and Amran. The UN Office for Project Services worked with local partners on projects to pave roads and light streets in Sana’a, Aden, Ibb, and Hadramout.

In addition to providing relief and development services, CSOs continued to provide services related to social and human development. Mwatana Organization in Sana’a continues to report on human rights violations committed by both parties to the conflict and issues periodic reports on these violations. Yemen Center for Human Rights Studies in Aden implements a variety of activities to increase awareness on international human rights among the public, government officials, and judges. Yemeni Women’s Union organizes bazaars to help women sell their handmade products, builds shelters for IDPs at Sadam camp in Ibb governorate, and provides protection and legal support to women facing social violations. CSOs such as Youth Without Borders, Youth of Sheba, Yemen Peace School, Gusoor Organization for Peace and Co-existence, Basement Cultural Foundation, Peace and Building
Foundation in Hadramout, Tanweer Foundation, and Wama Foundation in Ibb provide training to build individuals’ practical skills and other services related to community participation in public life and community peace.

In 2019, All Girls Foundation (AGF) in Sana’a, Wama Foundation in Ibb, and Qabas Association in Taiz implemented many projects to empower women economically by teaching them income-generating crafts and project management skills. Many CSOs, such as the Namaa Microfinance Network in Ibb and National Microfinance Foundation and Union Microfinance Program in Hadramout, provided loans to support small businesses. Partners Yemen offered an apprenticeship program in motorcycle maintenance and electricity installation to young men and women in Abyan, Khanfar, and Tibin. In Hadramout, the Good Deeds Humanitarian Organization distributed motorcycles to transport goods to unemployed youth as part of an economic empowerment project. Hadramout Foundation provided undergraduate scholarships to students studying outside of Yemen and supported education projects in-country as well.

Despite the large volume of services provided by CSOs, community needs remain much greater than the services provided. Given Yemen’s economic deterioration and the almost complete paralysis of public services, CSOs face a desperate need that is difficult to fully meet. In addition, the fragmentation of governmental authorities impedes the implementation of CSOs’ projects in the field including by requiring them to get officially registered in areas controlled by both parties to the conflict. Most CSOs provide their services without any discrimination related to gender, race, or otherwise.

The governments’ attitudes towards the role of CSOs vary from region to region. In Taiz and Marib, for example, CSOs have extensive contact with government institutions, which often acknowledge their contributions and participate in their activities. In other regions, such as Sana’a, Hudaydah, and Amran, CSOs are often accused of working to fulfill the hidden agendas of foreign parties.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.1**

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector was unchanged in 2019 and generally remains weak. CSOs in less populated or less developed governorates and rural areas in particular lack access to the technical and legal expertise they need.

Few organizations provide technical support to CSOs. Well-established networks, such as the Civil Promotion Network, Yemeni Nama Network for NGOs, and the Coordination Council for CSOs in Mukalla, faced financial challenges in 2019 because of their dependence on foreign donor funding and did not implement capacity-building programs for CSOs.

There were very few training opportunities for CSOs in 2019. The Aden Center for Studies and Research provided advisory services to other CSOs on doing research and other studies. However, there was an overall shortage of entities providing training and consultancies to CSOs in Aden in areas such as assessments, monitoring and evaluation, and proposal writing. The Yemen Microfinance Network implemented a series of capacity-building programs for its members in several governorates on topics such as risk management, project proposals, and customer service. Resonate! Yemen produced studies on community-based interventions and guides on participatory planning and community scorecards and trained CSOs on conducting community accountability sessions.

In 2019, the number of grantmaking organizations increased. With funding from Oxfam, Alf Ba Civilian & Coexistence Foundation and SOS Center funded local organizations implementing community activities in Aden. Youth Without Borders regranted funds from the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), the European Union (EU), and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), while Partners Yemen provided small grants funded by USAID and the EU to organizations providing services and community-based initiatives. With
funding from the National Endowment for Democracy, Resonate! Yemen announced a program of small grants for community accountability activities in several governorates.

Cooperation among CSOs on joint service provision remained poor in 2019. However, a bright spot was the establishment of the Civil Peace Coalition, comprised of eleven local CSOs from several governorates. The coalition aims to coordinate efforts to provide technical support in peacebuilding. Partnership between CSOs and the public sector remained very weak in 2019. In Taiz, several CSOs, including Youth Without Borders and IYSO, worked with the local authorities to implement service activities. CSOs occasionally cooperate with media to get coverage of their activities, but there were no examples of partnerships between CSOs and media to achieve mutual goals in 2019.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.1**

CSOs' public image experienced a moderate deterioration in 2019, continuing a three-year downward trend. In Houthi-controlled areas, widespread, official smear campaigns targeted CSOs. Newspapers, radios, and television channels aligned with the Houthis accused both international and local organizations of corruption. SCMCHA hosted a conference entitled "Waste and Tampering with Humanitarian Aid Funds" and claimed that international and local CSOs were stealing humanitarian aid. The agency also accused CSOs of feeding intelligence to foreign governments and other activities that undermine the values and traditions of Yemeni society. At the same time, Houthi authorities praised some organizations that it considered loyal. For example, the social affairs sector in the municipality of Amanat Al-Asimah honored CSOs that celebrated the Prophet's birthday, a religious activity that Houthi authorities had asked all organizations to observe.

In contrast, many authorities in areas controlled by the internationally recognized government considered international and local organizations key partners and accused the Houthis of blackmauling and obstructing the efforts of international organizations. The authorities in Taiz repeatedly stressed the importance of CSOs' work and the need to facilitate their humanitarian and service-providing activities in the city. In Marib, the official media highlighted the activities of only some organizations, such as the Islah Society.

Across Yemen, a mass campaign on social media entitled "Where is the Money?" pressured CSOs to disclose details on how they spent humanitarian aid funds. Concurrently, smear campaigns were waged against organizations throughout Yemen, accusing them of using aid funds to support Houthi military and economic activities.

The widespread incitement campaigns succeeded in encouraging negative public perceptions of CSOs. In Al-Odeen and Hobeish districts, people accused CARE of manipulating the distribution of food kits. As a rest, CARE had to suspend its operations in these areas. In Al-Dhali', some religious groups sought to incite the public against CSOs by accusing them of targeting Islam, which prompted militants to bomb the main office of the French organization ACTED and threaten other international organizations. Although the internationally recognized government and the Transitional Council, which oversees security in Al-Dhali', condemned the bombing and stressed the importance of providing a safe environment for organizations providing services, many international CSOs suspended their activities and left the city.

