2019 CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATION SUSTAINABILITY INDEX
FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
11th EDITION – DECEMBER 2020
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Developed by:
United States Agency for International Development
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance
Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance

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Disclaimer: The opinions expressed herein are those of the panelists and other project researchers and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or FHI 360.
Cover Photo: A group of youth gather at a free WIFI spot to access the internet in Maputo, Mozambique in March 2020. USAID is developing programs in several countries, mainly in Africa, to promote universal internet access. The program enables free access to information for young people who may not have the financial resources to access the internet otherwise, thereby helping them to participate in democratic processes, practice citizenship, and exercise their right to information.

Photo Credit: Gideon Américo Muiambo, representative of the Movement for the Prevention of Crime (MHPC)

This photo was a submission in the 2020 USAID Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance photo contest.
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INTRODUCTION

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is pleased to present the eleventh edition of the CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa, covering developments in 2019.

This year's Index reports on the state of CSO sectors in thirty-two countries in the sub-Saharan Africa, including, for the first time, Cameroon. The Index addresses continuity, advances, and setbacks in seven key components or "dimensions" of the sustainability of civil society sectors: legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, sectoral infrastructure, and public image. The Index provides useful information for local and international CSOs, governments, multilateral institutions, donors, academics, and other partners and stakeholders who want to better understand the CSO sector and monitor its successes, challenges, and opportunities.

The Index's methodology relies on CSO practitioners and researchers in each country, who form expert panels to assess and rate the dimensions of CSO sustainability during the year. The panel agrees on a score for each dimension, which ranges from 1 (the most enhanced level of sustainability) to 7 (the most impeded). The dimension scores are then averaged to produce an overall sustainability score for the CSO sector of a given country. A Washington, DC-based editorial committee composed of technical and regional experts reviews each panel's scores and the corresponding narrative reports, with the aim of maintaining consistent approaches and standards so as to facilitate cross-country comparisons. Further details about the methodology used to select panel members, calculate scores, and produce narrative reports are provided in Annex A.

The CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa complements similar publications covering other regions. The various regional editions of the 2019 CSO Sustainability Index assess the civil society sectors in a total of seventy-four countries, including eight in the Middle East and North Africa, twenty-four in Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, nine in Asia, and Mexico.

A publication of this type would not be possible without the contributions of many individuals and organizations. We are especially grateful to our local implementing partners, who play the critical role of facilitating the expert panel meetings and writing the country reports. We would also like to thank the many CSO representatives and experts, USAID partners, and international donors who participate in the expert panels. Their knowledge, perceptions, ideas, observations, and contributions are the foundation upon which this Index is based.

In addition, special thanks goes to Eka Imerlishvili from FHI 360, the project manager; Jennifer Stuart from the International Center for Not-For-Profit Law, the report’s editor; and Asta Zinbo and Mariam Afrasiabi from USAID, both of whom provided critical support for this edition of the CSO Sustainability Index. A full list of acknowledgements can be found on page ii.

Happy reading,

Michael Kott
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December 14, 2020
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 2019 CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa reports on developments in 2019 across seven key dimensions affecting the sustainability of the CSO sectors in thirty-two countries. One new country, Cameroon, is included in this year’s Index.

In 2019, civil society across sub-Saharan Africa continued to be shaped by and respond to major political and economic developments, including elections and changes in governments, insecurity, economic stress, and efforts to close civic space. Despite these often turbulent contexts, CSO sectors in a number of countries made notable advances in their advocacy and public image, frequently in the face of harassment by government officials, politicians, and media outlets.

While these developments are largely in line with trends affecting CSO sustainability in the region over the past few years, the world has changed dramatically since the end of 2019, when the novel coronavirus began to spread globally. The pandemic had created a sense of cognitive dissonance between the situations described in the reports contained in this Index and the current realities at the time of publication in late 2020. Next year’s edition of the Index will describe vastly different landscapes for CSOs. Given the devastating impact of the pandemic, dramatic declines are to be expected in CSOs’ financial viability, organizational capacity, and ability to travel, while public demand for CSOs’ services is likely to increase.

In 2019, civil society sectors across Africa faced challenges that made them vulnerable but also built their resilience to the challenges to come. The following summary highlights some of the trends observed in this pre-pandemic world.

THE CONTEXT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

A CHANGING POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

Two historic political milestones took place in sub-Saharan Africa in 2019: the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and the overthrow of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir.

Abiy, who came to power in 2018 after two years of intense turmoil, was recognized for his effort to resolve the decades-long border conflict with neighboring Eritrea and his respect for human rights. His government introduced a number of reforms that provided profound relief for CSOs. They included replacing the draconian Charities and Societies Proclamation with a new law that opens up space for civil society, easing restrictions on access to foreign funding, and emphasizing the government’s willingness to engage with CSOs. These and other reforms allowed every dimension of CSO sustainability in Ethiopia to improve in 2019.

In Sudan, protests over food prices that began in late 2018 evolved into an open revolt against the authoritarian regime. Led by the newly founded Sudan Professionals Association, thousands of protesters pushed successfully for the end of the al-Bashir government and then held the Transitional Military Council, which assumed power in April, to account. Despite the killing of hundreds of people by security forces, in August civil society groups succeeded in their demands for a transition to civilian rule. As in Ethiopia, the environment for CSOs eased considerably as the government relaxed restrictive laws and regulations and took a more cooperative stance towards CSOs.

Persistent Insecurity

Elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, violent conflicts persisted in 2019. Significant upticks in violence perpetrated by international extremist movements, foreign mercenaries, organized crime networks, and intercommunal combatants killed thousands of civilians and left more than 7 million people in urgent need of humanitarian assistance in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali, according to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Refugees. Another 7.7 million required assistance in Nigeria, where Boko Haram continued to threaten villages in the northern region and unknown assailants abducted six international aid workers in Borno State. Fighting between government forces and opposition groups and violent extremists also continued in South Sudan, Mozambique, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Kenya, and elsewhere, dislocating large
populations. As a result of these conflicts, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees reported that the overall number of refugees and people in refugee-like situations in sub-Saharan Africa totaled 6.3 million and internally displaced persons reached 14.3 million in 2019.

CSOs’ role in meeting the needs of these populations was crucial. CSOs provided food, shelter, health care, water, and other emergency services in tense and harrowing circumstances, sometimes even after governments were forced to withdraw. Local organizations relied on the generous support of donors and international partners to fund their services. But at times in 2019, even CSOs had to discontinue their important work. In Burkina Faso, for example, CSO services were disrupted by terrorist attacks in the northern, central, and eastern parts of the country. Malian CSOs were similarly unable to provide basic services because of the unstable security situation, which included the threat of improvised explosive devices.

Advocacy CSOs also made significant contributions to ameliorating conflict situations in sub-Saharan Africa in 2019. In South Sudan, both the government and the opposition appreciated the involvement of CSOs that were selected to participate in peace negotiations, particularly their nonpartisan contributions. Thanks to a heavy media presence, the South Sudanese public increasingly saw CSOs as agents of positive change. In Nigeria, CSOs helped develop a national security management plan based on a local-level approach to justice and security dialogues. Malian civil society took part in the development of a number of frameworks for security-sector reform. Though their involvement in crisis mediation and peace building is largely still nascent, CSOs’ interventions in 2019 show that they are steadily developing expertise and credibility in these areas and can offer new, well-received approaches to the region’s most difficult challenges.

The Year in Elections

Elections offer a primary measure of the health of any democracy, and CSOs often play a critical role in their conduct. Thirteen of the thirty-two countries covered in this year’s Index hosted presidential, legislative, or local elections in 2019, while a number of other countries began to prepare for votes in 2020.

Botswana, Nigeria, Senegal, and several other countries enjoyed elections that were generally seen as orderly and credible. One of the most closely watched races in 2019 was in South Africa, where voting was relatively smooth but President Cyril Ramaphosa was re-elected by an unexpectedly small margin. This year’s report for South Africa notes that the low voter turnout suggests that the electorate is increasingly distrustful of state institutions and skeptical about the potential of electoral processes to bring about change. A similar trend was noted in legislative elections in Madagascar.

In other countries, elections were undermined by “the reluctance or refusal of long-serving heads of state or governing political parties to make way for successors who might do a better job,” in the words of a December 2019 article in the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). Governments determined to cling to power through anti-democratic manipulation, such as extrajudicial actions and security overreach, encountered more spirited public resistance than in previous years, often spearheaded by CSOs. For example, Mozambican CSOs worked with international observers and opposition parties to record flaws in the country’s general elections, including voter registration fraud and ballot-box stuffing. They continued undeterred in their election-related work even after the executive director of a leading CSO, who intended to serve as an election observer, was fatally shot by a member of the elite security force during the tense pre-election period. In Malawi, after the incumbent president was re-elected, CSOs organized nationwide demonstrations to protest the management of the elections and then turned to the courts to obtain an injunction against the government’s effort to interfere with their right to demonstrate. The public’s resistance to fraud put pressure on courts to review the evidence, which ultimately led to the annulment of the election results by the Malawian Constitutional Court in 2020.

In Benin, during highly contested legislative elections, CSOs protested the actions of security forces and demanded the immediate release of arrested demonstrators after the government attempted to suppress protests. Despite a ban on demonstrations and a brutal crackdown by security forces, Guinean CSOs organized countrywide protests to object to the sitting president’s extra-constitutional proposal to change the constitution so that he could run for a third term, which he ultimately succeeded in achieving in 2020.

In nearly all countries conducting elections in 2019, CSOs provided crucial support, including educating citizens about the voting process, arranging for opportunities for voters to meet candidates, supporting women candidates, and observing the polling process. Many of these activities would not have been possible without the support of
international donors who, like their African partners, recognize the important role of civil society in securing and strengthening democratic processes.

**ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES**

Major economic trends in sub-Saharan Africa were generally positive in 2019. The region’s overall growth rate was estimated at 3.4 percent, up slightly from 2018, according to the World Bank. Growth was especially strong in Rwanda, the world’s second fastest growing economy, as well as Ethiopia, Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Uganda, Ghana, and The Gambia. At the same time, some of the region’s largest economies, including Nigeria, South Africa, and Angola, continued to underperform.

An agreement establishing the new African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) entered into force in 2019. Forty-nine countries signed the agreement in 2018, and by December 2019, it had been ratified by twenty-four countries. When fully implemented, the pact will establish the world’s largest free-trade area. The AfCFTA seeks to promote economic diversification and industrialization while creating jobs for Africa’s burgeoning population under the age of twenty-five. A key driver of success will be the development of the region’s infrastructure. The construction of roads, dams, electrical grids, water and sanitation systems, and other key infrastructure continued at full throttle in DRC, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and elsewhere in 2019.

For CSOs, a critical area of infrastructural development is information and communications technology. The majority of the countries covered in the Index are still “digitally under-connected,” in the words of the African Development Bank (AfDB), but they are rapidly catching up. The AfDB reports that Africa has the fastest growing mobile phone market in the world. Furthermore, although overall internet coverage in sub-Saharan Africa is low, investment in the expansion of broadband is robust, and the number of Africans who used internet services on a mobile device in 2018 was up by one third over 2016, according to the industry group GSMA. The effort to take sub-Saharan Africa online is supported by a spreading network of business-incubating tech hubs, which focus on empowering a new generation of internet users and count CSOs among their beneficiaries. Many of this year’s reports describe CSOs as avid and adroit users of digital technologies and as rapidly developing their abilities to harness the internet to manage their operations, communicate with constituencies, mobilize advocacy campaigns and social movements, and even experiment with crowdsourcing and other digital fundraising techniques.

Ambitious infrastructural development plans, along with depreciating currencies and poor fiscal management, accelerated national debt in much of the region in 2019. By the end of August 2019, eighteen countries were in or approaching debt distress, according to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Among the countries covered by the Index, this group was led by The Gambia and Mozambique and included South Sudan, Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Zambia. Since governments grappling with debt distress often meet repayment obligations by diverting funding from basic services, such as education and health care, CSOs are left to fill in the gap. The job of CSOs across the continent was made yet harder in 2019 as they experienced declining funding from donors, in part because donors narrowed their focus to specific areas, such as elections or insecurity.

Sub-Saharan Africa has suffered from the debilitating economic effects of climate change for years. But in 2019, cyclone Idai caused unprecedented suffering and destruction in Mozambique, Malawi, and Zimbabwe. The UN estimates that the cyclone, which struck Mozambique’s coast on March 14, was southern Africa’s worst natural disaster in at least two decades. Its destructive impact was compounded when cyclone Kenneth hit the same area six weeks later. According to World Bank estimates, the two storms caused damages and losses to houses, business, and core infrastructure that will cost at least $3 billion to rebuild. The humanitarian need caused by the cyclones was also immense. CSOs worked with governments and international partners to provide emergency relief to more than 2 million people affected by the cyclones. But with 1,200 square miles destroyed and the source of millions of livelihoods wiped out, the ruin will take years to overcome, and food security is likely to worsen. CSOs in these countries will need to remain focused on helping rebuild local economies and meeting the needs of affected populations even as they shoulder the additional burden of COVID response in 2020.

In their watchdog roles, CSOs were deeply involved in combating the perennial plague of corruption, which continued to undermine economic development throughout sub-Saharan Africa in 2019. Namibia experienced its worst corruption scandal ever, involving the apportionment of fishing quotas, while Kenyans learned of large, suspicious payments to building contractors by government officials. A major scandal over the illegal logging of kevazingo wood engulfed high-ranking government officials in Gabon. A few countries, such as Angola, Botswana, and Ghana, made headway in fighting corruption by launching investigations or passing legislation. On the other
hand, Liberia, Madagascar, and Malawi fell significantly in their rankings in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index for 2019. CSOs engaged in fighting corruption and enforcing transparency often did so at great peril. For example, in Uganda, young people from the Alternative Uganda social movement and Uganda Poor Youth Movement were arrested, tortured, and detained for protesting corruption in the parliament.

**TRENDS IN CSO SUSTAINABILITY**
CSO sustainability in sub-Saharan Africa remained constrained in 2019. Eight countries in the region have overall CSO sustainability scores that fall within the weakest category of sustainability, Sustainability Impeded, with scores of 5.1 to 7. The rest fall in the middle category of sustainability, Sustainability Evolving (3.1 to 5). No country has an overall CSO sustainability score that falls within the highest range of sustainability, Sustainability Enhanced (1 to 3).

The average score for overall CSO sustainability in sub-Saharan Africa improved slightly in 2019, driven largely by more competent advocacy, enhanced organizational capacity, and a stronger public image. Nine countries (Ethiopia, The Gambia, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan) reported overall improvements in scores. Four countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Tanzania) reported deteriorations, most often because of a moderate to extreme worsening of the legal environment.¹

**Legal Environment**

In line with a long-running global and regional trend, ten countries, or about one third of those covered in this edition of the Index, reported poorer legal environments for civil society in 2019. Although concerning, this is significantly fewer than the number of countries reporting deteriorations in each of the previous three years. The slowing down of deterioration of the legal environment suggests that CSOs are mounting more coordinated resistance to harassment and have pushed successfully to ameliorate some particularly repressive laws, including through legal challenges, as in Tanzania and Malawi.

Deteriorations were usually more related to harassment and arbitrary implementation of existing laws than actual changes in the legal framework. The most severe decline was reported in Benin, where the government cracked down violently on freedoms of assembly and expression during elections. In Cameroon, Niger, and Zambia, freedom of assembly was similarly suppressed as authorities blocked CSOs from organizing peaceful protests. The score for legal environment in Guinea regressed from Sustainability Evolving to Sustainability Impeded as CSOs were subject to abuses of power on many fronts, including arbitrary arrests, censorship, and the excessive use of force by law enforcement agencies.

Seven countries (Cote d’Ivoire, DRC, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mali, South Africa, Sudan) reported improvements in their legal environments. This development was most pronounced in Ethiopia, where a new law did away with many of the restrictions that had shackled the CSO sector under the former regime. Similarly, in Sudan, the new civilian government relaxed regulations that had previously hampered CSOs’ registration and operations. In future years, it will be important to note whether these improvements in situations of “exuberance” are sustained over the longer term. In other countries, an improved legal environment was most often due to an easing of requirements or conditions for registration and operations.

Despite improvements in certain countries, with an overall average score of 5.1, the legal environment for CSOs in sub-Saharan Africa hovered in the Sustainability Impeded range in 2019. Organizations throughout the region continued to encounter bureaucratic obstacles stemming from complicated procedures, inconsistent implementation of laws and regulations, poorly staffed government offices, or an aim to suppress advocacy organizations working on governance and human rights. Tax exemptions and progressive laws to foster social enterprises often fail to be implemented consistently.

**Organizational Capacity**

Twelve countries reported stronger organizational capacity in 2019—a notably higher number than in previous years. The most common reasons for improvement were CSOs’ more effective work with constituencies (for example, in Angola, Gabon, Nigeria, South Sudan, and Sudan) and the positive impact of capacity-building programs (in Benin, Burundi, Madagascar, and Rwanda). The organizational capacity of Gambian CSOs progressed from the Sustainability Impeded to the Sustainability Evolving range as they built strong relationships with constituencies. Only four countries reported deteriorations in their organizational capacity for reasons ranging from CSOs’ shift in focus from regular mission areas to donor priorities (Mali) to overall financial decline (Zambia).

Project-based funding and a heavy reliance on international funding remained significant barriers to organizational development across the region. Many reports point to donors’ preference for funding international organizations

¹ Here and under individual dimensions, Cameroon is not counted in discussions of change since it was included in the Index for the first time this year.
as a drag on the development of local organizational capacity, since it forces local CSOs into a supporting role and prevents them from developing higher-level project and financial management capacities.

A particular strength of many local CSOs is that they are close to their communities and can incorporate participatory approaches into project implementation through regular and consistent community engagement. However, CSOs often lack opportunities to identify and respond to local needs. For example, in Mali, a new wave of donor funding for projects to counter violent extremism has caused many CSOs to move away from their traditional areas of advocacy and social service provision, resulting in some distortions and inefficiencies in their interventions.

CSOs’ planning efforts and internal structures and policies are often poorly developed. Most countries report that the majority of CSOs have inactive boards, usually because of a poor understanding of boards’ role or a lack of funding for board operations. Strategic planning is most often conducted only by larger, better-funded organizations, usually at donors’ request. Human resources are deficient, since most CSOs can afford to hire staff only on a short-term, project-based basis.

Although CSOs’ office facilities vary, most are poorly equipped. Organizations in remote areas often face severe technological challenges. Nevertheless, CSOs’ presence on social media grew in 2019 as internet and mobile phone infrastructures expanded. CSO staff rely heavily on personal smartphones for their work.

**Financial Viability**

Financial viability remained the weakest dimension of CSO sustainability in sub-Saharan Africa. Deteriorations were reported in ten countries and were usually attributed to a shift in donors’ interests or a narrowing of their focus to specific issues (such as security, elections, or gender-based violence), thereby reducing funding for other programmatic areas. Only three countries reported improvements: Rwanda, where CSOs secured government contracts; The Gambia, where donors opened up funding to projects in new areas (corruption, sexual violence, and gender); and Ethiopia, where the new government loosened restrictions on access to funding and spending.

CSOs in all countries except South Africa remain overwhelmingly dependent on foreign funding. Accurate data on foreign funding levels is difficult to collect, but nearly all countries reported stagnant or declining donor funding in 2019. Domestic organizations are poorly equipped to compete with foreign organizations for funding, and they often access foreign funding as members of international consortia, sub-grantees of international CSOs, or local implementers. Since the funding that local organizations receive is usually project based and short term, they are deprived of opportunities to develop their organizational capacity and achieve longer-term financial sustainability by qualifying for donor funding on their own.

Very few CSOs benefit from locally sourced funding. Most governments do not fund the sector, unless required by donors to include CSOs in project implementation. Some CSOs are experimenting with raising funds through text messaging or crowdsourcing, but these efforts are too nascent to reduce the need for donor funding. Social enterprises are developing slowly, constrained by inadequate legislation or lack of investment capital. Except in South Africa, where corporations provided nearly a third of all funding to CSOs in 2019, and a handful of countries where extractive companies fund some CSO projects, corporate support for civil society is modest and narrowly targeted.

Most CSOs other than large, established organizations lack the resources to hire qualified financial administrators or develop sophisticated financial management systems.

**Advocacy**

CSO advocacy was again the strongest dimension of sustainability in sub-Saharan Africa and showed significant advances in 2019. Twenty-one countries reported improvements in this dimension, while five countries recorded deteriorations and five countries recorded no change. Sudanese CSOs recorded a dramatic improvement and moved from the Sustainability Impeded to Sustainability Evolving range thanks to their leadership during the revolution. Improvements elsewhere were also shaped by specific local circumstances, such as the search for solutions to political and security crises in Mali and South Sudan and new openings for cooperation with governments in Angola, The Gambia, and South Africa. Deteriorations in advocacy, which were reported in Burundi, Guinea, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda, were generally the result of unfavorable environments, whether because of political turmoil or increased government obstruction.
CSOs’ operational space and capacity to engage with governments was extremely varied in 2019. In countries with higher advocacy scores, such as Nigeria and Burkina Faso, CSOs worked actively with government bodies on policy reviews, budgeting decisions, and planning. Elsewhere, CSOs’ engagement with governments was nominal, informal, or constrained, with discussion of sensitive issues avoided. Relationships were often stronger with local government officials. In Kenya, for example, CSOs engage with county governments in key decision-making processes, such as budgeting, while in Guinea, CSOs worked with municipal councils on issues related to service provision.

CSOs successfully realized campaigns to raise awareness or change laws or behavior related to a wide range of topics, including extractive industries, corruption, and land rights. Campaigns on gender equity, gender-based violence, and election-related issues were also common, reflecting in part the interests of donors. CSOs often found it more effective to advocate on specific issues in coalitions or loose groupings, although such groups often break up because of internal tensions and competition.

CSOs in many countries continued to expand their use of social media for advocacy purposes in 2019. Community radio stations were important communications channels for advocacy in rural communities. CSOs have also begun to use strategic litigation effectively in recent years. For example, Tanzanian CSOs argued successfully in the East Africa Court of Justice that the Media Services Act of 2016 violated freedom of expression by criminalizing defamation and sedition, and South African CSOs privately filed charges in cases that the National Prosecuting Authority decided not to pursue.

Many CSOs across the region remain unaware of the importance of an enabling legal environment for the sector or are too poorly coordinated to push for reform. In a number of countries, such as the DRC, Liberia, Mali, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, national-level CSOs assertively pursued new laws to govern the sector in 2019, although their efforts were not always successful. In Niger and Sierra Leone, for example, CSOs’ efforts resulted in a postponement of unwanted changes threatened by the government rather than a realization of CSOs’ goals for reform.

**Service Provision**

Service provision continues to be one of the stronger dimensions of CSO sustainability. Improved service provision was reported in eleven countries, most commonly because of new funding sources (DRC, Namibia, Malawi, Nigeria). Gabon progressed from the Sustainability Impeded to Sustainability Evolving range in this dimension thanks to expanded areas of service provision. Deteriorations were reported in five countries because of insecurity (Burkina Faso, Mali), declines in funding (Liberia, Mozambique), and the contraction of the market for CSOs’ services as the government consolidated service provision (Benin).

Most CSOs work closely with their communities and rely on informal observation, surveys, and consultations to assess local needs. Larger organizations may have the capacity and resources to use formal assessment tools, such as data analysis and advanced monitoring and evaluation methodologies. In some countries, such as Rwanda, CSOs must align their services with government development plans. Local CSOs report that donors sometimes fund projects that are misaligned with local needs.

In all countries, CSOs make relatively little effort to recover costs by charging fees, either because the law prohibits this, CSOs lack business skills, or organizations believe that earning income from their activities is inconsistent with their nonprofit mission. Any earned income is usually minimal, mainly because of served populations’ inability to pay.

Governments increasingly acknowledge the role of CSOs in service delivery, although this has not always reduced suspicion or built trust. Local governments usually appreciate CSOs’ service-providing activities, since they are accustomed to collaborating with them closely, whereas central governments may be less inclined to recognize CSOs’ contributions.

**Sectoral Infrastructure**

The infrastructure supporting CSO sectors in sub-Saharan Africa is generally underdeveloped. But after years of stagnation, it showed signs of slight improvement in 2019. Eleven countries reported stronger infrastructures, based on factors such as more cohesion and networking among CSOs (Mali, Sudan) or better intersectoral
partnerships (Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Madagascar). Only Burkina Faso reported a deterioration because of declines in funding from intermediary support organizations.

Resource centers are usually limited in number and offer a narrow range of services. They do not usually serve organizations in more remote areas. Some countries (Mozambique, Namibia, Burundi) lack resource centers altogether. The last remaining resource center in Sierra Leone closed in 2019 because of a lack of funding. Few countries other than South Africa have locally funded grantmaking institutions that support CSOs, although local or locally based international CSOs often re-grant donor funds.

CSO networking is growing stronger, especially at the national level. In some countries (The Gambia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe), CSOs work well together and cooperation increased in 2019. However, networks are usually thematic in focus, and most countries lack an independent umbrella organization to promote the interests of the sector as a whole.

Training is generally available from skilled trainers, although its reach and variety varies. Organizations in remote areas often do not benefit from training opportunities. Training usually focuses on standard management topics and less commonly on more specialized areas, such as digital technologies, cybersecurity, and online fundraising.

CSOs, governments, and media are growing more aware of the benefits of working together and are taking a more strategic approach to developing partnerships, even if these relationships are otherwise tense. In Burundi in 2019, for example, where the space for civil society is constrained, CSOs signed partnership agreements with government ministries to facilitate their work in the field. In Tanzania, the government asserted stricter control over CSOs’ operations but worked closely with civil society to provide educational and health-care services. The South African government, which is generally supportive of CSOs, provides capacity building opportunities to help develop the CSO sector. CSOs’ collaboration with the media is more developed and usually focuses on training journalists or raising awareness about issues of public interest, such as health or elections. CSOs’ relationships with the private sector are often rudimentary, at best.

Public Image

After advocacy, CSOs’ public image recorded the greatest improvement of all dimensions in 2019. Seventeen countries reported improvements, often because of expanded media coverage of CSOs’ analyses or leadership in moments of crisis, with Sudan and Cote d’Ivoire progressing from the Sustainability Impeded to the Sustainability Evolving range. This development suggests growing appreciation of CSOs’ contributions, especially regarding advocacy. Only one country, Benin, reported a deterioration, spurred by a decline in coverage by government-owned outlets.

In countries with governments that are hostile to CSOs, such as Uganda and Zimbabwe, public media often convey negatives views or ignore CSOs altogether. Independent media are usually more impartial. CSOs must usually pay for media coverage, which is often beyond their reach. In general, coverage of CSOs does not generate revenue for media outlets and is therefore often relegated to the back pages.

Governments in many countries continued to view CSO advocacy with mistrust while appreciating the work of service-providing organizations in 2019. However, positive perceptions may be increasing as governments better understand the role of CSOs and do not automatically view them as aligned with opponents. In Mali, for example, the government’s view of CSOs has improved in recent years, and it now recognizes that CSOs should be key actors in the resolution of the political crisis.

Throughout sub-Saharan Africa, the public tends to view CSOs positively. In some contexts, governmental hostility for CSOs’ interventions in sensitive areas, such as female genital mutilation, can undermine public trust among some constituencies, although not enough to outweigh overwhelmingly positive public views. Private-sector perspectives are generally neutral or undeveloped. Businesses often hold CSOs at arms’ length if they fear that closer contact will jeopardize their relationships with the government.

CSOs in sub-Saharan Africa do not aggressively promote themselves or their activities. Social media and hashtag movements are the dominant mode of communication. Despite CSOs’ dependence on the internet, web sites are often not kept up to date, probably because organizations lack resources and dedicated communications staff.
There was little activity in the area of self-regulation in 2019. Individual organizations may have codes of conduct, but they are generally lacking at a sector-wide level. CSOs’ adherence to standards of transparency and accountability has increased but is usually driven by government or donor requirements.

**CONCLUSION**

The CSO sector in sub-Saharan Africa showed promising developments in 2019, with slowing deteriorations of legal environments, improvements in organizational capacity, and strong advances in advocacy and public image. The greatest obstacle to CSO sustainability in the region remains the lack of financial resources. With the international funding community now focused on pandemic-related initiatives, this situation may become even more dire in the years ahead. Despite this fundamental challenge, the region’s CSOs have managed to become more sophisticated in their activism and organizing, targeting and coordination, and media and public outreach, and they have thereby become more successful. How has this been possible, given the context of democratic backsliding and closing space that CSOs must navigate?

It is worth looking closely at the structure, composition, objectives, strategies, and operations of some of the highest-functioning CSOs in the region, many named in this year’s country reports, to better understand how the models they offer might be shared from city to countryside, from country to country, in the regional context. An important conclusion to draw about CSO sustainability in sub-Saharan Africa in 2019 is that CSOs and CSO coalitions are becoming more respected for their ability to effect local, regional, and national change. Now they must become better at advocating for themselves and ensuring that they have and retain the resources they need to continue their vital contributions.
ANGOLA

**Capital**: Luanda
**Population**: 32,522,339
**GDP per capita (PPP)**: $6,800
**Human Development Index**: Medium (0.574)
**Freedom in the World**: Not Free (32/100)

The government of Angola under President João Lourenço continued to take progressive measures to reduce corruption and introduce more open policies concerning CSOs, human rights activists, and journalists in 2019. The government made headway in its anti-corruption campaign as it recovered more than $5 billion in state assets stolen through corruption and money laundering and launched investigations into the enormous wealth of the family of the former president, José Eduardo dos Santos. As a result of these efforts, Angola jumped seven points in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index for 2019, scoring 26 out of a possible 100. Internet freedom in Angola also improved by four points, according to Freedom House, although the country remained “partly free” as the government retained controls over the digital sphere.

In October, Angola ratified three important international human rights treaties: the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which aims to abolish the death penalty; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Press freedoms improved minimally. In an important step forward, the parliament adopted a new penal code in January, which decriminalizes same-sex activities and prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation. The new penal code also criminalizes defamation, insult, and “abuse of press freedom,” including the spread of false news. The new penal code had yet to be implemented by the end of the year.

The process of democratization in Angola stagnated slightly in 2019, especially in municipalities in which first-time local government elections remained unscheduled. Although the constitution permits peaceful protest, in Cabinda, the police arrested activists demanding independence for the province, and in Lunda Norte, the police quelled protests of farmers living close to diamond fields who had trouble accessing their land. The police also arrested people protesting high prices and inflation in Luanda, Moxico, and Benguela and behaved violently towards street vendors during efforts to curb the informal market. The “Ras-gate” operation, which attempted to bring more law and order to the streets in 2019, was also marked by excessive force as police and other law enforcement personnel intervened in, for example, traffic jams.

The Angolan economy continued to suffer in 2019 because of lower prices for oil, which accounts for more than 90 percent of the country’s exports. The Banco Nacional de Angola adopted a restrictive monetary policy to anchor inflation and offset the impact of an exchange rate devaluation. Inflation, though high, declined from 18.6 percent at the end of 2018 to 17.2 percent in July 2019. The government introduced the country’s first value-added tax (VAT) in October, which caused widespread discontent, including among CSOs, whose operational expenses were not exempted.

Although CSOs’ overall sustainability did not change in 2019, their performance improved in several dimensions. Organizational capacity was slightly stronger as CSOs’ relationships with constituencies deepened. Advocacy efforts became more effective as avenues of cooperation with the new government expanded. CSOs’ public image also improved as state-controlled and private media gave extensive coverage to their activities. CSOs’ legal environment, financial viability, service provision, and sectoral infrastructure were unchanged.

According to the Institute of Promotion and Coordination of Aid Communities (IPROCAC), the main oversight body for CSOs, 366 national CSOs, 29 international CSOs, 26 national religious institutions, 8 local foundations, 7 international religious institutions, and 1 international foundation operated in Angola in 2019.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.0**

CSOs’ legal environment did not change significantly in 2019. CSOs continued to register by submitting requests for authorization to operate along with documentation to the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. Once they receive the ministry’s approval, CSOs register with IPROCAC and provincial authorities in the geographic areas in which they intend to work. Bureaucratic red tape continued to be the main stumbling block to gaining legal status in 2019, although the option of online registration, introduced in 2018, made the process easier and more open for most organizations. Organizations seeking to work on human rights and policy issues still faced some difficulties with registration, especially at the provincial level, where not all government officials shared the government’s more open attitude towards CSOs. Several entities, such as the National Endowment for Democracy, Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA), and European Union (EU), provided legal and other support to organizations that were not documented or were in the process of being recognized by government agencies.

Continuing a trend that started in 2016, few cases of state harassment of CSOs were reported in 2019. The International Humanitarian Organization (OHI) did not experience any problems when hosting a talk on human rights by an investigative journalist who had been shunned by the previous government. OHI was also able to conduct capacity building on social advocacy and access to rights in Kwanza Norte and Benguela. At the local level, an apparent disconnect still exists between the central government’s more open policy towards CSOs and local administrations that cling to the previous regime’s hostile attitudes. For example, if a CSO engages in a local human rights issue, local authorities may view it as a political move and harass the organization. Local officials sometimes show up without warning to investigate CSOs’ activities, which many organizations view as an abuse of power. During a rally and seminar on women’s rights conducted by the Platform of Angolan Women (PMA) in Horizonte Bantu in 2019, officials from the local office of the Criminal and Investigation Services appeared without notice to investigate. In Lobito, Benguela Province, some young people working with the Revolutionary Movement were temporarily detained in September 2019 while demonstrating against the chronic lack of electricity and drinking water. Community organizations in Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Moxico, and Cabinda were jailed for demonstrating against the treatment of smallholders and artisanal miners in 2019.

Amendments to the Patronage Law that give greater tax benefits to businesses donating to CSOs took effect in February 2019. Businesses registered with the Ministry of Finance may now deduct donations amounting to up to
40 percent of their total taxable profits, or 30 percent if the donations benefit employees and their families. The changes were meant to encourage private-sector support for social-responsibility initiatives but were not well publicized among national and local business communities in 2019. Data are lacking that would confirm whether the new Patronage Law increased corporate funding for CSOs during the year.

A new 14 percent VAT was effective as of October 1, 2019. VAT was imposed on all items purchased by CSOs, regardless of any other exemptions that may already have been in place. Operating budgets set before the VAT was introduced were heavily affected, especially since many donors would not adjust the terms of grants to take the new tax into account. Registered CSOs continued to be entitled to income tax exemptions and duty-free import of items needed for humanitarian work.

Legislation does not exist that would allow CSOs to generate profits through their own programs and activities, although they may charge fees to cover their administrative costs. To compete for government contracts, CSOs must have public utility status, which they obtain automatically if their registration documents are up to date. Since the competitive tendering process is unclear and CSOs’ eligibility to compete is not uniformly recognized, CSOs usually find it difficult to obtain government contracts.

Legal support for CSOs in Angola remains weak, although expertise in this area is gradually improving. Justice, Peace, and Democracy Association (AJDP) and Mãos Livre have independent lawyers on staff who provide legal services to CSOs. The young people detained in Lobita after protesting the lack of services were defended by a lawyer who did not charge for his services. Two lawyers in Lubango appear regularly at CSOs’ meetings to report on legal cases involving civil society.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.7**

CSOs’ organizational capacity was slightly stronger in 2019, as organizations were better able to develop relationships with communities and other constituencies thanks to the more open political environment.

CSOs demonstrated enhanced abilities to develop relationships to support their activities and help develop the sector in 2019. For example, PMA worked intensively with two groups of women activists on women’s rights, gender-based violence, and HIV/AIDS response in the city of Icolo e Bengo. These groups are now in the process of obtaining legal status as associations. Similarly, in cooperation with the Czech organization People in Need, the Association of Social Development and Integration of Vulnerable Populations (ADESPOV) collaborated with a number of women on human rights issues; from this work, three groups registered as formal associations focused on gender and development issues. A project implemented by Management Sciences for Health (MSH) to empower and support female sex workers spurred the formation of two working groups in cooperation with the Association for Christian Solidarity and Mutual Aid. Most organizations involved in health care continued to work with government-appointed community health agents to raise awareness and conduct other outreach activities.

CSOs in Angola usually have strategic plans and follow them. An organization’s strategic plan and charter of principles commonly define its mission, vision, and objectives. Some donors, such as the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), require CSOs to have strategic plans to obtain funding. In 2019, several developed CSOs began to help other organizations develop longer-term strategic plans. For instance, PMA helped Meninas de Rosa in Benguela develop a five-year plan, and OHI provided similar support to local organizations in Benguela, including Ekumbi-Ombaka, Mwenho Network of Women Living with HIV, Asoder, Defense and Protection of the Elderly (IDNC), Lecture Association of Benguela, and Benguela Rastafarian Circle. Mosaiko has a program that provides technical support to groups developing strategic plans.
By law, CSOs must have boards of directors. The boards meet periodically to review their organizational policies and major accomplishments. Annual general meetings must be documented in written minutes. CSOs usually also have clear management structures, although they may overlap at the board level. For example, the chairperson of the board of People-to-People Development Aid (ADPP) is also the head of operations, although the responsibilities of each position are clearly divided. Youth Forum for Health Support and AIDS Prevention (FOJASSIDA), ADESPOV, and PMA also have heads of operations who are members of the boards.

Although only a few organizations have conflict of interest policies, an increasing number of CSOs grappled with this issue in 2019. A donor asked PMA about possible conflicts of interest when the organization sought to compete on a bid. During a tender, FOJASSIDA was asked by UNFPA for evidence of its anti-fraud policy and showed an internal policy addressing conflict of interest. OSISA also requires this type of document. Mosaiko does not have a conflict-of-interest policy per se but has an internal regulation that addresses the issue.

Finding and retaining personnel with needed skills and expertise remained a major challenge for Angolan CSOs in 2019. The current government generally offers better pay and more secure jobs than CSOs, in contrast to the previous regime, when the reverse was true. Donors often limit staff costs to 25 percent of total budgets, which forces CSOs to minimize their spending on salaries to stay within this limit. Mosaiko compensated for this policy by spreading key staff over several projects rather than tying them entirely to a single project. ADPP and FOJASSIDA reported that they use contracts to fill key positions such as accountants and computer technicians and apply the costs of these contracts to a number of projects.

Larger and urban CSOs have computers, and a few organizations, such as Development Workshop (DW) and Action for Rural Development and Environment (ADRA), have their own servers. Most small and rural CSOs lack such equipment, although nearly all CSO workers have smartphones, which they use to communicate and access the internet. Although internet access improved in 2019, especially in rural areas, internet services remain weak and expensive. Some CSO staff resort to working at night, when internet services are more reliable. Larger CSOs commonly have websites and use Twitter, Facebook, and WhatsApp. The Angolan Network of Non-Governmental Organizations to Fight HIV/AIDS (ANASO) participated in a conference in South Africa in 2019 to learn more about website creation, data collection, and analysis and later established a website to inform the wider CSO community about its findings.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: **6.3**

CSOs’ financial viability was unchanged in 2019. Organizations continued to face severe funding constraints, especially after the introduction of the 14 percent VAT on October 1, which posed particular difficulties for CSOs relying on budgets funded prior to that date.

CSOs rely mostly on funding from foreign donors, which increased slightly in 2019. The major donor, the EU, introduced a new fund known as Strengthening Resilience, Food, and Nutritional Security in Angola (FRESAN), which offers multiple-year funding to consortia of domestic and international CSOs in south-central Angola. Groups receiving FRESAN funding in 2019 included World Vision, Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), and People in Need in Huila; DW, ADPP, Codespa Foundation, and Doctors with Africa CUAMM in Cunene; and COSPE and the Faith and Cooperation Foundation in Namibe. As an example of a FRESAN-funded project, ADESPOV, World Vision, and the Social Support Fund (FAS) received more than EUR 1.8 million (approximately $2.1 million) to build water infrastructure and field schools and impart agricultural techniques adapted to climate change in drought-affected areas of Huila Province. Under a separate project, the EU funded a four-year project focused on HIV/AIDS and malaria in Benguela, implemented by the Vall d’Hebron Institute of Barcelona University Hospital with OHI, Youth Association for Solidarity, Collective Investment Organization, and the Rastafarian Circle of Benguela.
International donors generally put their resources into programs providing emergency services such as water and sanitation, food, and nutrition rather than development projects. However, in Huila, People in Need used its own resources to support projects to combat domestic violence, which were implemented by the Mapunda Youth Association, ADESPOV, and Young Women’s Association. In Bié, ADESPOV used funding from People in Need to provide material and logistical support to the Adventist Youth Solidarity Association for activities countering domestic violence.

Other international funders in 2019 included the Embassy of Canada, which funded PMA’s projects on women’s participation in communities; Embassy of Japan, which funded the construction of classrooms in Benguela by Servir and ADC; and Embassy of France, which supported a small agricultural project by ADESPOV. USAID’s LINKAGES project, which aimed to strengthen HIV response in Angola, ended in July 2019, causing several CSOs, including MSH, FOJASSIDA, Mwenho, and the Christian Beneficent Association, to lose vital funding.

The central government rarely offers funding or contracts to CSOs. Local governments, mostly on the municipal level, offer small amounts of funding for social projects. In 2019, FOJASSIDA continued to receive funding from the municipal administration of Cazenga and the provincial administration of Bié for social projects targeting youth. FOJASSIDA also had an agreement with Cazenga to offer paid training to municipal staff. The Gender Observatory provided paid services to municipalities in areas such as protecting women street vendors and organizing fairs for the sale of goods. On the provincial level, the Benguela administration provided $190,000 worth of materials, including an ambulance, furniture, and laboratory supplies, to a health clinic constructed by ADPP. OHI, ANASO, Prazedor, and some other organizations worked with municipal administrations on various small social projects, with small incentives paid to CSO staff engaged in the activities. Since CSOs are nonprofit organizations, government agencies normally reimburse only actual costs incurred.

In the corporate sector, international oil companies continued to provide funding to CSOs. For example, ExxonMobil funded CSO projects in agriculture and health, Chevron supported educational and road safety projects, and BP funded educational projects in 2019. The only bank offering funding to CSOs for social projects in 2019 was BFA Solidário. Local companies provide more regular support to CSOs. For example, in 2019, Grupo Simples continued to provide funding to ADPP for agricultural projects. In general, any funding available through corporate social responsibility programs is not announced in newspapers or company bulletins, and only CSOs with good business contacts and good communication skills tend to access such funds.

Angolan CSOs make few efforts to generate income. A few CSOs earn revenue for programs by selling products and services. For example, Mwenho produces HIV ribbons and sells them to oil companies, and ADESPOV sells sealing products to the Coca-Cola Company and Empresa de Cervejas N’gola beer company, to earn about AOA 551,000 (approximately $6,000) monthly. FOJASSIDA has created a digital platform to attract small local donations, but it did not generate much response in 2019.

Almost all urban CSOs use standard financial software programs such as QuickBooks, Primavera, and LCGI for accounting and other financial management purposes. Rural CSOs use simple Excel spreadsheets to keep track of financial transactions. CSOs that receive foreign funding usually undergo external audits.

**ADVOCACY: 4.9**

CSO advocacy improved slightly in 2019, as the new era of cooperation between the government and CSOs, which began with the historic meeting of the president and CSO representatives in December 2018, grew more established in 2019.

CSOs continued to take part in government meetings and other policy-making deliberations in 2019. For example, PMA took part in a National Assembly meeting about the national budget and supported increased allocations to the Ministry of Social Action, Family, and Women’s Affairs for programs in women’s skills development and the prevention of domestic violence. ADRA organized a conference on municipal budgeting attended by various ministries and CSOs. OHI organized two roundtables on local government issues, which brought together CSOs, members of parliament, and other politicians in April and May. About twelve CSOs, including IDNC, Lecture Association of Benguela, Social Association for Rural Economic Development, Mwenho, Ekumbi-Ombaka, and student associations from Jean Piaget University, participated in these meetings. These groups also met with local communities to explain that local government elections were expected to take place for the first time in 2020.
Several CSOs were invited to participate in provincial and municipal social consultation committees to discuss development projects and policies. For example, PRAZEDOR took part in social committee meetings in Huila; OHI in Benguela and ADESPOV in Bié also attended such meetings.

Other advocacy efforts included FOJASSIDA’s monitoring of public health policies in Cazenga municipality. In parts of Benguela, especially the poor neighborhood of Lobito, local CSOs led by Revolutionary Movement demonstrated in an effort to push the authorities to improve electricity supplies. The effort was successful, since after the demonstration, the governor of Benguela ensured there was no major lack of electricity in the area. In Huila, the government worked hard with CSOs to improve public utilities. Although unsuccessful, this initiative at least established new possibilities for dialogue between the local government and CSOs.

ADRA organized a debate about educational policies in October 2019, with funding from OSISA and the Africa Network Campaign on Education for All. At the debate, Education for All Network, an umbrella organization of fifty educational CSOs, presented a study of educational policies. PMA continued to work with local mineral-water-producing companies to ensure cleaner environments, and Omunga helped organize several debates with CSOs in Benguela and Huila on citizenship and related issues.

CSOs’ lobbying efforts in 2019 included ANASO’s work on legislation addressing community action on HIV/AIDS. CSOs such as Maiombe Environmental Network and ADRA worked on environmental protection legislation to help compensate for the absence of laws to ensure that businesses are responsible to the communities in which they work. CSOs such as SOS Habitat advocated for the reform of laws governing land rights.

In an effort to improve the legal environment for civil society, CSOs contributed to the draft patronage law aimed at encouraging individual and corporate donations to CSOs. After the law’s passage, OHI made plans to disseminate it broadly to CSOs, private- and public-sector bodies, and individuals interested in commercial activities, many of whom were uninformed about its contents.

CSOs’ service provision did not change in 2019. CSOs continued to provide basic services in areas ranging from water and sanitation to education, primary health care, women’s entrepreneurship, human rights, and youth mobilization. Prazedor provided students and teachers with literacy training. In Benguela, Laity for Development, a faith-based organization linked to the Catholic Church, operated adult literacy projects. Several organizations continued to support Congolese refugees arriving in the northern province of Lunda Norte. For example, ADPP offered education to refugee children and literacy training to adults; Norwegian ChurchAid provided services in water and sanitation; World Vision supported food security; Doctors of the World offered health-care services; Jesuit Refugee Service and International Organization for Migration helped with refugee repatriation; and Lutheran World Federation worked on agricultural and livelihood projects.

CSOs are responsive to their communities, and, for that reason, members of the public often contact CSOs for specific services, such as HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria testing or community development projects. CSOs work
with communities and conduct studies to identify their most important needs. In 2019, MSH carried out a local study before offering syphilis testing services in the Viana area of Luanda. With funding from FAS, ADPP helped communities in Buco Zau in Cabinda Province and Icolo e Bengo in Luanda identify and prioritize development projects in their areas. PMA undertook studies in Icolo and Bengo and Terra Nova in 2019 to identify community problems and then worked with the authorities to find financing for projects to address water shortages. ADESPOV conducted a study in Huila about a possible water project prior to submitting a proposal to the EU’s FRESAN project.

CSOs sometimes seek to recover costs or generate income through service provision. PMA organized two seminars for the Ministry of Social Action, Family, and Gender Promotion in 2019 and, with People in Need, organized two training courses on female leadership in Bié and Camacupa. The costs of the seminars were reimbursed by the ministry. ADESPOV, FOJASSIDA, and Prazedor continued to have service contracts with municipal administrations, mainly for work on social projects, such as training for youth and campaigns to prevent malaria.

Overall, the government recognizes CSOs’ important contribution to the country’s development and establishment of democratic processes. While inaugurating the conference of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Luanda in August, the environment minister stated strongly that CSOs make a valuable contribution to the environmental sector. The government also recognized individual organizations in 2019. PRAZEDOR was singled out to participate in some high-level events, such as a commemoration of World AIDS Day attended by the First Lady. The Ministry of Social Action, Family, and Gender Promotion recognized PMA’s performance at a development conference for twenty women in South Africa, and the municipal health administration in Cazenga asked FOJASSIDA to participate in its activities to raise awareness about HIV/AIDS.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.8**

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector did not change in 2019. Few resource centers serve CSOs, and those that operate are largely informal. DW, AJPD, ADRA, Omunga, Mosaiko, and several other organizations have libraries with facilities for learning, research, and information exchange.

No intermediary support organizations exist in Angola. Few local organizations re-grant donor funds, although in 2019, ADPP awarded grants to three local CSOs with funding from a new UNDP-funded project on HIV/AIDS.

Angolan CSOs enjoy good solidarity and collaborate on projects. ADPP, OHI, and Prazedor continued to cooperate on HIV testing and awareness raising, and ANASO collaborated with many organizations in the fight against HIV/AIDS in 2019. ADPP and the Mentor Initiative worked together on initiatives to prevent malaria. Several consortia of Angolan and international organizations applied for funding from the EU’s FRESAN fund in 2019.

CSOs enjoyed a number of training opportunities in 2019, including training offered by other CSOs. For example, OHI participated in two training courses on HIV response at the Benguela provincial health office and attended a course on electoral issues offered by the Angolan Institute on Electoral Affairs. In Luanda, three sessions on community and individual health issues were provided to ANASO members with support from World Vision and several UN agencies. Partners in USAID’s LINKAGES project attended a training by MSH on the geography management system tool. OHI, ADESPOV, and ADRA helped other CSOs develop strategic plans and shared community baseline assessments and annual reports. Smaller organizations that belong to networks and umbrella organizations often benefit from capacity building and training. For example, in 2019, ANASO offered its members training on data collection and community campaigns, and FOJASSIDA organized training on HIV response attended by forty-one of its member organizations.
CSOs worked with the private sector, government, and media to achieve mutual goals in 2019. FOJASSIDA partnered with Radio Cazenga to publicize community health issues, and OHI worked with Voice of America on public policy debates. Mentor Initiative and ADPP helped the National Directorate of Public Health collect data on neglected tropical diseases among school children in Andulo and Cunhinga municipalities and compile a comprehensive report. On World Day of Remembrance for Road Traffic Victims in November, ADPP organized a large road march in Cabinda jointly with the traffic police directorate and a few private companies.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.1

CSOs’ public image continued to improve in 2019 as state-controlled and private media gave extensive coverage to their activities. New radio stations emerging in 2019, such as Radio Kizomba, Super FM Radio, Radio Youth, and Radio Alpha, were among the media most actively seeking information and presenting positive news about CSOs. Organizations received free airtime to broadcast campaign messages and advertise their events or activities. ANGOP, Angola’s online press service, regularly covered CSOs’ activities, including ceremonies for teachers graduating from training colleges and vocational institutes supported by ADPP, which were also covered by several television stations. An event on World Malaria Day led by OHI was covered by Radio Benguela, Voice of America, Radio Angola, Radio Ecclésia, and Radio Mais. Media appeared without invitation at a training for CSOs hosted by UN agencies in Luanda. The march organized by ADPP on World Day of Remembrance for Road Traffic Victims was featured prominently on the front page of Jornal de Angola and all television channels. Activities during OHI’s HIV project in Benguela were covered by ANGOP, Voice of America, TV-ZIMBO, and the national broadcaster TPA. The media also covered activities of organizations avoided by the previous government, such as Omunga, Mãos Livres, AJPD, and SOS Habitat.

CSOs generally enjoy positive public perceptions, especially since the new administration has signaled to the public that CSOs are its development partners. This is a marked change from views under the previous regime, when the public was aware of the services provided by CSOs but nevertheless not very welcoming. Today, the public sees CSOs less as a source of charity and more as providers of health information, services, and support that allow communities to help themselves.

The government’s perceptions of CSOs were largely positive in 2019. Government representatives made positive comments about CSOs in the press. On World AIDS Day on December 1, a number of CSOs belonging to ANASO were invited to an event attended by the First Lady, which was covered by the media. Speaking at the opening of the SADC CSO Forum in August, the environment minister stated that “CSOs play an important role in consolidating countries’ development processes . . . [and help] governments realize their programs for the well-being of communities.” He praised the work of environmental CSOs in particular. Although some local officials hold on to the negative view of CSOs typical of the former regime, many government officials whom CSOs had seen as arrogant in the past seemed more flexible towards CSOs in 2019.

Like the government, the private sector is positive about CSOs’ roles in the country’s development and increasingly offers support to CSOs’ projects.

Most large CSOs use Facebook and Twitter and host their own websites to disseminate information about their projects, events, and campaigns. They also strive to build relationships with journalists, which paid off in more favorable press coverage in 2019.

ADPP, Mosaiko, DW, and other leading CSOs publish annual reports and inform IPROCAC, their line ministries, municipal and communal administrations, and constituencies about their project objectives and key activities. They also announce the end of projects to communities and traditional leaders. All CSOs write periodic reports during project implementation, which they share with IPROCAC, donor agencies, and relevant government officials.
A majority of CSOs have internal codes of conduct, which they share with donors as part of funding requests, if required. Sectoral codes of conduct are also common. ANASO’s fifty active members have a common code of conduct for HIV/AIDS projects, and DW developed minimal standards for water and sanitation projects. CSOs must also abide by any codes of conduct espoused by line ministries. For example, the Ministry of Education has a code of conduct for educational activities that all CSOs working in the educational sector must observe. ADPP’s teacher training colleges also follow the ministry’s code of conduct.
The political climate was tense in Benin during 2019 as the government cracked down on freedoms of speech and assembly. Legislative elections took place on April 28 under new electoral rules that restricted participation to parties with $400,000 in assets and required candidates to win at least 10 percent of the national vote to qualify for national office. Parties allied with President Patrice Talon were the only parties to meet these requirements. With many voters boycotting the elections, fewer than 25 percent of the electorate voted. Defying bans on protests, thousands of people turned out to oppose the new electoral rules in a number of peaceful demonstrations between April and June. The military responded with tear gas on several occasions and, in Cotonou, used lethal force against the protesters, killing at least four people, according to Amnesty International. Scores of people were arrested on charges ranging from organizing and inciting unauthorized protests to violence and assault. Many of those arrested were released in November under a newly approved amnesty law. No legal investigation was conducted to identify the police officers and soldiers who killed the demonstrators.

Freedom of expression was severely restricted in 2019 as sixty-three people were imprisoned because of their social media posts during the elections. Of great concern was the arrest of a journalist with a private news website, who was sentenced to eighteen months in prison without chance of parole. Radio Soleil FM, the last operating radio station expressing views critical of the government, was prohibited from broadcasting after the High Commission on Audiovisual Media and Communications ruled that the station’s owner, who lives in political asylum in France, had to apply in person to renew the station’s broadcast license. The former president, Thomas Boni Yayi, was placed under house arrest for nearly two months in 2019 after he spoke out against the new rules for elections. House arrest does not exist under Benin’s laws, and no legal reason was given for Boni’s incarceration. After his release, Boni left the country.

In July, Benin agreed to join the African Continental Free Trade Area, which will promote African economic integration by facilitating duty-free trade among member countries, starting in 2020. However, in August, Nigeria unilaterally closed its border with Benin in an effort to staunch the chronic flow of smuggled rice and other commodities. The border closure impoverished thousands of Beninese living in the border areas, who survive exclusively on informal trade between the two countries.

Benin’s economy grew fairly rapidly in 2019, with the African Development Bank estimating economic growth at 6.7 percent and inflation at -0.1 percent. Cotton continued to be the leading export. The informal economy continued to dominate, and underemployment remained high at 67 percent. Benin’s overall poverty rate was more than 46 percent in 2019, according to the African Development Bank.
The overall sustainability of Beninese CSOs was slightly weaker in 2019. The legal environment recorded catastrophic deterioration as the government curtailed freedoms of assembly and expression in a crackdown during and after the election period. CSO service provision deteriorated slightly as the government’s consolidation of services and introduction of new standards reduced the volume of services provided by CSOs. CSOs’ public image was poorer as journalists consulted with CSOs less often. CSOs’ organizational capacity improved moderately as a result of a CSO certification program, and the infrastructure supporting the CSO sector improved slightly with the intermediary services offered by several programs. CSOs’ financial viability and advocacy did not change.

Benin’s civil society sector includes both formal and informal organizations. There is no database of CSOs or a recent census of registered organizations. The most recent information about the number of CSOs is from 2015, when the Ministry Charged with Relations with Institutions, Civil Society, and Beninese Abroad reported approximately 6,000 registered CSOs.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.6**

The legal environment for Beninese CSOs worsened catastrophically in 2019 as the government cracked down on freedoms of assembly and expression during and after the election period.

The 1901 law that governs CSOs requires organizations to declare their existence to register. National-level CSOs declare themselves to the Ministry of the Interior, and local CSOs declare themselves to the prefectures in which their head offices are located. The only restriction on CSOs’ organizational objectives is that they must be lawful and not disturb the peace or offend public decency. Continuing a trend of several years, government officials continued in 2019 to require CSOs to purchase and use template bylaws or else have their applications rejected. Prefectures continued unilaterally and lawfully to restrict the conditions under which associations may apply for official status and operate. For example, many associations reported that, without being given a reason, they did not receive receipts proving their registration in 2019. Despite numerous objections sent by the Benin Coalition of Human Rights Defenders (Coalition béninoise des défenseurs des droits humains, CBDH) and Action Group for Progress and Peace (Groupe d’action pour le progrès et la paix, GAPP)—Africa, the Cotonou prefecture did not cancel its demand that all CSOs re-register in 2019 and submit registration receipts with requests for authorization to hold demonstrations. Re-registration is not provided for by law and was instead a unilateral decision imposed by the prefect. It is unknown whether re-registrations will be demanded annually.

Freedom of assembly was increasingly restricted in Benin in a systematic attack on civil society in 2019. During the government’s crackdown on demonstrations during and after the April elections, security forces used excessive force and fatally shot at least four demonstrators, including a mother of seven children. Several human rights organizations, including Amnesty International, protested the actions of security forces and demanded the immediate release of arrested demonstrators. On October 31, Benin’s parliament approved an amnesty for anyone convicted of “criminal actions” during the election period, and all imprisoned people were freed without compensation for unlawful imprisonment. The law was viewed as a measure to protect security force members from prosecution if they were suspected of human rights violations and abuses, including the killing of protesters.

Freedom of expression was also severely curtailed in 2019. Internet access was cut off on Election Day. In the course of the year, sixty-three activists, opposition members, and journalists were arrested and imprisoned under the 2017 Digital Code, according to GAPP—Africa. On December 19, Beninese journalist Ignace Sossou was arrested by the national police after he posted remarks by the public prosecutor that seemed critical of the government’s attitude toward freedom of expression. The prosecutor denied having made the statements until an audio clip surfaced confirming that he had. After four days of detention and a search of his home, Sossou had a
brief trial and was convicted of harassment under the Digital Code. He was sentenced to eighteen months in prison without the possibility of parole. No activists with human rights associations were imprisoned in the course of their work in 2019.

CSOs’ tax-exempt status is set forth in the finance law approved at the beginning of each year. Individual CSOs may sign framework agreements with the government that grant them tax-exempt status. However, the government complies with such agreements on a case-by-case basis. CSOs may claim tax exemptions on the first XOF 50 million (approximately $87,000) of purchases. Costs over that amount are taxable.

CSOs may earn income through the provision of goods and services and must pay taxes on any income earned. CSOs are not entitled to bid on government contracts. However, the government sometimes awards contracts to CSOs for educational and training services. In such cases, the minister of finance decides on applicable taxes on a case-by-case basis.

Several attorneys offer pro bono legal advice to CSOs in Benin.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.6**

CSOs’ organizational capacity improved moderately in 2019, largely as a result of a CSO certification program that helped strengthen several CSOs. The Civil Society House (Maison de la société civile) implemented the second year of its Quality Label for CSOs program, which was launched in 2018. In a significant innovation in the Beninese context, the program highlights successes as a way to stimulate other organizations to better perform. The program evaluates CSOs against set criteria and conducts site visits to ensure that organizations applying for certification meet the criteria. After a review of applications and field visits, the program awarded quality labels to seven organizations out of twenty-three candidates in 2019. The winning CSOs benefit from financial and technical support, and the program also funds training on topics related to CSO operations to help organizations improve their organizational skills.

CSOs were able to effectively identify potential beneficiaries and build relationships with them in 2019. Many CSOs did so by creating annual work plans. For example, the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (Réseau ouest africain pour l'édification de la paix, WANEP)—Benin develops an annual work plan that requires rigorous upstream identification of and cooperation with beneficiaries. Beneficiaries participate in the work plan’s development, and the board of directors conduct semi-annual evaluations. These steps ensure that WANEP—Benin’s work meets beneficiaries’ needs.

The use of strategic plans is not common among Beninese CSOs. For one thing, CSO staff often do not have the skills needed to draw up the plans. In addition, few organizations have the financial resources to implement any plans that they might make. CSOs do not normally plan much in advance or have set budgets at the start of the year, since they pursue activities based on any funding that they manage to obtain from international partners. Among the few CSOs making an effort to develop strategic plans are Social Watch, Civil Society House, GAPP—Africa, Fondation Regard d’Amour, Dimension Sociale Bénin, and Amnesty Benin.

Almost all CSOs have boards of directors, since they are a requirement for registration. However, very few boards actually function, since they lack the human and financial resources needed to perform their role. Active boards of directors are most common in CSOs with sufficient financial resources to engage their boards actively, such as the Association for the Elimination of Racism, Ethnocentrism, and Regionalism (Association pour l’édification contre le racisme, l’ethnocentrisme et le racisme, ALCRER), trade unions, and other large organizations. Some CSOs have internal written policies. WANEP—Benin, for example, has an administrative and financial procedural manual and hires an audit firm to perform various checks and submit a report to its board of directors.
Very few CSOs in Benin have the financial means to hire permanent staff, which limits their ability to carry out long-term, sustainable activities. The small number of CSOs that hire permanent full-time employees rarely declare them to the National Social Security Office. This means that permanent workers in the CSO sector often have undeclared employment contracts and do not pay tax contributions to retirement funds. Most staff that CSOs are able to hire have trainee status or come on temporarily for individual projects. These employees are also not declared to the National Social Security Office, and they usually work part-time without job security or employment contracts. When project funding ends, they are let go without unemployment insurance.

Access to technology remains a challenge for CSOs that do not have sustainable financial resources. Most CSOs cannot afford to purchase computers or other modern equipment or to subscribe to permanent internet connections. CSOs that purchase computer equipment are able to do so only if donors allow their project funding to be used for this purpose. Larger CSOs, such as WANEP–Benin, ALCRER, Social Watch Benin, and GAPP–Africa, are particularly well equipped with internet access and up-to-date software. Many organizations use social networks to communicate.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.4**

CSOs’ financial viability was stable in 2019. CSOs depend overwhelmingly on funding from foreign donors, embassies, and other international entities. Because CSOs do not disclose their funding sources or publicize their budgets for funded projects, it is impossible to know the amount of funding that individual CSOs obtain from their partners.

The European Union (EU) is the largest donor in Benin. In 2019, it supported many organizations through its Strengthening and Participation of Civil Society in Benin (RePaSoc) program, an initiative launched in 2018 to emphasize civil society’s role in promoting democratic life in Benin. In 2019, RePaSoc issued a call for proposals in which 427 organizations participated. Forty-six projects and ninety-six beneficiary CSOs were funded with grants of between XOF 30 million (approximately $52,000) and 80 million (approximately $140,000), for a total outlay of nearly XOF 200 million ($350,000). The EU’s Justice Support Project awarded twelve CSOs a total of XOF 574 million (approximately $990,000) to support their efforts to increase access to justice. As part of its project to strengthen women’s and youth political leadership in Benin, Social Watch sub-granted approximately XOF 15 million (approximately $25,000) in EU funding to seven projects.

In addition, the French Embassy’s Fund for Innovative Projects from Civil Societies and Coalitions of Actors (PISSCA) financed forty-eight CSOs for projects on various topics. The German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) provided nearly EUR 350,000 (approximately $400,000) to eight organizations to improve citizen participation at the municipal level. GIZ also increased its support for programs for young people and organizations in rural areas, especially market women. During the year, USAID launched a small grants program with approximately $90,000 in funding and increased its funding for the agricultural sector and artisanal production.

Other international partners working in Benin that fund CSOs directly include the World Bank, United Nations (UN) Development Programme, Global Affairs Canada, Open Society Initiative for West Africa, Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Some faith-based organizations are funded by international religious groups, such as the Liliane Fund, Aleimar, Amici di Francesco, Buena Nascita, and Society of African Missions. A new international partner in Benin in 2019 was Direct Aid, a Kuwaiti organization that provides funding to CSOs for infrastructure projects, training scholarships, and health care.

Although CSOs often do not receive long-term or sustainable funding for the administrative component of their operations, USAID and the EU offer funding for multiple years.
There are practically no local sources of funding. CSOs do not normally have access to government contracts, although several ministries offer grants to CSOs. For example, several sports associations depend almost exclusively on funding from the Ministry of Sport. Private-sector entities do not normally fund CSOs, although several organizations have received funding from private companies to clean beaches and conduct awareness campaigns. Private and corporate foundations, such as the Zinsou, Moov, and MTN foundations, usually fund the construction of schools, health centers, and social and community centers directly.

Agricultural and revenue-generating cooperatives can sell products and receive bank loans. Many rural CSOs, including women’s handicraft groups, sell products such as pottery, sculpture, and produce to generate income. Some church-affiliated CSOs such as Caritas Benin collect donations from church members.

CSOs normally prepare project reports for donors. Very few CSOs publish annual activity reports with financial statements for public consumption. Exceptionally, WANEP–Benin publishes its annual financial statement along with a list of its funding sources.

**ADVOCACY: 4.0**

CSO advocacy did not change in 2019. CSOs in Benin do not generally have many advocacy tools and are not accustomed to advocacy work. In addition, the current government has fostered an environment that is not conducive to advocacy, especially in human rights. However, CSOs working in other fields faced fewer restrictions, and they were able to conduct a major joint advocacy campaign to address teenage pregnancy in 2019.

Unless donors request that CSOs be involved in government projects, the government is not required to involve civil society in its work and rarely does so. When it does work with CSOs, it uses preferred CSOs that do not publish controversial views about the government. Some cooperation between the government and CSOs takes place on an informal basis. For example, the Ministry of Mines and Energy continued to collaborate with CSOs on meeting challenges in the energy sector in 2019. Several donor-funded programs worked on strengthening citizen participation in public policy making and governance in 2019. The PartiCIP program, financed by the government of the Netherlands and implemented by ALCRER and Social Watch, and the Accountability program, funded by the Swiss government and implemented by Social Watch, supported citizen engagement and oversight in nearly all of the country’s municipalities. RePaSOC supported citizen participation in governance, while the Support for the Development of Agricultural Sectors in Benin (PROFI) and Support to the Health Sector (PASS Sourou) programs, funded by the Belgium development agency Enabel, helped ensure CSOs’ participation in agricultural and health-care policy making.

An exception to the relatively limited scope of CSO advocacy in Benin was the large campaign undertaken by many CSOs in 2019 to change teenage girls’ behavior so they could avoid pregnancy. The Look of Love (Regard d’Amour) Foundation was a leader of this effort, with support from the Ministry of Health and funding from the Economic Community of West African States, through the West African Health Organization. This campaign was encouraging for CSO advocacy in that it involved real cooperation between the government and civil society, resulted in strong national mobilization, had far-reaching impact on the behavior of young girls, and was highlighted in many media.

Other CSO advocacy activities in 2019 focused on democratic rights and values. The CSO Electoral Platform (Plateforme électorale des OSC) advocated for legislative elections inclusive of opposition parties. Amnesty International Benin lobbied the parliament to reject the amnesty law for criminal actions committed during post-election violence in 2019. Neither of these efforts was successful. In general, the government responded less often than in previous years to CSOs’ letters requesting information or denouncing human rights violations. A CSO consortium led by Social Watch and ALCRER launched an anti-corruption program that uses web and mobile apps.
to gather information about reported incidents of corruption. An advocacy program focused on public access to information was being developed in 2019.

CSOs are generally familiar with the laws that govern their activities. GAPP–Africa is working to reform the 1901 law governing CSOs but did not undertake significant activity in 2019.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.1**

CSO service provision deteriorated slightly in 2019 as the government’s centralization of services pushed CSOs out of some sectors.

CSOs provide a diverse range of services in areas such as health, agriculture, education, and construction. CSOs focused on agriculture, such as Songhai Training Center, continued to offer training on methods to enhance local resources and improve production. Christian and Muslim organizations continued to offer health-care and educational services. For example, the Office of Development Projects and Social Work (Bureau des projets de développement et des œuvres sociales, BUPDOS) helped combat malaria and improve maternal, newborn and child health in villages with funding from USAID. Many CSOs were supported by the Beninese diaspora, including the Association of Beninese living in Canada, which donated more than 500 tables and benches to schools in the Ouémé Valley region.

The volume of CSOs’ services continued to trend downward in 2019 as the government took over activities in certain sectors. The government’s decision to consolidate the management of the country’s health centers resulted in the closure of hundreds of centers, including centers run by CSOs, and stricter standards of operation. These steps have had a positive impact on the quality of services offered in public health centers, but CSOs working in health care in many municipalities experienced revenue shortfalls or even closed. Many CSOs had developed health-care activities for vulnerable populations in villages and non-urban areas, which the government also decided to close. Similarly, CSO-run schools have been subjected to tighter standards, and many of them have closed. CSOs’ construction of water taps was cut back when the government decided to work directly in this area and exert tighter controls, and CSOs’ involvement in waste management decreased after the central government launched a project in Grand Nokoué in southern Benin to improve solid waste management. The project handed waste management responsibilities that had previously been sub-contracted to CSOs to a private company, thereby forcing CSOs out of the sector.

The government increasingly refused donations of medical equipment in 2019. For example, the Ministry of Health refused to accept a donation of medical equipment from French CSOs valued at hundreds of millions of CFA francs. The government believed that the equipment was outdated and represented a significant public health risk. CSOs’ work in other areas has not been affected, and the government continued to welcome services such as the construction of classrooms.

CSOs’ services respond directly to community needs, many of which are urgent. For example, Oxfam offers educational and reproductive health-care services to women, and SOS Children’s Villages support children in need. Direct Aid organized a free surgery campaign to treat many people with medical problems in 2019. To help promote trade and develop income-generating activities, Direct Aid also provided the lakeside municipality of So-Ava with six motorboats for public use. To combat endemic diseases such as malaria, Prisoners Without Borders (PRSF) supplied prisoners at the Civil Prison in Parakou with artemisia, a plant that can be made into an herbal infusion to treat malaria. The program yielded ten kilograms in its first harvest in 2019.

CSOs that provide basic public services perform their work without discrimination. Most CSOs provide their goods and services for free.
Several CSOs generate income from their provision of services and products. For example, the Art Culture Tourism Association in the municipality of Boukombé in Atacora Department organized seventy-two groups of women to sell pottery, traditional jewelry, shea butter, fonio, baobab fruit, rice, soy, and fruit juice. They also developed home solar electricity kits and provided women’s groups with water tanks to sell. Women’s CSOs earn income from micro-lending projects among Benin’s poorest residents. CSOs in Benin do not operate social enterprises.

The government generally appreciates CSOs’ work. The Ministry of Family and National Solidarity collaborates closely with many women’s organizations and supports them with training and donations of cooking and agricultural equipment. In response to a request from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Micro-Finance, Direct Aid donated a significant volume of materials to relieve the suffering of people affected by recent floods. But overall, the government’s willingness to work with CSOs has decreased since 2016. The central government’s assertion of a larger role in multiple sectors has reduced CSOs’ scope of activity and seems to overlook the value that CSOs bring to basic community service provision.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.2**

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector improved slightly in 2019 with the implementation of intermediary services offered by several initiatives.

Beninese CSOs do not have a great deal of infrastructural support. There are few dedicated resource centers. The office of the UN High Commission for Refugees offers a meeting room to CSOs, and the Civil Society House has a reading room open on weekdays. Public libraries, Zinsou Foundation libraries, and the Ministry of Justice law library are available for CSOs’ use. WANEP–Benin has a library available for its members’ use. International donors such as the French Institute and U.S. embassy offer meeting spaces to CSOs.

Among the few local re-granting programs, the EU’s RePaSoc program allows capable CSOs to subcontract projects to smaller, local organizations. In 2019, this initiative supported several projects with an estimated XOF 50 million (approximately $87,000). For example, with funds from RePaSoc, Social Watch issued a call for proposals from community-based organizations for micro-projects to fight gender-based violence.

The Civil Society House was one of the few organizations that offered training to CSOs in 2019. The training sessions, which took place in Cotonou, covered topics such as budget and personnel management and project writing. In cooperation with Social Change Benin (Changement social Bénin) and the Platform of Beninese Civil Society Actors (Plateforme des acteurs de la société civile au Bénin, PASCIB), WANEP–Benin conducted training for CSOs on engaging in the preparation, implementation, and monitoring of public policies at the local and national levels. As CSOs in Benin’s interior generally lack all infrastructural support, the Civil Society House and other large organizations, including Social Watch, ALCRER, GAPP–Africa, and Care International Benin/Togo, make an effort to travel outside of the capital to train CSOs. The UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Chair at the University of Abomey–Calavi University offers an association law training module, but it does not specifically target CSOs and its cost is outside the reach of most organizations.

Several coalitions and networks of CSOs actively supported their members in 2019. The Federation of Associations for the Handicapped in Benin (Fédération des associations de personnes handicapées du Bénin, FAPHB), a 200-member organization, offered capacity building to members and lobbied public and private-sector decision makers on behalf of people with disabilities.

Partnerships between CSOs and the government are diverse. For example, international CSOs such as Oxfam and religious organizations such as Caritas Benin work regularly with the government to fight poverty. Direct Action
partnered with the government to construct classrooms and health centers and collect donations of food in 2019. CSOs have few real partnerships with the private sector in Benin, since the local business culture does not encourage financing for CSOs. However, some companies work with CSOs on environmental protection projects, especially in the Cotonou coastal area.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.2**

CSOs’ public image deteriorated in 2019. It became less common for journalists to consult CSOs about topics of public interest, since Beninese media outlets are owned or funded by businessmen who are close to the government, and they do not host guests who are critical of government activities. An exception to this trend is a print newspaper called *Droits Humains Infos* (Human Rights News), which often interviews CSO actors about various topics. CSOs must usually pay for media coverage. While coverage by *Droits Humains Infos* is fairly affordable, the cost of media coverage is generally high and increased by about 20 percent in 2019. Some media outlets charged CSOs as much as $500 to $2,000 for coverage because, they said, CSOs receive international support and thus are able to pay these large sums. In general, the media do not distinguish between CSOs that receive funds from abroad and those that do not in charging for coverage.

The public appreciates CSOs’ service provision. In the current political climate, however, the public no longer sees CSOs as actively preventing and managing political conflicts. WANEP–Benin continued to serve as a source of information for the public about issues of governance, security, and violence.

The current government does not have a good opinion of CSOs. It increasingly misunderstands CSOs’ advocacy efforts and feels that politics and policy making should be left up to political parties. Similarly, the government has banned municipalities from signing contracts with CSOs in the area of waste management.

CSOs in Benin understand the importance of their organizational image. To avoid the expense of paid media coverage, GAPP–Africa launched the Media Café (Café médias) in 2019, which brings together CSO and media representatives for weekly discussions about an organization and its activities. GAPP–Africa funds the costs of the meetings, and in exchange, participating press outlets agree to regularly cover CSOs’ activities for free. CSOs make extensive use of social networks to communicate with their target publics. Many CSOs maintain a presence on Facebook and Twitter and host discussions through WhatsApp and Telegram groups. In 2019, GAPP–Africa offered two training sessions on alternative social network platforms, such as Zoom, Ligne, and Signal, which are considered to offer greater security. Very few CSOs have websites, and those that do may not update them because of a lack of skilled staff.

CSOs in Benin do not have codes of conduct or ethics or a self-regulatory body. The government does not require CSOs to publish annual activity reports, and it is not a routine practice among CSOs.
Botswana is a multi-party democracy with a parliamentary system. Regular elections have been held in the country since 1965. On October 23, 2019, the twelfth general elections to elect members of parliament and councilors of local governments took place. As in all previous elections, the ruling party, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), won the vote, receiving 53 percent of the vote. The elections were notable for the high-profile split from the BDP by former president Ian Khama, who joined the new Botswana Patriotic Front. Candidates engaged in intense campaigning prior to voting day. The African Union and Southern African Development Community (SADC) declared the elections free and fair, but opposition parties claimed “massive electoral discrepancies” and challenged the election results in both the High Court and the Court of Appeal. Both petitions were dismissed. The country did not experience any violence during the election period. The Botswana Council of Non-Governmental Organizations (BOCONGO) led CSOs in encouraging citizens to vote, and CSOs hosted several workshops and meetings that allowed the public to meet candidates and ask about their manifestos. The new president, Mokgweetsi Masisi, committed to enhancing cooperation between the government and civil society.

Botswana made headway in its fight against corruption in August 2019, when the National Assembly passed the Declaration of Assets and Liabilities Bill, which requires high-ranking government officials to declare their assets. In a milestone for the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex people, the High Court of Botswana decriminalized same-sex relations between consenting adults, declaring relevant sections of the Botswana Penal Code unconstitutional, discriminatory, and serving no public interest. However, media freedom remained a major challenge in 2019. Journalists continued to be restricted by the 2008 Media Practitioners Act (MPA), despite a constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression. In July, a journalist for the private media outlet Mmegi was arrested for allegedly receiving pictures of agents of the Directorate of Security Services (DIS) from a former spy chief. CSOs called for a review of laws restricting media freedom to allow for better access to information from public bodies.

Botswana’s economy strengthened in 2019 as the real GDP growth rate improved from 4 percent in 2018 to 7.5 percent. The improvement was due to a resurging diamond industry, according to the African Development Bank. Inflation stood at only about 3 percent. The World Bank reported that although the poverty rate continues to decline, some 30 percent of the population remained just above the poverty line in 2019, contributing to Botswana’s very high rate of income inequality. Unemployment also remained high at nearly 18 percent across all sectors, including CSOs.

The overall sustainability of the Botswanan CSO sector did not change in 2019. No dimensions recorded a change in score for the year.
At the end of 2018, the latest year for which data is available, the Registrar of Societies reported a total of 9,756 registered societies. Of this figure, 156 organizations were inactive and in the process of being deregistered. As of December 2018, 331 trusts had re-registered following enactment of the Trust Property Control Act of 2018.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.0**

The legal environment for CSOs did not change in 2019. CSOs continued to enjoy a range of legal protections and operate freely under of the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Policy of 2012, which recognizes CSOs’ important contribution to national development and nation building. The policy provides a framework to guide the relationship between the government and CSOs, including mechanisms for supporting CSO programs through line ministries, overseeing the functions of the NGO Council, mobilizing resources, and facilitating effective CSO governance. The implementation of the NGO Policy is facilitated by the Policy Guidelines for Support to NGOs.

The registration process did not change in 2019. CSOs are able to register as long as they do not infringe on the rights of others. New organizations may register under the Societies Act of 2014, Companies Act as amended in 2008, or Trust Property Control Act of 2018. The Department of Civil and National Registration registers all non-profitmaking organizations, and the Master of High Court registers community trusts. Nearly all CSOs register as societies in a straightforward process. An organization must submit applications to the Registrar of Societies within twenty-eight days of adopting a written constitution, pay prescribed fees, and provide the names of office bearers and registered office and postal addresses. The registrar then issues certificates of registration. Successful registration does not immediately allow an organization to begin operating, as some organizations, such as those working with children, must obtain occupational permits or licenses showing that operational practices meet international standards. The standards can be difficult for groups in rural areas and settlements to meet. For example, in 2019, Humana People to People was unable to obtain a license to work in a settlement area because its physical infrastructure did not meet required standards. Groups in settlements and rural areas can face other hurdles to registration, including difficulties obtaining information about registration procedures, unclear guidelines on licensing, varying bylaws that district councils demand be followed, and, occasionally, local authorities’ unawareness of the possibility of registering as a CSO. No organization was reported as having difficulties with registration in 2019. The registrar regularly de-registers organizations that fail to comply with annual reporting requirements.

There were no reports of government harassment of CSOs in Botswana in 2019.

CSOs are allowed to mobilize resources freely provided they comply with relevant legislation. They may obtain funding from foreign donors but must comply with international agreements adopted by Botswana to counter money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The Financial Action Task Force added Botswana to its list of countries for increased monitoring of money laundering in 2019, but no additional restrictions on CSOs were reported as a result.

CSOs may operate businesses as long as they re-invest any proceeds in activities to achieve their public-interest objectives. The government has a mandate to work with and fund CSOs, and individual ministries sometimes award short- or long-term contracts to CSOs on a non-competitive basis. Under the terms of these contracts, only 20 percent of the funding can go to operational costs, such as human resources and utilities.

CSOs are exempted from paying value-added tax under the Income Tax Act of 1995. The act offers exemptions from income tax to religious, charitable, and educational institutions of a public character and trusts for nature conservation, scientific research, and similar public purposes. This exemption does not extend to non-state actors such as media that are involved in the acquisition of gain or the possibility of future gain by their members. CSOs registered through deeds of trust automatically become taxable entities, with taxes levied on trustees. Some
CSOs, particularly in rural areas, are not aware of the rules and regulations governing taxation, including exemptions and deductions on income from grants, endowments, fees, and economic activity.

A limited number of local lawyers are trained in or familiar with CSO-related laws. Organizations in rural areas find it difficult to obtain assistance about registration and other legal matters.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.1**

CSOs’ organizational capacity was unchanged in 2019. Several CSOs working on human rights and HIV/AIDS, including the Botswana Network on Ethics, Law and HIV and AIDS (BONELA), Sisonke Botswana, and the Botswana Christian AIDS Intervention Program (BOCAIP), have developed relatively strong organizational capacity, thanks in part to continued support from donors. These organizations have clearly defined missions, values, and objectives and have invested in implementing their strategic plans.

Many organizations, including the Botswana Network of AIDS Service Organizations (BONASO) and Youth Health Organization, were unable to strengthen relationships with constituencies in 2019 because of financial constraints. But other CSOs made progress in building relationships with their constituencies in 2019, especially if they received external support. For example, with financial support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Birdlife Botswana was able to empower local citizens to monitor biodiversity and help Botswana meet its commitments under the Convention on Biological Diversity in 2019. More productive relationships with constituencies were also achieved by Gender Links Botswana, was able to lobby for women’s increased participation in decision-making and more gender-responsive governance at all levels thanks to financial support from the European Union (EU). Gender Links used the EU funding to train gender focal persons working in both the government and CSOs to be more effective in their work and have more positive attitudes towards survivors of gender-based violence. The project also supported women candidates in the October elections and helped forge partnerships between women candidates across political parties.

With support from BONELA, a capacity-building initiative helped Sisonke Botswana, an organization that provides services to sex workers, develop its first strategic plan, which it rolled out to its members in 2019. Organizations such as BONELA, Humana People to People, BOCAIP, and Kuru also took part in the initiative, and they reviewed their strategic plans and redefined their strategic directions to better connect with their purpose and visions. These organizations also improved their capacity to write proposals, and some were awarded grants in 2019.

Although there were no reports of CSOs mismanaging funds in 2019, many organizations lack the institutional capacity and resources to ensure good governance. Most CSOs do not have resources to invest in annual general meetings. CSOs run by volunteers often have weak organizational capacity. For example, in 2019, several community-based organizations (CBOs) involved in the Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) project in the Okavango Delta displayed weak institutional frameworks, poorly developed policies, a lack of knowledge about the legislative framework for CBNRM development, and a lack of management skills.

Many CSOs grapple with a high turnover of experienced senior staff. They often do not have the funds to recruit qualified staff, as donors exclude salaries and training from any funding allowed for operational expenses. In addition, only 20 percent of government contracts can be applied to operating costs, which lowers the salaries that CSOs are able to offer and compromises the quality of the staff that they can hire. Many CSOs train staff only to have them leave for employment elsewhere. For example, since 2018, the Window of Hope has lost more than ten staff members after training them. This is a serious challenge for CSOs in rural areas. Volunteers run many organizations, often without functioning organizational structures.
Most CSOs rent offices but find it difficult to mobilize funding for rent and utilities. Although the State Land Act grants district land boards the authority to allocate urban land to individuals and entities, CSOs find it difficult to access land because of long waiting lists. Botswana has embarked on a review of land tenure policy and related institutional and administrative systems, and CSOs hope they will be given priority in acquiring land. Internet services are generally available throughout the country, although CSOs are often financially unable to subscribe to them. Many CSO staff rely on private internet cafes.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.7**

CSOs' financial viability was unchanged in 2019. The gradual withdrawal of major donors from Botswana after the country achieved upper-middle-income status in 2005 has left many CSOs dependent on funding from the government, which now manages priority developmental programs without external support. The work of some organizations has been threatened by the end of their international funding. In 2019, for example, SOS Children's Village Botswana was informed by its regular international funders that since Botswana is now a middle-income country, they will gradually stop supporting the village. SOS Botswana has asked the government to increase its funding by 50 percent to maintain operations, but the government was unable to comply with this request. CSOs in rural areas have been particularly hard hit by the withdrawal of donors, and in 2019, many organizations operated with little funding or had to close shop. Small CSOs are often unable compete for funding with larger organizations. For example, small CSOs in New Xade settlements are expected to submit their grant proposals via email but lack the facilities to do so.

Specific data about government funding levels is unavailable. The government continued to fund some CSOs in 2019, although uncertain funding criteria and delayed disbursement still posed challenges. In addition, the requirements of government funding mechanisms typically differ from donors’ requirements. To meet this challenge more effectively, CSOs working in health care, such as African Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnerships (ACHAP) and BONELA, developed social contracting mechanisms, or formalized contractual partnerships, which lay out the parameters under which funding will be disbursed to other organizations, such as Sisonke Botswana and LeGaBiBo, so that they can deliver quality goods and services on the government’s behalf. The social contracting mechanisms are aligned with the government’s third National Strategic Framework and 2017 Policy Guidelines for Financial Support to NGOs, which aim to support civil society’s participation in development through a standardized process of funding and improved transparency and mutual accountability. To ensure the successful implementation of the social contracting mechanism, which involves reconfiguring a host of processes, BONELA provided training to its affiliate members in 2019. It is hoped that the social contracting mechanisms will steer significant funding to affiliate members of CSO umbrella bodies.

Local funding sources provided limited funding to CSOs in 2019, in part because prolonged and widespread drought reduced available resources. Organizations usually lack strategies for mobilizing resources, as well as needed marketing and business capacities and the resources to hire dedicated staff. Some CSOs have formed partnerships with private-sector entities, which can support salaries and other operational costs. For instance, in 2019, CL Wolcott Vulture Restaurant in Ghanzi, a CSO that seeks to protect Botswana’s critically endangered vulture population, obtained support for its operating expenses, including salaries, fuel, vehicle maintenance, and educational materials, through a partnership with Tshukudu Metals Botswana. In addition, diplomatic missions in Botswana provided in-kind support to various groups throughout the year. For example, African diplomatic missions donated groceries and stationery to the Gamodubu Child Care Trust.

Most CSOs do not have the resources to produce audited financial reports, which hinders their ability to access donor funding.
ADVOCA CY: 3.7

CSO advocacy was stable in 2019. CSOs continued to have some access to government planning and decision-making processes. For example, although the Independent Electoral Commission of Botswana is not mandated by law to provide civic and voter education, the commission worked with CSOs to do so prior to the 2019 elections. The government continued to consult with CSOs through its national planning forums, with CSOs taking part in program reviews and the drafting of plans.

Despite challenges in the regulatory and funding environment, CSOs continued to have a highly visible role in addressing urgent social issues in 2019. Awareness and debate about disability issues came into focus in communities such as Palapye, Francistown, and Gaborone. With financial support from the Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Mission, human rights organizations, including BONELA and the Botswana Federation of People with Disabilities, sought to draw attention to the growing number of human rights violations affecting people with disabilities. These and other organizations advocated to strengthen CSOs’ engagement on disability issues, so that a more robust policy and legislative framework can be developed to guide the provision of services to this population. LeGaBiBo’s campaign to decriminalize consensual same-sex sexual conduct achieved an important success when the High Court declared relevant sections of the Botswana Penal Code unconstitutional.