Some organizations sought to improve the public image of the CSO sector in 2019, but their efforts were modest compared to efforts inciting the public against CSOs. Basement Cultural Foundation in Sana'a, Youth Without Borders in Taiz, SOS Center in Aden, and the Marib Dam Foundation in Marib initiated public debates about the importance of local and international CSOs' work. Some CSOs solicited the help of journalists to spread a positive impression about CSOs' role. But in general, organizations tended to avoid media coverage or promotion of their activities for fear of being blackmailed by the authorities.
CSOs have no sector-wide code of ethics, nor is there an institutionalized code of ethics at the organizational level. However, many CSOs have clear values that shape organizational ethics. Although the law requires CSOs to share financial and technical information about their activities, many CSOs do not share their budgets and financial statements with either the authorities or the public to avoid being harassed by corrupt government officials.
ANNEX A: CSO SUSTAINABILITY INDEX METHODOLOGY

INSTRUCTIONS FOR CSOSI IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS

2019 CSO SUSTAINABILITY INDEX

I. INTRODUCTION

USAID’s Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index (the Index or CSOSI) reports annually on the strength and overall viability of CSO sectors in Africa, Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, and Mexico. The CSO Sustainability Index is a tool developed by USAID to assess the strength and overall viability of CSO sectors in countries around the world. By analyzing seven dimensions that are critical to sectoral sustainability, the Index highlights both strengths and constraints in CSO development. The Index allows for comparisons both across countries and over time. Initially developed in 1997 for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, the CSOSI is a valued tool and methodology used by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), governments, donors, academics and others to better understand the sustainability of the civil society sector. USAID is continually striving to ensure the cross-national comparability of the Index scores, and to improve the reliability and validity of measurements, adequate standardization of units and definitions, local ownership of the Index, transparency of the process of Index compilation, and representative composition of panels delivering the scores.

Beginning with the 2017 Index and for the following four years, FHI 360 and the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) are managing the coordination and editing of the CSOSI. A senior staff member from both FHI 360 and ICNL will serve on the Editorial Committee as will one or more senior USAID/Washington officials. FHI 360 will provide small grants to local CSOs to implement the CSOSI methodology in country, while ICNL will be primarily responsible for editing the reports. Local Implementing Partners (IPs) play an essential role in developing the CSO SI and need a combination of research, convening, and advocacy skills for carrying out a high quality CSOSI.

Local Implementing Partners should please remember:

- Panels must include a diverse range of civil society representatives.
- Panelists should formulate initial scores for dimensions and justifications individually and in advance of the Panel Meeting.
- Discuss each indicator and dimension at the Panel Meeting and provide justification for the proposed score for each dimension.
- Compare the score for each dimension with last year’s score to ensure that the direction of change reflects developments during the year being assessed.
- Note changes to any indicators and dimensions in the country report to justify proposed score changes.
- The Editorial Committee will request additional information if the scores are not supported by the report. If adequate information is not provided, the EC has the right to adjust the scores accordingly.
II. METHODOLOGY FOR THE IMPLEMENTER

The following steps should be followed by the IP to assemble the Expert Panel that will meet in person to discuss the status of civil society over the reporting year, determine scores, and prepare a country report for the 2019 Civil Society Organization (CSO) Sustainability Index.

1. Select Panel Experts. Carefully select a group of at least 8-10 civil society representatives to serve as panel experts. Panel members must include representatives of a diverse range of CSOs and other stakeholders, such as:

- CSO support centers, resource centers or intermediary support organizations (ISOs);
- CSOs, community-based organizations (CBOs), and faith-based organizations (FBOs) involved in a range of service delivery and/or advocacy activities;
- CSOs involved in local and national level government oversight/watchdog/advocacy activities;
- Academia with expertise related to civil society and CSO sustainability;
- CSO partners from government, business or media;
- Think tanks working in the area of civil society development;
- Member associations such as cooperatives, lawyers’ associations and natural resources users’ groups;
- Representatives of diverse geographic areas and population groups, e.g. minorities;
- International donors who support civil society and CSOs; and
- Other local partners.

It is important that the Panel members be able to assess a wide spectrum of CSO activities in various sectors ranging from democracy, human rights and governance reforms to the delivery of basic services to constituencies. CSOs represented on the panel must include both those whose work is heavily focused on advocacy and social service delivery. To the extent possible, panels should include representatives of both rural and urban parts of the country, as well as women’s groups, minority populations, and other marginalized groups, as well as sub-sectors such as women’s rights, community-based development, civic education, microfinance, environment, human rights, and youth. The Panel should to the extent possible include an equal representation of men and women. If two or more representatives of the same CSO participate in the Panel, they can only cast one vote. It is recommended that at least 70 percent of the Expert Panel be nationals of the country that is being rated.

In countries experiencing civil war, individuals should be brought from areas controlled by each of the regimes if possible. If not, individuals from the other regime’s territory should at least be contacted, to incorporate their local perspective.
In some instances, it may be appropriate to select a larger group in order to better reflect the diversity and breadth of the civil society sector in the country. For countries where regional differences are significant, implementers should incorporate, to the greatest extent possible, differing regional perspectives. If financial constraints do not allow for in-person regional representation, alternative, low cost options, including emailing scores/comments, teleconferencing/Skype, may be used.

**If there is a USAID Mission in the country, a USAID representative must be invited to attend the panel.** USAID representatives that attend are welcome to provide some words of introduction to open the event, as it is funded by USAID, and they are welcome to observe and participate in the discussion. However, they will not have the ability to cast their vote in terms of scores.

**Please submit to FHI 360 for approval the list of the Panel members who you plan to invite at least two weeks before the meeting is scheduled to occur using the form provided in Annex A.** It is the responsibility of the IP to ensure that the panel composition, and the resulting score and narrative, are sufficiently representative of a cross-section of civil society and include the perspectives of various types of stakeholders from different sectors and different areas of the country.

2. **Prepare the Panel meeting.** Ensure that panel members understand the objectives of the Panel, including developing a consensus-based rating for each of the seven dimensions of civil society sustainability covered by the Index and articulating a justification or explanation for each rating consistent with the methodology described below. We encourage you to hold a brief orientation session for the panelists prior to the panel discussion. This is particularly important for new panelists but is also useful to update all panelists on methodology and process changes. Some partners choose to hold a formal training session with panel members, reviewing the methodology document and instructions. Other partners provide a more general discussion about the objectives of the exercise and process to the panelists.

The overall goal of the Index is to track and compare progress in the sector over time, increasing the ability of local entities to undertake self-assessment and analysis. To ensure a common understanding of what is being assessed, the convener shall provide a definition of civil society to the panel members. The CSOSI uses the enclosed definition to ensure the report addresses a broad swath of civil society.

In order to allow adequate time to prepare for the panel, distribute the instructions, rating description documents and a copy of the previous year’s country chapter to the members of the Expert Panel a minimum of three days before convening the Panel so that they may develop their initial scores for each dimension before meeting with the other panel members. It is critical to emphasize the importance of developing their scores and justifications before attending the panel. It is also important to remind panel members that the scores should reflect developments during the 2019 calendar year (January 1, 2019, through December 31, 2019).

We also recommend you encourage panelists to think of concrete examples that illustrate trends, since this information will be crucial to justifying their proposed scores. In countries with closing civic space, the IP should take initiative to ensure that expert panel members do not self-censor themselves, including by taking whatever
measures possible to build trust. The confidentiality of all members must be ensured, and participants must be protected against retaliation; to this end, the IP can choose to enforce Chatham House Rules.

Lastly, it is highly recommended to compile and send to panelists data and information sources to guide them as they score. Recommendations of information sources are listed below under #4.

We are very interested in using the preparation of this year’s Index to track lessons learned for use in improving the monitoring process in upcoming years. In addition, we will solicit feedback through regional debrief meetings, and will create an online forum where IPs can share best practices, ask questions, and submit their comments or suggestions. These methods will be supplemented by brief satisfaction surveys that will be used to help evaluate the success of methodological and process innovations.

3. Convene a meeting of the CSO Expert Panel.

3.a. We do not require panelists to score individual indicators but only overall dimensions. For each dimension, allow each panel member to share his or her initial score and justification with the rest of the group. (Note: If two or more representatives of the same CSO participate in the Panel, only one vote can be cast on their behalf.) Although scoring will not take place at the indicator level, please be sure that panel members discuss each indicator within each dimension of the CSOSI and provide evidence-based, country-relevant examples of recent or historical conditions, policies, and events within each of the dimension narratives. Please take notes on the discussion of each indicator and dimension, detailing the justification for all dimension scores, in the template provided. These notes must be submitted to FHI 360 with the first draft of the narratives (they do not have to be translated to English if not originally written in English).

At the end of the discussion of each dimension, allow panel members to adjust their scores, if desired. Then, for each dimension, eliminate the highest score and the lowest score (if there are two or more of the highest or lowest scores, only eliminate one of them) and average the remaining scores together to come up with a single score for each dimension. Calculate the average or arithmetic mean of these scores for a preliminary score for the dimension. Please keep all scores on record, making sure that personal attribution cannot be made to individual panel members. Use a table similar to the one provided below to track panel members’ scores without personal attribution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel Member</th>
<th>Legal Environment</th>
<th>Organizational Capacity</th>
<th>Financial Viability</th>
<th>Advocacy</th>
<th>Service Provision</th>
<th>Sectoral Infrastructure</th>
<th>Public Image</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td>3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

3.b. Once a score is determined for a dimension, please have panel members compare the proposed score with last year’s score to ensure that the direction and magnitude of the change reflects developments during the year. For example, if an improved score is proposed, this should be based on concrete positive developments during the year that are noted in the report. On the other hand, if the situation worsened during the year, this should be reflected in a worse score (i.e. a higher number on the 1-7 scale). Please note that for countries where a democratic revolution took place in the previous year, the panelists should be conscious to avoid scoring based on a post-revolution euphoria. The score-change framework should be closely followed to avoid panelists scoring based on anticipated changes, rather than the actual level of change thus far.

1 Arithmetic mean is the sum of all scores divided by the total number of scores.
A change of 0.1 should generally be used to reflect modest changes in a dimension. Larger differences may be warranted if there are more significant changes in the sector. The evidence to support the scoring change must always be discussed by the panel and documented in the dimension narrative. See CSOSI Codebook – Instructions for Expert Panel Members for more details about this scoring scale.

In addition, for each dimension score, review the relevant description of that dimension in “CSOSI Codebook – Tiers and Scores: A Closer Look.” Discuss with the group whether the score for a country matches that rating description. For example, a score of 2.3 in organizational capacity would mean that the civil society sector is in the “Sustainability Enhanced” phase. Please read the “Sustainability Enhanced” section for Organizational Capacity in “Ratings: A Closer Look” to ensure that this accurately describes the civil society environment.

If the panel does not feel that the proposed score is accurate after these two reviews, please note this when submitting proposed scores in your narrative report, and the Editorial Committee will discuss whether one or more scores needs to be reset with a new baseline. Ultimately, each score should reflect consensus among group members.

3.c. Discuss each of the seven dimensions of the Index and score them in a similar manner. Once all seven dimensions have been scored, average the final dimension scores together to get the overall CSO sustainability score. Please submit the table with the scores from the individual panelists together with the narrative report. Panelists should be designated numerically.

3.d. Please remind the group at this stage that reports will be reviewed by an Editorial Committee (EC) in Washington, D.C. The Editorial Committee will ensure that all scores are adequately supported and may ask for additional evidence to support a score. If adequate information is not provided, the EC may adjust the scores.

4. Prepare a draft country report. The report should focus on developments over the calendar year 2019 (January 1, 2019, through December 31, 2019).

The draft report should begin with an overview statement and a brief discussion of the current state of sustainability of the civil society sector with regard to each dimension. In the overview statement, please include an estimated number of registered and active CSOs, as well as a description of the primary fields and geographic areas in which CSOs operate. Also include a brief overview of any key political, economic, or social developments in the country that impacted the CSO sector during the year. If this information is not provided, the editor will request it in subsequent rounds, which will require additional work from you.