BOCONGO worked with the EU and private radio stations GABZ FM and Duma on a national tour offering workshops on civic participation in 2019. The workshops sought to educate communities about voting regulations and procedures, government functions, democratic values and human rights, and citizen empowerment through democratic processes. BOCONGO also advocated for the inclusion in the election process of minority and marginalized communities, such as the disabled and people with albinism. The team called on citizens to familiarize themselves with the constitution and urged them to accept election winners as everyone’s representatives, despite their political allegiances, adding that community members must overcome political differences to address local challenges. Kheedom Council and First People of Kalahari continued to advocate for the rights and inclusion of minority and marginalized communities in 2019.

Although there were relatively good advocacy efforts on developmental issues in 2019, CSOs tend to work in silos and compete for funding rather than pursue joint advocacy agendas.

CSOs are aware that more work needs to be done to achieve regulations that foster universal human rights. Some CSOs, including BONELA and Sisonke Botswana, sought to engage the Ministry of Health and Wellness and National AIDS and Health Promotion Agency on rolling out the 2017 Policy Guidelines through social contracting mechanisms in 2019. CSOs recognize that they need to engage in more research on the approaches, resourcing, and skills that will allow them to engage successfully with the government and communities.

SERVICE PROVISION: 3.6

CSO service provision did not change in 2019. CSOs continued to provide services to communities, particularly the marginalized, in areas such as voter education, human rights, food provision, and the monitoring and evaluation of community development projects. For example, Thapelong Empowerment Trust provided free food daily to needy children in Bokaa primary schools. The Women Institute improved livelihoods, raised awareness about breast and other cancers, supported health-care workers and people living with cancer, provided sanitary towels to schools, and provided braille equipment to Lephoi Center for the Blind in Francistown.

Beneficiaries tend to be minimally engaged in CSOs’ planning processes, particularly in sectors other than health, mainly because of a lack of financial resources for their transportation, accommodations, and meals. However,
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CSOs have good knowledge of the needs and aspirations of the communities in which they work, and they play a critical role in providing services aligned to the national development agenda, known as Vision 2036. For instance, with funding from the Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Mission, BONELA helped 1,230 women increase their incomes by improving their access to savings and credit and providing training in business management in 2019. By the end of December, ninety-five percent of the women in the program who had started their own small businesses were able to keep them running and generate a steady income. The project also trained twenty local government officials in three districts on advancing women’s income-generation schemes in their districts.

Umbrella bodies such as the Botswana Network of People Living with HIV/AIDS (BONEPWA), BOCAIP, and BONELA deliver services and materials from the Independent Electoral Commission to vulnerable groups regardless of their affiliation, race, gender, ethnicity, or sexual orientation. In 2019, unlike 2018, most organizations did not seek to recover costs by charging fees.

National and local authorities continued to recognize the vital role of CSOs in 2019. Their acknowledgement of CSOs’ role is evident in the government’s ongoing funding to organizations, particularly in the health sector. During the year, the president reiterated his commitment to enhancing cooperation between the government and civil society, and various ministries echoed his statements.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.8**

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector remained the same in 2019. Most rural communities and settlements do not have resource centers that could offer CSOs access to information, training, and technical assistance. CSOs can use some community libraries equipped with election-related and reading materials, including centers operated by the Botswana National Youth Council and local councils.

National grantmaking organizations include umbrella bodies such as BONELA, BONEPWA, ACHAP, and BONASO. In 2019, they supported projects in areas such as the human rights of key and vulnerable populations affected by stigma and discrimination, community-based HIV testing, and palliative care. Their levels of funding could not be verified. No grantmaking organizations exist at the district level.

CSOs participate in networks, although their collaboration could be improved. CSOs are poorly coordinated at the local level, and they tend to compete for resources instead of working together. National coalitions and networks, such as BOCONGO, BONASO, BONELA, and Ngamiland Council of Non-Governmental Organizations, support CSOs’ interests by coordinating and mobilizing resources for their members, facilitating an enabling environment, strengthening the capacity of CSOs and CBOs, and sharing information, experiences, and best practices. For example, as part of its effort to close the funding gap and increase members’ participation in decision-making and grant-making forums, BONELA offered its affiliates training on investment, programming, and transition planning in 2019. The training was expected to improve advocacy for community-led, rights-based, and gender-responsive programming by Sisonke Botswana, LeGaBiBo, and CBOs.

Specialized training facilities are available only in cities. Several organizations in the health sector, such as BONEPWA, Humana People to People, Botswana Federation of the Disabled, and Botswana Council for the...
Disabled, received trained in 2019 in strategic planning, human resource management, financial management, and other organizational processes, with funding from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria, and Tuberculosis, U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, and other donors. The UNDP and EU supported capacity building for organizations in sectors such as the environment and human rights to improve their capacity in strategic planning, program management, and monitoring and evaluation.

CSOs cooperate closely with the government through the NGO Council and the Media Institute of Southern Africa–Botswana. CSOs lack formal strategic partnerships with the private sector and receive financial support from businesses on an ad hoc basis only.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.1**

CSOs’ public image was unchanged in 2019. The media provided good coverage of CSOs’ activities on the elections and voter education during the year. Otherwise, public media coverage tended to be available only if the private sector donated goods to CSOs or events were attended by high-ranking government officials. Private media often participated in CSOs’ events if they paid for journalists’ accommodations, travels, and food. CSOs sometimes must pay for airtime on radio. The government appreciated CSOs’ efforts to seek greater protection for minorities in 2019. The government acknowledged CSOs’ contributions verbally, such as during election rallies by the ruling party in Ghanzi and Maun, but it did not explicitly document its appreciation in reports. Some civil servants have negative attitudes towards CSOs, and government departments can also be skeptical about CSOs’ ability to manage funds, although no CSO was associated with unprofessional conduct in 2019.

Most CSOs do not publish annual reports.
National security was the most pressing issue in Burkina Faso in 2019. Deadly terrorist attacks by groups suspected to have links with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State spilled over from the northern and eastern parts of the country into the Boucle du Mouhoun region in the west-central region and, to a lesser extent, the Cascades region in the south. The rapidly deteriorating security situation exacerbated inter-community violence, particularly in the large area between Arbinda, on the edge of the Sahel, to Kaya, 100 kilometers from the capital. The spike in armed conflict and extra-judicial violence among ethnic and religious groups stemmed mainly from disputes over land and resources. It also reflected the growing involvement of koglweogo, or community self-defense groups, which were mobilized by the government in the fight against terrorism. In 2019 alone, 2,000 people were killed in armed conflicts, according to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project. The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) jumped from 81,000 in January to about 560,000 by December, according to estimates by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. A state of emergency in several northern provinces was extended during the year.

The deteriorating security situation and political tensions between the ruling majority and opposition also affected other actors, including CSOs. CSOs’ operations in areas of conflict were disrupted by the terrorist attacks and staff kidnappings. Although the government and the opposition agreed on ways to address insecurity and the timing of the 2020 elections, they were unable to reach a consensus on a national reconciliation process to resolve social and political divisions lingering since the overthrow of the former government in a nationwide uprising in 2014. The need for a reconciliation process is at the heart of political debate in Burkina Faso, but during the past five years, the current government has faced huge difficulties implementing significant political, economic, and social changes.

Throughout the year, CSOs monitored the political situation for broader threats to human rights. CSOs, the media, and online activists were concerned by changes introduced to the Criminal Code in 2019, which they felt undid recent progress in the struggle for freedom and democracy and posed threats to fundamental freedoms, especially freedom of expression. The new code criminalizes “undeclared or prohibited” demonstrations and the dissemination of false news or information that could result in a disturbance to public order or cause offense to the president or vice president. The dissemination of information about the movement and location of defense and security forces or that “demoralizes” the armed forces is also criminalized. CSOs and others saw the goal of these changes as preventing negative comments about the degrading security situation.

Tensions between the central government and unions did not subside in 2019. Unrest continued over the functioning of public hospitals, education, and performance bonuses for public-sector workers. The government’s
decision to increase the tax on salaries also aroused widespread worker dissatisfaction. Demonstrations and sit-ins were frequent in the last months of the year.

Despite these challenges, Burkina Faso’s economy was fairly stable in 2019. The real growth rate of the gross domestic product stood at 6 percent, and inflation was at 3.2 percent, according to the World Bank. More than 40 percent of the population lives below the poverty line. Burkina Faso ranked 144 out of 157 countries on the World Bank’s 2019 Human Capital Index.

CSOs’ overall sustainability deteriorated slightly in 2019. CSOs’ financial viability worsened slightly as most organizations coped with sporadic funding and were unable to maintain their operations over the long term. Service provision was moderately disrupted by the terrorist attacks in the northern, central, and eastern parts of the country, which forced many international organizations and agencies to leave the country. The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector deteriorated slightly as financial support from intermediary support organizations (ISOs) declined. All other dimensions were unchanged.

The government does not readily provide information about the number of CSOs in Burkina Faso. The latest official data showed approximately 15,700 organizations registered in 2016. Most CSOs are unregistered and operate informally with minimal activity, which the legal system allows.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 3.3**

The legal environment for CSOs was stable in 2019 and continued to be generally favorable. CSOs are governed by Law 064-2015/CNT of 2015 on freedom of association. CSOs may form freely and do not need advance government approval. In the past, CSOs had to fulfill various registration requirements at different ministries, but new procedures under Law 064 entering into force on January 1, 2019, simplified registration by consolidating the application process under the Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Social Cohesion (MATD). CSOs obtain legal status as associations by submitting declarations of their existence along with draft bylaws, internal regulations, and other information to MATD. Existing CSOs had to re-register under the new procedures, and most organizations found the registration process fairly easy. To obtain status as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which brings tax benefits, CSOs must also register with the Ministry of Finance. NGOs are typically branches of large international organizations headquartered outside of Burkina Faso or national-level domestic organizations. The legal status and the financial and tax regimes governing foundations derive from common law under Law 008 of 2017.

CSOs that have operated for at least five years may apply to MATD for public benefit status, which is granted by the Council of Ministers. CSOs that have public benefit status may receive government funds. They are required to submit annual reports with financial statements to MATD, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and their line ministries. Failure to submit the reports can result in the suspension of funding, although this is not known to have happened. NGOs are supposed to submit annuals reports to the Ministry of Economy and Finance, but many NGOs fail to do this and do not face sanctions. Associations are not required to report to the government.

CSOs are free to focus on any topic without limitation. CSOs’ bylaws define their goals, internal decision-making bodies, and management rules. CSOs may take part in public discussions. Partisan politics have no obvious influence on CSOs in Burkina Faso, since they are bound by mandatory codes of ethics written into their founding documents, which require them to be non-partisan and promote democracy, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights.

Article 4 of Law 064 protects CSOs from government involvement in their operations. In practice, despite Burkina Faso’s poor implementation of many of its laws, government interference in CSOs is rare. No organization is
known to have suffered state harassment in 2019, although some individual activists were harassed and arrested for their writings in social media on public issues such as security and governance. No CSOs were suspended or dissolved in 2019. Organizations may take legal action in the administrative courts if they believe the government has infringed illegally on their existence or operations.

The laws governing CSOs generally lack precision and do not establish a clear framework for philanthropy. There is no comprehensive legislation defining the tax treatment of CSOs in Burkina Faso. NGOs and organizations with public benefit status receive tax exemptions, but associations do not. Corporations and individuals may receive deductions for donations to all types of CSOs. Foundations established under common law are not eligible for deductions.

There is some confusion as to whether CSOs may generate revenue to finance their operations. While Law 064 prohibits CSOs from conducting commercial activities, it does not explicitly ban all income-generating activities. However, most CSOs feel that income-generating activities do not belong in their scope of activity and do not pursue them.

CSOs may accept foreign funding. Law 064 and other laws do not specifically address public funding for CSOs, but some government entities offer financial support to CSOs, usually for short-term activities. CSOs may compete against businesses for government contracts, usually in areas such as education and health care.

In the capital, Ouagadougou, many attorneys and organizations specialize in laws related to civic freedoms. They include the Burkinabe Movement for Human and People’s Rights (Mouvement burkinabé des droits de l’homme et des peuples, MBDHP) and the Center for Democratic Governance (Centre pour la gouvernance démocratique, CGD). These organizations offer legal assistance to CSOs and usually do not charge them, since they try to obtain external or public funding for their services. At the local level, few attorneys specialize in CSO-related law. A small number of organizations such as the Conscious Citizens’ Movement (Mouvement citoyens conscients, MCC) in Ouahigouya defend public rights but lack the staff to meet all expressed needs.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.3**

CSO’s organizational capacity was unchanged in 2019.

CSOs at the local level usually involve their constituencies in their activities. For example, women’s self-sufficiency groups often organize their constituents into local groupings responsible for carrying out specific activities. CSOs that promote civil and political rights, such as the Alliance for the Defense of the Fatherland (Alliance pour la défense de la patrie, ADP), often have less stable relationships with their target groups, since the beneficiaries are less well defined and may simply be the public at large. The memberships of advocacy organizations are typically far smaller than the numbers of people touched by their communications, awareness-raising activities, and other campaigns. These CSOs may redirect or cut off their public outreach if the context for their work changes or they scale back or abandon their commitment to certain issues. For example, in 2019, the April 21 movement, also known as M21, which had pushed for controversial reforms to the electoral code during the political transition in 2015, issued a request for forgiveness from the Burkinabe people for its role in the country’s political and security deterioration.

CSOs’ objectives are stated in their founding documents, such as bylaws, internal regulations, and action plans. Organizations such as the Democracy and Economic and Social Development Research Group (Groupe de recherche pour la démocratie et le développement économique et social, GERDDES), Association of Women Lawyers of Burkina Faso (Association des femmes juristes du Burkina Faso, AFJ/BF), Burkinabe Media Observatory (Observatoire burkinabé des médias, OBM), and National Council of CSOs (Conseil national des OSC, CNOSC),
increasingly use strategic plans as tools for developing partnerships with donors, which often require them when making funding decisions. CSOs with funding partners are contractually required to comply with their strategic plans. They often use their plans as program and project management tools and adhere to the indicators specified in the plans to measure their achievement of expected results. Many donors cover the costs of strategic planning evaluations. CSOs that do not have partnerships with donors, such as the National Association of Medical Nurses (Association nationale de soins infirmiers, ANAIS), Youth Forum (Forum des jeunes, FOREM), and SOS Penitencier, are generally satisfied with short-term action plans to help steer their activities.

CSOs’ founding documents identify the bodies that govern their operations. It is common for bylaws and internal regulations not to be fully operational, since many organizations lack the resources to achieve optimal, transparent governance. For example, organizations with regional or municipal branches must arrange for representatives from these decentralized entities to participate in their general meetings, which entails costs that they often cannot afford. As a result, they are unable to hold general meetings for years. Most CSOs comply with the separation of financial and other key administrative tasks, dividing them between policy-making bodies such as the board of directors and management bodies such as the executive secretariat. Most CSOs in Burkina Faso seek to ensure that vulnerable populations, such as women, young people, disabled people, and the elderly, are represented on their governing bodies, although quotas for those categories are not strictly defined. Larger, more developed CSOs with strategic and financial plans succeed in achieving good governance more often than smaller organizations, since they have the means to develop and apply management tools, such as accounting and administrative manuals.

CSOs’ staffing reflects their financial viability. Organizations with sufficient funding, such as the NGO Permanent Secretariat (Secrétariat permanent des ONG, SPONG) and Tin Tua, hire the staff they need to function. The first staff to be hired are usually accountants and monitoring and evaluation coordinators. But the vast majority of CSOs in Burkina Faso do not have the resources to hire and retain enough staff, especially technical staff such as computer specialists and communications coordinators. Thus volunteers are most organizations’ primary human resource. CSOs that have paid staff must comply with employment law regulations. In 2019, there was no reported case of conflict between a CSO and its staff.

It is fairly common for urban CSOs to have at least one computer and use the internet to communicate. Activists and movements focused on governance and human rights make maximum use of digital technologies and often rely on social networks such as Facebook, YouTube, and WhatsApp. The situation with rural CSOs is dramatically different. In most areas, Burkina Faso has rudimentary internet service and ranks 182 out of 209 countries in terms of the percentage of the population with internet access, according to the International Telecommunication Union. The country’s poor internet infrastructure deprives rural organizations of access to modern communications.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.1**

CSOs’ financial viability worsened slightly in 2019 as most CSOs coped with sporadic funding and some became dormant, since they were unable to maintain their operations over the long term.

International donors are the primary source of funding for many CSOs in Burkina Faso. A significant number of donors work in the country, including the World Bank, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), European Union (EU), and national development agencies. They fund projects in many areas, ranging from civil and political rights to financial self-sufficiency. But this support reaches only a tiny fraction of CSOs, and most organizations perceived funding as having declined in 2019. The majority of organizations report that the process for accessing donor funding is difficult and outside their capacity. For example, the project proposal templates issued by donors such as the EU are so complex that organizations must hire experts to complete them. UNDP operates a program known as the Special
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Fund for Democracy, which considers grants of up to $1 million, provided CSOs that apply have counterpart funding of $400,000. In 2019, only SOS Sahel International, a French organization, and CECI, a Canadian organization, received funds from this program. Some CSOs, such as the Kaya-based Technical Alliance for Development Assistance (Alliance technique d’assistance au développement, ATAD), received funds from international organizations to provide primary goods and services to IDPs. However, since 2016, because of instability, many major humanitarian CSOs have had to leave the regions in which they used to work, particularly in the northern and eastern parts of the country. Some of these organizations moved to the capital, Ouagadougou, but it is difficult to say which of them are still working in the country.

Although a small number of Burkinabe CSOs have ongoing funding from multiple sources, most do not. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is still in its infancy in Burkina Faso. A few CSR initiatives exist, mainly among mining companies such as SEMAFO, Iam Gold, and Bissa Gold. Some CSOs obtain corporate support for short-term activities, usually involving sports. Businesses and stores may donate food for CSOs to distribute during natural disasters or religious holidays such as Ramadan. In the last few years, the Swedish CSO Diakonia has hosted a CSR competition in which the mining company with the largest CSR budget for the year receives an award at a gala dinner.

There is no formal system for CSOs to obtain central or local government funding. Public institutions sometimes offer short-term funding to CSOs, although the process is not regulated by law. For example, the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights provides support of up to XOF 1 million (approximately $1,750) to organizations such as Yam Wekre and Moral Support (Appui moral) to conduct civic education initiatives, usually during National Human Rights Week. The Independent National Election Commission provides funding to CSOs to promote peaceful elections and voter participation. During the second quarter of 2019, the electoral commission issued a call for projects and gave funding to a few CSOs. Health-care and education CSOs are able to charge the government for services such as infrastructure work and projects in community or reproductive health. For example, Tin Tua, based in Fada Ngourma in eastern Burkina Faso, Yam Wekre in Ouagadougou, and the Community Development Foundation of Burkina Faso (Fondation pour le développement communautaire/Burkina Faso, FDC/BF), obtained contracts from the Ministry of Education for adult and youth literacy programs in 2019.

Most CSOs view income-generating activities as outside of their scope of activity and do not pursue them. A few organizations, such as Action for the Promotion of Local Initiatives (Action pour la promotion des initiatives locales, APIL), based in Kaya, and the Association for the Development of Natural Resources through Self-Promotion (l’Association pour la valorisation des ressources naturelles par l’autopromotion, VARENA-ASSO), based in Diebougou, earn significant income from the sale of bush products such as honey, baobab fruit, soap, and shea butter. Although some NGOs have created successful social enterprises that generate income, most CSOs lack any start-up capital to launch successful enterprises.

CSOs’ bylaws and internal regulations always specify that members should pay dues, but given the country’s poverty, very few CSOs rely on dues as a source of income. A small number of CSOs, such as Burkina Association of Journalists (Association des journalistes du Burkina, AJB), MBDHP, Center for Democratic Governance (Centre pour la gouvernance démocratique, CDG), Coalition for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (Coalition CEDEF), and AJB, succeed in fundraising activities targeting their members or other groups.

Financially solid CSOs and organizations that receive donor funding have defined, transparent procedures for managing their financial resources. Except for SPONG, Burkina Faso’s largest NGO network, which posts its annual financial statements on its website, few organizations publish their accounts.

ADVOCACY: 3.1

Advocacy by Burkinabe CSOs was stable in 2019. Burkina Faso has had well-developed legislation mandating citizen participation in public policy making for almost twenty years, when, under the global Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative, the country worked with its development partners to introduce participatory policies. CSOs’ participation in this framework allows them to evaluate government policies and perform major advocacy campaigns. Since 2006, SPONG, CNOSC, and the Center for Citizen Monitoring and Analysis of Public Policy (Centre de suivi et d’analyses citoyens des politiques publiques, CDCAP) have been statutory members of the monitoring and evaluation group for the National Economic and Social Development Plan (Plan national de développement économique et social, PNEDES) 2015–20, which is chaired by the prime minister. This group
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conducts annual reviews of all the government sectoral actions. CSOs also take part in discussion frameworks to hold local elected officials accountable. For example, in Gourcy, the Rural World Association (l’Association monde rural, AMR) organizes at least one citizen discussion day each year, which is attended by the province’s mayors, other CSOs, and the public.

CSO advocacy campaigns are relatively infrequent because of funding limitations. Financially strong organizations organize awareness-raising campaigns on social topics. In July 2019, for example, the Alliance to Reform African Governance, Burkina Faso (l’Alliance pour refonder la gouvernance en Afrique, section du Burkina, ARGA/Burkina) launched a campaign entitled “Civil Society Governance: Challenges to Increasing Legitimacy and Effectiveness in Citizen Oversight and Monitoring of Government Action.” Campaign activities included media actions and sensitization meetings. With the technical support of the National Democratic Institute, the Gender Consultation Framework for Women in Politics (Cadre de Concertation des Organisations intervenant sur le Genre et la Participation Citoyenne des Femmes au Burkina Faso (CC/Femmes et Genre-BF) reviewed Law 003 of 2009, which established a quota of 30 percent for women candidates in elections, and advocated for the establishment of electoral lists showing men and women in alternate order to improve women’s chances of election. A parliamentary vote on the review of the law was scheduled for December 2019 but later postponed to 2020. In 2019, GERDES organized many gatherings of local authorities and community members to discuss governance issues. With funding from the World Bank, CNOSC organized a civil society forum on accountability. AJB advocated for the decriminalization of press offenses and the removal from the law of prison sentences for journalists.

Some CSOs’ advocacy initiatives provoked a reaction from other CSOs allied with partisan groups. For example, at the beginning of 2019, following targeted killings of Fulani people in Yirgou and Banh, the Collective to Combat Impunity and the Stigmatization of Communities (Collectif contre l’impunité et la stigmatisation des communautés, CISC) formed to demand justice in these important cases of human rights violations. But survivors of the incidents blamed the koglweogo self-defense groups and official security forces for the killings, and some activists affiliated with partisan groups accused CISC of defending the rights of terrorists. Anonymous threats against CISC were posted on social media, mainly from sources outside the country.

CSOs in Burkina Faso have difficulty distinguishing lobbying from advocacy. Many organizations are involved in both. For example, the Civil Society Network for Development (Réseau des organisations de la société civile pour le développement, RESOCIDE), Burkinabé Movement for the Emergence of Social Justice (Mouvement burkinabé pour l’émergence de la justice sociale, MBJUS), and the African Center for Strategic Studies (Centre d’études stratégiques pour l’Afrique, CESA BF) worked with the General Affairs Committee of the parliament on a review of the electoral code in 2019.

Law 064 on the freedom of association is fairly new and has not been amended since 2015. For the moment, CSOs feel that they can live with deficiencies in the law related to taxes and public funding.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.2**

CSOs' service provision was moderately worse in 2019 as services were deeply disrupted by terrorist attacks in the northern, central, and eastern parts of the country. Many international organizations and agencies had to leave the country because of the insecurity or the suspension of their funding. For example, the U.S. Peace Corps stopped work in Burkina Faso in 2017.

Burkina Faso has a long tradition of service provision by CSOs. In fact, social services, especially for disadvantaged populations in rural areas, are mostly provided by larger CSOs, NGOs, and development organizations such as the Red Cross, Cathwell, and the Catholic Office for Economic and Social Development (Office catholique pour le
développement économique et social, OCADES). Other organizations, such as Yam Wekre and Tin Tua, provide educational services for rural adults and children who are not enrolled in school. Groups such as the Center for Gender Research and Action (Centre de recherche et d’intervention en genre, CRIGED) and Young Girls (Pug Saada) offer protection to women. Only a few CSOs receive needed authorizations from the Ministry of Social Affairs to access refugee camps in areas affected by the terrorist attacks, such as Barsalogho. CSOs that are intervening in refugees camps provide IDPs with humanitarian services such as mental health care, shelter, food, and primary schooling.

CSOs’ long experience providing goods and services allows them to identify their beneficiaries’ needs competently. CSOs often have community liaisons and service providers who are close to their target groups and know their exact needs. CDCAP, for example, has fifty-six community-based monitoring groups. Organizations such as the Youth Network for Economic Development and Governance (Réseau des jeunes pour le développement économique et la gouvernance, RJDEG), based in Fada N’Gourma, practice communication for behavioral change, an approach in which CSOs get to know their target groups and conduct surveys on the actions of local governance bodies. Survey results are used to design advocacy projects and help the government formulate responses to pressing community needs. CSOs normally offer information about the effectiveness of their efforts in their activity reports, which are not easy to acquire. Beneficiaries also often express satisfaction with CSOs’ programs. For example, rural literacy programs in eastern and central Burkina Faso have shown location-specific satisfaction rates of up to 99 percent, according to annual evaluations funded by the World Bank.

Many CSOs produce publications on topics related to their activities, which they share with larger audiences. In 2019, CGD published its annual Présimètre survey reporting on public perceptions of the government, the Free Afrik Institute published studies on the security sector budget, and the Budget Information and Education Center (Centre d’information et d’éducation sur le budget, CIFOEB) published informational materials on participatory budgeting. Many organizations host training or informational sessions on topics such as farming and husbandry, storing and processing harvests, selling food products, reproductive health, and managing micro-loans and small enterprises.

Most CSOs offer their services for free. Any charges for services such as health care aim to show only that the services have value and motivate beneficiaries to use them. Any earned revenue is usually minimal.

The government acknowledges the value of CSOs’ services, especially as CSOs are usually the only providers serving very vulnerable groups. Government officials often make statements during ceremonies and other public gatherings recognizing CSOs’ work. Local governments are especially appreciative of CSOs’ activities, since they are accustomed to collaborating with them closely. For example, local authorities in the eastern regions of the country, such as Matiacoali, have developed tight links with CSOs and offer them annual grants of XOF 100,000 (approximately $175). In some communities, CSOs help local governments raise awareness among residents of the need to pay taxes, since the resources go to public services such as hospitals.

SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.7

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector in Burkina Faso deteriorated slightly as financial support from intermediary support institutions (ISOs) declined.

A few CSOs, though not nearly enough, serve as resource centers for other organizations. For example, CGD, SPONG, CDCAP, and Free Afrik Institute host informational sessions for other CSOs. Some resource centers sell products such as brochures, although the sales do not generate substantial income. Most resource centers, including CDCAP, reduced their services in 2019 because of declines in funding.
A small number of ISOs, including Oxfam, National Democratic Institute, and Diakonia, link CSOs to donors such as the EU, USAID, Danish International Development Agency, and Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. These ISOs help build CSOs’ capacity by providing technical assistance and offering access to knowledge tools such as libraries, media centers, and databases. ISOs also provide funding to Burkinabe CSOs. Such funding was perceived to decline in 2019. For example, Diakonia launched a call for projects in only one of its three programming areas, unlike past years, when all three programs issued calls for projects.

Few national foundations support CSOs. The Bank of Africa’s foundation offers grants to CSOs and other actors for humanitarian services to people displaced by terrorism. However, most CSOs do not know about the availability of such support.

Several coalitions and networks bring together CSOs on specific topics. For example, the Burkina Faso Quality Education Network (Réseau education de qualité, REB) includes a number of CSOs working in education and literacy. A coalition of organizations serving the disabled organizes discussions and engages in joint advocacy, which has led to accomplishments such as the adoption of laws on the rights of the disabled.

Training is important for CSOs in Burkina Faso and is offered by many organizations. COA/FEB, RJED, and other coalitions provided training to their members and the public at large. Inades-Formation has long offered CSOs and community groups training on topics such as project and organizational management. Sphère/Cafés Burkina, a SPONG member, organizes training on partnership building and resource mobilization. In January 2019, organizations working with the disabled received training on CSO financing and fundraising from the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation, funded by the EU. The main languages for capacity-building programs are Mooré, Dioula, and Fulfuldé. CSOs report that the trainings are satisfactory.

CSOs take part in a limited number of intersectoral partnerships. Public policy dialogue groups, which help plan and evaluate government policies, include representatives of the central government, municipalities, private sector, and CSOs. MCC in Ouahigouya organizes similar discussions on the local level. Outside of these groups, few networks include both government entities and non-state actors.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.4**

The public image of Burkinabe CSOs was unchanged in 2019.

CSOs get media coverage of their activities on both a paid and unpaid basis. CSOs usually pay for coverage of activities such as workshops or press conferences. In June 2019, CGD issued its annual Presimètre survey report, which was well covered by all kinds of media. Journalists sometimes cover CSOs’ activities free of charge if they judge it to be relevant or of interest. Media coverage of CSOs has frequent deficiencies, such as errors in content or distortions of CSOs’ messages. Overall, the media’s perceptions of CSOs fluctuate but can be unfavorable. Some media do not distinguish adequately between civil society and partisan party activities, especially in the case of individuals who worked for CSOs and later moved to government positions.
Public perceptions of CSOs also vary depending on the actions of individual organizations. The public distinguishes between CSOs that provide goods and services and those that are active in democracy and human rights. Organizations in the first group have solid, positive reputations because their services benefit the public and they do not take positions on sensitive or divisive political issues. Organizations in the second group are generally perceived as “troublemakers” that irritate the government. In 2019, some members of the public criticized CSOs for not taking a stronger stand on the various challenges facing Burkina Faso, such as insecurity and community conflicts. This criticism was different in tone from the vivacious praise of CSOs at the time of the political transition in 2015. But even at that time, when CSOs were actively involved in governance issues and often present in the media, the public did not always have a positive view of their positions. Private-sector views of CSOs are similar to those of public.

Government views of CSOs vary. While the government compliments some CSOs, it does not favorably view other organizations, particularly if they engage in human rights or are critical of government actions.

CSOs try to use the media to improve their image, and many organizations, including ADP and New Consciousness Alliance (Alliance des nouvelles consciences, ANC), succeeded in obtaining feature coverage on television and radio in 2019. CSOs often use media coverage as an opportunity to increase public awareness on governance or development issues. Organizations such as RESOCIDE have become faithful partners of the media and are consulted for their expert analysis of current events. CSOs frequently hold press conferences on the government’s activities or other topics.

Some CSOs have a fairly effective presence on social media and use it to communicate regularly with target groups. For example, the Eye of Youth (L’œil des jeunes) is active on social media, where most of its programs are developed. But in general, social media is the domain of individuals, including CSO leaders, who use it for personalized communication that may be dissociated from the visions and activities of their organizations.

The documents that CSOs submit for registration include codes of ethics and statements of values, principles, and operating policies based on democratic values and the rule of law. Most CSOs do not routinely publish their annual reports, probably because it is not required by law.
Civic space in Burundi continued to be constrained in 2019. The country focused on the 2020 presidential and legislative elections, which many domestic and international observers cautioned could spark renewed violence unless conducted in a free and fair manner. During the year, the Minister of the Interior temporarily suspended eight opposition parties after they handed in late activity reports. More than ten offices of a new opposition party, the National Congress for Freedom (Congrès national pour la liberté, CNL), were set ablaze or defaced, and dozens of CNL supporters were killed, kidnapped, and assaulted, according to international human rights organizations. In this context, some opposition members called for the elections to be postponed. In September 2019, the Catholic Conferences of Bishops of Burundi issued a pastoral letter denouncing efforts to “suffocate and assault certain political parties and persecute their members.”

A Commission of Inquiry mandated by the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council was denied access to the country in 2019 but conducted interviews with more than 3,400 witnesses living in exile. In September, the commission reported that serious human rights violations continued to be perpetrated by factions within the Imbonerakure (the youth league of the ruling party), National Intelligence Service, police, and local administrations. The crimes included “summary executions, arbitrary arrests and detentions, acts of torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, sexual violence, and forced disappearances.” Members of opposition political parties and people who refused to join the ruling party were often targeted. In June 2019, the government suspended one of the country’s last remaining human rights organizations, Speech and Action for the Awakening of Consciousness and Evolution of Mindsets (Parole et action pour le réveil des consciences et l’évolution des mentalités, PARCEM). Most activists, journalists, and CSO leaders who fled the country in 2015 and 2016 have not returned because of security concerns, and some continue to work from exile. Some international CSOs that were temporarily suspended in 2018 because they did not want to yield their hiring decisions to the government closed their offices and have not returned.

The Inter-Burundi Dialogue, led by the East African Community (EAC), ended without resolution in June 2019. Since 2016, the dialogue sought to resolve political tensions resulting from late president Pierre Nkurunziza’s controversial announcement in 2015 that he intended to stand for a third term, which many people viewed as violating the constitution. Although the EAC mediators convened representatives of Burundi’s political elite and civil society five times, the participants were unable to reach a compromise.

The Burundian economy remained fragile in 2019. The government’s lack of funds for public investment, a sharp drop in foreign exchange reserves, and a weak banking sector were among the challenges facing the county, according to the World Bank. Although more than 80 percent of the population works in agriculture, food
insecurity in Burundi is almost twice as high as the average for sub-Saharan Africa. Nearly two-thirds of the population lives in poverty, and less than 11 percent of the population had access to electricity in 2018. In December 2019, the World Health Organization reported that the country had more than 8 million cases of malaria since the start of the year, which the government did not confirm. About 400,000 of Burundi’s 10 million residents are displaced into neighboring countries.

CSOs’ overall sustainability was stable in 2019. CSOs’ organizational capacity was slightly stronger thanks to a European Union (EU)-funded project to improve CSOs’ compliance with Law No. 1/02, which governs domestic nonprofit associations. The sector’s legal environment was weakened slightly by two repressive laws introduced in 2017, which tightened government control of the sector. CSOs’ financial viability deteriorated slightly as resources offered by foreign funders declined. Advocacy was also weaker as the government’s increasing constriction of civil society undermined the effectiveness and sustainability of CSO advocacy efforts. CSOs’ service provision, sectoral infrastructure, and public image showed little change.

In December 2019, about 7,000 CSOs were registered in Burundi. This figure reflects a number of new CSOs but does not include registered CSOs that failed to update their bylaws in 2018, as required by Law No. 1/02. The number also excludes commune-level organizations waiting for official acknowledgment of their existence. Countless informal organizations exist at the community level.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.7**

The legal environment for CSOs was slightly more repressive in 2019. Although not fully implemented, two laws passed in 2017, Law No. 1/01 governing international organizations and Law No. 1/02 governing domestic nonprofit associations, continued to tighten government control of the sector. Under these laws, CSOs register by applying to the Ministry of the Interior or, if they intend to operate in a single municipality, by declaring their existence to communal authorities. The registration process must be completed in less than two months, and all existing organizations must re-register every two years. CSOs working in priority areas specified in Law No. 1/02 (good governance, the environment, the protection of vulnerable groups, peace promotion, and emergency intervention) may obtain public benefit status after five years’ experience. The status brings benefits such as tax and customs exemptions and eligibility for government funding.

Although in theory registration should be an easy matter, both new and existing CSOs experienced difficulties in 2019. A number of organizations had trouble obtaining required documents, and some organizations reported inconsistencies and discrimination in the registration process. For example, although Law No. 1/02 does not limit the scope of CSOs’ activities, some officials, especially in Cankuzo, Muyinga, Karuzi, and Makamba provinces, were reluctant to authorize activities aimed at youth without a legal or regulatory justification. Other officials showed a preference for registering new associations that could compete with existing organizations that they considered undesirable, or they prioritized the registration of government-sponsored Sangwe cooperatives, which operate in rural communities throughout Burundi. CSOs also reported obstructive, mistrustful, abusive, and even threatening treatment by government officials. New, private-sector offices have opened that offer to “help” new CSOs finalize their paperwork in exchange for payment.

Under Law 1/02, CSOs are required to submit annual reports to their line ministries by March 31 of each year. An organization that fails to submit the report, hold annual general meetings for two consecutive years, renew registration for two consecutive two-year periods, or have a physical address in Burundi for two years can be brought before the Administrative Court, and its activities may be suspended for up to one month. After that deadline, the court must uphold or overturn the suspension and may impose additional penalties, such as
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Law 1/02 protects CSOs against dissolution, but some authorities impeded CSOs' activities without legal or regulatory justification in 2019. The human rights organization PARCEM was suspended after the government accused it of tarnishing the country’s image. PARCEM’s Ukuri Kubiduhanze (“The Truth About Us”) campaign, which encouraged people to fight for their rights and demand accountability from their leaders, was suspended indefinitely after four months of activity. The Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP) was suspended for several months. Three members of PARCEM who had been sentenced to ten years in prison on charges of allegedly threatening state security in 2018 were released in 2019 after appealing their convictions. The conviction of human rights defender Germain Rukuki, who was sentenced to thirty-two years in prison in April 2018 on charges of rebellion and breach of state security, was upheld on appeal in 2019.

Media freedom was gravely threatened in 2019. A radio journalist was interrogated and jailed after reporting about criticism of the way in which government funds were spent at Sangwe cooperatives in Karuzi Province. In October, four journalists for the weekly newspaper Iwacu who traveled to Bubanza Province to report on fighting between government security forces and rebels were arrested and charged with “complicity in endangering the internal security of the state.” The government extended its 2018 suspension of broadcasting by Voice of America throughout 2019 and withdrew the BBC’s license to operate in Burundi.

The laws governing the taxation of CSOs did not change in 2019. Like all entities, CSOs pay value-added tax and taxes on their employees’ salaries.

CSOs may generate revenue by providing goods and services to realize their objectives or fund their operations. CSOs are allowed to bid on contracts for government projects if they have the required capacities. CSOs may fundraise and accept funding from foreign donors, with the funds passing through accounts that they must open at the Central Bank.

CSOs have access to paid legal services from attorneys, but their cost is unaffordable for many organizations.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 6.1**

CSOs’ organizational capacity was slightly stronger in 2019 as a result of lessons learned during the Strengthening CSOs to Increase Their Contribution to the Governance Process and Development program. The two-year project, which was funded by the EU and concluded in January 2019, helped hundreds of CSOs in eighteen provinces comply more fully with provisions of Law No. 1/02 by strengthening their internal structures, updating their bylaws and regulations, and improving the performance of their statutory bodies. CSOs taking part in the program received support in governance, strategic planning, monitoring and evaluation, project development, and related areas. Several dynamic CSOs implemented best practices and showed understanding of the importance of transparency by submitting voluntarily to internal and external audits. The progress that the Burundian CSO sector made through the project was somewhat offset by the withdrawal of some foreign partners from work in Burundi in 2018. Their departure weakened local partner organizations by forcing them to make cuts in areas such as employee compensation, office rentals, and service provision in 2019.

CSOs usually develop good relationships with the groups that they work with and identify community needs in a participatory manner. Together with their target groups, CSOs identify the problems needing resolution, identify actions to be taken, and divide up tasks and responsibilities. For example, the Strategic Lobbying and Advocacy Partnership, a consortium of six CSOs that promotes access to the legal system and the inclusion of women and
young people, works with target groups to identify key problems and potential solutions. The beneficiaries help

craft messages and identify potential and current allies for the group’s activities.

CSOs’ missions and scope of work are clearly defined in their foundational documents. Strategic plans are

common in many leading organizations, including the Observatory for Government Action (Observatoire de

l’action gouvernementale, OAG), Families Against AIDS (Famille pour vaincre le SIDA, FVS), and Burundian

Association for Family Well-Being (Association burundaise pour le bien-être familial, ABUBEF). Strategic plans

usually specify approaches to monitoring and evaluation, which take place through field visits, training, and

supervisory missions that enable observation of real-time progress on project activities.

Most CSOs have functioning statutory bodies, including general assemblies, executive committees, and monitoring

committees. These entities usually meet regularly and periodically evaluate implementation of their decisions and

recommendations. In 2019, in follow-up to the lessons learned from the EU project, and with the help of

international CSOs such as Cordaid, Oxfam Novib, Care International Burundi, and ActionAid Burundi, local CSOs

working in a variety of sectors continued to develop and employ higher-level management tools, including

administrative and financial procedural manuals, internal regulations, codes of ethics, and conflict-of-interest

policies.

CSOs continued to find staff retention a challenge in 2019. Many CSOs were forced to terminate or suspend

employee contracts or refrain from hiring permanent staff because of a loss of funding after some international

CSOs withdrew in 2018. A brain drain was evident at many local CSOs as better compensation and other factors

induced staff members to move to Sangwe cooperatives, which were created during the government’s campaign to

promote the movement. Because of funding shortfalls, CSOs often have no choice but to rely for help on their

members who agree to work without pay.

Burundian CSOs made progress in using information and communication technologies in 2019. A growing number

of CSOs had computer equipment, including printers, scanners, and software, which they received either as

donations or through donor-funded projects. CSOs located in cities usually have access to the internet either in

their own offices or in cybercafés. The lack of electricity limits internet access in rural areas. Some organizations

make effective use of social media to exchange information and accomplish other tasks. Active, dynamic CSOs also

host websites, where they post information. Many larger organizations have appropriate, well-equipped offices.

Few CSOs own their own buildings.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.5

The financial viability of CSOs in Burundi deteriorated slightly in 2019 as the level of resources offered by

foreign funders declined.

Overall, CSOs found it difficult to access financial resources to sustain their short-, medium-, and long-
term activities. Burundian CSOs depend heavily on foreign funding, and they were put in a vulnerable

situation when the government suspended international organizations in September 2018. Although funding

organizations such as Care International, Oxfam Novib, ActionAid Burundi, Cordaid International, World Vision,

Christian Aid, FHI 360, and Pathfinder International eventually resumed operations, the total amount of

foreign funding available to CSOs declined in 2019. For example, overall EU funding declined significantly from

EUR 157 million (approximately $180 million) in 2018 to 68 million (approximately $78 million) in 2019. Several

organizations received decentralized funding directly from the EU in 2019. For example, the Confederation of

Associations of Agricultural Producers for Development (Confédération des associations des producteurs

agricoles pour le développement, CAPAD) and Support for Integral Development and Solidarity in the Communes

(Appui au développement intégral et à la solidarité sur les collines, ADISCO) each received EUR 10 million

(approximately $1.14 million) for projects in cooperation with the Forum of Organizations of Agricultural
Producers in Burundi (Le forum des organisations des producteurs agricoles du Burundi, FOPABU) and other groups.

There are few local funding sources. The government provides little support to CSOs. A few government entities signed contracts for services with CSOs in 2019. For example, ABUBEF, Society for Women against AIDS in Africa–Burundi (Société des femmes contre le SIDA en Afrique, SWAA–Burundi), and National Association of Support for HIV-Positive and AIDS Patients (L’association nationale de soutien aux séropositifs et malades du SIDA, ANSS) contracted with the government to provide health care using government-paid staff members.

CSOs’ fundraising ability did not improve in 2019. Communities are too poor to provide financial support to CSOs and, on the contrary, look to CSOs for assistance. Some organizations operate revenue-generating initiatives, such as equipment rentals, sale of agricultural products, shops, and other services, but these efforts generate little income. Members’ dues are largely symbolic. Social enterprises have yet to be formed in Burundi.

CSOs that receive donor funding are usually required to have solid financial management systems, produce financial reports, and submit to external audits as conditions for funding.

**ADVOCACY: 5.3**

CSO advocacy deteriorated slightly in 2019. Burundi’s government continued to be unreceptive to advocacy, and as civic space grew increasingly restricted, the effectiveness and sustainability of CSOs’ advocacy efforts were severely undermined.

Law 1/02 includes a framework for discussions between the government and CSOs, but the framework had yet to be implemented in 2019. Government entities sometimes organize ad hoc, one-off meetings with CSOs on topics such as legal compliance and CSOs’ contributions to community development. Some organizations take part in specialized commissions with government employees, and CSOs are sometimes invited to sector-specific meetings. The municipal law specifies that CSOs may attend municipal council meetings, but even if they do, they have little access to decision-making processes. There are no mechanisms enabling CSOs to request government accounting statements.

Burundian CSOs understand the concept of advocacy, but the government’s statements, sometimes overlaid with threats, effectively hindered efforts to influence public opinion or legislation in 2019. Self-censorship is widespread. A new and notable advocacy effort, PARCEM’s Ukuri Kubiduhanze campaign, sought to raise awareness about malaria, inflation, and other topics of public interest, but the government suspended it soon after it began operations. However, PARCEM was able to use socio-economic data in an effort to help decision makers make evidence-based decisions in sectors such as health, education, and the economy. PARCEM also organized workshops on accountability using data collected from government departments.

CSOs have discussed Law No. 1/02 and identified some potential improvements to it but have yet to undertake concrete initiatives to promote a more favorable legal and regulatory framework for the sector.
CSOs’ service provision was stable in 2019. The range of products and services expanded to include support for vulnerable populations, such as the donation of school supplies to poor students, payment of hospital bills for indigent patients, workshops on peaceful conflict resolution, and initiatives such as sports and community work to promote community peace and security. For example, SWAA-Burundi, ABUBEF, ANSS, and Seruka Initiative for Victims of Rape (Initiative Seruka pour les victimes de viol) continued to offer health-care services, while Twitezimbere, OAP, INADES-Formation, and ADISCO provided services related to water, energy, and economic development. Other service-providing activities included work on conflict prevention by the Conflict Alert and Prevention Center (Centre d’alerte et de prévention des conflits, CENAP); services offered by the Network of Youth in Action for Peace, Reconciliation, and Development (Réseau des organisations des jeunes en action pour la paix, la réconciliation et le développement, REJA) related to peacekeeping, entrepreneurship, and youth; and Dufashanye’s efforts to foster girls’ and women’s empowerment.

CSOs emphasize local participatory approaches to project design to ensure that their goods and services are aligned with the needs and interests of target groups as well as government policies and programs. These needs can lead to improvements to the community infrastructure, the establishment of rural savings and loan initiatives, or the construction of fruit and vegetable nurseries or anti-erosion ditches. For example, environmental-protection CSOs took part in the Ewe Burundi Urambaye (“Burundi, You are Covered with Trees and Vegetation”) project, a government-sponsored reforestation project launched in December 2019, which involved the planting of thousands of bamboo plants on the banks of the Ntahangwa River in Bujumbura and will eventually be taken over by city residents.

Some CSO initiatives aim specifically to help their members tackle local challenges. For example, tontines, or pooled savings and loan plans, offer small loans to members in rural communities.

CSOs are not yet able to generate significant income through service provision, and the costs of their services are largely subsidized by foreign donors. Some products and services are marketed for token amounts. CSOs’ publications are usually distributed at no cost to other organizations and communities that can use them.

The government recognizes the contributions of CSOs in its public statements, especially if they work in sectors identified in Law No. 1/02 as eligible for public benefit status. CSOs working in health care and education have access to benefits such as contributions by the central government to staff salaries and tax deductions and exemptions.

CSOs’ sectoral infrastructure was stable in 2019. Resource centers and intermediary support organizations are still absent in Burundi. In general, foundations work directly with their target groups, which are usually vulnerable populations, although a few foundations support CSOs. For example, the Lions’ Club provided funding to the Ijenda Ophthalmology Center in 2019. Burundi has no community foundations.

CSOs share information and occasionally work together on issues such as human rights violations, access to the legal system, and children’s and women’s rights. Collectives and national and sectoral networks allow CSOs to promote their common interests. Networks active in 2019 focused on youth rights and people living with HIV or disabilities.

CSOs conducted several train-the-trainer workshops in Gitega, the capital, and the provinces in 2019. The workshops focused mainly on management and accountability. Specialized trainings were offered in response to
expressed needs. The trainings were funded by international CSOs such as Cordaid, ActionAid Burundi, Oxfam Novib, and Care International, which resumed operations in Burundi in 2019 after they were suspended in 2018. Training is usually provided in the national language, Kirundi.

Partnerships between CSOs and other actors, particularly the public sector, increased in 2019. Several CSOs signed collaboration agreements with ministries and government offices, which facilitated their work in the field. For example, the Organization for the Promotion of Women in the Great Lakes Region (Organisation pour la promotion de la femme dans les pays des grands lacs, OVAFEM) worked with the ministries for gender, external relations, and justice; OAG collaborated with the Ministry of Justice; ADISCO collaborated with the ministries of agriculture and local development; and Operation Supporting Self-Promotion (Opération d’appui à l’autopromotion, OAP) and Inades-Formation cooperated with the Ministry of Agriculture. CSOs focused on health care, such as SWAA–Burundi, ANSS, and ABUBEF, worked with the Ministry of Public Health and AIDS Prevention. Religious organizations worked closely with the Ministry of National Education. CSOs also created partnerships with the media to educate the public about topics such as the role of gender in the redistribution of tax revenues and the integration of women into decision making and the leadership of political parties. Their collaborations often took the form of radio and television debates, promotional spots, and skits. It is not known whether CSOs partnered with the private sector in 2019.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.7

CSOs’ public image was unchanged in 2019. Media coverage of CSOs’ activities was insufficient in 2019. Among the few media outlets covering CSOs in 2019 were Iwacu newspaper and Radio Isanganiro, both of which are private, as well as the national radio station. The small amount of coverage was generally positive. The international CSO Search for Common Ground offers CSOs and the public a voice through Radio Isanganiro. The public has a generally positive image of CSOs, since they respond to the needs of target groups and communities and contribute significantly to their well-being. Public appreciation for CSOs’ services was evident in statements on radio and television by individuals who benefited from CSOs’ work in areas such as community health care, family planning, aid to the vulnerable, and help accessing specialized care such as surgery. The public sometimes views advocacy CSOs, especially those working on human rights or corruption, as either pro-government or pro-opposition.

This viewpoint is also common in the government. While the government appreciates CSOs’ provision of services in education and health care, some government employees do not hide their distrust of CSOs, especially those that work with politically active youth. In 2019, this hostility intensified, and several organizations, including BLTP, were suspended or harassed with administrative roadblocks.

CSOs made little effort to promote their image and activities in 2019. A few organizations signed contracts with the Population Media Center and other media to ensure coverage of their activities. CSOs also made better use of social networks, such as WhatsApp, Instagram, Facebook, and Twitter.
Few CSOs took steps toward improving their accountability and transparency by adhering to codes of ethics in 2019. Most CSOs publish annual reports and send them to their line ministries by March 31 of each year, as required by law.
Paul Biya was re-elected to his seventh term as president of Cameroon in November 2018. One opposition parties, the Cameroon Renaissance Movement, rejected the election results, alleging voting irregularities. Post-election tensions, which continued into early 2019, led to a crackdown on the opposition by government forces and the harassment and intimidation of CSOs alleged to be affiliated with the opposition.

Security challenges persisted in Cameroon’s Far North region in 2019. Boko Haram terrorists and terrorist separatists in Anglophone areas killed nearly 300 civilians and displaced hundreds of thousands more. As a result of the conflict, nearly 1 million of the 2 million people living in the region needed humanitarian assistance. Tensions also escalated in anglophone areas of Cameroon’s North-West and South-West regions, which claim that they lack representation in the French-speaking national government. Violent conflicts between separatists and national armed forces caused as many as 435,000 civilians to flee their homes. In May, the United Nations (UN) Security Council held an informal meeting on the deteriorating human rights situation in the North-West and South-West, and in September, President Biya called for a national dialogue to address the crisis. The dialogue, chaired by the prime minister, led to the release of hundreds of imprisoned separatist fighters and political activists. In December, the government adopted Law 2019/024 on the General Code of Decentralized Local Authorities, which gives the two anglophone regions more local autonomy and replaces mayors appointed by the government by elected mayors. Many people saw the statutes as a political gesture intended to prove to the international community that the government was “doing something” but having little real impact. During the year, humanitarian organizations were deployed in the anglophone region under the aegis of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). These organizations became the targets of secessionist violence, and an employee of the organization Community Initiative for Sustainable Development was killed.

Cameroon’s economy grew at 4.3 percent in 2019, according to the World Bank. The resource-rich country received a fifth round of disbursements under the Extended Credit Facility of the International Monetary Fund, which brought needed funds to the public treasury and eased cash-flow tensions. Poverty rates across the country vary and reached a high of 77 percent in the Far North in 2019. Transparency International ranked Cameroon 153 out of 180 countries on its Corruption Perceptions Index in 2019. The government’s Vision 2035 development plan adopted in 2009 aims for poverty reduction, industrialization, the consolidation of democratic processes, and national unity.

In 2019, Cameroon’s first year in the CSOSI, the overall sustainability of the country’s CSO sector was in the evolving range. Advocacy was the strongest dimension. CSOs conducted several effective advocacy campaigns and cooperated with the government in a number of policy frameworks. Service provision, also relatively robust, was
distinguished by a diversity of services, especially to vulnerable communities needing humanitarian aid. Although the legal environment is shaped by a national legal framework harmonized with international conventions on human rights, it posed barriers to freedoms of association and expression, including bans on certain protests and other activities. CSOs’ public image was generally positive, although the public lacks a solid understanding of civil society’s role. CSOs’ organizational capacity was in the impeded range, with a small number of large organizations showing good capacity while capacity was poorer among the vast majority of CSOs struggling to find funds. In terms of the sectoral infrastructure, CSOs had access to training opportunities but exhibit little cooperation with each other through coalitions or networks. CSOs’ financial viability was the weakest dimension, as most CSOs depend on their members for funding, and few organizations benefit from external funding.

According to the National Governance Program, approximately 55,602 associations are registered in Cameroon. The Ministry of Territorial Administration (MINAT), the government body responsible for supervising CSOs, reports that Cameroon had some forty international CSOs and approximately fifty non-governmental organizations (NGOs), a separate legal form. Nearly 500,000 grassroots community organizations, private associations, common initiative groups (that is, economic and social organizations formed by individuals with common interests), development committees, and economic interest groups, many of which were unregistered, were thought to exist in 2019.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.9

Cameroon’s national legal framework is harmonized with international conventions to which it is a signatory, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; and International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. The preamble to the 1972 constitution and Law No. 96/06 of 1996 revising the constitution affirm the country’s commitment to the fundamental freedoms enshrined in these conventions.

All CSOs are governed by Law No. 90/053 of 1990 on freedom of association, which specifies procedures for creating, operating, governing, and dissolving organizations. In addition, NGOs are governed by Law No. 99/014 of 1999, sports associations are governed by Law No. 96/09 of 1996, and cooperatives and common initiative groups are governed by Law No. 92/006 of 1992. Cooperatives, common initiative groups, and economic interest groups are also governed by the Organization for the Harmonization of Corporate Law in Africa (OHADA) adopted by seventeen West and Central African nations in 1993. International CSOs have the status of NGOs.

CSOs may register at a MINAT divisional office in their places of residence. The registering organization must provide a declaration along with the minutes of the meeting at which it was created, its statutes and internal regulations, and a list of its leaders. The registration process is relatively simple for most CSOs. However, CSOs working on governance, anti-corruption, and human rights issues may encounter delays or other difficulties in obtaining registration receipts or be denied registration arbitrarily, giving rise to the perception that the registering authorities do not apply the laws in a fair and consistent manner. The government practices “administrative tolerance” in that it allows many organizations to operate semi-legally, unable to gain full registration but able to conduct activities without reprisal. Community-based and cultural organizations may operate without registration. Unregistered CSOs may not interact with the government or donors.

All CSOs must file annual activity reports with MINAT within sixty days of the end of the fiscal year and are subject to external audits. This provision is more strictly enforced with NGOs, particularly those working in human rights and governance. Most other CSOs never file these reports, thus exposing themselves to potential harassment.

The law allows MINAT to dissolve any organization that breaches public order and state security. In the event of dissolution, a CSO may appeal to the administrative court in its place of residence. While organizations that are critical of government policies or express opposing views sometimes experience sanctions such as dissolution, no organization is known to have been dissolved in 2019.

Law enforcement agencies require organizers of public protests to obtain permits for public protests and prior notifications for public meetings, in accordance with the Law No. 90/055 governing meetings and public events.
They sometimes use this rule to restrict freedoms of assembly and expression, which are enshrined in the constitution. Many protests and marches were banned in 2019. For example, all public meetings to discuss the election results were prohibited, and separatist activists in the North-West and South-West were often banned from protesting. More than 300 alleged separatists were arrested for defying these bans in 2019. Local authorities apply provisions of Law No. 90/053 on freedom of association inconsistently. In the Far North region, local authorities subjected international humanitarian CSOs to varying treatment in 2019, with some authorities denying them access to locations for food distribution or multisectoral cash transfers on the grounds that they were accomplice with armed gangs in the region. CSOs sometimes self-censor to cope with these restrictions. Although media were generally free to operate in 2019, some journalists were arrested during separatist activities in the North-West and South-West, and one was still in jail without due process at the end of the year.

CSOs may bid on government contracts, accept foreign funding, and generate earned income. Under Law No. 2019/004, a framework law passed in 2019 to govern the social economy in Cameroon, CSOs working in the social economy may receive subsidies, donations, and bequests, as well as income from fundraising.

Article 11 of Law No. 90/053 provides that only organizations recognized as being of public utility may receive public subsidies and donations and legacies from private persons. Any CSO that has operated for three years and demonstrates that its activities have had a significant impact on socio-economic development may apply for public utility status, which is delegated exclusively by presidential decree. Very few CSOs obtain this status. However, CSOs working with UN agencies on humanitarian response and with donors such as USAID often benefit from administrative tolerance with regard to donations from private companies and individuals who are not their members, thanks to the advocacy of the UN, which has emphasized the right of vulnerable populations to receive support.

CSOs are exempt from customs duties, value-added tax, and social charges for non-contributory social protection programs. CSOs benefit from tax deductions on revenues from grants, donations, fees, and economic activities in economically affected areas (that is, the North West, South West, and Far North Regions). These deductions work in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.

CSOs have access to legal expertise in large metropolitan areas. Quality legal advice on relevant laws and regulations is available elsewhere in the country, but CSOs do not usually have the financial means to access it.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.2**

The organizational capacity of Cameroonian CSOs is generally shaped by their funding structures. Since grants are usually conditioned on competent management, CSOs that depend on external funding sources tend to have better organizational capacities than organizations that rely on funding from their members. External funders typically fund the same CSOs repeatedly, which widens the capacity gap between the few organizations that receive foreign funding and all other organizations.

Most CSOs identify their target groups through local contacts and surveys of people in the areas in which they intend to work. For instance, in developing vocational training in agriculture, cattle breeding, and fisheries, the National Digital Agricultural Knowledge Center (CNNCA) sought to reach out to young people with primary or secondary education, adults intending to work in these areas, producers already working in these areas, and managers and trainers involved in agricultural and rural training. CNNCA conducted an informational campaign in major agricultural areas in ten regions to encourage individuals to express interest in working with the project. Other locally engaged organizations, such as the National Youth Council (CNJC), which is composed of 4,500 youth associations in 360 districts, can be assisted in their activities by locally elected officials, including sub-divisional officials, mayors, parliamentarians, and traditional rulers. At the same time, local officials sometimes hinder the activities of anti-corruption and human rights CSOs. Donor-funded CSOs often carry out monitoring and evaluation activities in accordance with Law No. 2018/011 on transparency and good governance in the management of public finances. Other CSOs generally lack the clearly defined monitoring mechanisms, trained personnel, and funding that they need to assess the effectiveness of their activities.

CSOs normally have statutes and internal regulations that specify their missions, target groups, and means of intervention. CSOs with good organizational capacities adhere to their stated missions, but other organizations often stray from their missions to obtain funding. Some CSOs use strategic planning processes to define their
priorities, but the majority of CSOs simply follow donors’ interests and develop strategic plans to comply with donor requirements.

Cameroonian CSOs are usually governed internally by general assemblies, supervisory bodies, administrative councils, management bodies, and various committees and working groups. The effectiveness of these groups is varied and usually determined by a handful of active members. Only so-called fourth-level CSOs, or large, amalgamated networks and federations, such as the National Episcopal Conference of Cameroon, Council of Protestant Churches of Cameroon, Council of Imams of Cameroon, and CNNCA, develop and follow written policies.

Because of financial constraints, most CSOs find it difficult to recruit and retain quality employees. A CSO’s staffing structure typically consists of a president, secretary general, treasurer, and financial secretary. Because of financial constraints, CSOs often fail to fill positions in communications, human resources, and financial management. The majority of organizations use ad hoc support staff as needed. The culture of volunteerism is growing in Cameroon, and CSOs rely heavily on volunteers.

Most CSOs have rented offices, which are often not well equipped. They often use outside providers for tasks such as data entry, printing, and scanning. CSO rely heavily on the internet to access information and conduct advocacy. The internet is largely accessible, thanks to the presence of several mobile telephone companies.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.8**

CSOs’ financial viability remains weak. Most organizations depend on funding from their members, and relatively few CSOs benefit from external funding.

CSOs that have better organizational capacity, such as Action Against Hunger, CODAS Caritas Cameroon, Cameroon Red Cross, International Bureau for Children’s Rights, and Plan Cameroon, receive funding from international agencies, diplomatic missions, and religious organizations. Major donors include the UN, European Union (EU), African Development Bank, World Bank, and USAID. Funded projects address areas such as GBV, education, health care, food security, agriculture and cattle breeding, advocacy, and accountability. For example, the EU’s Support to Civil Society program seeks to involve CSOs in development programs and policies, and USAID supports stakeholders in food and security in the East region through the World Food Program (WFP).

Most organizations are poor at fundraising, especially since Law No. 90/053 restricts CSOs other than those with public utility status from accepting private donations. Most CSOs depend on voluntary donations from members to sustain their operations. Other local sources of funding are few and ad hoc.

CSOs, especially social enterprises, cooperatives, and common initiative groups, can earn significant funding from the sale of products and services. For example, the 100 cooperatives that are members of CNNCA together earned about $5 million in 2019 by marketing their products to agricultural industries. Most organizations use their income from the sale of products and services to cover operating costs such as rent, electricity, office supplies, and salaries.

The business sector sees CSOs as partners in their corporate social responsibility efforts, which can result in funding for some projects. For example, the Orange Foundation supports digital centers for women. Very few CSOs partner with local businesses or market products or services to them.

Only CSOs that receive funding from international donors adopt and adhere to rigorous financial management systems. Other CSOs may have written financial management procedures but tend to ignore them in practice. Staff members with responsibility for financial management are often poorly qualified and poorly paid. CSOs usually find the cost of professional financial services unaffordable.

**ADVOCACY: 4.5**

CSOs conduct advocacy within limits allowed by the government. Most CSO advocacy focuses on sectoral issues, such as health care, women’s rights, or the improvement of basic service delivery. There is little public mobilization.
Several consultative frameworks provide CSOs with opportunities to interact with the government on a formal level. In accordance with Decree No. 2013/7987/PM of 2013, the government has institutionalized a participatory monitoring system to promote transparency in the management of public investments. In this framework, CSOs are key players in the committees overseeing Publish What You Pay in the extractive industries, government resource management, and Cameroon’s participation in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. CSOs such as Digital Accessibility Support Network and Multipurpose Community Telecenters (ADEN/TCP) sit on the Public Investment Budget Monitoring Committee, where they monitor projects for faulty work or violations of standards. Through these and other mechanisms, CSOs are able to protest government actions that they deem to be harmful to local communities. However, organizations may encounter difficulties with individual civil servants. For example, after its denunciation of corruption in a livelihoods and food security project run the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, ADEN/TCP was excluded from the project. Some CSOs expressed disappointment that donors such as USAID and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization did not intervene in this situation.

CSOs conduct awareness campaigns to influence public opinion and legislation and ensure greater government accountability. Their efforts are shaped by their financial capacity, involvement with local communities and marginalized groups, and circumstances in the localities in which they work. Successful advocacy initiatives in 2019 included efforts by the Buy and Sell Women’s Association to reduce food imports and the campaign of the National Union of Road Transporters of Cameroon to revise requirements for driving licenses and vehicle inspections. These organizations achieved their objectives by designing advocacy strategies; meeting with government officials, members of parliament, and private sector and civil society representatives; and developing communications tools to use in mobilizing mass media.

CSOs such as Humans Rights Watch and Transparency International help shape public policies by carrying out periodic studies of advocacy topics, such as corruption, the quality of health services, and human rights, and disseminating their reports widely. Other organizations working for more responsible governance in 2019 included Citizenship Dynamic, which pushed for financial accountability in project management; Network of Human Rights Defenders in Central Africa, which worked on GBV in conflict areas; Collective Humanitarian Organization Initiative, which conducted advocacy related to humanitarian responses, such as respect for humanitarian principles by all actors; and CNJC, which advocated for youth employment.

CSOs are aware of the importance of reforming the laws affecting the sector and regularly denounce the inadequacies of the legal and regulatory framework governing their activities. In particular, CSOs seek to revise provisions of Law No. 90/05 related to grants, MINAT’s ability to suspend and dissolve organizations, and requirements for declaring public events. Organizations such as the Artists’ Collective of Cameroon and the International Federation of Musicians met with ministry officials to discuss changes to the law in 2019. As a result of these discussions, the government has committed to revising the law and is expected to begin work on drafting revisions in 2020.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.6**

Cameroonian CSOs are distinguished by the diversity of services that they deliver to vulnerable communities and target groups. The CSO sector offers a wide range of services in many sectors, including health care, education, governance, water, energy, environmental protection, and economic development. For example, CSOs such as the Local Association for Participatory and Self-Managed Development, ADEN/TCP, and Association for the Fight against Violence against Women provide Central African war refugees in East Cameroon and Far North with food, logistical support, health care, education, legal support, GBV-related services, food security, water and sanitation, and protection. CSOs’ service-delivery activities emphasize breadth over depth, but they guarantee organizational survival by bringing in funding from donors.

CSOs’ services meet the needs and priorities of beneficiary groups and help improve their living conditions. CSOs’ activities are informed by national policy documents, analyses such as the Humanitarian Response Plan, studies of the National Statistics Institute, field experiences, household surveys, and consultations with traditional authorities and community members. For example, LandCam organized Land Week in Yaoundé in January 2019 on the theme of local land management in Cameroon. Participants from the government, the parliament, municipalities, local communities, and CSOs shared their experiences and ideas in eight workshops. Among the CSOs working
effectively to fulfil community needs is CODAS Caritas, which drills wells, builds classrooms, equips health centers, and conducts many other activities using funds collected locally and from international donors.

The rigorous identification of the needs and priorities of target groups makes it possible for CSOs to respond effectively without any form of discrimination. Legal provisions are in place that bar discrimination based on gender, ethnicity, or religion.

Few CSOs seek to recover the costs of the services that they provide. Most CSOs are ill-equipped to analyze market demand, and their target groups are generally unable to pay for technical assistance from CSOs. Women’s organizations such as the Catholic Women’s Association sometimes conduct modest income-generating activities.

The government recognizes the role of CSOs in its Vision 2035 plan and communal development plans. In 2019, CSOs and the government worked together on the evaluation of basic social service provision under the medium-term economic and budgetary program for 2019–21.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.3**

Infrastructural support for the CSO sector in Cameroon is varied. Several support organizations, such as Inades-Formation, Pan African Institute for Development (IPD), Junior Chambers International Cameroon, and AIESEC, offer training, computer services, information, and communications support. Inades-Formation and IPD also host libraries and resource centers that serve CSOs. In all divisions of Cameroon are faith-based CSOs, multipurpose community telecenters, and other structures that offer training and information services.

Locally funded grants are rare and inconsistent. In 2019, a handful of intermediary organizations provided grants to CSOs. For example, the Center for the Environment and Development offered grants in forest and soil management with funding from the EU.

CSO networks and coalitions are not common in Cameroon. CSOs do not normally share information, mainly because of the absence of a principle of accountability and transparency. However, initiatives of this sort are emerging. For example, under OCHA’s leadership, local organizations and international donors working in the humanitarian sector share information and engage in joint projects.

Competent local trainers offer both paid and free training to CSOs. Trainings usually address CSO management and fundraising, as well as sector-specific topics in agriculture, climate change, gender, and development. Their courses usually meet the needs of local CSOs. Organizations such as CNNCA organize capacity-building seminars for their members. In 2019, the German Agency for International Cooperation offered about twenty Cameroonian organizations training and technical assistance through its Support for Decentralization and Local Development program.

CSOs know that it will be difficult to evolve without partnering with actors from other sectors, and several Cameroonian CSOs cooperate with the private sector, public authorities, and media to achieve common goals. For example, the Cameroonian Red Cross partners with the government, businesses, and media to strengthen children’s rights, education, and first-aid services. Youth Connekt Cameroon, a CNNCA e-agriculture platform launched in December 2019, resulted from a partnership between the public and private sectors, civil society, UN, and technical and financial partners.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.7**

CSOs’ public image in Cameroon is ambiguous. Media coverage by private print and broadcast media is paid and usually unaffordable for most CSOs. Organizations tend to request coverage of their activities only if they have a strong community impact. CSOs’ coverage by public media is often controversial, especially if their activities are seen as incompatible with politicians’ publicity efforts.

The central government generally has negative perceptions of human rights CSOs but, in line with Vision 2035, has positive perceptions of CSOs that provide basic social services. Local authorities are often unaware of the range of services offered by CSOs because of CSOs’ low visibility and failure to share information about their activities.
Public perceptions of CSOs are generally positive, and their activities are known to benefit communities and target groups. However, the public often lacks a solid understanding of CSOs’ role, largely because of misinformation spread through social media (for example, claims that CSOs are linked to political parties) or CSOs’ own lack of visibility. The business sector sees CSOs mainly as partners in their corporate social responsibility efforts.

CSOs publicize their activities by cultivating relationships with journalists and having an active presence on social media. CSOs generally prefer to use internet-based platforms to promote their activities because of their low cost. CSOs realize that they must improve the authorities’ appreciation of their services by sharing more information about what they do, but only a few organizations have taken concrete steps in this direction. For example, More Women in Politics, which works with political parties to empower women, received a grant from the EU in 2019 with a communication and media access component.

Only NGOs are required to submit annual activity reports, but CSOs seeking to obtain NGO status must submit activity reports for the prior three years. CSOs usually have a code of conduct or code of ethics in their internal regulations.
Côte d’Ivoire made several positive steps in the field of human rights in 2019. A new National Human Rights Council (Conseil national des droits de l’homme, CNDH) was created under Law No. 2018-900 of November 30, 2018, which sets benchmarks for national human rights institutions in accordance with the United Nations (UN) Paris Principles. CSOs welcomed the creation of the CNDH. During the year, the CNDH created a university to teach human rights and conducted many other activities, including a human rights awareness campaign in secondary schools and commemoration of International Handicapped Persons Day and the Sixteen Days of Activism Against Gender-Based Violence. Côte d’Ivoire also submitted reports to the UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review process, UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, and UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. In these reports, Côte d’Ivoire addressed recommendations on torture, prison conditions, lawlessness, and the rights of freedom of expression and peaceful demonstration in the country but explicitly rejected protections for the rights of lesbians, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) people and the decriminalization of the offense known as “contempt for the head of state.” A new Criminal Code approved on June 26, 2019, aligns the country’s legal system with national and international commitments and includes provisions for improved procedural rights and better oversight of preventive detention.

The country’s political situation continued to be tumultuous in 2019. In January, the International Criminal Court (ICC) dismissed charges of crimes against humanity against the former president Laurent Gbagbo and his youth minister, Charles Blé Goudé, who were involved in the violent aftermath of the 2010 elections. The two men were barred from returning to Côte d’Ivoire while the prosecution filed an appeal. Teachers from public primary and secondary schools and a university organized multiple strikes in February and March to protest unpaid salaries and poor working conditions. Two teachers were jailed for public disorder and later released. In December, during a month-long period in which opposition meetings and demonstrations were banned in Yopougon in the Abidjan district, opposition members and members of parliament were arrested for taking part in a public gathering in support of 2020 presidential candidate Guillaume Soro. The government accused Soro of destabilizing the country and misusing government funds and issued an international warrant for his arrest. The government also harassed or silenced dissenting voices online. The former minister of youth was accused of inciting revolt online and jailed for one year, and the secretary general of the Coalition of Indignants of Côte d’Ivoire (Coalition des indignés de Côte d’Ivoire, CICI) was arrested for allegedly promulgating “fake news.”

The government launched a new social program in January 2019 to offer more efficient health services, enroll children in school, improve job opportunities for young people and women, and ensure affordable housing, electricity, potable water, transportation, and other essential services. Since its launch, the program has hired more than 10,000 teachers, built more than 500 new classrooms and schools, improved more than 15,000
kilometers of roads, and increased the number of vulnerable families receiving financial support. The government

With annual growth in its gross domestic product at 7 percent, Côte d'Ivoire's economic performance was excellent in 2019. The country's poverty rate remained high at 35 percent. Despite the government's efforts, gangs of children known as “microbes,” who sometimes engage in violent attacks, continued to disturb the peace and cause problems in Abidjan and the country’s interior.

The overall sustainability of Ivorian CSOs did not change in 2019. The legal environment improved slightly as CSOs were able to rely on a 2013 human rights law protecting whistleblowers and other activists. Advocacy expanded moderately with an increase in the number of initiatives and CSOs’ more active involvement in government decision-making processes. The sectoral infrastructure was slightly stronger as training opportunities flourished and partnerships with the government continued to develop. More positive public perceptions and CSOs’ efforts to develop relationships with the media helped improve their public image. CSOs’ financial viability deteriorated slightly as local organizations were increasingly used as project implementers, which undermined their longer-term financial sustainability. CSOs’ organizational capacity and service provision did not change.

The number of CSOs in Côte d'Ivoire is not known.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.3**

The legal environment for Ivorian CSOs improved slightly in 2019 as the government enforced Articles 61 and following of Ordinance 2013-660, which seeks to prevent corruption and similar offenses and protects whistleblowers and other civil society actors. The order went largely unnoticed when it was adopted in 2013, but in recent years, the opposition, media, human rights defenders, and other civil society actors have increasingly used it to deflect threats of retaliation against their activities by law enforcement agencies. In 2019, the country’s political polarization, the lead-up to the presidential 2020 elections, and the opposition’s difficulty accessing state media bolstered the activity of whistleblowers and further highlighted the importance of the law as a source of protection for civil society. For example, the Citizen Movement Against Land Grabs and Social Injustice in Côte d’Ivoire (Mouvement citoyen contre l’accaparement des terres et l’injustice sociale, NoVox Côte d’Ivoire) was able to rely on law for protection after it issued an alert about a mining company’s abuse of the rural land in the locality of N’dakouassikro.

Law No. 60-315 on associations continued to govern nearly all CSOs. Under the law, CSOs obtain legal status by filing declarations with the prefectures, or capital cities, of the districts in which they operate. Organizations that have filed declarations may not undertake activities for two months while the authorities process them. CSOs then receive provisional receipts that allow them to operate for three months while waiting for final authorizations granting legal status from the Ministry of the Interior. The final authorizations are difficult to obtain, and most CSOs do not ever obtain them, operating without them without problem.

In 2019, legal status was denied to several CSOs based on Article 4 of Law No. 60-315, which prohibits associations “devoted to an unlawful cause or objective that offends public decency.” For example, SOS Exclusion, which has promoted human rights, democracy, and gender since 2000, was rejected with the explanation that there is no more exclusion in Côte d’Ivoire. However, the organization continued to operate with its provisional receipt. Several organizations that work on issues related to sexual minorities applied for legal status in 2019 and did not receive responses. Student-run CSOs are unable to obtain legal status to operate in schools on the grounds that students are minors and do not have the right or ability to organize unions and make demands.
New requirements were added to the CSO registration process in 2019. Under a ruling issued by the Ministry of Employment and Social Protection, CSOs now need individual approvals from the ministries of health, education, water and forests, fish and wildlife, and employment and social protection to conduct activities with these ministries. After CSOs obtain provisional receipts, prefecture police must verify that they have head offices and their presidents, secretaries, and treasurers are of good moral standing. Donors sometimes ask for final authorizations before they will consider providing funds to organizations, even though the law allows CSOs to operate with provisional authorizations after they have declared themselves.

Unlike domestic CSOs, international CSOs require final authorizations to operate. These can take time to obtain, since only the minister of territorial administration and decentralization is allowed to sign them.

There are few regulations related to CSOs’ internal operations. Law No. 2014-388 on the promotion and protection of human rights defenders and its Application Decree No. 2017-121 require human rights organizations to file annual activity reports with the government. Only organizations that had filed annual reports were eligible to propose candidates and take part in the election of CSO representatives to the CNDH in February 2019. Health organizations must also file annual reports, but other organizations do not.

CSOs are generally allowed to work freely, and the government may not interfere in their activities unless they are unlawful or immoral. Administrative judges may penalize an inappropriate government intervention as an abuse of power. Article 4 of Law No. 60-315 prohibits CSOs from harming national security, such as by engaging in activities that seek to compromise public safety, cause political disturbances or hatred among ethnic groups, discredit or hinder political institutions, or incite citizens to break the law.

CSOs were subject to some harassment in 2019. A march for social cohesion by activists known as “orange vests,” which was organized by the Ivorian Citizen Alternative (Alternative citoyenne ivoirienne, ACI), was canceled because the government had banned all marches. NoVox Côte d’Ivoire was threatened verbally by representatives of a mining company, the authorities, and the police in N’akouassikro after it published a report in December on the company’s alleged abuse of rural land. A consortium of organizations that includes the Research and Advocacy Group on Extractive Industries (Groupe de recherche et de plaidoyer sur les industries extractives, GRPIE), N’ta Kia Yeh, and Network of Human Rights, Democracy, and Gender Educators (Réseau des educateurs aux droits de l’homme, à la démocratie et au genre, REDHG) was accused by the Divo local government of inciting the people of Hiré to rise up against mine operators during a project on the accountability of local mining development committees. Unlike in 2018, CSOs did not engage in significant self-censorship in 2019.

The legal framework does not require CSOs to pay income tax. CSOs are subject to value-added tax (VAT) and tax on goods that they import into the country. Cooperative corporations can receive preferential treatment in the form of reduced VAT and other taxes. Some organizations obtain tax identification certificates or corporate registration certificates if they are required by donors. Individual donors are exempt from taxes on donations to humanitarian organizations.

Law No. 60-315 does not restrict CSOs’ funding in any way. To be eligible for government funding or to bid on government contracts, CSOs must obtain public benefit status. Although no official statistics are available, very few organizations are known to have achieved this status, since it involves an arduous application process and must be approved by a decree issued by the Ministerial Council before final approval by the minister of interior.

CSOs are legally authorized to earn income from the provision of goods and services, provided the revenue goes back into the organizations. CSOs may fundraise from the public, corporations, and benefactors by holding galas, concerts, exhibitions, and other events. Some calls for bids require CSOs to furnish final authorizations, which is an impediment, since most CSOs do not have them.

No attorneys specialize in CSO law in Côte d’Ivoire. Nearly all attorneys are located in Abidjan. Although law schools operate in some other cities, such as Bouaké, Daloa, and Korhogo, nearly all of their faculty members live in Abidjan and offer only paid services, which not all CSOs are able to afford.
CSOs’ organizational capacity was stable in 2019. Ivorian CSOs generally cooperate well with their constituencies. Highly focused initiatives are especially skilled at targeting their audiences. For example, the Rural Land Ownership Platform (Plateforme sur le foncier rural, PFR) develops close relationships with rural communities by explaining land ownership law and helping them understand the process for obtaining ownership certificates to secure their land. The coalition Our Forest, Our Future (Notre forêt, notre avenir, NOFNA) in Guiglo works closely with local communities to monitor forests and raise awareness about deforestation and the importance of planting trees. Women’s associations stand out in their ability to build informal social movements, especially in rural areas. For example, the Fougnigué associations in Korhogo and Ferké build the husbandry skills of rural constituencies and construct school libraries to help students learn. Many union platforms have sought in recent years to strengthen the relationships between their field organizations and the public, especially in the educational, training, and health-care sectors. For example, the Côte d’Ivoire Education and Training Sector Coalition (Coalition du secteur éducation/formation de Côte d’Ivoire, COSEF-CI), a teachers’ union, communicates its members’ interests to the public.

Most Ivorian CSOs do not engage in strategic planning. Donors often ask organizations to create strategic plans. To receive funding, local CSOs sometimes align their activities and strategic plans, if they have them, with donors’ priorities, which can cause them to question their direction or change their activities. Some CSOs engage independently in strategic planning to improve their performance. Among the few CSOs that have strategic plans are the Ivorian Network for the Defense of Women’s and Children’s Rights (Réseau ivoirien de la défense des droits de l’enfant et de la femme, RIDDEF) and Observatory for Good Governance in the Mining Sector of Côte d’Ivoire (Observatoire pour la bonne gouvernance du secteur extractif en Côte d’Ivoire, OBGSE).

CSOs’ bylaws clearly identify various internal governing bodies. However, their roles are confused in most organizations, and members of the board may be directly involved in management tasks. This confusion creates problems with governance as well as internal and external transparency. Under a capacity-building initiative that was part of a debt-restructuring program funded by the French Agency for Development, the Ivorian Human Rights Stakeholders Group (Regroupement des acteurs ivoiriens des droits humains, RAIDH) helped strengthen the governance of CSOs in the country’s interior in 2019. The beneficiary organizations lacked proper boards and executive committees but were able to improve their governance by preparing action and strategic plans. Similarly, members of the Coalition of Ivorian CSOs for Reproductive Health and Family Planning (Coalition des OSC ivoiriennes pour la santé de la reproduction et la planification familiale, COSSR/PF) developed strategic plans with support from Pathfinder International, Innovations for Poverty Action, Doctors of the World, PSI, Engender Health, and Action Against Hunger in 2019. But such initiatives are rare, and the vast majority of CSOs lack knowledge of governance structures.

The concept of internal management tools and conflict management policies does not exist in Law No. 60-315 or CSOs’ organizational documents. In practice, the CSO sector has little knowledge of these tools and policies. As a result, organizations can find the management of internal crises a challenge. For example, a controversy involving competing leadership groups at the National Organization of Research Professors and Researchers (Coordination nationale des enseignants-chercheurs etchercheurs, CNEC) dragged on for seven years before finally being resolved in 2019.

CSOs have trouble retaining high-quality staff members, who are often tempted away by international entities. The vast majority of staff are members of their organizations. They are sometimes paid if project funding covers human resource expenses, such as salaries for project directors and administrative assistants. But such compensation lasts
only for the duration of projects, and otherwise these employees receive no compensation. Civil society actors are trained in the field through hands-on approaches. Some volunteers stay on after receiving training, but young people are more likely to move on to paying jobs. Some organizations, such as RAIDH, West Africa Network for Peacebuilding–Côte d’Ivoire (WANEP-CI), Civil Society Platform for Observation of the Electoral Process in Côte d’Ivoire (Plateforme de la société civile pour l’observation du processus électoral en Côte d’Ivoire, POECI), and West African Civil Society Organization Forum–Côte d’Ivoire (Forum des OSC d’Afrique de l’ouest Côte d’Ivoire, FOSCAO), manage their human resources with specialized departments, procedural manuals, and tools such as contracts, time sheets, and job descriptions. With sufficient funding, CSOs may hire accountants, communications directors, computer technicians, attorneys, and other professionals for specific projects.

Most CSOs have difficulty upgrading their office equipment. Côte d’Ivoire has widespread internet coverage, which can be accessed by various means. Many CSOs use online social networks, but rarely strategically.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.3**

CSOs’ financial viability deteriorated slightly in 2019 as Ivorian CSOs were increasingly used as local implementers, which undermined their longer-term financial sustainability. The vast majority of CSOs’ funding comes from outside of Côte d’Ivoire. In recent years, international support has decreased, and funding modalities have changed. While in the past, international partners funded CSOs directly, their funding is now managed by local representatives, who, when they execute projects with Ivorian CSOs, pay invoices and per diems directly. Donors’ requests for invoices, along with their presence in the field and their constantly changing budgets, force Ivorian CSOs into the role of local implementers and seem to imply a lack of trust in their management of funds. In addition, although Ivorian CSOs have many skills, donors seem to prefer to give awards to organizations from their home countries. This preference does not help local organizations develop leadership skills, self-confidence, or the ability to resolve their precarious financial situations.

Recently, a new form of subcontracting partnership has emerged to meet these challenges. Local CSOs increasingly work as technical partners with larger international organizations and are accountable to them rather than to donors. This system is more developed with the European Union (EU), which requires CSOs receiving funds to have managed projects with budgets of at least XOF 300 million (approximately $520,000). Ivorian CSOs partnering with major organizations that meet this requirement include SOS Exclusion, which is a co-applicant with France terre d’asile in the Capacity Building of CSOs to Better Combat Human Trafficking in Africa (Renforcement des capacités des organisations de la société civile pour mieux lutter contre la traite des êtres humains en Afrique, RECOLTEHA) project. Land Alert (Alerte foncier), a platform that works on land issues, is similarly partnering with the international organization Terre solidaire on a land ownership project.

Diversifying CSO funding sources remains a significant challenge. Little direct government support is available to CSOs. Only organizations with public benefit status, such as the Magic System Foundation and Children of Africa, are eligible for government funding, which typically goes to development projects, such as the construction of schools or hydraulic pumps or the funding of income-generating activities such as rice and banana cultivation. Other CSOs benefitting from government contracts include Action Light (Lumière action, LA), Alliance for Integral Development and Social Action (Alliance pour le développement intégral et l’action sociale, ADIAS), and Together We Imagine and Build the Future (Ensemble imaginons et construisons le futur, EICF). The CNDH offers marginal funding to CSOs for activities involving such areas as rural land ownership and social cohesion. Several agricultural cooperatives in the cocoa sector, such as Cargill and Armajaro, received government support in the form of tax reductions in 2019.
Corporations do not usually provide funding to CSOs. Businesses such as MTN, Orange, and Sifca have their own foundations that work directly with the public. The Cocoa Life project of Mondelēz International, for example, engages in the fight against child labor in the cocoa sector by building schools with money set aside from product sales. Foundations created by individual philanthropists, such as the Didier Drogba Foundation and Salomon Kalou Foundation, operate in much the same way.

CSOs have relatively little ability to mobilize resources through fundraising, and innovative strategies for attracting funding are rare. CSOs and unions find it difficult to collect membership dues. Asking for support from the community is not a common practice among CSOs except for agricultural cooperatives, which are unique in that they are able to raise funds from members to provide services to their communities. Some CSOs with public benefit status, such as Sanagouya, raise funds by hosting galas and scientific events. The Ivorian Association for Family Wellbeing (Association ivoirienne pour le bien-être familial, AIBEF), the Ivorian Network of Organizations of Persons Living with HIV/AIDS (Réseau ivoirien des organisations de personnes vivant avec le VIH-SIDA, RIP+), and the Union of Cooperative Enterprises in the Savannah Region of Côte d’Ivoire (Union régionale des entreprises coopératives de la zone des savanes de Côte d’Ivoire, URESCO-CI) earn income by marketing services, products, and rental spaces. Some CSOs have social enterprises or collect funds using online crowdfunding platforms, such as Orange Money and Seekewa.

Many CSOs lack reliable and up-to-date standards of financial management. Internal audits are conducted only if a condition for submitting a bid. Although some organizations publish annual reports, their financial statements remain confidential.

**ADVOCACY: 4.5**

CSO advocacy improved moderately in 2019 as advocacy initiatives increased and CSOs were more actively involved in government decision making.

Public policies and national laws do not require public access to government decision-making processes, and no formal mechanisms exist for the public to request government accounting statements. However, the government gave CSOs an expanded role in its policy processes in 2019. CSOs took part in discussions about the National Development Plan for 2021–25 and were increasingly involved in preparing action plans and strategic plans for the national budget. Their collaboration with ministries, municipalities, and regional councils improved as they took part in consultations on the economy, land control, HIV/AIDS prevention, natural resource management, and the formation of a new Independent Electoral Commission. Government bodies also involved CSOs in the security governance committee and committees fighting the high cost of living, seeking to end the use of obsolete pesticides, and dealing with various health issues. CSOs were in contact with monitoring bodies such as the High Commission on Good Governance, National Committee of the Transparency Initiative for Resource Extraction Industries, and the CNDH. For example, in 2019, the CNDH led a national dialogue with civil society actors that resulted in heated debates about land ownership and gold panning, especially in Oumé, Bouaflé, and Agbobville.

CSOs created several new advocacy groups in 2019. GRPIE worked with N’ta Kia Yoh and REDHG to conduct a baseline study of community views of local mining development committees and issue a citizen’s guide for monitoring them. The Ivorian Civil Society Convention (Conventione de la société civile ivoirienne, CSCCI) monitored public policies, and the Alerte Foncier platform addressed the reform of land-ownership governance. Several human rights CSOs worked on reforming the Independent Electoral Commission. CSOs in the Ivorian Observatory for Sustainable Management of Natural Resources (Observatoire ivoirien pour la gestion durable des ressources naturelles, OI-REN) sought to strengthen natural resource management.
Although the concept of lobbying is not well understood by Ivorian CSOs, several effective lobbying campaigns were conducted in 2019. OI-REN worked on a new forest code that included major articles requiring the independent monitoring of forestry management and the transfer of tree ownership from the government to land owners. The Ivorian Human Rights League (Ligue ivoirienne des droits de l’homme, LIDHO) and the HIV/AIDS prevention organization ENDA Health targeted legislators as part of their Remove Legal Barriers project and contributed significantly to clarifying language in Article 360 of the 1981 Criminal Code, which criminalizes same-sex sexual relationships. The Reproductive Health Coalition was able to ensure that provisions on reproductive health in the Maputo Protocol, a human rights instrument developed by the African Union to guarantee equal rights for women, were incorporated into Articles 427-428 of the Criminal Code. CSOs were less successful in their lobbying on several other issues, including illicit gold panning, which raises the distrust or outright hostility of the government and mining companies.

Discussions of revamping the legal and regulatory framework for CSOs took place in 2019 under the leadership of the Collective of Active NGOs in Côte d’Ivoire (Collectif des ONG actives de Côte d’Ivoire, CONGACI) and Union of NGOs in Côte d’Ivoire (Union des ONG de Côte d’Ivoire, UOCI), with recommendations from CSCI. The discussions led to an agreement to produce a civil society status report and civil society charter, including a code of conduct for CSOs, which were being drafted at the end of the year.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.7**

CSOs’ service provision did not change in 2019. CSOs provide a diverse range of services in areas ranging from health care, education, water, and energy to economic development, environmental protection, governance, women’s and youth empowerment, and humanitarian assistance. In the north, many CSOs work on empowering women and youth through revenue-generating activities, health care, and education.

CSOs' goods and services target communities’ most urgent needs, which are determined by analyses, reviews of studies, participatory action research, and surveys of knowledge, attitudes, and practices. Programs and projects are adjusted to align with feedback from beneficiaries. Most CSOs have monitoring and evaluation tools for their field work, but they do not always use them. Some organizations collect data from their work to demonstrate their contribution to meeting community needs. Since most CSOs are located in Abidjan and other urban areas, they are aware that they do not have a sufficient presence in the country’s interior, where they implement activities through branches or focal points.

Audiences beyond organizations’ members and beneficiaries sometimes benefit from the services and goods provided by CSOs. CSOs share field data with the government and other CSOs and host capacity-building programs for them. CSOs do not regularly distribute or sell services and goods to universities, businesses, and religious institutions. In general, goods and services are provided without discrimination.

CSOs’ ability to generate revenue through service provision is limited. Some CSOs that are social enterprises, such as the Ivorian Agency for Social Marketing (Agence ivoirienne de marketing social, AIMAS), a health insurance agency, issue invoices for the services or goods that they provide. CSOs sometimes sign service provision contracts with the government, but no major agreements are known to have been signed in 2019.

CSOs benefit from the government’s recognition and support. Article 26 of the Ivorian constitution adopted in 2016 acknowledges the importance of CSOs, stating that “civil society is a component of the expression of a democracy . . . [and] contributes to a country’s social, cultural, and economic development.” Government entities show their appreciation of CSOs by involving them in various projects and committees.
**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.3**

The sectoral infrastructure for CSOs improved slightly as training opportunities flourished and partnerships with the government continued to develop.

CSOs have access to information, technology, and training, which takes place mainly in Abidjan. Resource centers and intermediary support organizations (ISOs) serving CSOs include the university created by the CNDH to teach human rights, the training center of the National Bureau of Technical and Development Studies, a continuing education center at Nangui Abrogoua Abobo-Adjamé University, the UNESCO Chair for the Culture of Peace, the Ivorian Center for Economic and Social Research (Centre ivoirien de recherche économique et sociale, CIRES), and the African Management and Management Training Center (Centre africain de management et de perfectionnement des cadres, CAPMG). They offer CSOs capacity building on topics ranging from human rights and technology to accounting and project management. A CSO incubator, Jokolab, operates in Angré Ii-Plateaux. Training and technical assistance are nearly nonexistent in other parts of the country. ISOs and resource centers usually generate income from their training and other services.

Local institutions, organizations, and programs fund communities directly without going through CSOs. International organizations such as the International Rescue Committee, Care International, Doctors of the World, Ipas, EngenderHealth, Action Against Hunger, Pathfinder International, and PSI fund efforts targeting reproductive health, family planning, and nutrition.

Little cooperation occurs in the CSO sector, and CSOs do not share much information among themselves. Organizations may form coalitions to pursue joint activities at the urging of ISOs. For example, AGNDR was formed to advocate for the adoption of a sexual and reproductive health law in line with the Maputo Protocol. No organization or committee is known to promote cooperation in the CSO sector.

Training is offered to CSOs by CERAP, the UNESCO Chair, Kaidara Institute, and many other organizations and private firms. Training topics include accounting, financial management, fundraising, and advocacy. Local trainers who are knowledgeable about CSO management lead the training, which usually takes place in Abidjan. Smaller cities lack skilled trainers. Available training opportunities generally meet the needs of local CSOs, except in areas such as volunteer management and board service. Training materials are available in French, the national language.

Government entities and the media understand the need to cooperate with CSOs, and various collaborations took place in 2019. For example, CSOs such as the Media Actors Network for Child Protection in Côte d’Ivoire (Réseau des acteurs des médias pour les droits de l’enfant en Côte d’Ivoire, RAMEDE-CI)) and the Network of Ivorian Media Actors for the Promotion of Sexual and Reproductive Health (Réseau des acteurs des médias ivoiriens pour la promotion de la santé sexuelle et productive, RAM-2SR) worked with media networks on the communications component of advocacy projects. Written partnerships exist between CSOs and some government entities. For example, SOS Exclusion and the National Committee Against Human Trafficking have a work-coordination agreement to combat trafficking. CSOs’ partnerships with the private sector are largely nonexistent because of a pervasive atmosphere of distrust.
CSOs’ public image improved slightly in 2019 as public perceptions grew more positive and organizations sought to invest in their images and improve their relationships with the media.

CSOs receive media coverage on a paid basis. The most accessible media for CSOs are printed and online newspapers and local radio stations. CSOs generally have good relationships with private media but less consistent relationships with public media. Coverage of CSOs’ work is favorable in media outlets that are aligned with the opposition, especially if it involves criticism of the government. The media tend only to describe CSOs’ actions and, unless an organization contacts them, rarely offer analysis of CSOs’ larger role.

Public perceptions of CSOs are mostly positive. Some people trust CSOs because they benefit directly from their services. Communities often see CSOs’ work as relevant and mobilize around it. Other people lack understanding of CSOs’ work or feel that CSOs do not communicate effectively.

The government’s trust in CSOs varies, depending on the areas in which they work. For example, the government is very attentive to the recommendations of CSOs working on forest management but distrusts organizations involved in the mining sector. Some government entities view certain CSOs as partners of the opposition. Although the central and local governments rely increasingly on CSOs as community resources, some government officials are still wary of CSOs’ activities or believe that they are not professional. Only the opposition turns to CSOs for cooperation on issues of democracy and freedom.

The business sector tends to see CSOs as awareness-raising organizations that can incite internal uprisings. This is especially true in the mining sector, and CSOs often have difficulty communicating with mining companies. Private-sector companies do not share information about their internal management with CSOs.

More CSOs are investing in their image and seeking to improve their relationships with media. A communications component is usually included in CSOs’ projects and activities. CSOs increasingly use social media to educate the public and improve their visibility. CSOs that do not have communications departments often call on community managers to sponsor their publications.

Aside from a few experienced CSOs, most organizations do not have codes of ethics. Although most organizations have internal regulations, they do not post or distribute them. Larger organizations publish annual reports, but other CSOs rarely have the capacity to do so.
The defining event of 2019 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was the country’s first democratic transition of power. The elections on December 30, 2018, were marred by violence and fraud, but a new era of political leadership began as Felix Antoine Tshisekedi succeeded Joseph Kabila as president on January 24, 2019. Political tensions eased, and the government released political prisoners and activists from citizens’ movements who had been arrested during election-related demonstrations. Civic space and freedom of expression expanded as the losing presidential candidate, Martin Fayulu, was able to hold meetings, and several radio and television stations belonging to the opposition reopened. Bilateral and multilateral cooperation with donors also resumed.

The former president’s coalition, Common Front For Congo (Front commun pour le Congo, FCC), won by an overwhelming margin in national legislative and provincial elections that also took place in December 2018. After eight months of negotiations, the new president’s coalition, Cap pour le changement, created an alliance with the FCC and an FCC-led government. The delay in creating a new government undermined CSOs’ financial viability, since CSO support is part of the government’s action plan, which could be not formulated until the new government was installed.

The eastern part of the country was hit hard by the ongoing conflict between armed groups in the provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri provinces. In the wake of attacks on local communities, more than 300,000 people fled their homes in 2019, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Many cases of kidnapping, maiming, sexual violence, and other human rights violations were reported. The Ebola epidemic that began in 2018 in the city of Beni in northeastern DRC had resulted in more than 2,000 deaths by early 2020.

DRC’s economic growth rate slowed to 4.6 percent in 2019, mainly because of declining commodity prices, according to the World Bank. The mining sector, which is the main source of exports, continued to be wracked by corruption, cronism, and the improper management of public resources. The World Bank reports that seventy-two percent of the population lives in extreme poverty with poor access to basic services such as water, electricity, education, and health care.

CSO sustainability was stable in 2019. The legal environment was enhanced by the expansion of civic space and end of state harassment. CSO advocacy initiatives were slightly stronger thanks to better relationships with the national and provincial governments. Service provision strengthened with the expansion of a variety of programs in
The 2019 CSO Sustainability Index for Democratic Republic of the Congo

South Kivu, Tshopo, Tanganyika, and other provinces. Better cooperation between CSOs and the government improved CSOs' public image. CSOs' organizational capacity, financial viability, and sectoral infrastructure did not change.

The CSO sector in the DRC consists of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), nonprofit associations, public benefit institutions, and religious associations. The total number of registered organizations probably exceeds 30,000, according to the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. According to the ministry, 2,579 CSOs applied for registration in 2019, including 2,194 nonprofit associations and public institutions such as schools and 298 religious organizations. The Ministry of Justice and Human Rights reports, without explanation, that it did not grant legal status to any nonprofit association in 2019.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.5

The legal environment for CSOs in the DRC improved slightly in 2019 as civic space expanded and systemic state-sponsored harassment ceased.

All CSOs register under Law No. 004/2001 on nonprofit associations and public benefit entities. Since the implementing regulations for Law No. 004/2001 have never been issued, the distinction between different types of organizations is ambiguous. The process for obtaining legal status is long and expensive. CSOs seeking to register must obtain approval from their line ministries and then apply to the Second Directorate of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. Their applications must include bylaws, which, according to Article 7 of Law No. 004/2001, must address internal management bodies, decision-making procedures, scope of activity, persons authorized to make spending decisions, and procedures for dissolution. After filing their applications, organizations operate with so-called F92s, or written receipts for their applications, which are valid for six months. CSOs may continue to operate with F92s beyond six months if legal status is not granted within this period. Given the difficulty of traveling to Kinshasa, the capital city, CSOs in the provinces may obtain provisional authorization to operate from provincial governors, although the authority of provincial governments to grant legal status is ambiguous. In 2018, the government submitted an amendment to the parliament to reduce the validity of F92s from six to three months and to require any organization that did not obtain authorization within this period to cease operations. CSOs opposed this amendment, which was not discussed in the parliament in 2019.

Law No. 004/2001 is generally clear about government oversight of CSOs. Organizations must file periodic activity reports and, according to Articles 40 and 45, the central government must respect CSOs' autonomy and avoid involvement in their internal management. The law specifies reasons for dissolution, such as breaking the law or violating the public order or public decency. The government generally respects CSOs' protection from dissolution for political or arbitrary reasons. No organizations were dissolved in 2019.

CSOs and their staff worked freely within the confines of the law in 2019. In the past, CSO activists who promoted human rights and transparency or fought corruption were often subject to arbitrary arrest or detention by security forces. After the political transition of 2019, CSOs did not experience harassment. The new government demonstrated respect for citizens' freedoms and rights as guaranteed in the constitution, and civic space was more open. For example, CSOs did not experience retaliation when they denounced interference by the president's cabinet director into an investigation by the Inspectorate General of Finance of the diversion from government coffers of a $15 million payment made by petroleum producers. Similarly, the Congolese Anti-Corruption League (Ligue congolaise de lutte contre la corruption, LICOCO) and Association of African Parliamentarians Against Corruption (Association des parlementaires africains contre la corruption, APNAC) were able to denounce the embezzlement of funds by high-ranking officials in the former regime. The police dispersed several peaceful demonstrations in 2019, including protests in Goma and Mbuji-Mayi demanding that telephone
companies lower their rates, which were organized by Fight for Change (Lutte pour le changement, LUCHA) and other citizen movements. No major incident of tax-related harassment of CSOs, which was common under the previous government, was reported in 2019.

CSOs do not pay taxes on donations and grants. Under Article 39 of Law No. 004/2001, CSOs with legal status are eligible for exemptions on property, vehicle, and value-added taxes, as well as taxes on profits. CSOs must apply for the exemptions, which are granted by an inter-ministerial commission under the Ministry of Planning and Finance, with the approval of line ministries. Of the 300 CSOs that applied in 2019, 77 organizations, including 43 domestic CSOs and 34 international CSOs, were granted exemptions. The reasons that organizations were denied exemptions included a lack of legal status and the misalignment of the application with the organization’s purpose. CSOs that serve as implementing partners for the government’s National Strategic Development Plan are also eligible for tax exemptions, provided they register with the Ministry of Planning. In 2019, the ministry received 270 applications and registered 247 CSOs under this provision. The law sometimes allows organizations and individuals to deduct their donations to CSOs, since, in theory, any funds intended for the most disadvantaged populations are not taxable.

Although CSOs’ activities are not for profit, CSOs may, as an add-on, engage in revenue-generating activities, such as renting out meeting rooms and vehicles, selling food, and providing internet-related services. CSOs are free to conduct fundraising campaigns but rarely do so, given their organizational and technical constraints. They are free to receive funds from foreign donors. They may also participate in government calls for bids, although very few CSOs win contracts, largely because low organizational, financial, and technical capacities weaken their ability to fulfill bidding requirements and complete proposals.

CSOs in large and second-tier cities have access to attorneys and legal experts familiar with the laws related to nonprofit associations and public benefit entities. The Lubumbashi-based South Congo Network (Réseau Sud Congo) has trained many legal experts on Law No. 004/2001 and the legal protection of civil society actors. In rural areas, CSOs have limited access to legal professionals.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.1

CSOs’ organizational capacity did not change in 2019. CSOs usually rely on their beneficiaries to help identify needs, design and implement projects, and monitor and evaluate project results. For example, the People’s Neighborhood Health Insurance Cooperative (Mutuelle de santé des quartiers populaires, MUSQUAP) organized listening sessions with its members and beneficiaries to design care packages geared to constituents’ purchasing power. Religious groups are typically able to mobilize support from groups other than their direct beneficiaries. In 2019, for example, the Catholic cardinal worked through Caritas Congo to raise funds and supplies for civilians affected by attacks by armed groups in Beni, in North Kivu province.

CSOs’ bylaws clearly state their visions, missions, and objectives. CSOs are increasingly focused on specific sectors, topics, or areas of intervention, which allows them to respond more effectively to specific community needs and improve their professionalism. Only CSOs working on a national level prepare strategic plans and activity timelines, usually in collaboration with their donors. In 2019, Caritas Congo and the National Support Center for the Development of Public Participation (Centre national d’appui au développement et à la participation populaire, CENADEP) had to execute parts of their strategic plans to receive tranches of funding from donors.

Law No. 004/2001 requires CSOs to have general assemblies, boards of directors, control committees, and executive secretariats. Leading CSOs, including Caritas Congo, CENADEP, Public Spending Observatory (Observatoire de la dépense publique, ODEP), and Inades-Formation, convene their general assemblies regularly. The boards of national-level CSOs meet regularly and, in a transparent way, receive and evaluate information.
about their organizations’ administrative and financial management. In practice, most other CSOs find it difficult to get all required internal bodies to function properly, mainly because they lack the necessary financial resources.

Very few CSOs have paid staff or develop their management skills so that they can continue to operate after funding runs out. Although a culture of volunteerism is not widespread in the DRC, small CSOs work primarily with volunteers, and national-level CSOs often rely on volunteer staff to provide technical support to their programs. Religious organizations such as Peace and Justice Commission (Commission justice et paix), Safeguarding Creation (Sauvegarde de la création), and Caritas Congo are especially successful in recruiting volunteers.

CSOs in the DRC usually have physical offices. CSOs with donor support have sufficient equipment and can afford to upgrade their computers, printers, scanners, and office furniture periodically. They also have direct internet services. Small CSOs do not have computer equipment and rely on internet cafes for internet access. In rural areas, internet network coverage is poor, and access is unreliable.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.7

CSOs’ financial viability did not change in 2019. Organizations working in areas such as the environment, education, health care, mining, energy, and agriculture continued to receive funding from their traditional foreign partners. For example, the National Confederation of Agricultural Producers in the Congo (Confédération nationale des producteurs agricoles du Congo, CONAPAC) received funding from SOS Hunger Belgium, Solloc Belgium, and Trias for its Support Program for the Organization, Advocacy, and Professionalization of Family Farmers in the DRC (PASPOR) program. The Civil Society Coalition for Reform Monitoring and Public Action (La coalition de la société civile pour le suivi des réformes et de l’action publique, CORAP) received funding from American Jewish World Services for its advocacy to stop the construction of the Inga3 Dam. CSO funding typically lasts from one to five years, with renewal possible based on evaluations.

Congolese CSOs received support from a number of bilateral and multilateral donors in 2019. Major donors included the World Bank, European Union (EU), Global Environment Facility, and development agencies of Germany, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States. With support from the Norwegian Agency for Cooperation Development, the World Wide Fund for Nature’s Forest Governance Program supported the National Coalition Against Illegal Logging (Coalition nationale de lutte contre l’exploitation illégale du bois, CNCEIB) and Network of Indigenous and Local Populations for Sustainable Management of Forest Ecosystems (Réseau des populations autochtones et locales pour la gestion durable des écosystèmes forestier, REPALF). The Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest (REDD) climate working group received funding from the World Bank, United Nations, and a number of bilateral donors to address climate change in the DRC’s tropical rain forest. The EU funded the efforts of the Diakonia Consortium, Caritas Congo, CENADEP, and the National Civil Society Cooperation Framework (Cadre national des concertations de la société civile congolaise, CCNSC-RDC) to build CSO capacity throughout the DRC. Several international foundations, including the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, are also active in the DRC. For example, the Open Society Initiative for South Africa funded projects to build strengthen the CSO sector and strengthen public engagement in formulating and monitoring government economic policies in 2019.

Government agencies, such as the Central Coordination Office, DRC Social Fund, Congolese Major Projects Agency, and Office of Roadways and Drainage, sometimes engage CSOs to serve as local implementers of donor-funded projects, generally on a short-term basis. In 2019, the DRC Social Fund signed contracts with four Congolese CSOs and a UN entity. More than $16.5 million over a five-year period was earmarked for the four CSOs. In 2019, the UN disbursed about $3.6 million, of which the CSOs received 30 percent.
CSOs in the DRC have great difficulty obtaining funding from local sources. There are very few local philanthropies, and other funding sources are limited because of the country’s poor economic state. CSOs struggle to collect dues from their members, who generally contribute very little to their operations. National CSOs, such as the Center for the Study of Social Action (Centre d’études et de promotion d’actions sociales, CEPAS) and the Protestant Welcome Center (Centre d’accueil protestant) sometimes supplement their income by renting out rooms and vehicles or selling goods and products. Religious organizations may receive financial and non-financial support from the communities in which they are located. Some CSOs are supported by their beneficiaries. For example, in 2019, during the general meeting of the Coalition of Farmers’ Organizations for Equatorial Development (Convention des organisations paysannes pour le développement de l’Equateur, COPADE), farmers provided meals to delegates made from their own produce. CSOs sometimes engage in fundraising to respond to natural disasters or serious accidents.

Only national-level CSOs such as Caritas Congo have financial management systems and receive technical assistance from donors to help them manage their funds effectively. These organizations are subject to financial audits, as required by their contracts with donors, and make their activity and financial reports available to their donors and members. Smaller organizations generally do not keep accounts of their funds.

**ADVOCACY: 3.8**

CSOs’ advocacy strengthened slightly in 2019 as the new government created a number of tripartite forums to bring together government, CSO, and businesses representatives. These forums, which are structured according to the fifteen pillars of the National Strategic Development Plan, are intended to serve as channels of direct communication at the national, provincial, and local levels on topics such as health, education, the environment, and agriculture. The government is responsible for convening the discussions and in November 2019 organized a tripartite discussion on the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative with government officials, representatives of extractive industries, and CSOs. Another tripartite discussion to address universal health-care coverage took place in December 2019. At the national level, other specialized groups with ministry and CSO representatives evaluated public policies related to the fifteen pillars in 2019.

In compliance with the 2005 Paris Declaration, which seeks to improve the quality of aid and its impact on development, donors require the DRC government to involve CSOs in designing, implementing, and evaluating the projects and programs that they fund. In 2019, the government worked with CSOs and other stakeholders in the educational sector on the concept of free basic education. The efforts of the National Universal Education Coalition (Coalition nationale éducation pour tous, CONEPT), which had campaigned for free education for years, finally came to fruition when the new president made basic education free in 2019.

CSOs conducted a number of advocacy campaigns in 2019. For example, CORAP campaigned to prioritize the electricity sector in the context of the central government’s development program, and the president eventually declared the sector a national priority. The CCNSC-RDC, a discussion and cooperative space for organizations working on public policy at the national, provincial, and local levels, campaigned for the adoption of the National Strategic Development Plan, which was finally approved during a special meeting of the Council of Ministers in Zongo. CSOs also issued criticisms, requested independent investigations, and made contact with authorities at the national and provincial levels in an effort to end frequent massacres and keep people and property safe.

The larger CSO community is well aware that a favorable legal and regulatory environment would help it operate more effectively and more sustainably. CSOs have long advocated for reforms to Law No. 004/2001 on nonprofit associations. In 2019, CCNSC-RDC developed a draft amendment to the law, which includes, among other things, automatic legal status if organizations receive no response to their applications within six months, decentralization
of the granting of authorizations to provincial governments, withdrawal of the central government from CSOs’ internal management, and withdrawal of the minister of justice from the process of dissolving CSOs. At the end of the year, the amendment was awaiting approval by coalition members, which will be followed by its sponsorship by a member of parliament.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.4**

CSO service provision strengthened slightly in 2019 with the expansion of a variety of programs in South Kivu, Tshopo, Tanganyika, and other provinces funded by the DRC Social Fund.

CSOs continued to provide services in areas such as health care, education, sanitation, housing, water, energy, economic development, environmental protection, and governance. For example, the DRC Social Fund supported twenty-three local CSOs in South Kivu Province, twenty-one CSOs in Tshopo Province, and ten CSOs in Tanganyika Province to build and renovate schools, health centers, drinking water taps, and marketplaces.

CSOs’ services respond to the needs of target groups and communities. CSOs improve access roads in farming communities and assist internally displaced persons and natural disaster victims. Several CSOs, including the African Association for the Defense of Human Rights (Association africaine des droits de l’Homme, ASADHO), Congolese Association for Access to Justice (Association congolaise pour l’accès à la justice, ACAJ), and Solidarity for Security and Local Governance (Solidarité pour la sécurité et la gouvernance locale, SGL), help improve the safety of people and property and encourage cooperation between communities and the military. During its project to re-establish agricultural and grazing lands in vulnerable communities, the DRC Social Fund contracted with five CSOs in North and South Kivu, Tanganyika, Ituri, Hault Uele, Bas Uele, and Tshopo provinces to identify beneficiary households, organize them into farmers’ groups, and organize and monitor their activities. CSOs’ services are sometimes limited by donors’ priorities. For example, in 2019, CSOs received donor funding to distribute insecticide-treated mosquito nets, even though some CSOs and community members believe that the best way to prevent malaria is by cleaning up the environment.

CSOs publish analyses, manuals, studies, reports, and guidebooks and distribute them to the government, universities, churches, donors, and other organizations. For example, the task force on economic governance, composed of the Economic and Democracy Governance Network (Réseau gouvernance économique et démocratique, REGED), ODEP, LICOCO, and other CSOs specializing in economic and budget issues, published a 2019 budget analysis with recommendations for the government. CENADEP published five electronic and print issues of its journal, *The Congolese Farmer’s Voice*, to promote family farming in 2019.

CSOs do not usually seek to recover the costs of providing services, both because their purpose is not for profit and beneficiaries cannot afford to pay. However, some CSOs generate income by selling services. For example, Caritas Congo sells books and other documents and rents out housing and meeting rooms; CEPAS rents out its meeting rooms and offers paid training; and the Kinshasa Higher Education, University, and Research Documentation Center (Centre de documentation de l’enseignement supérieur et universitaire et de la recherche de Kinshasa, CEDERSUK), a nonprofit association affiliated with the University of Kinshasa, conducts paid trainings for universities and CSOs.

The national and local governments acknowledge CSOs’ value by hiring them to serve as local providers of basic social services. In 2019, for example, the government awarded funding to the Africa Zone League for the Defense of Students’ Rights (Ligue de la zone Afrique pour la défense des droit des enfant et élèves, LIZADEEL) to support struggling students and educate school children and university students about sexual abuse. Provincial and national government officials took part in general meetings for CCNSC-RDC provincial managers, which brought together civil society representatives from twenty-six provinces in November.
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**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.5**

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector did not change in 2019. In urban areas, resource centers offer CSOs access to training, technical assistance, information, and computers. For instance, the Network of Christian-Inspired Human Rights and Civic Education Organizations (Réseau d'organisations de droits humains et d'éducation civique d'inspiration chrétienne, RODHECIC) offers computer training to CSOs. The Network to Promote Democracy and Economic and Social Rights (Réseau de Promotion de la démocratie et des droits économiques et sociaux, PRODDES) operates two technical support cells for health insurance cooperatives and community-led economic initiatives to meet local needs.

Intermediary support organizations and community foundations give grants and in-kind support to meet locally identified needs and projects, especially during emergencies, such as floods and armed conflicts. The Diraff Foundation, Church of Christ in the Congo, and Caritas Congo offered grants to community-based organizations in 2019.

CSOs share information among themselves and work together toward common goals on issues such as governance, sexual violence, and climate change. Well-organized networks and coalitions include RRSSJ, CORAP, Natural Resources Network (Réseau ressources naturelles, RRN), Congolese Women’s Cooperation Framework (Concertation de la femme congolaise, CAFCO), and League of Voters (Ligue des électeurs). National task forces such as CORAP monitor public policies and reforms.

In the DRC, CSOs have access to trainers who are competent in a variety of fields, including project management, strategic planning, environmental advocacy, energy, local governance, and food security. Donor-funded and paid training is regularly offered in Kinshasa and the provinces. Inades-Formation, for example, offers training on internal governance, advocacy and political lobbying, social mobilization, and fundraising. As part of its citizen university, the Kinshasa Lay House organized training on establishing nonprofit associations, gender and sustainable development, management tools, monitoring and evaluation, and other topics in 2019. Many CSOs participated in these trainings, including the Association of Young People for a Bright Future for Congo (Association des jeunes pour l'avenir radieux du Congo, AJARC), Wellbeing (Bien être), Committee to Support Outreach Social Workers (Comité d'appui au travail social de rue, CATSR), Women’s House (Maison de la femme), and the Platform of Women’s Neighborhood Associations (Plateforme des organisations féminines des quartiers populaires, POFQ). Training materials are often translated into local languages.

Since CSOs have improved their focus on specific areas of specialization, an increasing number of private- and public-sector entities understand the benefits of working with them. In 2019, CSOs enjoyed a number of formal and informal partnerships with the media and public and private sectors. For example, in natural resource management, CNCEIB collaborated with the Federation of Logging Companies to enforce the logging code and its application texts; the Chamber of Mines worked with CSOs and the government to monitor the ore supply chain; and Publish What You Pay/DRC (Publiez ce que vous payez/RDC) worked with the community radio network to promote transparency in the resource extraction industries. The Association for Family Well-Being (Association pour le bien-être familial, ABEF) worked with television stations to promote family planning, and Women and the Media (Femmes et médias) partnered with media, audio, and audiovisual companies on capacity building for women journalists. Caritas Congo collaborated with the government to pay teachers in remote areas, and CONAPAC worked with the Ministry of Agriculture and the private sector to implement agricultural programs.
Public perceptions of CSOs improved slightly in 2019, as influential social networks and independent media with large audiences, such as the nationwide station Top Congo FM Radio Okapi and community radio stations in the provinces, provided favorable coverage of CSOs’ work.

Many media outlets conveyed more positive views of CSOs in 2019. International media outlets such as TV5, France 24, and RFI provided good coverage of CSOs’ activities without any attempt by CSOs to influence their stories. For example, as part of RFI’s reporting on the informal economy, a French journalist interviewed the director of the Musala project, which focuses on waste management in Kinshasa and is spearheaded by CENADEF. Radio Okapi organized a show with CORAP about the Inga3 Dam and its impact on local communities. Community radio stations also provided positive coverage of CSOs’ activities for free. Some national media, such as Congolese National Radio-Television (RTNC) and the Future Radio Television Group, do not independently analyze CSOs’ work but simply report on their activities.

Public perceptions of CSOs were more positive in 2019 as a result of their work to expose embezzlement, the massacres in Beni, and fraud and corruption in the mining sector. The public is beginning to understand the concept of CSOs and their role in securing rights and raising awareness. The public supports CSOs’ activities as long as their activities help solve socio-economic challenges.

As CSOs have become more professional and their capacities have improved in recent years, business and government perceptions of CSOs have become more positive. In 2019, some government officials made favorable statements about CSOs’ help in designing, implementing, and monitoring public policies. The government thanked environmental CSOs that had participated in discussions about forest governance. Businesses agreed to work with CSOs on a number of specific issues, such as mining and illegal logging, and they increasingly see CSOs as credible sources of information and technical expertise.

CSOs create and distribute reports, position papers, flyers, banners, brochures, and signs to communicate their messages. They enhance their image through websites, Facebook pages, WhatsApp groups, LinkedIn accounts, YouTube channels, and Twitter feeds. To ensure positive perceptions of their work, CSOs have created specialized networks of journalists who cover the topics that they work on, such as the environment, access to electricity, family farming, and human rights. For example, CENADEF and CONAPAC work with the Association of Agricultural Journalists in the Congo (Association des journalistes agricoles du Congo, AJAC) on agricultural issues.

In 2019, CSOs from twenty-six provinces approved an ethics charter and code of ethics following the second National Civil Society Forum. Leading CSOs publish annual activity reports.
ETIOPIA

Capital: Addis Ababa
Population: 108,113,150
GDP per capita (PPP): $2,200
Human Development Index: Low (0.470)
Freedom in the World: Not Free (24/100)

OVERALL CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 5.2

The political reform process that started in Ethiopia in March 2018 with the premiership of Abiy Ahmed faced serious challenges in 2019 because of political wrangling in and between the federal government and the regions. Tensions in the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front were exacerbated by a decision to eliminate ethnically based party membership and transform the coalition into the unitary Prosperity Party. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front, a coalition member, denounced the move as an act of betrayal and refused to join the new party. Animosities between Amhara and Tigray political elites peaked in June 2019 following the assassination of top officials of Amhara Regional State and the chief of staff of the Ethiopian Army.

In the lead-up to national elections planned for 2020, the House of Peoples’ Representatives adopted Proclamation No. 1133/2019, which reestablishes the National Electoral Board, and Proclamation No. 1162/2019, which addresses political party registration and an elections code of conduct. Most opposition parties objected to a prohibition on public servants standing for election and the number of signatures needed to form a party. Preparations for the elections, including voter registration and campaigning by candidates, were delayed as the new electoral board lacked readiness in areas such as staff recruitment and dealt with a referendum on statehood for the Sidama people. The quest for regional autonomy of the Sidama Zone was contentious, and at least seventeen people were reported killed in clashes between government security forces and activists supporting the referendum. CSOs observed the Sidama referendum, which took place in November 2019 and resulted in the establishment of an independent tenth state in the Ethiopian Federation. CSOs also conferred with the National Electoral Board on issues related to the national elections, such as voter education and election monitoring.

In July 2019, the House of Peoples’ Representatives appointed prominent human rights defender Daniel Bekele as head of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission. Bekele vowed to work with CSOs to protect and promote human rights and expand human and financial resources for the commission’s regional offices. His commitment to work with CSOs help facilitate the return to the country of organizations such as Human Rights Watch after an absence of nearly a decade.

Deadly ethnic violence broke out in the Oromia region in October 2019 after well-known media owner and political activist Jawar Mohammed alleged that the state was going to remove the government security personnel assigned to protect him. The unrest resulted in scores of deaths, injuries, massive internal displacements, and significant property damage.

Ethiopia’s economy continued to be one of the fastest growing in the world in 2019, according to the World Bank. While the agricultural sector continued to dominate, the government pushed ahead in its effort to expand the private sector by encouraging foreign direct investment and establishing industrial parks. The government also...
invested in programs to achieve its longer-term goal of accelerated poverty reduction. The poverty rate in Ethiopia decreased from 30 percent of households in 2011 to 24 percent in 2016, the most recent year for which data is available from the World Bank. Most poverty reduction took place in urban areas.

With Ethiopia’s continuing political reform, every dimension of CSO sustainability improved in 2019. The legal environment underwent transformational improvement as the parliament adopted the new Organization of Civil Societies Proclamation (CSO Proclamation) No. 1113/2019, which replaced the draconian regime that had governed the sector since 2010. CSOs’ organizational capacity was slightly stronger thanks to their new operational freedom, which made it easy for many service-providing CSOs to amend their objectives to include advocacy, human rights, and related themes, which had been prohibited under the previous regime. CSOs’ financial viability was moderately enhanced by their new ability to mobilize funds from diverse sources, regardless of their institutional purpose. As the new government continued to open up opportunities for collaboration with civil society, CSO advocacy improved moderately. The relaxation of strict limits on spending for administrative costs allowed CSOs to moderately expand their service provision geographically as well as quantitatively. The infrastructure supporting CSOs was moderately enhanced by the opening of new resource centers. CSOs’ public image improved moderately as both public and private media showed interest in covering the CSO sector.

After the CSO Proclamation entered into force on March 12, 2019, the Agency for Civil Society Organizations (ACSO), the new regulatory body for CSOs, reported 2,377 registered organizations in the country, compared to 3,000 organizations claimed by the ACSO’s predecessor, the Charities and Societies Agency (CSA). The 2019 number includes 1,381 domestic organizations and 315 international organizations that reregistered and 681 newly registered organizations. In 2019, the number of human rights CSOs increased, and a significant number of service-providing CSOs made changes in their organizational objectives to include human rights and advocacy activities.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.6**

CSOs’ legal environment underwent transformational improvement in 2019 as the draconian regime that had governed the CSO sector since 2010 was completely discarded. In January, the Ethiopian parliament repealed the Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009, which had posed significant impediments to the CSO sector, particularly human rights and policy advocacy organizations, and in its place enacted the liberalized CSO Proclamation. The preamble of the new law expresses the government’s recognition of CSOs and its commitment to ensuring that they take part in achieving sustainable development and an enduring culture of human rights and democracy in Ethiopia. The new proclamation establishes the ACSO to replace the CSA, which previously had oversight responsibility for CSOs. The ACSO has a fundamentally different mandate that gives more emphasis to the provision of support to CSOs and transparency and accountability on both sides. Although the majority of ACSO staff are holdovers from the CSA, the governance of the ACSO has changed into a participatory structure that includes more representatives of the CSO sector. Directives and regulations under the old law remained in effect for one year after the CSO Proclamation took effect in March, provided they did not conflict with provisions of the new law. During the year, the ACSO developed new directives, which have yet to be officially endorsed.

Registration is still mandatory under the CSO Proclamation. The three organizational forms that existed under the previous law—Ethiopian charities and societies, Ethiopian resident charities and societies, and foreign charities and societies—no longer exist. The new law provides a clear definition of CSOs, which are all subject to the same rules, except that foreign CSOs registered to operate in Ethiopia and local CSOs established by foreign nationals domiciled in Ethiopia may not engage in certain activities, such as lobbying political parties, voter education, and election observation and monitoring. Registration under the new law is permanent, and CSOs are not required to renew their registrations periodically, as under the previous law. Existing CSOs had to re-register after the CSO
The 2019 CSO Sustainability Index for Ethiopia

Proclamation came into effect, but the process was easy. New organizations that fulfilled all registration requirements were registered under the new law without significant impediments or delay. The maximum registration period is thirty days for local organizations and sixty days for foreign organizations, and the ACSO must give compelling reasons for not completing registration in these timeframes. Regional and local CSOs that operate in one region only may register with regional authorities rather than with the ACSO. The new CSO law permits regional governments to enact laws governing CSOs’ registration and other activities, but no region did so in 2019.

In contrast to the previous law, which highly disfavored CSOs working in human rights, democracy, and good governance, the CSO Proclamation emphasizes freedom of operation and does not restrict CSOs’ scope of engagement as long as they engage in lawful activities. In place of the 30/70 Directive, which had limited the amount that a CSO could spend on “administrative” expenses, broadly defined as including staff salaries, research, training, and transportation, to 30 percent of its overall budget, the new law more narrowly defines administrative costs according to generally accepted accounting principles and stipulates that they may not exceed 20 percent of the overall budget. Thus even though the limit for allowable administrative expenses declined from 30 percent to 20 percent, the net effect was positive for CSOs, as fewer costs are included under the limit. Under the previous law, CSOs were required to obtain licenses to conduct any activity, but the CSO Proclamation requires only that CSOs have registration certificates to implement their lawful institutional purposes. CSOs may work in any part of the country.

The CSO Proclamation requires some CSOs to establish identified internal governance structures. All CSOs must prepare and submit annual reports. Prior approval from the ACSO is required to open and operate a bank account. The law gives the ACSO the power to inspect the activities of any organization based on information from the government, donors, the public, or the agency itself.

The CSO Proclamation introduces strong safeguards on the dissolution of CSOs, which may take place only for specific reasons. Judicial review is an integral part of the new legal regime, and all CSOs, regardless of their institutional structures or mandates, may challenge any decision of the regulatory authorities in a court of law. No organization is known to have exercised this right in 2019.

The new government developed a civic engagement policy in 2019, which establishes formal channels of communication between the government and CSOs. The policy expects each government body to establish systems and procedures that allow for the effective participation of civil society during the planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of all government initiatives. The channels indicated in the policy include joint consultations and dialogue between the government and CSOs, as well as CSO membership in government task forces, committees, and advisory councils. CSOs represented by their umbrella organizations participated actively in the development of the civic engagement policy, which was waiting to be launched at the end of the year.

A draft Law on Hate Speech and Disinformation Prevention and Suppression was readied for adoption by the House of Peoples’ Representatives in 2019. The law seeks mainly to curtail the contribution of hate speech and disinformation to intercommunal and interethnic conflict, political instability, and other sources of violence. Human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch raised concerns that the draft law might adversely affect the exercise of freedom of expression on the internet, arguing that it would be better for the government to rely on other mechanisms, such as public awareness, digital literacy, and self-regulation, to alleviate hate speech and false information on the internet.

Continuing a trend of the previous year, state harassment of CSOs was not reported in 2019.

In a significant achievement, former provisions restricting CSOs’ access to foreign funding no longer exist. The CSO Proclamation allows CSOs to access funds from any lawful source and engage in any kind of domestic resource mobilization. Under the previous law, CSOs could engage in income-generating activities only if they were incidental to their objectives, but the new law allows CSOs to engage in any lawful business activity to generate income, provided they keep separate accounts for such activities and utilize the income to further their core objectives.

The laws governing the taxation of CSOs did not change in 2019. CSOs are exempt from income tax on grants but must pay taxes on purchased goods and services. Businesses may make deductible donations to CSOs of up to 10...
percent of their taxable income. Any income that CSOs generate from business activities is subject to the tax regulations governing for-profit entities.

As in previous years, the number of highly qualified lawyers with adequate knowledge of laws applicable to CSOs is limited.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.3**

CSOs’ organizational capacity improved slightly following the adoption of the new CSO Proclamation. The emphasis on operational freedom under the new law made it easy for many service-providing CSOs to incorporate advocacy, human rights, peace and conflict, gender equality, and access-to-justice themes into their objectives, which had been prohibited by the previous law. This shift was also encouraged by the support for governance and human rights programs provided by major donors such as USAID and donor programs such as the Civil Society Support Program 2 (CSSP2), funded by the United Kingdom, Ireland, Sweden, and Norway, and the Civil Society Fund III (CSF3), funded by the European Union (EU). While it is too early to predict the full impact that changes related to allowable administrative expenses will have on CSOs’ organizational capacity, the change is expected to help CSOs to expand their activities geographically and increase the quantity of services that they provide.

Ethiopian CSOs still do not have the desired relationship with their beneficiaries and other constituencies. Participatory project planning and management is not widely practiced. The new law requires CSOs to make necessary efforts to ensure that their activities contribute to sustainable development and democratization, promote the rights and interests of their members, and enhance the professions in which they engage. In addition, the ACSO must ensure maximum public benefit by ensuring that organizations carry out their activities in accordance with their registered objectives.

With the introduction of the new legal regime, CSO networks and consortia began to develop multi-year strategic plans in 2019. During their planning exercises, CSO groups such as the Consortium of Christian Relief and Development Associations (CCRDA), JeeCDO, and all eighty-seven organizations receiving funds under the CSSP2 program emphasized monitoring and evaluation as integral parts of their institutional focus. No major changes were evident in CSOs’ approach to project design. Most organizations continued to formulate their interventions to comply with the requirements of major financial partners, and they considered it less important to align their interventions with their core institutional mandates or the observed needs and priorities of beneficiaries.

The CSO Proclamation still requires most CSOs to adhere to prescribed governance structures, which, among other things, divide responsibilities between boards of directors and management. The boards continue to be responsible for ensuring their organizations’ effectiveness and efficiency.

Because of insufficient financial resources, most CSOs continued to experience difficulties retaining experienced and qualified staff in 2019. CSOs that failed to pay senior staff commensurate salaries sometimes saw those individuals move to other organizations with more stable funding. A well-crafted human resource policy is non-existent at most CSOs. Compounding CSOs’ difficulty with staffing is the undeveloped culture of volunteerism in Ethiopia, which deprives CSOs of volunteer labor. Most organizations still comply with the legal requirement that they employ an accountant. Although their organograms may label other positions such as lawyers or technology specialists as crucial, most CSOs lack the financial resources to employ them.

Financial constraints prevent most CSOs from acquiring modernized office facilities or using the internet in their operations. As part of its economic reform program, the government is liberalizing the telecom sector, which has been a government monopoly, and is expected to announce a call for bids for new telecom companies to join the market. This situation may expand CSOs’ use of internet in the coming years.
FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.3

CSOs’ financial viability was moderately enhanced in 2019 by provisions of the CSO Proclamation that allowed CSOs to mobilize funds from diverse sources regardless of their institutional purpose. This gain was offset somewhat by a significant decrease in total foreign funding.

Ethiopian CSOs remained highly reliant on foreign funding on 2019. Three major donor programs—CSSP2, CSF3, and the Ethiopian Social Accountability Program (ESAP, funded by the EU, Austria, Ireland, United Kingdom, and World Bank)—funded a variety of projects implemented by diverse CSOs. For example, under the third phase of ESAP, which launched in 2019 and will run until 2023, approximately $30 million will be disbursed to more than 100 Ethiopian CSOs implementing district-level activities. In addition, several donor agencies, such as USAID, embassies of the Netherlands and Canada, and Australian Aid, funded bilateral initiatives that benefited CSOs in 2019. For example, USAID funded CSOs through programs addressing the elections and rule of law.

Despite these programs, most CSOs experienced a decrease in foreign funding in 2019. The shift in donors’ focus to themes related to human rights reduced the resources available to a great number of CSOs working in other areas, although to be eligible for funding some service-providing organizations incorporated projects with human rights objectives into their engagements. At the same time, the lifting of restrictions on access to foreign funding increased the number of organizations eligible to access donors’ funds. This increased competition for funding combined with the highly burdensome eligibility requirements of some major donor programs made it difficult for smaller CSOs to obtain funding. Many CSOs had to reduce their activities significantly because of limited access to financial resources.

Given their reliance on foreign funding, most Ethiopian CSOs lacked the organizational capacity to mobilize funds effectively from other sources. In addition, no major improvements in domestic sources of funding were evident in 2019. The government provided some support to CSOs providing services to needy groups, such as orphans and the elderly. To broaden CSOs’ access to domestic sources of funding, the CSO Proclamation established a CSO fund, which is to be partly financed from government coffers. However, subsidiary legislation to define the management and administration of the fund had yet to be finalized by the end of the year.

Little corporate philanthropy was available to CSOs in 2019, and CSOs gave little thought to the need to establish sustainable strategic partnerships with the private sector. Of the limited corporate funding available to CSOs, the support given by Levi Strauss & Co. to Ethiopian Labor Rights Watch was noteworthy as a unique instance of a business partnering with a CSO having a mandate focused on human and labor rights. The government sometimes mobilizes corporate social responsibility programs in the event of a major humanitarian crisis. The Ethiopian Corporate Social Responsibility Fund, which was established in 2018 under the auspices of the Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce and Sectoral Associations, did not engage in major activities in 2019.

A weak culture of giving and limited organizational capacity prevents most CSOs from fundraising effectively. Some CSOs collect nominal membership fees at irregular intervals. Certain organizations attempt to mobilize funds from domestic sources by text messaging. For example, Macedonia, an organization that works with the elderly and intellectually disabled, continued to raise funds using text messaging in 2019, assisted by the main public telecommunications service provider, EthioTelecom. Macedonia obtained sufficient donations from the public that will augment its financial resources to construct a home for the elderly in 2019.

Some CSOs working in service provision engage in income-generating activities. For example, JeeCDO earns funds by renting out its conference center and guesthouses to CSOs and other stakeholders.

The financial management of most CSOs remained weak in 2019, since they lacked the resources to invest in such systems. Only larger CSOs use advanced financial management software. Some CSO consortia are trying to put
effective financial management systems into place, but they find implementation of these systems difficult because of financial constraints. Under the CSO Proclamation, most CSOs must be audited annually by independent audit firms. Only a few large CSOs publish annual activity and financial reports as part of their transparency and accountability efforts.

ADVOCACY: 5.4

As the new administration continued to open up opportunities for collaboration with CSOs, advocacy improved moderately in 2019. CSOs also took part in international mechanisms and advocacy campaigns to monitor the government’s compliance with its human rights obligations.

CSOs have sought actively to improve conditions for the CSO sector since 2017. Their advocacy for space to operate, contributions to drafting an enabling legal framework, and lobbying to enact the new law was successful thanks to their collaboration with the responsible departments of the central government. CSOs’ work on an enabling environment continued in 2019 as CSO consortia urged the government to issue subsidiary legislation to implement the CSO Proclamation. Leading consortia including CCRDA, ESCF, PHE, NSAC, Consortium of Reproductive Health Associations, and Consortium of Ethiopian Human Rights Organizations (CEHRO), collaborated with governmental stakeholders to draft subsidiary laws, which were awaiting official issuance at the end of the year. CSOs also worked with the ACSO to draft directives and design and implement various capacity-development interventions.

In February 2019, an ad hoc coalition of human rights CSOs submitted a stakeholders’ report during the third cycle review of the Ethiopian government under the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), a United Nations process to document human rights practices. The coalition was preparing to track implementation of the UPR recommendations at the end of the year. Coalition members included CEHRO, Ethiopian Lawyers’ Association, Vision Ethiopian Congress for Democracy, Ethiopian Women Lawyers’ Association (EWLA), Network of Ethiopian Women’s Associations (NEWA), Sara Justice From All Women Association, Advocates Ethiopia, Transparency Ethiopia, and Ethiopian National Association of the Blind. Some organizations attended the UPR pre-sessional meetings on Ethiopia in Geneva in May 2019. The Lutheran World Federation Ethiopia, in collaboration with the Addis Ababa University Center for Human Rights, organized a workshop to publicize the UPR recommendations accepted by the Ethiopian government.

Human rights organizations that are members of CEHRO pushed relentlessly for the government to comply with the Revised Anti-Terrorism Law, Hate Speech and Disinformation Law, and other human rights legislation. The ad hoc coalition of human rights organizations and a number of other human rights CSOs implemented activities promoting human rights on Human Rights Day in 2019.

CSOs conducted awareness-raising campaigns to draw attention to the government’s failure to implement laws connected to the abduction of girls from an institution of higher education in November 2019. EWLA, CEHRO, and other organizations issued press releases reminding the government to bring the perpetrators to justice. A coalition of CSOs observed the referendum on statehood for the Sidama Zone and worked with the National Electoral Board to establish necessary legislative and other frameworks for conducting free, fair, and credible elections in 2020.

Limited institutional capacity and competence impede lobbying by CSOs, and their participation in legislative process in 2019 was limited. CSOs successfully collaborated to achieve passage of new legislation to govern the sector in 2019. The CSO Proclamation requires the ACSO to organize formal workshops twice each budget year to offer CSOs a platform for discussing opportunities and challenges facing the sector. In 2019, the workshops focused on preparing subsidiary legislation for implementing the CSO Proclamation. The African Civil Leadership
Program (ACLP) worked closely with the ACSO to develop a users’ manual for the new law. CSO consortia, including CCRDA, ECSF, CEHRO, and PHE, were engaged actively in raising awareness throughout the sector about the CSO Proclamation and its value in ensuring CSOs’ meaningful participation in realizing sustainable democracy and development in Ethiopia.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.7**

Service provision improved moderately in 2019, despite the overall decline in donor funding. The new operational freedom and relaxation of strict limits on spending for operational and administrative costs allowed CSOs to expand their services geographically and quantitatively. Whereas under the previous regime, CSOs’ activities were tightly restricted to major urban areas, the new legal framework allows CSOs to extend their services to rural and other hard-to-reach areas and diversify the types of services they offer. In 2019, CSOs continued to concentrate on health care, water, education, children, women, and youth, while expanding their services into areas such as environment and climate change.

CSOs work closely with communities, and most of their projects are designed to address community needs and priorities, such as protecting women and girls from gender-based violence. According to the CSO law and established practice, CSOs are expected to work with government partners as much as possible. In particular, CSOs working in service delivery are required to have project agreements or at least be recognized by local authorities. Government stakeholders are required to review CSOs projects closely to make sure that organizations address problems prioritized by local communities while avoiding duplication of efforts.

After the repeal of a restrictive provision in the previous law, which had prevented most membership organizations from providing services to non-members, membership organizations can now offer their services to all people in their communities. CSOs generally provide their services without discrimination. No instance of a CSO failing to comply with legally mandated principles of equality and non-discrimination was reported in 2019.

The CSO Proclamation allows CSOs to engage in any business activity and offer their products for sale. However, aside from a few CSOs such as JeCCDO, which generated income through rentals, most CSOs had yet to venture into business activities to augment their financial resources in 2019.

Although not yet officially launched, the government’s new civic engagement policy recognizes CSOs’ invaluable contribution to the country. In his opening statement to the CCRDA general assembly in March 2019, the attorney general, through his representative, expressed the continued support of his office for the CSO sector. Government stakeholders are willing to collaborate with CSOs in implementing service-provision initiatives, particularly at local levels.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.4**

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector was moderately stronger in 2019. While no central resource center serves the CSO sector as a whole in Ethiopia, CEHRO worked on establishing a resource center in its head office at Addis Ababa in 2019. This center, which is supported by the East Africa Regional Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, will offer CSOs access to information as well as learning and research opportunities. A new organization, the Center for Civil Society Capacity Building, became operational after the CSO Proclamation went into effect, and it offers CSOs training and technical resources such as manuals and how-to guides. CCRDA’s resource center continued to provide training and other services to its members, and a local resource center in the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People’s Regional State was still functional in 2019. The limited financial capacity of most CSOs makes it impossible for resources centers to charge service fees.
The CSO Proclamation repealed the restrictive provision of the previous law that prohibited intermediary support organizations (ISOs) from implementing activities directly. This change is expected to encourage ISOs’ presence, and CSOs hope to benefit from their ability to re-grant donor funds. Although Ethiopia has few local sources of funding, the 2019 launch of the Ethiopian Diaspora Trust Fund, which aims to support the development endeavors of the Ethiopian government, should enhance CSOs’ access to domestic funding.

The previous restriction on networks and consortia involving CSOs with different institutional forms no longer applies. CSOs are now able to establish consortia and other groups as long as a collaborative structure is considered necessary for the attainment of shared objectives. After the enactment of the CSO Proclamation, the ACSO registered fifty-six network organizations in 2019. Most of these organizations already existed, though a few new coalitions were also founded. For example, in December, human rights organizations established the Coalition of Ethiopian Human Rights Defenders, with membership open to organizations with a human rights mandate as well as individual activists. The Coalition of CSOs for Voter Education Actors also became operational in 2019 and began to prepare voter education initiatives in an organized, collaborative way. The Coalition of Ethiopian CSOs for Elections registered with the principal mandate of coordinating CSOs’ contributions to free, fair, and credible elections in 2020.

Most consortia engaged in strategic planning and sought to ensure their members’ adherence to codes of conduct in 2019. Despite these efforts, many member organizations did not introduce required policies and procedures by the end of the year. The CSO Proclamation calls for the establishment of a CSO council to represent the sector’s interests. The creation of this council, a joint effort of the ACSO and CSO representatives, was underway during the year.

Several consortia and donor programs focused on building the capacity of CSOs in 2019, especially organizations involved in human rights. Most consortia organized trainings and workshops to inform their members about key changes in the new legal framework. Other projects to build the capacity of CSOs engaged in human rights were launched at the end of 2019. For example, the Pro-just Research and Training Center launched a project entitled “Building Organizational Capacity for Effective Promotion and Protection of Human Rights” with financial support from the Open Society Initiative for Eastern Africa.

The government promotes strategic partnerships with the CSO sector, particularly in health care and education. For example, many government projects in the health-care sector are implemented in cooperation with the Ethiopian Medical Professional’s Association. CSOs’ partnership with media and the private sector improved in 2019. The media promoted the role of CSOs in sustainable development and democratization, and local media helped disseminate information about the importance of an enabling legal environment for CSOs. In a tri-sectoral partnership, the ACSO signed an agreement with the media company Miliket Media and Communication to enhance public understanding of CSOs’ role in 2019. The ACSO hosted consultations with CSOs to prepare this initiative.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.4

Continuing a trend that began in 2017, CSOs’ public image improved moderately in 2019. In the context of the political reform process, both public and private media continued to show interest in covering the CSO sector. The enactment of the CSO Proclamation and the sector’s contribution to democratization was high on most media agendas. CSO representatives spoke to both public and private media about the value of the new law for freedoms of association and expression and the highly acclaimed reform process of the new administration.

With the advent of a reform process emphasizing the role of CSOs in establishing an enduring culture of democracy and human rights, the public continued to develop more positive perceptions of the sector in 2019.
CSOs also enjoyed a significant shift in attitudes on the part of the government. Government officials at all levels stated repeatedly that CSOs were key partners in development and democratization. The ACSO’s agreement with Miliket Media and Communication to promote understanding of CSOs’ role also showed enhanced government respect for the CSO sector.

CSO do not promote themselves through the media, largely because the costs of working with private media are exorbitant. They have improved their use of social media somewhat, although very few organizations use such platforms. Except for some events connected with the enactment of the CSO Proclamation, most CSOs did not implement public relations activities or have regular contact with journalists in 2019. In June, JeeCDO organized a good practice day for community-based organizations to promote their role in sustainable community development.

The CSO Proclamation explicitly recognizes a self-regulatory mechanism in the form of an independent national CSO council. CSOs demonstrated a high degree of solidarity in their efforts to realize the council in 2019, and representatives of the CSO sector conducted a series of consultations with the ACSO regarding its launch. The council will have the mandate of ensuring transparency and accountability in the CSO sector, and it is expected to adopt a code of conduct applicable to the entire sector. Some prominent networks and consortia sought to revise their codes of conduct in line with the new legislative framework. Among other provisions, these codes of conduct usually make it mandatory for member CSOs to adopt operational policies and procedures, including a policy on conflict of interest. For example, CCRDA revised its existing code of conduct and made it mandatory for all members to subscribe to it. Only leading or strong CSOs publish their reports as part of their efforts to ensure transparency and accountability.
Several dramatic developments took place in Gabon in 2019. After President Ali Bongo’s prolonged absence from the public, evidently because of illness, some people called on the government to declare a power vacuum and hold new elections, in accordance with constitutional provisions addressing the president’s incapacitation. The government resisted these demands and resorted instead to intimidation and arrests to dissuade anyone from speaking publicly about the topic. On January 7, as public speculation about the president’s health and lack of public appearances escalated, a group of Republican Guard officers attempted a coup d’état. Within a day, the coup plotters were killed or arrested. Soon after this event, the president named a new government. CSOs viewed the failed coup as an opportunity to call for an inclusive dialogue in Gabon, focused especially on the need for better communication from the government about the president’s health.

In February, Gabon was confronted with the so-called Kevazingo Gate scandal, which involved the illegal logging of kevazingo wood, which is highly valued on the Asian market but has been banned from logging since 2018. In a widespread anti-corruption operation known as Scorpion, the Gabonese authorities seized more than 350 containers of illegally harvested kevazingo wood as they were being readied for export from the port of Owendo. After the impounded containers disappeared in April, the authorities questioned many high-ranking government employees and politicians, and the president fired his vice president and minister of water and forests in a step encouraged by CSOs. About 200 containers were eventually recovered, but the whereabouts of the rest of the shipment, which had a reported street value of about $250 million, are unknown. The Network of Free Civil Society Organizations for Good Governance in Gabon (Réseau des organisations libres de la société civile du Gabon, ROLBG) kept the public informed about the Kevazingo Gate scandal through educational campaigns, position papers, and press releases.

Gabon is an upper-middle-income country dependent on oil as its main export. Despite the government’s efforts to end a prolonged economic crisis caused by the drop in world oil prices in 2014, Gabon’s economy struggled in 2019. According to the World Bank, nearly a third of Gabon’s population lives below the poverty line. Gabon ranked 110 out of 157 countries in the World Bank’s Human Capital Index for 2018 and 132 out of 162 countries in the 2019 Human Freedom Index published by the Fraser Institute, a Canadian think tank.

The sustainability of Gabon’s CSOs was stable in 2019. CSOs’ organizational capacity was moderately stronger as CSOs worked on building trusting relationships with beneficiaries and improving the training of staff in leadership roles. CSO advocacy was moderately stronger thanks to a number of successful campaigns. CSO service provision improved slightly as organizations increased their range of services to meet community needs. The sectoral infrastructure was also stronger as intermediary support organizations (ISOs) and international organizations...
offered new funding and other services and CSOs launched new partnerships with the government and private sector. CSOs’ legal environment, financial viability, and public image were unchanged.

The exact number of CSOs in Gabon is difficult to determine, since they may register with various agencies, and information about registration is not centralized. In 2019, no official statistics on the number of CSOs in Gabon were available. The latest census of CSOs in 2017 by the Gabonese Network of Organizations and Projects (Réseau des organisations et des projets associatifs du Gabon, ROPAGA) documented nearly 1,750 associations. The number of public- and private-sector unions is unknown.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.3**

There were no significant changes in 2019 in the legal environment for Gabonese CSOs, which remained constrained.

Laws 35/62, 18/92, and 3/94 govern the creation and operation of associations, public-sector unions, and private-sector unions, respectively. The law specifies that all CSOs must be registered to operate, although associations registered under Law 35/62 commonly organize community activities before their registrations are completed. Registration procedures for all three types of CSOs are simple and low cost. Unions register by filing applications along with their bylaws and lists of board members with the mayor’s offices of the towns in which their head offices are located. They then receive registration receipts, which allow them to operate. Associations apply to the Ministry of the Interior and receive provisional receipts in a relatively short time. The ministry is supposed to issue final receipts after the moral standards of the founders are investigated. If the ministry deems it necessary, assessments of organizational documents, activities, and compliance with relevant laws are collected from ministries overseeing social security, the environment, youth, sports, and other areas. Although provisional receipts should be valid for only three months, the turnaround time for acquiring final receipts can be long. A recent report from the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) mapping CSOs involved in forestry and agriculture showed that all fifteen Gabonese CSOs documented in the study operated on provisional receipts, even if founded as long ago as 1997.

Associations with legal status may apply for public benefit status, which enables them to access certain sources of government funding. Article 6 of Law 35/62 specifies that associations may be dissolved by presidential decree. CSOs are not required to submit activity reports to the government.

Gabonese CSOs experienced various forms of government harassment in 2019. Organizations focused on good governance, human rights, and democracy continued to have difficulty registering, operating, and expressing themselves freely. For example, on January 25, the president of the Gabon Association for Social Works (Association gabonaise pour les œuvres sociales, AGOS) was sentenced to eight months in prison without the possibility of parole and fined XAF 10 million (more than $17,000) for questioning the integrity of the public prosecutor. After the national board of the trade union confederation Dynamic Unity (Dynamique unitaire, DU) speculated about the president’s death at a press conference in July, four DU members were detained for ten days at the judicial police office. The next day, officials of the Directorate General for Research, a semi-independent department of the national police associated with the president’s office, searched the home of the DU president. The High Commission of Communication subsequently issued a decision forbidding DU from having access to public media for three months.

CSOs faced with unfavorable administrative and political decisions or state-sponsored harassment have recourse to common-law and administrative courts, the Council of State, and the Constitutional Court. However, they know little about these options, and very few cases that go through these channels are successful. Instead, CSOs increasingly turn to international organizations to advance their causes. For example, in July 2019, after the detention of its members, DU filed a complaint with the lower court in Libreville accusing the public prosecutor of...
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abducting, detaining, and aggressively treating many of its members. The case was later closed with no further action. When DU was prohibited from participating in the annual May Day parade in Gabon, it took part in celebrations in France and informed European members of parliament about its treatment by the Gabonese government.

 Freedoms of assembly and protest are enshrined in Gabon's constitution. Law 001/2017 requires public assemblies to be declared in advance. Exceptions to this rule include religious gatherings, non-political sporting events, and meetings of unions and union federations. There were no bans on demonstrations in 2019. However, in March, the national police blocked access to a press conference organized by the citizen movement Call to Action (Appel à agir), which was founded in February 2019 to call for respect for the constitution after the president's reported stroke in October 2018.

 The General Tax Code grants nonprofit associations certain tax advantages. Any funding, gifts, and bequests that they receive are tax free. CSOs are exempt from value-added tax on any expenses going to their general operations, according to Article 210-8 of the General Tax Code.

 By law, CSOs are prohibited from generating revenue from goods and services. In practice, CSOs are tacitly allowed to earn revenue as long as they reinvest the funds into their operations. The Contracts Code prohibits CSOs from bidding on public contracts. However, they may offer consulting services to the government or subcontract with a main contractor to the government provided they use the revenue to support their operations.

 The legal support available to CSOs in Gabon remains limited. No attorneys specialize in issues specific to CSOs, and attorneys are unequally distributed through the country, with most located in major cities such as Libreville and Port-Gentil. Few organizations needing legal advice have the financial resources to pay for attorneys.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.2**

Gabonese CSOs’ organizational capacity improved moderately in 2019, as CSOs made efforts to build trusting relationships with beneficiaries, improve the training of staff in leadership roles, and upgrade the quality of their offices, equipment, and social media use.

CSOs continued to engage their members and beneficiaries through field work and the provision of social services. CSOs have no difficulty identifying the needs of their target groups, since they are the products of communities themselves, and their beneficiaries often engage with them through participatory approaches. For example, as part of its activities to support communities affected by the palm oil agro-industry, Muyissi organized an educational session in Ngounié in April 2019 to gather information about the difficulties encountered by women in those communities, helped the women to identify their training needs, and organized a sales event to promote their self-sufficiency. CSOs maintain relationships of trust with their beneficiaries through projects, local offices, and open communications. For example, to strengthen its relationships with beneficiaries, the Network of CSOs for the Green Economy in Central Africa (Réseau des organisations de la société civile pour l’économie verte en Afrique centrale, ROSCEVAC) opened an office in Mouila, in the Ngounié region, in 2019.

CSOs must identify their purposes and objectives when they are formed. However, a lack of strategic planning and professionalism causes many organizations to deviate from their missions. Most CSOs are unable to raise enough funding to implement their action plans, in part because they find it difficult to follow funding procedures that they find too complex. In addition, the poor economic environment and scarcity of funding drive many CSOs away from their main objectives into other activities. Only a few CSOs, such as Keva Initiative, Brainforest, National Petroleum Employees Organization (Organisation nationale des employés du pétrole, ONEP), and Woman, Environment, Health and Education (Femme, environnement, santé, et éducation, FENSED), have put effort into strategic planning and the implementation of their plans. Some organizations attempt internal evaluations, but their
efforts can seem subjective and difficult to conclude, especially given the lack of national evaluation standards, including general policies, reporting templates, and systematic audits. In 2019, most CSOs had insufficient funding to cover the cost of audits and other external evaluations, even for projects funded by international donors.

Gabon’s laws require that all CSOs have internal governance structures, such as executive committees, general assemblies, and boards of directors, as well as governance tools, including procedural manuals and monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. These structures often do not function properly. The general trend in Gabon is for boards to be only minimally involved in overseeing day-to-day management. Many CSOs do not hold regular general meetings or have administrative and financial manuals. While unions and CSOs that receive support from international donors have relatively solid management systems, few organizations engage voluntarily in transparency measures, such as publishing activity reports and accounting statements.

The lack of vision and low level of professionalism in many CSOs undermine best practices in human resource management. Hiring and retaining qualified paid staff, such as project managers, legal experts, financial professionals, and communications specialists, remains difficult and usually possible only for donor-funded projects. Volunteers fulfill staff roles at most CSOs. Some small steps have been taken to improve the skill of CSOs’ leadership staff through training, role playing, and gradual increases in responsibilities.

The most active and stable CSOs have continued their efforts to procure modern office equipment and vehicles. CSOs usually try to rent offices and use digital technologies to facilitate their work and improve their visibility. Many organizations use social networks such as Facebook to promote their activities or WhatsApp for internal communications. In major and second-tier cities, CSOs have easy access to the internet via cell phones. According to the National Agency of Digital Infrastructures and Frequencies, 48 percent of the population had internet access and 35 percent were social media users in January 2019. Public wi-fi access is not widespread.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.3**

The financial viability of Gabonese CSOs was unchanged in 2019. International donors remained the largest source of funding, but their funds are still generally accessible to only a few CSOs with fundraising and project management expertise. The major donors include the United Nations (UN) Food and Agriculture Organization, USAID, European Union (EU), embassies, and international CSOs. In an attempt to resolve CSOs’ difficulties in responding to the complex requirements of the EU’s calls for bids, the EU delegation in Gabon, through the French embassy, created the Azobé program in 2019. With a budget of XAF 260 million (approximately $450,000), the program will provide CSOs with simpler methods of accessing small amounts of funding, ranging from EUR 15,000 to 60,000 (approximately $17,000–$68,000), for sustainable development projects.

Multiple in-country sources of funding exist, but the funding is usually of short duration and insufficient to sustain organizations over the longer term. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs exist but are not widespread. In 2019, businesses such as Orabank and Société des Brasseries du Gabon provided financial support to Malachie and several other organizations for projects such as food banks and a micro-loan program for market women. The Gabonese government gives some grants for social and environmental projects on a discretionary basis.

Gabon does not have a strong philanthropic culture. Philanthropy is still dominated by political figures. For example, several foundations are associated with the Bongo family, which has ruled Gabon since 1967. These foundations give some support to CSOs but usually work directly with local communities on social projects in health care, education, children’s rights, food, and income-generating activities.
In 2019, CSOs organized many fundraising events, including webathons and gala dinners, to benefit vulnerable groups. These events do not usually earn much money, since the public does not understand this method of fundraising and can have concerns about the use of collected funds. CSOs often receive non-financial support from volunteers and communities in the design and implementation of their activities. Membership dues offer minimal income.

Some CSOs earn income from offering training, consulting, or design services, selling t-shirts and hats, or renting out vehicles. A few social enterprises have been formed, including Malachie’s Self-Sufficiency, Oversight, and Community Savings (AVEC) program, which trains and offers financial support to women as they improve their income-generating skills. In 2019, AVEC helped nearly 140 women who sell goods in the Libreville and Akanda markets.

Stronger CSOs have relatively solid financial management procedures and hire finance professionals such as accountants and auditors. They are required by donors to publish annual activity reports that include financial statements. Other CSOs usually have weak financial management systems.

**ADVOCACY: 4.7**

Gabonese CSOs' advocacy improved moderately in 2019. CSOs took part in public debates, furthered community interests on a wide range of topics, and achieved many advocacy successes during the year.

CSOs interact directly with decision makers at the national, provincial, and local levels. Communication channels include working groups, position papers, press releases, and letters. For example, in 2019, CSOs began to participate in the national working group on the standards of the Round Table for Sustainable Palm Oil, discussions to revise the Labor Code, and the prime minister’s discussion group. Although many of these discussion forums are informal, they reflect the government’s desire to include civil society in its decision-making processes. CSOs also consulted with the government by participating in more formal groups such as the Economic, Social, and Environmental Council and by submitting questions verbally to the National Assembly.

CSOs worked both individually and together to conduct sizable awareness-raising campaigns and influence legislation in 2019. High-priority efforts included educational campaigns to defend the human rights and well-being of vulnerable groups. SOS AVC advocated for better care for stroke victims; Dynamic Youth Awareness (Jeunesse dynamique consciente, JDC) championed respect for human rights; Gender Action (Agir pour le genre) pushed for the restoration of African values in sexual behavior; and ROLBG sought to open up civic space. DU, ONEP, and the Gabon Confederation of Free Trade Unions (Confédération gabonaise des syndicats libres, GCGL) worked together to contribute to a tripartite agreement between the government, employers, and workers on revisions to the Labor Code. The Don’t Touch My Land (Touche pas à ma terre) movement led to the cancellation of the government’s decision to transfer certain land titles from the central government to the Deposit and Consignment Fund. Malachie, Gender Action, Women’s Discussion Platform (Plateforme salon de la femme), and Resolution 1325 Group (Groupe résolution 1325) campaigned to ensure approval of the government’s draft Women, Peace, and Security National Action Plan, which seeks to implement UN Resolution 1325 on women’s participation in conflict resolution. CSOs also advocated with press conferences, position papers, and contact with the upper chamber of parliament to request parliamentary investigations on illegal kevazingo logging and the presidential power vacuum. CSOs successfully called on the president to dismiss his vice president and the minister of water and forests during the Kevazingo Gate scandal.

CSOs are more comfortable lobbying through international institutions than attempts to influence the National Assembly directly. For example, CSOs sometimes send position papers to international development entities and partners on the transfer of land titles involved in forest concessions. In 2019, CSOs continued to lobby the UN
The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), European Institute of Peace, and EU delegation to intervene on their behalf for improvements in the legal environment, government support for civil society, and transparency in the award of government support.

CSOs view Law 35/62 as generally obsolete and restrictive. The law has not been revised since its passage in 1962, despite various advocacy initiatives over the past six years aimed at the government, donors, and international CSOs. Government officials in fact seem reluctant to update the legal framework. At the end of 2019, CSOs were still waiting for an amendment to Law 35/62 in accordance with discussions during the National Dialogue in 2017. CSOs regard the failure of the government to issue final receipts before the legal deadline as a widespread and significant problem, and it has been the target of CSO advocacy since 2012, with no real progress.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 5.0**

CSO service provision improved slightly in 2019 as CSOs increased their range of services to meet community needs.

CSO service provision focuses primarily on vulnerable groups. CSOs offer basic social services in areas such as education, health care, and sanitation, as well as human rights, professional training, and environmental protection.

CSOs' services take into account the public’s priorities and needs. For example, in 2019, the organization Active Angondjé disinfected households and exterminated rats, and Circas Gabon and Caritas Sainte Marie provided free medical consultations. Malachie founded a childcare center to support teen mothers and distributed free school supplies to children from disadvantaged families.

Organizations such as No More AIDS in Families (Plus de sida dans les familles) and Zero AIDS (Zéro sida) offered psychosocial support to vulnerable people, including orphans and people living with HIV/AIDS. Brainforest, Malachie, and ONEP provided services to help needy populations obtain income-generating skills, legal counsel, collective bargaining, and individual and group conflict resolution. ONEP handled nearly 1,800 cases of individuals' labor conflicts. CSOs' services often meet needs identified by beneficiaries themselves through educational sessions, surveys, project evaluations, alerts, and support requests. For example, in August 2019, seventeen Invido communities asked for help from Brainforest to bring a complaint against nine logging companies for failure to comply with provisions of their contracts. CSOs present data through activity reports and media coverage to show that they are present in the field alongside their target groups.

The principle of equality is the basis of CSOs’ actions, and Gabonese CSOs offer goods and services without discrimination. Although they focus on vulnerable populations, CSOs share their expertise with the government, private sector, research institutes, and international CSOs.

Several CSOs generated income in 2019 by charging for their products and services, including training, consulting, t-shirt and hat sales, vehicle rentals, and website and media design services. CSOs usually charge the public only token amounts and sometimes rely on socio-economic surveys to gain a better understanding of their audiences' ability to pay.

The government increasingly acknowledges the impact of CSOs’ activities and has created mechanisms that allow civil society to participate in its processes and discussions. For example, Law 7/2014 on environmental protection acknowledges the role of environmental associations and gives them the right to take part in the National Environmental Commission, Inter-Ministerial Environmental Commission, and Environmental Protection Fund. CSOs can also take action as parties in civil litigation to protect the environment. Government officials sometimes acknowledge CSOs’ contributions in their public statements.
SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.1

The infrastructure supporting CSOs was slightly stronger in 2019, as ISOs and international organizations offered new funding and other services to CSOs, and CSOs launched new partnerships with the government and private sector.

Several resource centers and ISOs support CSOs in Gabon. The Civil Society House, which reopened in 2018, continued to provide office space to CSOs for a small monthly fee in 2019. The Amissa Bongo Ondimba, Omar Bongo Ondimba, Sylvia Bongo Ondimba, and Paul Biyoghe Mba foundations supported Gabonese CSOs with free expert advice, information, technical assistance, and help in starting up local projects. They also offered some funding to CSOs. While little is known about the origin of the funds or the methods that they use to award funding, the foundations seem to support civil society’ priorities and offer their services cost free. In 2019, the Sylvia Bongo Ondimba Foundation launched the Agathe Okumba d’Okwatsegue prize, which recognizes people or associations that promote women’s rights.

International CSOs such as WWF and Caritas France provide funding to domestic organizations. Their grants sometimes support activities that are international in scope. For example, in 2019, the WWF office in Gabon and the Republic of the Congo launched a call for consultants to implement the Free, Informed, Advance Consent process for people in the Messok Dja area of the Republic of the Congo, who were affected by the creation of a protected area in the Sembé. The Gabonese CSO Brainforest won this call for bids.

Many networks, platforms, and partnerships were active in Gabon in 2019. Their goals are typically to share experiences and information and pool efforts on various causes. Prominent platforms include ROLBG, ROSCEVAC, Publish What You Pay (Publiez ce que vous payez, PCQVP), Women’s Discussion Platform, Pan-African Climate Justice Alliance (Alliance panafrique pour la justice climatique, PACJA), and Gabon, My Land, My Right (Gabon, ma terre, mon droit, GMTMD). The Economic, Social and Environmental Council remains the main government institution that offers CSOs an opportunity to present and promote their rights.

Throughout the year, international institutions and organizations such as OCHA, International Organization of La Francophonie, Economic Community of Central African States, and WWF offered training to CSOs. Training topics included climate change, environmental standards, strategies to encourage political participation by marginalized groups, and human rights in the context of business activity. In April 2019, with funding from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, ROSCEVAC and PACJA offered training to CSOs on creating and managing community development projects. The international Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) mechanism also offered capacity building to CSOs. Training is delivered in French. Although available training opportunities are still not sufficient to meet CSOs’ needs, they align with their priorities.

Most actors are aware of the advantages of intersectoral partnerships, but there are gaps in the methods used to create them. For example, there was no communication between CSOs and private-sector players about signing partnership agreements in 2019. Some collaboration between CSOs and businesses takes place in the context of CSR programs, mostly for service provision. For example, Gender Action received support from the oil company Vaalco for school-based teen pregnancy educational programs in 2019. At WWF’s initiative, a civil society platform was formed in December 2019 to oversee corporate compliance with social and environmental standards.

The idea of formal partnerships between civil society and the government is still in its infancy. Initiatives-Development-Research-Consulting (Initiatives-développement-recherche-conseils, IDRC) Africa, an organization that works on the environmental and social aspects of major investment projects, launched the One Gabonese, One Garden program in 2019 to train young arborists to tend vegetable seedling gardens under a partnership agreement signed with the Ministry of Agriculture. A local CSO facilitated a public-private partnership for
sustainable palm oil production in Gabon, and CSOs took part in the cooperation framework on revising the Labor Code in 2019.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.9**

CSOs’ public image was stable in 2019. Civil society was seen as productively engaged on public policy issues and communicated effectively about their activities.

CSOs rely on the media to convey messages about their work at both the national and local levels. They have access to traditional and online media. However, some CSOs criticize restrictions levied by public media, such as the censorship of statements by union members if the government considers them aggressive. In addition, many organizations continue to have difficulty paying for media coverage of their activities. To compensate, some CSOs maintain personal relationships with journalists and use online social media to improve their visibility and public image.

Although the public still sees their contributions as insufficient to meet the country’s development needs, perceptions of Gabonese CSOs have improved as their local presence and direct contact with beneficiaries have grown. Although wider-ranging efforts to educate and mobilize the public are still needed, the public is gaining a clearer idea about civil society’s role as a development actor. CSOs’ national advocacy and services to businesses have led to a better appreciation of civil society in the public and private sectors. CSOs are more often invited to the table when national policies and strategies are discussed or corporations are implementing CSR strategies. The government appreciates CSOs’ contributions unless they denounce its human rights and freedoms violations, corruption, financial crimes, lack of transparency, or related concerns.

Very few CSOs had clearly defined communications strategies in 2019, since they lacked the financial resources to develop them. Organizations inform the public about their activities and promote their image mainly through the media, social networks, field missions, and communications materials such as banners, posters, flyers, and t-shirts. Some CSOs cultivate close relationships with journalists.
The Gambia continued its transition to democracy in 2019, which was made possible by the end of the twenty-three-year Jammeh dictatorship in 2016. In November, the Constitutional Review Commission released the first draft of a new constitution for public comment. Many people believe the new constitution is needed because of numerous amendments to the current constitution, which were introduced during the period of dictatorship to weaken the country’s democratic standards. The release of the draft constitution generated huge interest. Public opinion polls indicated deeply divided views of the draft, particularly regarding the secularity of the state, the inclusion of Shari’ah as a source of law, and the existence of Shari’ah courts. The Constitutional Review Commission was praised at home and abroad for its management of an intense, inclusive, and participatory consultative process. CSOs contributed by urging citizens to take part in the review, advocating for social and economic rights to be included in the draft, and pressuring the government to keep to the announced timeline for the review. The commission said that it expected a referendum on the new constitution to take place before December 2021, when the next presidential election is scheduled to take place.

The Truth, Reconciliation, and Reparations Commission established in 2017 continued to hear testimony from victims, perpetrators, and witnesses of events during the dictatorship. Civil society is well represented on the eleven-member commission, which continued to engage with CSOs to raise public awareness of and participation in its work. The Gambia Bar Association, Association of Non-Governmental Organizations in The Gambia (TANGO), and many other CSOs engaged with international human rights organizations to discuss the prosecution of cases of sexual violence and execution, which are difficult to conduct in The Gambia because of the weak capacity of the justice system.

Political life was roiled in March when the popular leader of the United Democratic Party (UDP), a member of the governing coalition, was sacked along with the ministers of finance and agriculture, who were also UDP members. The firings followed sharp divisions between the UDP and President Adama Barrow over Barrow’s stated intention to abandon a campaign promise to serve only a three-year transitional period and instead seek a new term in 2021. A new civil group known as Three Years Jotna (“Three Years Is Up”) demanded that the president step down at the end of the transitional period in January 2020. The Jotna group staged its first mass protest in December 2019, which the police confined to an uninhabited area along the highway to Banjul.

1 The score for the legal environment was recalibrated in 2019 to better reflect the situation in the country and align it with other scores in the region. Without this recalibration, the overall score for CSO sustainability in The Gambia would be 5.0. The recalibration changes the overall score to 4.9.
The Gambia’s economy grew at a slightly slower rate of 6 percent in 2019, according to the World Bank. The economy is heavily dependent on agriculture and tourism, both of which have suffered shocks in recent years because of climate change and the Ebola crisis. A large number of Gambians have returned from abroad since 2017 to set up small and medium-sized businesses across the country. The United Nations (UN) World Food Program reported that The Gambia’s poverty rate was as high as 48 percent in 2019, and food insecurity was rising. Many people work in the informal sector, and youth unemployment was above 40 percent, according to the African Development Bank.

The overall sustainability of The Gambia’s CSO sector improved moderately in 2019, moving the country from the Sustainability Impeded to the Sustainability Evolving range. CSOs’ organizational capacity was moderately stronger as CSOs built constituencies more effectively despite ongoing challenges with governance, staffing, and equipment. New sources of external funding afforded moderate improvement in CSOs’ financial viability. CSO advocacy strengthened moderately with the proliferation of activities directed at holding the government accountable. The sector’s public image was buoyed slightly by positive media coverage and favorable public opinion. CSOs’ legal environment, service provision, and sectoral infrastructure did not change.

While the number of CSOs in The Gambia is unknown, the CSO sector was fluid and evidently expanding in 2019 with the emergence of many new groups focused on myriad issues.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.0**

The legal environment for CSOs in The Gambia remained the same in 2019. As in 2018, CSOs for the most part operated freely and openly, although a few organizations were denied permits to protest and, in what appeared to be an isolated incident, several journalists were assaulted by members of a crowd during a tour of the president.

The Companies Act of 2013 and the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) Act of 2009 continued to be the main laws governing CSOs. CSOs register with the Ministry of Justice, and after two years of operation, they may apply to register as NGOs with the NGO Affairs Agency in the Ministry of Regional Governments and Land. The number of NGOs is small, since the status conveys no real benefit. CSOs may operate without legal registration.

Since the government loosened restrictions on registration in 2018, the registration process has been fairly easy and efficient, although some delays continued to be reported in 2019. The Companies Act and NGO Act do not impose strict reporting obligations, other than the requirement that NGOs indicate their sources of funding and “provide strategies for financial self-reliance and institutional sustainability.” The minister of interior may take steps to remedy a CSO’s breach of the NGO Act but did not do so in 2019. No CSO reported interference in its internal governance during the year.

Although the highly restrictive Public Order Act 2009 remained in force in 2019, CSOs generally enjoyed unfettered freedom of assembly, aside from two isolated incidents. The first incident involved the youth movement Occupy Brikama Area Council, or #OccupyBAC, which was denied a permit to protest poor service provision by the local government. In July 2019, when the group staged a protest without a permit, a heavily armed paramilitary police force mobilized to break up the group. The police used teargas and batons to disperse the protesters, and several injuries and property damage occurred. The police arrested the group’s leaders under the Public Order

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2 The score for the legal environment was recalibrated from 5.5 in 2018 to 5.0 in 2019 to better reflect the situation in the country and align it with other scores in the region. The score does not reflect a change in the legal environment, which remained largely the same as in 2018.
Act and confiscated bundles of their t-shirts. With charges still pending, the arrested activists had not been taken to court by the end of the year.

A similar clampdown took place in the country’s largest city, Serekunda, in July, when many people were injured during a protest that erupted spontaneously to denounce the death of a vendor working in the city’s main market. The vendor was temporarily detained and allegedly tortured by a special police unit known as the Anti-Crime Unit. The National Human Rights Commission conducted an investigation into the incident but had not shared its findings by the end of the year. In addition, some journalists were harassed by supporters of the president during his countrywide tour in November.

The Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States has urged the government to bring its draconian media laws in line with international standards, but the reform was not undertaken in 2019. Publishing false news remained a criminal offense, and severe criticism of the president could be viewed as sedition. The Gambia lacks a freedom of information law. The registration of newspapers remains expensive.

CSO do not pay taxes on grants or revenue from the sale of products and services. They are eligible for waivers on duties for materials and equipment imported for their activities. Donors to CSOs do not receive tax deductions.

CSOs are not restricted from selling goods and products to generate income. They may engage in fundraising activities and accept foreign funding. Some government contracts are available to CSOs, especially for services in the areas of education and health care.

Competent legal counsel is available in the country. While larger CSOs sometimes retain lawyers, their fees are

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**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.0**

The CSO sector’s organizational capacity improved moderately in 2019. As CSOs sought to perform their roles more effectively, their passion and commitment allowed them to build constituencies, engage communities, and expand their programs and activities. At the same time, CSOs continued to be challenged by inadequate governance, staffing, and equipment.

CSOs usually build and maintain strong constituencies, especially with persons with disabilities or living with HIV/AIDS. CSOs work effectively in rural communities and with women and other vulnerable groups that are excluded from or have limited access to services and other opportunities. Some large CSOs, such as ActionAid International The Gambia (AAITG), have strong constituencies among youth. CSOs’ ability to connect with their constituencies is driven by their high level of passion and commitment, which enables them to achieve the necessary impact.

Established and prominent CSOs, such as AAITG, United Purpose (UP), ChildFund (CF), and Catholic Relief Services (CRS), usually have strategic plans that they follow and use to evaluate their results against set goals. Smaller CSOs have annual work plans at best, both because they are unable to fund the development of full-blown strategic plans and because they have limited scopes of activity. Smaller CSOs that are able to develop strategic plans usually lack the resources to implement them fully.

Registered CSOs are required by law to have governing boards, although the boards may not function effectively. Large CSOs, which constitute about 10 percent of the CSO sector, have clearly defined management structures, such as senior management teams and committees for procurement, gender, and finance. They usually have necessary organizational tools and policies to ensure transparency, accountability, and effective management. Their
internal policies and guidelines are usually written. Smaller CSOs have weaker systems in line with their limited resources, staff, and scopes of activity.

Very few CSOs, other than large organizations, have full complements of staff. At most CSOs, especially small organizations, the staff has limited competence and technical ability. The Gambia’s culture of volunteerism is robust, and most CSOs depend on volunteers. The contributions of volunteers have helped many CSOs conduct their activities with relatively few resources and reduced technical capacity. In fact, most organizations, including Child Protection Alliance (CPA), Network Against Gender-Based Violence, and Gambia Family Planning Association (GFPA), began as volunteer movements.

Large CSOs, such as UP, AAITG, CF, and CRS, usually have sufficient office equipment. Smaller organizations are poorly equipped because of lack of financial resources. However, with the spread of internet services, most CSOs can now access the internet through wi-fi dongles. Big CSOs typically have permanent internet infrastructures, such as antennas and modems, as well as functioning websites. Most organizations have social media accounts.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.0**

Although CSOs continued to face severe funding challenges, new sources of external funding afforded moderate improvement of their financial viability in 2019.

Most CSO funding continued to be external in 2019. Major donors, including the UN, European Union, European embassies, and international foundations, maintained funding levels consistent with the previous year. New funding areas included corruption, sexual violence, and gender issues. For example, the National Endowment for Democracy granted funding to the Anti-Corruption Coalition Gambia (ACCG) in partnership with the Partnership for Transparency to encourage public involvement in fighting corruption.