The report should then include sections on each dimension. Each of these sections should begin with a summary of the reasons for any score changes during the year. For example, if a better score is proposed, the basis for this improvement should be clearly stated up front. These sections should include a discussion of both accomplishments and strengths in that dimension, as well as obstacles to sustainability and weaknesses that impact the operations of a broad range of CSOs. Each indicator within each dimension should be addressed in the report. The report should be written based on the Panel members’ discussion and input, as well as a review of other sources of information about the CSO sector including but not limited to analytical studies of the sector, statistical data, public opinion polls and other relevant third-party data. Some international sources of information and data that should be considered include the following:

- CIVICUS Monitor -- https://monitor.civicus.org/
- World Giving Index - https://www.cafonline.org/about-us/publications
- Varities of Democracy (V-Dem) - https://www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/analysis/
- Media Sustainability Index - https://www.irex.org/projects/media-sustainability-index-msi
• ITUC Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights: https://survey.ituc-csi.org/
• U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report: https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/
• ICNL Civic Freedom Monitor: http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/
• Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: https://carnegieendowment.org/regions
• Afro-Barometer: http://www.afrobarometer.org/

Please limit the draft reports to a maximum of ten pages in English. Please keep in mind that we rely on implementers to ensure that reports are an appropriate length and are well written.

While the individual country reports for the 2019 CSO Sustainability Index must be brief, implementers may write longer reports for their own use to more fully describe the substance of the panel meetings. Longer reports may include additional country context information or examples and could be used for a variety of purposes, including advocacy initiatives, research, informing project designs, etc.

Please include a list of the experts who served on the panel using the form provided. This will be for our reference only and will not be made public. Also, please remember to provide the individual panelists’ ratings for each dimension (with the names replaced by numbers).

Submit the draft country reports with rankings via email to FHI 360 by the date indicated in your grant’s Project Description.

5. Initial edits of the country report. Within a few weeks of receiving your draft report, FHI 360 and its partner, ICNL, will send you a revised version of your report that has been edited for grammar, style and content. As necessary, the editors will request additional information to ensure that the report is complete and/or to clarify statements in the report. Please request any clarification needed from the editor as soon as possible, then submit your revised report by the deadline indicated.

6. Editorial Committee review. In Washington, an Editorial Committee (EC) will review the scores and revised draft country reports. The EC consists of representatives from USAID, FHI 360, ICNL, and at least one regional expert well versed in the issues and dynamics affecting civil society in the region. A USAID representative chairs the EC. If the EC determines that the panel’s scores are not adequately supported by the country report, particularly in comparison to the previous year’s scores and the scores and reports of other countries in the region, the EC may request that the scores be adjusted, thereby ensuring comparability over time and among countries, or request that additional information be provided to support the panel’s scores. Further description of the EC is included in the following section, “The Role of the Editorial Committee.”

7. Additional report revision. After the EC meets, the editor will send a revised report that indicates the EC’s recommended scores, and where further supporting evidence or clarification is required. Within the draft, boxes will be added where you will note whether you accept the revised scores or where you can provide further evidence to support the original proposed score.

The report should be revised and returned to the editor within the allotted timeframe. The project editor will continue to be in contact with you to discuss any outstanding questions and clarifications regarding the scoring and the report’s content. Your organization will be responsible for responding to all outstanding comments from the EC, as communicated by the project editor, until the report is approved and accepted by USAID.

8. Dissemination and promotion of the final reports. After the reports are approved by USAID and final formatting is conducted, the country reports will be grouped into regional reports. Each Implementing Partner will be responsible for promoting both the final, published country report and the regional report. Your organization will conduct activities to promote the Index’s use and its visibility. This may include organizing a local public event, panel discussion, or workshop and by making the report available electronically by web posting or creating a social network page for the country report and through the other methods described in your Use and Visibility Plan. Documentation that you have conducted these activities as described in that Plan must be submitted to FHI 360 before it will authorize the final payment.
III. THE ROLE OF THE EDITORIAL COMMITTEE

As an important step in the CSO Sustainability Index process, all country reports are reviewed and discussed by an Editorial Committee composed of regional and sector experts in Washington, DC, and an expert based in the region. This committee is chaired by a USAID Democracy Specialist and includes rotating members from USAID (past members have included experts from regional bureaus, the USAID Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance’s Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DCHA/DRG), the USAID Bureau for Economic Growth, Education and the Environment’s Local Solutions Office, and USAID Democracy, Human Rights and Governance foreign service officers). The committee also includes civil society experts from FHI 360 and ICNL.

The Editorial Committee has three main roles. It reviews all reports and scores to ensure that narratives are adequate and compelling from the standpoint of supporting the proposed score and to determine if the proposed change in score is supported by the narrative. A compelling narrative demonstrates that a score results from evidence of systematic and widespread cases and is not based on one or two individual cases. For example, a country environment characterized by a growing number of CSOs with strong financial management systems that raise funds locally from diverse sources is a compelling justification for an elevated financial viability score. A country in which one or two large CSOs now have the ability to raise funds from diverse sources is not. The Editorial Committee also checks that scores for each dimension meet the criteria described in “Ratings: A Closer Look,” to ensure that scores and narratives accurately reflect the actual stage of CSO sector development. Finally, the Editorial Committee considers a country’s score in relation to the proposed scores in other countries, providing a regional perspective that ensures comparability of scores across all countries.

CSOs are encouraged to remind their panels from the outset that the Editorial Committee may ask for further clarification of scores and may modify scores, where appropriate. **While implementing partners will have the chance to dispute these modifications by providing more evidence for the scores the panel proposed, the USAID Chair of the EC will ultimately have the final say on all scores.** However, by asking panels to compare their scores with last year’s scores and “Ratings: A Closer Look” (which is essentially what the Editorial Committee does), it is hoped that there will be few differences between proposed scores and final scores. Ensuring that the narrative section for each dimension includes adequate explanations for all scores will also limit the need for the Editorial Committee to ask for further clarification.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR CSOSI EXPERT PANEL MEMBERS

Introduction

USAID’s Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index (the Index or CSOSI) is a tool developed by USAID to assess the strength and overall viability of the CSO sectors. By analyzing seven dimensions that are critical to sectoral sustainability on an annual basis, the Index highlights both strengths and constraints in CSO development.

The Index allows for comparisons both across countries and over time. Initially developed in 1997 for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, the CSOSI is a valued tool and methodology used by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), governments, donors, academics and others to better understand the sustainability of the civil society sector. In 2019 the CSOSI was implemented in 74 countries.

Beginning with the 2017 Index and for the following four years, FHI 360 and the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) are managing the coordination and editing of the CSOSI. To develop the Index each year, FHI 360 provides small grants to local CSOs to serve as implementing Partners (IPs) that implement the CSOSI methodology in country. ICNL is primarily responsible for editing the country reports once they are drafted by IPs. A senior staff member from both FHI 360 and ICNL serves on an Editorial Committee that reviews all reports, as do one or more senior USAID/Washington officials.