Donors’ stringent funding requirements usually limit eligibility to bigger CSOs. Some smaller organizations, including Gambia Participates, Green Up Gambia, Salimatou Foundation for Education, and Activista, obtained substantial donor funding for projects in areas such as corruption, education, environmental protection, and human rights. Larger CSOs sometimes partner with smaller local organizations to obtain funding.

Domestic funding opportunities for CSOs are limited. There are few philanthropic organizations or corporate social responsibility programs. CSOs sometimes get piecemeal funding from businesses or embassies for one-off events, such as celebrations on World AIDS Day, International Human Rights Day, Day of the African Child, and World Disability Day. The #IAmToufah march against sexual violence in June 2019 was supported by a business that provided t-shirts, food, and water.

The government does not offer grants or subsidies to CSOs and also does not usually contract with CSOs. However, a few organizations with expertise in education and health care, such as GFPA, AAITG, and Future-In-Our-Hands The Gambia (FIOH), have obtained government contracts for services such as the construction of classrooms and health care. These contracts usually originate in development partners’ requirement that CSOs be involved in any government projects that they fund. For example, funding from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria was channeled through the government to organizations such as AAITG, CRS, GFPA, Health Promotion and Development Organization, and Santa Yalla Support Society in 2019.

Fundraising is a challenge for Gambian CSOs because of their limited capacity and the public’s limited means. CSOs sometimes market goods and services or rent chairs and meeting halls. But since they do not see themselves as profit-making enterprises, CSOs often set prices that are far below commercial rates. Membership subscriptions are few, and fundraising events do not bring in much revenue. The practice of crowdfunding does not exist. CSOs have access to non-monetary support, such as volunteer labor from their communities and beneficiary groups.
A few bigger CSOs, such as CF, CRS, and UP, have sound financial management systems and undergo annual audits. Smaller CSOs lack financial management capacity and do not have the resources to conduct audits.

ADVOCACY: 4.2

CSO advocacy strengthened moderately in 2019 with the proliferation of activities to hold the government accountable. The new democratic transition has offered greater space to CSOs to raise sensitive issues with the government, and civil society helped ensure that democracy and good governance continued to prevail. In particular, CSOs engaged in determined campaigns to protect the environment, fight corruption and government excess, and encourage the constitutional review process.

CSOs engaged frequently with the government at both the central and local levels in 2019. CSO representatives continued to take part in the Constitutional Review Commission, National Human Rights Commission, and Truth, Reparation, and Reconciliation Commission. CSOs had formal and informal meetings with ministers and parliamentarians to discuss legal and institutional reforms in the public sector, especially of the security agencies. They also raised sensitive issues in social media, protests, and campaigns. The CSO community was unable to obtain an audience with the president in 2019.

Advocacy campaigns continued to grow in 2019. For example, the Access to Information Coalition, which includes ten organizations led by the Gambia Press Union (GPU) and TANGO, pushed, albeit unsuccessfully, for an access to information law. The coalition conducted a series of workshops for CSOs, law enforcement agencies, public officials, and journalists to seek their support for the campaign.

Strong campaigns to protect the environment and fight against corruption and government excess took place in 2019. In the coastal towns of Gunjur, Sanyang, and Kartong, local communities and movements struggled unsuccessfully to have Chinese fishmeal factories closed down. Although several activists and youths were arrested and charged with trespassing, the actions prompted the government to temporarily close the factory in Gunjur and demand corrections to its waste management system. Organizations such as Team Gomsabopa, OccupyWestfield, and Gambia Participates continued to speak out against corruption on radio and television in 2019, although they did not make much progress in curbing corrupt practices. CSOs protested the award to a local company of a $35 million contract for road rehabilitation in Banjul, saying that award was made without due diligence and other necessary checks.

Civil society was heavily engaged in the process of drafting the new constitution. Several organizations, including the Gambia Bar Association, TANGO, GPU, Activista, a group of clerics under the Concerned Citizens banner, and the Muslim and Christian councils, submitted position papers advocating for a constitution that protects all rights. New social movements dominated by young activists also emerged, including Three Years Jotna, which staged its first protest in December. Another important new group was Our Nation Our Voice, a movement advocating for transitional justice.

Lobbying is not a common practice in The Gambia. However, in November 2019, CSO campaigns prompted the government to withdraw a controversial provision in the Criminal Offenses Bill making it an offense to “insult” the parents of the president, ministers, parliamentarians, and other senior government officials.

CSOs have sought since 2018 to force a review the Public Order Act to better protect the right to freedom of assembly. CSOs are mainly concerned that the law requires protest organizers to obtain permits from the Inspector General of Police before embarking on processions or using public address systems during demonstrations. The act empowers the Inspector General to grant or deny permits without having to provide a reason. Human rights defenders and other activists consider these provisions contrary to international law and standards on freedom of assembly. In 2019, TANGO and the Gambia Bar Association organized workshops for
activists and the police to discuss the Public Order Act, with funding from the US-based International Center for Not-for-Profit Law. CSOs have not yet addressed the NGO Act or the Companies Act.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.6**

Service provision by Gambian CSOs was constant in 2019. CSOs continued to provide much-needed support to communities and affected groups in all regions. The services ranged from health care, education, and agriculture to livelihood skills for school drop-outs. For example, CF operates educational programs for children, AAITG supports farmers, and UP helps communities overcome the effects of climate change.

Thanks to their work in communities, CSOs understand and respond to local challenges. In many communities, support for CSOs is far greater than support for the government. In November 2019, in response to the hardships experienced by local farmers as a result of climate change, AAITG launched a multimillion dollar project on climate resilience and sustainable agriculture targeting thirty rural communities. In December, CF donated a twenty-foot container full of footballs to rural communities as part of a project to improve the lives of deprived, excluded, and vulnerable children. FIOH conducted country-wide training and sensitization activities on a wide range of issues, including gender, women’s empowerment, and governance, and hosted dialogue forums between parliamentarians and their electorates.

Some CSOs provide services to their members only, while others provide services to communities as a whole or to specific target groups. TANGO, for example, is composed of member organizations but serves both member and non-member CSOs, especially through its training programs. Similarly, not all journalists are members of GPU, but the union will defend any journalist faced with harassment, regardless of membership status. CSOs that produce publications share them with the public, government, private sector, and academia.

CSOs sell goods and services not to make profits but to support their continued operations. They generally price their goods and services so that poorer community members can afford them. For example, the Gambia Beehives Association sells honey to the public, and GFPA provides health-care services for a fee. UP supports the establishment of marketing federations among farmers, so that as a cooperative they can buy their members’ produce to sell to the public.

CSOs and the government enjoyed a cordial relationship in 2019, and public authorities always welcomed CSOs to their meetings, events, and other activities. The government is not known to have rejected or disapproved of CSOs’ contributions during the year.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.1**

CSOs’ sectoral infrastructure did not change in 2019. A few large organizations, such as AAITG and FIOH, operate resource centers. They usually offer reading and audio-visual materials. No intermediary support organizations operated in The Gambia in 2019.

There are no local grantmaking organizations. A few companies, such as TAF Global Gambia, QGroup, Unique Solutions, and several banks, and a few wealthy individuals such as Momodou Turo Darboe offer very limited support to CSOs and communities for specific events or incidents.

A number of new thematic networks emerged in 2019. For example, ACCG was created by TANGO, Gambia Participates, Anti-Corruption International The Gambia, and a few other organizations. The CSO Dialogue Forum emerged to promote human rights and support the National Human Rights Commission. Existing networks, such as TANGO, Child Protection Alliance, West African Network for Peace Building, Gambia Federation of the
Disabled, Freedom of Information Coalition, and Anti-Forest Fire Campaign, continued to offer training and share documents, research reports, and information on topics such as funding, training, and partnership opportunities. They also served as platforms for organizations to advocate on issues of shared concern.

The Gambia has no specialized training institutes for CSOs. Various commercial training institutes, including Insight Training Institute, Jollof Tutors, Strafford College, and Trust Communications, offer courses that are relevant to CSOs. Training topics range from financial and human resource management to advocacy and computer technology. CSO staff usually provide training to other staff members, although organizations sometimes bring in external trainers to train their staff.

There are no specific mechanisms for CSOs to form partnerships with the government or the private sector. Individual CSOs may have informal partnerships with various stakeholders. For example, TANGO cooperates with the Gambia Chamber of Commerce and Industry, GPU works with the Ministry of Justice, and the Child Protection Alliance communicates directly with the Department of Social Welfare. These partnerships or cordial working relationships allow the organizations and government offices to share information and pursue joint programs on issues of mutual concern, such as child rights, gender-based violence, or the rights of persons with disabilities. CSOs’ relationships with businesses remain undeveloped and undefined, even though both sides appreciate the other as critical for the development of the country.

The relationship between the media and CSOs has always been cordial. CSOs depend on the media to promote their causes and obtain visibility and legitimacy, while the media depends on CSOs for income. Many CSOs pay for access to radio or television programs and to advertise with newspapers.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.4

CSOs’ public image improved slightly in 2019 as CSOs continued to enjoy favorable media coverage and were highly visible on all media platforms. Several media houses broadcast special coverage, exclusive stories, and prime-time features about CSOs as well as interviews with civil society actors. For example, Youth Hour, a program hosted by the leading television station QTV, featured youth groups and women’s rights organizations in 2019. Several radio and television stations broadcast Constitution Hour, which offered CSOs a platform to discuss the draft constitution.

Public views of CSOs are overwhelmingly positive. The public recognizes CSOs’ immense contribution to improving lives and livelihoods, exposing corruption, defending human rights, and holding the government accountable. However, some mistrust of CSOs lingers from the previous regime, including the misconception that they are money-making enterprises or foreign-backed agents. There are justifiable concerns about transparency and accountability at some organizations.

The government was not always happy with CSOs in 2019 because of disagreements over issues such as the national budget, corruption, and the president’s sacking of a National Assembly member in February. However, both CSOs and the government recognize each other’s indispensable roles and the need to partner for the good of the country.
Private-sector perceptions of CSOs were generally good in 2019. Businesses recognize that CSOs bring them significant income by purchasing their goods and services.

CSOs generally do not make great efforts to raise public awareness about their activities. Most organizations have social media accounts, but they often do not use them effectively to showcase their work. Several organizations are active online, either through social media or the livestreaming of their activities. Groups such as Gambia Participates, Team Gomsabopa, and ACCG produced several radio and television programs about their efforts to fight corruption in 2019. Otherwise, most organizations ensure visibility by staying active in their communities.

CSOs in The Gambia do not engage in across-the-board self-regulation. Individual CSOs may have codes of conduct in their constitutions or separate documents, and they usually seek to comply with them. The only sectoral self-regulatory mechanism is a media council set up by GPU to monitor journalists and media houses. Very few CSOs publish annual reports. Those organizations that do produce annual reports rarely share them with stakeholders.
The New Patriotic Party (NPP) government in Ghana served the third year of its four-year term in 2019. President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo outlined his main policies in his third state-of-the-nation address at the Parliament House in February. His proposals included amending Articles 55(3) and 243(1) of Ghana’s constitution to pave the way for the direct election of metropolitan, municipal, and district chief executives (MMDCEs) from candidates sponsored by political parties. The proposal was heavily debated amid concerns that partisan local elections would further polarize the country along tribal and political lines. A referendum on the amendment was scheduled for December 17, but on December 1, the president canceled the referendum and withdrew the proposed amendment, citing a lack of political consensus. This reversal elicited mixed reactions from civil society groups but was welcomed by the main opposition political party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC), which had campaigned vigorously against the amendment.

Another significant political development in 2019 was the outbreak of violence during the January 31 by-election to elect a new member of parliament for Ayawaso-West Wogon constituency after the incumbent died. Chaos erupted when masked vigilante groups wearing uniforms of national security forces and allegedly allied with the ruling party invaded some polling stations and attacked suspected opponents, injuring twenty-six people. CSOs and development partners condemned the bloodshed and called for a public investigation. In response to the outcry, the president established a four-member presidential commission of inquiry, which, six weeks later, submitted a report with recommendations to restructure the national security and police, disband the SWAT team of the National Security Council Secretariat, and punish those found to have violated the criminal code. The incident led to the passage of the Vigilante and Related Offenses Act, which bans acts of vigilantism in the country.

A dissatisfied public accused the government of security lapses following the murder of a prominent investigative journalist and the failure of the police to resolve the case of three kidnapped Takoradi girls, who were later found dead. The arrest and trial of alleged coup plotters and the rejection of a comprehensive sexual education curriculum proposed by the Ghana Education Service were other major topics of public debate. During the year, Ghana was visited by many members of the diaspora as part of the “Year of Return” promoting tourism.

Ghana’s economy was generally stable in 2019. The government completed its Extended Credit Facility Program with the International Monetary Fund, which commended Ghana for its strong macroeconomic performance while highlighting possible external risks with the 2020 elections. Provisional data provided by the Ghana Statistical Services indicates a rate of 6.5 percent growth for the gross domestic product, compared to 6.3 percent in 2018. Exchange rate difficulties continued to plague the economy as the cedi depreciated drastically against the U.S. dollar in the third and fourth quarters.
The overall sustainability of Ghanaian CSOs did not change in 2019. Advocacy remained the most vibrant dimension and improved slightly with several successful efforts, including passage of the Right to Information (RTI) Bill. CSOs’ financial viability deteriorated slightly as donors shifted their priorities and reduced funding for STAR-Ghana, the major local funder. All other dimensions were unchanged.

The number of CSOs registered with the Department of Social Development (DSD) increased from 7,950 in 2018 to 9,251 in 2019. The increase may be attributed to banks’ strict enforcement of laws dealing with money laundering and illicit financial flows, which require any company registered as a nonprofit organization (NPO) to submit a permit or certificate from the DSD to prove that it is registered before opening a bank account. Of the total number of CSOs registered in 2019, only 788 organizations renewed their operating permits during the year.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 3.9**

CSOs’ legal environment did not change in 2019. CSOs register with the Registrar General’s Department as NPOs limited by guarantee under the Companies Act. The process is fairly easy, although beginning in 2019 CSOs must include their constitutions with registration materials. After registration, CSOs acquire permits to operate from the DSD, which has oversight responsibility for NPOs. The permits are subject to annual renewal, but many CSOs do not bother to do this, because the rule is rarely enforced. Many organizations experienced delays in obtaining certification from the DSD in 2019, especially at the local level, mainly because of the DSD’s lack of organizational capacity. For example, Syppa Ghana in Ashaiman, in the greater Accra region, waited nearly three months to finalize its registration. The Central Bank’s stricter enforcement of measures to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing, coupled with the delays in obtaining permits to operate, made it difficult for many newly registered CSOs to open bank accounts and start operations.

A new Companies Act was passed in 2019 to improve corporate governance standards. The act establishes the Office of the Registrar of Companies, an autonomous government body, to replace the Registrar General’s Department; requires business owners to declare their beneficiaries before they can be incorporated; and establishes a central register of directors, to which the public will have access. Following passage of the act, the registrar served notice that it would more strictly enforce regulations requiring, among other things, that all companies, including NPOs, file annual returns signed by their directors. The Office of the Registrar of Companies indicated that in 2020 it will begin to delete the names of companies that are defunct or have failed to file annual returns in line with the statutes.

Company regulations stipulate that CSOs must operate in accordance with their objectives and nonprofit status. Because of past cases of abuse and neglect, the DSD regularly scrutinizes CSOs that operate social welfare services, such as orphanages and shelter homes, to ensure that children under their care are protected. Other CSOs, including those in research and advocacy, do not face significant hindrances.

CSOs in Ghana generally operate free of state harassment. The state does not censor CSOs. However, individual government officials occasionally chastise CSOs that they consider to be opposed to certain government policies. Both urban and rural organizations are able to participate in protests.

Grants and other income received by Ghanaian CSOs are not taxed. CSOs pay all statutory taxes on behalf of employees, including pay-as-you-earn and social security taxes, as well as indirect taxes such as value-added tax (VAT) on goods and services. CSOs are obliged to pay taxes on income from commercial activities, although government agencies are not known to tax CSOs on their sale of books.

CSOs are allowed to charge fees for services and establish social enterprises to earn income. CSOs may establish social enterprises, provided they amend their registrations, but few organizations have done so. CSOs may
compete for government contracts to undertake projects such as research, capacity building, and infrastructure projects, including the construction of educational facilities, but they rarely do so. CSOs are free to undertake fundraising campaigns and accept funding from foreign donors.

Since there is no law specifically governing CSOs, organizations seek legal advice from general practitioners or attorneys specialized in company law. Quality legal advice is available in the capital, Accra, and other major cities. CSOs are not usually involved in legal cases.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 3.9**

The organizational capacity of Ghanaian CSOs was unchanged in 2019. CSOs usually have targeted constituencies and undertake activities in response to their identified needs. CSO generally have good relationships with their constituents, and targeted beneficiaries usually participate in CSOs’ activities. For example, the Wassa Association of Communities Affected by Mining (WACAM) mobilizes community members on the effects of mining. Its activities are community led in that community members call on WACAM to take action on situations that they deem detrimental to their well-being. A few CSOs occasionally face criticism from some of their stakeholders. For example, organizations that work on governance and anti-corruption issues may encounter difficulties in working with political parties. The Institute for Economic Affairs has been boycotted and accused of bias by the largest opposition party.

CSOs in Ghana have mission statements, which are required for registration. Unregistered and informal social movements and groups usually also have mission statements to define what they do. Most CSOs, including rural organizations, now have strategic plans, since STAR-Ghana, the country’s largest local funder, requires strategic plans to accompany grant applications. However, most organizations are unable fully to implement their strategic plans because grants, including those from STAR-Ghana, rarely include core funding for institutional development. CSOs in Ghana typically measure their performance through feedback from donors and beneficiaries. Organizations that perform well tend to attract new or regular funding to continue their work. STAR-Ghana conducts due diligence and sustainability assessments of grantees to inform the award of new grants.

Nearly all CSOs have defined leadership and governance structures. Although CSOs must identify their board members at the time of registration, most CSOs, both large and small, are challenged by the composition and tenure of their boards. For example, most organizations have not changed their boards since they were established. Although clear divisions exist between the work of board members and staff, not all organizations, especially smaller and rural organizations, follow the best corporate governance practices, with the board of directors approving critical decisions. Most CSOs strive to be open and transparent with their funders and targeted beneficiaries but not with the public at large. In part, this is because the public sees CSOs as providers of charity, and CSOs fear that knowledge of their finances will induce the public to increase its financial demands, thereby affecting project implementation. In most organizations, conflicts of interest are limited because of stringent donor requirements for transparency in procurement and financial reporting.

The retention of staff members remains a significant challenge for both large and small CSOs. Most donors only provide project-based funding, which makes it difficult for CSOs to give long-term contracts to their staff members. Job security in the sector is low, and the rate of attrition is high. Although CSOs typically seek to develop staff skills through capacity-building workshops or specialized training programs, fewer organizations could afford these costs in 2019. Succession planning remains an unfamiliar concept to both urban and rural CSOs, although a few organizations, such as the West Africa Media Foundation, Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana), and West Africa Network for Peace Building, have developed succession plans and engaged in successful transitions.
Many CSOs work with volunteers and interns on an ad hoc basis. CDD-Ghana regularly advertises internship programs and engages both local and international interns and volunteers every year. Most CSOs rely on the services of volunteers if they have large projects or short periods in which to complete activities. For instance, in 2019, some CSOs recruited volunteers to help their core staff implement activities related to local elections, such as voter registration and polling observation.

The use of information technology managers and other professionals is common, especially at large urban organizations. In recent years, many urban CSOs have begun to hire communications officers to help with media and public relations. They usually also have accountants on their permanent staff. Smaller organizations hire accountants on a temporary basis to help them with financial reporting but do not have the resources to hire other specialists.

In the current economic climate, CSOs have limited to no funding for furnishing their offices. Most project-based grants offer minimal support for replacing office equipment. With recent improvements in internet penetration, Ghanaian CSOs generally have access to internet services. Most staff check emails and convey and obtain information through smartphones. CSOs in both urban and rural areas use social media to disseminate information and showcase their activities.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.0**

CSOs’ financial viability deteriorated slightly in 2019. In general, Ghanaian CSOs are overly dependent on foreign funding. Major donors include the European Union, United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, USAID, Oxfam, and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). None of these donors announced major grant opportunities or calls for proposals for CSOs in 2019. Recent changes in donors’ priorities have undercut the work of some organizations. For example, the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) reduced its aid from DKK 124.5 million (approximately $19.7 million) in 2018 to DKK 23.850 million (approximately $3.7 million) in 2019, while shifting its priority to trade and ending funding for STAR-Ghana. This loss of income reduced STAR-Ghana’s budget and, going forward, the budgets of CSOs that STAR-Ghana used to support with DANIDA funding. In addition, some donors now prioritize lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) issues in their human rights programs. However, because of cultural and religious pressures, many human rights CSOs in Ghana are not interested in championing LGBTI issues, which has affected their funding streams.

Very few CSOs in Ghana have multiple sources of funding. Most rural and community-based organizations (CBOs) depend completely on one funding source. Although CSOs are making a conscious effort to diversify their funding sources, the search for funding has become very competitive as viable sources of funding continue to shrink. In addition, there is no centralized database on funding opportunities for CSOs other than UKAID’s Devtracker, which does not list all opportunities. Finally, even if an organization has more than one source of funding, the funding is usually project based. Funders such as STAR-Ghana, Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA), and UNDP usually provide funding for one-year periods. Organizations can be drastically affected when multiple projects end at about the same time.

Domestic funding for CSOs is limited. The government does not fund CSOs in Ghana. However, some CSOs are able to obtain contracts with government agencies, and at times, service-providing CSOs partner with government agencies and private-sector companies at the local level to implement projects in water, sanitation, and health. For example, the Ghana AIDS Commission partners with CSOs on HIV/AIDS activities and maternal health education.

Local philanthropy is not well developed, and CSOs receive little funding from businesses other than a few that have corporate social responsibility (CSR) funds for specific activities. For example, a handful of mostly small
organizations receive funding from the corporate foundations of telecommunications and mining firms. But budgets for CSR programs are usually tiny, and the funding tends to come as small grants for short-term projects.

Ghanaian CSOs do not usually fundraise in local communities, mainly because the public perceives CSOs as sources of charity. Crowdfunding has not taken root, although informally, a few groups and individuals use crowdfunding to raise funds to pay for hospitalizations or surgeries for needy individuals. The Ghana Philanthropy Forum has started an awards scheme to promote giving in an effort to harness domestic resources to support the work of CSOs. CSO coalitions and membership-based organizations find it challenging to raise funds from their members. CSOs sometimes draw on in-kind support from local communities. For instance, traditional leaders and other local groups may grant organizations access at little or no cost to facilities such as community centers, public address systems, and classrooms. But such practices are not the norm.

Ghanaian CSOs do not earn substantial income from their services or products. For example, public interest in paying fees for CSOs’ publications is low. Although advocacy is underway to popularize the concept of social enterprises, only a handful of CSOs have established social enterprises as sources of income. For example, in northern Ghana, Afrikids’ Energy for Life initiative sells clean cook stoves to generate funds for its charitable projects. Beads of Hope in the Upper East region raises money through a social enterprise, Detiina, that trains young women to produce and sell jewelry. STAR-Ghana’s sustainability program has helped some of its grantees to develop their capacity to earn income through paid services.

Many donors require sound financial management systems, and nearly all Ghanaian CSOs have such systems in place. Donors usually also require audit reports to be included with grant applications and additional audits to be performed after funding is awarded. STAR-Ghana conducts due diligence assessments to identify potential risks in organizations before disbursing funds. CSOs that receive regular donor funding use the services of professional accountants. The publication of annual reports and financial statements is common among large organizations, as well as smaller CSOs that receive funding specifically to carry out such activities.

**ADVOCACY: 3.3**

Advocacy is the strongest dimension of CSO sustainability in Ghana and improved slightly in 2019. CSOs were active on a number of advocacy fronts. Notable achievements during the year included passage of the RTI Bill, cancellation of an unfavorable electricity contract by the government, and advocacy against a proposal to increase VAT.

CSOs have access to government institutions in various sectors from the national to the local level and work with them on many projects. Most engagements between the government and civil society are formalized and have clear objectives. In 2019, in response to CSO advocacy, the government terminated the concession agreement between the Electricity Company of Ghana and a private operator, Power Distribution Services Ghana Ltd., because of the latter’s failure to meet fundamental terms in the contract.

However, political leaders often criticize CSOs’ advocacy work, particularly if it focuses on changing the government’s populist policy programs. In the latter part of 2019, some CSOs publicly campaigned against a proposal by the Electoral Commission to create a new register of voters, since they felt it was not needed and thus was a poor use of national resources. As their position was shared by the largest opposition political party, the issue became polarized, especially since the government supported the commission. Political polarization is widespread at the local level as well, which makes it difficult for smaller organizations to assess government policies critically.

Several CSOs and CSO coalitions focused on policy issues to respond to the needs of communities and interest groups in 2019. For instance, the Social Enterprise Development Foundation–Ghana published reports analyzing
expenditures for social protection and poverty reduction, taxation, child protection and welfare, and water sanitation, and hygiene. CSOs generally seek to consult with and mobilize key stakeholders to attract a critical mass of support. In 2019, the National Coalition for Proper Human Sexual Rights and Family Values, a mass civil society coalition led by faith-based organizations, formed to protest the comprehensive sexual education curriculum that the Ghana Education Service proposed to introduce. The coalition organized widespread public condemnation and compelled the government to suspend implementation of the curriculum.

Informal social movements are usually one-off groups that spring up in response to particular problems. They sometimes metamorphose into registered organizations. For example, OccupyGhana, which emerged as a middle-class social movement in 2014, is now established as a registered organization and works on issues of public accountability in collaboration with state agencies such as the Auditor General.

CSOs seek to influence public policy by engaging frequently with parliamentary committees and influential members of parliament. Although draft bills and memoranda are not always made available in advance, CSOs have learned to use their relationships with members of parliament to proactively obtain proposed legislation. In February, after the Ghana Revenue Authority announced that the local VAT would increase from 17.5 percent to 21 percent, a coalition of organizations led by Imani Center successfully advocated against the proposal, and the government was forced to abandon it. The Coalition on the Right to Information, composed of CDD-Ghana, GACC, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, Ghana Integrity Initiative, Media Foundation for West Africa, and other organizations, has worked steadily on the RTI bill since 2018 and engaged intensively with the parliament during final consideration of the bill, which was passed in 2019. The Economic Governance Platform (EGP), an umbrella body of fifteen CSOs, played an instrumental role in the passage of the Fiscal Responsibility Act, which capped the government deficit at 5 percent of GDP, prescribed punishments of the government if the limit was breached, and called on the government to give legal status to the new Fiscal Responsibility Advisory Council set up by the president.

CSOs also participated in a review of the Persons with Disabilities Act and continued to push for the passage of the Affirmative Action Bill through a number of protests in 2019. About twenty-one CSOs led by the Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition (GACC) petitioned the Finance Ministry to provide detailed information on the GHS 2.75 billion (approximately $510 million) savings reported in the government’s mid-year budget review submitted to the parliament. Other advocacy efforts focused on the local government referendum and proposal to introduce partisan local elections. For example, a new group, the Coalition on the National Referendum and Election of MMDCEs, led public education and engaged with the parliament to support the referendum process. Organizations such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) Youth Platform, a sub-platform of the Ghana CSOs Platform on SDGs, took advantage of their participation in STAR-Ghana’s Youth Parliament to present a communiqué to the speaker of the parliament.

Calls for enactment of a law for the CSO sector became louder in 2019 after the Inter-Governmental Action Group of the Economic Community of West African States recommended that Ghana tighten up its laws related to money laundering, terrorist financing, and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. At the launch of the 2018 CSO Sustainability Index report for Ghana, various speakers, including the executive director of the Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG), called for speedy enactment of a CSO law to avoid international sanctions and ensure the sustainability of existing organizations. As part of the government’s measures to foster stakeholder involvement, CSO representatives serve on the government committee developing a CSO law. At the end of 2019, consultants were helping develop separate bills on trusts and NPOs. The two bills are expected to reach the cabinet and possibly be sent to the parliament for passage before the end of 2020.
CSO service provision was steady in 2019. CSOs work in almost all sectors, and their broad diversification is the result of their ability to respond effectively to societal issues and failures in public service delivery. For instance, the CSO Platform on the SDGs disseminated a shadow report on the implementation of the SDGs in Ghana. As beneficiaries’ needs vary from one region to the next, CSOs’ services are usually adopted to local contexts. In mining communities, for example, most CBOs focus on environmental issues, while in rural and poor communities with weak public infrastructures, CSOs’ primary focus is services related to water, education, and health care. CSOs’ activities sometimes originate in response to news stories or appeals in the media. CSOs usually document their work with communities or other critical stakeholders so that they can showcase their contributions when seeking funding.

Membership organizations often provide services that go beyond their members. CSOs typically provide services to a wide range of stakeholders, based on their interests and needs. While they do not discriminate on the basis of gender, tribe, social class, or religion, CSOs may target specific audiences for their projects.

The CSO sector in Ghana does not recover the costs of services that it provides. Unless they are registered as commercial services, most CSO services, including training workshops, are free of charge. Previous attempts by some CSOs to charge fees decreased the use of their services. For instance, the West African Civil Society Institute (WACSI) started to charge fees for training programs but eventually had to stop because of low demand. Some CSOs have begun social enterprises, but they are still at the incubation stage, and little information about them is available.

The government at both the national and local levels generally recognizes CSOs’ contributions. For example, the government has awarded contracts to CSOs to undertake research and public education and partner on programs to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. Because of the country’s polarized political atmosphere, government officials sometimes seek to discredit CSOs that carry out independent studies to identify weaknesses or failures in public service delivery, since they see such reports as attacks on their stewardship. For instance, the Imani Center was subject to a barrage of criticism in 2019 after it gave the government a mediocre score in fulfilling its campaign promises.

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector was unchanged in 2019. A few organizations in Accra, such as WACSI and the African Women’s Development Fund, offer CSOs access to information, sometimes about specific sectors. Intermediary support organizations that provide information or other services for CSOs generally do not exist, with the exception of several centers in universities, which offer some capacity-building programs in which CSOs can take part.

The STAR-Ghana Foundation remains the main local institution awarding donor funds to Ghanaian CSOs. In 2019, STAR-Ghana’s funding went mostly to projects related to the 2020 elections, corruption, local governance, media, and social inclusion. STAR-Ghana provides technical support to its grant partners. Local foundations set up by corporations such as telecommunications and mining companies offer small grants, mostly for activities in health care and education.

Individual organizations generally do not exchange information. There are few networks that facilitate cooperation and few organizations through which the sector promotes its interests. Several coalitions represent and organize sub-sectors of CSOs, and CSOs often come together to share information on crucial policy or advocacy issues.
For instance, ahead of the botched national referendum on local government reforms, CDD-Ghana and IDEG collaborated on several advocacy efforts through meetings and public education.

CSOs have access to training on fundraising, monitoring and evaluation, project management, advocacy, proposal writing, and other topics. The institutions offering training include WASCI, universities, and private firms. The University of Cape Coast has developed paid post-graduate courses on CSO management, and in major cities such as Accra and Kumasi, private institutions provide management training. Most training offered by universities or the private sector involves fees, and very few organizations can afford for their staff to attend. The training materials are in English rather than local languages.

CSOs enjoy good relationships with the media and some government agencies based on shared interests and objectives. For instance, anti-corruption CSOs, such as the Ghana Integrity Initiative and members of GACC, collaborated with the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice to commemorate National Anti-Corruption Week. The media have partnered with CSOs to carry out advocacy campaigns and deliver services. The Coalition on the Right to Information partnered with the Media Foundation for West Africa to raise awareness of the RTI bill among district assemblies and local media practitioners. CSOs occasionally partner with businesses, but little information about existing partnerships is available.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.0**

CSOs’ public image was stable in 2019. CSOs generally enjoy favorable media coverage, and many news stories appear in the mass media about CSOs’ work. In 2019, the fifteenth annual Kronti ne Akwamu lecture series on gender and inclusive development organized by CDD-Ghana received massive media coverage. Most major radio and television stations turn to CSOs for independent reviews of policy and news stories. Rural-based CSOs have a harder time gaining coverage than urban organizations, particularly on mainstream television, and stories about their work are rarely aired. There is a clear distinction between announcements and advertising. Advertisements are generally expensive, and only a few larger urban organizations can afford their cost. Corruption Watch Ghana was able to advertise its roundtable discussion on public procurement systems in the media thanks to a partnership with the Multimedia Group, which includes Joy FM, the media partner in the coalition.

The public’s perceptions of CSO are generally good, except among party activists, who perceive CSOs’ criticisms of the government as attempts to make the regime unpopular. Most people see CSOs as charitable organizations and broadly support their activities, especially in local communities.

Government perceptions of CSOs remain mixed. For instance, although a few members of parliament publicly
collaboration is limited. Both the government and portions of the business sector recognize the expertise of CSOs and invite them to speak at their events.

Most urban-based CSOs have communication strategies and communication officers to manage their media relations and public visibility. Social media usage is high among both urban and rural-based organizations, with many organizations using Facebook to disseminate information.

CSOs in Ghana still do not have a general code of ethics, although most organizations include codes of conduct in their operational manuals. In 2019, as part of the grant award process, CSOs receiving funding from STAR-Ghana had to share their organizational codes of conducts with it. Most urban CSOs publish annual reports in both electronic and paper form and disseminate them on their websites and to their target beneficiaries.
The political landscape in Guinea was volatile in 2019 as the country prepared for legislative elections and debated a new constitution. The elections were supposed to take place in late 2018 but were postponed until 2019 and then postponed a second time before being set for February 2020. Opposition political parties proposed boycotting the elections, claiming that the structure of the National Independent Electoral Commission and the composition of voter rolls did not meet the conditions for fair and free elections. They also protested delays in finalizing the 2018 local elections, whose results were disputed.

CSOs, opposition political parties, and other stakeholders united to object to changing the constitution, fearing that a provision in the current constitution that limits the president to two terms would be eliminated, thereby allowing President Alpha Condé to run for a third term. The National Front for the Defense of the Constitution (FNDC), a pro-democracy coalition of CSOs and opposition political parties, organized countrywide demonstrations to protest constitutional reform, despite a ban on demonstrations imposed in 2018. The protests resulted in a number of fatalities, including a student reportedly beaten to death by police during a demonstration at the University of Labé in May and eleven protesters killed by security forces using tear gas and live ammunition in October. Law enforcement authorities have not acknowledged these deaths. At least sixty FNDC members were arrested in October and November, of whom six were sentenced to up to one year in prison for organizing the protests. Six journalists were arrested and charged with defamation in cases that some observers viewed as efforts to silence criticism of the government, according to the U.S. Department of State 2019 Report on Human Rights Practices in Guinea. Human rights organizations denounced many rights violations during the year, including the ban on demonstrations, illegal arrest procedures, and the denial of many CSO registrations. In December 2019, after months of speculation, the president released the draft of a new constitution and announced that a referendum on it would take place ahead of the presidential election scheduled for 2020.

Guinea’s economic growth was robust in 2019, driven by foreign investment in the mining sector. More than half of Guinea’s workers are employed in agriculture, which continued to struggle with climate change in 2019. Unemployment remained high, especially among young people. The country’s public education sector was disrupted by a strike by the Guinea Free Teachers and Researchers Union (SLECG), which called for better working conditions and salary increases. Guinea ranked 130 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2019 Corruption Perceptions Index and 174 out of 189 countries in the World Bank’s Human Development Index for 2019.

The sustainability of the CSO sector in Guinea deteriorated slightly in 2019. The legal environment worsened moderately as CSOs were subjected to abusive enforcement of existing laws. CSOs’ organizational capacity
The legal environment for CSOs in Guinea regressed moderately in 2019. Although CSOs openly debated a wide range of subjects and freely expressed their opinions, they were subject to abuses of power on many fronts, including a restriction of their right to demonstrate, arbitrary arrests, censorship, the use of excessive force by law enforcement agencies, and repression of other individual and public freedoms.

Article 10 of the constitution gives all Guineans the right to form associations and corporations. Among the legislation governing CSOs are Law L/2005/013/AN and Law L/2005/014/AN on associations and NGOs, the Guinea Labor Code, Law L/02/CNT on freedom of the press, and the treaty on the Organization for the Harmonization of African Business Law, which regulates cooperative groups. The main difference between associations and NGOs is that associations may operate without state recognition and generally have limited fields of action, whereas NGOs must be authorized by the state, have wider fields of action, and must adhere to strict legal provisions governing their creation and operations. In 2019, the National Assembly revised Law L/2005/013/AN to allow NGOs to be funded as public benefit entities, provided they meet certain criteria. However, the new law has never been promulgated.

Before they may operate fully, all domestic CSOs except for unions must be approved by ministerial order or, at the local level, by governors and prefects. CSOs register with the Regional Service for the Support and Coordination of Cooperatives and NGOs (SERACCO) and the Department of Micro-Achievements at the prefecture and regional levels. At the national level, CSOs register with the Service for the Regulation and Promotion of NGOs and Association Movements (SERPROMA) in the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization (MATD). Despite favorable laws, CSOs had great difficulty registering at the national level in 2019, largely because SERPROMA was inactive after it was evicted for months from its head office by a family that claimed to own the property. Once approved, registration is valid for three years. CSOs must submit activity and financial reports to the MATD each year. In 2019, the MATD refused to renew the registration of many CSOs that had violated the law by, for example, failing to submit annual reports, taking part in political activities, or calling for civil disobedience. Registration and re-registration were easier at the regional, prefecture, and sub-prefecture levels.

A coalition of CSOs, led by the Platform of Citizens United for Development (PCUD) and some opposition groups, filed a series of legal cases before national, regional, and international courts. The cases disputed the government’s actions in 2019, including restrictions on the right to demonstrate, unlawful arrests, censorship of the media, excessive use of force by law enforcement agencies, and other suppression of public and individual freedoms.
freedoms. On June 25, 2019, the National Assembly adopted a law on the use of force by law enforcement agencies. The law establishes several justifications for the use of force, including the defense of positions occupied by the police. The law does not emphasize clearly that firearms are be used only in case of a threat of death or serious injury. The explanatory note accompanying the law stresses the need to protect law enforcement officers who have used force against revengeful lawsuits. This provision raises concerns that the law could be used to impede judicial oversight of law enforcement agencies and individual officers.

The taxation of CSOs is governed by Law L/2005/013/AN, Articles 30 and 31, Chapter III. Upon application, the Ministry of the Economy and Finance may grant exemptions to CSOs on duties on goods and equipment imported for their operations and other tax benefits, based on their stated activities. For many years, this law has benefited international organizations rather than Guinean CSOs. Grants from donors are tax exempt. Corporations donating to CSOs receive tax deductions with government approval.

The law allows CSOs to conduct revenue-generating activities and found social enterprises, as long as they scrupulously comply with associated laws and regulations. CSOs may bid on contracts with central and local governments provided they meet stated criteria. CSOs may conduct fundraising campaigns to benefit victims of natural disasters, the poor, and other disadvantaged and marginalized groups.

CSOs have access to various sources of competent legal support, including Attorneys Without Borders (Avocats sans frontières, ASF), Equal Rights for All (Mêmes droits pour tous, MDT), Association of Women Legal Experts (Association des femmes juristes, AFJ), Guinea Bar Association (Barreau des avocats de Guinée), Guinea Attorneys’ Collective (Collectif des avocats de Guinée), and Guinea Magistrates’ Association (Association des magistrats de Guinée, AMG). Some of these entities provide their services pro bono.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.7

CSOs’ organizational capacity deteriorated slightly in 2019, as relationships between CSOs and their target groups were undermined by the country’s socio-political tensions.

CSOs typically initiate projects with a participatory, inclusive approach, often relying on feedback from community management groups, such as health and hygiene committees and parents’ associations at schools. Community-based organizations usually focus on activities that implement local development plans. For example, the Kaporo Neighborhood Youth Association (Association des jeunes du quartier Kaporo, AJK) dredges canals and cleans public spaces in the Ratoma area of Conakry; Farmers’ Development Aid (Aide paysanne pour le développement, APAD) performs sanitation work in the Bonfi district of Conakry; the Dabola Economic Development Association (Association pour le développement économique de Dabola, ADED) cleans the central market and places of worship in Dabola prefecture; and the Guinea Action for Sanitation and Environmental Protection (Action guinéenne pour l’assainissement et la protection de l’environnement, AGAPE) works on reforestation in the Kindia region.

CSOs’ missions, structures, and operations must be clearly defined in accordance with Laws L/2005/013/AN and L/2005/014/AN. Few CSOs engage in strategic planning, because they have difficulty mobilizing needed resources. Guinean CSOs are overwhelmingly dependent on funding from foreign donors, which do not normally finance the costs of strategic planning. Some organizations, such as the African Training Center for Development (Centre africain de formation pour le développement, CENAFOD), Alliance for the Promotion of Governance and Local Initiatives (Alliance pour la promotion de la gouvernance et des initiatives locales, AGIL), and Young Leaders for Peace and Development (Leadership jeune pour la paix et le développement, LEJEPAD), experienced difficulties implementing their plans in 2019 because of the lack of local and international fundraising opportunities.
Guinea’s laws clearly define the basic requirements for CSOs’ internal governance. For example, a CSO’s board of directors is supposed to represent and promote the organization, identify strategic priorities to be approved by the general meeting of members, and help fundraise. Some CSOs comply with these rules, but other organizations have serious problems with overlapping responsibilities among their internal structures. The lack of clearly defined duties can lead to conflicts among founding members, who may fill multiple roles, such as serving as both members of the board of directors and executive directors.

CSOs that receive donor support often face increasing difficulties retaining staff after funding for specific projects ends. Some CSOs seek to retain staff by offering bonuses, loans, or health insurance for their families, but these benefits usually cease once donor funding runs out. CSOs increasingly hire young people into positions of responsibility. Although the young employees benefit from opportunities to develop their skills, their hiring does not help with succession planning and is usually not a part of strategic plans, if they exist.

Only organizations that receive regular donor support, such as CENAFOD, AGIL, LEJEPAD, and Coalition of Young Leaders for Peace and Development (Coalition des jeunes leaders pour la paix et le développement, CoJeLPaiD), have basic equipment and materials such as computers, vehicles, and office furniture. The internet is becoming more accessible throughout the country, and many CSO staff use smartphones to communicate. Some organizations use platforms such as Facebook, WhatsApp, and LinkedIn to obtain information and heighten their visibility.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.2**

CSOs’ financial viability did not change in 2019. Although some foreign funders decreased their funding during the year, CSOs continued to receive financial support from other sources, including the government, social enterprises, and the marketing of products and services. Guinean CSOs depend mainly on foreign funding, which is usually restricted to short-term activities aimed at satisfying immediate needs. The main foreign funders include USAID; EU; World Bank; United Nations agencies, French Development Agency (AFD); Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA); Carter Center; Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance; and Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria, and Tuberculosis. These donors fund projects in areas such as health care, food security, and transparency in the mining sector. U.S. funding decreased from $75 million in 2018 to $60 million in 2019, and EU funding declined from EUR 185 million (approximately $210 million) in 2018 to EUR 63 million (approximately $72 million) in 2019.

Given their low level of experience, domestic CSOs usually receive the bulk of their foreign funding as subcontractors to international CSOs. International CSOs partnering with local organizations include RTI/USA, Plan International, National Democratic Institute (NDI), Winrock International, Catholic Relief Services, FHI 360, ChildFund, International Foundation for Electoral Systems, and Charente Maritime Cooperation. Guinean organizations working as subcontractors to international organizations include CENAFOD, AGIL, LEJEPAD, CoJeLPaiD, Africa Youth Network of Guinea (Réseau Afrique jeunesse de Guinée, RAJ-GUI), Coalition of Women Leaders (Coalition des femmes leaders, COFEL), Coalition of Guinean Women/Girls for Dialogue, Peace Building, and Development (Coalition des femmes/filles de Guinée pour le dialogue, la consolidation de la paix et le développement, COFFIG-DCPD), and National Coalition of Guinea for the Rights and Citizenship of Women (Coalition nationale de Guinée pour les droits et la citoyenneté des femmes, CONAG-DCF). While partnerships with international CSOs can boost their visibility and provide valuable capacity building, Guinean CSOs find that serving as subcontractors has little lasting benefit, since it does not help them become independent or self-sufficient.

Many CSOs also receive international funding through the government for short-term projects in health care, education, environmental protection, human rights, gender equity, or citizenship. For example, CENAFOD, AGIL,
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and Community Library and Study Center (Centre communautaire de documentation et d’études, CECODE) received funding from the World Bank and the AFD through the MATD’s Village Community Support Program (PACV3) in 2019. There were no known instances of the government discriminating in its selection of CSOs for project implementation in 2019.

Businesses ranging from banks and telephone companies to industrial corporations and shops contribute to CSOs’ activities. For example, mining companies such as the Guinea Gold Mining Company, Guinea Bauxite Company, Global Alumina Corporation, and Rio Tinto help further the country’s socio-economic development with infrastructure projects such as the construction of schools, roads, and health-care centers or reforestation. They often include CSOs in such projects.

Despite the variety of funding sources, most Guinean CSOs are not financially self-sufficient over the long term. In the past few years, CSOs have begun to create social enterprises to generate income. For example, the Guinea Medical Brotherhood (Fraternité médicale de Guinée, FMG) offers prenatal consultations and pediatric maternal care, and Tinkisso-Antenna manufactures and sells health and hygiene products. Some organizations continued to earn revenue from the marketing of services, products, and rentals in 2019, despite the political turmoil in the country.

Donors increasingly require audit reports or certified accounts from CSOs before funding their projects. Organizations with sufficient financial resources use approved accounting firms to certify their financial statements. Some CSOs use accounting software such as Sage, TOMPRO, and Ciel.

ADVOCACY: 4.9

Advocacy was slightly weaker in 2019 as the country’s turmoil hindered CSOs’ ability to plan and implement activities.

Guinean CSOs have direct lines of communication with government entities and are often consulted by them on important issues in education, human rights, elections, security, transportation, and other areas. For example, in 2019, the prime minister’s office held discussions about a new constitution with the participation of many CSOs, including the National Council of CSOs in Guinea (Conseil national des organisations de la société civile de Guinée, CNOSC), National Coalition of CSOs in Guinea (Coalition nationale des organisations de la société civile de Guinée, CONASOG), and CoJeLPaiD.

CSOs are sometimes involved on a formal level in government decision-making mechanisms. In 2019, for example, CSOs participated in the committee overseeing Guinea’s adherence to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, the inter-party committee of the National Independent Electoral Commission, and the steering committee on the regulation of public contracts. The CSO Platform to Support Vaccination Activities (Plateforme des OSC pour le soutien aux activités de vaccination, POSSAV) and COFEL are statutory members of the steering committee for the national coordinating body of the Global Fund. FMG, Guinean Red Cross, and AGIL are members of the interagency coordinating committee on health issues. ACORD International, Guinea Ecology (Guinée écologie), and Agri-Business Excellence participate in the multi-actor discussion framework on land ownership.

On the local level, the municipal code gives CSOs opportunities to participate in many discussion forums, ranging from ordinary municipal council sessions to prefecture development committees. CSOs and the public may also take part in groups such as health and hygiene committees, water source management committees, local child protection committees, and conflict prevention and management committees. CSOs taking part in such activities include the Dabola Economic Development Association in Dabola, the Cooperation and Research Association in N’Zérékoré, and the Norassoba Locals’ Association in Siguiri.
CSO coalitions sometimes influence public debate and public opinion more effectively than individual organizations. Prominent coalitions include FNDC, which organized resistance to the proposed new constitution in 2019, and SLECG, which spearheaded the teachers’ strike. CSO initiatives in 2019 reviewed the organization of legislative elections and referendums, demanded decreases in gas prices, and sought to improve the living conditions of communities affected by mining. A coalition of CSOs led by the Platform of Citizens United for Development (Plateforme des citoyens unis pour le développement, PCUD) filed a series of legal appeals in national, regional, and international courts and tribunals contesting government actions in 2019 stemming from the 2018 ban on demonstrations. Advocacy CSOs such as the Guinean Bloggers’ Association and Balai Citoyens sought to evaluate whether the government had kept its campaign promises in 2019, but they experienced difficulties accessing needed information.

Few Guinean CSOs understand the concept of lobbying, and they make little effort to work together to influence legislation. Exceptionally, in 2019, lobbying by the Guinea National Workers’ Confederation (Confédération nationale des travailleurs de Guinée, CNTG) resulted in a change to the Guinea civil code to grant women the right to register their children at birth.

The CSO community is aware of the importance of the legal and regulatory framework for their effectiveness and sustainability. However, in 2019, CSOs did not make significant efforts to promote legal reforms to benefit the sector, other than a few statements on Laws L/2005/013/AN and L/2005/014/AN by CNOSCG, PCUD, CoJelPaiD, and the Network of CSOs for Election Observation and Monitoring (Réseau des organisations de la société civile pour l’observation et le suivi des élections, ROSE). CSOs have been unable to persuade the government to promulgate the new law on CSOs.

SERVICE PROVISION: 5.0

Service provision by CSOs did not change in 2019. Despite difficulties in planning and implementing activities because of the country’s unrest, CSOs provided services in a variety of areas, including health care, education, water and sanitation, environmental protection, agriculture, fishing and aquaculture, animal husbandry, transportation, security, and governance. For example, with funding from PACV3, CENAFOD, AGIL, and CECODE provided services to support local municipalities. Expertise France, Online Platform for Health, Democracy, Citizen Engagement (Plateforme démocratique sanitaire et implication citoyenne, DES-ICI), and POSSAV conducted a mass vaccination educational campaign with funding from RTI. The West Africa Network for Peace (WANEP)–Guinea developed early alerts to prevent and manage conflicts in the Boké region, and the Friends of the World Club (Club des amis du monde, CAM) distributed long-lasting insecticide-treated mosquito nets.

CSOs’ services sometimes reach larger groups, including academics, government officials, and the reading public. For example, WANEP–Guinea publishes a monthly newsletter on road safety and violence, and LEJEPAD publishes a monthly newsletter analyzing Guinea’s socio-political environment. Most CSOs in Guinea are not religiously affiliated and do not discriminate based on race or ethnicity.

CSOs often market their products and services, and their prices are usually lower than those asked by businesses. For example, the Catholic Organization for Human Promotion (Organisation catholique pour la promotion humaine, OCPH) offers office and meeting space to other CSOs at relatively affordable prices. CSOs have not had difficulty collecting payment for the services they offer to their target groups.

The government is aware of CSOs’ contributions to the country’s development through the media, CSOs’ websites, meetings, and activity reports. CSOs are constantly asked by the government to participate in public interest efforts, such as the prevention of female genital mutilation.
SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.5

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector was stable in 2019. CSOs in Conakry and the regional capitals continued to have access to information, the internet, and other services at regional libraries, embassy libraries, controlled-access urban areas for youth known as “blue zones,” the MOUNA Technology Center, the Press House, and youth houses organized by the Center for Listening to, Advising, and Guiding Young People (Centre d’écoute, conseil et orientation des jeunes, CECQJ). CSOs in Guinea’s interior continued to find it difficult to access these services.

International organizations such as FHI 360, RTI, and NDI reallocate donor funding to Guinean CSOs for projects identified at the local or community level. Community foundations such as Rio Tinto, Prosmi, and Djériba Diaby offer small amounts of funding for community projects.

While CSOs lack an umbrella platform to defend their interests, they often cooperate through networks and coalitions. For example, the members of WANEP–Guinea produce research reports on security, and COFEL issues reports on citizen oversight of governance in the health-care sector. One of the primary private media coalitions is the Guinea Union of Free Radio and Television Stations (Union des radios et télévisions libres de Guinée, URTELGUI), which represents the interests of private communications operators and serves as an interface between its members and the government. CNOSCG organizes discussions and represents its members’ interests to the government and the private sector, and PCUD helps improve members’ visibility and promotes best practices in organizational governance.

Local private-sector trainers skilled in CSO management and related areas are available to work with CSOs. Several CSOs offer capacity building to other organizations. For example, CENAFOD provides training in public relations, advocacy, fundraising, and the establishment of new organizations, and the firm Conforma hosts workshops on accounting, marketing, and monitoring and evaluation. A growing number of private companies offer training to CSOs. Optima Training offers training on project management, Guinea Consulting Business provides training on accounting and financial management, and PRIDE offers training on project management and entrepreneurship. Basic CSO management training is also available free of charge through SERPROMA and its offices in the capital and second-tier cities, but these sessions are difficult to access, since the MATD does not provide the necessary financial or material resources for CSOs to attend.

CSOs in Guinea have developed a variety of partnerships with public entities. For example, POSSAV and the Ministry of Health work together on vaccination projects, and CONAG-DCF cooperates with the Ministry of Citizenship and Human Rights on National Citizenship Week. CSOs regularly work with mining companies such as the Guinea Bauxite Company, Kindia Bauxite Company, and Ashanti Gold Company, and they occasionally cooperate with the media. These relationships are focused on short-term service provision rather than sustainable partnerships.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.5

CSOs’ public image was slightly stronger in 2019 as organizations were given more prominent coverage in the media, especially online media, and their reputations with the public improved.

CSOs’ services and participation in public debates received considerable coverage in local and national media in 2019. Public outlets covering CSOs included Radio-Television Guinea, Guinea Press Agency, and Rural Radio Guinea. Private outlets included Espace, Evasion, CIS Média, Nostalgie, and LYNX FM, as well as online news sources such as guineenews, aminata.com, bouba.com, africaguinee, guinee.com, and sincery.com. CSOs must
normally pay journalists to cover their events. The media increasingly broadcasts public interest messages, such as announcements about campaigns to vaccinate children or distribute insecticide-treated mosquito nets.

While the public has widely varying concepts of CSOs, it is generally in favor of them, especially when they advocate to lower fuel prices or improve teachers’ working conditions and salaries. Some people had a negative view of CSOs in 2019, because of the protests organized by FNDC, which they saw as significantly disrupting public life and causing days of economic paralysis, property damage, and deaths.

Central and local governments are aware of the positive impact of CSO advocacy and service provision, and CSOs have recently taken on greater importance in the government’s eyes. For example, CSOs are represented at various levels of decision making in the mining, education, and health-care sectors. But government officials, especially if they are aligned with the party in power, tended to view FNDC’s actions negatively. Data is lacking on private-sector views of CSOs.

CSOs sought actively to enhance their public image in 2019. Events such as Independence Day, International Women’s Day, National Citizenship Week, International Workers’ Day, and CSO Day offered opportunities for CSOs to promote themselves by disseminating information on their activities and areas of interest. The growing online press was increasingly involved in conveying CSOs’ messages. Although most online media reach only the literate segment of Guinean society, CSOs appreciate their ability to publish information quickly in real time. CSOs also use WhatsApp, Facebook, Messenger, Imo, Zoom, Duo, and Skype to communicate with their audiences.

CSOs adopted a code of ethics many years ago with technical support from RTI and funding from USAID. This code has never been revised, despite many changes in CSOs’ environment. Several larger CSOs, including CENAFOD, CNOSCG, RAJ-GUI, CONAG-DCF, and Citizen Coalition for Elections and Governance (Coalition citoyenne pour les élections et la gouvernance, CoCEG), make an effort to show transparency by employing their own codes of ethics. Few CSOs publish annual activity reports. Some organizations share information about the results of their work on their websites or in e-mails.
The year 2019 got off to a poor start in Kenya when al-Shabaab terrorists attacked a hotel and office complex in the capital, Nairobi, on January 15. Twenty-one people were killed, and at least twenty-eight others were injured. Five terrorists were killed during the attack, and the National Police Service prosecuted two other suspects in the High Court. In December, terrorists attacked a bus on the Wajir-Mandera route, killing ten people, including seven police officers.

According to a January 2020 report released by the Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA), a body mandated to provide civilian oversight of the police, 3,200 instances of abuse by police occurred in 2019. The report highlighted that police abuse of civilians is worsening and included extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in 2019. The Human Rights Watch World Report 2020 says that security forces killed twenty-one people living in informal settlements, apparently without justification, and used excessive force to disperse protesters on a University of Nairobi campus.

In June 2019, Kenya submitted a report in preparation for its 2020 Universal Periodic Review (UPR), a mechanism of the United Nations Human Rights Council to secure states’ commitments to improving their human rights records. The report said that Kenya had implemented several recommendations to secure legal and institutional reforms and civil and political rights, such as establishing more high courts and reducing a backlog of cases. A separate report prepared by the Kenya Stakeholders Coalition on the UPR, whose members include CSOs and the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, noted that Kenya had yet to implement critical measures to safeguard human rights, such as enacting comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation and bringing legislation such as Media Council Act (2013), Kenya Information and Communications Act (1998), and Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act (2018) in line with international norms.

Corruption continued to be a problem in Kenya in 2019. After a major scandal involving questionable payments by government officials to contractors building the Arror and Kimwarer Multi-Purpose Dams in Elgeyo Marakwet County, twenty-six people, including the National Treasury cabinet secretary and principal secretary, were charged with fraud, conspiracy, abuse of office, and lack of proper planning. The suspects were later released on bail, and investigations into the incident were ongoing at the end of the year. The Corruption Perceptions Index published by Transparency International ranked Kenya 137 out of 180 countries in 2019.

In November 2019, the president released a report on the Building Bridges Initiative (BBI), which was launched in 2018 to resolve disputes arising from the contentious 2017 general elections. The BBI task force conducted county- and national-level public consultations on such issues as ending ethnic division, ensuring election safety and
security, and dealing with corruption. CSOs submitted recommendations to the task force but were not involved in drafting the report, which had not been made public by the end of the year.

According to the World Bank, Kenya is one of sub-Saharan Africa’s fastest growing economies, with a growth rate of 5.7 percent in 2019. Contributing to the country’s economic expansion are macroeconomic stability, positive investor confidence, and resilient service sector. However, ballooning public-sector labor costs crowded out spending on development projects in key sectors such as education, health, and agriculture in 2019. The World Bank reports that in recent years, Kenya has met some important development targets, including reduced child mortality, nearly universal primary school enrolment, and narrowed gender gaps in education.

CSOs’ overall sustainability was stable in 2019. CSO advocacy was slightly stronger as most advocacy organizations successfully adopted a “working more with less” approach, which enabled them to achieve significant results despite declines in funding and the departure of key employees. CSOs’ financial viability was slightly weaker as several prominent organizations closed because of funding shortfalls. Other dimensions of sustainability were unchanged.

For the first time in 2019, the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Coordination Board undertook a survey to establish the total number of CSOs registered under the NGO Act. The agency announced a cumulative total of 11,262 organizations registered between financial years 2009–10 and 2018–19. The board reported that it registered 77 national and 21 international NGOs in 2018–19. Of the 8,893 CSOs presumed to be active in 2019, only 3,028 organizations, or 34 percent, filed annual reports in 2018–19. More than 300,000 community-based organizations (CBOs) were registered as residential association in 2013, the last year for which data are available. No information is available on the number of CSOs registered as companies limited by guarantee, societies, or trusts.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.5**

The legal environment for CSOs did not change in 2019. Organizations continued to register under the NGO Act No. 19 (1990), Companies Act (2017), Societies Act (2012), or Chapter 164 of the Laws of Kenya governing trusts. CSOs that register as companies limited by guarantee, including many service-providing institutions, such as schools and health-care organizations, find the process comparatively fast and easy, requiring only a decision of the company board, followed by approval by the registrar of companies. Registration as an NGO, society, or trust is more bureaucratic. CSOs registering as societies, which include clubs and other associations of ten or more persons, must file their applications with the Registrar of Societies within twenty-eight days of their formation. Registration as a trust, which holds and manages assets for the benefit of others, requires the preparation of a trust deed, which is submitted for stamp duty and then filed with the Registry of Documents. Organizations registering as NGOs, which work in areas such as health, relief, agriculture, and education and are the most visible type of organization, must complete name searches before filing their applications and supporting documents with the NGO Coordination Board, which has one month to process the registration. CBOs register with the Department of Gender and Social Services in the location in which they will operate.

CSOs seeking to register as NGOs continued to experience delays in 2019, in part because officials with the NGO Coordination Board imposed procedures that were not clearly posted on its website. Some organizations that had initiated the registration process in 2018 were still trying to fulfill registration requirements in 2019. Registration can be rejected if an organization is judged to have provided false information or its activities do not serve the national interest. The NGO Coordination Board may deregister organizations that violate the NGO Act or fail to fulfill regulations or the conditions of their registration. No NGO was deregistered in 2018–19. In 2019, the NGO Coordination Board reported that it had deregistered 2,468 NGOs since its inception in 1992.
In 2019, little progress was made in harmonizing the legal framework for NGOs with the Public Benefits Organization (PBO) Act (2013), which has yet to be implemented despite two court orders that the government do so. The PBO Act would replace the NGO Act and create a more enabling legal environment for NGOs by introducing an independent regulator, mandatory government support, and high standards of governance and management through self-regulation. Consultations between the government and CSOs about the PBO Act were stalled in 2019, and its implementation remained in limbo. Stakeholders attributed the impasse in part to the government’s efforts to maintain control of civic space. The NGO Coordination Board has yet to call for the government to implement the PBO Act.

CSOs are free to debate issues of national importance, and they have access to information under the Access to Information Act No. 3 (2016). However, major concerns arose over the government’s unwillingness to protect the rule of law in 2019, especially after it defied several court orders related to political activists. In a prominent case, the activist Miguna Miguna was unable to return to Kenya despite a court ruling that his deportation was unconstitutional and the authorities should return his passport and allow him to re-enter the country. Miguna had been forcefully sent into exile in 2018 on charges of violating the Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act of 2011 when he acquired a Canadian passport in 1988.

In 2019, under the Tax Base Expansion program, the Kenya Revenue Authority continued to examine tax returns previously submitted by CSOs to ensure that they complied with relevant laws. NGOs may apply for tax exemptions from the National Treasury, but the process is burdensome, and NGOs are sometimes reluctant to open their financial records to scrutiny. Some CSOs providing medical, education, religious, and social welfare services for free or below normal cost were able to obtain certain tax exemptions in 2019. CSOs in other fields were less likely to attempt to obtain exemptions. Individuals and institutions that support CSOs do not receive tax benefits. CSOs are generally obliged to pay value-added tax and pay-as-you-earn tax for employees.

CSOs are legally allowed to bid for government contracts. However, they are usually reluctant to do so because of the prevailing culture of “tender-preneurship,” which requires them to offer bribes. CSOs are also unwilling to bid for government contracts for fear of damaging their reputations. CSOs may accept foreign funding without prior permission from the government, although the government scrutinizes funding sources to ensure that they do not support terrorism or money laundering. CSOs may undertake income-generating activities to sustain themselves.

There are few lawyers in Kenya who specialize in CSO-related laws, mainly because most CSOs cannot afford to pay their fees. CSOs have access to several free legal resources. The private law firm Oraro and Company has posted a simplified interpretation of the PBO Act online, and the TripleOK Law firm offers an interpretation of the Cyber Crimes Law on its website. The CSOs Kituo cha Sheria and International Federation of Women Lawyers provide free legal advice to the public, including CSOs.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 3.9**

There was no change in CSOs’ organizational capacity in 2019. National-level CSOs tend to have more capacity, particularly in research and advocacy, than organizations operating at the county level. A number of national-level CSOs include capacity building in their projects targeting county CSOs working in areas such as advocacy, policy review, and budget analysis.

Many CSOs incorporated consultations with stakeholders into their strategic objectives and project results in 2019. CSOs often sought to promote “downstream” public participation at the same time that they pursued “upstream” influence with policy makers. For example, the Consumer Unity and Trust Society (CUTS) Nairobi implemented programs in cooperation with national and county multi-stakeholder forums, known as reference groups, which include government officials, donors, businesspeople, community- and faith-based organizations, and special-interest groups. For the last three years, the International Institute for Legislative
Affairs has worked with county assembly members and other CSOs to formulate legislation to limit tobacco use. However, the management of stakeholder expectations remained a challenge for CSOs in 2019, especially as stakeholders often participate in their activities only if they are offered daily stipends.

CSOs generally have strategic plans with clearly defined visions. The Tax Justice Network Africa (TJNA), for example, has a strategic plan for 2018–21, which it used in 2019 to inform its efforts to build constituencies on issues related to public finance and double taxation. CSOs’ implementation of strategic plans is usually dependent on funding. Some organizations develop strategic plans to fulfill donor requirements, although their implementation is not guaranteed. CSOs can find it difficult to link donor-funded projects to their organizational goals and objectives. The Kenya Correspondents Association (KCA) noted that the poor environment for service contracting in 2019 forced it to take on new projects that rendered implementation of its strategic plan impracticable. CUTS Nairobi and the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) coped with a similar challenge by breaking implementation of their strategic plans into phases, in which they work on short-term projects that fit into the overall strategic approach. Measuring the achievement of strategic objectives continued to be difficult for policy and advocacy CSOs in 2019, since their work often lacks concrete results, and few of these organizations have monitoring and evaluation departments.

Most CSOs have defined internal structures such as boards of directors and secretariats. Some CSOs have functioning boards that understand their roles, hold regular meetings, and work alongside staff, which also have clearly defined responsibilities. Other organizations function less formally, especially if the core staff consists solely of an executive director and a consultant. Board members are often inactive and do not stay abreast of organizational issues. Board oversight is compromised in organizations in which board members have been handpicked by the founder, who may serve as the executive director or a board member. Founders are sometimes unwilling to give up control even after leaving their organizations. They may, for example, continue to make hiring decisions, thereby undermining the authority of senior management and potentially damaging the quality of the organizations’ work.

Although CSOs usually have good human resource manuals, staff retention is a challenge, since staff often leave for better-paying jobs with other CSOs or county governments. Most organizations employ staff on a contractual basis, with contract renewal subject to available funding. If CSOs are unable to retain staff when a project ends, the remaining employees are often forced to take on additional duties. Some organizations do not provide staff with clear terms of reference and require them to assume multiple functions, such as project management, data entry, and monitoring and evaluation. Some CSOs engage unpaid interns for the duration of a particular project.

CSOs are increasingly dependent on the internet. Some organizations are able to invest in technology, while others are prevented from doing so by inadequate financial resources. Most donors do not provide funding for equipment such as computers, projectors, or even supplies. If provided by donors, equipment must usually be returned when a project ends unless a different arrangement has been negotiated.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.9**

CSOs’ financial viability was mixed but overall deteriorated slightly in 2019. On the one hand, funding for NGOs operating under the NGO Act increased by 8 percent in the 2018–19 financial year, according to the 2019 survey of the NGO Coordination Board. NGOs received 88 percent of their funds from sources outside of Kenya, 11 percent from local sources, and less than 2 percent from income-generating activities, such as rentals or consultancy services. On the other hand, prominent CSOs, such as the Institute for Education in Democracy and the international organization Action for Cooperation in Research and Development, had to close their Nairobi offices in 2019, in part because of financial difficulties. The Parliamentary Initiative Network, a network funded by CSOs working on parliamentary issues and hosted by IEA–Kenya, also closed, and some of its work was taken over by the African Parliamentarians Network Against Corruption (APNAC). Other CSOs, such as Africa Policy Research Institute, International Institute for Legislative Affairs, Eco News Africa, and TJNA, experienced fiercer competition for financial resources, especially as bilateral donors such as the governments of Sweden, Denmark, and Canada increasingly offered service contracts to individuals and organizations rather than funding CSOs directly.
Most CSOs continued to rely on foreign funding from donors such as the European Union, Danish International Development Agency, and USAID in 2019. Donors preferred to fund short-term projects, mainly in the areas of devolution, citizen engagement, and accountability. For example, the International Budget Partnership, a U.S. organization funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, and Ford Foundation, supported projects fostering participatory public budgeting in 2019. In other sectors, according to the NGO Board, PATH funded projects in health care, the Center for Health Solutions funded projects related to HIV/AIDS, the African Academy for Sciences supported educational projects, Give Direct and World Vision supported relief and disaster management, and Compassion International and Christian UK Aid supported projects related to children. Some development partners used individual consultants rather than CSOs to offer technical support and capacity building to government officials. Obtaining core financial support remained a challenge.

Among local donors, the Uraia Trust provided grants to CSOs working on social accountability and civic education in 2019. The Uraia Trust benefits from a basket fund supported by the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, Diakonia, the governments of Finland and the Netherlands, and other donors.

Although they are free to bid on government tenders, most CSOs prefer not to risk their public reputations by working with the government. In addition, CSOs are often requested to pay bribes to secure government contracts. As a result, few CSOs sought government funding in 2019.

Although not common, CSOs raised funds and generated income in diverse ways in 2019. Some CSOs earned income by offering consulting services in areas such as training and research. The Yetu initiative, co-funded by the Aga Khan Foundation and USAID, helped organizations raise cash and materials through crowd sourcing in 2019. For example, Vijana Amani Pamoja raised approximately KES 875,000 (about $8,200) to provide education and health care to adolescent girls, and Tumaini Innovation Center raised enough money to provide technical and vocational training to street youth. CSOs report that local philanthropy is generally more forthcoming for educational and health-care projects, which provide tangible results. CSOs have a harder time raising funds for advocacy, policy, and legislative work. Communities also donated land, time, and labor to CSOs. KCA benefited from the free use of venues, particularly in Migori County, thanks to the visibility of its work in local communities.

Many CSOs have good financial management practices and keep adequate records of their financial activities, especially if required by donors. NGOs that receive or spend more than KES 1 million (approximately $9,300) are required to file audited accounts with the NGO Board. According to the NGO Board, the rate of compliance with this requirement was 83 percent in 2019, up from 80 percent the previous year.

ADVOCACY: 2.9

CSO advocacy was slightly stronger in 2019. Most advocacy CSOs successfully adopted a “working more with less” approach, which enabled them to achieve significant results despite declines in funding and the departure of key employees.

CSOs’ cooperation with the government strengthened in 2019, especially at the county level, as county governments included CSOs in various committees on an ad hoc basis, thus enabling them to influence key decision-making processes. For example, the government of Nakuru County invited CUTS to participate in its committee on the dairy sub-sector. CUTS also worked closely with the Bomet and Homa Bay county assemblies on renewable energy policies. Caritas International continued to be a strong partner on both development and advocacy in Turkana County and acted as an important channel for other CSOs aiming to work effectively with the county government.
Organizations working on social audits and citizen scorecards undertook advocacy in county-level health-care, water, and educational sectors in 2019. For example, the Center for Transformational Leadership engaged with the county health management team to improve health-care services in Nakuru county. The CSO hosted a breakfast meeting with members of the county health management team to obtain buy-in for the development of community scorecards for health-care service delivery. The team requested training on the scorecard process, and a social accountability implementation committee was established to oversee implementation of the scorecard initiative.

Also on the county level, the Institute of Social Accountability (TISA) worked on open contracting with the government of Elgeyo Marakwet County, which has signed onto the Open Governance Partnership to promote transparency and accountability in governance. The Baringo County CSO Network cooperated with the county government on participatory governance in budgeting, public finance, and public service delivery. The Center for Enhancing Democracy and Good Governance (CEDGG) worked with the Commission on Administrative Justice, Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, and Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission as community resource persons in Baringo and Nakuru counties on the mandate of these oversight bodies and ways in which citizens can engage with them to seek redress on issues related to service delivery, human rights, and governance. Following CEDGG’s work on social accountability in Nakuru County, the county government improved noticeably its publication of budget information and adherence to public finance regulations.

On the national level, some CSOs undertook a more collaborative approach than in previous years to working with government bodies. The Julisha campaign, led by TISA in partnership with Article 19, CEDGG, and other CSOs, influenced the Commission on Administrative Justice to issue a circular on the implementation of the Access to Information Act. After the Health Rights Advocacy Forum championed the need to review Kenya’s Mental Health Act (1989), the national government created a task force in 2019 to study the issue. Oxfam International worked with the Kenya National Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Center for International Private Enterprise, and Kenya Private Sector Alliance to ensure public participation in the drafting of new regulations to promote trade. IEA hosted public discussions and shared policy recommendations on the regulation of alcohol, leasing of medical equipment to county hospitals, and public debt.

The 2019 Kenya Population and Housing Census conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics recognized intersex individuals for the first time. This milestone was the result of a petition submitted to the National Assembly in 2017 by the Intersex Persons Society of Kenya, an organization created by the county government of Nairobi. The Cradle Children’s Foundation, International Development Law Organization, Open Society Initiative of Eastern Africa, and other CSOs contributed to this effort.

CSOs increasingly used public-interest litigation as their preferred advocacy strategy in 2019. For example, TJNA litigated successfully to challenge the constitutionality of a double-taxation agreement between Kenya and Mauritius. This was a win for the tax justice campaigners seeking to ensure transparency in bilateral tax treaties. In other advocacy action, consumer groups came together and pooled resources to issue a joint press statement on mercury in sugar.

Kenyan CSOs increasingly used online media platforms, such as Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook, to share their work and engage on policy issues in 2019. For example, the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) used social media to encourage the protection of whistle blowers against lawsuits and vilification. TISA relied on social media to engage stakeholders on the issue of revenue division between the national and county governments. The growth of county-based media enhanced advocacy by CSOs operating at the county level.

CSOs made a few efforts to reform the legal framework affecting their work in 2019. USAID’s Safeguarding Democratic Space in Kenya (SADES-K) program supported the Poverty Eradication Network (PEN) as it pushed for commencement of the PBO Act. PEN’s efforts included working with CSOs and networks and convening regional and national-level forums to advocate for implementation of the PBO Act. PEN also established and
strengthened six PBO networks and worked with the NGO Coordination Board to finalize PBO rules and regulations. In addition, the Kenya Community Development Foundation (KCDF) and other organizations in the philanthropic sector have been pursuing an enabling legal framework that can facilitate efforts to mobilize and preserve resources and other assets for the public good in a flexible, accountable, sustainable, and secure manner. In 2019, their efforts were directed towards pursuing amendments to the Trust Law.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.4**

There was no change in CSOs’ service provision in 2019. Kenyan CSOs provide services in sectors ranging from emergency and relief assistance, water, health, education, and agriculture to governance, gender, and human rights. Kenyan CSOs work closely with local communities to meet their needs. For example, in 2019, Rural Women Peace Link (RWPL) in Uasin Gishu County built the capacity of women to participate in leadership and governance by strengthening their knowledge of the Kenyan Constitution, Bills of Rights, and National Action Plan. These efforts enabled women to engage meaningfully and, in particular, champion women’s rights in county peace committees, mediation platforms, and gender technical working groups. RWPL also collaborated with local women to establish a platform to mentor young women leaders and offered training, legal advice, mentorship, and other services to improve the livelihoods of women and youth in Uasin Gishu County. CSOs funded by the Uraia Trust implemented several social accountability initiatives in 2019, including social audit and community scorecards. Caritas had a strong presence in Tharaka-Nithi County, particularly the Igamba Ngombe area, where it supported livelihoods in local communities. ActionAid Kenya and Sauti Ya Wanawake launched a rescue center in Magarini Constituency, Kilifi County, to help teenaged mothers develop sustainable livelihoods.

CSOs often share their research and publications with wide audiences. For example, in partnership with IEA, CEDGG tracks expenditures by the Baringo County educational bursary fund and shares its findings with the county assembly. The International Budget Partnership and Uraia Trust conduct research on budget expenditure tracking and social accountability in public spending and distribute their results to a range of stakeholders. In collaboration with the Dutch CSO SNV, Consumer Downtown Association, Kenya Consumer Protection Advisory Committee, and other organizations, CUTS disseminated a research report on food safety awareness for consumers.

CSOs usually offer their services free of charge, since they are funded by donors. Most CSOs are not involved in income-generating activities or, if they are, raise only small amounts that are insufficient to meet their financial needs.

Governments at the national and county levels often commend CSOs on their implementation of programs that contribute to government objectives, such as public education and service provision. For example, the Supreme Audit Institution in the Office of the Auditor General demonstrated appreciation of CSOs’ work on accountability by partnering with them during the development and launch of the Citizen Accountability Audit Engagement Framework in 2019. On several occasions in 2019, the president rallied CSOs and other stakeholders to help address the challenge of corruption and raise awareness of the BBI report.
CSOs’ sectoral infrastructure was stable in 2019. Because of limited financial resources and competing needs, there were no new infrastructural improvements.

CSOs with established resource centers maintained them throughout the year. Functioning centers included the KHRC Ndula Center in Kiambu County, which focuses on human rights; Mapaka Center in Makueni County, which offers legal services and internet access; and the KCA center for journalists in Kisumu County.

The main local grantmakers in Kenya are the Uraia Trust, which sub-grants international funding for projects on social accountability and civic education, and the Yetu initiative of the Aga Khan Foundation and USAID, which strengthens CSOs by supporting local fundraising and citizen empowerment.

Existing CSO networks and coalitions continued to function in 2019. They usually unite members sharing common objectives, so they can achieve greater impact through joint programming. For example, the Police Reform Coalition in Western Kenya coordinated joint projects, and the Social Justice Center working group brought together CSOs working on social justice at the local level. However, coalition effectiveness and sustainability was sometimes a challenge in 2019, as members often competed with each other for the same resources and power imbalances disrupted joint decision making. For example, during the implementation of joint projects, smaller, less-established organizations in the Kenya Water Sector Network sometimes felt left out because larger partners tended to dominate. In 2019, USAID announced a program to involve CSOs in the formation of local development organizations, or umbrella organizations representing CSOs and businesses at the county level that can serve as a collective voice for local citizens.

CSOs had access to training in citizen engagement, budgeting, social accountability tools, and other areas in 2019. County-based CSOs grantees of the Uraia Trust received training on social accountability from previous grantees. The Uraia Trust and International Budget Partnerships trained staff from local CSOs across the county so that they could train other members of their networks on budget analysis. Training from the private sector remained expensive for CSOs. Strathmore University offers courses on management and entrepreneurship to clients from all sectors, but the courses are beyond the financial reach of most CSOs, especially since donors do not usually allow their resources to be used on seminars.

Intersectoral partnerships continued to be active in 2019. National and county government entities engaged with CSOs on policy issues and in governance processes such as development planning and budgeting. For example, CEDGG collaborated with the governments of Laikipia, Baringo, Nakuru, Kericho, and Elgeyo Marakwet counties on a study on county support to social accountability and organized a peer learning forum with county officials on issues emerging from the study. The Nakuru County CSO Forum and the county government signed an agreement to work together to improve service delivery through civic education and engagement, policy formulation and implementation, joint performance management, and resource mobilization. Several CSOs provided capacity building to government officials. The Africa Policy Research Institute Limited offered technical support on public financial management systems to Wajir County officials, and APNAC continued to provide support to the parliament on anti-corruption issues.

The media provided services to the government and CSOs in areas such as polio campaigns and media engagement. Among CSOs’ partnerships with the business sector, Asante Africa Foundation, an international CSO, worked in collaboration with the Safaricom Foundation to support girls’ empowerment. The Coca Cola Foundation provided a grant to a grassroots movement, Shining Hope for Communities, to develop entrepreneurship opportunities for women in urban slums.
PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.3

CSOs’ public image was unchanged in 2019. Media coverage of CSOs in Kenya varies. While the social issues raised by CSOs are important, the media do not generally view them as suitable content for their short news clips, which usually deal with sensational or political topics. For example, CUTS was unable to secure widespread coverage of its launch of research on trade issues. CSOs usually find it easier to secure coverage of demonstrations or events in which senior government officials and politicians take part, such as the opening of a rescue center for teenaged mothers supported by ActionAid Kenya and Sauti Ya Wanawake, which was attended by local members of parliament, the county executive committee member for culture and social services, and two members of the county assembly. Live television shows sometimes invite CSO representatives to offer expert opinions on issues such as health care, agriculture, economics, and public accountability. This is particularly true of local media, which have grown in recent years and regard CSOs as key partners in content development.

Local community members recognize that CSOs are valuable partners. In Tharaka-Nithi and Samburu counties, for example, Caritas is viewed favorably because of its livelihood activities, and Fair Trade is highly regarded by marginalized groups and people with disabilities thanks to its advocacy for ethical trade practices and the eradication of child labor in coffee and tea production. The public is occasionally hostile towards CSOs, especially if there is lack of adequate information about their activities. For example, field interviews revealed that when Give Directly operated a cash transfer program to improve the livelihoods of poor citizens, local populations in sections of Kisumu and Siaya counties, where the program did not operate, viewed Give Directly with suspicion and associated the receipt of its money with bad luck.

County governments across the country appreciate CSOs and their efforts to improve governance and services in local communities. The member of parliament of Marafa in Kilifi County commended ActionAid Kenya and Sauti Ya Wanawake Magarini for developing a resource and protection center for young mothers in the settlement. However, public officials sometimes view organizations that undertake work on transparency, accountability, and human rights as antagonistic.

According to media practitioners such as KCA, CSOs have yet to understand the dynamics of working with journalists or creating partnerships with the media. CSOs’ packaging of information contributes to their lack of coverage, since they do not produce the concise summaries that journalists need to help them understand their work. Some CSOs have captured media attention through press briefings, press releases, and invitations to government officials and politicians to attend their events. Muslims for Human Rights has created its own media channel and uploads videos of its events to YouTube, Instagram, Twitter, and Facebook. The Institute of Social Accountability, Institute of Public Finance, and Integrated Development Facility in Homabay County also use social media platforms to disseminate information and engage stakeholders.

While some CSOs produce annual reports of their activities and finances and post them on their websites, the online reports are often outdated. International CSOs such as Asante Africa Foundation tend to produce more accurate reports in line with donor requirements. Many larger CSOs in Kenya develop their own codes of conduct. Local CSOs rarely have codes of ethics per se and instead spell out their core values to guide their professional conduct.
Liberia faced a tumultuous year in 2019, marked by corruption scandals, an economic slowdown, the aftermath of the disappearance of a large amount of cash from the Central Bank in 2018, and unfulfilled demands for the government to establish a war crimes court to investigate the country’s civil war from 1989 to 2003. The excitement and expectations raised by the election of President George Weah in 2017 dissipated in 2019 as the business climate turned unfavorable and the government failed to deliver on campaign promises.

In March 2019, the International Monetary Fund revised Liberia’s 2019 economic growth forecast from 4.7 percent to 0.4 percent. The Liberian dollar depreciated steeply against the U.S. dollar, social services declined, and inflation stood at 21.7 percent, according to the African Development Bank. Civil servants’ salaries were delayed throughout the year, and in September, the government began a “salary harmonization plan” that led to major reductions in the wages and benefits of government employees. Although the government argued that the plan standardized rates and qualifications for all pay grades, many people viewed it as a strategy to control the cost of the civil service payroll, which had ballooned after the Weah administration added thousands of new hires. Civil servants organized “go-slow” actions, and nurses at the John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital went on strike to protest cuts and delays in salaries.

The country’s economic hardship led to a wave of protests, open expressions of frustration on social media, and the landslide defeat of the president’s party in a senatorial by-election in a county that the party had held since 2005. On June 7, 2019, thousands of citizens took to the streets of the capital, Monrovia, in Liberia’s biggest demonstration since the end of the war. Under the banner “Save the State,” protesters demanded that the government fight corruption, improve accountability, and reverse the country’s economic slide. With government forces guaranteeing the safety of protesters, the demonstration was largely peaceful, although twenty persons were arrested during minor riots a few days before the event.

One of the demands of the protest was that the government re-open Punch FM, a private radio and television station whose license had been suspended in 2018. Punch FM sued the government in October 2019 for being deprived of its right to operate, and a verdict is expected in early 2020. Roots FM, the home of a popular show co-hosted by a fierce government critic, was also shut down in October 2019 on charges of inciting violence and operating on a frequency for which it did not have a license. The station has not reopened. Senior government officials launched many verbal and even physical attacks against the media in press briefings and on social media. For example, the deputy presidential press secretary called members of the executive mansion press corps “opposition journalists” and verbally attacked a woman journalist.
In December, the economic crisis peaked when people found it nearly impossible to obtain cash because of liquidity shortages. Account holders queued for hours at banks, and ATMs were unable to dispense funds. Mutilated banknotes, which had been withdrawn from circulation in preparation for the introduction of a new currency, began to reappear. The government considered printing additional banknotes to pay civil servants and avert a protest planned for December 30, but the Senate refused to approve the step. The government declared the planned protest, which intended to call on the president to resign, unlawful and treasonous. The protest was postponed after the Economic Community of West African States, United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), and United States issued a joint statement expressing fears that it could lead to serious civil disorder and urging the protesters to use venues offered by the government and conduct the event on Sunday, when many businesses and government offices would be closed.

The overall sustainability of Liberia’s CSOs was unchanged in 2019. CSOs’ push for more accountability from the government and an end to violence against women and children boosted advocacy moderately. At the same time, service provision was moderately weaker because of funding cuts and the government’s inability to provide subsidies during the slowdown in the national economy. CSOs’ legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, sectoral infrastructure, and public image did not change.

The Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Coordination Unit of the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, the main regulatory body for CSOs, accredited 306 new organizations (278 local and 28 international) and renewed the accreditation of 333 organizations (249 local and 84 international) in 2019. This brought the total number of accredited organizations to 639 in 2019, compared to 557 in 2018.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.0**

CSOs’ legal environment was unchanged in 2019. Although CSOs worked with the government to improve CSO-related laws and exercised their rights to peaceful assembly with minimal state harassment, they continued to experience barriers to registration and some harassment.

CSOs are governed by two policy documents: the Government-CSO Partnership Policy of 2006 and the CSO Accord signed in 2012 by the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning and the National Civil Society Council of Liberia (NCSCCL), one of the main CSO umbrella organizations. These documents are the foundation of the National Aid and NGO Policy, which was validated and passed by the President’s Cabinet and a broad coalition of NGO stakeholders in April 2019. Generally considered by CSOs to be a positive achievement, the policy consolidates multiple directives and laws into the first legally binding document to guide government oversight of CSOs. CSOs contributed to various drafts of the policy, but most organizations had not received the final text by the end of 2019. According to the NGO Coordination Unit, which offered a very broad description of the policy, it spells out the government’s responsibilities to CSOs and lays out mechanisms for CSOs to hold the government accountable. The policy increases the government’s ability to investigate CSO financing to curb money laundering and imposes limits on the number of foreign staff that CSOs may hire.

To obtain legal status, CSOs must register with the Liberian Business Registry for tax purposes, obtain accreditation from the NGO Coordination Unit, and sign memoranda of understanding with the government ministries or agencies responsible for the sectors in which they will work. CSOs must renew their accreditations every year. The lack of appropriate documentation or, as is common, the submission of documents one at a time slows down the accreditation of many CSOs. Some organizations, especially in rural areas, lack required documents or have not bothered to update the documents that they need to become fully legitimate. Organizations may operate without formal recognition but are limited in their interactions with the government and may not apply to the government or foreign donors for support.
Some CSOs continued to face delays in registration and re-accreditation in 2019. Advocacy CSOs reported abnormally long wait times of up to nearly one year to complete re-accreditation, which put them at risk of operating illegally and hampered their ability to apply for grants. Although several lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) organizations reported fewer difficulties obtaining accreditation and clearance to operate in 2019, many other organizations working in this field continued to experience delays and obstacles during registration, including requests to identify their constituents. Service-delivery organizations, international CSOs with extensive government networks, and organizations with big projects that complement the government’s agenda tended to face few barriers in registration.

The NGO Coordination Unit and its branches remained understaffed and under-resourced in 2019. Because the NGO Coordination Unit has few employees and typically confines its work to Monrovia, it gathers information about CSOs’ activities mostly from their annual reports, which are submitted during the reaccreditation process. However, in 2019, the NGO Coordination Unit sought to strengthen its monitoring of CSOs. Its county staff made more frequent monitoring visits to rural organizations, and the unit made other random visits to CSOs’ offices and held more frequent meetings with the Liberian NGO Network (LINNK) and Liberian International NGO Network. Many of the service centers established in 2017 and 2018 to ease the registration process and reduce travel costs for rural organizations continued to function poorly for reasons ranging from the lack of electricity to staff who were absent or tacitly asked for bribes to expedite processing.

Liberia’s constitution guarantees the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and protest. CSOs’ ability to exercise these rights was mixed in 2019. On the one hand, the president signed into law the Kamara Abdullah Kamara Act of Press Freedom, which amends the Penal Law to decriminalize libel against the president. The government granted permits for many protests and used state security personnel to protect protesters. On the other hand, the government sought to curtail freedom of expression by blocking access to social media during the huge protest on June 7, during which protesters used VPN to bypass restrictions.

CSOs may earn income from the provision of goods and services, compete for government contracts, and receive funds from foreign sources.

Charitable and nonprofit organizations registered with the Ministry of Finance and relevant sectoral ministries are exempt from taxes. However, if an organization registered as a nonprofit engages in profit-making business activities or other activities inconsistent with its charitable purpose, it must pay taxes on the additional income. CSOs pay a withholding tax of 10 percent on contracts of more than LRD 100,000 (approximately $500). CSOs that rent out buildings pay a 10 percent tax on their rental income.

Liberia does not have specialists in CSO law. High-quality legal counsel is usually unavailable to CSOs because of its cost. Instead, CSOs usually request assistance from counterpart organizations with relevant expertise or experience or, informally, from legal experts whom they know and trust. Any legal advice that CSOs obtain is usually provided on a pro bono basis. Some organizations have lawyers on their boards who can offer general advice or provide links to other generalists with slightly more experience.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.1**

CSOs’ organizational capacity did not change in 2019. Some donors invested in building staff capacity, improving monitoring and evaluation, and strengthening organizational management. For example, with funding from the new Spotlight Initiative of the EU and the UN, which seeks to prevent gender-based violence, the Development Education Network Liberia (DEN-L) conducted an extensive assessment of CSOs in five counties to inform the initiative’s capacity-building component. The program offered modest training in 2019 to strengthen the organizational capacity of local CSOs. USAID’s Liberia Accountability and Voice Initiative (LAVI), implemented by DAI, continued to build the capacity of Liberian CSOs in advocacy, grant writing, and monitoring and evaluation. Information about changes in the organizational effectiveness of participants in these programs has not yet been made available.

CSOs usually build relationships with constituents and beneficiaries by providing them with quality goods and services. Some CSOs seek to engage their communities extensively. For example, iCampus holds quarterly meetings to solicit constituent and beneficiary feedback and suggestions about their co-working spaces, guest
speaker series, and capacity-building events. The Christian Health Association of Liberia (CHAL) helps communities develop their own health-care projects and then provides seed funding for project implementation.

Most CSOs have clear missions and vision statements. However, they are also driven by donor priorities, and several CSOs worked outside of their mission areas in 2019 to take advantage of funding opportunities. Many organizations include multiple sectors in their articles of incorporation so that they can seek funding for a broad range of projects from various sources. Apart from CSOs with international funding or leaders deeply experienced in nonprofit management, very few CSOs have strategic plans. For those that do, the incorporation of the plans into their decision making is a major challenge because of insufficient funding and staff capacity. For similar reasons, most CSOs do not monitor or evaluate their activities. Any evaluations that take place are usually not sophisticated enough to provide strong evidence of impact. These limitations make it difficult to determine CSOs’ effectiveness and the extent to which they adhere to their missions and visions or implement their strategic plans.

Most CSOs have clearly defined management structures that define the responsibilities of boards of directors and staff. But these structures are not rigidly implemented, in part because many boards are set up to meet registration requirements or to enhance grant eligibility but do not actively engage in internal governance. CSOs with functioning boards often see their board members only at quarterly meetings. Many CSOs’ board meetings are not well attended, and major decisions are taken without consulting the boards. Although some CSOs have written policies and procedures to guide their operations, they rarely completely comply with them. For example, a CSO’s procurement policies may not be strictly followed if the organization lacks full-time or qualified staff to work on procurement. It is difficult to know the extent to which CSOs follow their internal policies because of the lack of compliance audits, published annual reports, and other transparency measures.

Staff retention continued to be a major problem for most CSOs in 2019. As donor support declined and the cost of living increased, many organizations lacked sufficient funding to hire permanent paid staff. Employees were usually hired only when project funding started up. CSOs were unable to compete for highly qualified employees or offer professional development opportunities to core staff. CSOs that could afford to pay sufficient salaries to competent staff were usually international organizations, local organizations with deep international ties, and umbrella organizations working as implementing partners of large grantees. In 2019, as CSOs faced tighter resource constraints, their professional staff often joined bigger or international CSOs or moved on to other careers. The government continued to recruit CSO staff because of their expertise, good reputations, and contact with international donors. CSO employees who joined the public sector were often criticized for having worked in civil society to burnish their credentials and then falling silent on issues that defined their advocacy once they secured government jobs.

Local CSOs that rely heavily on foreign funding are usually required to have adequate human resource systems, including contracts, job descriptions, and time sheets. CSOs do not hire specialized professionals unless specific projects require and fund their services. Many CSO staff perform multiple roles. Most CSOs have a few part-time volunteers, usually current or recently graduated university students. Several organizations, such as Educate the Future, which helps high-school seniors prepare for the national final exam, rely exclusively on volunteers to implement their activities. Very few CSOs have well-structured volunteer programs that fully utilize volunteers or incorporate them into core organizational functions. Some CSOs do not use volunteers because they cannot afford expected stipends for meals and transportation.

Most CSOs have basic equipment such as computers and printers. Their employees usually have basic to intermediate computer skills. With the spread of smartphones, younger staff tend to be active social media users and have good knowledge of major platforms. Some CSOs utilize social media to disseminate program information and updates. But many organizations are deterred from using the internet because of unstable internet connections and the high cost of internet services. In 2019, the government increased taxes on mobile and data operators, leading to a significant increase in the price of services. CSOs using the Liberia Electricity Corporation face regular
power outages during the workday. Most CSOs have backup generators, but they are expensive to operate because of the high cost of gasoline and the need for continuous maintenance.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.0**

CSOs’ financial viability did not change in 2019. Several new donor programs began during the year, but these new initiatives did not bring in substantial resources or had minimal impact on aggregate funding levels, since they were spread across multiple years. Donor funding continued to decline overall, according to the NGO Coordination Unit. The decline along with the poor economic environment forced some CSOs to scale back activities, reduce staff, or abandon offices. Severe cash shortages particularly impaired the ability of small, rural, community-based organizations (CBOs) to implement programs and pay bills. These organizations had depended for support almost entirely on the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), which closed in 2018, and they have yet to find other sources of funding.

CSOs in Liberia rely almost exclusively on foreign support. The major donors in 2019 continued to be traditional funders such as the UN, EU, and USAID, which worked either directly with local CSOs or with international CSOs that sub-contract with or directly support Liberian CSOs. In 2019, the UN and EU launched the Spotlight Initiative, a four-year, $18 million investment to eliminate violence against women and girls by developing the institutional capacity of advocacy organizations, enhancing data collection, and strengthening women’s rights movements in five counties. The Spotlight Initiative disbursed about $7 million for projects in 2019. The Open Society Initiative for West Africa continued to be one of Liberia’s biggest funders and supported programs in education, health care, youth empowerment, civic engagement, and other areas. Small U.S. foundations continued to fund CSOs in health and education, and Liberian CSOs also attracted funding from non-traditional donors such as the Daphne Foundation. CBOs, grassroots organizations, and informal groups received funding from donors and international CSOs because of their proximity to local communities.

The government rarely provides direct grants or contracts to CSOs, other than small amounts to organizations providing services that complement the government’s agenda. In 2019, the government’s shrinking budget resulted in an across-the-board cut in funding for CSOs. CSOs that had been consistently included in the government’s budget saw smaller allotments or a complete end to government support. For example, government funding for the Liberia Albinism Society decreased 25 percent, which prompted a peaceful but unsuccessful protest to demand its restoration. The government stopped supporting CHAL altogether. CSOs sometimes partner with government agencies to apply for grants from donors, and some donors require that CSOs implement certain activities under grants that they award to the government. In 2019, a CSO founded by the government, the Liberia Agency for Community Empowerment, continued to implement projects funded with contracts from donors.

Few local philanthropic foundations provide funding to CSOs, since they usually implement their own programs directly. International companies have more generous and more structured philanthropic programs than local companies. All of the major banks and mobile phone companies have active CSO partnerships. Orange Liberia is one Liberia’s biggest donors and funds projects in education, sport, entrepreneurship, and women’s participation in technology. Lonestar Cell MTN provides highly subsidized data packages to some CSOs, including SMART Liberia, a youth organization engaged in education, entrepreneurship, and technology. Businesses do not support LGBTI or advocacy organizations because they fear consumer backlash and damage to their relationships with the government. Liberia’s first LGBTI news service, journalRAGE, struggled to raise funds from businesses and individuals and secure partnerships in 2019 after Syracuse University’s Newhouse Center for Global Engagement provided start-up funding.

Domestic fundraising is limited because of the lack of a culture of giving and infrastructure such as credit cards, which are needed for digital donations on CSOs’ websites but many people do not have. CSOs have started to use...
mobile money mechanisms to collect donations, but this practice is not widespread. CSOs occasionally raise funds through charity balls, car washes, and similar activities. For example, Kids' Educational Engagement Project Liberia, an organization that provides educational materials to elementary-school students, has hosted charity dinners every year since 2015. CSOs often find it difficult to collect on pledges made at fundraising events, and they usually receive amounts far smaller than promised. Few CSOs are able to raise money from their constituents, but communities usually provide in-kind support such as labor, food, and materials. In 2019, because of declines in donor support, CSOs increasingly rented out their facilities, leased property, or sold land to generate funds. FBOs, associations, and informal CSOs sometimes receive membership fees.

Most CSOs have weak financial management systems and operate with little transparency, especially concerning their finances. CSOs typically cannot afford to obtain professional financial management services or hire qualified financial management staff. They often do not produce financial statements that adhere to widely accepted accounting standards. Most CSOs do not conduct independent audits, since they do not need to submit annual audited financial statements during reaccreditation unless they have budgets of $50,000 or more. In 2019, donors continued to express concerns about CSOs' lack of adequate financial management systems and policies, but some CSOs argued that it is unfair to characterize their financial systems as weak when local laws set different standards than those of donors.

**ADVOCACY: 3.4**

Advocacy improved moderately in 2019, as CSOs pushed the government for more accountability and swifter responses to the economic crisis and demanded an end to violence against women and children.

Direct lines of communication exist between CSOs and policymakers at both the central and local levels. CSOs are usually invited to provide input into government programs, although their level of involvement varies by sector. For example, LGBTI organizations reported greater visibility in 2019 because the government had included them on its health task force, while CSOs’ attendance at meetings on technical and vocational education organized by the Ministry of Youth and Sports was poor. CSOs serve on many committees and technical working groups in government ministries. The Public Health Initiative of Liberia (PHIL), the head of a coalition of health-care CSOs, was a member of the Expanded Program on Immunization technical working group. CSOs’ impact on policy development remains unclear, and at times, CSO feel that they are included merely to meet the requirements of grants or major funders.

CSOs were active in political advocacy in 2019, often organizing their work through coalitions. For example, the Coalition for Transparency and Accountability in Education, National Parents and Teachers Association of Liberia, Youth Coalition for Education in Liberia, Inclusive Development Initiative, and National Teachers Association of Liberia joined together in the More for Education initiative, which pushed for an allotment to education of at least 20 percent of the national budget. Their efforts resulted in an increase in spending on education from 14.7 percent to 15.8 percent (although, since the overall national budget decreased by 8 percent, spending on education declined in absolute terms). CSOs sometimes engaged in advocacy partnerships at donors’ request or applied to join coalitions funded by donors. For example, the More for Education initiative was sponsored by USAID’s LAVI project, and CSOs engaged in a competitive process to join it.

Multiple protests were organized in 2019 in addition to the large Save the State protest. In February, the Liberian Feminist Forum and other women’s groups organized a protest in response to a ProPublica and Time magazine investigative report about the rape of underaged girls by an HIV-positive male staff member at More Than Me, an all-girls school in Monrovia. In August, a diverse group of women’s organizations protested in front of the president’s office against all forms of violence against women and children. The Council of Patriots, a group whose
leadership is dominated by senior members of opposition parties, led a protest in which many other groups presented a broad set of grievances.

Informal CSOs pressured the government to investigate corruption and make structural changes to address Liberia’s economic slowdown in 2019. CSOs continued to use mobile phones, emails, radio, and social media to foster civic engagement and disseminate information. For example, Medica Liberia shared an invitation on Facebook to its public event about cancer awareness for women. The June 7 protesters shared their petition online to galvanize support and relied on Facebook to share videos during the protest.

Liberian CSOs have a long record of lobbying and were exceptionally active in this area in 2019. For example, a large coalition of women-focused CSOs pushed for passage of the Domestic Violence Act, which toughened punishments of perpetrators of domestic violence and protections for victims and survivors. The bill was introduced in 2014 but stalled because politicians had feared that criminalizing female genital mutilation (FGM) would be unpopular among traditional voters. The final act, signed by the president in August 2019, omitted the criminalization of FGM and weakened the language of other provisions.

CSOs made multiple efforts to promote legal reforms to benefit the sector in 2019 and inform the wider CSO community about the importance of a favorable legal and regulatory framework. The focus of their efforts was the NGO Policy, and many CSOs and CSO coalitions contributed to various drafts. For example, CSOs suggested changing the accreditation and reporting schedule from annually to every three years and proposed provisions that would allow CSOs to hold the government accountable for not fulfilling its obligations. The final version of the policy went to the President’s Cabinet for discussion and was evidently approved, but CSOs have little indication as to whether it reflects their concerns, since few organizations have received the final text and the government has yet to distribute it widely.

SERVICE PROVISION: 4.8

CSO service provision deteriorated moderately in 2019, largely because of declines in donor funding and the government’s inability to provide subsidies during the slowdown of the national economy. The funding shortage was most acute for CSOs providing health-care services, as projects related to the Ebola crisis had ended and government support declined. At times, doctors did not receive salaries, and some major public hospitals stopped operating or limited their operating hours because of a shortage of fuel. In some instances, operations resumed only when local and international CSOs provided fuel or patients helped cover fuel costs.

CSOs provide services across a diverse range of sectors, especially health care, agriculture, and education. They are also active in youth development, legal protection, women’s empowerment, and environmental protection. While CSOs often work closely with their communities, it is not common for them to have formal processes for involving beneficiaries in program development. This is especially true in rural areas, where CSOs usually implement activities stipulated in agreements with donors and lack the resources to meet the challenge of involving beneficiaries, such as paying transportation costs and the “sitting fees” that beneficiaries often request to take part in meetings with CSOs. In addition, CSOs usually assume that they know what their beneficiaries want or need based on previous interventions or their understanding of best practices. The results are not always satisfactory. Willette Safehouse, a CSO that provides Liberia’s disabled community with services in education, advocacy, and socio-economic empowerment, built numerous prostheses for amputees but later discovered that the amputees did not want them because prosthetic legs are not used in Liberia.

CSOs generally provide their goods and services without discriminating on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or religious affiliation. The Liberian Albinism Society runs a medical center that helps many
patients, including non-albinos. In 2019, CSOs did not normally seek to recover the costs of products and services because they usually work with constituencies that cannot afford to pay.

The government recognizes the value of CSO service provision at the local and national levels. For example, the National AIDS Control Program recognized the work of LGBTI organizations in spreading awareness about HIV/AIDS prevention. LGBTI organizations were also mentioned in the government’s regular press briefing at the Ministry of Information, Culture, and Tourism. LGBTI CSOs are active on multiple steering committees and task forces, including the Liberia Coordination Mechanism of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria.

SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.8

The infrastructure supporting CSOs was unchanged in 2019. Although some resource centers and intermediary support organizations (ISOs) still operated and hosted training and capacity-building events, they were insufficient to fill the gap caused by the sluggish economy and the 2018 departure of UNMIL, which had built the capacity of many organizations.

Resource centers are based mostly in the capital and a few other major cities. The Monrovia-based iCampus hosted a space that offered better internet access and logistical support to organizations working at the intersection of technology, accountability, and social change. Although iCampus rental rates are prohibitive for most local CSOs, events at the space are free and attract many people, especially youth. Resource centers, such as the one operated by KEEP Liberia, did not break even in 2019 because of low usage.

There are not many local foundations in Liberia. Family and individual foundations have very limited resources, do not usually operate full time, and rarely provide grants to CSOs. They usually implement programs directly, such as by providing scholarships or making donations to hospitals. The more visible local foundations tend to have U.S. nonprofit status for fundraising purposes.

Few local coalitions or networks operate through which CSOs cooperate or share information. Coalitions usually do not have functioning websites or databases that could offer information about their membership, activities, or strategic plans. In some sectors, multiple networks address different priorities and have different memberships, and organizations are often members of more than one network. For example, in education, the National Education Coalition of Liberia and the Education NGO Forum both provide training, share information, and engage in advocacy. Their members pay a monthly fee of $50, and while they often do not attend regular meetings, they turn out in high numbers for training and other capacity building.

Most information aimed at CSOs is shared through LINNK or NCSCL. LINNK is more active and works more closely with government bodies and international CSOs to host discussion forums on sector-specific themes, organize petitions, and coordinate and monitor fund transfers to local CSOs. CSOs report that the NCSCL does not have an active database of CSOs and does not actively monitor CSOs’ activities or advocate on their behalf. In 2019, the NCSCL was gripped by internal tensions as some members of the leadership team refused to leave their posts after their tenure expired. Overall, CSOs viewed the NCSCL as doing little to enhance their work.

Many projects and initiatives have partially filled the gap left by UNMIL, which had funded several capacity-building activities targeting civil society. For example, USAID’s LAVI Project has helped strengthen the capacity of twelve Liberian CSOs in advocacy, proposal writing, policy dialogue, networking, and monitoring and evaluation. ActionAid Liberia continued to provide capacity building and broader organizational support to smaller CSOs, such as the Lesbian and Gay Association of Liberia (LEGAL), which it helped with financial management, international advocacy, and payment of rental fees for its head office. Donor-funded training workshops in 2019 covered topics such as partnership formation and monitoring and evaluation, as well as sector-specific topics such as sexual and gender-based violence, behavioral change communication, and classroom management. Trainings were usually led
by experienced, often local trainers. For example, LAVI-supported trainings were conducted by local firms selected in a competitive bid.

Liberian CSOs engaged in many intersectoral partnerships in 2019. International CSOs, FBOs, and CSOs such as the Liberian Initiative for the Promotion of Rights, Identity, and Equality, a LGBTI organization, took part alongside government bodies and businesses in the Liberia Coordinating Mechanism, which designs proposals for the Global Fund and oversees all activities associated with grant implementation. The Center for Media Studies and Peacebuilding partnered with the British Embassy to strengthen media freedom through intersectoral discussions and online training. Print journalists, CSOs, and school press clubs met to discuss a range of topics, including ethical journalism and responsible social media usage. In collaboration with the Merck Foundation, the Office of the First Lady conducted a training for Liberian journalists to improve their knowledge of infertility and help end the stigma around this sensitive issue.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.7

The public image of CSOs did not change in 2019. CSOs used the media to enhance civic engagement, disseminate information, and mobilize public support. At the same time, many CSOs lacked resources to access mainstream media outlets.

The media covered many CSO activities in 2019. Both electronic and print media covered the revelation of the alleged rapes at More Than Me as well as public protests, press releases, and opinion pieces from CSO leaders. Some CSOs have their own media programs. Willette Safehouse, for example, airs a radio program that promotes voices of the disabled community. CSOs normally pay for coverage from both electronic and print media, with some payments made formally to media outlets and others going informally to the journalists covering the events.

The Liberian government has a mixed relationship with CSOs. In general, the government approves of organizations working in service provision, because they contribute to realizing the government's aims, while it has an unfavorable view of organizations that demand accountability or apply pressure about corruption and human rights violations. The government may question the credibility of CSOs if their information shows that the government is failing. For example, in 2019, the Water Sanitation and Hygiene Commission investigated Last Well, a charity that said it had provided safe drinking water to more than two million people. The Commission reported that Last Well’s claims were “deceptive” and that audits had uncovered discrepancies and violations of national policies at the organization.

The public had mixed views of CSOs in 2019. On the one hand, the public appreciates CSOs engaging in service delivery, advocacy, information sharing, and critiques of the government. On the other hand, the public is skeptical of some CSOs, especially if their leaders have political ambitions and are thought to use their organizations to gain popularity. Some people believe that certain CSOs are corrupt and collect foreign funds to enrich their leaders. Public trust in CSO advocacy is similarly mixed. CSOs are perceived as more trustworthy than opposition political parties, because there is no overt political basis for their work. However, when CSOs persistently advocate against government wrongdoing, people question their motives and accuse them of being paid by anti-government institutions. CSOs are branded as government agents by opposition actors if they praise the government’s efforts.

Businesses perceive CSOs as an essential part of society and often partner with them to deliver services through their corporate social responsibility programs.

Many CSOs engage in public relations by sending out newsletters, flyers, brochures, press releases, and radio announcements. Most CSOs do not have dedicated public relations staff, although they may assign this duty to employees with other responsibilities. CSOs increasingly use social media to disseminate information. However,
there is a generational divide in the volume and sophistication of social media use, and CSOs with younger leaders tend to have a livelier social media presence using many more features.

In 2019, CSOs made several suggestions to the NCSCL to institute a code of conduct to self-regulate the sector. Some CSOs have pushed for sector-wide standards, such as the production and publication of annual reports and the creation of an index to rank CSOs into tiers based on their organizational capacity, which donors and other stakeholders can use in evaluating CSOs for grants, training, or other organizational support. These suggestions have yet to be implemented.
After Madagascar’s tense presidential campaign in 2018, the year 2019 got off to a promising start with a peaceful democratic transition. In January, the High Constitutional Court ruled on disputed election results and proclaimed Andry Rajoelina the new president, which his opponents accepted. Less than ten days after the new president’s inauguration, Prime Minister Christian Ntsay presented the parliament with a plan for implementing the new government’s policies. The plan focuses on thirteen high-priority initiatives, including the restoration of peace and security, universal access to electricity and water, zero tolerance for corruption, universal education, improved health care, autonomy and accountability for decentralized municipalities, and the sustainable management of natural resources. However, the low rate of participation in legislative elections in May and in municipal elections in November showed that citizens were disengaged from democratic processes and distrustful of state institutions. Despite an intense opposition campaign, the ruling party won most of the National Assembly seats and mayoral and municipal council positions.

The new government faced a host of challenges in 2019. The nationwide spread of banditry led to a surge in kidnappings and armed attacks, while frequent power cuts and water shortages increased tensions in many places. In Antalaha, in northeastern Madagascar, in March, a fire at the offices of state-owned electric utility and water services company Jirama killed two people and injured two others. In Maroantsetra, in eastern Madagascar, in November, an angry mob ransacked Jirama’s offices. Power and water was cut off for days at a time in certain neighborhoods in the capital, Antananarivo, spurring residents to take to the streets to express their dissatisfaction. Plans to construct a new city, to be called Tana Masoandro, caused a great deal of controversy in the rural municipality of Ambohitrimanjaka, where residents opposed the backfilling of 1,000 hectares of rice fields and the expropriation of land from more than 700 families. Negotiations between the government and local residents continued into December, and CSOs advocated strongly for land ownership rights and environmental reforms.

Although Madagascar is one of the fastest growing economies in sub-Saharan Africa, its economy showed signs of weakness in 2019, according to the World Bank. The growth rate slowed slightly as export volumes decreased and the new government pulled the brake on public expenditures. At slightly under 75 percent, the poverty rate continued to be one of the highest in the world. Droughts and other extreme climactic conditions continued to contribute to food insecurity, particularly in the Atsimo Andrefana region in the southwest.

The overall sustainability of CSOs in Madagascar improved slightly in 2019. The legal environment was slightly more enabling as organizations improved their compliance with registration requirements, tax regulations, and other legal obligations. CSOs’ organizational capacity was moderately stronger as many organizations...
professionalized their governance and operations. Advocacy was enhanced by CSOs’ increasing involvement in government decision-making processes. The diversification of CSOs’ services and their better alignment with target groups’ needs strengthened service provision. The sectoral infrastructure improved slightly with expanding intersectoral partnerships and training opportunities. CSOs’ public image was slightly more positive as press coverage increased and the public respected CSOs for their expertise. Only CSOs’ financial viability did not change.

CSOs in Madagascar include associations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), unions, foundations, cooperatives, savings and loan groups, and religious and cultural associations. The number of active CSOs fluctuates with available funding. Precise numbers of registered organizations are not available. The most recent study by the Central Bank, published in 2014, counted approximately 800 associations and NGOs, of which 81.5 percent were national and 18.5 percent were international organizations. A spike in registrations was observed in 2019, but no estimate of the number of CSOs newly registered during the year is available. More than one-third of CSOs are believed to be informal.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.8**

CSOs’ legal environment was slightly more enabling in 2019 as organizations improved their compliance with registration requirements, tax regulations, and other legal obligations, such as the filing of annual reports.

The regulatory framework under which CSOs are founded and operate varies from one legal form to another. While unregistered CSOs may operate legally, a growing number of CSOs find that formal registration offers better access to funding, since only registered CSOs that comply with tax obligations may respond to calls for proposals. Each time a new call is published, many CSOs rush to begin the registration process or renew their tax identification cards so that they can apply for funding. This occurred in 2019 after USAID and a group of European countries announced new funding programs. In addition, training offered to CSOs over many years has emphasized that registration confers credibility and promotes professionalism, thereby resulting in a growing number of registered organizations.

The majority of organizations register as associations under Order No. 60-133. The process is easy, requiring only the submission of three copies of the declaration of formation and the bylaws. NGOs register under Law 96-030 in a two-step process that includes filing an application with a declaration with the regional bipartite committee and then filing the approved application with regional authorities. Organizations that file as NGOs have access to a wider array of funding sources. Registration as an association or NGO is usually completed within two weeks and is rarely denied.

With only a single management or administrative body, associations have a simpler internal structure than other legal forms. Law 96-030 on NGOs stipulates mandatory governing bodies, which are detailed in bylaws and regulations. Some twenty articles of Law 2004-014 on foundations deal with their internal administrative arrangements. Public benefit status, which provides eligibility for certain tax exemptions, is granted solely at the discretion of the Government Council, and official requirements for the status do not exist.

Logistical challenges continued to act as barriers to registration in 2019. For example, CSOs in the municipality of Manantenina that wish to register must travel 114 kilometers to Taolagnaro, the district seat. The journey takes a number of days, with five river crossings in motorboats that often run out of gas. Once in Taolagnaro, the organization’s representative often find that the trip has been made for nothing, since the responsible official has not shown up to work, is in a meeting, or is out of town.

Since Madagascar’s government has limited human and material resources, it monitors only a sampling of CSOs for compliance with legal and regulatory requirements. CSOs with public benefit status, NGOs, and associations
receiving donor support are more strictly monitored than other types of organizations. The central government does not get involved in CSOs’ internal management unless the law authorizes it to do so, as in cases in which it chooses, at its own discretion, to conduct technical and financial audits. The government may dissolve an organization, suspend its activities, or withdraw its public benefit status provided it gives a reason for doing so. This is not known to have happened in 2019. CSOs may appeal such decisions to the appropriate authorities.

CSOs operate freely as long as their activities do not threaten public order or public safety, harm national unity, or offend public decency. The authorities occasionally cite these reasons to constrain or prevent demonstrations, which require prior authorization. CSOs and journalists were generally able to express themselves freely and question the government in 2019, although occasional conflicts arose between the government and the press. For example, in September, the army filed charges against three journalists for defamation, spreading false news, and disturbing the peace after they reported inaccurately on a situation involving the landing of a military helicopter in the Mahamasina stadium. The court found one of the defendants innocent but fined the other two MGA 10 million (approximately $2,800), which some people viewed as excessive and an act of intimidation. In October, law enforcement forces confronted journalists covering a demonstration opposing the construction of a new city in Ambohitrimanjaka, on the outskirts of the capital, and confiscated their cameras to erase their photos. The Order of Journalists and the Photojournalists’ Collective condemned the incident as abuse of power. Afterward, law enforcement and journalists signed an agreement to guarantee journalists’ safety on the job.

With a few exceptions, registered CSOs are subject to the common-law tax code and must have a tax identification number and tax card, which is renewed each year. In the absence of a law on social enterprises, CSOs are subject to business taxes if their activities generate income. Religious, social, educational, and cultural associations are exempt from income tax, and CSOs with public benefit status are exempt from taxes on profits, the flat tax on transfers, document registration and transfer fees, and customs charges. Donors are entitled to tax deductions on donations to organizations with public benefit status. Donations to foundations are tax deductible up to 25 percent of the tax amount owed. CSOs can pay their tax bills over the internet.

The law allows CSOs to hold fundraising campaigns, offer services for fees, monetize their assets, bid on government contracts, and respond to calls for projects. Over the years, specialized networks and platforms have formed to provide legal expertise to CSOs. The Voahary Gasy Alliance (Alliance Voahary Gasy, AVG) has a legal unit that offers CSOs and the public assistance, consultations, and mediation. Solidarity of Land Stakeholders (Solidarité des intervenants du foncier, SIF) and the Liaison Office for Training Institutions in Rural Areas (Bureau de liaison des institutions de formation en milieu rural, BIMTT) offer similar services. Their legal advice is usually provided by attorneys or legal experts specializing in the environment, land rights, labor, the press, or other areas.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.2**

CSOs’ organizational capacity improved moderately in 2019. Although some organizations still had trouble adapting to the culture of written documentation and a “modern” governance style, in which responsibilities are divided and procedures are defined in procedural manuals and then adhered to, training programs in 2019 helped CSOs of all sizes operate more professionally and make progress towards these goals. For example, members of the Antsirabe Network of Child Welfare CSOs (Organisation de la société civile d’Antsirabe pour l’enfance, OSCAPE) improved their internal governance after participating in a training on social change and association governance offered by Fanainga, a multi-donor program that provides CSOs with capacity building, funding, networking opportunities, and other support.

The 2019 CSO Sustainability Index for Madagascar
Throughout 2019, some CSOs succeeded in involving their target groups in activities to increase beneficiaries’ sense of ownership for their projects. For example, the NGO Beautiful Future (Bel avenir) in southern Madagascar inspired a greater sense of responsibility among its beneficiaries under the slogan “Creating Schools Together.” The program encouraged students from the École des Salines, their parents, and school staff and administrators to meet every three months to share opinions on issues ranging from school operations to courses and extracurricular activities. During the legislative elections, the Election Institute for a Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) and its partner organizations successfully trained and deployed 875 election educators and monitors who were members of local communities. In Toamasina, more than one hundred fokontany (neighborhoods) committed to fighting child neglect and abuse in an initiative of the Child Protection Network (Réseau de protection des enfants, RPE), with support from the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). The Youth Observatory held a campaign to reinvigorate its target youth groups in more than twenty locations, with the result that it nearly doubled the number of groups from thirty-five to sixty-five.

Many CSOs formalized their governance structures and engaged in planning in 2019. The HINA Platform created a permanent executive secretariat, internal communications plan, and procedural manual and appointed nine new regional focal points, each composed of a director and deputy director. Twelve members of the HINA Platform’s Androy branch in southern Madagascar took part in budgeting for an approved three-year action plan. Eighty organizations belonging to the umbrella organization ROHY devoted two days to evaluating the previous year’s achievements and preparing a five-year action plan. In Tulear, CSOs, including smaller associations, used analyses prepared by Action Against Hunger to create action plans as part of the Health Systems Strengthening program, which is spearheaded by the Ministry of Public Health with funding from Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance.

Despite these efforts, however, CSOs were often unable to implement the plans that they drew up in 2019 because of a lack of funds. When CSOs face funding shortfalls, they tend to bid on available donors’ projects, even when these activities do not align with their missions. CSOs also often change their procedural manuals to align with individual donors’ requirements.

Over time, CSOs, including smaller associations, have become more accustomed to ensuring transparency by producing written reports for the government and local and international donors. For example, the Development Intervention Fund (Fonds d’intervention pour le développement, FID) and Catholic Relief Service (CRS) trained their partners in the Atsinanana region to produce reports at the end of projects. The partner CSOs now automatically send reports to donors and the government at the end of each project. Registered CSOs and sometimes informal CSOs realize that submitting activity and financial reports to the appropriate authorities is important so that they can renew their tax identification cards, which are needed to respond to government bids.

A lack of funding has undermined the quality of CSOs’ human resources. Even if they reduce their expenses to a minimum, small CSOs often cannot afford to hire staff. As a result, executive directors tend to do everything and sometimes even fund organizational activities, such as travel and meetings, out of their own pockets. Many CSOs are hemorrhaging trained staff, who leave for jobs with higher salaries and better benefits with international organizations, donors, the private sector, or the government. To compensate for the loss of staff, CSOs are more often turning to contractors, which cost less than full-time employees, or to consultants hired to do specific jobs for specific time periods. Volunteering is rare, given the country’s impoverished socio-economic environment. Only a few large CSOs, such as the Madagascar Red Cross, National Committee for Election Monitoring and Citizen Education (Comité national d’observation des élections et d’éducation des citoyens, KMF–CNOE), and Madagascar Aid and Action (Aide et action Madagascar), are able to rely regularly on volunteers. But as young people become more socially aware, they increasingly seek to get involved with CSOs through short-term volunteer positions or unpaid internships, which sometimes come with a small stipend.

Executive directors’ homes serve as the offices of most smaller CSOs. Larger CSOs can afford to rent offices. Organizations lacking donor support rarely have sufficient funding to purchase new computer equipment or upgrade their old computers. However, more than 50 percent of households have mobile phones, according to the 2018 Madagascar Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey, and CSO employees commonly use their personal mobile phones to access the internet in their daily work. Some small organizations use low-cost pre-paid telephone plans to make calls and access the internet to gain visibility, obtain information, contact supporters, and receive notices of calls for bids. Many CSOs, even in remote areas, have Facebook accounts. CSOs use other modern technologies as well. For example, as part of its natural disaster prevention and response activities, CARE International Madagascar uses drones to identify and map high-risk areas and evaluate emergency situations in real time.
CSOs’ financial viability was unchanged in 2019. Given the scarcity of funding, especially for the long term, many CSOs found it difficult to diversify or stabilize their sources of income during the year. The situation was most difficult for organizations that are not used to raising funds from donors, the government, or the private sector, especially since they feel unprepared to take part in the fierce competition for funding. Many smaller organizations are unable to meet donor requirements, such as the need to use their own resources to fund up to 10 percent of total project costs. Some funding programs, such as the 2019–22 Fanainga program (previously known as Dinika and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund), allow CSOs to obtain co-financing from other donors or make in-kind contributions of land or labor. Many organizations believe that there is unequal access to information about funding opportunities and that donor funding is the “private turf” of a select group of organizations. CSOs feel harmed by donors’ shift a few years ago from covering operating expenses to not allowing administrative expenses to be included in approved budgets and providing compensation only for staff assigned to funded projects.

CSOs depend overwhelmingly on external funding. In 2019, the primary donors continued to be the World Bank, European Union (EU), UN Development Programme (UNDP), other UN agencies, USAID, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, and the governments of Monaco, Germany, and France. Among new funding opportunities in 2019, the EU awarded eleven CSO projects a total of EUR 4 million (approximately $4.6 million) as part of its European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) program and other programs supporting civil society. The Fanainga program, which is funded by the EU and the governments of France, Germany, and Monaco, awarded thirty-six initiatives a total of MGA 6.5 billion (approximately $1.8 million) for work in seven regions. Twenty projects were selected from 142 applications to receive a total of EUR 400,000 ($456,000) in the second phase of the French Embassy’s Innovative Projects for Civil Societies and Coalitions of Actors (PISCCA) project. The EU’s Support Program for the Financing of Agriculture and Inclusive Sectors also launched in 2019. Although not primarily a program for CSOs, it is possible that they will participate as service providers.

Local resources for CSOs are lacking. CSOs rarely obtain government funding. An exception is municipalities that have adopted a participatory budgeting approach, such as those in the Atsinanana region, where CSO initiatives are included in municipal budgets. The budgets for these initiatives are very small and consumed largely by operating expenses. Aid from the central government sometimes takes the form of payments for certain budget items, such as staff salaries. For example, the central government has categorized 90 percent of the teachers from Father Pedro’s Akamasoa Association as civil servants and pays their salaries.

Private-sector contributions to CSOs are limited. The lack of a favorable regulatory environment, especially tax incentives, does not encourage businesses to fund CSOs. Companies usually invest in direct and basic interventions, sometimes in partnership with the central government. However, several companies have developed partnerships with CSOs in recent years.

CSOs derive little income from members’ dues, which are largely symbolic. Sponsorships from individuals and humanitarian associations fund associations that support and pay school fees for orphans and vulnerable children. CSOs’ ability to generate income from other sources is limited, especially as the absence of favorable laws, including a law on social enterprises, keeps them from developing sources of sustainable income, such as rental property or marketable products and services. Smaller associations sometimes find fundraising campaigns worthwhile, but most CSOs are reluctant to get involved in fundraising, since the results are often not worth the effort. Target groups are more likely to contribute labor or building materials than funds.

Some CSOs have mismanaged the funds that they received from donors. To increase their credibility, large CSOs, especially those with a national scope, now try to implement solid financial management systems and share financial
The CSOs, reports with the government and donors, but usually not the public. Donors often pay for audits. Smaller CSOs often do not have accountants, and their financial records tend to be limited to ledgers of transactions with receipts. The financial reports of small CSOs usually consist of brief narratives and statements of income and expense, which are typically presented only to the annual general meetings or boards of directors.

**ADVOCACY: 3.4**

Advocacy by Malagasy CSOs was slightly stronger in 2019 for the fourth year in a row. CSOs were more involved in government decision-making processes, either informally or through formal mechanisms for strategic discussion. CSOs’ engagement with the government and their other advocacy and lobbying efforts resulted in notable progress on a number of fronts.

On a formal level, CSOs participated with the government in discussions of the Emerging Madagascar Plan, National Land Ownership Policy 2020–25, and draft framework law on specific land parcels in 2019. The National Independent Election Commission brings together political players and CSOs. This multi-actor discussion framework gave CSOs a chance to offer suggestions on the electoral process, including the feasibility of using a biometric system to register voters and transmit election results.

While in the past, the Ministry of Finance and Budget organized informal work sessions with CSOs to prepare the finance law, this process was formalized into regional budget conferences in 2019. The ministries of finance and budget and of the interior and decentralization met with CSOs from Madagascar’s twenty-two regions to hear their opinions and recommendations about the national budget. CSOs were also invited to help prepare regional and municipal development plans. Other working groups with government and CSO representatives formed on an as-needed basis. For example, a working group from the Ran’Eau Network (Réseau Ran’Eau) took part with technicians from the Ministry of Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene in a Suivi Technique et Financier (STeFI) process to monitor the technical and financial performance of water and sanitation services.

During the year, CSOs continued to pursue efforts to ensure democratic elections, which they began during the 2018 presidential election. They protested the government’s decision to hold a constitutional referendum on abolishing the Senate and giving more power to the regions at the same time as legislative elections in 2019. The High Constitutional Court overturned the scheduled referendum. CSOs also advocated for candidates in the 2019 legislative and municipal elections to sign an agreement called Toky Nomena or “You Have my Word,” in which they pledge to keep campaign promises. Sixty-nine percent of legislative candidates signed the agreement.

In an open letter to the highest government authorities, seven CSOs and platforms successfully opposed the release from prison of two members of parliament, one of whom was in preventive detention for alleged corruption, while the other had been sentenced for illegal logging to five years in prison without the possibility of parole. The Citizens’ and Citizen Organizations’ Collective (Collectif des citoyens et des organisations citoyennes, CCOC) organized public discussions on the 2020 draft law on finance in December. On the environmental front, community protests pressured the Council of Ministers into suspending the Base Toliara ilmenite mining project, which was to be the third largest mining project in Madagascar. When the Menabe Antimena protected area was under threat from migrants and extended slash-and-burn farming for commercial corn crops, the regional CSO platform Five Menabe alerted the public and the central government, and the Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development decided to hold a national dialogue on dry forests in the area.

In the Vakinankaratra region, the HINA Platform engaged in significant advocacy to ensure that civil society was represented on regional and district technical committees for the Nutritional Results Improvement Project, co-financed by the International Development Association and Power of Nutrition. Sedera, Mivoatra, and the Federation of Women’s Development Associations (Fédération des associations femme et développement,
FAFED) successfully advocated for communities to have fair access to royalties from the Ambatovy mining project, which they used to build a market in Ambalamanasy. Several women’s organizations, such as FAFED, Movement for the Promotion of Gender in Politics and Development (Mouvement pour la promotion du genre en politique et développement, VMLF), and Association of Women Neighborhood Leaders (Association des femmes chefs fokontany), successfully convinced the Atsinanana regional water, sanitation, and hygiene authority and the municipality of Toamasina to install water access points in many of the city’s neighborhoods.

CSOs’ lobbying efforts were often productive in 2019, although the turnover of parliamentarians in the National Assembly and the shuffling of personnel in government ministries slowed down the legislative process. Important CSO successes included an order promulgating a new law on the repossession of improperly obtained property, approval of a law on gender, and an indefinite delay in a review of a highly controversial law on the production and sale of artisanal rum. Other advocacy actions did not achieve the desired effects. On December 5, the CSO Platform on Extractive Industries (Plateforme des OSC sur les industries extractive, OSCIE) published an open letter to the central government criticizing draft amendments to the mining code, which they saw as ignoring repeated recommendations from civil society. Fifteen days later, when OSCIE representatives joined a discussion on the amendments, they stormed out of the meeting to show their disapproval of the proceedings, stressing that the amendment process should not be rushed.

Leading CSOs did not view reform of the legal framework affecting the sector as a priority in 2019. The reasons for their lack of action included the discouraging failure of an earlier effort to prepare a civil society charter, as well as their involvement in work on the municipal and legislative elections. CSOs did get together to reflect on certain issues needing attention, such as legislation on social enterprises and more flexible procedures for issuing authorizations for head offices for international CSOs.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.1**

CSOs’ service provision improved slightly in 2019 as services became more diverse and aligned with the needs of target groups, communities, and partners. The central government, donors, universities, and religious institutions often acknowledged CSOs’ expertise in service provision and consulted with them.

The range of products and services that CSOs provide expanded in 2019 in response to needs of target groups identified through field visits, direct community requests, or surveys. For example, the Akamasoa Association conducted metalwork, carpentry, and sewing workshops to support home construction and infrastructure projects and the production of smocks and uniforms for primary and high school students. In addition to fulfilling community needs, these activities created work opportunities for needy community members. In December 2019, the Tsiafajavona Training Center of the NGO Barefoot College Madagascar graduated its first class of twelve women solar engineers, who, during the five-month training, had learned to read and write and install solar equipment to bring electric lights to their villages in Nosy Be, Betioky Sud, and Ambatolampy. In the second half of 2019, BIMTT offered trainings to 2,500 people who were vulnerable to having their land expropriated because they were unaware of land ownership laws.

CSOs’ goods and services are provided without discrimination, and they usually benefit members and non-members equally. For example, sick people of all religions receive health care in centers run by the Akamasoa Association, which is affiliated with the Catholic Church.

CSOs provide fee-based training and capacity-building services to universities, religious institutions, and the government. Rates are negotiated. For example, at the request of the Catholic Church, Ny SAHY trained 400 priests and 1,800 nuns in management skills, and the Youth Observatory prepared new documents for the youth strategy of the Don Bosco congregation. SAF–FJKM delivered lectures to college students on development and
career planning. BIMTT earned significant income by offering technical and organizational capacity building related to agriculture, livestock, and land ownership.

It is nearly impossible for CSOs to charge for the actual cost of their services, especially health-care services, given their target groups’ low purchasing power. The Andzaha Santé Community Clinic on Nosy Boraha island charges tourists and expatriates the full price of health care and has an income-based sliding scale of payment for local people. The most disadvantaged populations pay nothing at all.

Municipal and regional authorities take great interest in CSOs’ activities and do not hesitate to help them out as much as their resources allow. At the central level, government officials often fail to acknowledge CSOs and may even take credit for their work, such as by including CSOs’ achievements in descriptions of the government’s accomplishments.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.2**

CSOs’ sectoral infrastructure was slightly more supportive in 2019 as a new spirit of cooperation strengthened intersectoral partnerships and training opportunities expanded.

Several resource centers, including the Technical and Economic Information Center (Centre d’information technique et économique, CITE) and the Malagasy Press Center (Centre de presse Malagasy, CPM), offer training and technical assistance to national CSOs. CITE, which has fourteen branches across the country, provides information, training, reading and writing rooms, discussion opportunities, and assistance with organized events and the creation of databases and websites. CPM organizes training and capacity-building sessions, lectures, and discussions on media-related topics. BIMTT is a CSO resource center and offers training to CSOs working in livestock, agriculture, and land ownership.

Organizations such as the Sanitation Support Fund, Aga Khan Foundation, Global Environment Fund, Tany Meva Foundation, Professional Training and Agriculture Improvement Program (Programme de Formation professionnelle et d’amélioration de la productivité agricole, FORMAPROD), and Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria have local offices that directly support CSOs, or they provide funds to local organizations that then finance CSOs. The Tany Meva Foundation provides sustainable funding for environmental and community projects and manages the Partnership Fund for Critical Ecosystems, a joint initiative of the French and Japanese governments, EU, World Bank, Conservation International, Global Environment Fund, and MacArthur Foundation.

CSOs often come together in geographic or specialized coalitions and platforms to make their voices heard and coordinate their activities. These groups allow their members to increase their effectiveness with pooled resources, harmonized visions, and complementary action plans. The Human and Environmental Impact and Knowledge Alliance (HENIKA) speaks for its CSO members when communicating with central government officials and the national environment office, with which it signed a collaboration agreement in November. Some platforms such as the HINA Platform have regional branches to bring them closer to the expectations and needs of communities.

Training opportunities on various topics expanded in all regions in 2019 at the initiative of CSOs and donors. UNICEF organized three days of training on advocacy for some fifty young people from various associations and platforms. Fanainga offered training to youth associations on CSOs and social change, and EISA trained election monitors on group leadership. Networks and platforms also offered diverse training across the country in 2019. For example, the HINA Platform provided training in association management to its 208 member organizations, and OSCAPE partnered with Fanainga to offer a training module on social change and association governance. Madagascar has a network of trainers who are skilled in various topics.
CSOs collaborated regularly with the government, private sector, and media in 2019. On World No Tobacco Day, Ny Sahy worked with the Ministry of Public Health, National Tobacco Prevention Office, and Tobacco Prevention Consultation Committee to organize the Grassroots Festival, which was attended by more than 600 children and cited worldwide as a best practice. The Youth Observatory helped the Ministry of Youth and Sports prepare UNICEF’s U-Report, a social platform for young people based on text messaging, and also helped the rural community of Antanetikely Ambohijoky prepare its youth education policy. AVG worked to combat illegal natural resource extraction in cooperation with various government ministries.

In partnerships between CSOs and the business sector, the Telma telephone company launched a service to promote access to loans and grants for members of village savings and loan associations in the Vatomandry district. Care International partnered with the bank Société Générale Madagasikara to allow vulnerable people to access low-cost financial services. CSOs enjoyed a number of partnerships with the media in 2019. For example, the HINA Platform worked with the ChaNut network, which is made up primarily of local journalists, in order to develop a common vision for improving nutrition.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.0

CSOs’ public image improved slightly in 2019 for the fourth year in a row. With a busy news cycle focused on the new president, legislative and municipal elections, weather events, and insecurity, CSOs had never been so sought after by the press or had such widespread media coverage as in 2019.

Both large and small CSOs formed good relationships with national media outlets and individual journalists in 2019. The public radio and television stations RNM and TVM, in partnership with the regional directorate of the Ministry of Population, Social Protection, and Women’s Promotion, provided spots on Tuesdays and Thursdays for CSO programming in the Atsinanana region. In 2019, BIMTT launched a weekly show called Ny Zoko (Point of Law) on the private television station Viva, in which many individuals, CSO representatives, government officials, and businesspeople discussed social and human rights. CSOs were often asked to give their opinions on current events or provide information. During the legislative and municipal elections in 2019, for example, CSOs participated in debates on radio and TV stations and commented on the election results in real time. CSOs must sometimes pay for newspaper inserts or radio and television spots.

CSOs’ critical attitude can sometimes annoy the government, and the government sometimes accuses CSOs of being puppets of the opposition. But the government also acknowledges CSOs’ expertise and often calls on them for advice. For example, in the Atsinanana region, the government has involved CSOs in preparing sector-specific policies and urban plans, managing household waste, supplying drinking water, and expanding the Toamasina port. Municipal governments particularly appreciate CSOs that build schools, health clinics, roads, and other infrastructure.

CSOs that work for the public wellbeing and focus on community concerns are highly regarded by the public. Father Pedro’s Akamasoa Association, which responds to the needs of the most disadvantaged populations, is one of the country’s most respected CSOs. In areas that lack public infrastructure, such as poor urban neighborhoods and rural and remote areas that are difficult to access, CSOs are beacons of hope. Victims of land ownership conflicts, injustice, and abuses of power flock to CSOs for aid and assistance. At the same time, the concept of CSOs is still in flux in the public mind, and it is not uncommon to hear people say that CSOs should stick to useful charity work. They question campaigns to promote the use of condoms, for example, and, perhaps out of a bias against people who are HIV positive, they think that funding spent on AIDS prevention would be better spent on cancer prevention. Others see CSOs as opportunities for their leaders to earn money or launch political careers. The public is not always convinced of CSOs’ political neutrality.
These uncertainties about CSOs are also common in the private sector. Businesses are sometimes reluctant to work with CSOs, as they do not want to be seen poorly by the government. At the same time, businesses, like the government and donors, often call on CSOs for their expertise in various areas. The Telma phone company, for example, asked the association Mpanazava Eto Madagasikara to offer an environmental training to public primary school students in schools that participate in its Sekoly Telma program.

CSOs use opportunities such as fairs, trade shows, specialized international days, and social networks to highlight their work. Journalists respond favorably to invitations from civil society to attend press conferences and signing ceremonies or attend field site visits. CSOs’ statements often make media headlines. In 2019, some organizations increased their visibility by working with pools of journalists focused on their particular areas, such as the water, sanitation, and hygiene professional media team created by Water Aid. Other organizations organized regular site visits for journalists. CSOs’ communications strategies can sometimes seem to do more harm than good, as when the same people appear repeatedly on the media and wear out their messages.

Specialized platforms or networks have their own codes of conduct. While CSOs are slowly getting accustomed to writing reports for local and international supporters as well as the government, it is still uncommon for CSOs to make their reports available to the public. Only a few organizations, such as Beautiful Future and the Foundation for Protected Areas and Biodiversity (Fondation pour les aires protégées et la biodiversité, FAPBM), publish their reports online.
Malawi conducted general elections on May 21, 2019. Although a new law regulating the activities of political parties, including party financing, was enacted in 2018, it did not become operational in 2019. As a result, political parties did not declare their sources of funding and were not prevented from giving handouts to voters during their election campaigning. After President Peter Mutharika and his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) were declared the winners, the opposition alleged voting irregularities and contested the results in court. The case was still in the High Court at the end of the year.

The election largely defined CSOs' activities during the year. Led by the National Initiative for Civic Education (NICE) and Malawi Electoral Support Network (MESN), CSOs provided civic and voter education in the run-up to the elections, and many CSO workers served as observers on Election Day. After the announcement of the election results, a coalition of governance and human rights CSOs, led by the Human Rights Defenders Coalition (HRDC), took issue with the management of the elections and mobilized the public in nationwide demonstrations calling for the ouster of the chairperson of the Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC). The DPP responded by introducing measures to stop the demonstrations and organizing counter-demonstrations led by the party’s youth cadets. HRDC and other CSOs turned to the courts to obtain injunctions to stop the government from interfering in the right to demonstrate. The Public Affairs Committee (PAC), an interfaith umbrella organization, assumed the role of mediator and brought together representatives of the government, CSOs, and opposition parties to seek a resolution of the election disputes. The dialogue failed to produce concrete results, as most of PAC’s recommendations were rejected by the president and the DPP, including recommendations for the government to fire MEC commissioners and engage in electoral reforms.

In March, the Center for the Development of People (CEDEP) and Center for Human Rights and Rehabilitation (CHRR) obtained an injunction to stop the president from swearing in commissioners of the Malawi Human Rights Commission (MHRC), an independent government body, on the grounds that he had appointed two of the commissioners without following set procedures. State agents continued to perpetrate significant human rights violations in 2019. The most common violations included the torching of property of members of opposition parties; the torching to death of people, mainly the elderly, who were suspected of practicing witchcraft; oppression of the media; and stifling of the right to demonstrate. Several criminal suspects were beaten up while in police custody, and some of them died. For example, an individual suspected of involvement in the abduction of a boy with albinism died in police custody in February 2019, and a postmortem report commissioned by the MHRC indicated that he had been severely tortured and died a result of electrocution. An HRDC leader was severely assaulted while leading a demonstration against the mismanagement of the 2019 elections in Blantyre in September.
Malawi’s economy grew at a slightly faster rate of 4.4 percent in 2019, buoyed by a better crop harvest, according to the World Bank. The inflation rate remained at about 9 percent. The general welfare of citizens remained a concern, as Malawi ranked 172 out of 189 countries in the 2019 Human Development Index of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Slightly more than 1 million people of an estimated rural population of 15 million required food aid during the year. Malawi was among the southern African countries hit by cyclone Idai, which caused severe flooding and displaced thousands of citizens, who required assistance from the government and international donors. Local and international CSOs, including the Council for Non-Governmental Organizations in Malawi (CONGOMA), Concern Worldwide, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, Plan international, and Oxfam, also played an active role in providing assistance to Malawians displaced by the cyclone.

The overall sustainability of the CSO sector in Malawi did not change in 2019. The legal environment deteriorated moderately as the government harassed and threatened CSO leaders. The sector’s financial viability deteriorated moderately as funding declines and shifts in donors’ focus threatened the sustainability of many organizations. At the same time, advocacy was moderately stronger thanks to several effective campaigns in the governance sector. CSOs’ service provision was enhanced by two major service-provision campaigns that responded to urgent community needs. CSOs’ public image also improved thanks to positive coverage by private media. CSOs’ organizational capacity and sectoral infrastructure were unchanged.

According to the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Board, 671 CSOs were registered in Malawi as of the end of 2019. This figure represents a drop from the 713 CSOs registered at the end of 2018, probably because some organizations closed or did not renew their registrations with the NGO Board. However, the actual number of organizations is far larger, since many CSOs are not registered.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.7**

The legal environment governing CSOs in Malawi deteriorated moderately in 2019 as CSO leaders were harassed by the government, beaten up by ruling-party agents, and subjected to death threats.

All CSOs, other than faith-based organizations (FBOs) and informal organizations without written constitutions, must register under the NGO Act before beginning operations. To register, CSOs apply to the Office of the Registrar General, which either approves the applications directly or refers them to the minister of justice for approval. Before they begin their operations, CSOs must also register with the NGO Board and CONGOMA, which are statutory entities established under the Non-Governmental Organizations Act (2000). Community-based organizations (CBOs) register only with district councils’ social welfare offices.

The NGO Act stipulates that registered CSOs must have a board of trustees with at least two members who are Malawian citizens. FBOs are exempted from this requirement. CSOs must seek written permission from the government to use the word “Malawi” in their names, since it is protected under the Protected Flag, Emblems, and Names Act of 1966.

A bill to amend the NGO Act that was introduced in 2018 remained under judicial review in 2019. Among other provisions, the draft NGO Amendment Bill would concentrate powers for the registration, regulation, and deregistration of CSOs with the NGO Board, thereby excluding CONGOMA. In addition, the new law would restructure the NGO Board into a statutory corporation, or government company, with members appointed by the government and would give the minister of finance more powers to regulate CSOs. The legal tussle between CONGOMA and the NGO Board over significant increases in registration fees, which the government proposed in December 2017, continued in 2019 while the fee hike was under judicial review. Once the injunction is lifted and higher fees are imposed, organizations that operate at the district and national levels are likely to be more affected than CBOs, which are registered by district councils rather than the NGO Board. The NGO Board has indicated...
that the purpose of the fee increase is to enhance accountability, but many CSOs believe that the new fees are actually meant to shrink the space for civil society.

The government used its power to shrink the space for CSOs and silence organizations viewed as critical of its activities in 2019. In the tense post-election period, CSO leaders were arrested, detained, beaten, and subject to death threats by agents of the ruling party. DPP youth militants attacked and beat demonstrators and CSO leaders while in many instances the police refused to act. Traditional leaders were used to garner support for the ruling party and spoke out frequently against CSO leaders. The government responded to CSOs’ use of social media by interfering with social media channels, and the Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority threatened to use the Electronic Transactions and Cyber-Security Act to force mobile phone companies to shut down popular social media platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp.

CSOs are allowed by law to receive grants and donations and generate income. The National Decentralization Policy requires CSOs to inform the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development of any assistance that they receive. This requirement is not fulfilled by most CSOs, and some district commissioners have threatened to expel CSOs that do not comply on the grounds that they lack transparency.

Like other nationally registered entities, CSOs are required to pay taxes on all income, including grants. The Malawi Revenue Authority receives CSOs’ tax returns and scrutinizes them to confirm that they comply with the Taxation Act. Registered CSOs can receive exemptions from taxes on essential imported goods from the Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning, and Development.

Few CSOs have in-house legal departments. Some CSOs with programs on law, human rights, and governance have internal legal teams that provide services to their organizations while conducting programmatic activities. Other CSOs obtain legal services as the need arises. Legal services from private lawyers are usually too expensive for CSOs, causing them to either fail to challenge litigation or to resort to public legal institutions, such as the Office of the Ombudsman. The Malawi Legal Aid Bureau also provides free legal services to CSOs.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.5**

The organizational capacity of CSOs was unchanged in 2019. Declines in donor funding continued to prevent CSOs from improving their internal systems and structures. Many organizations responded to this challenge by broadening their mandates to apply to a larger pool of potential funders. However, this survival strategy tends to weaken their capacity to deliver quality services or advocate effectively, because they lack the workforce and expertise to implement the broader scope of interventions.

CSOs coordinate with their constituencies and involve them in project planning and implementation. In 2019, however, CSOs were urged by various sectors to improve their relationships with the government and the wider public. Speaking at a conference with more than 100 local CSOs in December 2019, the NGO Board, for example, called on CSOs to align their programs with district development plans. CSOs were also urged to improve their accountability not only to donors, but to the people that they serve. In response, CSOs scaled up their efforts to employ bottom-up and participatory approaches to project formulation. Some CSOs have started to implement their projects through existing local government development committees instead of creating their own structures.

Most CSOs possess strategic plans and policy documents that outline their visions, core values, and missions. These documents are usually required by donors, and CSOs feel compelled to include elements such as theories of change and monitoring and evaluation frameworks, even if they do not use them. Many strategic plans depict a broad organizational focus to expand funding possibilities. But in practice, strategic plans and policy documents are
rarely adhered to because of the constantly changing operating environment, which demands that decisions be made in the moment.

The organizational structures of most CSOs clearly define divisions of labor and reporting channels. CSOs are required under the NGO Act to have boards of trustees or directors. In many instances, the boards are ceremonial and symbolic, while the management actually discharges policy-making, strategic guidance, and operational functions. Boards often fail to meet because of associated costs. CSOs tend to draw their board members from their social networks. It is common for CSO leaders to sit on each other’s boards, which stifles accountability and creativity in the CSO sector.

Malawian CSOs have been slow to adopt new technologies because of their high cost. Charges for internet and mobile phone services are among the highest in the world, and connection speeds are low. According to Afrobarometer survey data from 2019, 35 percent of the country’s citizens do not own mobile phones, and the proportion in rural areas is higher. Nevertheless, many CSOs use social media for their internal communications and outreach to constituents. During the 2019 election campaigns, for example, MESN, Youth Net and Counseling (YONECO), and Youth and Society (YAS) used Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp to educate and mobilize voters.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.3**

CSOs’ financial viability deteriorated moderately in 2019 because of shrinking donor funding and donors’ shift in focus to the elections and “aid for trade.” The difficult funding environment threatened the sustainability of many CSOs and forced some organizations to close or scale back their activities. For example, at least twenty partner members of the Civil Society Education Coalition (CSEC) closed in 2019 because of a lack of funds. In addition, the state’s deliberate campaign to damage CSOs’ reputations impinged on their ability to access donor funding.

CSOs continued to rely on foreign sources of funding in 2019. Prominent donors include the European Union (EU), Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA), UNDP, USAID, United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), Norwegian embassy, and Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. In the run-up to the 2019 general elections, these partners provided financial support to CSOs for civic education, election monitoring, and specialized projects, such as the 50-50 Campaign, which aimed to boost the election of women candidates. Donors’ focus on the elections in 2019 left most CSOs working in other areas without sufficient financial resources to implement activities and meet operational costs. Even CSOs working on the elections complained that they were unable to secure funding to run effective civic education campaigns.

Most funding agencies prefer to work with relatively large CSOs, which are likely to have big impact and high visibility but are not necessarily responsive to the needs of local constituents. Small CBOs often believe that they are not well served by funding agencies because of their bias in favor of urban organizations. In 2019, local CSOs expressed concerns that some international CSOs were implementing projects directly in local communities, thereby sideling rather than partnering with Malawian CSOs. For their part, international CSOs indicated that they had reservations about the capacity, accountability, and transparency of Malawian CSOs. Malawian CSOs do not commonly put up joint bids for funding, mainly because of persistent competition among domestic organizations. This lack of cooperation limits CSOs’ ability to access funds when donors require bidders to form a consortium. Any joint bidding is usually for short-term projects.

Another trend that affected the financial position of many organizations in 2019 was donors’ increasing reliance on an “aid-for-trade” approach, which promotes trade over traditional forms of development assistance to developing countries. Among the donors adopting this approach are the UNDP, African Development Bank, EU, and World Bank. The aid-for-trade approach is not fully understood by most CSOs. They are challenged by the need to
incorporate business models into their projects and to rely on profits both to cover some operational costs and to invest in their longer-term sustainability. CSOs view such models as contradicting their basic philosophy, which is to serve the poor through charitable activities, and they have yet to re-orient their thinking to accommodate these emerging aid modalities.

There are few local sources of funding in Malawi. The Tilitonse Foundation, funded by a consortium of donors, including the Norwegian embassy, DFID, and EU, remained one of the largest local funders of CSOs in 2019. Tilitonse mostly supported CBO projects in urban governance and management, local governance, and active citizenship.

The government does not provide financial support to CSOs. In 2019, the government committed to creating a “matching fund” mechanism in a memorandum of understanding signed with CSOs, but it had not yet honored this commitment by the end of the year. Through CONGOMA, CSOs requested that the government include MK 500 million (about $650,000) in its 2019–20 budget, which would be accessed by CSOs implementing projects listed in the NGO Policy. The government failed to make the requested funds available.

During the year, the corporate sector provided funding to some CSOs as part of their corporate social responsibility activities. For example, the National Bank of Malawi supported the Information and Communications Technology Association of Malawi and Economics Association of Malawi. FDH Bank and Standard Bank donated to many CSOs, including the Adventist Relief Agency, Public Relations Society of Malawi, and Hope for the Blind.

Some membership-based CSOs generate income from their members. For example, the Teachers Union of Malawi receives subscription fees, which the government deducts from members’ salaries. If a dispute arise between the government and union, the government often threatens to stop deducting and remitting the fees, thereby threatening the union’s operations and independence. CSOs sometimes generate income through fundraising initiatives or donations from the diaspora and people living in towns. The amounts raised from these initiatives are usually low and support specific activities.

A culture of innovation in income-generation is generally lacking. One of the few exceptions is Timveni, a child and youth media organization, which at the time of its launch received seed funding from Plan International to establish a commercial department that would operate a radio and television station. The station now is able to generate income to supplement donor funding. This type of initiative has not been explored by many other CSOs in Malawi, since donors usually fund projects rather than offering seed grants.

CSOs’ financial management capacity is varied. Large CSOs have ample and qualified capacity to manage financial resources, including donor aid, while smaller CSOs and CBOs rarely have the resources to employ and retain qualified financial staff. Some CBOs and CSOs were rejected for grants because they failed due diligence tests. Donors often awarded funding directly to international organizations in 2019 because of inadequacies in local CSOs’ financial management capacity.

**ADVOCACY: 4.3**

CSO advocacy improved moderately in 2019 with several successful advocacy campaigns in the governance sector, particularly human rights and electoral justice.

CSOs continued to cooperate with the central and local governments on policy issues, using the few formal avenues available for consultation, such as joint sectoral working groups and committees of the National Planning Commission. CSOs were invited to take part in consultations on the national budget, although the government did not take most of their suggestions into account in the final budget documents tabled in the parliament in September 2019. CSOs interacted with local governments through the executive committees of district councils and area and village development committees, which are the basic local government bodies in Malawi.

In the run-up to the elections, many CSOs, including the Gender Coordination Network, a grouping of fifty-one organizations working on gender equality, launched the 50-50 Campaign to support women candidates standing for parliamentary and local offices. The campaign was a partial success: a record 304 women competed in the parliamentary race and forty-four women were elected, compared to 262 women candidates and thirty-two women elected in 2014. Under the banner Youth Decide, CSOs such as YAS, YONECO, Network for Youth Development, and Young Politicians Union developed a youth manifesto, which they presented to all major
political parties in a campaign for youth-centric policies. After the media reported on numerous government corruption scandals, CSOs such as YAS, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, and HRDC organized demonstrations against financial abuse, which they argued benefited the ruling party by financing electoral campaigns and rewarding party loyalists. CSOs offered moral support to the Office of the Ombudsman, which took two principal secretaries to court for their roles in the so-called Tractorgate scandal, which involved the sale to influential politicians of government tractors meant for local farmers.

In the second half of 2019, HRDC took center stage in protesting the mismanagement of the general elections by organizing multiple nationwide demonstrations and vigils at strategically selected government sites. Thousands of Malawians from different backgrounds joined these protests, which continued throughout the year. The president did not act on protesters’ calls to oust electoral commissioners, but the campaign for electoral justice maintained its momentum and became a symbol of the struggle for a better Malawi. A survey conducted by Afrobarometer in November 2019 found that 61 percent of Malawians considered the HRDC-led demonstrations justified.

In 2019, a group of CSOs operating under the banner of the Civil Society Platform on Governance lobbied the parliament to allocate funds for activities to protect people with albinism in accordance with the National Action Plan on Persons with Albinism, which was launched in 2018. The government responded by allocating MWK 400 million (approximately $545,000) in the 2019–20 national budget to implement the plan. The Association of People with Albinism in Malawi (APAM) lobbied successfully for the appointment of a commission of inquiry to investigate the market in body parts of people with albinism and obtained the release of MWK 3.1 billion (approximately $4.2 million) to implement provisions in the National Action Plan on Persons with Albinism over a four-year period. In a separate action, the Malawi Health Equity Network successfully lobbied to recruit more 3,000 nurses, doctors, pharmacists, and ward attendants for government health facilities across the country.

CSOs’ involvement in formal and informal policy making increased in 2019, in part because of improved networking, which allowed organizations to share information and participate in policy-making processes in a coordinated way. However, CSO networking suffered a major blow with the establishment of breakaway networks in 2019, which deprived CSOs of the opportunity to speak with one voice and exacerbated competition among policy-oriented CSOs, especially if they were funded by different donors. For example, in the post-election period, a new grouping called Forum for Concerned Women Association (FCWA) organized demonstrations defending the MEC chairperson, whose ouster was demanded by a coalition of governance and human rights CSOs led by HRDC. The formation of smaller consortia focused on specific issues also led to competition for donor resources and the attention of policymakers in 2019. Political parties, especially the ruling DPP, took advantage of CSOs’ lack of coordination to create confusion by creating or backing organizations that supported the government. For example, the leadership of the Forum for National Development (FND) spoke out regularly against HRDC and other CSOs that were critical of government actions and lobbied for the removal of the HRDC chairperson from the board of MESN.

Most CSOs do not invest in research because of a lack of funding or a failure to appreciate its value. As a result, they are unable to engage in evidence-based policy making. CSOs that have empirical data often gather their information through participatory methods from local communities, and thus it is too localized to apply to issues of national interest.

CSOs’ efforts to improve governance are often derailed by the slow pace of institutions mandated to investigate and prosecute financial injustices, such as the Anti-Corruption Bureau and Financial Intelligence Bureau. These agencies complain that they have inadequate resources to operate effectively, but CSOs charge that they are selective in their choice of cases and do not give sufficient attention to cases involving politically connected individuals.
Instead of taking a proactive approach to legislation affecting the sector in 2019, CSOs largely maintained a reactive approach. For example, following the government’s decision to introduce a carbon tax in the 2019 budget, CSOs, led by the Center for Environmental Policy and Advocacy, questioned the legality of the new tax and lobbied unsuccessfully against it. CSOs must now pay the carbon tax. After CONGOMA obtained an injunction against the hike in registration fees and CHRR obtained an injunction against the NGO Amendment Bill in 2018, CSOs engaged with the NGO Board and the Ministry of Gender to resolve the disagreements in 2019.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.3**

There was a slight improvement in CSO service provision in 2019. The choice of services provided by CSOs is influenced largely by donors, which, in an effort to avoid accusations by the government of political interference, usually focus on “soft” themes, such as health care, civic education, climate change, and agriculture. This dynamic brings into question the responsiveness of services provided by CSOs, as well as the claimed participatory and bottom-up nature of the methods used to involve constituents.

Nevertheless, in 2019, CSOs engaged in two major service-provision campaigns that responded to urgent community needs. Following cyclone Idai, which affected about 700,000 people, both international and domestic CSOs supported the Department of Disaster Management Affairs (DoDMA) in delivering a well-coordinated range of services. CSOs joined forces with the government to distribute hygiene kits containing essential items, such as water buckets, laundry soap, food, tents, and temporary housing. Organizations taking part in this effort included CONGOMA, Médecins Sans Frontières, Save the Children, Concern Worldwide, Oxfam, Church and Society, Catholic Commission of Development in Malawi, Tithandizane Youth Support Organization, and Reach Out and Touch. Despite DoDMA’s coordinating role, government officials raised concerns that some CSOs were limiting the effectiveness of relief interventions in bypassing official structures and duplicating efforts and costs.

CSOs also played an active role during the 2019 elections. The MEC accredited 121 CSOs to conduct civic and voter education activities. However, funding challenges prevented most accredited CSOs from fulfilling this role, except for organizations with external funding, such as MESN, NICE, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, Women Legal Resources Center, and Center for Multiparty Democracy.

CSOs provide goods and services to their constituencies and clientele without discrimination, although resource constraints sometimes limit their targeted audiences. A few CSOs must reach out to specific clientele carefully to avoid victimizing their clients. For instance, CEDEP took a discreet approach to working with the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex community because of cultural and religious sensitivities in Malawi.

CSOs usually provide their services free of charge, since they are expected to serve vulnerable and poor communities. CSOs sometimes sign agreements with partners to meet the costs of service provision. For example, the Christian Health Association of Malawi (CHAM) signed a service-level agreement with the government so that CHAM hospitals could provide free maternal health services to local communities, with the government covering the costs. World Vision Malawi signed agreements with community members, who were sponsored for teacher training provided they teach in local schools after completing their education.

The government typically expresses appreciation for essential services provided by CSOs in areas such as health care and education, indicating that it regards them as “true” partners in promoting the welfare of Malawi’s people.
The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector in Malawi was unchanged in 2019. CSOs’ need for information was generally satisfied through institutions with libraries and information centers, such as the Malawi National Library Service and NICE. Thanks to the government’s initiative to establish telecenters, which provide internet and related services to rural communities, district-based CSOs and CBOs had better access to online information in 2019.

The most prominent local grantmaker is the Tilitonse Foundation, which is funded by a consortium of donors that includes the Norwegian embassy, DFID, and EU. In 2019, Tilitonse supported CSOs’ projects in urban governance and management, local governance, and building and strengthening active citizenship. Tilitonse Foundation also conducted informational sessions in major cities and posted calls for proposals on its website. However, these informational sessions did not benefit most CBOs, since they usually did not have funding for travel and internet access.

The lack of trust among Malawian CSOs usually prevents them from sharing information and working together systematically. In addition, CSO leaders that split their time between leading their parent organizations and their coalitions face the challenge of advancing the strategic plans of two bodies that are not always pushing in the same direction. For example, HRDC leaders were accused of focusing more on the HRDC agenda in 2019 at the expense of the strategic plans of their respective organizations. Successful networks such as the CSEC and CISANET provide their members with technical support on projects they are implementing, lobby on their behalf, and vouch for their credibility when seeking funds from donors. CONGOMA coordinates and promotes the interests of CSOs and interfaces with the government on CSO governance issues.

Donors often provide training in line with projects that they support and sponsor general trainings on topics such as organizational structure, financial management, and communications. CSOs feel that donors prefer to work with organizations that already have the capacity that they seek, thereby creating a situation in which it is unclear whether CSOs should expect to be given support to develop their capacity or should develop their capacity to receive support. CSOs that are well resourced sometimes hire external trainers with specialized knowledge, while other CSOs conduct internal workshops in which staff members pass on their knowledge to other staff. In 2019, however, CSOs initiated limited training because of financial constraints.

CSOs cooperated with other sectors on various fronts in 2019. A network of nine CSOs and four media houses formed to manage the presidential debates. CSOs cooperated with the government and businesses through sector and technical working groups established to support the implementation of the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy. For instance, CISANET was engaged in deliberations of the Agriculture Sector Working Group.

The public image of Malawian CSOs improved slightly in 2019. While state media coverage of CSOs was mostly negative, private media offered generally good reviews of CSOs and their activities. Because of their limited access to public media platforms, CSOs relied mostly on private media to reach large audiences. During the 2019 elections, CSOs in the governance sector focused more on obtaining coverage of their press conferences than of their project activities. Their success in attracting coverage, which came mostly from radio and television, usually depended on their ability and willingness to pay for the placement of press releases and direct payments to journalists to attend press conferences. Other costs included travel and meals for the staff of media houses attending the meetings.
Public perceptions of CSOs were generally positive in 2019. For example, many people responded enthusiastically to the protests organized by HRDC and had positive views of CSOs’ role in fighting corruption. In fact, a national survey conducted by the Institute of Public Opinion and Research in April 2019 found that CSO leaders were highly rated to lead the fight against corruption. At the same time, certain negative perceptions of CSOs persisted, usually reflecting political divisions. Part of the public saw certain CSOs as anti-government or pro-opposition and took part in demonstrations and press conference supporting the ruling party.

This division was encouraged by the president and senior government officials, who accused CSOs that were critical of the administration of being pro-opposition or appendages of the donor community. The government sometimes sought to discredit the activities of governance CSOs by labelling them “anti-government” and “anti-development.” At the same time, the government depicted service-providing organizations as model CSOs. Since service provision is mostly implemented by international CSOs, they were generally perceived as pro-government, while Malawian CSOs, which make up the bulk of advocacy and governance organizations, were assumed to be anti-government. Officials from the Directorate of Public Sector Reforms and Ministry of Gender, Children, Disability, and Social Welfare mobilized ruling-party supporters to demonstrate in support of the MEC commissioners when CSOs called for their ouster. FND, a pro-government CSO, issued several press statements attacking governance CSOs and their leaders. The deliberate campaign by the state to damage CSOs’ reputations undermined their ability to access donor funding.

The private sector tends to perceive CSOs as partners able to offer good results and visibility while meeting community needs. Businesses seem to recognize that they need to go through CSOs if they are to have an impact in local communities, since they do not have effective structures that allow them to work with communities directly.

CSOs publicize their activities and share information with other organizations and their constituents by means such as pullouts in daily and weekend newspapers showcasing their achievements. In 2019, CSOs publicizing their activities on radio and television included CEDEP, YAS, Malawi Human Rights Resource Center, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, Plan Malawi, and Church and Society.

CSOs’ self-regulatory efforts in 2019 included the maintenance of records of meetings of management and boards. CONGOMA continued to serve as the self-regulatory platform for CSOs, although its ability to fulfil this role was limited by a lack of capacity, including insufficient funding and staffing challenges. Some CSOs publish annual reports, especially if they are required by their donors.
The deep and multifaceted security crisis that has disrupted Mali since the military coup in 2012 continued unabated in 2019. A separatist rebellion, aggravated by a jihadist invasion and a crisis of national unity, undermined the country’s institutions. Despite the efforts of international peacekeeping and government counter-terrorism forces to contain persistent insecurity in the north, violence spread into central and southern regions of the country in 2019. Taking advantage of the absence of the state in some localities, terrorist groups affiliated with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State in the Grand Sahara attacked civilians while attempting to win the support of the larger population. In some areas, the conflict took the form of inter- and intra-communal and ethnic conflicts, creating a climate of hostility among neighboring communities. In July, with facilitation from the government, Dogon and Fulani ethnic groups signed agreements to cease hostilities. Although great efforts have been made to implement the 2015 Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, their success has been hampered by the government’s weak political will and the bad faith of some signatory groups from the north.

Extremist groups and ethnic militia committed significant human rights violations in 2019, according to the U.S. State Department’s 2019 Report on Human Rights Practices in Mali. Abuses included summary executions, targeted killings, torture, kidnapping, the recruitment of child soldiers, and the burning of villages. In the first six months of the year, hundreds of civilians were massacred by ethnic militias or jihadist groups in the administrative sub-division of Bankass Circle, Intahaka near Niono, Segou Region, and elsewhere. Many other civilians were killed or maimed by explosive devices, and tens of thousands were displaced from their homes. The deteriorating security situation demanded an intense humanitarian response, often at the price of neglecting important aspects of sustainable development. Many CSOs shifted from their main areas of intervention to providing services related to the security crisis as donors refocused their funding to address these needs.

After a popular uprising over the insecurity led to the resignation of Prime Minister Soumeylou Boubeye Maiga in April 2019, a team under the new prime minister, Boubou Cissé, was tasked with forming an inclusive “government of wide openness.” On May 2, 2019, the government, some opposition parties, and CSOs signed a political agreement that led to the formation of a new cabinet that included opposition members. The government also established a portfolio dedicated to relations with civil society. In December, despite a boycott by the opposition, the president opened a week-long Inclusive National Dialogue, which brought together nationwide stakeholders, including CSOs, to find non-military responses to the security crisis. The conference issued several resolutions, including calls for elections and for a referendum on revising the constitution.

The overall viability of CSOs improved slightly in 2019. The legal environment was strengthened by the government’s agreement to ratify implementation modalities for the 2017 Law on Human Rights Defenders.
Advocacy was slightly stronger as Malian CSOs were deeply engaged in searching for solutions to the country’s crisis. Capacity-building opportunities and the creation of new CSO coalitions helped to improve the sectoral infrastructure. CSOs’ public image was enhanced by their increased visibility and growing credibility as they helped populations affected by the crisis. At the same time, CSOs’ organizational capacity deteriorated as many organizations abandoned their main areas of work to focus on projects related to the poor security situation, resulting in distorted and inefficient interventions. CSOs’ financial viability declined because of the insecurity, which caused donors to shift funding to address the effects of the crisis. CSO service provision similarly declined as the quickly changing security situation forced many CSOs to redirect their work away from their established areas of activity or prevented them from reaching their beneficiaries.

According to the Grassroots Development Support Unit of the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, 2,000 formal local organizations and more than 2,150 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) existed in Mali at the end of 2019. The number of informal organizations is unknown.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.2**

CSOs’ legal environment improved slightly in 2019 as the government agreed to ratify an application decree establishing modalities for implementing the 2017 Law on Human Rights Defenders. Among other provisions, the law protects the inviolability of the homes and offices of human rights defenders as well as their right to receive funding for their activities. The step was the result of concerted efforts by domestic CSOs such as the Malian Coalition of Human Rights Defenders (COMADDH) as well as international CSOs, including Amnesty International, Women in Law and Development in Africa (WiLDAF), West African Human Rights Defenders Network, International Service for Human Rights, and Front Line Defenders. The decree was eventually signed in February 2020.

Law No. 04-038-PRM on associations continued to be the main law governing CSOs in 2019. The law allows associations to form and operate without registration. The law is clear about registration procedures, stipulating that to gain legal status, an organization must submit a declaration to a district office of the central government and, once it is approved, publish an announcement in the government’s official journal. CSOs seeking national reach must register in Bamako, the capital city, while organizations registered outside of the capital are limited to activities in specific localities.

Despite the simplicity of these provisions, in practice, CSOs can encounter significant difficulties while registering, as the process includes a number of steps whose completion can be agonizingly slow. For example, the town hall must review and legalize the declaration document before it is submitted to the district office. This requirement can take an inordinate amount of time, as no formal deadline is specified in the law. Thereafter the organization must request a morality investigation at a local police station, which triggers the preparation of a report that is forwarded to the National Police Force for review and approval. Some observers view the slowness of the registration process as proof of both the lack of qualified government personnel and deliberate efforts to block CSOs’ registration. CSOs’ founders often lack knowledge of the law, which can also contribute to registration difficulties. Law 04-038-PRM states that the central government may not dissolve a CSO for political or arbitrary reasons, and organizations are rarely de-registered.

Associations may gain status as NGOs after three years of activity, the submission of annual reports and certified financial statements, and the signing of a framework agreement with the government. NGO status entitles an organization to some state support and advantages such as tax exemptions. NGOs must submit annual activity and financial reports and undergo annual audits by the national, regional, and local governments. In practice, few NGOs comply with these requirements. Under Article 16 of Law 04-038-PRM, the Council of Ministers may decree public
utility status following a decision by the Supreme Court and a probationary period of at least five years. Public utility status is a condition for bidding on government contracts.

Law No. 2017-049 of 2017 governs foundations, which are defined as private nonprofit entities created by one or more donors to undertake community projects. The process for creating a foundation is decentralized, and foundations face few major obstacles in obtaining legal status.

Law 04-038-PRM does not specify rules about CSOs’ internal governance, thereby allowing organizations to define their internal structures and systems in their bylaws and internal regulations. All CSO directors must undergo background checks. CSO staff are subject to monitoring and must register with the National Institute of Social Welfare on assuming their positions.

CSOs may freely determine their areas of activity without government interference, provided the activities are not illegal, of a political nature, offensive to public decency, or destabilizing to the country. CSOs work freely and without pressure, and they are able to debate current events and organize and participate in demonstrations. If a CSO conducts illegal activities, it can be subject to prosecution. CSOs engaged in monitoring, watchdog, and oversight activities are often harassed or threatened. In the absence of an application decree, the government’s implementation of the 2017 Law on Human Rights Defenders was uneven in 2019. For example, some organizations belonging to the Hope Advocacy Committee (Comité de plaidoyer espoir, CPE), a group of eighteen CSOs seeking justice and reconciliation for women, minors, and other people affected by the crisis, were the target of persecution and threats from extremist groups while organizing public hearings in support of the Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission, a component of the transitional justice process.

All CSOs in Mali may seek funding from public and private donors provided they reinvest the funds into realizing their missions. CSOs may bid on government contracts and accept foreign funding on a tax-free basis.

NGOs may obtain tax exemptions on imports such as vehicles provided they have operating certificates indicating that they have submitted their annual activity reports and certified financial statements. Large, institutionally strong CSOs that conduct high-impact activities usually benefit from such exemptions. Individual and corporate donors are not eligible for deductions.

CSO human rights specialists offer the sector sophisticated knowledge of the legal framework. Umbrella organizations, such as the National Council of Civil Society (Conseil nationale de la société civile, CNSC), Coordination of Women’s Associations and NGOs (Coordination des associations et ONG féminismes, CAFO), and Association for the Advancement and Defense of Women’s Rights (Association pour le progrès et la défense des droits des femmes, APDF), also have staff with knowledge of legal issues. The branches of national organizations and many local organizations are well informed about the law. Few lawyers specialize in CSO law, and CSOs rarely seek their services.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.4**

CSOs’ organizational capacity deteriorated slightly in 2019 as many CSOs shifted from their regular efforts to activities addressing needs arising from the worsening security situation. This transition, spurred by donors’ funding priorities, prevented Malian organizations from developing capacity in their stated areas of activity and resulted in some distortions and inefficiencies in their interventions. Malian CSOs engaged in humanitarian responses continued to work mostly as local partners of international organizations, which also hindered their internal development, since their interventions were limited and their roles were defined mainly by the requirements of the international partners.

Most CSOs cooperate well with their target populations. However, CSOs working on sensitive issues, such as female circumcision, child marriage, child labor, and gender equity, are sometimes perceived as opportunists
meddling in things that are none of their business or imposing ideas that are alien to local cultures. For example, in 2018, the Ministry of Education and a national NGO, with support from the Netherlands government, sought to introduce sex education in Malian schools. Some religious leaders judged the project to be contrary to Mali’s cultural values and constitution and fought hard against it. In December 2019, the president of Mali announced the end of the project. Similar resistance has arisen to projects focused on gender equity, as some traditional and religious organizations, such as hunters’ associations or Islamic organizations, do not approve of or practice gender equity.

CSOs generally have clear missions and visions spelled out in their founding documents. In practice, however, CSOs’ dependence on external funding often causes them to operate in a disorganized, ad hoc manner, opportunistically pursuing funding rather than deliberately aligning their activities with their missions and visions. Similarly, CSOs usually have action plans and defined roles and responsibilities for their members, but in practice, founders tend to ignore these documents when determining their organizations’ activities and operations. An exception to this tendency can be seen in some networks, which are more difficult for one person to control. CSOs often manage to renew their plans and documents only when they receive institutional support from funders. NGOs generally have stronger structures and are better organized than other CSOs, both because they must complete external audits and submit activity reports and because they generally have more ample resources.

Malian CSOs continued to lack a stable, well-qualified pool of human resources in 2019. Most staff is hired for the duration of a project and then let go when the project ends. Managers change jobs frequently, and organizations often find it difficult to hire staff with the qualifications needed for specific projects. Larger and more sustainable salaries at international organizations cause a brain drain of managers from local CSOs. CSO staff do not usually receive training. Community-based volunteers are common in the health-care and educational sectors. Most CSOs have professional accountants but rely on outside service providers for information and technology services.

CSOs’ office equipment and internet access continued to be more or less adequate in 2019. Grants from international partners usually cover only programmatic expenses, and CSOs are limited in their ability to purchase new supplies, materials, and equipment. At the end of projects, most donors reclaim any equipment supplied, such as motorcycles, computers, tables, and desks. Many CSOs have websites but rarely update them because of a lack of dedicated staff. Only a handful of CSOs are highly visible on social media, although individual staff members use social media frequently.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.6**

CSOs’ financial viability deteriorated slightly in 2019. Although donors mobilized large sums of funding in response to the country’s crisis situation, much of this funding was earmarked for projects related to security, humanitarian aid, and gender equality and bypassed activities addressing the root causes of the crisis, such as poor governance and extreme poverty.

CSOs are heavily dependent on external funding. The main international partners include United Nations (UN) agencies, the European Union, French Development Agency (AFD), USAID, German Agency for International Cooperation, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), Netherlands Development Cooperation, and Center for International Studies and Cooperation, a Canadian organization. Most funding from international partners in 2019 was focused on peacebuilding and the effects of the security situation on local populations. For example, AFD committed EUR 206 million (approximately $235 million) to Mali, about 70 percent of which went to peacebuilding initiatives in 2019. According to the Financial Tracking Service of the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, CSOs received about $61 million in 2019, compared to $72 million in 2018.
Malian CSOs tend to be sub-contractors for international CSOs, which have stronger technical capacity and more transparent management practices. Foreign funding for Malian CSOs is usually short term. Competition for foreign funding is intense, and Malian CSOs find it easier to access external funding if they join together in consortia or networks, which seem to be favored by many international partners. For example, the Alliance for Rebuilding Governance in Africa (ARGA)–Mali partnered with the Malian Association for Survival in the Sahel (AMSS) to receive funding until September 2019 from the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF). As in 2018, the prolonged political crisis and poor security situation motivated some donors to provide funding directly to Malian CSOs for projects in unsafe or remote areas. GCERF, for example, continued to fund Action Mopti, AMSS, Think Peace, Enda Mali, and other local partners for community-based projects to combat violent extremism in 2019.

Very few CSOs benefit from multiple sources of funding. A small number of NGOs and organizations with public utility status are able to access government funding. Organizations that are members of CNSC, CAFO, or the National Youth Council (Conseil national de la jeunesse, CNJ), which have branches at the national level modelled on the administrative divisions of the state, often also receive financial support from the government. The government covers some CSOs’ costs, such as office rentals in Bamako. The prefectures of Banamba, Diré, Bourem, Bougouni, and elsewhere sometimes make accommodations in government facilities available to CSO staff when they travel. Some corporate funding is also available. In 2019, for example, the Orange-Mali Foundation provided funding to various organizations, including Smara, which arranged for ten children to have cardiac surgery at the André Festoc Center.