The expert panel members for whom this Codebook is designed participate in in-country panel discussions on the seven dimensions of sustainability covered by the Index. The IP convenes these panel discussions annually to assess the situation of civil society in their countries and determine scores based on an objective analysis of the factual evidence.

The CSOSI team is continually striving to ensure the cross-country and cross-year comparability of the Index’s scores, as well as to improve the reliability and validity of measurements, standardization of definitions, local ownership of the Index, and transparency of the Index’s methodology and processes.

Therefore, FHI 360 has created this Codebook to inform and guide expert panel members through the scoring process. The Codebook provides definitions of the key concepts used to assess the overall strength and sustainability of the civil society sector in a given country, explains the scoring process, and standardizes the scale to be used when proposing score changes.

This is the first part of the Codebook, providing an overview of the concepts and processes that guide the expert panel members’ role in the CSOSI’s methodology. The second part of the Codebook provides descriptions, or vignettes, of each score for each dimension, to standardize expert panel members’ understanding of the scoring scale and to assist them in ensuring that scores are accurate.

CSOSI Methodology

The CSOSI measures the sustainability of each country’s CSO sector based on the CSOSI’s seven dimensions: legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, sectoral infrastructure, and public image. Its seven-point scoring scale mirrors those used by Freedom House in its publications “Nations in Transit” and “Freedom in the World.”

The Implementing Partner (IP) in each country leads the process of organizing and convening a diverse and representative panel of CSO experts. Expert panels discuss the level of change during the year being assessed in each of the seven dimensions and determine proposed scores for each dimension. The scores are organized into three basic “tiers” representing the level of viability of the civil society sector: Sustainability Impeded; Sustainability Evolving; and Sustainability Enhanced. All scores and narratives are then reviewed by a Washington, D.C.-based Editorial Committee (EC), assisted by regional civil society experts. The graph below summarizes the approach and process.
### Definition of Concepts

The overall goal of the Index is to track progress or regression in the CSO sector over time, increasing the ability of local entities to undertake self-assessment and analysis. To ensure a common understanding of what is being assessed, panel members need a shared understanding of the key concepts underlying their assessment.

### Civil Society Organization

Civil society organizations are defined:

“...As any organizations, whether formal or informal, that are not part of the apparatus of government, that do not distribute profits to their directors or operators, that are self-governing, and in which participation is a matter of free choice. Both member-serving and public-serving organizations are included. Embraced within this definition, therefore, are private, not-for-profit health providers, schools, advocacy groups, social service agencies, anti-poverty groups, development agencies, professional associations, community-based organizations, unions, religious bodies, recreation organizations, cultural institutions, and many more.”

This definition of CSO includes informal, unregistered groups and movements, but to be included in the CSOSI, the movement must possess the structure and continuity to be distinguished from a single gathering of individuals and from personal or family relationships. In many countries political parties and private companies establish and support CSOs, but these entities are usually either public, for-profit, or not self-governing.

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Seven Dimensions of Sustainability

The CSOSI measures sustainability across seven dimensions by analyzing a series of indicators related to each dimension.

1- **LEGAL ENVIRONMENT**: The legal and regulatory environment governing the CSO sector and its implementation

- **Registration** – Legal procedures to formalize the existence of a CSO
- **Operation** – The enforcement of the laws and its effects on CSOs
- **State Harassment** – Abuses committed against CSOs and their members by state institutions and groups acting on behalf of the state
- **Taxation** – Tax policies that affect CSOs
- **Access to Resources** – Legal opportunities for CSOs to mobilize financial resources
- **Local Legal Capacity** – Availability and quality of legal expertise for CSOs

2- **ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY**: The internal capacity of the CSO sector to pursue its goals

- **Constituency Building** – Relationships with individuals or groups affected by or interested in issues on which CSOs work
- **Strategic Planning** – Organizational goals and priorities for a set timeframe
- **Internal Management** – Structures and processes to guide the work of CSOs
- **CSO Staffing** – Quality and management of human resources
- **Technical Advancement** – Access to and use of technology

3- **FINANCIAL VIABILITY**: The CSO sector’s access to various sources of financial support

- **Diversification** – Access to multiple sources of funding
- **Local Support** – Domestic sources of funding and resources
- **Foreign Support** – Foreign sources of funding and resources
- **Fundraising** – CSOs’ capacity to raise funds
- **Earned Income** – Revenue generated from the sale of products and services
- **Financial Management Systems** – Processes, procedures and tools to manage financial resources and operations

4- **ADVOCACY**: The CSO sector’s ability to influence public opinion and public policy

- **Cooperation with Local and Central Government** – Access to government decision-making processes
- **Policy Advocacy Initiatives** – Initiatives to shape the public agenda, public opinion, or legislation
- **Lobbying Efforts** – Engagement with lawmakers to directly influence the legislative process
- **Advocacy for CSO Law Reform** – Initiatives to promote a more favorable legal and regulatory framework for the CSO sector

5- **SERVICE PROVISION**: The CSO sector’s ability to provide goods and services

- **Range of Goods and Services** – Variety of goods and services offered
- **Responsiveness to the Community** – Extent to which goods and services address local needs
- **Constituencies and Clientele** – People, organizations and communities who utilize or benefit from CSOs’ services and goods
- **Cost Recovery** – Capacity to generate revenue through service provision
- **Government Recognition and Support** – Government appreciation for CSO service provision

6- **SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE**: Support services available to the CSO sector

- **Intermediary Support Organizations (ISOs) and CSO Resource Centers** – Organizations and programs that provide CSOs with training and other support services
- **Local Grant Making Organizations** – Local institutions, organizations or programs providing financial resources to CSOs
- **CSO Coalitions** – Cooperation within the CSO sector
- **Training** – Training opportunities available to CSOs
- **Intersectoral Partnerships** – Collaboration between CSOs and other sectors
7- PUBLIC IMAGE: Society’s perception of the CSO sector

| Media Coverage – Presence of CSOs and their activities in the media (print, television, radio and online) |
|___________________________________________________________________________________________|
| Public Perception of CSOs – Reputation among the larger population |
| Government/Business Perception of CSOs – Reputation with the government and business sector |
| Public Relations – Efforts to promote organizational image and activities |
| Self-Regulation – Actions taken to increase accountability and transparency |

How to Score

The CSO Sustainability Index uses a seven-point scale from 1 to 7. **Lower numbers indicate more robust levels of CSO sustainability.** These characteristics and levels are drawn from empirical observations of the sector’s development in the region, rather than a causal theory of development. Given the decentralized nature of civil society sectors, many contradictory developments may be taking place simultaneously. The levels of sustainability are organized into three broad clusters:

- **Sustainability Enhanced (1 to 3)** - the highest level of sustainability, corresponds to a score between 1.0 and 3.0;
- **Sustainability Evolving (3.1 to 5)** - corresponds to a score between 3.1 and 5.0;
- **Sustainability Impeded (5.1 to 7)** – the lowest level of sustainability, corresponds to a score between 5.1 and 7.0.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sustainability Enhanced</th>
<th>Sustainability Evolving</th>
<th>Sustainability Impeded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0 – 3.0</td>
<td>3.1 – 5.0</td>
<td>5.1 – 7.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scoring Process

The primary role of the expert panel is to provide an assessment of the CSO environment based on the seven dimensions mentioned above. During the panel discussion, panel members are tasked with discussing their initial scores for each dimension, including their evidence for these scores, and determining their final proposed scores for each dimension. The overall score for the country will be an average of these seven scores. Below are the steps to be followed by members of the expert panel:

**Step 1:** Please start by reviewing last year’s report and other sources of information about sectoral developments from the last year of which you are aware. Then, rate each dimension on the following scale from 1 to 7, with a score of 1 indicating a very advanced civil society sector with a high level of sustainability, and a score of 7 indicating a fragile, unsustainable sector with a low level of development. Fractional scores to one decimal place are encouraged. See “Scoring based on Level of Change” on page 8 below for guidance on how to determine proposed scores.

When rating each dimension, please remember to consider each indicator carefully and make note of any specific, country-relevant examples of recent or historical conditions, policies, or events that you used as a basis for determining this score.

**Step 2:** Review your proposed score for each dimension to ensure that it makes sense in comparison to last year’s score given the weight of the impact the developments will have at the sector level and the scoring guidance below. In determining the level of change, look at the evidence of change and the various factors over the year being assessed that led to those changes (events, policies, laws, etc.).

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3 The ‘Sustainability Evolving’ categorization does not assume a direct or forward trajectory. Dimension and Overall Sustainability scores that fall within this category may represent both improvements and regressions.
**Step 3:** Once you have scores for each dimension, average these seven scores together to arrive at an overall CSO sustainability score and provide all these scores to the Implementing Partner before you attend the Expert Panel discussion.

**Step 4:** Attend the Expert Panel discussion. Listen to other experts describe the justification for their scores. After discussing each indicator in a dimension, you will have the opportunity to revise your proposed score. The Implementing Partner will use the consensus score as the final proposed score. If consensus is not reached during the discussion, the Implementing Partner will average the Expert Panelists’ scores, removing one instance of the highest and lowest scores, to arrive at the final scores that will be proposed to the Editorial Committee.

It is very important that the discussion includes specific examples and information that can be used to justify the Expert Panelist’s scores. Therefore, please come prepared to share specific evidence of examples to support trends you have noted during the year. **If adequate information is not provided, the Editorial Committee has the right to adjust the scores accordingly.**

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**Important Note:** In countries with disputed territories or areas (e.g. self-declared states, breakaway states, partially recognized states, declared people’s republics, proto-states, or territories annexed by another country’s government), panelists should score based only on the area under the national government’s control. However, these territories’ contexts should be discussed, to be referenced briefly in the introduction of the country report.

In countries experiencing civil war (political and armed movements that administer parts of the country, regions governed by alternative ruling bodies), panelists should balance the situation in each of the territories when determining all scores and discuss trends and developments under each regime.

In countries where a great deal of regional autonomy is recognized (e.g. Iraqi Kurdistan), expert panelists should take those areas into account when scoring and compiling examples, and IPs should ensure the situation in these areas are well-integrated into the scoring decisions and narrative report.

For countries with closing civic space, sufficient data and informational sources should be discussed to both acknowledge the changes in civic space and consider its impacts on dimensions. The panelists should respond to published sources and present their evidence to ensure balance between positive and negative developments affecting civil society in their country. To avoid self-censorship and ensure the confidentiality of and non-retaliation against any expert panel member, the IP could choose to enforce the Chatham House Rule.

In countries where a democratic revolution took place in the previous year, the panelists should still closely follow the score-change framework when determining the new dimension-level scores to justify the changes, avoiding exaggerated score increases that may be due to a post-revolution feeling of euphoria. The proposed scores should always measure the actual changes thus far and not anticipated impacts in the near future.

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**Scoring Based on Level of Change**

The level of change in a dimension from one year to the next is determined by assessing the impact of multiple factors including new policies and laws, changes in implementation of existing policies and laws, various organization-level achievements and setbacks, changes in funding levels and patterns, as well as contextual political, economic, and social developments. While individual examples may seem impactful on their own, ultimately a sector’s long-term sustainability only changes gradually over time as the implications of these positive or negative developments begin to be felt and their long-term effects take hold. Therefore, dimension-level score changes each year should not in normal circumstances exceed a 0.5-point change from the previous year.

When determining what weight to give different trends and developments in how they affect the scores, consider the relative scope of the changes and the duration of their impacts. Those trends and developments that will have larger and longer-term impacts on the sector as a whole should be weighted more heavily compared to those that

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4 **Note:** This scale has been adjusted for the 2018 CSOSI to more accurately reflect the scale at which trends and developments should impact a score given the definitions of the scoring scale above.
affect only limited parts of the sector and are more likely to change from year to year. For example, a demonstrated increased capability to mobilize domestic resources (e.g. through corporate philanthropy or crowdfunding), or a new mechanism for long-term funding of CSOs (e.g. through a basket fund or a tax designation mechanism) would signal a longer-term change in a sector’s financial viability than a one-year increase in donor funding to CSOs conducting work around national elections.