CSOs are generally not able to rely on membership fees as a source of income, since the fees are rarely paid. Some CSOs, such as the Network of Young Women of Political Parties (Reseau des jeunes femmes des partis politiques, REJEFPO) in Mopti fundraise through cultural activities such as concerts and art exhibitions. Other organizations, including Unity and National Reconciliation (Coalition citoyenne de la société civile pour la paix, l’unité et la réconciliation nationale, CCSCPURM) and the Mopti Youth Collective, generate income through consulting, research, and training services. Funds earned in this way usually cover consultants’ fees, with little left over for operational costs. CSOs generally do not engage in public fundraising efforts, since they have very low fundraising capacities and local populations have minimal resources to support CSOs. A television show called Téléton continues to serve as a kind of fundraising space for CSOs and offer information about funding opportunities.

Most CSOs keep accounts and prepare financial statements, usually annually. CSOs that receive funding generally have financial management systems and conduct annual audits, which they must submit to the government and their donors. Otherwise, audits are rarely conducted.

**ADVOCACY: 3.4**

CSO advocacy improved slightly in 2019. Malian CSOs were deeply engaged in the search for solutions to the country’s crisis, and advocacy efforts multiplied. Many efforts were not wholly effective, and there was sometime a sense that little was achieved. Moreover, some observers believed that civil society had deviated from its role and bent too easily to the will of politicians, as when a major civil society actor agreed to serve in the government as the minister of institutions and relations with civil society. Nevertheless, CSOs’ active engagement in 2019 signaled the growing determination of their advocacy efforts.

CSOs continued to engage with the government in discussions and decision-making processes at the local and national levels. The National Civil Society Council (Conseil national de la société civile, CNSC), ARGA–Mali, and CNJ were deeply involved in the Inclusive National Dialogue convened by the president in December 2019 as part of the country’s stabilization process. CPE
proposed initiatives to advance justice and reconciliation for women, minors, and others affected by the crisis and worked hard to organize public hearings in support of the Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission. Other frameworks for collaboration between the government and CSOs exist in sectors such as security. For example, a number of experts from the CSO sector were involved in security-sector reform at all levels in 2019.

At the local level, several organizations in Mopti and Timbuktu, including the Network of Youth REPERE of Mopti (Reseau des jeunes REPERE de Mopti) and CRAM-CRAM collective, worked with communal authorities to elaborate 2019 community development, social, and economic plans. These organizations also hosted community debates, mobilized networks, and conducted digital campaigns to press decision makers to improve the security situation and end gender-based violence (GBV). During the Sixteen Days of Activism Against GBV in November, organizations in Mopti organized several activities to reduce GBV, and women’s groups throughout the country pressed decision makers on social platforms such as Facebook and Twitter to end GBV. REJEFPO held workshops to prepare women candidates for legislative elections and organized training sessions for about thirty young people and women in each of the country’s regions on Law 052, which established a 30 percent quota for women in elected and appointed position in 2015. However, many of these activities lacked follow-up, and their results seem unsustainable.

In the meantime, GBV continues to grow, according to many published reports. Overall, CSOs often feel that they have little impact, even though the Malian government does not take overt steps to curb their advocacy work. For example, Tabital Pulaku and other groups conducted a vast digital campaign to alert the public about possible violence before the Ogossagou massacre. Although the alert resulted in the departure of a number of people from the risk zone, the campaign’s overall impact was disappointing, as most residents did not have access to the internet, and approximately 160 people were subsequently reported missing. CSOs’ advocacy efforts can also be poorly coordinated. In a promising development, CPE was revitalized in 2019 to mobilize on a few key issues, including the fight against impunity. The committee pushed for the adoption of laws to protect victims and witnesses and prevent GBV. However, by the end of the year, the movement was fading because members’ efforts were not united.

CSOs have made timid efforts to monitor government activities, but their efforts are not favorably perceived by public officials. Monitoring and watchdog activities are often performed more effectively by individuals rather than entire organizations. For example, the Platform Against Corruption and Unemployment (PCC) is led by a well-known activist who engaged in a number of anti-corruption activities in 2019, including filing a lawsuit against 8,000 civil servants for corruption.

In 2019, CSOs such as Amnesty International and WiLDAF advocated for the adoption of an application decree defining modalities to implement the 2017 Law on Human Rights Defenders. The decree was finally signed in February 2020. CSOs are aware that Law 04-038-PRM is outdated and needs to be revised to address current challenges. Areas of concern include the definition of public utility status, procedures for receiving government funding, the boundaries between CSOs and political parties, and the need for sanctions against CSO staff found guilty of embezzlement. The National Council of Civil Society coordinated efforts to revise the legal framework to better ensure the CSO sector’s effectiveness in 2019. The new minister in charge of relations with civil society began to meet with CSOs to discuss the course of reform and ways in which CSOs could perform better.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.8**

CSO service provision declined moderately in 2019 because of the quickly changing security situation, which forced many CSOs to redirect their work away from their established areas of service provision. Some CSOs were unable to provide populations with basic social services as the unstable security situation and the threat of improvised explosive devices curtailed freedom of movement. Areas of the country became inaccessible, and residents of communities in Gao, Bamba, Temera, Kidal, Menaka, Timbuktu, and parts of Mopti and Segou were unable to travel. For example, Advice and Support for Basic Education (Conseil et appui pour l’éducation a la base, CAEB) was unable to provide educational services in areas of Mopti and Segou that beamse difficult to access. CSO service provision was also inhibited by terrorist groups’ disapproval of their work.

CSOs’ services are greatly diversified. The majority of CSOs work to improve living conditions by providing basic services, such as access to water, education, and health care. In 2019, CSOs also provided services in areas such as gender inclusiveness, citizenship, peaceful co-existence, peace and security, agriculture, and territorial development. For example, with the support of the Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission and other
CSOs, Lawyers Without Borders Canada set up a referral system to provide victims of GBV with contact information and other resources.

CSOs generally provide services that meet community needs or promote self-help initiatives. In Sikasso and Kayes, for example, the Cooperative of Cotton Producers (Cooperative des producteurs de coton, CPC) led an initiative to collect small portions of members’ income from cotton sales to support community development projects, such as the building of medical dispensaries and village water systems. In Mopti, the Community Health Association (Association de santé communautaire, ASACO) and other CSOs made financial contributions to develop a community radio station and the Referral Health Center (Centre de santé de référence CSREF). In Kayes, migrants from the Western Sahel helped build community schools and community health centers. AMSS operates several successful initiatives in the Timbuktu region to strengthen communities’ resilience, including free treatment for obstetric fistula, a widespread affliction.

CSOs usually carry out participatory diagnostics, in which communities clearly identify their needs and CSOs then use the information to formulate projects and other activities. For example, in partnership with AMSS and local organizations in Sikasso, ARGA–Mali launched a participatory diagnostic process to identify local needs in November 2019. Peace Direct and the Malian Institute of Action Research for Peace (Institut Malien de la recherche action pour la paix, IMRAP) began similar assessments on the border between Mali and Burkina Faso during the year.

The government shows appreciation for CSOs’ service provision in various ways. In 2019, the Office of the Commissioner for Security-Sector Reform organized several training workshops for CSOs, and, in collaboration with the Malian Ministry of Communication, the UNESCO Office in Mali organized a training workshop on good practices for dealing with returning migrants for some twenty young influencers, bloggers, and community managers in Selingué. Government representatives often recognize CSOs’ contributions by attending their activities, and government offices increasingly consult with umbrella CSOs while developing policies.

SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.3

CSOs’ sectoral infrastructure was significantly stronger in 2019, as umbrella organizations conducted training activities for member organizations, and CSOs working in the same field showed more cohesion by forming coalitions.

Several organizations, including CNSC and the CSO Forum (Forum des OSC, FOSC), operate resource centers that offer technical support services. Intermediary support organizations (ISOs) such as Lawyers Without Borders Canada continued to provide CSOs with information and training on such topics as humanitarian standards, information management, advocacy, child protection, democratic governance, and natural disaster response in 2019. ISOs and resource centers are funded by international and bilateral development agencies.

Several international organizations, including International Alert, FHI 360, and the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, regrant foreign funds to local CSOs.
CSO umbrella organizations gained strength in 2019. Platforms such as FOSC, CNSC, and the CSO Citizens’ Coalition for Peace, Unity and National Reconciliation in Mali (La Coalition citoyenne de la société civile pour la paix, l’unité et la réconciliation nationale au Mali, CCSC-PURN) defended the interests of their members and encouraged information sharing through publications, panel discussions, and seminars. The members of some networks have improved their cooperation by integrating their actions plans, and CSOs working in the same sector and same locality formed consortia or worked together. For example, in October 2019, AMSS and ARGA–Mali began to conduct joint community diagnostic activities in the Sikasso region in the framework of a conflict-prevention project funded by DFID. The two organizations aim to exchange experiences and increase their efficiency by addressing common challenges together.

Training opportunities are readily available and cover almost all areas, including conflict, violent extremism, human rights, and security-sector reform. In 2019, CSOs benefited from technical support and capacity building offered by umbrella organizations, international CSOs, and national NGOs. For example, REJEFPO offered its members a series of training sessions to help strengthen their organizational capacities to promote gender equity and democratic control of the electoral process. Several training activities were conducted in 2019 for umbrella organizations in both Bamako and the interior. A large number of expert trainers work as consultants. Trainers are increasingly members of CSOs or CSO networks.

Collaboration between national and local governments and CSOs improved in 2019. Civil society and government representatives increasingly met together in dialogues, workshops, and seminars to discuss and evaluate needed reforms. For example, government agencies such as the Office of the Commissioner for Security Sector Reform were more interested in finding opportunities to collaborate with CSOs on reform of the security sector in 2019. The government invited CSOs to participate in discussions on national and local issues at the Inclusive National Dialogue in December 2019.

CSOs’ collaboration with journalists and media organizations in 2019 was focused primarily on monitoring and assessing government activities, including human rights issues and public policies related to mining resources. The Association of Bloggers of Mali and DoniBlog awarded the second annual #Boukary_Konate Award for Malian bloggers, with support from CSOs such as the Tuwindi Foundation.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.0

CSOs’ public image improved moderately in 2019 as their efforts to help populations affected by the crisis gained visibility and credibility with the public, the government, and donors.

The written press, radio, television, news websites, and social media increasingly followed CSOs’ activities during the year. It was not uncommon for the media to interview CSO representatives in 2019.

The public has a generally good opinion of CSOs because of their work to identify and help communities respond to local needs. As the extreme insecurity exacerbated a breach in trust between Mali’s government and citizens in 2019, communities turned to CSOs knowing that they defend human rights and offer vital services that the state is no longer able to provide. The public sees CSOs as promoting the public interest while generating innovative ideas to raise awareness and meet needs. At the same time, some people perceive CSOs that intervene on sensitive issues, such as female genital mutilation, child marriage, child labor, and gender equity, as transgressors of public morals.

The government’s perception of CSOs is generally positive and has improved in recent years. As the crisis revealed the extent to which the state was unable to meet its obligations to communities, the relationship between the state and CSOs was strengthened. The government recognizes that CSOs are key actors in the resolution of the crisis and often replaces the state in conflict areas that it finds inaccessible, such as Menaka, Kidal, and a large
part of Timbuktu. At the same time, the government sometimes views CSOs as competitors encroaching on its domain in both service provision and policy making.

Some organizations communicate successfully with the public, in part through the effective use of social media. For example, as part of its projects to strengthen community resilience in Mopti and Ansongo, ARGA–Mali uses Facebook to publicize its activities. West Africa Network for Peacebuilding regularly publishes information about its activities in the Djene zone. Several other organizations, such as Think Peace and Democracy Tech Squad, gathered larger followings in 2019 thanks to their dissemination of information about their activities. On International Women’s Day on March 8, 2019, CSOs flooded the media and social networks with information about women’s needs. However, many of these efforts are episodic rather than ongoing, and the quality of the information conveyed on social media can be unreliable.

Few CSOs file annual reports with the government, although it is required by law. Some CSOs produce monthly, quarterly, semi-annual, or annual activity reports at donors’ request. These reports are considered internal documents and are not published for public consumption. Some organizations have charters defining members’ shared values.
Mozambique’s ruling party, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), and main opposition party, the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), signed a peace accord in August 2019 ending their long military conflict. The agreement paved the way for elections on October 15, 2019. Voters chose a new president, members of parliament, and, for the first time, governors of the country’s ten provinces, who were previously appointed by the president. The incumbent president, Filipe Nyusi of FRELIMO, was re-elected to a second five-year term. FRELIMO, which has been in power since Mozambique’s first elections after independence in 1975, also won gubernatorial races in all ten provinces.

International observers, opposition parties, the media, and CSOs recorded flaws in the electoral process, including voter registration fraud, manipulation of electoral rolls, intimidation, and ballot box stuffing. RENAMO filed charges of electoral fraud against FRELIMO and threatened to return to the military conflict. The election period was marked by violence and deaths, including the murder of Anástacio Matavel, executive director of the Forum of Non-Governmental Organizations in Gaza (FONGA) and member of the Sala da Paz platform for electoral observation. Matavel was shot and killed by members of an elite security force shortly before the elections. As during previous national elections, the period around the 2019 elections saw increased intimidation and harassment of civil society and the media.

Cabo Delgado, in northeastern Mozambique, continued to be the target of brutal attacks by violent extremists in 2019, which resulted in many deaths and internal displacements. The region’s residents were also subjected to torture, violence against women, and arbitrary arrest, including of journalists, according to the 2019 Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Mozambique issued by the U.S. Department of State.

Mozambique was hit twice by strong tropical cyclones in 2019. The storms Idai and Kenneth devastated towns in the central and northern regions, especially Sofala Province, where infrastructure was flattened, livelihoods were destroyed, and hundreds of people died. Joint efforts by the government, CSOs, and cooperation partners provided emergency water, food, and health care to more than 2 million people affected by the cyclones. The ruin caused by the cyclones is expected to take years to overcome.

A scandal involving some $2 billion in fraudulent debt by state-owned companies, known as the hidden-debt scandal, continued to be front-page news in 2019. Since the scandal broke in 2016, CSOs helped keep it on top of the national and international agenda. In 2019, twenty people, including the son of a former president and several former high-ranking government officials, were indicted for money laundering, blackmail, abuse of office, and other offenses. The former minister of finance, who
The 2019 CSO Sustainability Index for Mozambique is accused of large-scale corruption, continued to be detained in South Africa, where he awaits a final decision on his extradition to Mozambique or the United States.

The World Bank reported that Mozambique’s gross domestic product grew by just 2 percent in 2019. More than two-thirds of the population lives in rural areas, where communities grapple with poverty and rising unemployment. About 80 percent of the Mozambican labor force works in the informal sector, mostly in agriculture and informal self-employment, according to the World Bank. The last general census in 2017 showed that living conditions have not improved in recent years. Data from the United Nations International Children’s Fund (UNICEF) shows that one in two children under the age of five suffers from chronic malnutrition. The oil and gas industry reached a decisive milestone in June 2019 when the government and Anadarko Petroleum Company signed an agreement for a liquefied natural gas project in the Rovuma River Basin in the northern part of the country. CSOs claimed that the agreement was not well publicized, and such contracts generally have limited transparency, which can lead to corruption.

The overall sustainability of Mozambican CSOs did not change in 2019. The legal environment deteriorated as a prominent CSO leader involved in electoral observation was killed by security forces and other CSO workers received threats. CSO advocacy suffered in the turbulent political and military environment, which caused CSOs to refrain from many advocacy actions because of fear of reprisal. Service provision also deteriorated slightly because of growing corruption in the public sector, the destruction caused by cyclones Idai and Kenneth, and the closure of many local institutions. All other dimensions of CSO sustainability stayed the same as in the previous year.

While no up-to-date official data are available, the number of CSOs in Mozambique is thought to be around 10,000. The largest proportion of organizations engage in education, health care, social development, governance, and public policy.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.2**

CSOs’ legal environment deteriorated in 2019 as the intimidation and harassment of CSOs intensified, including the killing by security forces of FONGA executive director Anástacio Matavel after he attended a training for electoral observers and threats against other CSO workers.

CSOs continue to register under Law No. 8/91 on Associations, which regulates the right to free association. CSOs may acquire legal status at the national level from the Ministry of Justice, at the provincial level from provincial governors, and at the district level from district administrators. Organizations are usually able to begin working before completing registration.

The costs associated with registering an organization have increased in recent years and were high in 2019. Although a public announcement of registration in the official gazette *Boletim da República* is considered the final step of the registration process, the cost of such an announcement is beyond the reach of most organizations. Organizations that have otherwise completed registration are generally able to operate without fulfilling this requirement. Almost 50 percent of the members of Organizations of People with Disabilities (OPD), a nationwide forum of more than thirty organizations, operate without having announced their registrations, citing the high price of publication as the main reason.

While service-providing CSOs reported few problems with registration in 2019, those working on governance continued to encounter bureaucratic barriers. For example, the Brotar Association, which focuses on participatory budgeting, faced numerous delays before it was finally registered.

Article 10, No. 2 of the Law on Associations gives full powers to the attorney general to disband associations if they have fewer than ten active members whose payment of membership fees is up to date. Although this provision was not implemented in 2019, it continued to pose a threat to CSOs, especially community-based
organizations (CBOs), which have limited knowledge of the laws. The government itself noted in its Transparency, Governance, and Corruption Report of July 2019 that laws are not consistently applied or are weakly implemented and lack necessary regulations and explanatory guidelines.

A proposed new law on associations was submitted to the Assembly of the Republic by CSOs in 2016–17 but since then has not progressed.

As in previous years, the government viewed CSOs working on governance and policy in areas such as health, education, and public expenditures as enemies and constantly targeted them in 2019. The Center for Public Integrity (CIP), an organization that advocates for the integrity of public institutions and engaged in legal proceedings involving the hidden-debt scandal, received a number of threats in 2019, including death threats against one of its workers. Amnesty International asked the president for protection for its staff after some employees received personally targeted threats. When the Youth Parliament (PJ) conducted a simulation of the trial of the former minister of finance on its own premises, a strong contingent of the national police showed up, tried to stop the event, and prevented some participants from entering.

CSOs were often unable to fully exercise their right to freedom of speech. CSO representatives and political figures were afraid to criticize government actions that they considered wrong, and self-censorship on controversial topics was evident on state-run television and in newspapers. Some groups resisted government control by seeking to make information public regardless of the government’s sensitivities. The Southern African Institute for Social Communication held a conference on Freedom of the Press Day, during which it encouraged the media to remain engaged in the face of recent threats, abductions, arbitrary arrests, and torture targeting journalists and public figures.

The government treated CSOs working in service delivery and other areas that are compatible with its agenda more leniently. For instance, the Foundation for Community Development, an organization whose members include national political figures, conducted much of its work in collaboration with the government and did not report any instance of harassment in 2019.

Under the Law on Associations, CSOs may engage in fundraising activities and receive funding from foreign donors. They may earn income from the provision of goods and services, although few organizations take advantage of this opportunity. Organizations may bid on government contracts but rarely do so, as they assume that they have no chance of winning the contracts.

CSOs obtain status as public utility organizations with the approval of the Council of Ministers. Public utility status involves a long process and is difficult to obtain. Article 11 of the Law on Associations stipulates that public utility organizations may be granted tax and fee exemptions and other unspecified benefits. The Law on Associations does not address exemptions for the bulk of CSOs lacking public utility status. Similarly, Article 14 of the law determines reporting and accountability obligations for public utility organizations but not for other CSOs.

Some local lawyers have knowledge of the laws affecting CSOs, but their services are beyond the financial reach of most organizations and are not available throughout the country. The Tete Law Enforcement Association and the Provincial Law Enforcement Arbitration and Sustainable Development Network–Environmental Justice for Communities (REPADES–JAC) provide limited legal support to some communities and CBOs.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.2**

CSOs’ organizational capacity remained the same in 2019. CSOs continued to work in collaboration with constituencies and target groups, although some organizations were still developing a solid base of trust with beneficiaries and root knowledge of their needs. After cyclones Idai and Kenneth, a number of CSOs and international cooperation partners combined their efforts in a well-timed, successful operation to support the cyclone victims. Mozambican CSOs worked closely on the ground with the affected communities, intensively building new relationships, while international partners provided the material and financial resources that allowed them to make a visible impact.

Local communities recognize the role of civil society and sometimes give them considerable support. Religious and informal movements, especially at the grassroots level, developed stronger day-to-day ties with their constituents in 2019. For example, the informal savings group Chitucuco Cha Achacongwe (“Women’s Development”) in
Niassa Province is made up of more than 900 members, mostly women, who are divided into ninety groups in about fifteen communities. In 2019, they received training in savings and management from a social mediator at the Civil Society Support Mechanism (MASC) Foundation and then served as a source of investment support for many people in their communities. The Hankoni Association, which conducts culinary demonstrations to teach good nutrition, receives voluntary support from the communities in which it is active.

Most CSOs have defined missions and objectives. However, they often pursue activities in areas in which funding opportunities arise but do not coincide with their stated objectives, which prevents them from deepening their mission-related skills and improving their internal capacity. For example, some advocacy organizations have begun to provide services that are outside of their mandates and divert their attention from their advocacy activities. There is a tendency for organizations to form in response to a specific funding opportunity and then, after a given period, to disappear. For example, when funding was available for activities related to HIV/AIDS and the elections, some CSOs emerged to carry out public awareness activities in these areas and then disappeared or changed their focus when funding dried up, as the topics were not really their areas of expertise.

Most organizations have annual activity plans rather than detailed strategic plans, and they usually lack a process for identifying goals and measuring results. For example, Voice, Association of Legal Support and Assistance to Communities, Social Monitoring and Accountability Committee, REPADES-JAC, and Forum of Women Farmers carry out activities that deliver significant results at the local level, but they have weak abilities to capture and disseminate information about their performance.

The division of responsibilities between management boards and operational teams is still unclear in many CSOs. Informal rules are still the norm at Mozambican CSOs, particularly smaller organizations. This informality can result in conflicts of interest and deficient financial management, even if approved internal governance procedures are in place. For example, in smaller organizations, the boards are often inactive or exist in name only, leaving the president of the board and the executive director to run the organization. Many organizations, particularly those that do not have strong internal governance structures, are dependent on their founders, and when the founders stop exercising leadership roles, members often disperse and the organizations themselves disappear.

Many CSOs do not have staff qualified to perform internal management functions, including the management of finances and monitoring and evaluation. The lack of financing for long-term projects undermines CSOs’ ability to maintain permanent staff and volunteers. Many young people and adults are uninterested in volunteering or working with associations as they cope with the harsh economic situation.

Many CSOs, particularly in Maputo and provincial capitals, have reasonable access to basic office equipment and internet services. However, internet services are limited at district and local levels, and only 6.6 percent of the Mozambican population has internet access, according to the National Statistics Institute.
The financial viability of the CSO sector did not change in 2019. Most Mozambican CSOs have never had stable financial situations, because funding has always been scarce and difficult to access. Some larger donors require that CSOs have announced their registrations and published their statutes in the Boletim da República, which most CSOs cannot afford. Nevertheless, like the country itself, the CSOs sector is highly dependent on donors. Since the discovery of hidden debt and large-scale corruption in 2016, donor financing, and consequently funding for CSOs, has decreased every year. However, at an international donor conference in Sofala Province in 2019, donors pledged $1.2 billion to help reconstruct areas affected by the cyclones. While this funding went mainly to the government, CSOs received part of it from cooperation partners such as the World Food Program and UNICEF.

A few well-established CSOs, such as IESE, CIP, MASC Foundation, Women and Law in Southern Africa, Rural Observatory (OMR), and Civil Society Learning and Training Center (CESC), have several funding partners, including the European Union (EU), World Bank, United Nations, and African Development Bank. Some of these organizations have managed to diversify their incomes, often by working with the private sector on small-scale consultancies. Most smaller CSOs lack diversified sources of support, which greatly complicates their long-term planning. CSOs are generally aware that the Law of Associations does not forbid them from developing income-generating activities, but few have the experience and the funds to pursue this possibility. Cultural CSOs such as the Fernando Leite Couto Foundation are able to organize cultural events to generate some funding. Some associations seek to earn income from one-off registration fees and monthly or yearly dues, but many members do not pay on a regular basis. A few informal local groups operate without donor support by marketing technical assistance offered by committed volunteers. Social enterprises are almost non-existent in Mozambique, and the concept is unfamiliar to most CSOs. However, a few organizations have begun to see their potential for leveraging resources to invest in long-term programming and sustainability.

Local foundations, such as the Foundation for Community Development (FDC), MASC Foundation, Manhiça Foundation, Lurdes Mutola Foundation, and Joaquim Chissano Foundation, continued to offer limited support to CSOs in 2019. Neither the government nor the private sector plays a prominent role in funding CSOs. In a recent trend, some big corporations with corporate social responsibility policies, such as Mozal, Sasol, and Vale, support projects that benefit a small number of communities, but these projects usually do not include CSOs unless they share similar objectives, which is rare.

Many CSOs are unable to meet donors’ demand for accountability in financial management, which means that they have little or no chance of winning calls for proposals or other types of donor funding. CSOs often lack manuals of administrative and financial procedures and do not have professional financial management staff. CSOs that manage larger funds and must be accountable to several donors usually conduct independent financial audits and produce robust, professional financial reporting. Ongoing training in financial management for local CSOs has shown encouraging results in improved accountability and financial reporting.
ADVOCACY: 4.3

CSO advocacy deteriorated slightly in 2019. The turbulent political environment was not conducive to advocacy, and CSOs did not move forward with many advocacy actions because of fear of reprisal. Some activists working on the hidden-debt scandal, such as CIP members, received death threats, while terrorist attacks in Cabo Delgado essentially halted advocacy activities for CSOs in the region. With freedom of expression increasingly threatened, combined with less transparency in state actions and shrinking space for political participation, the overall environment was hostile to CSO advocacy in 2019.

The government and CSOs cooperated in areas that were convenient for the government itself, especially if they increased its credibility and visibility. These areas included the construction of small community infrastructures such as water fountains, community training on environmental issues, agricultural production, education, and health care. On the other hand, the government did not welcome CSOs’ engagement on sensitive issues, such as corruption and a new law giving greater powers to provincial and district-level governments. Government officials usually interfered in civil society initiatives that seemed confrontational to the regime. For example, when PJ conducted a simulated trial of the former minister of finance on its own premises, a strong police contingent showed up, prevented some participants from entering, and tried to stop the event. In contrast, the national police offered escort protection to participants in a march organized by the Activist Movement Mozambique in partnership with ActionAid Mozambique to celebrate Africa Day on May 25, which was viewed favorably by the government.

Formal mechanisms of communication exist between CSOs, their constituents, and the government. But national and provincial governments and the parliament make little effort to ensure that CSOs receive advance notice of the issues on their agendas. On the national level, formal communication between CSOs and policy makers through bodies such as development observatories is sporadic and dysfunctional. Direct lines of communication on the local level are mostly ad hoc, although CSOs seek to hold regular meetings with local government officials. Local advisory councils are meant to ensure that communities participate in decision making, but in recent years, they have been increasingly appropriated by local governments, which often select participants based on partisan politics. Communities and CSOs usually discuss public issues in community committees subdivided by area of interest, such as health and education, as well as informal community groups. Since the government can be oppressive and combative, depending on the issue, CSOs and informal community groups must usually carry out their advocacy actions with restricted dissemination of limited information.

The Budget Monitoring Forum, a platform of about twenty CSOs, scored a major victory regarding the hidden-debt scandal in 2019, when the case that they brought to the Constitutional Council was decided in their favor. The council ruled that a government-guaranteed $850-million Eurobond issued by the state-run company Ematum for a tuna fishing fleet in 2013 was illegal.

Some advocacy successes were also recorded on a regional level in 2019. Gender equity is a current issue of importance, and monitoring and other actions aiming to promote gender equity tend to be well regarded by government officials and thus gain acceptance and credibility. The Forum of Feminist Organizations of Niassa, ARO Mozambique, Somos, Reborn Life Association, and Forum of Non-Governmental Organizations of Niassa belong to a committee aiming to improve communications between patients and medical officials and the quality of health services at Lichinga Provincial Hospital. The committee reported improvements in communications at local health units in 2019. CIP, which advocates for the integrity of public institutions, sought to keep the hidden-debt scandal in the public eye in 2019 and actively shared the results of prosecutions in the case in the media, social networks (Facebook, Twitter), and YouTube.

The concept of lobbying is familiar to more robust CSOs with better access to political information. Many organizations seek to have regular meetings with parliamentarians. A significant lobbying win came in July 2019,
when after almost two years of extensive advocacy by the National Coalition for the Elimination of Child Marriages, the parliament approved a law to prohibit, prevent, and penalize premature unions and to protect children in such unions. The Citizenship Observatory of Mozambique (OCM) submitted laws on civil identification cards, the containment of public expenses, and personal income tax to the parliament for consideration in 2019. Smaller CSOs are unaware of the concept of lobbying or engage in lobbying only sparingly.

CSOs view the Law of Associations as needing reform, since it has many gaps, including on CSOs’ internal governance, and is out of touch with the current environment for Mozambican civil society. A coalition of civil society groups submitted a proposal for a new law to the parliament in 2016–17. Since then, CSOs have engaged in sporadic advocacy campaigns to try to move the draft forward, but they have made meaningful progress.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.1**

Service provision deteriorated slightly in 2019. The drop in foreign funding because of the hidden-debt scandal, growing corruption in the public sector, the destruction caused by cyclones Idai and Kenneth, and the closure of many local institutions weakened service provision in many areas, including by CSOs.

CSOs continued to offer diverse services in 2019, especially in health care, nutrition, education, and social work. In 2019, CSOs offered services related to the elections, including public education and training for election monitors. CSOs also focused on training for community members. For example, the Association of the Blind and Partially Sighted of Mozambique, which has a computer room in its main offices, trained young people with visual difficulties to use computers and did not have enough space to meet demand. The Italian Cooperation Agency approved a professional training project valued at approximately EUR 1 million ($1.14 million) to promote access to vocational training and professional opportunities for persons with disabilities, with the Institute for Vocational Training and Labor Studies Alberto Cassimo as the local partner. The Alberto Cassimo Institute also trained 150 young people in various technical professions in partnership with the labor market preparation program of the mining company Vale. The Institute for Sponsorship and Legal Assistance provided legal assistance to needy citizens, although it did not have the capacity to help all those in need. In general, CSOs’ lack of knowledge and experience, combined with the unfavorable legal environment and inadequate funding, hampered their provision of services in development and social justice areas in 2019.

CSOs’ services expand and contract depending on available funding. More than 66 percent of Mozambique’s population lives in poverty in rural areas, with little access to public services. These rural communities tend to regard CSOs as service providers, especially as public services continued to decline, a phenomenon that has been exacerbated by widespread corruption. To ensure that the services that they provide are responsive to specific community needs, larger CSOs usually carry out baseline studies. Smaller, local CSOs engage informally in needs assessments by interviewing local residents and leaders. CSOs use community score cards to monitor the government’s provision of public services. However, most Mozambican CSOs do not have a strong capacity for collecting, processing, and disseminating information and data.

CSOs do not usually discriminate on the basis of race, gender, or other factors. They often provide goods and services to constituencies broader than their own memberships.

CSOs have little understanding of market demand for their services or the value chains to which they contribute. The possibility of recovering the costs of service provision or operating social enterprises is unfamiliar to many organizations. Several organizations charge for their services, but there is no consensus in civil society or even among members of the same organization as to whether such practices are appropriate. In 2019, the topic of income generation was discussed at an OMR general assembly meeting, and opinions about it varied considerably.
among OMR’s members. In the end, they agreed that income-generating activities are excellent for ensuring an organization’s sustainability but may carry management risks.

The relationship between the government and CSOs greatly depends on organizations’ focus and approach. The government seems to appreciate CSOs engaged in service provision because their work helps fill gaps and is not controversial, while it is more hostile towards advocacy organizations, which it frequently views as impeding the country’s development.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.0**

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector did not change in 2019. There are still no resource centers for CSOs in Mozambique. A few intermediary support organizations (ISOs) offer access to funding, information, and capacity building in areas such as financial management, which is difficult for many CSOs, especially smaller organizations. ISOs do not usually charge for their training.

There are few local grantmaking organizations. Those that exist usually allocate funds through competitive calls for proposals. For example, in 2019, the MASC Foundation offered grants on good governance, as did Diakonia, Oxfam, and WeEffect through AGIR Mozambique, with funding from the Swedish, Norwegian, and Canadian embassies, Irish Aid, EU, and Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation.

No entity in Mozambique unites all CSOs or covers all areas of interest to civil society. Geographic and sector-specific networks include the Forum of Mozambican Associations of People with Disabilities, which has nationwide reach; FONGA, which unites CSOs from Gaza Province; Civil Society Forum for the Rights of the Child, which brings together organizations focused on children; and Mozambican Civil Society Platform for Social Protection. Most networks offer their members training, coordination, information, and technical assistance.

ISOs and specific donor projects offer training in advocacy, service provision, and program and financial management. Training is rare in strategic management, accounting, fundraising, and constituency building. CSOs located in provincial capitals have easier access to training than rural organizations, although the MASC Foundation, CESC, OCM, Budget Monitoring Forum, H2n Association, Women’s Forum, and Community Information and Communication Support Center provide training for local CSOs and their communities on topics such as advocacy, community score cards, budget monitoring, women’s rights, and project management. Language can be a limiting factor, in that most materials are available in Portuguese or English but not all trainers or CSO staff are fluent in these languages. CSOs such as N’weti, which works on reproductive health, distributes some communications and informational material in local languages, but since Mozambique has more than forty languages, not all of them are covered.

Few CSOs create intersectoral partnerships. In 2019, the COVida–Together for Children project continued to develop interventions based on guidelines approved by the Ministry of Gender, Children, and Social Action and refer families to district and provincial government agencies for services. The project is funded by USAID and the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and implemented by FHI360 and other partners. A small number of other partnerships between CSOs and the government operate in the health-care and educational sectors, although not in a structured, mutually beneficial way. The Friend Support Foundation has partnered with the mining company Vale in the framework of the Education for Road Protection project to reduce the number of accidents on the roads in the Nacala Logistic Corridor.
The public image of CSOs was unchanged in 2019. According to the Social Communication Institute, about 75 percent of the country’s population has access to public information through community radio stations, with the remainder relying on television and, less often, printed newspapers. CSOs’ image is mostly positive in the media, especially when they provide services. Mozambican state-influenced media have great outreach but generally avoid controversial topics, therefore preventing CSOs working on difficult issues from reaching grassroots audiences. Recently, there has been a growing demand on social networks and the personal social media accounts of opinion makers for information about CSOs’ activities. CSOs report that they have to pay high prices to media agencies to publish their information, although it should be a public service.

The public does not have a uniform view of CSOs. Local communities tend to view CSOs as lifesavers able to bring relief and fulfill needs not met by the state. Other groups do not approve of CSOs, because they view their members as belonging to the elite or seeking personal gain. The government recognizes the role of CSOs and is favorable towards those that provide services while viewing advocacy organizations as opposed to or incompatible with the country’s development. CSOs resent these hostile attitudes and the need to confront harsh judgments just to function. The private sector assumes a more indifferent stance towards CSOs, although businesses sometimes partner with civil society initiatives.

Few organizations have extensive experience working with the media. Larger CSOs sometimes promote their activities and public images through documentation and public appearances covered by magazines, books, posters, television, radio, newspapers, and other media. Smaller CSOs have limited financial and technological resources to promote themselves. Social media is of great importance to the sector, and CSOs often use social networks, Facebook in particular, to disseminate information about their work.

There are no mandatory ethical regulations for CSOs in Mozambique. CSOs have created a code of ethics and transparency index, which have been adopted by a few organizations. Although CSOs recognize the importance of disclosing their reports and results to beneficiaries and the public, they usually share their regular progress and annual reports only with their funders and members.
Namibia experienced a turbulent year in 2019, characterized by an ongoing economic recession, the most closely contested national elections since independence in 1990, and a major corruption scandal.

The economy shrank by just over 1 percent in 2019, likely worsening the unemployment figures last recorded in the government’s 2018 national labor survey, which showed that 33 percent of the labor force and 46 percent of young people under the age of thirty-five lacked jobs. A multi-year drought hampered agricultural production, increasing the number of people in need of food aid to more than 700,000 and prompting President Hage Geingob to declare a state of emergency in May. Public debt rose to above 50 percent of the gross domestic product, and the International Monetary Fund urged the government to undertake structural reforms to cut the debt, improve services, and boost business confidence. Perhaps not surprisingly in an election year, the government showed little appetite for taking any drastic actions, such as reducing the size of the civil service or closing loss-making public enterprises.

Just weeks before parliamentary and presidential elections at the end of November, news of Namibia’s worst-ever corruption scandal, known as “FishRot,” broke in local and international media. The scandal was unleashed by the leak of thousands of corporate documents indicating that an Icelandic fishing company had paid at least $10 million in bribes to secure fishing quotas from Namibia. In the wake of the scandal, two cabinet ministers and several leading businesspeople were arrested and charged with fraud and money laundering. News of FishRot sent shockwaves through Namibian society and sparked several public demonstrations in Windhoek and Walvis Bay.

The adverse economic conditions and persistent drought, compounded by the FishRot scandal, led to losses by the ruling SWAPO Party of Namibia and particularly President Geingob in the elections. SWAPO lost its two-thirds majority in the National Assembly by a narrow margin, while the president bore the brunt of the protest vote, gaining only 56 percent of the vote compared to 80 percent in 2014. CSOs lacked the resources to undertake widespread electoral observation, but organizations such as the Namibia Institute for Democracy (NID) undertook voter education and research associates from the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) offered analyses of electoral developments and results.

Namibia regained the top spot in Africa for its free media environment on the Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index 2019. However, the media did not escape official invective for allegedly showing anti-government bias, particularly as the November elections neared. The most outspoken comment came from the minister of industrialization, who called journalists “flies” because, he claimed, they were giving investors the wrong impression of the country.
Overall, the sustainability of Namibia’s civil society was unchanged in 2019. A greater number of public protests focused on issues such as corruption and gender-based violence (GBV) contributed to an improved advocacy score. Service provision was slightly stronger as organizations explored new ways to broaden their reach. The sector’s public image improved slightly with better media coverage and reduced anti-civil-society rhetoric from the government. CSOs’ legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, and sectoral infrastructure did not change.

There is no recent data available on the size of the civil society sector in Namibia. The best estimate comes from a database developed by CIVIC +264, which lists 225 active organizations countrywide.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 3.6**

The legal environment for civil society did not change in 2019. CSOs operating as trusts complained of arcane procedures and bureaucratic delays. No progress was made toward repealing the draconian research law or introducing access to information legislation.

CSOs register as trusts with the Master of the High Court or as companies not for gain with the Business and Intellectual Property Authority. CSOs continued to struggle with administrative procedures at the Office of the Master of the High Court in 2019. For example, they faced bureaucratic inefficiencies and delays in the registration process, and updating records was also a challenge. CSOs offering health-care or educational services are legally required to also register with relevant line ministries, and organizations involved in child protection activities must comply with additional registration requirements. While such measures might be justified, given the need for expertise in such work, they impose additional administrative burdens on CSOs. Smaller organizations, which tend to operate as voluntary associations, are not required to register with any government authority but need only to have a written constitution.

Concerns rose in 2019 about the possible introduction of an initiative to regulate CSOs through a new umbrella body. It was not clear whether this initiative, which was developed without broad consultation with civil society, was driven by donors or the government. The German Agency for International Cooperation organized at least one meeting of civil society and government representatives in October to discuss the revitalization of a civil society-government partnership policy. A previous effort to formulate a similar policy was abandoned more than a decade ago, at a time when CSOs mistrusted the government’s intentions, especially regarding their registration.

Civil society’s attempt to challenge the Research, Science, and Technology Act of 2004 as unconstitutional and overly restrictive dragged on for an eighth year in 2019 without resolution in the High Court. The law requires all organizations and individuals to apply for permits for research projects. A more positive legal development was the Supreme Court’s ruling in favor of a local newspaper, which had been prosecuted for reporting on corrupt property deals involving officials from the Namibian Central Intelligence Service. Despite the court’s ruling in favor of the newspaper, the fact that the state spying agency used an apartheid-era law, the Protection of Information Act, to try to silence the newspaper was disquieting. No progress was reported in 2019 on the long-promised access to information bill.

CSOs in Namibia were generally free to plan and conduct activities as they deemed fit in 2019. While civil society has to contend with bureaucratic challenges and red tape, no incident of outright interference or state harassment of CSOs or their work was reported.

There are no legal controls on foreign funding of CSOs. Very few CSOs compete for government contracts, although in theory this is possible. CSOs are allowed to engage in income-generating activities, although this option is not often utilized. Charitable, religious, and welfare organizations are exempt from paying taxes on their income.
While private legal services are available to CSOs, they are very costly. Only the Legal Assistance Center (LAC) provides legal advice on a pro bono basis.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.3**

The organizational capacity of Namibian CSOs did not change in 2019. Many organizations continued to operate with limited financial and human resources, which constrained their ability to plan strategically and maintain high standards of governance.

Some organizations showed improved ability to build constituencies in 2019. For example, the Namibia Media Trust (NMT), Editors Forum of Namibia, and the IPPR worked together to organize a high-profile event on World Press Freedom Day, which raised awareness of media sustainability in the digital age. The rise of informal social movements coalescing around single issues showed CSOs’ improved ability to mobilize community support in 2019. With the support of volunteers, a group of feminists organized the Slut Shame Walk in April 2019 to protest the high prevalence of GBV in Namibia. While notable for its reach, this event also underlined the limits of social mobilization, as the protest was localized, and most participants were young urbanites. With the exception of a handful of organizations, such as the Shackdwellers Federation of Namibia, most CSOs have few to no grassroots connections, and their reach does not extend far beyond Windhoek, the capital.

Many CSOs continued to be hamstrung by weak boards in 2019. Few qualified and experienced Namibians are willing to act as board members, given the challenging circumstances and lack of remuneration. Once appointed, board members often lack commitment.

Donors increasingly demand internal documents such as strategic plans, vision statements, and detailed monitoring and evaluation reports. Given their limited resources, many CSOs find these requirements difficult to meet, which limits their ability to apply for funding successfully.

CSOs face varied management, staffing, and resource situations. The Namib Desert Environmental Education Trust (NaDEET) has reported a marked improvement in the skills and motivation of its new staff and volunteers in the past two years. On the other hand, many CSOs operate with limited staff, who are hired only for the duration of projects. Few organizations have the resources to fill permanent positions, and funding for support and administration staff is severely constrained. To mitigate staffing gaps, many CSOs make use of local and international volunteers, which comes with its own challenges, such as the need for extra supervision and training and uncertainty about legal obligations and recruiting guidelines.

In general, CSOs’ first priority for their limited resources is to secure office space and cover utility and communication costs. NID, for example, covers operational costs, including its office and utilities, by deducting 10 percent from staff and consultants’ wages. Few CSOs have access to modern office equipment, such as computers, printers, and furniture. Larger, more established CSOs, such as LAC and PositiveVibes, have managed to secure ownership of their own offices, which is unusual.
The sector’s financial viability did not change in 2019. Although funding for activities related to climate change seemed to increase, the financial situation of most Namibian CSOs remained precarious and dependent on external donors, which offered limited core funding and short program cycles.

Exact figures of foreign funding are difficult to come by. Several factors are known to constrain international funding in general and funding for CSOs in particular. The World Bank’s classification of Namibia as an upper-middle-income country often makes it ineligible or a low priority for donor funding. Moreover, much of the donor funding that Namibia receives is allocated to government institutions. For example, according to the U.S. embassy, the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief provided approximately $1.1 billion to Namibia for HIV/AIDS-related activities between 2003 and 2018, the bulk of which was allocated to the Ministry of Health and Social Services. In addition, few local CSOs have the capacity to absorb and manage sizable, multi-year funding opportunities, such as those offered by the European Union (EU).

Namibian CSOs working on conservation have benefitted from growing worldwide interest in addressing the causes and consequences of climate change. The United Nations Development Programme runs a small grants program in Namibia, which funds activities related to climate change and environmental management. This program disbursed approximately NAD 33 million ($2.6 million) to CSOs and communities between 2012 and 2018. Illegal wildlife trafficking and poaching have also become focal areas for international donors in recent years. USAID’s five-year, $16 million Combatting Wildlife Trafficking project is implemented by a consortium of ten international and local CSOs and will operate through 2021.

Financial support from the government remains limited. The government provides marginal support for CSOs to pursue projects such as shelters for GBV victims. A few CSOs have managed to secure government in-kind support. NaDEET, for example, receives assistance from the Ministry of Education to transport students on visits to its environmental education centers, and Regain Trust, a CSO focusing on GBV, has free office space provided by the Ministry of Youth and Sports in the Omusati Region.

A culture of philanthropy is not well established in Namibia. The private sector provides some funding to CSOs, but it is limited to non-controversial issues, such as sports and health. Some companies are strong supporters of CSOs seeking to prevent poaching and protect the environment. Corporate interest has been a boon to NaDEET, whose environmental education camps for school groups and teachers are financed by educational institutions and a wide range of private and corporate sponsors. Save the Rhino Trust was awarded business sponsorships for a fundraising event to generate money for operational and program expenses. However, businesses often establish their own foundations or corporate social responsibility projects to exert greater control over the spending of funds and support the communities in which they operate directly. For example, Lithon Holdings, a local engineering company, has set up its own welfare organization, the Lithon Foundation.

In general, Namibian CSOs have neither the dedicated staff nor the capacity to engage in systematic fundraising. In the past, some CSOs sought to improve their finances by offering services and products for sale, but they met with limited success, since poor communities could not afford them.

More established CSOs that still receive funding from the few donors left in Namibia usually have effective financial management systems. Very few CSOs publish detailed financial statements or annual reports.
Advocacy improved slightly in 2019, as CSOs effectively organized public protests and raised issues of corruption and GBV.

While Namibia has a culture of public dialogue, discussions are often carefully stage-managed by government officials, and controversial issues are seldom discussed. There are no formal forums for engagement between the government and CSOs, and any consultations that do take place are sector or issue specific. For example, some civil society representatives serve on the Presidential Commission on Ancestral Land Rights, which was established in 2019 to review claims of indigenous communities to land lost during the colonial period. Representatives of CSO-supported community conservancies, or designated nature reserves protected and managed by local communities, meet regularly with senior officials of the Ministry of Environment and Tourism, which affords an avenue to contribute opinions on issues such as sustainable hunting and the government’s position at international fora such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora. The government maintains a CSO desk at the National Planning Commission, but the desk officer is rarely active and has minimal contact with CSOs. Government officials are often reluctant to take part in events organized by CSOs, especially if they address issues that may be controversial.

Advocacy by CSOs has increased over the past few years as organizations have come together with other stakeholders, such as social media activists and social movements, for protests, social media activism, and lobbying. For example, the alarming increase in GBV cases in Namibia prompted a range of organizations to raise awareness of gender equality in 2019. In April, more than 100 activists took part in Namibia’s first-ever Slut Shame Walk to protest GBV and associated stigmas. In May, a coalition of human rights organizations and activists launched Namibia’s MeToo movement. The coalition formed links with the Office of the First Lady, which has been active on women’s and children’s rights, and gained significant publicity for its work during the year. Although public protests are still quite rare in Namibia, several lively demonstrations were organized in both Windhoek and Walvis Bay at the end of 2019 to call for action and arrests during the FishRot scandal. These protests served as a focal point for national outrage over the diversion of government funds into private pockets, and they made headlines in both print and broadcast media.

Other advocacy campaigns included a loose coalition of environmental CSOs, businesses, retailers, and municipalities that came together in an initiative sponsored by the Otto Herrigel Environment Trust to curb plastic waste in coastal towns. As a result of the coalition’s activities, many supermarkets instituted a small levy on plastic bags, and the local drive successfully pushed the government to legislate a mandatory, nationwide levy on plastic bags in August 2019. Some retailers donated the levy’s proceeds to CSOs prior to the legislation’s enactment. CSOs led by the ACTION coalition raised concerns about joint army and police patrols, which had led to a number of human rights abuses in impoverished communities.

A number of Namibia’s more established CSOs seek to engage with the government on drafting, reviewing, and revising legislation. LAC and other CSOs that specialize in policy analysis or legal work are sometimes asked to give advice on draft laws and policy documents. However, these requests are often submitted on such short notice that they are not conducive to effective feedback. Notable lobbying work in 2019 included contributions by the Regain Trust, a CSO concerned with gender issues, to laws being formulated on GBV, traditional marriage, sexual assault, and other issues. LAC provided recommendations that proved crucial to finalizing regulations related to the Child Care Protection Act of 2015. NaDEET lobbied successfully for the cabinet’s adoption of a long overdue environmental education policy in 2019 (although the final draft of the policy reflected little consultation with stakeholders). The Namibian government was not the only target of CSO lobbying in 2019. NID, for example, met with the Chinese embassy to air concerns about issues such as the treatment of workers in Chinese businesses and the rise in wildlife poaching.
Limited progress was made on reviewing or passing laws of special concern to civil society in 2019. The Whistleblower Protection Act passed in 2017 is seen as a crucial tool in the fight against corruption, but it was not made operational in 2019 because of a lack of funds, according to the government. Despite pressure from several CSOs led by the ACTION coalition, a long-promised access to information bill was not brought before the parliament in 2019.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.0**

CSOs’ service provision improved slightly in 2019 as organizations provided limited but important assistance to communities underserved by the government. Their services ranged from basic health care to psychosocial support, voter education, and capacity building. Some CSOs shifted to offering tailor-made services to meet identified community needs. For example, the AIDS and Rights Alliance for Southern Africa (ARASA) provided more funding to its community partners to provide HIV prevention and treatment services to minority and discriminated populations, such as sex workers and sexual minorities. These programs were primarily driven by donor research, although past regional and national advocacy work by CSOs also contributed to this programmatic shift. In October, NaDEET opened a new environmental education center that offers interactive exhibitions and other activities to students, educators, and the public. Its location in an urban area in the town of Swakopmund makes it more accessible and less costly for users. Prior to its opening, the new center piloted various activities to ensure their relevance and usefulness.

Some of the shift to specific services can be attributed to a new generation of CSO staff and management. For example, the Namibian Scientific Society (NSS), traditionally a more exclusive, membership-driven organization, has sought to provide a platform for public dialogue on current issues, including negotiations on genocide with Germany and intercultural discussions of the legacies of apartheid. These discussions usually involve guest speakers from affected communities, academics, government officials, and members of the public. This kind of dialogue would have been unlikely under the more conservative management previously at the NSS. The rise of issue-specific social movements around GBV, housing, and land in recent years can also be attributed to younger, more vocal, media-savvy activists. CSOs also collaborate and share expertise to improve project outcomes. LAC and NaDEET, for example, worked together in 2019 to produce informative comics about environmental protection. A number of other CSOs produced educational materials on various subjects, as many public schools in Namibia lack adequate learning resources.

CSOs are well placed to form independent, critical views of government and business development efforts and public finances, thus providing a valuable service to academics, diplomats, journalists, and donors. In 2019, for example, IPPR, Economic Association of Namibia (EAN), LAC, and other organizations provided crucial insights and data to a visiting group of World Bank representatives.

Most CSOs do not seek to generate income from their services, since they serve mostly poor communities.

Overall, the government hardly acknowledged the work and efforts of civil society in 2019. At the same time, the government refrained from attacking individual organizations outright, as has happened in previous years.
SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.7

There was no change in the minimal infrastructural support available to CSOs in Namibia in 2019. The country has no dedicated resource centers to facilitate coordination and capacity building. The House of Democracy, a building in central Windhoek owned by the Hanns Seidel Foundation, a German organization, offers space to CSOs for meetings and consultations. In 2019, CSOs used the meeting space at the House of Democracy to consult with the special rapporteur on freedom of expression and access to information from the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

CSOs coordinate their work in certain areas, such as GBV, access to information, and environmental action and education. But otherwise, the sector lacks overall cohesion and organization. As a result, there was little attempt by CSOs to present a united front on issues of national interest in 2019. CSOs occasionally cooperate on topics of mutual interest or to leverage funding and public attention. For example, NMT and IPPR undertook joint research on digitalization and media sustainability and presented their findings at a public event on World Press Freedom Day in May. The MeToo movement, a loose coalition, operated in an ad hoc but effective manner in 2019. In an effort to improve information sharing and coordination among CSOs, five organizations—NID, LAC, IPPR, NMT, and Citizens for an Accountable and Transparent Society—formed a new hub known as CIVIC +264. By the end of the year, CIVIC +264 had established an office but had not yet been publicly launched. Sector-specific CSOs that coordinate fellow organizations include the Namibian Chamber of Environment, which continued to bring together stakeholders in environmental protection in 2019, and the ACTION coalition, which unites about seven CSOs to promote access to information. The Namibia Non-Governmental Organizations Forum (NANGOF) remained mostly inactive in 2019, mainly because of a lack of funding.

There is limited support for developing CSOs’ capacity and skills. A sizable, EU-funded, multi-year program known as Action for Becoming a Credible CSO in Namibian Communities has helped build the capacity of organizations in five regions but came to an end in August 2019. Donors occasionally provide training workshops for the staff of CSOs that they support. For example, in 2019, in partnership with U.S. embassy, NID provided training under the Civil Society Support program to twenty Namibian CSOs on topics such as organizational ethics, financial management, and monitoring and evaluation.

There is little cooperation between civil society and most government institutions, although some partnerships take place in specific sub-sectors. For example, many CSOs with a focus on environmental protection and conservation maintain strong links with the Ministry of Environment and Tourism as well as the private sector, especially businesses involved in tourism. In 2019, IPPR, with support from the Ministry of Agriculture, Water, and Forestry, undertook a study of livestock marketing in cooperation with the Namibia National Farmers’ Union, which represents communal farmers. The media also engage with CSOs on a regular basis, often to source independent information and opinions as an alternative to those provided by the authorities.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.8

The CSO sector’s public image improved slightly in 2019, largely as a result of more positive media coverage, better engagement with citizens on pertinent issues such as GBV and corruption, and reduced criticism from the government.

Both print and electronic media remained well disposed to civil society in 2019. In Namibia’s free media environment, as reflected in its relatively high standing in the 2020 Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index, a wide range of media rely on civil society activists as experts and commentators. Both government-owned and private media sought out civil society activists to comment on political and economic developments in 2019. For example, the state broadcaster’s weekly Talk of the Nation television show regularly
invited civil society representatives to participate in panel discussions about a range of political, social, and economic issues. A new radio station focusing on current affairs, Eagle FM, made particular use of IPPR’s research associates as political commentators. Journalists routinely attend CSO-organized events, and their activities and protests, particularly against corruption in the latter part of the year, received mostly positive coverage from a range of private and government-controlled media. Civil society groups gained positive media attention for successfully pushing the government to legislate extra duties on disposable plastic bags to reduce waste and encourage recycling. CSOs also gained media attention through their links with business, such as the Recycle Namibia Forum’s ability to earn income for its educational work from the sale of plastic bags in supermarkets.

There are signs that Namibians feel comfortable engaging with and expressing themselves through CSOs. The Afrobarometer survey conducted in mid-2019 showed that some 69 percent of those surveyed felt that Namibians should be able to join any organization, whether or not the government approves of it, while 31 percent said that the government should be able to ban any organization that goes against its policies. The protests over the FishRot scandal were a positive sign that CSOs and individual activists can work together to galvanize public concern about national issues.

In 2019, unlike in previous years, President Geingob did not launch verbal broadsides against civil society representatives as “failed politicians.” Despite the reduction in criticism from the president, public officials overall remained skeptical about the role and purpose of civil society. For example, at a press conference, the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology criticized a report by IPPR on surveillance by the state. Officials often seem to be under the impression that civil society is overly critical of government efforts and policies, holds vested interests pushed by donors, and is itself not accountable to an electorate. As a result, the government seldom engages openly with CSOs. For example, the government excluded civil society representatives from the multi-stakeholder National Governing Council for the African Peer Review Mechanism, which was appointed at the end of year.

The business community has mixed perceptions of CSOs and prefers to work with and support only certain sub-sectors of civil society, such as environmental organizations. The private sector would like to see more evidence of well-organized and transparent CSOs.

In 2019, Namibian CSOs continued to underestimate the importance of engaging on social media to announce events and broadcast them live. There were, however, some notable exceptions. NMT became particularly adept at broadcasting its own and other CSOs’ events and created a series of podcasts about freedom of expression and other media-related issues. A podcast interview with journalists working on the FishRot scandal gained more than 40,000 listeners. Individual activists and CSOs working on governance, such as LAC, NMT, and IPPR, used Twitter to mobilize support for corruption-related demonstrations. The GBV protests were also promoted mainly by an informal network of activists on Twitter.

There were no efforts by the sector to self-regulate in 2019. Very few CSOs publish annual reports and financial accounts or publicly promote their codes of ethics and other governance policies.
The poor security situation in Niger continued to cast a pall in 2019. As in 2018, the year’s defining event was the fight against terrorism, particularly in the eastern and western parts of the country. Terrorists killed scores of soldiers and civilians during the year, with the worst attack taking place in December in Inates, in the Tillaberi region, which resulted in the deaths of seventy-one defense and security personnel. The country’s position as the main migratory hub in West Africa continued to encourage human smuggling and activities of organized crime and armed gangs. Nearly one-fifth of Niger’s 2019 budget went to security despite other urgent development needs.

Escalating violence in the larger Sahel region continued to displace large numbers of people into Niger in 2019. According to the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Refugees, Niger hosted more than 220,000 refugees and 196,000 internally displaced persons during the year. The International Organization for Migration estimated that 2.3 million people, equal to 10.4 percent of the country’s population, required humanitarian assistance in 2019.

Niger’s first trade union elections took place in 2019. The elections were important in that they confirmed the legitimacy of unions and open the way for the government to negotiate directly with workers. During the year, the government engaged in a lengthy stand-off with the National Union of Higher Education Teachers (SNECS) over a new law allowing public university chancellors to be appointed by the government instead of being elected by professors and staff. The law was approved by the National Assembly but rejected by the teachers’ union, which saw it as a threat to democracy and organized a nationwide strike. The strike was called off when the government agreed to enter into discussions, but the issue remained unresolved at the end of the year.

Niger’s economy grew at a rate of more than 6 percent in 2019, representing a doubling of gross domestic product in the last ten years. Ongoing efforts to reform the business environment lifted Niger’s ranking in the World Bank’s Doing Business report from 143 of 190 surveyed countries in 2018 to 132 in 2019. Although Niger ranks last on the UN’s Human Development Index, the country has reduced the number of people living in extreme poverty from a high of 65 percent in 2001 to 41.5 percent in 2019, according to estimates of the World Bank.

The overall sustainability of Niger’s CSO sector improved slightly in 2019. CSOs’ organizational capacity grew slightly stronger as they successfully tackled more larger-scale projects. The sectoral infrastructure progressed slightly as CSOs and the government recognized the need for a CSO House to provide support. CSOs’ legal environment, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, and public image did not change.
Legal Environment: 5.2

The legal environment for Nigerien CSOs was stable in 2019.

Law No. 84-06, as amended by Law No. 91-006, governs the CSO sector in Niger, which consists of associations and NGOs. The main difference between an association and an NGO is that the former acts to benefit its members while the latter acts to benefit people other than its members. CSOs feel that the laws governing the sector do not fully comply with Niger's constitution or the requirements of the Economic Community of West African States, the Organization for the Harmonization of Corporate Law in Africa, and other regional organizations of which Niger is a member. For example, the law does not recognize CSO coalitions or informal neighborhood youth groups known as fadas. Without legal status, these organizations cannot open bank accounts and, if audited by the central government, risk being prohibited from operating.

CSOs must be registered to operate in Niger. The process of forming a CSO is flexible but time consuming. CSOs intending to work on the national level apply to Niamey city authorities, which send their applications to MDC/AT. When they submit their applications, CSOs receive receipts from the Niamey city office. If the government has not responded within three months, they may begin operations while waiting for final authorizations, which are issued by the Ministry of Interior in consultation with MDC/AT and the line ministries. CSOs intending to work at the regional level must sign master agreements with their line ministries and implementation agreements with the regions, departments, or municipalities in which they will operate. International organizations must obtain accreditation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in addition to registering with MDC/AT.

CSO registration is plagued by several problems, including administrative slowdowns and long delays in processing applications. Organizations must constantly monitor the status of their applications to ensure that the government processes them. Religious organizations and associations of people from the same geographic areas often encounter difficulties with registration, since they are viewed as disrupting national unity. Ethnic and regional organizations are not officially allowed to register. Many networks, coalitions, and other groups of organizations, including the Citizen Cooperation and Action Framework (Cadre de concertation et d'action citoyenne, CCAC), Citizen Action Framework (Cadre d'action citoyenne, CAC), and Youth Association Cooperation Framework (Cadre de concertation des associations de jeunesse, CCAJ), operate without registration, which can increase their staff members’ risk of arrest, especially if the organizations’ activities bother the government.

CSOs are overseen by their line ministries, which monitor and audit their activities. According to Implementing Decree No. 84-49 and their master agreements, domestic and international CSOs must file annual activity reports, financial reports, and action plans with MDC/AT. As part of the government’s effort to tighten up oversight of the sector in 2019, the Ministry of Interior and MDC/AT sought to impose more stringent requirements on CSOs’ annual reporting. MDC/AT has asked CSOs to report their accomplishments with associated costs by sector, so that the information can be integrated with central government data. The ministry claimed that most reports filed by CSOs in 2018 were not usable, because CSOs often failed to include complete information. According to the government’s most recent annual report about CSOs, it has information about the origins of only about half of their funding. The ministry also reminded CSOs in 2019 that their approvals to operate would be suspended if they failed to file reports for two years. MDC/AT requested that CSOs submit their activity reports by March 31 or
else have their approvals withdrawn. Given the complexity of the reporting framework, some CSOs wished to postpone this date. The MDC/AT did not agree to this but suspended the penalty for 2019.

MDC/AT also emphasized that CSOs need to announce their new office locations in the official journal and, per a ruling issued in 2019, publish their certified financial statements along with the origins and purposes of all funds received. CSOs were provided with a template for approved audit firms to use in certifying their financial statements, but both CSOs and the National Order of Chartered Accountants were dissatisfied with the form.

CSOs that raise awareness about controversial issues or publicly criticize the government can feel chronically harassed. For example, although CSOs do not need to ask for authorization to demonstrate but merely declare their intention to do so, the authorities often prohibit demonstrations, sometimes with less than forty-eight hours’ notice. Their reasons include “security concerns,” “disturbing the peace,” and “threats to defense and security forces.” In 2019, demonstrations opposing the presence of foreign military bases in Niger were officially prohibited. However, in March, CSOs were able to demonstrate in Niamey against the presence of foreign armed forces in Niger and the 2019 finance law. Some individuals who did not comply with prohibitions and insisted on their right to demonstrate were arrested in May 2019. CSOs may bring legal action against the government and did so fairly frequently in 2019, often to protest prohibitions on demonstrations against poor governance or new, unfavorable tax rules. The courts rarely decided in favor of CSOs.

NGOs and associations that work on development may obtain public benefit status. Under a legal provision introduced in 2019, the central government may make land available to public benefit organizations for activities such as the construction of schools, health-care centers, and youth centers, provided the organizations are in good standing and work well with the central government. CSOs with public benefit status found it easier to obtain land for their activities in 2019.

Niger’s tax policy treats all taxable entities, including CSOs, equally. While the master agreements signed by many CSOs allow them to apply for tax waivers on certain imported items, the procedures for doing so are rigid, and the waivers are difficult to obtain. The central government sometimes gives CSOs exemptions to build head offices or facilities such as orphanages, clinics, schools, and housing for displaced persons. In 2019, the government reintroduced a tax on incoming international calls. The government denies exemptions to CSOs that have failed to file annual reports. Individuals and corporations do not receive tax exemptions for donations to CSOs.

The law allows CSOs to fundraise for charitable purposes only. CSOs may charge fees to recover their costs, provided they reinvest any income into their nonprofit activities or operational costs. CSOs must have authorization from the government to stage fundraising campaigns or collect funds.

The national contract policy allows domestic CSOs to receive government funding for activities that benefit the population. CSOs may accept funding from foreign donors, which must go into accounts at the central bank. The 2004 counterterrorism law allows the government to block CSOs’ foreign-sourced funding if it is determined to come from prohibited sources. In 2018, the National Financial Information Processing Unit began to monitor the origins of CSOs’ funding to determine their legality. It is not known whether any funds intended for CSOs were blocked in 2019.

No attorneys in Niger are specifically trained in CSO-related law. Several attorneys, including members of the Young Lawyers’ Association of Niger, usually charge only token amounts to support CSOs having difficulties with the government. CSOs may also obtain paid legal advice from other attorneys in Niamey and other regions.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.0**

CSOs’ organizational capacity improved slightly in 2019, as demonstrated by the fact that they enjoyed greater success in tackling larger-scale projects through partnerships, including with international CSOs. For example, SOS Civisme and the Network for Transparency and Budget Analysis (Réseau des organisations pour la transparence et l’analyse budgétaire, ROTAB) worked together to respond to a call for proposals issued by the European Union (EU)’s Civil Society Support (PASOC) program. SOS Civisme and Swisscontact responded successfully to a call for proposals by the Democratic Governance Support Program of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation for projects related to the 2020–21 general elections.
Nigerien CSOs are able to mobilize communities, identify partners, and target beneficiary groups effectively. Nearly all CSOs involve their beneficiaries in their work by consulting with them in the planning stages to help determine their needs and desired results. Beneficiaries also contribute actively to project implementation, often by expanding program activities voluntarily and evaluating the effectiveness of CSOs’ interventions. For example, at their own initiative, beneficiaries in communities targeted by a dialogue-justice-security program implemented by the U.S. Institute of Peace and the Network to Support Local Initiatives (RAIL) created discussion platforms to bring defense and security forces together with the public. These sessions are likely to continue after the program ends. Beneficiary populations in Dosso experimented with a variety of seeds in the framework of an agricultural project implemented by RAIL. CSOs also organize community events, such as sports matches, cultural activities, and educational programs, to educate their constituencies and mobilize their support to ensure projects’ sustainability. These events are often included in CSOs’ budgets or may be sponsored by celebrities or local leaders. CSOs increasingly use new technologies to engage beneficiaries in information exchange and fundraising. Some organizations mobilize Nigerien expatriates to generate political support for their activities.

CSOs’ missions and operating policies are usually defined in their bylaws and internal regulations. More established organizations, such as Diko, Alternative Citizens Spaces (Alternative espaces citoyens, AEC), and Nigerien Coalition of Associations, Unions, and NGOs for the Education For All Campaign (Coalition nigérienne des associations, syndicats et ONG de la campagne éducation pour tous, ASO-EPT), have created strategic plans with donor support or to satisfy donors’ requirement for plans as a condition of funding. These organizations sometimes also have vision statements. However, they often lack the financial resources to revise their plans once they expire. Most local CSOs have, at best, action plans.

While most organizations seek to comply with their missions and strategic or action plans, they also “follow the money” and undertake other activities if funding becomes available. All NGOs and development associations must align their activities with the priorities of applicable public and sector-specific policies and municipal development plans. For example, the NGO and Development Association Collaboration Group (Chambre de concertation des ONG et associations de développement, CC0AD) continued to implement sector-specific policies for rural development, economic promotion, human rights, gender, and other areas in 2019. Some more established CSOs, such as Karkara and the Network of NGOs and Associations in the Health Sector in Niger (Regroupement national des ONG et associations du secteur de santé du Niger, ROASSN), have adopted monitoring and evaluation policies to measure the success of their work.

To register, all CSOs must have governing bodies, which are typically known as boards of directors, executive committees, or executive boards. These entities oversee planning and institutional partnerships and externally represent their organizations. At some organizations, the leaders have had their positions more than two decades without renewing their boards. Although government officials point to this pattern as proof that these leaders are unqualified to provide lessons in democracy, the CSOs’ founding documents may not limit the number of terms that board members may serve. Executive secretariats generally perform management duties, overseen by an internal account auditor. Some larger CSOs, such as the Association for the Revitalization of Livestock in Niger (Association pour la redynamisation de l’élevage au Niger, AREN), SOS Civisme, and Nigerien Association for the Defense of Human Rights (Association nigérienne de défense des droits de l’homme, ASSO), have administrative, accounting, and financial manuals and a multi-signature system for expenses. In 2019, CSOs seeking donor funding were usually required to prepare written policies on topics such as gender, anti-corruption, and security before signing contracts.

According to the government, CSOs have offered more than 13,000 full-time and temporary jobs per year since 2017. The vast majority of CSOs hire staff to work on specific funded projects. Most national CSOs without external funding do not have the ability to hire qualified staff. Organizations outsource work to professionals such
as accountants, technology specialists, and attorneys on an as-needed basis. Volunteerism is rare, although young people who have just finished school and are looking for jobs may agree to unpaid internships to gain work experience. Some CSOs such as Cercle DEV rely on volunteers to distribute food and clothing. Retirees with experience and time are not interested in volunteering.

The requirement that CSOs have physical addresses for their head offices, which was introduced in 2018, motivated some CSOs to purchase their own offices in 2019. The central government supported this effort by giving some CSOs land for free. Computers, basic software, and other equipment is often beyond the financial reach of smaller CSOs. Internet access is spreading in Niger, although connection speeds can be slow. In some rural areas, internet service is still unavailable. Despite these difficulties, most CSOs rely on smartphones to access social networks, transfer money and documents, and stay in contact with their target populations. Larger organizations such as the Youth Movement for Development and Citizen Education (Mouvement des jeunes pour le développement et l’éducation citoyenne, MOJEDEC) are better equipped and may organize meetings through WhatsApp, use KoBo Collect to conduct surveys, or rely on Trello for project management. CSOs are enthusiastic social media users, and organizations such as Youth-Childhood-Migration-Development (Jeunesse-enfance-migration-développement, JMED) and Women, Action, and Development (Femmes, actions et développement, FAD) use Facebook and Twitter to promote their activities. RAIL has created WhatsApp groups for each of its projects and for all staff and members.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.0**

CSOs’ financial viability was stable in 2019. As in 2018, the best-funded sectors were security and humanitarian aid, primarily in the Diffa, Tillabéri, Agadez, and Tahoua regions.

Most funding for CSOs comes from external sources. The main foreign funders in 2019 were the EU, USAID, French Agency for Development (AFD), German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ), and other bilateral donors. Funding is generally distributed through donors’ calls for projects, which can involve long and complex procedures. Domestic CSOs often lack the skills needed to set up fundable projects and thus have trouble accessing foreign funds. Nigerien CSOs feel that their need to compete with foreign organizations for funding is unfair. In 2019, some organizations took part in national or international consortiums to access donor funding.

The central government’s attempts to disburse funds to CSOs invariably encounter problems because of the lack of effective and transparent coordination. In 2019, unlike some previous years, MDC/AT did not give grants to CSOs. Some other public entities gave grants if they had funds available and CSOs submitted requests. For example, MOJEDEC obtained a grant from the Independent National Election Commission to educate young people about the election process. Local governments sometimes help fund projects such as the construction of water, health, and religious facilities. In Dogondoutchi Department in 2019, RAIL completed a drinking water access program funded in part by XOF 10 million (approximately $17,000) from two municipalities.

Local businesses sometimes sign local service contracts with CSOs. Other funding initiatives with the private sector are rare.

Nearly all organizations generate resources from membership dues and member identification cards. Some CSOs earn income from service fees or office or vehicle rentals. These efforts are seldom sufficient to fund activities or cover operating expenses, and CSOs often close down if they rely on such efforts as their only source of funding. Fundraising campaigns are rare and must be approved by the government. Only a few organizations are able to fundraise or collect in-kind contributions. For example, Cercle DEV collects food and clothing on behalf of terrorism victims. Communities often provide sites for CSOs’ activities free of charge.
Many CSOs do not have solid financial management systems or accounting software. Most organizations use Excel spreadsheets as their primary financial management tool. Some organizations, even if they do not receive donor funding, require two signatures to disburse funds and have specific accounts for each project. Many organizations do not engage in annual budgeting. Large national CSOs are aware that donors require proper financial management systems and, to the extent possible, they have finance departments and use at least minimal accounting tools to maintain financial records that meet donor requirements. Nigerien CSOs with standing agreements with international CSOs operate under widely accepted procedures and conduct internal, external, or post-project audits, which are often covered by donor funding. In 2019, MDC/AT required that all CSOs publish their financial reports in Niger’s official gazette.

**ADVOCACY: 4.2**

CSO advocacy did not change in 2019. CSOs’ main achievement during the year was their success in persuading the central government to pause its effort to “clean up” the sector by withdrawing approval of organizations that had not filed annual reports or whose annual reports were unusable.

CSOs take part in several government bodies, including the Independent National Election Commission, National Human Rights Commission, Public Contracts Regulatory Agency, High Commission on Personal Data Protection, African Peer Evaluation Mechanism, National Coordinating Commission to Prevent Human Trafficking, High Commission on Communication, Water Council, and several working groups. CSOs participate actively in these forums and represent diverse viewpoints rather than merely repeating the government’s views. In 2019, under the third phase of the PASOC program, the government established a formal discussion framework to bring together ministry central directors and CSO coordinators. The aim of these discussions is to take the public’s needs into account during policy formulation, thereby avoiding confrontations in the street. The program also helped line ministries improve their communications with CSOs, thereby ensuring that CSOs’ development work is aligned with government priorities.

Evaluations of public and sector-specific policies and national laws, if they exist, are not always accessible to the public or CSOs. No formal channels exist for CSOs to request accounting statements from the government. CSOs usually rely on press releases, letters, meetings with government officials, or even public demonstrations to obtain the information they need. CSOs’ advocacy and monitoring campaigns seeking to promote citizen oversight of government activities at both the local and national levels usually enjoy public support. AEC and ROTAB conducted lectures and discussions in the country’s interior to educate local communities about citizen oversight in 2019.

Among the most prominent CSO advocacy campaigns in 2019, RAIL worked with the government to develop a national security management plan, with support from the U.S. Institute of Peace. The initiative includes local actors and builds on the local-level dialogue-justice-security approach that the two organizations have implemented successfully since 2016. MOJEDDEC continued its Citizen Vigilance project to map security incidents and improve partnerships between defense and security forces and the public in District Five in Niamey. The National Commission for Human Rights, the Office of the Ombudsman, and SNECS advocated unsuccessfully for revisions to Niger’s Law on Public Universities. CCAC mobilized the public to demonstrate against the new tax regime imposed in the 2018 Finance Law but was unsuccessful in getting the law changed. FAD continued to advocate for girls’ education. Other CSOs mobilized their partners to educate the public about economic and social reforms.

The government does not comply with application decrees that state that it must regularly evaluate policies related to the CSO sector. Although organizations such as AEC, CCOAD, and ROASSN have promoted the idea of a more favorable legal and regulatory framework, CSOs generally fail to monitor the government’s fulfillment of its commitments to produce a civil society charter, create a CSO observatory, and revise laws and other legal
provisions governing CSOs. Many CSOs are not aware of the need for an enabling legal environment, and some even oppose it, believing that more regulations will increase restrictions on their operations. CSOs expressed heated resistance to the government’s request that CSOs file annual reports by March 31 of each year or else have their approvals withdrawn. Although some government ministers even spoke out against the proposal, the government did not change the date but suspended the penalties for 2019.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.3**

There were no significant changes in CSO service provision in 2019. CSOs continued to provide services in areas ranging from health care, education, shelter, water, and energy to economic development, environmental protection, governance, and self-sufficiency. Several national NGOs helped international humanitarian organizations distribute food and non-food items. For example, Akarass supported the UN Children’s Fund by building emergency latrines in refugee camps and distributing menstrual hygiene kits to women in the camps and host villages. The UN Children’s Fund also worked with other partner CSOs in Maradi and Agadez.

Nigerien CSOs tend to be closer to their communities than foreign CSOs working out of large offices in the capital. For this reason, as well as security considerations, foreign CSOs often rely on local CSOs to implement activities. Nigerien CSOs are attentive to communities’ concerns and involve them in planning and implementing their activities by conducting feasibility studies and consulting municipal development plans compiled from communities’ expressions of need. In addition, all donors require CSOs’ field approaches to be inclusive. CSOs’ actions must align with government policies at the national, regional, and municipal levels.

While associations and unions generally serve only their members’ material and moral interests, NGOs and development associations provide services to people other than their own members. CSOs provide services without discriminating on the basis of race, gender, ethnic group, political affiliation, or sexual orientation, as such discrimination is prohibited by law. However, they may provide goods and services to distinct target groups, such as disabled persons, women, or livestock raisers, in what is known as “positive discrimination.”

CSOs sometimes seek to recover their costs by charging fees for their services or renting out their meeting rooms or other facilities. For example, AREN, Karkara, and RAIL recover costs by marketing their expert services and renting vehicles and meeting rooms under projects related to food and water improvements.

The national and local governments clearly acknowledge the added value of CSOs in implementing policies related to basic social services and sustainable development. In its annual reports, MDC/AT always estimates the percentage contributed by CSOs to fulfilling the government’s efforts. Representatives of line ministries often attend CSOs’ large events and mention their work in official speeches.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.1**

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector improved slightly in 2019 with the government’s and CSOs’ recognition that a CSO House should be founded to provide facilities for CSOs’ use.

Other than a few scattershot initiatives, there are no public resource centers for CSOs or other facilities that offer CSOs easy access to information, technology, and technical assistance. CSOs have some access to meeting spaces. The Private Support Group, for example, allows CSOs to use its facilities on a contractual basis. Many hotels and government-owned facilities built for regional infrastructure festivals are now appealing locations for NGOs and development associations to hold their workshops and seminars. With funding mostly from GIZ, cities and towns
have constructed mayoral offices buildings and often allow CSOs to use these premises. Géo-A offered youth organizations, especially those for girls, access to the internet in its offices, with the goal of eliminating the gender-based digital divide. In feedback about the reports on Niger in the 2017 and 2018 CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa, CSO and government representatives unanimously recommended that CSOs be provided with their own CSO House, modeled on the Press House, a government facility that provides private-sector journalists with office space. To date, there has been no follow-up on these recommendations.

Local foundations infrequently support CSOs’ activities. Some local foundations fundraise and conduct field activities, but others, such as the Salou Djibo Foundation (FOSAD), are largely inactive. No Nigerien foundations re-grant funds to local CSOs.

CSOs have learned to work together through many networks and coalitions. Prominent groups include ROASSN, ROTAB, Collective of Organizations for the Defense of Human Rights and Democracy (Collectif des organisations de défense des droits de l’homme et de la démocratie, CODDHD), and Nigerien Network of Human Rights and Democracy NGOs and Development Associations (Réseau nigérien des ONG et associations de développement de défense des droits de l’homme et de la démocratie, RODDADH). Local organizations have also combined their efforts on common projects. For example, local CSOs and CBOs in Niamey commune and the regions of Agadez, Zinder, and Diffa work with Counterpart International on the Participatory Responsive Governance in Niger program, with funding from USAID and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. CSOs still struggle to present a unified front to defend their interests. CCOAD is meant to represent the interests of the sector as a whole, but it is known to be sluggish because of leadership issues.

Nigerien CSOs enjoyed numerous training opportunities in 2019. PASOC launched a program to help CSOs become more professional and employ proper management and good governance tools. AFD and many other donors and donor-funded programs provided CSOs with capacity-building interventions. Some CSOs offered training to both CSOs and beneficiaries in their areas of specialization, such as good governance, extractive industries, human rights, the environment, and water, sanitation, and hygiene. Géo-A provided free training on internet-based communications to young people, and the National Youth Council (le Cadre de concertation des associations de Jeunesse, CCAJ) and MOJEDEC trained youth organizations on association governance and leadership. Private firms offer specialized training on strategic management, financial management, fundraising, and advocacy, but few organizations have the financial capacity to pay for such training without donor support.

Available training opportunities generally meet local CSOs’ needs. Training materials are not always available in Niger’s ten national languages.

Nigerien CSOs are beginning to enjoy partnerships with other sectors. ROASSN, ASO-EPT, RAIL, unions, and many other organizations partner with central and local governments to prepare sector-specific public policies. CSOs also partner with municipalities, as authorized by the decentralization law. Although regional groups can have trouble registering, the government sometimes calls on them to participate in events such as festivals celebrating Republic Day on December 18. A few organizations collaborate with the private sector. CSOs participate in debates on governance that private media host each week. Media and organizations such as ROTAB, AEC, and ASO-EPT also collaborate on projects to educate the public about various issues.
CSOs’ public image did not change in 2019. CSOs benefit from coverage by public and private newspapers, radio, television, and online press services. Coverage is usually free if it involves statements, press releases, interviews, charitable activities, sporting events, or cultural activities. CSOs must pay for coverage of other activities. Public media do not always publish CSOs’ statements if they are deemed offensive to the government. The media distinguish between advertising and public interest messages, and they appreciate CSOs’ role in promoting democracy, governance, and human rights.

The public appreciates the level of transparency and good governance shown by CSOs, especially in comparison to certain central government entities. CSOs’ efforts to be accountable, which are often required by donors, help build public trust. Many people see CSOs as their intermediaries with the government and notice if CSOs fight for citizen oversight, seek to protect public resources, or defend consumers’ and taxpayers’ rights. Rural populations are familiar with CSOs’ efforts to improve their living conditions but less familiar with CSO advocacy campaigns, which typically take place in large and medium-sized cities. The public generally has opinions about the people who work for CSOs rather than the organizations themselves.

The government and other decision-makers show their positive assessment of CSOs that support their work by enlisting them to build classrooms, set up drinking water systems, purchase equipment for health centers, and similar efforts. The government particularly appreciates the work of CSOs such as AEC in Diffa and other insecure areas, where they organize peace talks, distribute food, and perform other valuable services. The central government perceives some advocacy CSOs as tools of the opposition, especially if they organize demonstrations, even if peaceful.

Private-sector companies continued to appreciate CSOs’ activities in 2019, especially the work of organizations that sought donor funding for infrastructure projects in which they could serve as lead contractors.

Nearly all CSOs seek to gain visibility through the media and social networks and often set aside funds for this purpose or receive funding from donors that require such activities. CSOs often sign partnership agreements with media outlets. Collaboration between activists and journalists, especially those working for private media, is becoming more common. Nigerien CSOs are very adept at using social media, especially if they are led by young people and women. CSOs’ cooperative relationships with the media helped them become more visible while developing audiences for their media partners.

Most CSOs comply with transparency and accountability principles, especially since MDC/AT began to require that CSOs publish their financial reports in Niger’s official journal in 2019. CSOs working with international organizations publish annual reports that include their financial statements. Under the new WAEMU guidelines, CSOs are required to share these reports with their members. In most organizations, accounting statements are presented at general meetings. Formal codes of conduct are rare, but they are under consideration as part of the planned revitalization of the CSO sector by the central government.
The 2019 CSO Sustainability Index for Nigeria

Presidential and National Assembly elections took place in Nigeria on February 23, 2019, followed by governor and state assembly elections on March 9. President Muhammadu Buhari was re-elected for a second four-year term. Voter turnout was lower than in previous years, and voting was generally peaceful, although several incidents of violence were reported. CSOs worked with the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to conduct voter education before and during the elections, and they observed the voting process.

Nigeria continued to face severe security challenges in 2019. Boko Haram and other insurgent groups killed more than 640 civilians in armed attacks and suicide bombings in the Northeast, according to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Kidnappings and banditry spiked throughout the North, and Boko Haram abducted six international aid workers in Borno State, five of whom were later released. In August, the military withdrew from areas of conflict into consolidated camps, leaving more than 220,000 people without protection. In this fragile security situation, OCHA reported that more than 7 million people were in urgent need of assistance, 1.8 million people were internally displaced, and 823,000 people were inaccessible to humanitarian actors. CSOs continued to distribute materials and provide services throughout the country to complement government and international relief efforts.

Nigeria’s economy improved marginally in 2019. The annual growth rate of the gross domestic product increased slightly to 2.27 percent, but inflation remained high, posting at 11 percent in the first half of the year, according to the World Bank. About one quarter of the working-age population was unemployed, and almost half of the population lived in extreme poverty. Nigeria ranked 152 out of 157 countries in the World Bank’s 2018 Human Capital Index, which measures the ability of countries to mobilize their populations’ economic and professional potential.

Overall CSO sustainability in Nigeria improved slightly in 2019. Four dimensions showed improvement, while one recorded a decline. CSO advocacy and service provision were moderately stronger, thanks to several important advocacy successes and the provision of a number of new services, including services related to the elections. CSOs’ organizational capacity improved slightly as the sector mobilized large numbers of temporary staff and volunteers during the elections. CSOs also enjoyed a more positive public image thanks to media coverage of their election-related activities. However, the legal environment deteriorated slightly after two state governments introduced stringent new requirements and the federal government reintroduced the CSO Regulatory Commission Bill. CSOs’ financial viability and sectoral infrastructure were unchanged.

Nigeria has a diverse CSO sector, which includes more than 500,000 organizations registered at national, state, and local levels. More than 93,000 national-level CSOs were registered with the Corporate Affairs Commission.
It is difficult to ascertain the total number of CSOs registered at state and local levels, as they register with different agencies. Many organizations operate without formal registration.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.0**

The legal environment for CSOs deteriorated slightly in 2019 as the House of Representatives reintroduced the CSO Regulatory Commission Bill, Borno State enacted a stringent new law affecting CSOs, and Akwa Ibom State introduced new requirements for CSO registration.

The laws regulating the registration of national CSOs did not change in 2019. National CSOs are required to register with the CAC, as provided in Part C of the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) of 1990. Most CSOs register as incorporated trustees or, less often, companies limited by guarantee. National-level CSOs continued to register easily through the CAC’s online platform in 2019. Although all national CSOs must also register with the Special Control Unit Against Money Laundering, which monitors for the financing of terrorism and money laundering, most organizations fail to do so because of poor enforcement and difficulties in dealing with the unit. In a practice that has existed for many years, CSOs must also register with certain ministries that they work with, such as those for women’s affairs and the environment. In a recent trend, other federal and state ministries, such as the ministries for health and education, are also asking CSOs working with them to register for a fee in an effort to generate revenue. Foreign CSOs register with the CAC and National Planning Commission. No organization is known to have been denied registration in 2019.

The CSO Regulatory Commission Bill was reintroduced to the House of Representatives for its first reading in the last quarter of 2019. The law is ostensibly meant to ensure transparency and accountability in the CSO sector and curb the financing of terrorism. However, CSOs complained that if passed into law, the bill will stifle the operations of organizations that are critical of the government, since it provides for legislative scrutiny of CSOs’ activities, establishes codes of conduct to guide CSO operations, and creates a CSO database that would require CSOs to renew their registrations and, CSOs believe, could be used to deny registration to organizations that the government does not like. The bill met with strong opposition in the House and was withdrawn in March 2020.

In November 2019, a bill prohibiting hate speech was reintroduced to the Senate after it had been withdrawn in June. The bill prohibits abusive, threatening, and insulting behaviors without clearly defining them. Most CSOs oppose the bill, arguing that if it is passed into law, it could be used to restrict critical views and satire and thereby constrain freedom of expression as guaranteed in Section 39 of the constitution. CSOs also called for the withdrawal of the so-called social media bill introduced in November, which intends to curb the spread of false news on the internet. CSOs saw the bill as an effort to suppress the right to freedom of expression. Both bills were still under consideration at the end of the year.

Most state and local CSOs continued to operate without formal registration in 2019. In December 2019, the Borno state government enacted a new law establishing the Borno State Agency for Sustainable Development and Humanitarian Response, which the state government claimed will address gaps in humanitarian response. According to CSOs, the law is meant to stifle their operations, as it requires all CSOs operating in the state to obtain letters of introduction from the Office of the National Security Adviser in Abuja, register online even if they have previously registered, and obtain clearances for all employees to work in the state. CSOs are also required to remit to the agency 1 percent of all grants received. CSOs fear that the state government intends to use the new agency not only to boost its revenues but also to control the activities of organizations perceived to be critical of the government. Although the Borno state government has yet to enforce the new law, international CSOs are not willing to remit 1 percent of their grants to the government. The EU and other development partners operating in the state sought to explain to the government that their activities benefit the state and this provision should be reconsidered. In Akwa Ibom State, the governor’s special assistant on multilateral and donor agencies
mandated that all CSOs operating in the state must register with the state Ministry of Economic Development and Ibom Deep Seaport. This trend is expected to continue across the country in 2020.