In determining how the level of change in the dimension of sustainability should translate into a change in score, the following scale can be used to assist expert panel members’ decision making:

What was the overall impact of the change(s) on the dimension?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deterioration</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cataclysmic deterioration</td>
<td>Trends and developments have had a completely transformative negative effect on at least one or two indicators in the dimension and significantly affected other dimensions as well.</td>
<td>Example: Legal Environment – A law has banned all international CSOs and their affiliates from the country, as part of the government’s systematic crackdown on civil society organizations.</td>
<td>0.5 or greater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme deterioration</td>
<td>Trends and developments have had very important negative effects on at least one or two indicators in the dimension.</td>
<td>Example: Organizational Capacity – Economic depression and instability have led donor basket funds to close abruptly, leaving many major CSOs without funding for their activities. Outreach efforts to constituencies have been halted due to funding shortages and many major CSOs have lost their well-qualified staff members.</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant deterioration</td>
<td>Trends and developments have had important negative effects on at least one or two indicators in the dimension.</td>
<td>Example: Public Image – The government conducts a relentless media campaign to discredit the image of CSOs by calling them agents of foreign actors seeking to destabilize the country. At the same, the government intimidates media outlets and threatens them with retaliation should they partner with or cover CSO activities without prior approval by the government.</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate deterioration</td>
<td>Trends and developments have had a somewhat negative impact in at least one or two indicators in the dimension.</td>
<td>Example: Legal Environment – In an effort to increase public revenue, the government has decided to increase fees by 100% for some types of government services, including CSO registration renewal fees, which were already very high according to many CSOs. As a result, some CSOs, particularly community-based organizations (CBOs), had to delay or suspend their activities.</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slight deterioration</td>
<td>Trends or developments have had a slightly negative impact on at least one or two indicators in the dimension.</td>
<td>Example: Legal Environment – The government has decided that CSOs should submit their financial statement and annual activity report to the registration agency every year. This may have a long-term positive effect but in the short-term it has increased bureaucratic hurdles and the possibility of harassment by overzealous government officials.</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement</td>
<td>The country has not encountered any significant trends or developments in the dimension or developments have been both positive and negative in equal measure.</td>
<td></td>
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<td>-------------</td>
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</table>
| **No Change** | **Slight improvement:** Trends or developments have had a slightly positive impact on at least one or two indicators in the dimension.  
Example: Legal Environment – To facilitate CSO registration, particularly for those in rural areas, the government has decided its registration agency will allow the agency to take applications locally and process registration directly at the district level. Now, CSOs in rural areas are not required to travel to the capital to apply. However, this measure is accompanied with a small increase in the registration fee. |
| | **Moderate improvement:** Trends and developments have had a somewhat positive impact in at least one or two indicators in the dimension.  
Example: Service Provision – To improve the effectiveness of public service delivery, the central government has decided that at least 10% of local government contracts for basic service delivery will be set aside for CSOs. The law is lacking in specificity, particularly around the application process, but it reinforces CSOs’ image as credible partners. |
| | **Significant improvement:** Trends and developments have had important positive effects on at least one or two indicators in the dimension.  
Example: Public Image – There has been a net increase of CSO partnerships with businesses. CSOs have also agreed to and published a general code of conduct for the sector, reinforcing a positive trend of greater transparency and accountability. |
| | **Extreme improvement:** Trends and developments have had very important positive effects on several indicators in the dimension.  
Example: Organizational Capacity – The government and international donors have launched a five-year multi-million-dollar basket funds to support CSO-led activities and to strengthen CSO capacity, with a special focus on skills training for CSO staff members, particularly those from CBOs. |
| | **Transformative improvement:** Trends and developments have had a completely transformative positive effect on at least one or two indicators in the dimension and will potentially affect other dimensions as well.  
Example: Legal Environment – A nonviolent revolution that toppled an authoritarian regime and installed a more democratic regime has produced sudden political and legal changes that will protect basic freedoms and human rights. |
Instructions for Baseline Recalibration

Background
To enhance its methodology, the Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index (CSOSI) incorporates recalibration as one of its pilot activities for 2018 and again in 2019 CSOSI. Recalibration is introduced to adjust dimension-level scores that are not accurate, either because their baseline scores lack accuracy or because they have not moved significantly enough over time to reflect structural changes in the sector’s sustainability. The goal of resetting these scores is to improve the cross-country comparability of scores and to increase the analytical usefulness of the CSOSI to its target audiences. The scores to be recalibrated have been selected after review by the Editorial Committee and verification by regional experts and have been finalized after consultation with the Implementing Partner (IP).

Instructions
1. Communicate with participating expert panel members – The IP communicates to the expert panelists the purpose and the scores that have been selected for recalibration.

2. Use Sustainability Categories and Scores – A Closer Look and a comparison to other scores in their region to determine new score(s) – Instead of using the scoring guidance whereby proposed scores are determined by analyzing the level of change from the previous year, the scores identified for recalibration are determined by analyzing where they fall on the one-to-seven scoring scale, as well as a comparison with the other scores for that dimension in the other countries covered by the CSOSI in the region. The expert panelists should review the vignettes and illustrative examples in Sustainability Categories and Scores – A Closer Look to familiarize themselves with how various levels of CSO sustainability should correspond to the CSOSI’s scoring spectrum. Scores should be proposed based on how well they match the descriptions of the various full-point scores listed in this codebook. To help narrow proposed scores to the tenth decimal point, experts can review other countries’ scores listed for that dimension in the most recent regional report (which are provided to the IP with the other scores to be recalibrated removed to avoid confusion).

3. Discuss evidence for recalibrated scores, as well as trends and developments in the past year that led to improvements and deterioration in the dimension – The narrative report should be drafted the same as the other dimensions, reviewing the current situation and discussing what has changed over the previous year. A note will be included into the final report that clarifies that the new score for that dimension is based on a recalibration and should not be compared with the previous year’s score to make assertions about improvement or deterioration.

Tips
Implementing Partners should communicate with the expert panelists which dimensions have been selected for baseline recalibration at least one week in advance of the panel discussion. This will give the panelists an opportunity to prepare evidence about the status quo in the country under this dimension to inform their selection of a new baseline score.
Instructions for Electronic Questionnaire

Background
To enhance its methodology, the Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index (CSOSI) has incorporated several activities into its annual process in select countries. These new activities respond directly to the methodological issues identified through the feedback and consultation process conducted with project stakeholders from June to August 2018 and again in July and August of 2019.

One of these activities to enhance the methodology’s implementation is to disseminate an electronic questionnaire to a larger group of individuals. The goal of incorporating this questionnaire is to enable new individuals to contribute their perspectives and insights on the CSOSI dimensions, to increase the representativeness and inclusiveness of the process, and increase the amount of data and information Implementing Partners (IPs) receive to use as evidence of the assertions made in their report.