Otherwise, CSO operations did not change significantly in 2019. Existing laws allow CSOs to operate freely, although the constitution permits the government to disallow or restrict CSOs’ protests or assemblies if they are perceived to threaten public peace or order. Few incidents of state harassment of CSOs took place in 2019. In September, the federal government banned the international organizations Action Against Hunger and Mercy Corps from operating in the Northeast with allegations that they supported insurgents. The ban was subsequently lifted in October after the UN intervened to strengthen coordination and partnership between development partners in the Northeast and the Nigerian government. In the period leading up to the general elections in February, governments at both the national and state levels restricted civic space by arresting and detaining individuals, especially journalists who expressed views critical of the government. Amnesty International reported that at least nineteen journalists were harassed between January and September. In Cross Rivers State, a journalist was detained for reporting on alleged corrupt practices involving state government personnel. He was released in February 2020.

CSOs continued to enjoy exemptions from income tax except on income earned through business activities, as provided in Section 23(c) of the Company Income Tax Act of 2004. CSOs are legally able to establish social enterprises, engage in fundraising, receive grants from foreign donors, and compete for government contracts. The government contracts with CSOs largely for service provision, including research, monitoring and evaluation, and capacity building.

Legal advice for CSOs is available in major cities. Legal services sometimes entail modest fees, especially in the case of new organizations seeking help with registration. The Legal Aid Council continues to provide pro bono legal services to the sector. Other human rights CSOs providing legal services to CSOs and the public include Lawyers Alert, Human Rights Law Service, and Legal Defense and Assistance Project.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.7**

CSOs’ organizational capacity improved slightly in 2019 as organizations showed they were able to mobilize large numbers of well-qualified temporary staff and volunteers to implement election-related activities.

Nigerian CSOs typically enjoy good relationships with their constituencies, although in the Northeast, problems persisted. Many organizations, including the Policy and Legal Advocacy Center (PLAC), Partners West Africa Nigeria (PWAN), and CLEEN Foundation, effectively engaged their constituencies on voter education and security issues in 2019. Through the Nigeria Policing Program, PWAN facilitated the establishment of a technical working group in which CSOs cooperated with the police and other security agencies to coordinate election-related security management, thereby deepening trust between the two sides. However, in the Northeast, local communities continued to mistrust international CSOs. In December, to encourage community acceptance of international CSOs, the Borno state government enacted a law requiring international CSOs to employ natives of the state in intermediate and junior positions. Through OCHA, the humanitarian community submitted a joint statement to the state government in which they pledged to provide capacity development and other support to local staff. While claiming that 90 percent of their staff in the state in 2018 were Nigerians, international CSOs also stated that staff recruitment must be performed appropriately and with due consideration to technical capacity, safety, and other concerns.

Partly because of dwindling funding, most CSOs have tried to develop strategic plans to fulfill donors’ requirements and thereby win grants. CSO observers reported an overall increase in strategic planning in 2019. However, most CSOs still do not implement their plans fully because of capacity and resource constraints.
Most CSOs continued to operate without properly constituted boards in 2019. In Borno, local CSOs often do not understand the roles of boards, and board engagement is limited as a result. A few large CSOs in major cities, such as the Center for Democracy and Development (CDD) and Center for Research and Documentation (CRD), have active boards, with board members contributing to strategic planning and working with management to ensure that organizational activities are in line with the plans. As donors continue to demand transparency and accountability in CSO operations, some organizations have begun to activate their boards to ensure that they operate in a more transparent manner. Most CSOs comply with donors’ contractual agreements, which usually oblige organizations not to use grants for purposes other than those stipulated in agreements or to use information for other projects without donor consent.

Only a few CSOs are able to maintain permanent paid staff, and most CSOs rely on temporary staff and volunteers. Staff attrition from local CSOs increased in 2019 as funding constraints prompted employees to move to international organizations or the civil service. Local CSOs that lost staff were often proud that their former staff were sufficiently skilled to represent the sector’s interests in the government or with international CSOs. In the South East and South South, CSOs continued to experience difficulties engaging permanent paid staff, and some organizations had to lay off staff because of the lack of funding.

Despite funding constraints, the professional quality of CSO staff is increasing thanks to the influx of university graduates as temporary staff and of volunteers with specializations that are directly relevant to the work of their organizations. In 2019, CSOs effectively mobilized large numbers of temporary staff and volunteers to conduct voter education and observe the election process. For example, Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth, and Advancement (YIAGA Africa) engaged 48 state focal persons, 774 local government supervisors, and more than 3,000 observers at polling units during the elections. The Situation Room, a platform of more than seventy CSOs led by PLAC, deployed 4,000 field observers in addition to the more than 20,000 field observers mobilized by its member and partner organizations. CDD also engaged 3,500 field observers during the elections.

The CSO sector slightly increased its use of technology in 2019. Many CSOs at the national and state levels used the internet and cell phones to observe and report activities during the elections. The use of social media such as Facebook and WhatsApp increased, especially during the elections, when CSOs used social media tools to educate voters. Connectivity challenges continued to hamper internet access by CSOs in rural areas. Large CSOs continued to have modern office equipment, such as computers, printers, and scanners, while smaller organizations were less well equipped.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.5**

CSOs’ financial viability did not change in 2019. Dwindling donor funds and the effects of a weak national economy were offset by some success with local fundraising and social enterprises.

Large CSOs have access to multiple grants, but diversification is still limited, as the sector relies largely on foreign support. Major donors to CSOs include USAID, the United Kingdom’s (UK) Department for International Development (DFID), European Union (EU), MacArthur Foundation, and UN agencies such as the UN Development Programme (UNDP). Funding from USAID declined slightly in 2019. A substantial portion of U.S. support went to humanitarian response, health, population, and governance. USAID’s state-to-state project, which was scheduled to start in 2019, did not begin as planned. DFID’s aid to Nigeria rose by 8 percent in 2019, although not all funded projects commenced in 2019. DFID funding went mostly to programs in health, government and civil society, and education. A few DFID-funded programs, such as the Nigeria Policing Program, will not continue after 2019.

Most foreign aid was channeled to the North, especially the Northeast, which has the highest poverty rates and lowest school enrolments in Nigeria. International CSOs continued to implement most projects in the Northeast.
directly, thereby restricting opportunities for local CSOs. Although international CSOs often bid for projects with local CSOs as implementing partners, local organizations are not often well compensated in these partnerships. A few local CSOs in the Northeast obtained grants from the Emergency Food Intervention Fund for the Northeast, which provides food to internally displaced persons (IDPs). But most local CSOs were unable to tap into the fund because of its stringent funding conditions, which left OCHA implementing most of the fund’s projects directly. Since it was an election year, the EU and UNDP provided short-term funding for CSO activities in voter education and elections observation.

Aid inflows to other parts of the country continued to decline in 2019. Most CSO projects in parts of the Northcentral region are self-funded because donors are absent in the region. CSO projects in some regions are funded through corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs. For example, in the South South region, multinational oil companies provide CSR funding to support community development in health, education, and infrastructure. CSOs work closely with the companies, communities, and the government to monitor the implementation of these projects. A few local foundations such as the TY Danjuma Foundation continued to support CSOs providing primary health care and education in 2019. However, more local foundations now implement their projects directly. For example, Dangote and Indimi Foundations provided direct support to IDPs in the Northeast.

CSOs are still unable to raise substantial amounts of funding locally, although they continue to try different approaches. Some organizations host talent shows or sporting events or use social media sites to appeal for funds. DJ Cuppy Foundation raised more than NGN 5 billion (nearly $14 million) for victims of insurgencies in the Northeast through a fundraising event in Lagos. Professional associations such as the Academic Staff Union of Universities raise funds by collecting monthly dues from their members. A few CSOs use crowdfunding to raise funds. For example, in 2019, PWAN generated funds through crowdfunding to renovate classrooms in Adamawa State. Some foreign donors prevent local CSOs from using cash donations to add to foreign grants in implementing projects, which inhibits local fundraising. For example, in 2019, some individuals offered donations to PWAN for a project that it was implementing in northern Nigeria, but the main donor advised PWAN not to accept them.

CSOs continued to earn income from their products and services in 2019. For example, CLO provided mass transport services in parts of southern Nigeria, including Lagos, Port Harcourt, and Enugu. Other CSOs operated social enterprises to earn income, including the Women’s Environmental Program (WEP), which has a social enterprise focused on renewable energy. CSOs such as the Peace Ambassadors Innovation Center in Borno, BudgIT in Lagos, and the Association of Women Farmers of Nigeria in Kano run businesses whose income is partly channeled to their primary activities. Some organizations offer mentoring, training, and research services for a fee. For example, PWAN earned income by training CSOs on communicating impact in 2019. However, the amounts raised through such activities are usually meagre compared to foreign grants.

The government does not offer grants to CSOs. A few government agencies award CSOs with contracts to provide services. For example, the Office of the National Security Adviser contracted with PWAN to train security operatives in the Northeast, Northcentral, and Northwest in 2019.

CSOs’ financial management systems improved slightly in 2019, thanks to donors’ ongoing insistence on transparency and accountability. CSOs increasingly rely on finance professionals, such as accountants, to manage donor funds and ensure adherence to donors’ transparency and accountability standards. However, most state- and local-level CSOs do not access professional services because of the cost. Leading CSOs in major cities prepare annual reports, but the inclusion of financial statements in annual reports is not widespread.

**ADVOCACY: 3.0**

Advocacy improved moderately in 2019 as CSOs achieved several notable successes at the federal and state levels.

The 2019 general elections provided an opportunity for CSOs to collaborate effectively with the government at all levels. INEC worked closely with CSOs such as YIAGA Africa and CDD on voter education and election planning. The Center for Citizens with Disabilities, Inclusive Friends Association, and other CSOs persuaded INEC to make arrangements so that persons with disabilities could vote, and INEC provided braille ballot guides and posters for voters with visual or hearing impairments.
The Open Government Partnership (OGP) allowed CSOs to participate actively in the government budgeting process, including in Kaduna State, where CSOs participated in budget hearings for the first time. CSOs continued to take part in the DFID-supported Monitoring Recovered Assets in Nigeria through Transparency and Accountability project, to ensure that recovered funds were used for development purposes. In Jigawa State, the Network of NGOs monitored cash disbursements to poor and vulnerable people, as provided in the state’s social protection policy.

CSOs achieved several important advocacy successes in 2019. At the national level, the Nigeria Labor Congress influenced the government’s decision to increase the national monthly minimum wage from NGN 18,000 (approximately $50) to NGN 30,000 ($84). As a result of advocacy by the Center for Citizens with Disabilities and the Joint National Association of Persons with Disabilities, the president assented to the Discrimination Against People with Disabilities Bill, which bars any form of discrimination against persons with disabilities by, for example, requiring all public buildings to be made easily accessible to the disabled.

Organizations such as League of Democratic Women (LEADS) in Kaduna were actively involved in the state and local fiscal transparency accountability and sustainability programs, which aim to strengthen transparency and accountability in state and local governments and ensure efficient service delivery. Women’s rights CSOs in Ogun State prompted the government to appoint six women to state cabinet positions. After WEP pushed for the inclusion of more women in Benue State political offices, nine women were elected chairs of local governments and eleven others were appointed local government secretaries. CSO advocacy on security issues, especially kidnapping and banditry in Kaduna and Zamfara states, made the government pay more attention to these concerns.

CSOs effectively used the internet in their advocacy in 2019. CLEEN Foundation adopted software to monitor court proceedings on corruption cases and expose corrupt practices in the public sector. PWAN introduced the Court Observer app to report on court proceedings involving implementation of the Criminal Justice Act at the federal level and in Lagos and Ondo states. The Shehu Musa Yar’Adua Foundation also sponsored an online anti-corruption platform. CSOs were able to use social media to allay public concerns during the elections, especially after the elections were postponed for a week because of logistical problems.

CSOs had several lobbying successes in 2019, especially at the state level. Thanks to CSO advocacy in Jigawa State, the state government signed onto the OGP and approved a social protection policy for poor and vulnerable populations. CSOs influenced the adoption of the federal disability law by Jigawa, Kaduna, and Kano states and the signing into law of the Yobe State Road Transport Agency Bill.

The CSO sector was not comfortable with legal reforms initiated by the government in 2019, including the CSO Regulatory Commission Bill. CSO groups and human right advocates such as Enough is Enough and Nigeria Union of Journalists openly criticized the bills and new requirements and lobbied against their adoption, accusing the government of trying to restrict their activities.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.7**

CSO service provision improved moderately in 2019. CSOs provided many services related to the 2019 elections, introduced several new services, and engaged actively in social service provision for IDPs in camps across the North. CSOs continued to fill the gap in social service provision caused by ongoing shortfalls in the national budget.

CSOs provided a wide range of services in 2019. For example, the Federation of Muslim Women’s Associations of Nigeria provided services in early childhood educational development; the Civil Liberty Organization (CLO) provided transportation services to the mass transport service; WEP was active in renewable energy; and several...
CSOs in the Northeast provided humanitarian services to victims of the insurgency. CSO service provision expanded into a new area in 2019 as several organizations organized talent shows and boot camps for various causes. For example, the Grassroots Project for Good Governance organized a boot camp for good governance in which participants received intensive coaching in a camp-like setting. In Enugu State, the Parent-Child Intervention Center provided psychosocial support to the public and safe spaces for the elderly. In collaboration with the Nigerian Correctional Services, PWAN provided services related to prison decongestion.

Many CSOs provided bespoke services to ensure a credible and transparent electoral process in 2019. In Kano, the Center for Information Technology and Development (CITAD) and Democratic Action Group organized voter education activities for youth, women, and the unemployed. YIAGA Africa organized several sensitization programs on the electoral process and observed voting on election days. Other organizations, including CDD, CLEEN Foundation, Policy and Legal Advocacy Center, and Good Governance Team, organized election-related events. During the elections, most CSOs used social media and other apps to educate the public about the electoral process and observe the elections.

CSOs continued to provide services in response to the needs of their communities in 2019. Some CSOs, especially larger organizations, conducted baseline assessments to understand community needs. Local CSOs in the Northeast are beginning to negotiate with donors and international CSOs working in the region to ensure that their activities reflect the needs of target beneficiaries. However, Northeast communities often view international CSOs as agents of imperialism or business and believe that the missions of these organizations are at variance with their needs. CSO also tracked budget implementation and monitored projects to ensure that they were in line with the needs of beneficiaries. In Jigawa, a network of CSOs conducted townhall meetings to assess community needs and ensure that they were reflected in the state government’s budgetary allocations for 2020.

In the Northeast, local CSOs partnered with international CSOs and the federal and state emergency management agencies to distribute relief materials to IDPs. In response to acute malnutrition among children in the region, local CSOs came up with locally made, ready-to-use therapeutic food. However, international CSOs were reluctant to adopt their products to replace similar products provided by the UN Children’s Fund. WEP continued to provide solar dryers to fishers in Benue State.

In general, CSO services are not restricted to their members. Professional organizations such as the Nigeria Medical Association and Nigeria Bar Association continued to provide services to the public at large. The Academic Staff Union of Universities provided relief materials to IDPs in the Northeast. Most CSO publications are distributed to the public free of charge since they are donor funded. However, a few CSOs sell public documents online. CSOs at all levels in Nigeria provide services in a non-discriminatory manner.

CSOs sometimes recover the costs of services by charging fees, especially for services provided through their business entities. Otherwise, CSO services are usually donor funded and provided to beneficiaries at no cost.

Federal and state governments increasingly recognized CSOs in 2019, largely because they needed CSOs’ support in the elections. At the national level, INEC recognized the value of CSOs in the electoral process and collaborated with them in election-related activities. In Kano, the anti-corruption programs of the Center for Democratic Studies were publicly praised by representatives of two federal agencies, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and Independent Corrupt Practices Commission, and the center was invited to take part in the anti-corruption efforts of the two agencies. In Abia State, the state government invited CSOs to contribute to budgetary process during public hearings, indicating its recognition of the value CSOs can add to the process.
The infrastructure supporting CSOs in Nigeria was stable in 2019. CSOs continued to enjoy ample training opportunities and collaborated well within the sector.

CITAD, the Center for Leadership, Strategy and Development (Center–LSD), and the British Council continued to operate resource centers in 2019 that provided training in strategic planning, computer skills, and project management. Intermediary support organizations such as CDD, CLEEN Foundation, Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Center, and Center for Democratic Studies continued to provide CSOs with information and training. For example, the Center for Democratic Studies offered training to CSOs on budget tracking. ISOs and resource centers usually charge fees for their services to recover some of their operating costs. Their services generally meet the training needs of local CSOs, especially in fundraising and strategic planning.

Local grant making in the CSO sector did not change in 2019. Large CSOs, such as WEP, CLEEN Foundation, and CDD, continued to sub-grant to smaller CSOs, especially in communities in which they implemented projects. TY Danjuma Foundation continued to provide grants to local CSOs for projects in specific thematic areas such as health. Most local foundations implement their projects directly.

CSO coalitions such as the Situation Room, Nigeria Network of NGOs, and Kano Civil Society Forum continued to operate in 2019. At the national level, the Nigeria Network of NGOs facilitated information sharing among its members, and CSO networks in most states did the same. The Civil Society Action Coalition on Education for All has a well-established governance structure at the national level and across the six geo-political zones, which facilitates synergy and contact among its more than 600 members working on educational issues. The Civil Society Coalition on Sustainable Development has more than 2,000 registered members working in areas such as empowerment, human rights protection, development, and peace in Nigeria.

As in 2018, training opportunities continued to be offered in major cities. For example, the Lagos Business School and Center–LSD provided training on strategic management and fundraising. The Center for Democratic Studies provided training on budget tracking, YIAGA Africa and many other large CSOs offered training on election observation. PWAN continued to provide capacity building to local CSOs working to curb corruption and also offered training on needs assessment. Trainings were usually tailored to CSOs’ needs and were mostly available in major cities. Training materials were offered in English.

There was a slight improvement in the collaboration of CSOs with other sectors in 2019. Both the government and media recognized that partnerships with CSOs increase the effectiveness of activities to raise public awareness about issues such as the electoral process. At the federal level, many local CSOs worked with INEC to implement election-related activities, including voter education. Local CSOs in the Northeast provided hands-on support to the government in the distribution of relief materials in IDP camps. Jigawa and other states signed onto the OGP, which entailed working closely with CSOs in the budgeting process. PWAN partnered with the Nigeria Correctional Services on prison decongestion and with the Office of the National Security Adviser on capacity building for security personnel.

Local CSOs increasingly collaborated with the media in 2019. For example, YIAGA Africa formed a partnership with Channels TV on voter education; the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA) cooperated with Africa Independent Television on election matters; and the Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Center collaborated with journalists to report on corruption in Nigeria. CSOs continued to work with businesses to address community challenges in 2019. For example, First Bank Nigeria PLC worked with the International Women’s Society and Vision Spring to provide 500 eyeglasses to widows on global Giving Tuesday. Through its Enabling NGOs for Success program, Union Bank provided support to thirty-seven CSOs across the country for community development projects.
CSOs had a slightly more positive public image in 2019. Large CSOs such as WEP, YIAGA Africa, OSIWA, and PLAC enjoyed considerable media coverage in 2019. Although CSOs usually pay for media coverage, most media organizations, especially private outlets, covered CSOs’ activities during the elections at little or no charge. Channels TV publicized WEP’s solar dryers for free, and Freedom Radio in Kano and Solace Base, a YouTube channel, reported on the launch event for the 2018 CSO Sustainability Index report for Nigeria at no charge. CSO practitioners also served as election analysts for many government and private media organizations. At the state level, government-owned television channels rarely reported on CSO activities for free. In Benue, the Nigerian Television Authority charged NGN 50,000 (approximately $140) and NGN 100,000 ($280) to cover CSO activities at the state and national levels, respectively. In Kano, CSOs enjoyed positive media coverage from nearly twenty media organizations, most of them private.

While CSOs are applauded in communities across most regions of Nigeria, in the Northeast, international CSOs are seen as agents of international imperialism or business rather than humanitarian service providers. Local CSOs have a good reputation in the Northeast and are trusted above the government because of their accessibility and prompt response to disasters.

The government and business sector regard CSOs largely as a source of expertise. Government agencies such as INEC and the Nigeria Correctional Services have positive perceptions of CSOs. However, the relationship between the Nigerian Army and international CSOs such as Mercy Corps and Action Against Hunger was still strained after the government accused the CSOs of being agents of instability and barred them from working in the Northeast. The government does not usually have a positive view of CSOs that are critical of its policies.

CSOs continued to raise awareness of their activities using various media in 2019. YIAGA Africa, CDD, PLAC, and other organizations relied on both mainstream and social media to educate voters about the electoral process. CSOs also used social media to build their image. Journalists continued to be involved in CSO activities in 2019. In most cases, they are members of CSO coalitions such as the Voice and Accountability Platform in Kano, which makes it easy for them to understand and cover CSOs’ activities.

Nigerian CSOs have yet to institute a sector-wide code of ethics, even as they continue to resist government attempts to introduce new regulations and laws to govern the sector. Leading CSOs in major cities and some loose coalitions such as the Situation Room usually operate transparently and advocate for transparency among their members. Larger CSOs publish annual reports, but it is not a common practice among smaller CSOs at the state and local levels.
Rwanda remained generally stable in 2019, despite several developments that caused unrest. In the northern and southwestern parts of the country, rebel groups based in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), particularly the National Liberation Forces (FNL) and Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), carried out sporadic attacks, killing fourteen civilians and injuring another eighteen. In May 2019, the head of the FNL was arrested and charged with sixteen criminal counts, including terrorism, kidnapping, murder, genocide denial, armed robbery, arson, forgery, and causing bodily harm. He pleaded guilty to all charges and awaited sentencing at the end of the year. In September 2019, the FDLR commander and several other military personnel were killed in operations carried out by DRC armed forces.

Tensions between Rwanda and neighboring Uganda escalated during the year. Rwanda’s main grievance was that Ugandan authorities supported dissidents and militias seeking to oust the Rwandan leadership. At the height of the tensions in the early spring, the Rwandan government barred its citizens from travelling to Uganda and then closed the border, citing the ongoing harassment, unlawful detention, and torture of Rwandan nationals travelling to Uganda. Efforts by Angola and the DRC to further reconciliation did not yield results during the year.

In November 2019, Victoire Ingabire, a prominent opposition figure, abandoned the United Democratic Forces of Rwanda (FDU-Inkingi) party and announced that she was forming the new Development and Liberty for All party. She revealed that it was no longer possible for FDU-Inkingi to operate, since the party’s leaders were no longer based in the country. Her announcement followed the deaths or disappearances of a number of FDU-Inkingi members. Their cases were investigated by the Rwanda Investigation Bureau, but no conclusions were announced.

Rwanda’s economy grew by 9.5 percent in 2019. Rwanda was ranked 30 out of 190 countries for ease of doing business in the 2019 World Bank’s Doing Business Index Report, the only low-income country in the top thirty. Inflation was low during the year, and living standards continued to improve. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index for 2019 ranked Rwanda 51 out of 180 countries and the fourth least corrupt country in Africa.

Overall CSO sustainability in Rwanda improved slightly in 2019. CSOs’ organizational capacity improved slightly as an ambitious capacity-building program helped a number of CSOs attain better performance in several key areas. CSOs’ financial viability was slightly stronger after several organizations secured business contracts with the government. The establishment of several working groups to take part in discussions with the government and cooperate with the government on policies affecting women improved CSO advocacy. CSO service provision strengthened slightly in 2019 as organizations worked effectively through the JADF to help achieve ambitious
district-level service targets. CSOs’ public image was also slightly stronger thanks to regular and positive coverage of their activities. CSOs’ legal environment and sectoral infrastructure did not change.

Data for 2018–19 from the Rwanda Governance Board (RGB) lists 1,596 local CSOs and 184 international CSOs. During the same period, RGB registered 180 international CSOs, including 15 new organizations, and 261 local CSOs, including 131 organizations with legal personality and 130 organizations with temporary operating certificates.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.9**

The legal environment for Rwandan CSOs did not change in 2019. CSO registration was still an area of concern. While Law No. 04/2012 governing national non-governmental organizations (the NGO Law) and Law No. 05/2012 governing international CSOs present clear guidance on registration procedures, RGB continued to impose additional requirements that are not mentioned in the laws or guidelines. For example, although Article 15 of the NGO Law requires only that CSOs introduce themselves to local administrative offices in their geographic areas of operation during the pre-registration period, RGB does not register organizations if they do not obtain letters of collaboration from the local administrative offices. However, unlike in 2018, when several organizations were denied registration because they were not granted letters of collaboration by local governmental authorities, no case of registration being denied was reported in 2019. The NGO Law requires RGB to share its reasons for denying registration in writing and allows CSOs to contest refusals of registration in court.

Drafts of a new NGO law and new policy for CSOs were expected to be approved in 2019, but this did not happen. In contrast to the current law, the draft law and draft policy include provisions limiting CSOs’ freedom to operate, and they omit mention of the rights to advocate, to protect and promote human rights and other national values, and to express opinions about government policies and legislation. CSOs did not receive updates about the status of the draft law and draft policy in 2019, and they were uncertain whether their recommendations were under consideration. This uncertainty created suspicion and anxiety among CSOs, but people familiar with the process suggested that the government was reflecting on feedback from consultations with stakeholders, including CSOs.

The current law on international CSOs includes strict accountability mechanisms. Article 22 stipulates that the government may request internal or external audits of international CSOs to assess their operations and expenses. International CSOs must submit mandatory financial reports within the first three months of each fiscal year and must obtain approvals from district authorities and RGB of the previous year’s financial reports and action plans for the upcoming year. In 2018, the government prepared a new law to replace Law 05/2012 governing international CSOs, which remained in draft form throughout 2019.

A potential legal barrier to CSOs’ operations is the requirement in the law establishing RGB that the board pre-approve any research that CSOs wish to conduct on governance-related issues and other topics that the government designates as “homegrown,” or based on grassroots and indigenous knowledge. Although no official policy or document codifies the definition of homegrown initiatives, a CSO expert has stated that RGB has developed a list of twelve such areas. In 2019, Never Again Rwanda (NAR), a human rights and peacebuilding organization, obtained RGB approval for research on homegrown initiatives after satisfying research accreditation requirements. There is no recorded case of RGB ever denying approval to a CSO to conduct research on homegrown initiatives.

After the introduction of a new tax law in 2018, the Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA) started to interpret taxable income as any revenue that exceeds expenses in the financial year. This interpretation was inconsistent with CSOs’ practice of carrying balances forward from one year to the next or returning surpluses to donors. After several
consultations between CSOs and the RRA, the RRA made a verbal commitment in 2019 to not regard balances carried forward by CSOs as taxable income. Although the RRA had asserted previously that CSOs would not receive registration renewal certificates without RRA tax clearance certificates, this rule was not enforced in 2019. For most of 2019, CSOs were unable to register vehicles, largely because of the lack of clear written guidelines. Although this issue was later resolved, the RRA’s continuing adjustments in applying the new tax code to CSOs without clear written directives created a sense of insecurity among CSOs. Many organizations found that they needed to hire or train skilled financial staff to ensure full compliance with the complex tax law, which was difficult because of their limited resources.

Article 4 of the NGO Law allows a CSO to conduct income-generating activities if it is authorized to do so and the profits from such activities are used on activities related to its objectives. CSOs have not explored this opportunity, because they lack the capacity to develop competitive business plans and Rwanda’s private sector is small and underdeveloped. CSOs may bid on government contracts but usually lack the capacity to do so.

As in previous years, only a few lawyers were available to provide legal advice on CSO-related laws in 2019. While CSOs may procure services from private legal practitioners, their high cost forces many organizations to operate without legal assistance. A few lawyers are employed by CSOs as senior managers or technical staff, but their legal focus is mainly on policy and human rights, and they do not offer general legal advice to other CSOs.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.9**

CSOs’ organizational capacity improved slightly in 2019, thanks to an ambitious capacity-building program that helped a number of CSOs improve their performance in several areas.

In partnership with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), RGB continued to implement the $8 million Strengthening CSOs for Responsive and Accountable Governance in Rwanda program, which began in 2014. The program focuses on strengthening CSOs’ capacities in areas such as partnerships, policy dialogue and advocacy, and organizational mandates. In 2019, the program offered tailored trainings on resource mobilization, proposal writing, results-based management, financial management, and gender. According to the RGB annual report for 2018–19, thirty-three CSOs taking part in the program were able to produce results-based reporting and started using financial forms such as purchase requisitions, payment orders, and payment vouchers. The program noted, however, that sustaining these results may be challenging, since one-off capacity-building programs do not offer ongoing coaching and monitoring.

The Rwanda Civil Society Platform (RCSP), a collective of nine umbrella CSOs with a combined membership of about 1,445 affiliated organizations, proposed a new capacity-development plan in 2019. During a consultative meeting attended by 170 participants, RCSP member organizations, other affiliated and non-affiliated CSOs, development partners, and government officials identified deficiencies in CSOs’ research capacity, policy analysis and development, and advocacy. CSOs participating in the meeting showed large disparities in their organizational, financial, and knowledge management and program design. Monitoring, evaluation, and documentation were also cited as deficits, with CSOs seemingly unable to capture data to adequately measure the effectiveness of their interventions. According to the plan, most of the issues raised at the meeting were to be addressed by existing capacity-building initiatives, such as the RGB program.

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1 The score for Organizational Capacity was recalibrated in 2018 to better reflect the situation on the ground and align it with other scores in the region. The score does not reflect a change in organizational capacity, which in 2018 remained largely the same as in 2017.
Beneficiaries and target groups are usually merely recipients of CSOs’ services and rarely involved in planning, implementing, or phasing out their interventions. Only a few membership organizations, such as the Collaborative Council of Organizations for Basic Initiative Support, Community of Potters of Rwanda (COPORWA), Imbaraga, Tubibe Amahoro, Adena, Profemmes Twese Hamwe, and Haguruka, have strong constituency bases. Most organizations have limited funding for community outreach and struggle to mobilize communities to participate in their activities. They usually fail to solicit feedback on their successes and shortfalls and rarely monitor and track changes over time. CSOs also lack the necessary systems or strategies to disseminate reports about the outcomes of their interventions.

Most CSOs have visions and mission statements, strategic plans, and annual action plans. Yet few organizations have clear approaches to their work or the institutional capacities needed to realize their strategic goals. Even when strategic plans are aligned with missions and visions, the scarcity of funds often causes CSOs to shift their focus to take advantage of new funding opportunities. CSOs rarely inform their planning with prior baseline assessments. Some CSOs have not updated their strategic plans for more than fifteen years, while other organizations have no notion of what strategic plans are until asked to produce them by prospective donors.

Many CSOs reported that they were unable to comply with basic management practices in 2019. Governance weaknesses were sometimes mentioned as a critical factor in dysfunctional management and leadership. Expectations of boards are uneven, and some CSO board members are disconnected from their organizations, while others are so fully engaged that they end up performing the daily tasks of executive directors. Because of limited funding to hire staff, most CSOs are unable to define clear staff responsibilities. For example, financial management and procurement roles often overlap, which can lead to a risk of corruption.

CSOs’ organizational capacity is challenged by a lack of human resources. Most staff positions are project based and offer contracts of two to four years. Without guarantees that their positions will continue unless project timelines are extended or new projects are secured, CSO staff members often move on to positions elsewhere. CSOs typically use consultants to provide services that require legal expertise. A few organizations, such as NAR, Great Lakes Initiative for Human Rights and Development (GLIHD), and Health Development Initiative (HDI), recruit volunteers to work at their head offices.

Most CSOs report that they are comfortable using technology in their operations. Many urban CSOs have access to good internet connections and are able to communicate through e-mail and conduct meetings online, usually via Skype. In doing so, organizations are susceptible to potential cyber-security threats that they are unequipped to deal with. CSO staff often use their personal smartphones for work, even though they are not reliable sources of internet service. Small and rural CSOs struggle with internet connectivity because of poor public infrastructure and a lack of financial resources. The Legal Aid Forum (LAF), HDI, GLIHD, NAR, RCSP, and other large organizations continued to be active on social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook in 2019. Some CSOs use Kobo Toolbox, a GPS-enabled software, to monitor field activities. Most CSOs collect data on hand-written forms or Excel spreadsheets rather than using sophisticated data analysis and monitoring and evaluation software.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.7**

CSOs’ financial viability improved slightly in 2019, although it remained the weakest dimension of sustainability. The improvement stemmed from CSOs’ break-through success in securing contracts from the government.

CSOs remain almost entirely dependent on donor funding. In 2019, the major donors included USAID, United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, European Union, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, the Belgian agency Enabel, Embassy of the Netherlands, and international CSOs such as Norwegian People’s Aid and CARE International. Funding from most of these donors increased in 2019. Donors prefer to support organizations with strong internal systems and reasonably long records of positive performance. Newer and smaller CSOs, including community-based organizations (CBOs) with long histories, such as the Nyabimata-Adenya Development Association and Association for Integrated Development Terimbere, still find it difficult to access donor funding.

Article 12 of the current NGO Law stipulates that the government must allocate funds to CSOs in its annual budget. The 2018–19 budget law allocated more than RWF 678 million (approximately $730,000) to empower political parties, faith-based organizations, and CSOs, and nearly RWF 616 million (approximately $685,000) to
strengthen CSOs for responsive and accountable governance. The 2019–20 budget law increased these allocations to more than RWF 800 million (approximately $895,000) and nearly 678 million ($757,000), respectively. This funding originated with UNDP and was channeled through RGB and provided to CSOs in the form of grants. Sixty CSOs received the maximum grant allowance of RWF 25 million (approximately $28,000) for projects and maximum grants of RWF 45 million (approximately $50,000) for research. Project areas included gender and family promotion, justice and human rights, climate change and the environment, youth empowerment, conflict resolution, and unity and reconciliation. The level of RGB’s support is in line with its legal mandate to support CSOs.

In 2019, in a major break-through, Profemmes Twese Hamwe, African Evangelistic Enterprise (AEE), and Young Women Christian Association (YWCA) secured contracts from the government to monitor the implementation of social protection programs. Although the number of organizations was small, the contracts demonstrated the government’s confidence in CSOs’ ability to deliver on commitments and contribute to its ambitious agenda. They also open up opportunities for other CSOs to be considered for similar contracts. Under the contracts, the organizations will, among other duties, identify incidents of malpractice and provide beneficiaries with coaching so that they can make best use of the social protection support offered by the government.

CSOs do not generally have diversified sources of income. They are legally able to pursue income-generating activities, but most organizations do not do so because of their lack of capacity to develop competitive business plans and shortage of capital to start businesses. A few urban CSOs such as Duhamic-Adri have established income-generating social enterprises, such as renting out recreational grounds, offices, and conference facilities.

Rwanda does not have in-country philanthropic organizations. Because the private sector is small, it does not offer significant support to CSOs. CSOs did not actively encourage businesses to develop corporate social responsibility programs in 2019.

CSOs that work with foreign donors usually have procedural manuals and use financial management software such as QuickBooks and Sage Pastel. Newer and smaller CBOs usually have basic financial management systems but may lack project management tools and internal procedures and policy manuals. Organizations often have weak or non-existent internal controls if they are not subjected to regular audits.

**ADVOCACY: 4.0**

CSO advocacy improved slightly in 2019 as CSOs established thematic working groups (TWGs) in social transformation, economic transformation, and transformational governance to mirror the government’s National Strategy for Transformation. Working through the TWGs, CSOs are expected to contribute more effectively to government discussion forums, such as sector working groups and the Joint Action Development Forum (JADF), a formal multi-stakeholder platform that promotes the full participation of citizens in decentralized, participatory governance and improved service-provision processes. If successful, the TWGs will serve as the entry point for CSOs to actively influence government policies and programs. In 2019, the TWGs focused on building structures and systems, and their effectiveness was still unproven. The TWGs are coordinated by RCSP.

CSOs worked more closely with the government in several policy areas affecting women in 2019. The umbrella group Profemmes Twese Hamwe, its members, and other stakeholders ensured that a new gender policy that was under development explicitly addressed unpaid care, which is typically performed by women. The policy was

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2 The score for Advocacy was recalibrated in 2018 to better reflect the situation on the ground and align it with other scores in the region. The 2018 score also reflects a slight improvement in advocacy over 2017.
waiting for cabinet approval at the end of the year. Profemmes Twese Hamwe also created a core community advocacy team to fight gender-based violence (GBV) and with other CSOs proposed amendments to the law on persons and family. The Faith Victory Association (FVA) established a network of community volunteers to educate women and girls about GBV and sexual and reproductive health rights. HDI, GLIHD, FVA, ActionAid Rwanda, and other organizations also advocated on these issues with interventions ranging from press conferences to meetings with local and central government officials. Their efforts culminated in the development of community sensitization sessions on GBV and sexual and reproductive health and rights, using government structures such as inteko z’abaturage (community assemblies) and umuganda (monthly community work).

In 2019, CSOs engaged the government on the ubudehe categories that it uses to determine households’ eligibility for social programs. Ubudehe is a homegrown initiative based on traditional forms of collective action and mutual support. Since the government re-introduced ubudehe in 2015, the public has not been fully content with the structure of its categories. When the government decided to review the ubudehe categories in 2019, CSOs constituted a technical steering committee composed of organizations such as RCSP, NAR, and Pax Press to ensure that the review process incorporated community views. The steering committee presented a position paper based on community consultations, which included recommendations that the government increase the number of ubudehe categories and adopt more in-depth criteria to determine needs. By the end of 2019, the new categories had yet to be approved by the cabinet.

CSO advocacy was hindered by several shortcomings in 2019. Some organizations misunderstand advocacy as meeting with decision makers in their offices rather than voicing the concerns of the voiceless. CSOs sometimes fail to consider the true cost of advocacy and give up on their efforts if they become too expensive to sustain. There are perceptions that advocacy work is the responsibility of umbrella organizations, and CSOs are often reluctant to engage on controversial topics, preferring instead to maintain positions that are aligned with government policies. Many CSOs self-censor because they wish to gain favor with government authorities or lack the experience and confidence needed to engage with knowledgeable and skilled government bureaucrats. Finally, CSOs often lack the ability to work on legal issues, because they have limited knowledge of the law and there are few lawyers available to advise them. In 2019, private lawyers challenged a new provision in the penal code that criminalized defamation of national leaders and persons in public service, arguing that it violated freedoms of expression and the press, which are guaranteed in the constitution. The fact that private lawyers took responsibility for challenging this unpopular law revealed the gap in CSOs’ capacities to advocate on important matters of law and policy. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, with the exception of defamation of the president.

In 2019, RCSP led discussions with the Ministry of Finance, RRA, and RGB on the income tax law passed in 2018, which includes provisions that are ambiguous or inconsistent with CSOs’ operations. CSOs were able to clarify the law, making it easier for them to comply with its provisions. CSOs also sought to address elements of the draft NGO law, despite their lack of knowledge about its status. For example, in consultations with RGB, CSOs contested the failure of the draft law to mandate government support for CSOs in the national budget.
CSO service provision improved slightly in 2019 as organizations worked effectively through the JADF to achieve ambitious district-level service targets.

CSO services cover a wide range of areas, including the construction of schools, health centers, and early childhood development centers; agriculture inputs; support services for children, young people, and people living with disabilities; economic development; and environmental protection. In 2019, the YWCA served as a local implementer of the USAID-funded Isuku Iwacu project, which aims to improve household sanitation and hygiene by training community agents to construct hygienic public toilets and buy and distribute materials. The Isuku Iwacu program established sanitation centers in all districts, which are managed by private-sector actors. HDI operated two centers in Kigali to offer services such as family planning services, pre-natal care, and sexual health education, and the Rwanda Women’s Network and Haguruka operated safe shelters for women victims of GBV. CSOs continued to provide all-inclusive, stigma-free services to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex populations in Rwanda.

Services provided by CSOs generally reflect the needs and priorities of their communities. In 2019, local and international organizations and other development partners continued to work closely with the government at the district and local levels through the JADF. The JADF is a coordination framework that enables joint planning, reduces duplication of services, ensures equitable distribution of resources, and facilitates monitoring to ensure that communities are well served. Some CSOs are embedded in communities, and the work they do is specified in ambitious district performance contracts, or imihigo, signed by the president. CSOs’ services under the imihigo in 2019 included school meal programs, small-animal livestock provision, and the construction of schools, houses, and water supplies. According to the report of a JADF assessment conducted by RGB in 2019, the alignment of CSOs’ interventions with district imihigo “improved coordination [and] streamlined equitable distribution of JADF members’ interventions, resulting in the reduction of duplication and concentration of efforts only in accessible areas.”

In 2019, strong cost recovery remained an unattainable goal for Rwandan CSOs, mainly because of their overdependence on donor funding, which comes with stringent accountability conditions that generally prevent efforts to recover costs. In addition, some CSOs do not understand the concept of cost recovery, which makes it difficult for them to negotiate cost-recovery arrangements with their funders. Moreover, the public generally views CSOs as charitable organizations providing free services, since this has been the long-time practice.

The government recognizes CSOs’ contributions and demonstrates trust in CSOs. For example, in 2019, the government approached CSOs such as FVA, Profemmes Twese Hamwe, YWCA, and AEE to work together on community mobilization and the monitoring of social protection programs. At public events, government officials recognize CSOs as key stakeholders in the country’s development. At a roundtable meeting between CSOs, government officials, and donors in March 2019, the acting head of RGB expressed appreciation for CSOs’ contributions to various sectors of development. At the local government level, FVA was publicly recognized for raising public awareness of GBV and sexual and reproductive health and rights.
SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.1

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector did not change in 2019. The Youth Association of Human Rights Promotion and Development continued to host a youth center offering training to youth on civic rights and responsibilities, and GLIHĐ’s library and center for human rights and strategic litigation continued to offer lawyers, human rights workers, and others access to legal journals, human rights materials, and jurisprudence on human rights litigation.

There are no domestic grant-making organizations in Rwanda.

CSOs wish to work together but often lack the knowledge of best practices needed to form connections with partner organizations. CSOs tend to work independently and do not make use of established networks, which limits their ability to share information and engage in peer-to-peer learning. Rwandan CSOs are organized mainly into the nine umbrella organizations that are members of the RCSP. The main role of the umbrella organizations and the RCSP is to advocate for the rights of their members and provide technical support in areas such as fundraising. However, the RCSP strategic plan developed in 2019 acknowledged that both member umbrella organizations and the RCSP itself do not effectively perform their functions, mainly because of weak coordination and missed opportunities for establishing relationships. Umbrella CSOs, particularly the RCSP, have a mandate to implement sectoral infrastructural projects, but they lack the skills and financial resources needed to carry out this work. Many existing support tools, such as organizational websites and information-sharing platforms, are not regularly updated.

CSOs continued to receive training from RGB, international CSOs, and some local CSOs supported by donor funding in 2019. Most training is ad hoc and covers topics such as financial management, leadership, and organizational governance. Specialized training organizations serving CSOs do not exist. CSOs rarely take advantage of online training opportunities because of their lack of technical knowledge.

In 2019, the first publicly recognized business relationship between CSOs and the government was established as three organizations secured government contracts to monitor and report on social protection services. CSOs continued to strengthen their partnerships with the media in 2019 through the formal partnership with Pax Press established in 2018. Pax Press worked with the RCSP, LAF, and Haguruka to organize advocacy activities about the implementation of laws relating to the public interest. Pax Press also established new relationships with organizations such as Imbaraga, Adenya, COPORWA, and Transparency International to strengthen access to information, fight censorship, and promote freedom of speech and accountable governance. CSO-business partnerships are almost non-existent, especially since CSOs have not taken a strategic approach to nurturing partnerships with the private sector.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.3

CSOs’ public image was slightly stronger in 2019. On the basis of their formal partnership with Pax Press, CSOs received regular and positive coverage of their activities, including policy dialogues with government officials, district meetings with local leaders, and public events. The media also reported on CSOs’ interventions in areas such as GBV, teenage pregnancy, sexual reproductive health and rights, and transparency and accountability. The media depicted some CSOs’ activities as steps forward in advancing citizen-centered policies, which burnished CSOs’ public image. Pax Press continued to air community radio outreach programs that allowed CSOs to voice concerns about government policies. RCSP, LAF, FVA, Haguruka, NAR, Tubibe Amahoro, Imbaraga, Adenya, COPORWA, Transparency International, and other organizations participated in radio programs organized by Pax Press. Radio debates were organized on themes such as the legal and policy framework for land expropriation and
transfers; access to information, censorship, and the promotion of freedom of speech and accountable governance; and improved distribution processes for seeds and fertilizers.

The interventions of service-providing CSOs increased the public’s generally positive view of CSOs in 2019. The public tends to regard CSOs as charitable organizations that provide free services. In some cases, the public sees that CSOs can be wasteful and uncoordinated, and many people prefer to rely on private-sector solutions.

The government generally has a positive or neutral view of CSOs. CSOs’ cooperation with districts through their imihigo has earned the sector greater credibility with government officials and allowed CSOs to engage more effectively with the government on other issues, such as governance and accountability. Some government officials retain negative perceptions of CSOs as lacking accountability, based mainly on their observations that some CSOs have huge budgets but little or no presence at the community level.

Other than the organizations working with Pax Press, most CSOs do not invest in building their public image and, in particular, do not use innovative technologies effectively. A handful of CSOs have websites but fail to use them to advertise their missions or develop appealing messages. Websites can remain out of date for years. In 2019, some CSOs used social media such as Twitter and Facebook to promote debate on public policy issues, such as youth unemployment, abortion, the penal code, and peace building. For example, NAR implemented a USAID-funded youth empowerment project, Inzira Nziza, which helps youth use social media to articulate their concerns. In late 2019, the Network of International NGOs commissioned Three Stones International to develop an annual thematic report on its members’ contribution to the government’s National Strategy for Transformation for 2019. The rationale behind this report was that international and domestic CSOs needed to make a more concerted effort to publicize their involvement in Rwanda’s development.

The current legal framework does not recognize CSO self-regulation. The draft CSO Policy recognizes the need for CSOs to be able to self-regulate, but despite requests from CSOs, the revised NGO Law omits this provision. Even if recognition of CSOs’ right to self-regulate is eventually adopted into the legal framework, CSOs are challenged by their inability to self-regulate effectively in the face of deficient financial and human resources. While some CSOs, especially in Kigali, have websites, only one organization, NAR, publishes its annual narrative and financial reports on its website.
Public life in Senegal in 2019 was dominated by the February presidential election and its aftermath. The election took place in an atmosphere of controversy after a law approved in 2018 required presidential candidates to obtain the signatures of approximately 1 percent of voters in seven regions to qualify for the election. The new law reduced the number of candidates significantly. Of the twenty-seven candidates who applied to the Constitutional Council, only seven were approved to participate in the election, including the incumbent, Macky Sall, whose candidacy was viewed by some as a violation of his promise to reduce his term in office. Two approved candidates belonging to the opposition were disqualified after they were convicted of misusing public funds shortly after their candidacies were announced.

The election was largely peaceful, transparent, and properly conducted, according to election observers and the Constitutional Council. Some pre-election violence and restrictions on the freedom of assembly occurred. Two people died in violent confrontations in Tambacounda in February, and many people took to the streets to protest controversial amendments to the election code and the disqualification of certain candidates. Journalists were attacked by people suspected of supporting the coalition in power. After Sall won with more than 57 percent of the vote, a significant portion of the opposition and the public refused to accept this result. However, feared public uprisings did not occur.

After his re-election, the president declared his intention to modernize Senegal’s governmental institutions and increase oversight of the oil and gas industry. The president eliminated the position of prime minister and announced a process of national dialogue. Some opposition members boycotted the dialogue, but in the course of the year, many political, business, CSO, and other leaders took part in discussions focused on governance and the terms of political office. Civil society played a key role in facilitating discussions about election issues between the ruling majority and opposition.

Peace talks aimed at managing the separatist conflict in Casamance continued without resolution in 2019. The conflict, one of sub-Saharan Africa’s longest running, has displaced large populations in Senegal as well as The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau.

Senegal’s economic growth rate was above 6 percent in 2019 for the sixth year in a row, according to the World Bank. Although poverty is falling, the United Nations (UN) World Food Program reported that one-third of the population continued to live below the poverty line in 2019. In some areas, particularly Dakar, the capital city, communities suffered from the harmful environmental effects of major infrastructure projects. While CSOs did not engage in significant advocacy on this issue, spontaneous movements arose in some neighborhoods.
The sustainability of Senegal’s CSO sector was unchanged in 2019. The success of women’s organizations in mobilizing support for a law criminalizing rape and pedophilia, and CSOs’ role in mediating discussions about elections between the ruling majority and opposition parties, strengthened CSO advocacy. The sectoral infrastructure improved slightly as CSOs cooperated more often with each other and partners from other sectors. CSOs’ legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, service provision, and public image were unchanged.

The Ministry of Interior has not made data about the number of CSOs available for several years. Registered CSOs are estimated to include more than 10,000 associations and 589 non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Many unregistered organizations are also active.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.0**

The legal environment for Senegalese CSOs did not change in 2019.

Decree No. 76-040 of 1976 continued to govern associations. The Ministry of Interior approves all registrations and oversees all CSOs. After two years of operation, associations may apply for NGO status under Decree No. 2015-145. NGO status confers eligibility for tax and customs waivers. An inter-ministerial advisory commission approves the applications, but as the commission rarely meets, the processing of applications is slow. Delays in acquiring NGO status can create problems for organizations that have already agreed on project timelines with donors. NGOs commonly have multi-year spending programs that are approved and supported by the government, and they must produce annual reports in accordance with Decree No. 2015-145.

Registration became more bureaucratic in 2019, with local CSOs, especially religious associations suspected of having ties to violent extremists, reporting tremendous difficulty with the registration process. Since the Ministry of Interior was busy overseeing the election during the year, the processing of applications for registration and NGO status slowed to a crawl. However, the Ministry of Interior recognized that Decree No. 2015-145 needs revision and began to work with CSOs to revise the decree in 2019.

NGOs continued to be subject to periodic government inspections in 2019. Teams composed of representatives of the government, Council of NGOs in Support of Development (Conseil des organisations non-gouvernementales d’appui au développement, CONGAD), and other CSOs occasionally visit the offices of NGOs to access information, including financial documents, so that they may evaluate the results of approved spending programs, the impact of activities, and organizations’ relationships with their stakeholders, including local authorities and beneficiaries. After their visits, the teams issue recommendations for improvement. The government may impose punitive measures such as suspension if it discovers any mismanagement of funds. CSOs have the right to appeal such decisions.

With the election and extreme polarization of public life in 2019, the government imposed more systematic restrictions on civic activities. Some marches were banned, which spurred CSOs to find other ways to spread their messages, such as gatherings and the distribution of flyers. The advocacy positions of some CSOs resulted in their exclusion from meetings and other government-organized activities. CSOs that are subject to state harassment usually work on contentious issues, such as human rights, governance (including natural resource governance), the concerns of people or organizations distrusted by the central government, and talibés, or young boys who leave their typically rural families to study the Qur’an with urban-based teachers. Some CSOs that failed to comply with requirements such as filing quarterly reports or that were suspected of collaborating with alleged subversive groups were subject to various forms of pre-emptive intimidation in 2019. The central government frequently mentions that CSOs can be used as pass-throughs for money laundering, and it now commonly audits larger
 amounts of money that CSOs receive by wire transfer before allowing organizations to access the funds. In 2019, an NGO’s funds were blocked for a lengthy period while the government audited the origins of its funding.

CSOs are required to file yearly tax returns and pay corporate taxes and taxes on behalf of their employees. NGOs are entitled to exemptions from taxes and customs fees on supplies and equipment used for activities included in spending plans approved by the government, but the process for obtaining these exemptions is slow. International CSOs may sign agreements with the government to obtain tax advantages. CSOs that sign paid consulting services contracts with the government must pay taxes on this income. In 2019, some CSOs working on public funding programs and projects did not understand this rule and were required to pay a tax penalty after negotiating a moratorium.

CSOs may bid on government contracts, but after signing agreements, they are often paid late or not at all. CSOs may earn income by selling goods and services and operating social enterprises, provided the profits are used to support their missions.

Legal professionals in Dakar and smaller cities can help with CSOs’ legal needs. Human rights CSOs often have legal experts on their staff, who, usually on a pro bono basis, handle requests from individuals and CSOs that cannot afford or lack access to private-sector professionals. These clients are often faced with the challenges that beset vulnerable populations, such as a lack of protection for women and children and land ownership claims.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.1**

The organizational capacity of Senegalese CSOs did not change in 2019.

CSOs continued to empower community stakeholders through capacity building and investment programs. CSOs’ processes and methods are fairly well proven, and they are able to maintain good relationships with their communities. CSOs known for especially strong relationships with their beneficiaries include the Solidarity and Mutual Aid Network (Union pour la solidarité et l’entraide, USE), Ndeyi Jirim, Living Water (Eau vive), and Collective to Modernize the Daaras (Collectif pour la modernisation des Daara). However, most projects are limited to period of six months to two years, which poses serious impediments to achieving effective and sustainable impact. CSOs’ ability to take initiative is dwindling, since they are often unable to freely and responsibly choose their areas of focus or the geographic areas in which they work and instead, their funding partners identify these parameters in advance.

Strategic planning is widely practiced. However, its relevance is uncertain, as CSOs must work according to spending programs approved by the government and use planning and management tools provided by donors. An inter-ministerial commission reviews and approves all agreements between the central government and CSOs, but it has no formal work schedule and does not meet regularly. Thus CSOs’ planning efforts are regularly undermined by delays in approvals and changes in circumstances. CSOs feel that they will need more financial and technical support before they can prepare and implement high-quality strategic plans.

Registered CSOs are required by law to have statutory bodies such as general assemblies, boards of directors, and executive committees. These bodies generally have trouble functioning in a satisfactory manner because of a lack of resources.

The operations of larger CSOs usually benefit from skilled program and project monitoring-and-evaluation coordinators. CSOs usually hire staff and specialists for one-off or short-term assignments on service-provision contracts. Although this type of labor contract is not referenced in labor legislation, and CSOs that use them could be accused of breaking the law, in practice, the government turns a blind eye to them. Many schools offer project management training, and young people participating in these programs often go on to internships at CSOs.
CSOs make full use of digital technology, although their meager resources mean that internet services are often unaffordable. CSO staff typically have smartphones, which they pay for themselves and use for their work. The smartphones have helped improve the quality of CSOs’ operations in recent years.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.9**

CSOs’ financial viability was stable in 2019. CSOs’ financial resources vary in terms of their origin, amount, purpose, and conditions for their use. In general, funding is for short-term projects, and almost no project lasts more than three years.

The major international donors in Senegal include USAID, European Union (EU), and the French government. Several other bilateral donors operate smaller funding programs targeting a single sector or location. No data are available about exact levels of funding in 2019. A great deal of donor funding continued to go to projects in the health-care and education sectors. In 2019, the EU announced a EUR 4 million (approximately $4.5 million) support program for civil society to foster constructive dialogue between CSOs, the government, private sector, and Senegal’s development partners. Otherwise, foreign donors offer little direct support to local CSOs, which must typically compete for funding under the auspices of international CSOs. Since they serve in a supporting role to highly visible lead organizations, Senegalese CSOs lack opportunities to improve their organizational capacities and increase their visibility with potential donors and the public. The intense competition for donor funding and donors’ requirements for the management and use of funds can cause CSOs to alter their operations or missions or reduce the volume of services that they provide.

It is difficult for CSOs to access government support. Some organizations sign service contracts with the government for projects in governance, education, clean water and sanitation, or health care. The Ministry of Finance sometimes provides CSOs with short-term funding to support the implementation of approved projects, using resources from donors such as the EU.

Dues at membership organizations remain modest, irregular, and difficult to collect. Some CSOs no longer require their members to pay dues. At some organizations, wealthier members donate significant amounts of funding to help cover the costs of important, time-limited activities. Some local CSOs conduct fundraising events to raise money for social actions, and their members often contribute free labor. In 2019, the United Nations (UN) Children’s Fund planned to support a local fundraising campaign, but it was delayed.

Corporate social responsibility is developing slowly in Senegal, as some corporations have committed to responsibly managing the social, environmental, and economic effects of their businesses in line with public expectations. Corporations are expected to reinvest a portion of their profits in social and environmental programs, but they rarely do, although they sometimes support social and humanitarian actions or offer sponsorships on a one-off basis.

The executive teams at larger CSOs usually include skilled financial and accounting managers. A lack of funding makes it difficult for other CSOs to hire skilled financial professionals.
CSO advocacy improved slightly in 2019 as women's organizations made significant progress in mobilizing support for a law criminalizing rape and pedophilia, and CSOs served as impartial brokers in discussions about elections between the ruling majority and opposition parties.

CSOs regularly cooperate with the central government on public policies and programs such as the government’s Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development, which is keyed to the UN's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). CSOs participate in the government’s Economic, Social, and Environmental Council and contribute to the work of monitoring bodies, such as the National Anti-Corruption and Fraud Office and Public Contracts Regulation Agency. The central government and CSOs meet regularly in dialogues, strategic planning projects, international meetings, and other programs addressing issues such as access to water and sanitation, women, reproductive health, and education. CSOs often write position papers to support their efforts to influence public policy. For example, in 2019, the CONGAD Working Group on SDG Monitoring, CSO Platform for Monitoring the SDGs (Plateforme des organisations de la société civile pour le suivi des ODD, POSCO Agenda 2030), and National Group of Education and Training Partners (Groupe national des partenaires de l’éducation et de la formation, GNPEF) submitted a position paper during the annual review of the educational program and contributed to Senegal’s annual report on implementing the SDGs.

Civil society groups played a key role in launching and mediating a dialogue between the ruling majority and opposition organizations on election issues in 2019. The Fed Up movement, Platform of Civil Society Actors for Election Transparency (Plateforme des acteurs de la société civile pour la transparence des élections, PACTE), and Sunu Election Program (Programme Sunu élection), which was created by the CSO Collective for Elections (Collectif des OSC pour les élections, COSCE) and the Platform of Senegalese Non-State Actors (Plateforme des acteurs non étatiques du Sénégal, PFAnE), contributed to the election process by registering voters, collecting biometric cards, and observing polling.

Women’s organizations made significant progress in advocacy in 2019. With the support of UN Women, a number of organizations and women members of parliament formed a network known as Synergy of CSOs for the Elimination of Gender-Based Violence (Synergie des organisations de la société civile pour l’élimination des VBG, SYSC). The network mobilized support for a law criminalizing rape with activities such as hearings with high-level government officials and development partners, celebration of International Women’s Day on March 8, and the Deliver for Good campaign, which advocated for gender quality. Other women’s CSOs formed networks and specialized commissions that prepared and implemented advocacy action plans on issues such as infanticide. These efforts resulted in the adoption in 2020 of a law that classifies rape and pedophilia as crimes. Women’s CSOs also kept up their efforts to advocate for significant representation in decision-making bodies.

Following a workshop on the impact of Decree No. 2015-145 in 2018, the Ministry of Interior invited a few influential CSOs to begin work on revising the law in 2019. Regular meetings were held to review all articles of the law and gather proposals for items needing revision. CSOs participating in this initiative, including CONGAD and the Association of International NGOs (Association des ONG internationales au Sénégal, ONGIS), stated that they reached agreement on the most important items, such as the frequency of submission of reports by NGOs. CSOs expect that the proposed revisions, if adopted, will strengthen civil society’s role in development and improve its ability to hold the government to account. National-level CSOs such as CONGAD member organizations brought together stakeholders from Senegal’s fourteen regions and the diaspora for the National Civil Society Meeting in February 2019. At the meeting, participants discussed strategies to strengthen CSOs’ role in the development process.
SERVICE PROVISION: 3.7

Service provision did not change in 2019. CSOs continued to offer services in many areas. For example, in the educational sector, CSOs worked on a broad range of issues, including the exclusion of some children from the educational system, girls’ education, non-traditional educational models, and literacy and professional training for young people and adults. CSOs were particularly involved in youth employability in 2019. The international organization Education Development Center (ECD) continued to cooperate with the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Employment, Vocational Training, and Crafts on a program to imbed youth employability programs in the educational system. Caritas, the Young Men’s Christian Association, Youth and Development (Jeunesse et développement, JED), and Entrepreneurs of the World (Entrepreneurs du monde, EDM) subcontracted with EDC to conduct participatory community studies, establish entrepreneurship clubs, and provide on-the-job training and other services to beneficiaries.

CSOs collaborate closely with local communities to identify and respond to their needs. Depending on their resources, CSOs work in collaboration with public institutions such as municipal governments. For example, to better align its services with public needs, ENDA Graf Sahel developed locally adapted strategies in its community health program. Communities were fully involved in planning, implementing, financing, and monitoring health-care activities to ensure that they respond to primary challenges, such as lack of equity in health-care services, insufficient access to information, and sub-standard facilities. ENDA Graf Sahel established an ophthalmological center and a center to advise youth on sexually transmitted diseases and HIV. In collaboration with municipalities and associations of women restaurant owners and in partnership with Frères des Hommes Luxembourg, ENDA Graf Sahel also developed a program to build the professional skills of women food-service workers in the Dakar and Thiès regions through training and improved value chains.

Senegalese CSOs usually regard market analyses as prerequisites for their fieldwork. They increasingly engage in planning, which requires a thorough knowledge of their work environments and targeted stakeholders.

To the extent possible, membership associations provide goods and services to people other than their own members. CSOs generally provide goods and services without regard to race, gender, ethnic group, sexual orientation, or other factors. Earning money through service provision remains a major challenge for Senegalese CSOs. Some organizations recover costs by billing for services. For example, the Public Learning Center (Centre d’apprentissage populaire, CAP) run by Literacy for Sustainable Development (Alphabétiser pour un développement durable, ALPHADEV) provides professional training to youth from disadvantaged backgrounds. HandicapForm-Educ (HFE) trains handicapped persons in professions related to information and communication technology. However, the funds that these and other organizations collect by billing for services are minimal, since CSOs’ work largely targets disadvantaged populations. Revenues that CSOs generate from services are used almost exclusively to support their services and pay their operating expenses.

In response to CSOs’ demands, the government recognizes that good governance is essential to strengthening transparency and accountability in key social sectors, including health care, education, and water. The government also acknowledges CSOs’ contribution to the provision and oversight of basic services. For example, in its 2019 evaluation of the work of Helen Keller International in Dakar, Thies, and Tambacounda, the Ministry of Interior noted significant results from the organization’s activities, including beneficial social change and improved quality, coverage, and use of services to treat acute malnutrition.
SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.4

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector improved slightly in 2019, as CSOs increasingly cooperated with each other and with partners from other sectors.

Several resource centers foster discussion among CSOs and help them develop relationships with each other and development partners. For example, the Migration and Development Network (Réseau migration et développement, REMIDEV) operates resource centers to build its members’ capacities in migration issues. Intermediary support organizations (ISOs), including CONGAD, African Assembly for the Defense of Human Rights (Rencontre africaine pour la défense des droits de l’homme, RADDHO), and National Council for Concertation and Rural Cooperation (Conseil national de concertation et de coopération des ruraux, CNCR) offer their members training and capacity building on project management, civic monitoring, policy dialogue, advocacy, and other topics. CONGAD also helps associations complete the procedures for registering as NGOs and preparing investment programs. These services do not generate revenue.

CSOs participated in a significant number of new joint activities in 2019. For example, under the aegis of CONGAD and with the support of the international organization Sightsavers, a number of Senegalese NGOs and organizations representing groups such as handicapped persons, youth, women, and rural growers created a working group to strengthen citizen participation in public policy formulation and monitoring. The group’s aim is to contribute to Senegal’s achievement of the SDGs by encouraging public dialogue with decision makers. Other CSO platforms, including PFAnE, ONGIS, and the Platform of European NGOs in Senegal (Plateforme des ONG européennes au Sénégal, PFONGUE), continued to defend members’ interests and sponsor publications, discussions, seminars, and workshops in 2019. With a membership of 178 Senegalese and foreign organizations and nine thematic networks, CONGAD is the only coalition that promotes the CSO sector’s interests as a whole and represents civil society on the central government’s Inter-Ministerial Consultation Commission.

The training sector is highly developed and covers almost all areas, including strategic management, accounting, and financial management. Many trainers skilled in CSO management work as consultants in cooperation with public- and private-sectors academics, researchers, and other professionals. Trainers are often members of CSOs or CSO networks. Many training schools offer training on organizational management in Dakar and other cities. Provided that funding is available, CSO training needs are generally met, either through courses at training institutions or one-off sessions. CSOs increasingly translate training manuals and study reports into the most widely spoken national languages.

CSOs are developing collaborative relationships with other sectors. For example, in 2019, the Thiès Forest Center and Tostan Center collaborated with government departments on training, discussions, and other events in the agricultural, health-care, educational, and other sectors. Action and Development (Action et développement, AcDev) and the Kaidara Center, an educational farm, spearheaded the Health University, a discussion framework. CSOs have few significant interactions with businesses other than through PFAnE, which was created as part of the Cotonou Agreements to promote, in part, dialogue about CSOs’ role in national public life.
The public image of CSOs was unchanged in 2019. The media regularly publish interviews with CSO representatives alongside articles about their activities. For example, CSOs’ activities related to SDGs in 2019 were covered by the main media outlets, including daily newspapers, radio and television stations, news websites, and social networks. CSOs invite journalists to their major events and usually reimburse them for transportation costs but not for their services.

The public has a generally positive opinion of CSOs, especially those working on education, health care, and the environment. Beneficiaries usually praise CSOs’ efforts to improve living conditions and address the social and economic needs of vulnerable groups. The public also appreciates CSOs’ work to defend human rights. No negative assessments of CSOs’ work were known to be expressed by the public in 2019.

The central government demonstrates respect for service-providing CSOs, since they strengthen its performance in so many areas. Civil society actors involved in governance issues are sometimes subject to accusations by anonymous politicians intending to discredit them. In 2019, CSOs involved in the election process, such as COSCE, were subject to this kind of attack.

Companies generally have positive perceptions of CSOs. Businesses are most familiar with community associations and see them as partners for one-time support or sponsorships in areas such as education, health care, sports, arts, and culture.

CSOs are evolving a public-relations style that manages to keep their image intact in the face of political attacks. For example, during the election period, when the ruling majority generally opposed the type of analysis and advocacy that are at the heart of CSOs’ missions, CSOs stuck to their purpose without allowing themselves to be distracted. As a result, relationships between CSOs and the government remained relatively relaxed.

Discussions continued in 2019 to improve ethical standards among CSOs. During the National Civil Society Meeting, CSOs endorsed a proposal to draft a common code for the CSO sector, based on CONGAD’s code of ethics for its members. However, the new code was not drafted in 2019. CSOs regularly produce and distribute annual reports in line with internal statutory provisions, legal requirements, and formal requirements of donors.
Politics and the economy dominated public discourse in Sierra Leone in 2019. Political tensions arising from the 2018 presidential election, which transferred power from the All Peoples Congress (APC) to the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP), continued to disrupt public life. In the increasingly polarized environment, civil servants were sacked or sent on endless leave and replaced with supporters of the new ruling party. The opposition APC party suffered from internal rifts over leadership succession, and there were numerous instances of parliamentary walkouts, protests, and low-level violence. At the core of the tension was the work of the Commission of Inquiry (COI) established to investigate corruption in the APC government from 2007 until 2018, whose establishment was recommended in the transition report produced after the change in governments. Although a number of prominent lawyers questioned the legal ramifications of the COI, it began operations in 2019.

Severe violence erupted on May 31 when the court found ten APC members of parliament guilty of breaching the electoral law and inciting violence in the 2018 elections. The court revoked their seats and replaced them with SLPP candidates. The decision caused the APC to lose its majority in the House of Representatives, sparking protests by APC supporters. During the protests, the Sierra Leone police fired teargas into the APC offices and arrested a number of people. Several APC executive members went into hiding after the SLPP put bounties on their heads. In August, the National Electoral Commission conducted parliamentary by-elections in Constituency 110, a voting area affected by the court’s revocation of APC seats. Despite an intense police presence during the voting, violence broke out in some polling centers, and the home of an SLPP candidate was reportedly attacked. Many people were arrested, some of whom remained in prison at the end of the year.

The economy went into a downward spiral in 2019 as the leone depreciated against the U.S. dollar. The 2019 budget eliminated fuel subsidies, which significantly increased the price of basic commodities. The suspension of mining company licenses, high inflation, and a heavy tax burden led to the closure of a number of businesses, increasing the economic strain on many people, especially the rural poor. CSOs’ operations were financially stretched.

Overall CSO sustainability was fairly stable in 2019. The legal environment weakened moderately with the government’s introduction of the Development Cooperation Framework (DCF), which replaces the NGO Policy and imposes even stiffer restrictions on CSOs. CSOs’ financial viability regressed slightly as donor funding was rechanneled from CSOs to government activities. Advocacy, traditionally the strongest dimension of CSO sustainability in Sierra Leone, improved slightly as organizations engaged in many effective advocacy efforts, especially people-centered, evidence-based initiatives. CSOs’ organizational capacity, service provision, sectoral infrastructure, and public image did not change.
In 2018, the last year for which data is available, the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development (MOPED) reported 274 registered domestic and international CSOs, and the Sierra Leone Association of Non-Governmental Organization (SLANGO) reported 292 registered domestic and international NGOs. The Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) lists all registered entities as companies limited by guarantee and does not disaggregate data on CSOs. The Ministry of Social Welfare, other ministries, and local councils also register CSOs but do not release data on their numbers. Many unregistered CSOs operate at the community level. The bulk of CSOs in Sierra Leone engage in advocacy, although in 2019, CSOs expanded their scope to include other sectors, such as agriculture and telecommunications.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT:  5.7

The legal environment for CSOs in Sierra Leone continued to deteriorate in 2019 with the introduction of restrictive new regulations under the DCF, an upgraded form of the NGO Policy approved in 2017, which applies to all CSOs. The DCF was partially introduced in 2019 and is expected to be fully implemented in 2020. CSOs may register with a variety of government bodies in Sierra Leone. Because of the simplicity of its registration process, most CSOs register with the CAC. Only registration with the CAC provides legal status that allows organizations to sue and be sued. This became an issue in 2019 when several organizations that were not registered with the CAC wanted to sue the government in the court of the Economic Community of West African States on behalf of Ebola victims. They could not pursue this because they did not have appropriate legal status in Sierra Leone.

Some CSOs choose to register with the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development (MOPED), a successor ministry to MOFED formed in 2018, although its registration process is more cumbersome. Organizations registered with MOPED must obtain NGO status to qualify for tax waivers. To gain NGO status, organizations additionally register with SLANGO, the umbrella organization responsible for overseeing the activities of local and international CSOs. SLANGO levies huge registration fees on its members. All CSOs must also register with other bodies, including line ministries and local councils. CSOs with a wide geographic reach, such as the Campaign for Good Governance (CGG), ActionAid Sierra Leone, and Fambul Tok, must register in every district in which they will operate. CSOs operating at the local level need only register with local councils in their areas, while organizations working across districts must register with each district as well as local councils. Under the NGO Policy as well as the DCF, CSOs must re-register annually to continue operations.

CSOs complain that this approach to registration is overly complicated and urge the government to create a simple, centralized registration system. The CAC is trying to unify the laws for registration but has struggled with the task, since every government agency has a different mandate and statutory instrument. CSOs and community-based organizations (CBOs) may operate freely without registration but must register to gain legal status and interact formally with other entities.

With the government’s introduction of the DCF, stiffer restrictions were imposed on CSOs than those in place under the NGO Policy, which were already considered draconian. The DCF is broadly divided into two main parts. Articles 1 to 4 address issues related mainly to relationships between the government and international development partners (or donors), while Article 5 deals with the regulation of national and international organizations. New provisions in the DCF include the requirement that CSOs’ programs mirror government priorities. All assistance to CSOs, including from foreign donors, must also be aligned with national priorities, which impedes funding for advocacy, human rights, and good governance. Organizations must sign mandatory service-level agreements with their line ministries and share information about their activities and budgets with the government, including details of sources and amounts of funding, bank accounts, and installment arrangements.
Under the DCF, CSOs are subject to site visits by officials from the line ministries without prior notice. Membership in SLANGO is mandatory for all NGOs.

The introduction of the DCF caused worry among CSOs in 2019, especially after the government announced that the policy would be fully implemented in 2020. CSOs see the DCF as threatening to restrict civil society by allowing the government to micromanage their work and forcing them to serve merely as implementing agents for government ministries. Moreover, under the DCF, CSOs and development partners are regulated together as one group, which CSOs believe is unfair, since their missions, degree of independence, financial capabilities, and interests differ markedly. Finally, the DCF and CAC policy conflict about requirements for CSOs’ operations, such as those regarding registration and registration renewals. Domestic and international CSOs issued a joint communiqué highlighting their concerns about the DCF in February 2019. The United Nations (UN) special rapporteurs on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association and on the situation of human right defenders sent a joint letter to the government emphasizing the immense contribution of CSOs in Sierra Leone and, in a meeting with the government in February, stated that the DCF violated key international human rights standards. At the end of the year, the government and CSOs were at an impasse over the DCF. Several organizations changed their registration status to comply with DCF requirements while advocating for the policy’s reversal.

State harassment of CSOs was common in 2019. For example, the Malen Land Owners Association (MALOA) in Malen Chiefdom faced trial for confronting the Socfin Agricultural Company about rights violations and environmental hazards. The case was not heard in the district in which alleged incidents happened but was transferred miles away to Freetown, the capital, which made it difficult for Malen residents to follow the trials and visit their family members in custody. Two people associated with MALOA were killed during this period, but no one had been charged with the killings by the end of the year. The head of Green Scenery, a locally registered and international recognized CSO, was also in court in 2019 on charges of defamation after accusing Socfin of contributing to the destruction of land and livelihoods in Malen. The government also denied him entry into the chiefdom.

Government ministers and the SLPP criticized CSO leaders in both traditional and social media for challenging government actions. For example, the head of the CGG was attacked by SLPP supporters, including the deputy minister of internal affairs, who made a negative post on social media about her promotion of good governance and respect for the rule of law. The head of Native Consortium and Research Center was arrested and detained for organizing a peaceful protest against the removal of fuel subsidies. When Njala University students staged a protest after their lecturers went on strike because of nonpayment of salaries, some students were beaten by security personnel. State-orchestrated harassment was also directed against elected market women leaders across the country, whom the government wanted to replace with SLPP party stalwarts. The leader of the Lumley market was arbitrarily removed from her position by the minister of trade after she stood up against intimidation and was arrested for violating government policy. She later died, allegedly of depression. Other trade unions, including the Drivers Union and Bike Riders Association, were also targeted—according to some observers, because they had allowed party politics to infiltrate their administration. The government often grants clearances for demonstrations to CSOs that work in its favor, but rejects clearance for organizations that criticize its policies or actions.

CSOs in Sierra Leone do not receive tax exemptions. Organizations registered as NGOs may apply to receive tax waivers on import duties and items such as humanitarian relief supplies and equipment for hospitals and persons with disabilities, which are awarded at the discretion of government agencies. The process of applying for waivers is cumbersome and subject to abuse by government officials. Although the waivers are often granted, CSOs that are critical of the government do not usually receive them. Organizations registered with the CAC are not entitled to waivers.

CSOs may compete for government contracts but seldom do so, since they rarely obtain them. CSOs also shy away from government contracts for fear of compromising their efforts to hold the government to account. CSOs are allowed to fundraise locally, but few do so. CSOs may receive funds from foreign donors.

CSOs have access to legal services from distinguished human rights lawyers and organizations, including AdvocAid, Center for Accountability and Rule of Law (CARL), LAWYERS, Society for Democratic Initiatives (SDI), Center for Human Right and Development International, Legal Link, and Namati. The heads of these organizations are mostly legal practitioners who provide services to CSOs and individuals on a pro bono basis in Freetown and major provincial cities.
CSOs’ organizational capacity remained unchanged in 2019. The biggest strength of Sierra Leonean CSOs is their ability to build constituencies. In 2019, Focus 1000 formed a platform of market women and religious leaders to advocate for rights-based interventions in communities in Karene, Port Loko, Bombali, and Tonkolili districts. National Election Watch (NEW) operated a network of more than 400 organizations countrywide and its members observed by-elections in Falaba, Kambia, Koinadugu, Port Loko, and Kenema districts and elsewhere. As their effort had little donor support at the time, NEW’s members mobilized the network using their own resources. The Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene Network of Sierra Leone (WASH-Net Sierra Leone) has partners in all districts to construct water and sanitation facilities in schools and hospitals. The People Power Movement came together in 2019 to provide training in advocacy and accountability, especially concerning service provision, so that communities can speak for themselves and hold duty bearers accountable at all levels.

Many CSOs in the capital and larger cities have defined missions and goals. Outstanding in this regard are the Human Rights Defenders Network, Center for Democracy and Human Rights (CDHR), Center for the Coordination of Youth Activities (CCYA), and Social Enterprise Development. Smaller organizations tend to lack mission statements and plans. Many organizations, even those having these instruments, are often forced to shift their focus in response to funding challenges. Some CSOs have changed into network-like structures of multiple organizations to qualify for funding for various projects. For instance, the head of a CSO with a human rights focus might form another organization focused on health and then years later form another organization that advocates for roads. As a result of the search for funding, CSOs must often compromise their positions or remain quiet on issues of national interest.

The leadership of many CSOs revolves around one person. Although boards are a legal requirement, many CSO boards do not function. At organizations that have managed to set up boards, board members are usually handpicked by the founders. Board governance can be poor, especially since boards rarely meet or fail to operate according to codes of conduct or procedural guidelines. Board members sometimes do not know the goals and activities of their organizations or have the expertise needed to serve on boards. Focus 1000, CGG, and ActionAid Sierra Leone are among the few organizations whose board members have term limits, meet regularly, and support their organizations’ operations. The West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) nominates board members based on their expertise, and WANEP’s board members contribute to the development of funding proposals.

Human resources are inadequate at many organizations. Professional expertise is usually lacking, and most CSOs cannot pay for the services of quality professional and technical staff. Volunteering is common in Sierra Leone. In 2019, for example, Focus 1000 depended on market women to raise awareness of health issues in their communities, and NEW trained unpaid volunteers to observe the by-elections. But the notion of volunteerism has changed in Sierra Leone. CSOs increasingly rely on unpaid interns and trainees, usually recent university or college graduates, and take time to help them understand their work. In some cases, these trainees will demand huge amounts for tasks performed during training, thereby forcing CSOs to pay for expertise that they themselves have cultivated.

Since funding is almost exclusively short term and activity based, CSOs receive little support to build their internal capacity, which would help ensure their longer-term sustainability. Funding partners offer minimal support for administrative costs, and if they provide funding for tangible assets such as vehicles, they often retrieve them at the end of funded projects. CSOs’ access to technology improved in 2019. Internet services remained costly, but many CSO staff avoided this problem by using internet hotspots on their phones and even sharing hotspots with their
colleagues to provide internet access in their offices. CSOs are generally effective at using social media and other platforms, including Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, and Zoom.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.7**

CSOs’ financial viability regressed slightly in 2019. After increasing their funding to CSOs in 2018, an election year, donors shifted to funding government initiatives directly in 2019, driven in part by the new government’s development plan. As a result, funding that had been available to strengthen civil society advocacy was diverted to government programs in agriculture, youth employment, education, and other areas. Foreign donors such as USAID, UK AID, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and European Union (EU) continued to fund initiatives related to development, accountability, service delivery, and governance. But donor funding to Sierra Leone declined considerably in 2019. For instance, EU funding dropped from $208.6 million in 2018 to $65.4 million in 2019, and foreign donors continued to route a considerable portion of funding through international organizations such as Save the Children, the Catholic Agency For Overseas Development (CAFOD), Oxfam, Christian Aid, and Trócaire, with local CSOs serving as implementing partners. This arrangement impedes the growth and capacity of local CSOs, since they lack the authority to implement activities independently and are unable to respond to emerging situations effectively. In 2019, it became more common for CSOs to form consortia and bid for funding jointly, since donors preferred this type of arrangement. These consortia were often successful in their bids.

The government does not usually provide grants or contracts to CSOs. CSOs generally prefer not to compete for government contracts, since they fear that accepting government funding will undermine their credibility and integrity. Some funding from foreign donors such as the EU and World Bank passes through government agencies to CSOs.

CSOs do not usually raise funds from local sources. A few organizations, including the Sick Pickin (Kids) project and Breast Cancer Foundation, rely on crowdfunding, marathons, and street donations to support their causes. Humanitarian organizations seem to be most successful at fundraising, probably because they have needed capacity and their missions appeal to donors’ emotions.

A few organizations, such as CDHR and MADAM in Makeni, the 50-50 Group in Freetown, and the nationwide Sierra Leone Teachers Union (SLTU), earn income by renting out facilities that they own. FORWARD Sierra Leone, KAADRO, and several other CSOs sell agricultural products to keep their organizations afloat. But the income from these efforts is minimal, since the organizations lack funds to invest in such ventures. Membership organizations and trade unions, such as the Market Women’s Association, Motor Drivers Union, and SLTU, raise funds from members’ subscriptions and dues, which are used mainly to ensure members’ welfare. WANEP collects yearly subscriptions from member organizations.

As in previous years, CSOs grappled with financial management in 2019. CSOs usually adhere to basic standards of financial management, such as keeping records of financial transactions and submitting financial reports to donors. Since they survive on a project-to-project basis, most organizations do not have the resources to build or sustain sound financial systems, hire professional staff, or engage certified audit firms, although specific projects may undergo professional audits. The few organizations that have professional finance staff and systems and undergo annual audits usually receive funding for these purposes from donors, which demand up-to-date audits as a prerequisite for continued support. But donors do not generally cover the full cost of audits, which stifles the growth of CSOs.
ADVOCACY: 3.7

CSO advocacy improved slightly in 2019 as CSOs engaged in a number of effective advocacy efforts, including people-centered, evidence-based initiatives.

CSOs and government work together mainly in task forces and steering committees overseeing policy reviews. These platforms offer opportunities for CSOs to influence policies and achieve desired reforms quickly. For example, in 2019, organizations such as CGG supported the Ministry of Local Government in its review of the Decentralization Policy 2010. CGG and NEW took part in the development of the National Registration Authority’s strategic plan for 2019–23, and CSOs also served on the Security Sector Reform Committee. Some CSOs have been caught up in the divide between the government and the opposition, and the government sees them as opposing it when they raise issues of government excess. For example, the government called CGG and the Campaign for Human Rights and Development International (CHDRI) unpatriotic after they condemned government appointments, which were straining the already stretched salaries bill.

Most Sierra Leonese CSOs engage in advocacy, and they took on a variety of issues in 2019. LAWYERS and other organizations urged the president to declare rape a public state of emergency in 2019, and the 2012 Sexual Offenses Act was swiftly reviewed. Space opened for women-led and women’s rights organizations to denounce sexual violence and call for the protection of women and girls. While WANEP and other organizations were unsuccessful in their efforts to get the government to include CSOs in the National Peace and Cohesion Conference in May, they succeeded in ensuring that the government include other political parties in planning the conference. Native Consortium and other think tanks intensified their work on telecommunications and economic issues, including a push to reduce the price of fuel and other essential commodities. CSOs recognize that they need to expand their focus to include service delivery related to trade, science, and technology, but they lack expertise in these areas.

Many CSOs changed their approach from representative advocacy to people-centered advocacy in 2019. In other words, they shifted from engaging in traditional advocacy on behalf of citizens and communities to training community leaders to advocate for themselves and channel their concerns directly to government officials. For example, ActionAid Sierra Leone and its partners trained communities in Bombali, Kono, Bo, Western Area Rural, and Western Area Urban districts on advocacy and service delivery, so that they could engage directly with local councils and other local authorities to demand and monitor service delivery. Budget Advocacy Network (BAN) and its partners trained local community members to take part in budgeting by local councils and monitor the implementation of approved spending plans.

CSOs in Sierra Leone also emphasized evidence-based advocacy in 2019. They conducted research, opinion polls, and perception surveys to sample the public’s views and engage communities actively in essential issues, such as health, education, telecommunications, and the economy. The Institute for Governance Reform (IGR), CGG, CARL, SDI, BAN, National Coalition on Extractives (NACE), and Native Consortium are among the organizations that produced evidence to back up their advocacy on national issues in 2019.

CSOs’ lobbying efforts had some positive results in 2019. For example, the Sierra Leone Association of Journalists (SLAJ) worked with the Ministry of Information to expunge Part 5 of the Public Order Act, which criminalizes libel. During the year, CSOs sought to have the decision to implement the DCF reversed. Their efforts to protect civic space led to repeated verbal clashes with the government. For example, CSOs accused the government of wanting to silence criticism, and the government accused CSOs of supporting the opposition or not wanting to be accountable for the funds that they receive. Some CSOs alleged that their annual registration renewals were delayed because of their outspoken positions on the DCF. Local and international CSOs issued a joint communiqué highlighting their concerns about the DCF in February, and organizations such as the Human Rights Defenders Network urged the government to conduct a review of the DCF. At the end of the year, the
government and CSOs were still at an impasse over the issue. But because of widespread resistance to the DCF,

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.9**

CSO service provision was stable in 2019. CSOs provide a variety of much-needed services. Although fewer CSOs engage in service provision than in advocacy, a growing number of organizations are stepping up to deliver services. For example, WASH-Net Sierra Leone provides water and sanitation services to local schools and hospitals, while Focus 1000 offers health-care support to communities across the country.

CSOs are responsive to their communities in various ways. CSOs consult directly with their communities to design projects that respond to community needs and aspirations, and they conduct research in communities in which they intend to implement projects to determine the needed areas of intervention. CGG continued to work on the UNDP-funded Peace and National Cohesion project in 2019 after communities requested its extension following highly divisive national elections in the previous year. Christian Aid and its local partners introduced a public financial management project in 2019, which allows them to monitor the flow of resources and service delivery in the districts in which they operate. CSOs also provided many training services in 2019. For example, BAN trained local communities and CBOs on budgeting and public financial management. With funding from the EU, ActionAid Sierra Leone, CGG, and the Center for Coordination of Youth Activities joined together in the Building an Active Civil Society for Gender-Responsive Public-Service Delivery consortium to train communities on advocacy, fundraising, and gender-responsive service delivery.

Several organizations provided legal services to people in conflict with the law in 2019. Namati and SDI continued to provide pro bono representation, especially concerning land rights and community ownership, and LAWYERS provided counsel to women and girls affected by sexual and gender-based violence. AdvocAid provided pro bono services to women behind bars. CHDRI and Individuals and Human Rights Advocates also provided pro bono legal representation to persons in need.

CSOs mostly work pro bono, especially in rural communities, and do not seek to recover the costs of the services they provide.

The government acknowledges the capacity of CSOs to monitor its activities and recognizes that it benefits from CSOs’ expertise. However, the government fears criticism from independent CSOs and, as a result, chooses to work with CSOs that it knows will support its work.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.2**

The infrastructure supporting Sierra Leone’s CSO sector was stable in 2019.

The last remaining CSO resource centers in Sierra Leone, including those hosted by the Lawyers Center for Legal Assistance and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa as well as some at the district level, closed because of a lack of funding in 2019, leaving no designated centers to serve CSOs’ needs. The only resource materials available to CSOs are books and pamphlets on the shelves of CSOs’ offices across the country.

There are still no local grant-making organizations in Sierra Leone. International CSOs such as Christian Aid, Oxfam, Care, and Trócaire continue to serve as intermediaries for DFID, EU, Irish Aid, and other funders. However, in 2019 their funding dwindled as donors turned their attention to funding government programs.
Networking continues to be among the biggest strengths of CSOs in Sierra Leone, and many consortia and networks operate throughout the country. In 2019, CSOs continued to use these relationships to access information and training and expand their reach, especially in rural communities. For example, Scaling Up Nutrition, a strong network focused on nutritional health for babies and breastfeeding mothers, and Sierra Leone Unite, which has an extensive online platform, provided capacity strengthening so that their members could conduct trainings to teach mothers about healthy breastfeeding. Their online platforms also helped members keep communities updated about nutritional supplies.