Instructions
1. Identify about 50 additional participants to whom you will send the questionnaire – The IP selects individuals who will expand the scope and diversity of inputs into the process. The selected individuals should include representatives of or specialists in specific sub-sectors of civil society organizations (CSOs), such as labor unions, capacity building organizations, organizations representing marginalized and vulnerable groups, informal movements, community-based organizations, faith-based organizations, intermediary support organizations, resource centers, and research institutes. Emphasis should be placed on selecting individuals who are in other localities of the country and those located in rural areas. The objective is for the IP to select a group of people who would add new perspectives on various aspects of the sector on which the in-person panelists might not have deep expertise, as well as individuals who have broad knowledge but would be unable or available to attend the in-person panel discussion. FHI 360 and the local USAID Mission may request additions to the list of questionnaire recipients from their own network of contacts.

2. Disseminate the electronic questionnaire to your selected additional participants – FHI 360 provides the IP with a link to the questionnaire, which includes both structured and open-ended sections, to distribute to the IP’s selected additional participants. Upon request, FHI 360 can send the IP the text of the questionnaire beforehand so the IP can translate it into its local language. The questionnaire is brief and should take no more than 15 minutes to complete, so the IP should ask the additional participants to complete it within a period of two weeks or less.

3. Receive analysis of the questionnaire’s results from FHI 360 – FHI 360 compiles the quantitative and qualitative data received and submits it to the IP.

4. Incorporate the findings into the panel discussion – Statistics and examples that are raised through the questionnaire responses should be presented to the in-person panel to serve as an additional data source for the scoring process and the discussion around the relevant indicators.

5. Write the conclusions reached into the narrative report – In addition to discussing these additional inputs in the panel discussion, they should also be incorporated wherever possible into the narrative report. The data and information received from the electronic questionnaire should be incorporated in the same way that the expert panelists’ insights are incorporated, in that individual participants should not be attributed, nor should the questionnaire be explicitly cited. Instead, their inputs should simply be mentioned where relevant as evidence of what has changed positively or negatively in ways that affected the sustainability of the CSO sector in the relevant year.

Tips
When selecting additional participants, please keep the following points in mind:

- If you or your organization has partnered with other organizations or individuals in other areas of the country, sending the questionnaire to people with whom you already have a working relationship may increase the response rate;
• Sharing the questionnaire with donor agencies operating in your country and allowing them to propose other individuals to receive the questionnaire can be a useful way of reaching new experts and perspectives outside of your own organization’s network;

• Sharing the questionnaire with civil society networks and allowing them to forward it to their member organizations’ leaders, or other experts with whom they work, is a useful way of maximizing circulation outside of your network;

• When sending out the questionnaire, it may be useful to commit to sending participants a copy of the final country and regional reports, so they feel a sense of participation in the larger process of developing the CSOSI.

• As a best practice, the IP can compile a written overview of the conclusions and evidence of the additional participants and send it to the expert panel members before the panel discussion, so they can review it. FHI 360 will provide all the results to the IP. If a written overview is sent out before the panel discussion, the IP can ask the expert panelists at the discussion which findings stood out most to them, to spur discussion.

• Pay special attention to geography – if your country has breakaway regions or is experiencing civil war, make extra efforts to reach people in all the relevant areas.

• Convincing the participants that their inputs are confidential is key to obtaining a high participation rate and meaningful findings. Especially in countries where self-censorship might be an issue, be very clear that only your organization and FHI 360 will see their inputs, and no comments made will be personally attributed under any circumstances.
Instructions for University Review

Background
The Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index (CSOSI) measures the civil society sector’s sustainability in 74 countries across seven dimensions of sustainability: legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, sectoral infrastructure, and public image. The methodology for developing the Index each year involves working with a local Implementing Partner (IP) in each country to convene a panel of local experts to discuss trends and developments over the past year and re-score the seven dimension-level scores based on a list of indicators. Based on this panel discussion and some additional research, the IP then drafts an eight- to ten-page narrative report summarizing the status of civil society in their country and explaining their evidence and providing examples of how the situation has changed from the previous year.

FHI 360 develops the CSOSI in collaboration with the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), whose editors work with the IP to revise and improve their report. After editing and revision, the report is sent to the local USAID Mission and an Editorial Committee (EC) in Washington, DC that consists of representatives from FHI 360, ICNL, USAID, and a regional expert to further review the content of the reports and the scoring decisions made by the expert panelists.

Purpose of the Review
To enhance its methodology, the CSOSI will incorporate several pilot integration activities into its annual process in select countries in developing the 2019 CSOSI. These pilot activities respond directly to methodological issues identified through a feedback and consultation process conducted with project stakeholders from June to August 2018, and again in summer of 2019.

One of the pilot integration activities to be implemented for the 2019 CSOSI is to work with the local university for its peer review of the draft country report. The goal of incorporating this review is to add a quality control mechanism in which the reviewers have local knowledge, to improve the validity of the narrative reports.

Instructions
1. Read the draft CSOSI country report – The university reviewer(s) read through the draft and note any inaccuracies or overlooked trends and developments for civil society in the country in 2019. Please note that the CSOSI reports on the developments of the previous year.

2. Make comments on the report – Comments should include corrections, additional statistics and information that would be useful for the Implementing Partner (IP) to include, and recommendations of other relevant data sources that the IP could benefit from reviewing. The university reviewers do not propose scores but can provide their thoughts on the IP’s proposed scores.

3. Return the report to FHI 360 – The draft CSOSI country reports are returned to FHI 360 within two weeks, so the comments can be reviewed by the Editorial Committee reviewers before they meet to discuss the report and forward it to the IP for consideration. Please note that since the CSOSI country reports are eight to ten pages long, the IP might not be able to fully address the comments from the university reviewers.

Tips
• Ideally, universities should select two to three individuals to review the draft report. This will increase the depth and breadth of inputs without overloading the draft with too many comments.
• Select individuals to review who collectively have broad expertise in civil society in your country, as well as current information on the trends and developments that have affected civil society in the previous year specifically.
• If you identify an inaccuracy, or a statement that lacks neutrality or evidence, please propose a specific phrasing, or example that supports the assertion.
ANNEX B: STATISTICAL DATA

2019 MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA SCORES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>CSO Sustainability</th>
<th>Legal Environment</th>
<th>Organizational Capacity</th>
<th>Financial Viability</th>
<th>Advocacy</th>
<th>Service Provision</th>
<th>Sectoral Infrastructure</th>
<th>Public Image</th>
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To further explore CSOSI’s historical data and past reports, please visit www.csosi.org.
**COUNTRIES RANKED BY SCORE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal Environment</th>
<th>Organizational Capacity</th>
<th>Financial Viability</th>
<th>Advocacy</th>
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ANNEX C: REGIONAL MAP

OVERALL CSO SUSTAINABILITY

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