CSOs benefited from an assortment of training opportunities in 2019. The African Consulting Group in Freetown, a for-profit company that offers free services to CSOs, hosted capacity-building sessions on advocacy, fund raising, financial management, and other topics. BAN and its partners conducted training on public financial management and monitoring, especially at the local level. CSOs also benefitted from training on cyber-security and terrorist financing conducted by the Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa.

CSOs worked closely with other sectors in 2019. CSOs and the media cooperated effectively to hold duty bearers accountable on issues of national concern, especially governance, service delivery, and accountability. For example, CSOs such as CGG and media such as African Young Voices Television and Radio Democracy worked together to set an agenda for public discourse on governance and development. CSOs also partnered with government agencies. SDI and CARL worked with the National Civil Registration Authority and Ministry of Internal Affairs to develop a strategic plan and reform the civil registration and vital statistics. CGG collaborated with the Ministry of Local Government and the Decentralization Secretariat on local governance reform by reviewing the Decentralization Policy 2010. No cooperation between CSOs and businesses is known to have taken place in 2019.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.2

The public image of CSOs was stable in 2019. The media still generally value the contributions of CSOs and their insights on national policies. Journalists rely on CSO representatives to help educate the public and respect some CSO leaders for their independent policy analyses. At the same time, some journalists are alleged to be secretly paid by politicians to serve as their mouthpieces, and they often prefer to cite government-supported CSOs that speak in favor of government actions. Thus the media sometimes misinform the public and undermine the role of independent CSOs.

The public generally looks up to CSOs as trusted and unbiased partners in the country’s development. In 2019, some members of the public criticized once vibrant CSOs for being too quiet in the face of government excesses. The picture of CSOs painted by party zealots on media outlets led to more negative public perceptions. In addition, the CSO sector was infiltrated by organizations that act either as government mouthpieces or operatives of opposition parties. Their messages confuse members of the public who depend on CSOs to fight on their behalf and hold the government accountable.
The government generally views CSOs as a sort of opposition and does not appreciate their efforts to expose wrongdoing and check excesses. Members of the ruling party appreciate CSOs’ analyses only if they resonate with party positions. Otherwise, they paint CSOs as activists seeking to sabotage the government. Business views of CSOs are mixed, but the private sector tends to acknowledge the value of CSOs working on issues that help them. Businesses are more critical of CSOs engaged on other issues, such as workers’ welfare, price increases, and social security.

CSOs increasingly use social media to discuss critical issues, develop campaigns, and raise awareness of issues of public interest. Prominent CSOs have Facebook and Twitter accounts, which they use to promote their work. CSOs that publish reports, newsletters, and briefs usually disseminate them via email and rarely share hard copies. Many CSOs with functional websites no longer update them, making information from and about these organizations difficult to obtain.

Effective self-regulation among CSOs is limited. A few organizations and coalitions, such as NEW and the National Civil Society Forum, have codes of conduct that more than 500 members have signed. The government has adopted a corporate governance code that the CAC has proposed applying to CSOs as well. The majority of CSOs in Sierra Leone do not develop or publish annual reports.
South Africa celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary of its transition to democracy in 2019. Despite the “new dawn” introduced with the inauguration of President Cyril Ramaphosa in 2018, the country continued to be hungry for change in 2019. Elections in May for the National Assembly and provincial legislatures produced the lowest voter turnout since 1994, with only 66 percent of registered voters casting votes and a particularly poor turnout among youth. Although the African National Congress (ANC) again won the majority with 57 percent of the vote, it obtained its lowest share of votes since coming to power in 1994. The official opposition party in the National Assembly, the Democratic Alliance (DA), also received a smaller proportion of votes than in 2014. During his 2019 state of the nation address, President Ramaphosa acknowledged CSOs’ contributions several times, noting the need for civil society to partner with the government and hold the government accountable to achieve common goals.

South Africa remains one of the most unequal countries in the world, with a Gini co-efficient score of 0.63, according to the World Bank. In September 2019, South Africa entered a technical recession as the gross domestic product shrank by 1.4 percent, causing international financial analysts such as Moody’s Investor Services to reduce the country’s investment credit rating outlook from stable to negative. Unemployment among people between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four hit an all-time high of 58.2 percent. With the economy faltering, there were concerns across the CSO sector about the stability of corporate giving and individual contributions.

Economic insecurity contributed to an increase in xenophobic attacks against foreign nationals and their businesses in March and September 2019. In March, the national government launched its National Action Plan to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance, which CSOs helped to draft. The plan commits stakeholders to working together to promote and protect all human rights. In October, nearly 700 refugees and asylum seekers camped for more than a month in front of the building of the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Refugees in Pretoria, requesting resettlement in response to the attacks they had suffered. The Open Society Foundation for South Africa (OSF-SA) hosted a dialogue at which CSOs condemned the attacks and developed strategies to protect the rights of asylum seekers, refugees, and immigrants. In November, the South African rugby team, the Springboks, won its third World Cup since 1995. Responding to frustration with South Africa’s inequalities and declining economy, the team approached the competition using the Twitter hashtag

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1 Thank you to the Centre for Civil Society at the University of Kwazulu-Natal in Durban, South Africa for their review and contributions to the 2019 CSOSI report for South Africa.
#StrongerTogether, and its victory, together with its first black captain, aroused widespread feelings of national unity.

A major national issue in 2019 was the introduction of the National Health Insurance (NHI) Bill in the parliament. The CSO sector was divided in its reaction to the bill. For example, while the South African National Aids Council (SANAC) and the People’s Health Movement of South Africa supported the bill, the health CSOs Section 27 and Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) expressed serious concerns over the bill’s funding and implementation. They expressed concerns about good governance, structural oversight, transparency, stakeholder participation, and funding plans, which were not clearly laid out in the bill. It is estimated that expenditures on the NHI will increase from ZAR 1.2 billion (approximately $81 million) in 2018–19 to approximately ZAR 3 billion ($203 million) in 2021–22. Some of the funds may go to CSOs implementing NHI pilot projects.

The overall sustainability of CSOs in South Africa was unchanged in 2019. The legal environment improved slightly with the government’s release of a draft green paper on the social economy, which addresses the role of social enterprises and seeks to reform CSO funding and reporting mechanisms. Advocacy improved for the second year in a row as CSOs’ work on gender-based violence (GBV) led to changes in government policy. Service provision was stronger as government recognition of and support for CSOs’ services expanded under President Ramaphosa. An array of training and capacity-building opportunities strengthened the sectoral infrastructure. The sector’s public image improved as the media offered positive stories about CSOs, in sharp contrast to the previous two years. At the same time, CSOs’ financial viability deteriorated moderately because of the contracting economy and dwindling international and government funding. Organizational capacity was unchanged.

As of October 2019, nearly 221,000 CSOs were registered with the Nonprofit Organizations (NPO) Directorate in the Department of Social Development (DSD), an increase of almost 21,000 since 2018. On average, about 20,000 to 30,000 new NPOs have registered each year since 2012, resulting in a 43 percent growth in the number of registered CSOs in the last three years alone. However, because some CSOs retain their registrations after they are no longer operational, DSD figures may not accurately indicate the number of active organizations. The 2019 Trialogue Business in Society Handbook reported that in 2019, 83 percent of CSOs were registered as NPOs, 29 percent were registered as nonprofit companies, and 14 percent were registered as nonprofit trusts.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 3.2**

The legal environment for CSOs in South Africa improved in 2019 for the first time in ten years as concrete steps were taken to improve policies affecting CSOs and legal services became more available. The government released a draft green paper on the social economy, which includes recommendations to recognize the role of social enterprises, streamline funding for the CSO sector, and establish mechanisms for systematic reporting. The paper includes a legal and regulatory pillar. It was drafted in a consultative manner, with the International Labor Organization playing a key role in developing the paper by hosting workshops and public consultations to ensure that the CSO sector contributed. If implemented, the recommended reforms will legitimize and better regulate the social economy sector, including all CSOs. The policy was met with positive responses by actors across all sectors. Finalized policy recommendations are expected to be presented to the parliament for approval by the middle of 2020.

South Africa has a stable legal framework that regulates CSOs, and organizations continued to register and operate freely in 2019. Most CSOs register with DSD as voluntary associations under the NPO Act or with the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission as nonprofit companies (NPCs) under the Companies Act. They may register either online or at DSD offices. The relatively easy registration process is free of charge and takes approximately two months to complete. In a somewhat more complex process, CSOs may also register with the
master of the Supreme Court as nonprofit trusts under the Trust Property Control Act. Most faith-based and small, grassroots community-based organizations register as voluntary associations, while larger, better-resourced organizations usually register as NPCs or nonprofit trusts.

DSD prepared amendments to the NPO Act in 2019 to improve the policy and regulatory environment in which CSOs operate. However, DSD was unable to submit the draft bill for consideration during the year, because certification under the Socio Economic Impact Assessment System had not been completed.

CSOs in South Africa enjoy freedom under the law, are allowed to criticize the government, and generally are not subjected to state harassment. In 2019, the judicial system held the government accountable for interference in civil society activities when it found the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) party, a member of the coalition government, guilty of contravening the South African Electoral Code by harassing a journalist. The Social Justice Coalition cited several instances in which police and other law enforcement agencies used excessive force against protesters, including killing two men during a protest over service delivery in April 2019. At the end of the year, the case was still under investigation.

DSD embarked on a nationwide #KnowYourNPOStatus campaign to help improve transparency, good governance, and accountability in the CSO sector in 2019. The campaign included training for DSD officials across the country so that they could help CSOs comply with regulations. The campaign was implemented in cooperation with a number of government and civil society stakeholders, including the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPS), National Lotteries Commission, and the Southern African NGO Network (SANGONeT).

As of March 2020, 24,123 public benefit organizations (PBOs) were listed on the website of the South African Revenue Service (SARS), an increase of 1,721 organizations since February 2019. CSOs registered as PBOs receive preferential tax treatment. Under Section 18A of the Income Tax Act of 1962, PBOs may accept tax-deductible donations if they are used for specified public benefit activities. Individuals making donations to PBOs may apply for tax deductions on a percentage of their donations. CSOs may also register with SARS for exemptions from value-added tax (VAT) on their goods and services, although many CSOs report that they struggle to get VAT refunds from SARS.

CSOs are allowed to engage in income-generating activities provided the activities relate to their main objectives, aim at cost recovery, and do not involve competitive practices that are unfair to taxable entities. Some CSOs fear that these strict limitations on income generation will lead to financial penalties or even deregistration and therefore avoid engaging in such activities. CSOs can engage in fundraising activities as long as the funds are used to realize their primary aims.

Legal services for CSOs expanded slightly in 2019. The Legal Resources Center (LRC) helps CSOs comply with legal and administrative requirements and promotes good governance and accountability across the sector. In 2019 alone, LRC was involved in representing civil society in numerous legal cases. These included a successful case against the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-Related Information Act, the silicosis class-action settlement for gold miners, and a community-led challenge against Sasol Ltd.’s greenhouse gas emissions. Lawyers Against Abuse offers legal advice to CSOs working on GBV issues. DGMT NGO Commons, the website of the DG Murray Trust, provides access to resources about registration and compliance. Other organizations providing legal support to CSOs include the National Organization of Democratic Lawyers, South African Society for Labor Law, ProBono.org.za, and TrustLaw.
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 3.8

The organizational capacity of CSOs was stable in 2019. CSOs continued to build strong relationships with their constituencies. For example, TAC, which has more than 8,000 members in 193 branches across the country, used its regular newsletter to reach and engage its constituents. The Citizen Justice Network, a network of paralegals, opened three new offices in underserved areas, which provide paralegals and journalists with access to technology so that they can have regular contact with constituents. Sonke Gender Justice’s One Man Can campaign helped community-based organizations (CBOs) partner with community radio stations, and some CBOs used local radio stations to reach constituencies, especially in rural areas. Many smaller faith-based organizations (FBOs) used their links to churches to build constituencies. The Organization Undoing Tax Abuse (OUTA), a recently established but already influential CSO, built its constituency through paid memberships. OUTA reported that its membership revenue grew by 16 percent in 2019 to reach ZAR 46 million (approximately $3.3 million).

Strategic planning for CSOs continues to be facilitated primarily by external consultants, who are brought in to conduct planning sessions and then often write the plans. As a result, organizations often lack a sense of ownership for the plans, which can lead to poor implementation and turn strategic planning into a box-ticking activity rather than a useful practice. Most smaller CSOs view strategic planning as too expensive to undertake. In recent years, many CSOs have branched out to areas beyond their missions and the goals included in their strategic plans in their search for funding.

Internal governance remained a major challenge for CSOs in 2019. Board members serve on a voluntary basis, but in some instances their motivation for serving is questionable. For instance, some board members anticipate economic benefits. Training for board members is generally inadequate, and several organizations report that board members do not understand the role of the board, which can lead to inappropriate involvement in management and operational issues. CSOs that seek to maintain good scores with the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) program, which aims to reduce economic inequality and is important for public funding, must comply with its requirements for board composition.

Staff turnover remained high in 2019 because of declines in CSOs’ financial sustainability and the general volatility of the funding environment. In many cases, CSOs could not afford to pay competitive salaries, which made it difficult to attract good candidates for open positions. DSD, a major domestic CSO funder, pays salaries to social workers that are almost 40 percent higher than those offered by the average CSO. DSD’s policy of only partially subsidizing CSOs’ salary costs while expecting organizations to cover the balance with income from other sources largely drives this pay disparity. High staff turnover forces CSOs to divert resources from service delivery to training new employees. It is too expensive for many CSOs to engage in succession planning in management by keeping senior personnel on their payrolls. The rate and impact of staff turnover are generally worse for small, local CSOs. Larger, national CSOs often have diversified funding and cash reserves to retain qualified employees.

Staff training remains a major concern in the CSO sector. Funding from donors for training is limited, and any available funding must be used for training in technical, project-focused areas rather than general management skills. Training on general topics of leadership, management, and monitoring and evaluation is offered only to selected individuals, who are then expected to pass on their learning to other staff.

CSOs struggle with access to needed technology. Many CSO employees still use their own cell phones for service provision, and some even use their own laptops. Without computers or reliable internet access, CSO staff often rely on smartphones and WhatsApp as their primary method of communication. Some CSOs were able to purchase vehicles in 2019 with funding from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria.
CSOs’ financial viability declined for the third year in a row in 2019, largely because of dwindling support from international and public donors as well as the contracting economy. According to the 2019 Trialogue Business in Society Handbook, nearly one-quarter of CSOs had stagnant income in 2019, one third had declining income, and only 44 percent reported an increase in income, down from 48 percent in 2018 and 60 percent in 2017. As they competed for a shrinking pool of funds, CSOs found it challenging both to secure adequate funding for day-to-day operations and to ensure their sustainability. Almost half (43 percent) of CSOs lack cash reserves, and 55 percent of CSOs have incomes of less than ZAR 2 million (approximately $135,000) per year, according to 2019 Trialogue Business in Society Handbook.

Foreign funding for CSOs has decreased dramatically in recent years. As a high-middle income country, South Africa is no longer a priority for international donors, and the donors that remain channel most of their funding to the government rather than CSOs. CSOs report that funding is often given to organizations based on donors’ organizational preferences rather than CSOs’ ability to implement programs. This approach has resulted in service delivery failures and sometimes even the suspension of funding. CSOs that lack the resources to build relationships with funders are even less likely to receive funding in new funding cycles.

USAID funding for democracy, human rights, and governance declined in 2019.

Although the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) suspended its bilateral aid program with South Africa in 2015, its project budget for South Africa increased in 2019–20 to GBP 13.7 million (approximately $17.8 million) from GBP 7.8 million ($10.1 million) in 2018–19. In April 2019, the Global Fund allocated a grant of ZAR 5 billion ($338 million) to combat HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis in South Africa. Thuthuzela Care Centers, which provide services to rape victims, will receive some of this funding to improve their HIV prevention services.

Domestic funding is still dominated by corporate donors, which, according to the 2019 Trialogue Business in Society Handbook, accounted for 29 percent of all CSO income in 2019, a 5 percent increase over 2018 (although real growth was minimal after adjustment for inflation). Corporations expended ZAR 10.2 billion (approximately $690 million) on corporate social investment (CSI) in 2019, with retail and wholesale companies contributing the largest amount, followed by the mining and financial sectors. As in the past, about 50 percent of CSI support was channeled to education, 15 percent to social and community development, and 9 percent to food security. CSI support for health-care interventions fell from 9 percent in 2018 to 7 percent in 2019.

Many corporate entities increased their non-cash contributions to CSOs in 2019. However, CSOs report that their appreciation of CSI has been undermined by some companies’ tendency to donate products or services that they do not need rather than investing in skills development or simply donating cash. The business sector also engages in fundraising to assist the CSO sector. In the MySchool MyVillage MyPlanet initiative, one of the biggest community fundraising events in South Africa, individuals can swipe loyalty cards at participating stores to have a percentage of their purchases donated to the program.

Government funding sources include provincial departments of social development, the National Lottery Distribution Trust Fund (NLDTF), and the National Development Agency (NDA). In 2019, CSOs reported a 36 percent decline in funding from the National Lotteries Board, which oversees the NLDTF.

Individuals contribute regularly to CSOs in South Africa. Although their contributions declined in 2019, almost 72 percent of CSOs received contributions from private individuals, according to the 2019 Trialogue Business in Society Handbook. Eighty-eight percent of organizations received non-cash donations, such as products, services, and volunteer time, from individual donors, companies, and other entities. Since 2017, philanthropic income at
institutions of higher education, including donations from trusts and foundations, the private sector, and individuals, has increased as a result of the #FeesMustFall movement.

CSOs sought to diversify their funding base in 2019, as they increasingly recognize that dependence on a single, inadequate source of funding often results in closure, especially of smaller, grassroots organizations. CSOs have grown better at fundraising. For example, Reach for a Dream Foundation hosts an annual Slipper Day, when people purchase wristbands to benefit the foundation and are encouraged to wear slippers to work or school. The Sunflower Fund, which support patients in need of bone-marrow transplants, sells bandanas on its annual Sunflower Day. Almost all CSOs handle fundraising internally, as they lack the resources to employ professional fundraisers or even to have dedicated fundraising staff. CSOs that are dependent on donor income still struggle to implement a fee-for-service model, and crowdfunding is still in its infancy in South Africa. The business sector is willing to assist CSOs with loans, but CSOs do not view this as a feasible funding alternative.

All registered NPOs must submit audited financial reports to the NPO Directorate to maintain their registrations, and PBOs must submit financial reports to SARS to maintain their tax-exempt status. Although other CSOs are not required to conduct annual audits, many organizations do so to meet funding requirements. External financial audits are very expensive for smaller CSOs. The number of CSOs with insurance against project-related risks increased from 29 percent in 2018 to 37 percent in 2019. However, about 40 percent of CSOs do not have formal risk management processes, and more than 60 percent of CSOs are not required by funders to develop risk management plans, according to the 2019 Trialogue Business in Society Handbook.

**ADVOCACY: 2.8**

Advocacy by South African CSOs improved for the second year in a row in 2019 as various organizations expanded their GBV efforts. CSO initiatives focused on GBV demonstrated that South African CSOs were able to advocate publicly for policy change while working productively with the government. In September 2019, the #TotalShutDown movement, which began as a protest action in 2018, mobilized women’s and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) groups in marches across the country to call for action against GBV. One of the movement’s major achievements was the government’s creation of the Interim GBV and Femicide Steering Committee, co-chaired by representatives of the president and civil society, which is charged with updating and implementing an emergency response plan against GBV and femicide. The committee is developing a national strategic plan on the issue through extensive, multi-sectoral consultations. CSOs such as the Networking HIV and AIDS Community of South Africa (NACOSA) and Lifeline are working with the Department of Health, DSD, South African Police Service, and National Prosecuting Authority to ensure that Thuthuzela Care Centers are fully functional to treat GBV victims. The president created a fund to support survivors of GBV and femicide attempts.

Another important GBV effort in 2019 was the #AmINext movement, sparked by the rape and murder of a nineteen-year-old student at a post office in August. #AmINext asked all South Africans to march against GBV and called on the government to declare GBV a national emergency. In response to the protest, the government promised to amend the Sexual Offences Act and Domestic Violence Act and make the National Register for Sex Offenders publicly available.

Under the new administration, CSOs were able simultaneously to work with the government and hold it to account. Organizations such as Section 27, Social Justice Coalition, and Ahmed Kathrada Foundation used community events as opportunities to advocate for social justice and push the government to comply with or change its policies. In 2019, the Zondo Commission of Inquiry into State Capture continued its investigation of government corruption in response to advocacy by anti-corruption activists and organizations. The South African
CSO Corruption Watch monitored the commission's progress, and more than twenty CSOs submitted a paper, An Agenda for Action, which includes recommendations for reforming the government and private sector to eliminate state capture.

In 2018, the Constitutional Court ruled that Section 12(1)(a) of the Gatherings Act, which made failure to give adequate notice of a gathering of fifteen or more people a criminal offense, was unconstitutional. Despite this positive development, various organizations continued to advocate for the constitutional right to protest without the fear of harassment, police brutality, and prosecution in 2019. In November, the Social Justice Coalition led a demonstration, joined by Right2Know, Equal Education, and other CSOs, to defend the constitutional right to protest. Several movements and campaigns struggled for social rights, including the shack dwellers movement, which brought a case against the City of Ekurhuleni for illegal demolitions and evictions. A number of CSOs created a civil society working group to strengthen and oversee the newly established Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture. At a conference commemorating International Anti-Corruption Day in December, several organizations signed a document affirming their continuing efforts against state capture.

Activists and civil society groups continued a new trend in 2019 of pursuing private prosecutions of cases that the National Prosecuting Authority has decided not to prosecute. For example, proceedings started in a delinquency case brought by OUTA and the SAA Pilots' Association against the former chair of South African Airways. In a case filed by the Nelson Mandela Foundation and South African Human Rights Commission, with the support of the Institute of Justice and Reconciliation, the Equality Court in South Africa ruled in August 2019 that showing the apartheid-era South African flag amounts to hate speech, racial discrimination, and harassment and is a crime in most cases.

Various CSOs, such as Earthlife Africa Durban and the SA Wind Energy Association, lobbied for renewable resources in 2019. Under the hashtag #ClimateStrike, thousands of South Africans marched across the country during global protests against climate change in March and September 2019. The marches were organized by the youth-led advocacy group African Climate Alliance, supported by Extension Rebellion, Oceans Not Oil, and Energy and Climate Change. During his 2019 budget speech, the minister of finance acknowledged the seriousness of climate change and promised that Eskom, the public electric company, would expand its sources of renewable energy. The president signed the Carbon Tax Act into law effective as of June 1. Various CSOs, including the World Wide Fund for Nature, GreenPeace, and Groundwork, had pushed for the law since 2015.

CSOs did not advocate for changes in laws specifically governing the CSO sector in 2019. They were, however, actively involved in drafting the green paper on the social economy, which, if enacted, will legitimize and better regulate the social economy sector, including all CSOs. CSO stakeholders were also involved in the #KnowYourNPOStatus campaign, which aimed at good governance, accountability, and compliance with registration requirements.

### SERVICE PROVISION: 3.2

CSO service provision improved slightly in 2019 as government recognition and support for CSOs' services expanded under President Ramaphosa. CSOs continued to provide services in health care, social welfare, GBV, early childhood development, the law, governance, emergency support, and other areas in which the government does not act. CSOs often provide specialized social services that the government does not have the expertise to provide. For example, the Teddy Bear Clinic provides psycho-social support services to victims of GBV and child abuse.

The services provided by CSOs generally respond to community needs and priorities. For example, Harambee Youth Employment Accelerator addresses young people's pressing need for employment assistance with training and placement in first jobs. To date, Harambee
has supported more than 600,000 youth and placed more than 100,000 of them in jobs. However, CSOs that are dependent on donor funding must implement services specified by their donors rather than respond to identified community needs. The CSO sector is often criticized in the media or by local and international funders and businesses for focusing on projects that aim for short-term change rather than long-term impact. But this approach is often unavoidable, since most donors want to see measurable changes within one to five years.

Membership organizations generally provide their products and services to paying members only, although they may offer some products free of charge to non-members. CSOs often market their goods and services to other CSOs. For example, the Foundation for Professional Development, which is both a CSO and a registered institute of higher education, offers paid courses to staff from other CSOs. It is illegal for CSOs to discriminate against potential recipients of their goods and services, and CSOs strongly uphold South Africa’s robust legal framework and culture in support of non-discriminatory practices.

CSOs have difficulty recovering costs for services. Communities believe that services provided by CSOs on behalf of the government should be free of charge, especially as high poverty rates mean that many beneficiaries are unable to pay for them. There are some exceptions, however. At its early childhood development centers in central Tshwane, PEN charges fees on a sliding scale based on parents’ income. At the Sediba Hope clinic in Pretoria, payments made by clients who can afford to pay for health-care services help offset the costs of services for clients who are unable to pay.

Government recognition and support for CSOs’ services have improved greatly under President Ramaphosa. In stark contrast to former president Zuma, who implied that most CSOs worked to undermine the government, President Ramaphosa emphasized in public statements that the government sought to cooperate with CSOs to meet common goals, including putting an end to GBV and femicide. The National Development Plan 2030, the government’s strategic vision for the next ten years, highlights the importance of a good working relationship between the government and CSOs and refers to CSOs as social change partners. These important expansions in the relationships between government departments and civil society are expected to improve and expand the services delivered by CSOs.

SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 3.7

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector improved as an array of training and capacity-building opportunities were provided by resource centers, networks, the government, and the private sector.

A limited number of resource centers and networks provide services to CSOs. A key resource center is Inyathelo: The South African Institute for Advancement, which offers both free and paid goods and services to all types of CSOs. In 2019, Inyathelo helped fill the gap in board training by offering publications and workshops to help CSOs improve their governance and the work of their boards. In cooperation with the CMDS group of financial consultants, Inyathelo also offered management training to NPOs and CSOs during its annual #ThinkGood gathering, a free networking and training event. The institute also offers a paid service linking CSOs to potential donors. TechSoupSA provides CSOs with technical support, reduced rates for access to computer programs, and other similar resources.

Several local grantmaking organizations operate in South Africa. For example, the privately funded Raith Foundation supports social justice programs, while the DG Murray Trust focuses on early childhood education and youth development. OSF-SA created a new fund for South African human rights defenders in 2019.

The CSO sector in South Africa is still fragmented, with organizations operating in silos defined by their areas of activity and, within sub-sectors, competing for funding or duplicating work. Nevertheless, several networks and organizations support CSOs’ capacity-building and networking needs. SANGONeT facilitates CSOs’ access to
information and communications technologies and has created a bi-annual consultative forum to help organizations engage with each other at the national and provincial levels. The Women’s National Coalition strengthens women’s and girls’ movements for social change, while NACOSA brings together 1,800 organizations working on HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and GBV. SANAC coordinates multi-sectoral HIV/AIDS responses. The South African National NGO Coalition, one of the oldest CSO networks, still exists but is much less active than it used to be.

The government, private sector, and CSO resource centers and networks conducted several interventions to improve managerial skills in the CSO sector in 2019. NDA, a government agency tasked with eradicating poverty, implemented a new program to develop CSOs’ institutional capacity in 2019. NACOSA and Lifeline provided training to assist CSOs with income generation. ABSA, a major bank, provided training on financial support services and business management to emerging small businesses, social enterprise initiatives, and other organizations. Tiger Brands Ltd. introduced capacity-development programs for its CSO partners to ensure that they are sustainable when CSI ends. Tiger Brands also began a CSO accelerator program to provide training on governance, compliance, fundraising, and other topics. The Southern African Institute for Business Accountants, South African Institute of Tax Professionals, and DSD support CSOs’ financial compliance through the project NPOAssist. Inyathelo collaborates with the company Turning Point Chartered Accountants to offer regular workshops to help CSOs understand financial and donor reporting requirements.

CSOs in the health-care, GBV, and early childhood education sectors partner frequently with the government, private sector, and media. Many CSOs in the health-care and GBV sectors implement interventions in conjunction with the relevant government departments. Organizations that are district support partners have staff embedded at the district departments of health and hire clinicians to work in public-sector health-care facilities. In partnerships like these, CSOs’ data are incorporated into government statistics. In 2019, the private sector primarily partnered with CSOs and the government on training initiatives, as described in the paragraph above.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.6**

CSOs’ public image was slightly better in 2019. Media reporting on CSOs was generally positive. In particular, the media reported on the work of better-known and highly regarded CSOs, such as Gift of the Givers, Afrika Tikkun, and the Nelson Mandela Foundation. Their stories were in sharp contrast to the negative media reporting of 2017 and 2018, when CSOs were heavily criticized after patients died while in the care of a poorly qualified CSO in the so-called Life Esidemeni crisis.

Government perceptions of CSO were mixed in 2019. The government increasingly recognizes the value of CSOs’ contributions, as evidenced in President Rhamaphosa’s expressed acknowledgement of their work. The departments of health and social development also acknowledge the work of CSOs. At the same time, the change in political climate and a general sense of rising corruption has increased government pressure on CSOs to ensure that they are not corrupt and use funds consistently with their aims.

Public trust in the CSO sector is relatively high. The 2020 Edelman Trust Barometer indicates that public trust in the sector increased to 60 percent in 2019 from 50 percent the previous year. While public trust in the government, media, and business also increased, the CSO sector remains the most trusted sector in South Africa, with business trailing at 58 percent and the government at 21 percent. The public perceives CSOs as ethical but not necessarily competent. A survey conducted by Afrobarometer in 2019 showed that 30 percent of South African respondents believe that CSOs are involved in corruption and 64 percent of respondents believe that corruption increased in the country overall in 2019. Hearings of the Zondo Commission of Inquiry into State Capture in 2019, which highlighted corruption in the service-delivery sector in South Africa, led to some distrust of CSOs. At the same time, several CSOs that support anti-poaching initiatives are viewed favorably by the public.
CSOs that are financially stable and have a social media presence generally have better public images than those that do not.

The slight increase in CSI in 2019 suggests that the level of trust in CSOs among businesses is also relatively high. Well-established CSOs, such as DG Murray Trust, Food and Trees for Africa, Harambee, and Section 27, have good reputations with the private sector.

Although CSOs seek to communicate about their projects, strategies, and outcomes, communications and marketing remain a challenge for CSOs. Most organizations have staff responsible for managing communications, but only 40 percent of CSOs have communications budgets. In the last several years, CSOs have increasingly relied on hashtag movements and social media to advocate and create awareness. Major hashtag movements in 2019 included #AmINext, which drew attention to GBV; #I’mStaying, dedicated to South Africans who decided to believe in the country, despite ongoing frustrations; #TotalShutDown, a movement of women and LGBTI communities calling for action against GBV; and #NotInMyNameSA, a national campaign for civil rights.

CSOs are required to submit narrative annual reports to the government to maintain their registrations. The Independent Code of Governance for Nonprofit Organizations in South Africa, which was first published in 2012 by Inyathelo, remains the main source of legal and ethical guidance for CSOs.
South Sudan was the third most fragile state in the world in 2019, according to the Fragile States Index of the Fund for Peace, which measures states’ vulnerability to pressures that they may not have the capacity to manage. The country sought to make progress in implementing the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), signed by President Salva Kiir and opposition leader Riek Machar in September 2018. The deadline for forming a transitional unity government was delayed twice in 2019 as negotiations mediated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development failed to resolve several key sticking points, including the formation of a unified army, security-sector and economic reform, states and their boundaries, and the formation of a hybrid court to prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Sporadic fighting continued in 2019 as all sides violated the 2017 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) and R-ARCSS. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) reported that between September 2018 and April 2019, human rights violations and abuses were lower than in previous years, except in Central Equatoria, where attacks on villages led to the deaths of 104 civilians, and 187 civilians were abducted for sexual slavery or forced labor or were forcefully recruited into government or rebel armies. Many women and girls, some as young as age twelve, were raped or subjected to other forms of sexual violence. Private and public property was looted and destroyed. In this environment, CSOs worked intently on hosting a dialogue between soldiers and civilians in Yei and Wau to achieve peaceful co-existence and freedom of movement.

South Sudan’s humanitarian crisis was urgent in 2019 as more than 7 million people, or about two-thirds of the population, remained in dire need of assistance and protection, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Humanitarian operations were disrupted by armed conflict and military operations as well as bureaucratic obstacles, poor roads, and flooding. In areas of conflict, health-care facilities were attacked and vandalized, supplies were looted, and staff were ambushed, threatened, harassed, detained, or killed. On October 20, three aid workers employed by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) died in crossfire between government forces and the National Salvation Front in Isebi village, Yei River State. After the killings, the IOM suspended Ebola monitoring along South Sudan’s border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Another 129 staff had to be evacuated in 2019 because of the insecurity, OCHA reported.

South Sudan’s economic growth rate improved from -3.5 percent in 2017–18 to 3.2 percent in 2019. The improvement was due mainly to the resumption of oil production, South Sudan’s main export. With most of its budget going to defense and security, the government continued to underinvest in poverty reduction and development during the year. According to OCHA, more than 80 percent of the population lived below the absolute poverty line in 2019.
Despite this challenging environment, overall CSO sustainability improved in 2019. The establishment of internal management and governance structures and policies by some larger organizations enhanced the sector’s organizational capacity. Advocacy was stronger as CSO had better access to government decision-making processes. The improved security situation allowed CSO services to resume and expand. The establishment of a new resource center buttressed the sectoral infrastructure. CSOs’ public image improved significantly as CSOs were featured frequently in the media. Only CSOs’ legal environment and financial viability were unchanged.

The exact number of CSOs operating in South Sudan is unknown. The South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC), the regulatory body for CSOs under the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management, keeps track of the number of organizations operating legally in the country but does not publish this information. The South Sudan NGO Forum, an umbrella group of domestic and international CSOs, reported that in 2019 its membership included 261 South Sudanese and 116 international CSOs, for a total of 377 organizations, up from 330 in 2018.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.8**

The legal environment for South Sudan’s CSOs did not change in 2019.

The main laws governing CSOs are the South Sudan Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Act 2016 and SSRRC Act 2016. All CSOs must register annually with the Ministry of Justice to maintain legal status and with the SSRRC to obtain operating licenses. As part of the registration process, CSOs submit annual plans, budgets, lists of staff, and funding information to the SSRRC. The authorities generally scrutinize the registration applications of CSOs working on advocacy or human rights more closely than those of organizations engaged in service provision. The government sometimes regards outspoken CSOs as political parties and denies them operational licenses in violation of their rights. Despite a waiver on registration fees in 2018, some local authorities charged fees to international and domestic CSOs to register at the state level and national level in 2019. All CSOs must pay administrative costs and service fees, which are often determined arbitrarily. For example, the cost for work visas for international humanitarian workers and other CSO staff increased significantly in 2019. Unregistered CSOs, media houses, and journalists are not allowed to operate in South Sudan.

The 2014 Security Act allows the authorities to arrest and detain individuals without warrants or guarantees of fair trial. The arbitrary arrest and detention of activists, journalists, and prominent opposition leaders by the National Security Services (NSS) remained a concern in 2019. The 2014 Media Law, which was expected to promote an independent, pluralistic media environment in South Sudan, was also abused as the government showed an increasingly hostile attitude towards the media in 2019. For example, two staff members of the Union of Journalists of South Sudan (UJOSS) were arrested in July, and in November, the NSS arrested and detained the managing editor of *The Dawn* newspaper for poking fun at a dress worn by the minister of foreign affairs and international cooperation while on a diplomatic visit to Eritrea. The editor was conditionally released on bail and forced to apologize publicly. The license of Al-Watan newspaper was withheld and the NSS arrested its managing director for alleged non-compliance with licensing requirements after the newspaper published a story about protests against Sudanese president Omar al Bashir in Khartoum, Sudan. The editor of the independent Juba Monitor was forced to flee to Nairobi after the NSS shut down the newspaper. The government also blocked access to four internet news sites. The Association for Media Development in South Sudan (AMDISS) and Union of Journalists in South Sudan (UJOSS) blamed media authorities for failing to defend the detained journalists. Arrested individuals were often denied access to their families and lawyers.

The rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly was curtailed in South Sudan in 2019. In May, the government blocked a peaceful protest by the new Red Card Movement (RCM), a youth initiative espousing
nonviolent protest. The president warned the protestors that they would face consequences if they continued with the protest, and the minister of information said that the protestors would be stopped with live ammunition and automatic weapons. A leader of the group was arrested, and others associated with the movement were intimidated and assaulted during RCM protests in Kenya and Ethiopia.

Under the NGO Act 2016, CSOs are entitled to exemptions of customs duties on imports of equipment and goods purchased for their nonprofit work. However, Republican Order No. 24/2018 issued in December 2018 suspended CSOs’ exemptions from customs excise taxes and duties on all imported items except those connected with humanitarian relief. These taxes discouraged some CSOs from pursuing activities such as delivering radio equipment to local communities. Local authorities sometimes demand tax payments from national staff even if their taxes were already deducted from their salaries at the national level.

The law allows CSOs to engage in income-generating activities provided all income is used to further their organizational objectives. CSOs do not compete for government contracts.

Several lawyers provide professional legal services to CSOs. However, their services are expensive, especially for smaller organizations.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.3**

CSOs’ organizational capacity improved moderately in 2019 as some larger organizations strengthened their management and governance structures, expanded their operations, and developed internal policies. These improvements reflected both donors' requirements and the independent goals of some organizations.

Most CSOs sought to build relationships with their constituencies in 2019. CSOs with funded projects built relationships by offering capacity-building and mentorship programs; livelihoods training in areas such as agriculture, fisheries, arts and crafts, and bee-keeping; village savings and loan projects; health-care and humanitarian services; and activities to further sustainable development. Local CSOs deeply involved in their communities include Women Training and Promotion (WOTAP) in Wau, which empowers women to pursue livelihoods to sustain their families, and South Sudan Youth Peace and Development Organization (SSYPADO), which provides youth in Eastern Equatoria with capacity building and entrepreneurship training. Some CSOs worked with communities to make them aware of their constitutional and civil rights and able to identify human rights violations in 2019. For example, the Foundation for Democratic and Accountable Governance (FODAG) and Organization for Non-violence and Development (ONAD) sensitized people to their constitutional, civil, and human rights, and FODAG conducted several workshops on trauma awareness and healing, which enabled citizens to testify about the war crimes and human rights violations that they witnessed during the years of conflict to assist the hybrid court. Smaller, grassroots organizations are often deeply rooted in communities but lack the economic resources to respond to issues of concern.

Many CSOs have mission and vision statements. All organizations must submit activity plans during their annual re-registration. More established organizations have short-, medium-, or long-term strategic plans. For example, FODAG has a five-year strategic plan that focuses on truth telling, justice, reconciliation, and healing in South Sudan. ONAD’s strategic plan is directed towards building a peaceful and democratic society through training, research, and advocacy and also emphasizes the internal development of ONAD and its grassroots partners. These organizations made progress in realizing their plans in 2019. FODAG conducted consultative meetings on the reconstitution of the Commission on Truth, Healing, and Reconciliation, and ONAD conducted several workshops on non-violence, good governance, and democratization.
A number of CSOs strengthened their internal structures in 2019, and many CSOs could be seen to be evolving from “briefcase” operations to full board and office structures. In 2018 and 2019, for example, CEPO established regional and field offices in Wau, Yambio, Yei, Rumbek, Terekeka, and Torit with support from the Wildlife Conservation Society, UNMISS, IOM, and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. FODAG expanded its office with qualified and experienced staff members and better internet connectivity. Some smaller CSOs, which typically work in the grassroots in collaboration with larger domestic and international CSOs, were able to recruit field staff and volunteers to help with workshops and trainings. Other smaller CSOs, such as Gender Empowerment for South Sudan (GESSO) and Advocates for Human Rights and Democracy (TAHURID), were established field offices.

Many CSOs have administrative and management policies to govern their operations, in large part because donors may ask for their constitutions and policies governing human resources, financial management, and procurement when assessing organizational capacities before awarding grants. In 2019, some organizations were compelled by donors to update or improve their human resource and financial management policies. Two newer organizations, SSYPAD and the Mundri Relief and Development Association (MRDA), adopted such policies to be eligible for grants.

CSO staffing is gradually improving in South Sudan. Employees are usually offered project-based contracts that include job descriptions and standards of conduct. At many CSOs, new employees take part in orientation workshops about the projects they will work on. Employees may be assigned to a variety of projects or receive leadership and technical training to develop their knowledge and skills. CSOs increasingly have policies addressing staff recruitment, conduct, salaries, overtime, taxes, and benefits at termination, although they may not implement them fully. Some CSO human resource managers have been known to advertise jobs as a formality but hire relatives or close friends regardless of their qualifications. Other CSO staff are said to engage in corrupt behavior, such as accepting bribes or kickbacks when hiring employees or awarding grants. Oxfam, Democracy International, South Sudan NGO Forum, and several other organizations organized training workshops for human resource and other managers in 2019, which seemed to have improved recruitment procedures and curb favoritism in the award of jobs. International donors offering grants also provide guidelines to reduce malpractice during the recruitment of new employees. Volunteers are an important human resource, especially for the organization of workshops and trainings. Although some volunteers are accused of working as informants for the government, most of them are deeply committed to national service and are willing to work without pay or expressions of appreciation from international and larger domestic organizations.

Most CSOs funded by international partners have offices well equipped with laptops, scanners, printers, wi-fi, modems, and smart phones. They also have access to 4G cellular network technology, which enables them to send large amounts of data through platforms such as Facebook, WhatsApp, Twitter, LinkedIn, and Snapchat. Trained technicians are available to repair and update computers and ensure stable internet connections. Elsewhere in South Sudan, CSOs tend to have small offices, outdated technology, and limited to no internet access. For example, Greater Upper Nile and Unity states are served by only one telecommunications network, and internet service is not available in some counties.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.3**

CSOs’ financial viability remained impeded in 2019. Most CSOs continued to be fully dependent on donor funding. The main donors were the United States, United Kingdom (UK), Germany, and the European Commission. OCHA’s Financial Tracking Services reported that South Sudan received $1.4 billion in donor funding in 2019, about the same amount as in 2018. Nearly half of this sum went to projects in food security and nutrition and about 19 percent, or $263 million, was earmarked for CSOs. A handful of South Sudanese organizations, including Nile Hope, Universal Intervention and Development Organization, Christian Mission for Development, Impact Health Organization, and Universal Network for Knowledge and Empowerment Agency, received about 4 percent, or $10 million, of this amount, for a significant increase of $4 million over 2018. The main international CSOs receiving funding were the International Committee of the Red Cross, Catholic Relief Services, Norwegian Refugee Council, Danish Refugee Council, and World Vision South Sudan. Young CSOs in the grassroots have little access to funding because of the insecurity and poor roads, which prevent them from meeting donors’ requirements for safe, nearby, and accessible offices.
The 2019 CSO Sustainability Index for South Sudan

With the signing of R-ARCSS in 2018, implementation of the COHA, and partial implementation of security-sector reform measures, international CSOs continued to localize projects through South Sudanese CSOs in 2019. For example, Oxfam, the World Food Program, and UNMISS supported the delivery of services related to food security, livelihoods, peace building, gender-based violence, nutrition, and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) by Women Training and Promotion, Action For Development, Unity Cultural and Development Center, and CEPO in Western Bhar-el-Ghazal State. In addition, the United Nations Development Programme invited CSOs to apply for small grants to establish and operate justice and confidence centers in Aweil, Bentiu, Bor, Juba, Torit, Wau, and Yambio.

Corruption, self-interest, kickbacks, and other irregularities continued to undermine CSOs’ relationships with donors in 2019. For example, some donor employees were alleged to demand kickbacks from potential grantees, with threats to award grants to other organizations if they did not receive payment. Staff at international intermediary support organizations were also reported to demand bribes. The executive director of a local CSO said that he lost three contracts because he refused to pay bribes to international organizations and a UN agency in 2019, according to a May 2019 article on the Devex website. In addition, some donors with budgets denominated in U.S. dollars exchange the funds for local currency, which they give to South Sudanese CSOs for project implementation. This arrangement is disadvantageous for local organizations, since the ongoing depreciation of the South Sudanese pound eats into budgets for project implementation. These funding irregularities cause resentment among South Sudanese CSOs, and the South Sudan Democratic Engagement Monitoring and Observation Program (SSUDEMOP), ONAD, CEPO, and other organizations advocated for the fair award of grants without malpractice in 2019.

South Sudanese CSOs sometimes believe that donors view them as cheap sources of labor without offering sufficient capacity building or financial support to ensure that they become economically sustainable. For example, funding for UNMISS’s quick impact project in Yei County was limited to project activities and did not cover local CSOs’ administrative costs. Many South Sudanese CSOs also believe that donors have their favorite organizations, usually located in urban centers, and view smaller CSOs in rural areas as lacking the knowledge, skills, and experience needed to execute projects. In an effort to assess CSOs’ readiness for grants, some donors offer “testing” or mini-grants to see whether organizations can implement projects transparently and accountably. The mini-grants are often phased, with grantees expected to submit narrative reports with financial accounts and supporting documents at the end of each phase. If an organization fails to meet expectations, donors may shift their funding to other CSOs or stop funding projects altogether. Local CSOs usually accept these mini-grants even if they are not convinced that the projects will have a positive community impact.

Most CSOs derive their funding solely from donors and do not engage in income-generating activities that could sustain them without donor support. Local CSOs that are loyal to the government occasionally receive government contracts. A few innovative CSOs produce items such as beads, bed sheets, and clothing to sell for income to support their operations. For instance, the Women Grassroots Empowerment Organization in Juba sells clothes, hats, handbags, beads, and sandals produced by women in nearby villages who they have trained to generate income to sustain themselves, their families, and their communities.

CSOs with developed visions, missions, values, and objectives usually have adequate financial systems. Their strict financial rules typically include limits on petty cash and financial transfers and pre-set salaries determined by qualifications, experience, and performance. Most organizations undergo annual internal and external audits. If CSOs are thought to misuse project funding, donors will often investigate. Donors usually require organizations lacking financial policies to establish them and provide training to staff. If existing policies have been violated, donors may warn the organizations or discontinue their funding.
ADVOCACY: 4.6

CSO advocacy continued to improve in 2019. The NGO Act 2016 allows CSOs to access government decision-making processes and offer opinions about government activities. In 2019, CSOs’ access to government policy makers and decision-making processes was noticeably stronger as CSOs met with political leaders to push for resolution of issues impeding the implementation of R-ARCSS. South Sudan Network for Democracy and Elections (SSUNDE), Organization for Responsive Governance, FODAG, SSUDEMOP, CEPO, and other organizations advocated for implementation of the COHA, registration and cantonment of the armed forces, and training and deployment of unified forces. As a result of their input, twenty-five cantonment sites were established in February 2019, and the first class of military trainers graduated from the Mapel Training Center in Wau in October 2019. CSOs also conducted trainings and awareness workshops to inform the public about delays in forming the transitional unity government, security-sector reform, and the development of unified forces. In addition, CSOs established consultative committees to confer with the South Sudanese people about the controversial issue of the number of states and their boundaries.

CSOs and CSO coalitions engaged in a range of efforts aimed at political and socio-economic change in 2019. Their activities included meetings, seminars, trainings, workshops, talk shows, peaceful demonstrations, and public rallies. FODAG, for example, advocated for public consultations on reconstitution of the Commission on Truth, Healing, and Reconciliation. In October, the Women’s Monthly Forum on the Peace and Political Process in South Sudan organized a peaceful rally to support the 35 percent representation of women in the transitional unity government. Africa Partnership Aid for Rehabilitation and Development (APARD), ONAD, and CEPO worked with local authorities and chiefs to enact customary laws against cattle raiding and forced and early marriages in Central Equatoria, Western Equatoria, Northern Bhar-el-Ghazi, Warrap, and Lakes states. CSOs also pushed for the National Action Plan to address implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security.

As a result of CSOs’ push for the rule of law and respect for human rights in South Sudan, the government established juvenile and mobile courts in Warrap, Aweil, Yambio, Yei, Juba, and elsewhere in 2019. South Sudan Law Society (SSLS), Lawyers without Borders, CEPO, and other organizations worked to establish a Transitional Justice Resource Center to raise awareness, conduct research, and publish studies about transitional justice in South Sudan. CSOs also advocated for the UN Cooperation Framework for South Sudan (2019–21) to include provisions to improve the lives of vulnerable groups, protect freedom of expressions, and promote the right to education and youth empowerment.

South Sudanese CSOs also engaged in lobbying to push their agendas. Although the Transitional National Legislative Assembly was not yet constituted to enact or amend legislation in 2019, CSOs engaged with specialized committees of the assembly to advocate for reforms. For example, the Women’s Monthly Forum on the Peace and Political Process in South Sudan met with legislators in May to urge them to put women in 35 percent of the positions in the transitional unity government.

CSOs did not focus on efforts to reform the legal environment for civil society in 2019.
SERVICE PROVISION: 4.7

CSO service delivery improved slightly in 2019 as the improved security situation allowed services to resume and expand. In particular, humanitarian agencies and local CSOs were able to access remote and rural areas to render services to needy populations.

CSOs deliver a broad range of good and services throughout the country. Major areas of service provision include health care, shelter, education, nutrition, agricultural production, peace building, conflict mitigation, civilian protection, and environmental conservation. CSOs’ services most often respond to urgent humanitarian needs. For example, HealthNet TPO is the leading organization providing health-care services in Central Equatoria and engages in projects such as the renovation of health-care facilities and responses to new outbreaks of disease. The South Sudan Health Association provides health-care services in Kupera, Morobo, Lainya, and Kejokeji.

International CSOs often implement service-providing projects through domestic organizations, since they are in closer touch with local communities. For example, local partners are implementing a three-year nationwide project to improve schooling by paying allowances to teachers. The project is funded by the European Union and coordinated by Mott MacDonald, a UK firm. In Upper Nile and Unity states, GESSO, Nile Initiative Development Organization, Nile Hope, and other domestic organizations construct health centers, supply medications, provide water and food to internally displaced persons (IDPs), and offer nutritional services to malnourished children with funding from various donors. Many CSOs deliver social services that the government is unable to provide, especially in rural areas. In Tonj County in Warrap State, for example, the Organization for Children Harmony (TOCH), a local organization, provided WASH services and assessed 125 boreholes, repairing thirty-three of them. TOCH also constructed two primary health-care units and a maternity ward in Romich. ONAD, SSUDEMOP, SSUNDE, Organization for Responsive Governance, and several other organizations provided training to local peace monitors so that they could monitor, verify, and report violations of R-ARCSS and the COHA.

CSOs countrywide typically conduct surveys and assessments and monitor and evaluate their projects. In 2019, MRDA and Norwegian People’s Aid learned through monitoring and evaluation exercises that beneficiaries in Mundari Community appreciated their efforts to reconcile conflict-torn youth in Terekeka State.

CSOs usually provide goods and services without discrimination. South Sudanese CSOs do not normally charge for their services to recover costs. Some organizations sell products to generate income. For example, the Roots Project produces and sells beads and pottery to provide women with livelihoods while helping cover its operational costs. CSOs sometimes conduct market assessments to determine the prices of goods and identify business opportunities for community livelihood projects.

The government acknowledged the importance of CSOs’ work in 2019. For example, some local authorities issued statements of thanks to media houses during the handover of facilities provided by CSOs.

SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.6

The sectoral infrastructure for CSOs improved slightly in 2019 with the establishment of a new resource center.

Resource centers for CSOs in South Sudan are limited in number and usually overcrowded. Democracy International continued to support the operation of resource centers in Juba, Yambio, Rumbek, Bentiu, Torit, and Wau in 2019. The centers, which are managed by CSO user committees, offer training, internet access, and library services to CSOs and other groups. Organizations such as SSUNDE, SSUDEMOP, FODAG, and the Organization for Responsive Governance used the centers free of charge to train staff, interns, women, local authorities, and other small groups in areas such as organizational leadership, lobbying and advocacy, and project development and
management. In September, CEPO, in partnership with FODAG, TAHURID, Lawyers Without Borders, and SSLS, established the Transitional Justice Resource Center in Juba to support research and awareness raising on issues of transitional justice in South Sudan.

There are few local grant-making entities. The Civil Society Facility (CSF), a multi-donor fund established by the governments of Norway, Sweden, and Netherland, launched the second phase of five-year grants in 2019. The grants support CSO capacity building in Bor, Western Equatoria, and Bhar-el-Ghazal.

South Sudanese CSOs are poor at communicating with each other and coordinating their work. The exchange of ideas and information is limited, and competition and conflicts of interest can undermine cooperation. Limited internet connectivity, particularly in rural areas, is also a major obstacle to collaboration. CSO networks and coalitions, such as the South Sudan Civil Society Alliance, Women’s Bloc, South Sudan Women’s Empowerment Network, and other more established CSOs usually show a united front if any member of the group faces a security threat.

Training opportunities for CSOs are limited. International CSOs have offered capacity building to their local partners for years to prepare them to take over project implementation. Some of these partners now implement project activities to the satisfaction of both donors and communities. Common topics of training include proposal writing, project management and reporting, financial and procurement policies, human resources, and administrative policies. Little training has been offered on resource mobilization, which is needed to help CSOs improve their financial viability.

CSOs continued to partner occasionally with government agencies in 2019. For example, ONAD worked with the police, security agencies, and army to conduct several trainings on community security and safety. The government consulted with some of the more vibrant organizations about contentious political, economic, and social issues. Local authorities sometimes invited CSOs to mediate between warring communities. For example, the governors of Terekeka State invited the executive director of CEPO to facilitate a dialogue between the Yanguara and Korbura sections of the Mundari community.

CSOs and media houses have friendly relationships and tend to work hand in hand. CSOs, media outlets, journalists, and security agencies participate in joint trainings on communications and related topics. These gatherings offer them the opportunity to discuss their roles and avenues for cooperation in nation building. In 2019, UJOSS and AMDISS worked to raise public awareness of media laws. Media outlets such as Eye Radio, Radio Tamazuj, and the Juba Monitor helped raise awareness about media laws and human right violations against activists and journalists. Partnerships between CSOs and the business community are negligible.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.6

CSOs’ public image improved in 2019, as CSOs’ views of the changing political environment were more frequently featured by the media.

CSOs had a heavy media presence in 2019. They were seen and heard daily on radio and televisions, in newspapers, and at seminars, workshops, and conferences. Representatives of CEPO, ONAD, and FODAG took part in talk shows about hot political, economic, and social issues, including R-ARCSS, security-sector reforms, the timely payment of civil servants’ salaries, and the need for assistance for refugees and IDPs. They were featured by outlets such as the South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation, independent Eye Radio, the UN radio station Miraya FM, and Voice of America, and they were also seen on South Sudan National Television taking part in face-to-face meetings with political leaders and other decision makers. CSOs normally do not pay for media coverage of their statements about national political events but sometimes must pay to broadcast their programs.
CSOs in South Sudan generally have a positive and progressive reputation, and the public approves of their work. In 2019, the public increasingly saw CSOs as agents of change and its eyes and voice on important political, economic, and social issues. Communities appreciated CSOs’ support for the rule of law and human rights. Organizations selected to take part in the peace talks were praised and appreciated by the public as well as the government and the opposition for their impartial, unique contributions during negotiations in Addis Ababa and Khartoum.

The relationship between the government and CSOs is variable and usually determined by political events. The government views CSOs that approve of its activities as its friends and partners but regards CSOs that are critical of its actions as enemies. Some government officials misperceive CSO leaders as politicians or agents of foreign governments. For example, in 2019, the government accused certain CSOs of being western agents when they demanded reinstatement of the ten states.

CSOs actively engaged with the media in 2019. Organizations such as SSUDEMOP, FODAG, and CEPO issued strong press releases about political events and sought out appearances on local radio stations in the states, such as Voice for Peace in Rumbek and Bhakita Radio operated by the Catholic Church. Catholic Radio Network was critical to information dissemination in Juba. CSOs also raised their visibility by engaging in community meetings, conferences, funerals, mediations, and other public events.

CSOs share their annual reports with the public through media workshops, seminars, and community gatherings. CSOs usually have statements of values in their constitutions.
Sudan underwent seismic changes in 2019. Thirty years of authoritarian rule brought the country to the brink of collapse and then unleashed a revolution with civil society at its core. Despite years of repression and tightly closed civic space, an unprecedented number of young Sudanese men and women began in early 2019 to coalesce around a social movement known as Tasgut Bas (“Just Fall, That’s All”), which called for an end to the rule of President Omar al-Bashir. At the helm of the movement was a nascent umbrella organization, the Sudan Professionals Association (SPA), which worked with political allies in the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) alliance to topple the regime. The government’s collapse in April 2019 was triggered by thousands of protesters, who, heeding the calls of the SPA and FFC, descended on the Sudanese army headquarters in downtown Khartoum for a sit-in on April 6. After al-Bashir was ousted on April 11, the Transitional Military Council (TMC) took power but was unable to persuade the protesters to disband. On June 3, in what came to be known as the Khartoum massacre, security forces violently dispersed the sit-in, and hundreds of people lost their lives. Tensions between the FFC and the TMC were eventually resolved through mediation by the African Union. Following the August 17 signing of the Constitutional Declaration, which paved the way for a transition to civilian rule, Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok was sworn into office on August 21.

Sudan’s economic crisis worsened in 2019, as the fuel and bread queues that originally sparked the revolution grew along with the cost of basic commodities. A mission from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) at the end of 2019 projected a bleak economic outlook for Sudan, with inflation at 60 percent and the Sudanese pound depreciating rapidly. The IMF reported that ballooning fuel subsidies and weak revenue mobilization caused Sudan’s fiscal deficit to rise from 7.9 percent of gross domestic product in 2018 to 9.3 percent in 2019. At the same time, an estimated 9.3 million Sudanese were in urgent need of humanitarian assistance, according to the United Nations (UN). The country’s overall security situation improved significantly, and by the end of 2019, fighting between government forces and armed groups in the conflict areas of Darfur and the Two Areas has subsided.

CSO sustainability improved moderately in 2019 after CSOs took the lead in toppling the al-Bashir regime and helped usher in a period of transitional rule. CSOs’ performance improved in five out of seven dimensions. The legal environment was moderately more enabling after the new government relaxed restrictive laws and regulations and restructured the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), the main oversight body for CSOs. Organizational capacity improved slightly with the loosening of operational restrictions, which allowed organizations to better mobilize their constituencies. Advocacy showed transformational improvement as CSOs assumed leadership of the revolution and made substantial contributions to the profound and positive changes underway in the country, including the Constitutional Decree. The sectoral infrastructure was moderately stronger as CSO partnerships and coalitions surged in the newly opened civic space. CSOs’ public image improved
significantly as extensive media coverage was given to their leadership role in the revolution. Only CSOs’ financial viability and service provision were unchanged.

The vibrant and diverse CSO sector in Sudan is made up of formal, informal, and traditional organizations and structures. Formal civil society includes faith-based organizations, charities, humanitarian organizations, clubs, associations, and the more modern type of CSOs commonly known as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Professional associations and unions of journalists, doctors, and teachers, which form the core of the SPA, were banned and operated clandestinely under the former regime but emerged as prominent actors during the revolution. The HAC claimed to have 6,745 registered CSOs in its database at the end of 2019. However, this figure likely includes a large number of CSOs that are inactive but have not been struck from the HAC registrar.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.5**

The legal environment for CSOs in Sudan improved moderately in 2019. The new civilian government reformed the humanitarian sector and relaxed regulations and procedures that had previously hampered CSOs’ registration, hiring, and project implementation. In addition, the HAC issued new directives easing travel restrictions and allowing previously de-registered organizations to return to Sudan.

CSOs in Sudan may register under various government ministries according to their nature and purpose. The majority of CSOs register with the HAC under the Sudan Voluntary and Humanitarian Works Act (SVHWA) of 2006, which continued to be in effect throughout 2019. The act is problematic for several reasons. It criminalizes voluntary and humanitarian work by organizations that do not have prior registration, thereby violating several international agreements to which Sudan is a signatory, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Registration under the SVHWA requires a CSO to have at least thirty members, and smaller groups may register only if they give proof of their financial ability, sustainability, and sources of funding, which are subject to the approval of the minister of humanitarian affairs. These requirements create unjustifiable constraints on CSOs’ ability to obtain legal status and give the minister discretionary powers over registration. Once an organization is registered, its license to operate must be renewed every year in a laborious process.

In the second half of 2019, the authorities relaxed or bypassed some of the more rigid requirements involving CSO registration, such as the need for CSOs to convene their general assemblies with the registrar or its representative present. The HAC also overturned earlier decisions to expel international CSOs and cancel the registration of several national CSOs. The Al-Khatim Adlan Center for Enlightenment and Sudan Social Development Organization re-established themselves and began to operate freely. The International Rescue Committee, which had been expelled with several other humanitarian organizations in 2009, was granted permission to resume operations in Sudan.

On the operational level, procedures and regulations that had obstructed the work of CSOs under the old regime remained in place for most of the year, although they were less rigorously enforced in the quickly changing situation. These rules included the need for CSOs to obtain technical agreements for new projects, to have prior permission before working with communities on needs assessments and program implementation, and to be accompanied by security personnel when undertaking activities. Towards the end of the year, the new civilian government began reforming the HAC to ease restrictions on humanitarian access and other operational impediments. According to HAC directives issued in November 2019, international CSOs no longer had to involve HAC personnel in the recruitment of local staff. The HAC consented verbally to multi-year programming by international CSOs and began to recognize travel notifications in place of issuing travel permits. The HAC also sped up the processing of technical agreements.
During the tumultuous early months of 2019, the harassment of CSOs was unprecedented. The government arrested and intimidated CSO staff and criminalized social movements. During the protests, security agents checked in with organizations to identify staff members who had responded to calls for civil disobedience rather than come to work. In a change from 2018, when the harassment of CSOs focused on institutions rather than individuals, prominent figures from the CSO community were rounded up and put in prison. After the fall of the al-Bashir regime, they were released without being charged, and incidents of state harassment of CSOs decreased on both the staff and organizational levels.

The laws and regulations governing CSOs’ access to resources remained unchanged in 2019. CSOs may bid without restriction on contracts with the government and other development actors, although most organizations lack the capacity to do so. CSOs registered under the SVHWA are generally not allowed to earn income or provide services and products for fees. CSOs may engage in fundraising activities and receive funds from foreign donors, provided such funding is approved in advance by the minister of humanitarian affairs.

Only CSOs registered under the SVHWA are eligible for exemptions from customs duties on items imported for their operations. These exemptions are not a right and require the approval of the HAC, Sudan Customs Authority, and Ministry of Finance and National Economy. Because of the turmoil caused by the changes of 2019, these agencies were dysfunctional for most of the year.

Local legal capacity remains limited. Only a handful of lawyers in the capital city of Khartoum are familiar with CSO-related laws and can offer high-quality legal advice.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.6**

CSOs’ organizational capacity improved slightly in 2019 as their ability to build and mobilize constituencies developed quickly. The improvement was particularly evident during the revolution, when coalitions such as the SPA were able to mobilize thousands of people across the country. The revolution opened the door to new forms of engagement and constituency building, and more organic, indigenous platforms and structures emerged at the grassroots and local levels. For example, neighborhood resistance committees formed to oppose the old regime, and they were on the frontlines confronting security and armed forces during the popular uprising. These committees have evolved into key players throughout the country and now lead efforts to improve daily life in their communities by repairing schools, undertaking street cleaning campaigns, fighting corruption, and other activities.

Otherwise, CSOs’ organizational capacity remained deficient in 2019. USAID’s Toward Enduring Peace in Sudan project conducted capacity assessments of 120 CSOs in six states and found them to be especially weak in financial and resource management, proposal writing, financial reporting, and project management, monitoring, and evaluation. In most CSOs, knowledge of evaluation and learning frameworks is poor, which renders them unable to track their impact or learn from the process of implementing activities. CSOs often engage in strategic planning only to fulfill donor requirements and very seldom link planning to the design and implementation of programs and activities.

Most CSOs continued to exhibit deficiencies in their internal management in 2019. They generally do not adhere to internationally recognized standards of internal accountability and transparency. Staff performance appraisals, internal bylaws, internal financial audits, and quality assurance mechanisms remain lofty aspirations that have yet to be achieved by a majority of CSOs.

A large portion of the sector continued to struggle to retain qualified staff in 2019. Entry-level staff often move on to better-paying positions with international CSOs and UN agencies after acquiring experience with domestic
organizations. Sudanese CSOs are often unable to pay competitive salaries and are challenged by inadequate practices involving contracts, job descriptions, payrolls, personnel policies, and skills development and training for staff.

CSOs’ use of technology continued to be curtailed in 2019 by the high cost of internet services and hardware such as personal computers and photocopiers. In addition, the U.S. designation of Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism blocks CSOs’ access to a wide range of internet services, since the services and products of global providers such as Google, Apple, and Cisco are restricted in Sudan. Despite these challenges, CSOs were able to leverage social media as a tool for organizing demonstrations during the year.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.1**

Despite overwhelmingly positive developments, CSOs’ financial viability remained unchanged in 2019. CSOs’ funding sources began to diversify slightly as new international actors, such as the International Republican Institute, Canal France International, and several foreign embassies, began to support the changes underway in the country. The priorities listed in the Constitutional Declaration opened up new areas for programming, including corruption, institutional and legal reform, and the media, while also helping organizations diversify their funding sources. However, this diversification was generally enjoyed only by a handful of well-established CSOs, which were positioned to capture new funding opportunities because of their advanced organizational capacities, access to information, and proximity to decision makers.

Foreign funding remained unchanged from 2018. The top donors continued to be the United States, United Kingdom, and European Commission. USAID’s annual contribution to humanitarian services in Sudan increased slightly from about $327 million in 2018 to about $356 million in 2019. No significant new funding flows were evident in 2019.

International CSOs flocked to Sudan in 2019 to take advantage of donors’ increased interest in the country, and many high-level exploratory visits by representatives of international organizations took place during the year. A widely held view among Sudanese CSOs was that this influx of newcomers would mean gains as well as setbacks for their longer-term financial viability. International CSOs are generally required to partner with domestic CSOs in developing and delivering programs. But at the same time, as international CSOs establish themselves in Sudan, their ability to offer higher pay is expected to drain qualified Sudanese staff from domestic CSOs. Given the limited pool of highly qualified Sudanese organizations, donors will likely need to invest in building the capacity of weaker domestic organizations, which represent the bulk of the CSO sector.

In a change from the previous year, support to CSOs from the private sector and corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs was highly visible in 2019. This support was especially evident during the sit-in from April 6 to June 3 in Khartoum. Private-sector power companies provided generators to the protesters, which they used to power air coolers during the hot afternoons, provide lighting at night, and run refrigerators for water and food. International firms working in the extractive sector in remote areas such as South Kordofan and Darfur are obliged to run CSR programs to benefit the communities in which they work. However, the impact and sustainability of these programs is questionable, given the lack of transparency in the extractive industry sector in Sudan.

CSOs’ efforts to raise funds and earn income continued to be hampered by obstructive or inadequate legislation in 2019. There is no law providing for the establishment of social enterprises, and the SVHWA of 2006 prevents CSOs from earning income from their programs or services, although the law was less stringently enforced in 2019 than in previous years. Even so, CSOs that sought to earn income from services or goods reported that any income raised hardly covered their costs, given Sudan’s poor economic condition.
CSOs’ financial viability also continued to be hampered by the sanctions imposed on Sudan. Sudan’s inclusion on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism made transfers of funds from overseas to CSOs in the country extremely difficult in 2019. The blocking of overseas funding not only frustrates CSOs but also forces them to pursue irregular or unscrupulous ways of receiving funds from foreign donors, thereby raising questions of transparency and accountability.

Although the changes in Sudan in 2019 eliminated many concerns that had previously kept CSOs from disclosing information about their finances, financial transparency among CSOs remained limited in 2019. CSOs were cautious about the government’s intentions and, until their legal and operational environment is tangibly reformed, are unlikely to fully embrace financial transparency. Only a small pool of Sudanese CSOs that work with foreign donors and have been subject to due diligence checks adhere to international standards of financial management.

**ADVOCACY: 4.6**

CSO advocacy improved dramatically in 2019, as CSOs assumed leadership of the revolution and made sustained contributions to the profound and positive changes underway in Sudan.

A number of civil society coalitions helped shape the year’s revolutionary events. Driving the fall of the al-Bashir regime in April were the Tasgut Bas movement, Civic Forces Assembly, SPA, and other civil society groups and actors. The SPA, Civic Forces Assembly, Civil Society Initiative, and other groups, alongside legal experts, academics, and other civil society professionals, helped draft the Constitutional Declaration signed by the FFC and the TMC.

Women-led networks, such as the Women of Sudanese Civic and Political Groups (MANSAM) and No to Women’s Oppression Initiative, were especially prominent in 2019. They successfully advocated for recognition in the Constitutional Declaration of women’s equity and pushed for a 40 percent quota of women in the transitional government. After the declaration was signed, CSOs contributed significantly to several areas prioritized by the transitional agenda, including women’s rights. CSOs played an active role in repealing the Public Order Act, which, among other restrictions, curtailed women’s presence in public. The repeal of the act in December 2019 was hailed by many CSOs as a big step forward for women’s rights in Sudan. Other campaigns, such as the Kouni Kawiya (“Be Strong”) initiative, mobilized public opinion on behalf of changes in the Personal Status Law affecting women.

Some national CSOs and CSO coalitions benefited from their relationships with transitional executive bodies to influence decision making and help shape public opinion in 2019. Late in the year, the Sudanese Development Initiative convened a roundtable to discuss civic space during the transition and identify the main priorities for reforming institutional, legal, and policy frameworks. Meeting participants sent a proposal for legal reform to the Ministry of Labor and Social Development and the HAC. Other CSO representatives went further and presented a draft law to replace the much-reviled SVHWA. These and other advocacy and lobbying efforts were possible thanks to the accessibility of certain cabinet members, who had formerly been part of the civil society community. Since many CSO advocacy efforts were based on personal relationships, they tended to be informal, ad hoc, and somewhat uncoordinated. Going forward, sustaining these and other contributions will depend on the ability of CSO coalitions and networks to institutionalize and acquire greater credibility with the public and other key actors in the transition.

On the regional level, networks emerged to focus on a number of important issues in 2019. Organizations active on the community level in North and West Darfur formed the advocacy network Fashir-Genina Road, which pushed to resume construction of a much-needed highway in the area, which had been suspended in 2015. Members of the network made proposals to authorities at both the state and federal levels, including officials at the ministries of the interior, finance, and public works and the Sovereign Council.
On the international level, Sudanese CSOs partnered with international organizations to undertake more structured advocacy in 2019. CSOs contributed to various efforts to ensure a sustainable peace. The British charity Saferworld helped Sudanese voices reach the highest levels of decision making by arranging visits to the African Union and European Union and meetings with foreign envoys visiting Sudan. In mid-October, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung facilitated a visit by a group of CSOs and political representatives to Germany, where they met with German parliamentarians and officials from the Federal Foreign Office and Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development to discuss lifting restrictions on development assistance to Sudan.

After the new government came to power, the government moved quickly to lift certain restrictions on CSOs’ operations. For example, new directives from the HAC in November 2019 ended the need for travel permits and the commission’s involvement in the recruitment of local staff. CSOs advocated for additional reforms through the year. Among other demands, CSOs sought to remove requirements that they obtain prior approval and be accompanied by security officials when assessing needs and implementing programs. CSOs also pushed to end the need for technical agreements and prior approval of funding for new projects.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 5.2**

Service provision was unchanged in 2019. Most goods and services offered by CSOs involved humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons and rural populations. Service areas included agriculture and food security, economic recovery, health care, multi-purpose cash assistance, protection, humanitarian coordination, nutrition, shelter and settlements, and water, sanitation, and hygiene. Other development-oriented goods and services provided by CSOs included vocational training, microfinance management, and agricultural and livestock support, including agricultural inputs, training to improve practices, and veterinary care.

CSOs were better able to respond to community needs after reform of the HAC in 2019. Executive decisions issued by the HAC in late November eased restrictions on travel for both domestic and international CSO and enabled staff to more readily access and meet with communities to determine their priorities and needs.

CSOs’ ability to recover costs and generate revenue from the sale of goods and services remained curtailed in 2019 because of the deteriorating economy and the urgent humanitarian needs of an estimated 9.3 million people. Moreover, the SVHWA of 2006 prevents CSOs registered under it from earning income from their programs or services, although the law was less stringently enforced in 2019 than in previous years. Certain other legal forms of CSOs, such as training and cultural centers, may earn income.

Although the government curtailed CSOs’ activities in advocacy areas such as human rights and political participation in 2019, both the national and local governments valued the ability of the CSO sector to monitor service provision and supply basic services that would normally be the government’s responsibility. At the same time, government support for service-providing CSOs was often limited and at times obstructive. For example, Sabah Association faced insurmountable difficulties with police authorities when it sought to provide services to street children in Khartoum state in 2019. The government also obstructed service provision to women tea sellers by the Women’s Food and Tea Sellers’ Cooperative, and security and so-called public order police increased their harassment of the union in early 2019.
SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.3

The infrastructure supporting CSOs improved moderately in 2019 with the resurgence of partnerships and proliferation of new coalitions and networks after the revolution opened up civic space. MANSAM was formed by women’s political and civil society groups led by an alliance of eight political groups and eighteen CSOs. Other new coalitions included the Civil Forces Assembly and the Peaceful Coexistence Initiative, which came together to help quell unrest between ethnic groups in Red Sea State. However, a spirit of competitiveness and suspicion rather than collaboration and synergy often overshadowed relationships between networks and coalitions and individual members in 2019. These tensions were driven mainly by competition over limited financial resources and fragmentation of the political landscape following the revolution. Both the SPA and the FFC began to face internal problems with their organizational structures and legitimacy. The continuity and sustainability of these partnerships in the longer term may be questionable, since they lack robust, democratic structures and were hastily formed to respond to immediate needs.

The proliferation of partnerships, coalitions, and other initiatives in 2019 occurred against a backdrop of limited support from intermediary support organizations (ISOs) and resource centers. Sudan’s few ISOs include the Gissa organization, which in 2019 implemented a new USAID-funded civic lab, where youth from the revolutionary committees can develop their abilities in various dimensions of civic engagement. Another distinguished resource center is the Impact Hub, a social enterprise community center that offers an entire ecosystem of resources, inspiration, and collaborative opportunities for startups and small to medium-sized enterprises, including CSOs. Outside of Khartoum, ISOs and resource centers are rare. The few that exist include peace centers at state-level universities, which provide resources and services related to conflict mitigation and peacebuilding.

Few local grantmaking and philanthropic institutions exist in Sudan. The Haggar Foundation has traditionally been the country’s main grantmaking institution. CSR programs are gradually increasing in number and are run mostly by family-owned businesses, such as the DAL Group and Cofftea, and telecommunication companies, such as MTN, ZAIN, and Sudani.

Training opportunities and training service providers remained concentrated in Khartoum in 2019. Scant opportunities for training were available to CSOs in other regions of the country. Informal training activities took place during the sit-in and protests, when training professionals and other experts helped train protesters in skills such as public speaking. This development stimulated the formation of the Sudanese Trainers Assembly, a nascent assembly of training firms and consultants that aims to build the capacity of the training industry.

CSOs’ intersectoral partnerships, especially with the business sector, began to evolve steadily in 2019. In the lead of such efforts was the Haggar Corporate Sustainability and Social Impact program, which convened several events in 2019. The program brought together CSOs, young entrepreneurs, and academics to discuss environmental protection, disabilities, and other issues. The Haggar program collaborated with Eiman Disability Rehabilitation Center on an interactive training workshop for the parents of children with disabilities. Together with the Al-Sudaniya Mentoring group, the program hosted a workshop to help thirty-one participants prepare ideas for community development projects in education, the environment, and women’s rights.

After the revolution in 2019, CSOs’ partnerships with the government began to flourish, although they were limited in scope and involved only a small portion of CSOs in Khartoum. For example, from August to November 2019, Partners for Development Services worked with the FFC on an extensive consultation to prepare a program to help the transitional government identify public expectations and priorities for the first half of 2020. A few signs of CSO partnerships with the media sector emerged as well. The Civic Space Monitor, a new online platform, brought together CSOs and journalists for quarterly group discussions on freedom of expression. CSOs and journalists also published short analytical pieces on the Monitor’s website. In late 2019, the Sudanese Development...
The 2019 CSO Sustainability Index for Sudan Initiative announced that, in cooperation with Canal France International, it would organize a media conference in early 2020.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.0

CSOs’ public image improved significantly in 2019. With the year’s seismic events, coverage of Sudanese CSOs increased profoundly in offline, online, national, and international media. Before the collapse of the al-Bashir regime, coverage of CSOs by independent media outlets was muted and guarded, while coverage by state-owned public radio and television broadcasters was overwhelmingly negative. Social media offered broader, more diversified news coverage. But starting in April, negative coverage of the CSO sector gradually gave way to more neutral coverage. The coverage was Khartoum-centric and focused on CSOs playing a central role in the changes underway. International broadcasters and networks such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya featured stories and interviews with civil society representatives, most of whom were affiliated with the SPA. During the sit-in, they also reported on the contribution of CSOs such as the Doctors’ Committee, which provided health services, and the revolutionary work of artists’ groups that was visible on the streets and walls in front of the military headquarters. After the new civilian government was formed, coverage of the sector diminished but remained positive. It continued to focus largely on organizations in Khartoum and ignored CSOs in other regions of the country. CSOs consider it likely that the positive coverage will continue, given the opening up of civic space in Sudan and media and public recognition of CSOs’ role.

Public perceptions shifted during the year, as CSOs that had previously been ostracized gained new recognition. CSOs working on human rights and gender issues found themselves operating in a new political context, facing less suspicion and fewer threats of public defamation. Informal and organic civil society networks such as the Resistance Committee gained credibility in the public eye. More than the individual political actors with whom they were allied, CSOs themselves were seen as the key champions of the revolution. The SPA was especially important in shifting public perceptions of CSOs, as it was able to access a large public audience, often through social media and other digital platforms. Young people and revolutionaries at the sit-in unhesitatingly rallied behind the nascent SPA as it engaged in negotiations with the TMC. The extremely positive perception of Sudanese CSOs took on international dimensions as organizations from Africa and elsewhere expressed their respect for the formidable role played by the CSO sector in representing the people and bringing change to the country.

Government and business perceptions of CSOs were also transformed and, given the strong reputations of CSOs in both domestic and international arenas, were characterized by respect and consideration at the close of 2019. Government institutions were headed by former civil society activists, and they turned to their former colleagues as sources of expertise and credible partners in shaping policies for the transitional period.

The changes in media coverage and public and government perceptions of Sudanese CSOs in 2019 resulted more from the events taking place than an orchestrated strategy by the CSO sector. Consequently, experts question whether the change in CSOs’ public image is sustainable. Among other concerns, they point to the fact that the CSO sector has yet to adopt any form of self-regulation that might promote accountability and transparency. Such measures would undoubtedly help sustain the positive public image that the sector acquired in 2019.
Civic and political space continued to shrink in Tanzania in 2019. Local government elections conducted on November 24, 2019, were marred by irregularities, resulting in minimal CSO engagement and the withdrawal of major political parties. Rallies continued to be banned, save for those organized by groups affiliated with the ruling party or the government. Members of professional associations, opposition parties, and CSOs experienced harassment and reprisals from the police force, tax officials, and prosecuting agencies. According to the U.S. State Department’s 2019 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Tanzania, significant human rights abuses during the year included torture, arbitrary detention, unjustified arrests and prosecutions, censorship, internet blocking, pervasive corruption, and violence against women and girls.

Attacks on the media were severe, and media content was closely monitored. The Citizen newspaper was suspended for seven days for violating the Media Services Act of 2016, and well-known journalist Erick Kabendera, who had written articles critical of the government, was arrested on non-bailable offenses related to money laundering, tax evasion, and organized crime. Implementation of the Electronic and Postal Communication (Licensing) Regulations of 2018 required community radios to obtain commercial licenses, burdening already struggling media with increased annual licensing fees and taxes. The Electronic and Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations of 2018 imposed confusing registration and licensing requirements, giving the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority wide powers to regulate content and blogs to register and pay approximately $900 to post online. The Media Services Act of 2016, which establishes a number of crimes and penalties associated with the media, and the Cybercrimes Act of 2015, which criminalizes a wide range of online activity and the sending and receiving of certain types of information, also contributed to the shrinking of freedom of expression. Tanzania’s ranking on Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index dropped from 93 in 2018 to 118 in 2019 out of 180 countries.

Tanzania’s gross domestic product growth rate hovered at about 6.8 percent in 2019, according to the African Development Bank. The World Bank reported that Tanzania’s poverty rate continues to decline slowly and was estimated at 26 percent in 2019. The government focused its development agenda on improving the business environment and investing in roads, health-care facilities, railroads, and the electrification of rural areas. In 2019, the government broadened its internal funding sources through taxation and tighter business regulations.

CSOs’ overall sustainability regressed in 2019. The legal environment deteriorated significantly as laws were changed to give the government stricter control over CSOs’ registration and operations. CSOs’ organizational capacity was slightly weaker as a result of burdensome new regulations and statutory requirements, reduced funding, and internal governance challenges. CSOs’ ability to advocate was hampered slightly by the central
government’s unresponsive attitude towards CSOs and its tendency to introduce reforms under a pretext of urgency, giving CSOs very little time to mobilize and unite on the issues. The remaining dimensions of sustainability did not change.

The exact number of CSOs in Tanzania was difficult to determine in 2019, given the variety of legal forms and the re-registrations required after the government’s NGO verification exercise in 2017–18. The Registrar of NGOs in the Ministry of Health, Community Development, Gender, Elderly, and Children, which has primary oversight responsibility for CSOs, reported approximately 9,000 organizations registered in 2018. In 2019, 617 CSOs on the Tanzania mainland were newly registered as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), according to the ministry. Of this number, 44 organizations were international, 551 national, 7 regional, and 15 at the district level. Approximately 3,400 NGOs were registered in Zanzibar, a semi-autonomous region.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.4**

The legal environment deteriorated significantly in 2019 as laws were amended and implemented to introduce stricter registration and operational requirements for CSOs.

In the past, CSOs have registered with various government agencies as a variety of legal forms, including societies (under the Societies Act Cap 337 of 2002), trusts (under the Trustee Incorporation Act Cap 318 of 2002), companies limited by guarantee (under the Companies Act No. 212 of 2002), and NGOs (under the NGO No. 24 of 2002). In practice, the mainland government views all CSOs as NGOs. In 2017–18, the mainland government conducted a verification exercise and identified 158 organizations registered with offices other than the Registrar of NGOs which it deemed to be operating as NGOs. In 2019, these organizations were removed from the register and required to re-register in accordance with the Miscellaneous Amendments Act No. 3 of 2019, which amended the Companies, Societies, and NGO Acts. Organizations that failed to re-register faced deregistration. Several organizations, including the Foundation for Civil Society (FCS), Twaweza, and Tanzania Women Lawyers Association (TAWLA), changed their legal status from companies or associations to NGOs to ensure their continued existence in 2019. The Registrar of Associations in the Ministry of Home Affairs conducted a verification exercise for societies from March 20 to May 30, 2019, but did not report on the results of the exercise in 2019.

In April, the NGO Board deregistered six organizations without due process on charges of violating the law and their own constitutions and committing unethical acts. Three of these organizations—Community Health Education Services and Advocacy, Kazi Busara na Hekima, and AHA Development Organization—opted to register as new organizations rather than appeal their de-registrations. The other three organizations—Pathfinder Green City, Hope, and Hamas Poverty Reduction—requested deregistration after self-assessments led them to acknowledge that they were in violation of their constitutions and national laws.

No new organization seeking to register is known to have experienced difficulties with registration in 2019, aside from the burden of traveling to Dodoma to apply as a national NGO. However, changes in government personnel overseeing NGO registration disrupted relationships and increased bureaucratic red tape in 2019.

CSOs in Zanzibar register under the Societies Act No. 6 of 1995 with the Business Property Registration Agency in the Ministry of Trade and Investment. The Miscellaneous Amendment Act No. 1 of 2019 amended the Societies Act to shift coordination of CSOs in Zanzibar from the national Ministry of Constitutional and Legal Affairs to the Special Department in the President’s Office of Regional Administration and Local Government (PO-RALG) in Zanzibar. The move allows for closer supervision and coordination of Zanzibar CSOs.

PO-RALG’s 2018 directive requires CSOs to seek multiple permits from regional and district-level authorities and sectoral ministries before implementing activities at the community level. The permitting process is bureaucratic,
redundant, time consuming, and expensive. In a positive development, the Statistics Act 2015 was amended in 2019 to allow CSOs, academic institutions, and other independent bodies to produce statistics without approval or oversight from the National Bureau of Statistics. However, organizations must still obtain research clearances or permits from the Commission for Science and Technology and National Institute for Medical Research, even if research is their key function.

On September 29, 2019, the Registrar of NGOs and PO-RALG Special Department required registered NGOs on the mainland and in Zanzibar to re-register and obtain recommendation letters from their registrars before carrying out any activities in other parts of the country. The Tanzania Human Rights Defenders Coalition (THRDC) was barred by the PO-RALG Special Department in Zanzibar from launching a CSO election manifesto in Zanzibar in October because of its failure to fulfill this requirement. Overall, the order effectively stifled joint programming and coalition building among CSOs from Zanzibar and the mainland and prevented them from engaging on issues requiring immediate mobilization.

The NGO Act (Amendment) Regulations of 2018 require NGOs biannually to publish accounts of expenditures and funds received in widely circulated newspapers or media and to submit project plans, budgets, and timelines of contracts with donors valued at TZS 20 million (approximately $8,700) or higher to the NGO registrar and treasurer within ten days of the signing of the contract. These requirements increased the burden on CSOs’ operations, tighten government oversight, and reduce CSOs’ autonomy.

CSO representatives faced reprisals for expressing opinions and other legitimate activities in 2019. In a break with tradition, the outspoken president of the Tanganyika Law Society (TLS) was not included in the National Law Week program in February 2019, effectively gagging her from raising legal and constitutional concerns on a national platform. A journalist and a public engagement officer with the Legal Human Rights Center (LHRC) were arrested and charged with the non-bailable offenses of money laundering and organized crime. CSOs or activists offering alternative analyses of public and national issues were sometimes branded as supporters of the opposition or neo-colonialists. Foreign organizations participating in the CSO Forum ahead of the heads of state summit of the Southern African Development Community in Dar Es Salaam in 2019 were also affected. In August, South African CSOs in Tanzania to attend the forum were summoned and interrogated by the police after protesting the 2012 police massacre of striking miners at Marikana and the deplorable conditions in mines across Africa. Confronted with these oppressive tactics, CSOs sought to minimize attention to their work and increasingly self-censored or held back in their comments on controversial issues. In August 2019, the U.S. Embassy and the British High Commission issued a joint statement expressing concern about lack of due process in arrests, detentions, and indictments in Tanzania.

Media freedom regressed in 2019 as media content was closely policed. The Citizen newspaper was suspended for seven days in February for reporting on the fall of the Tanzania shilling against the U.S. dollar. In September, the Tanzania Communication Regulatory Authority fined Ayo and Watetezi online television outlets and suspended Kwanza online television for contravening regulations by failing to publish user policies and guidelines. Meetings organized by Twaweza in Kigoma and a press conference by Dignity Kwanza in Arusha were blocked despite having the necessary approvals. The International Committee for the Protection of Journalists and Media Council of Tanzania (MCT) decried obtrusive harassment and attacks on journalists while performing their jobs.

CSOs’ finances are overseen by the Tanzania Revenue Authority with minimal regard for their nonprofit status. The new Finance Act of 2019 stretched CSOs’ administrative budgets by increasing the skills development levy to 4.5 percent and the pay-as-you-earn threshold for all employers. Tax exemptions are available for charitable entities, but burdensome bureaucratic processes discourage many CSOs from seeking them. In 2019, FCS and Twaweza unveiled a study that showed that between 2016 and 2018, sixteen CSOs had brought in $105 million in foreign exchange income, on which they paid $8.2 million in direct taxes to the government.

CSOs are permitted to raise funds from national and international donors, conduct fundraising campaigns, and charge fees for their products and services. CSOs may compete for private and government contracts but rarely do so because of their lack of awareness or capacity. The Finance Act of 2019 and other laws outlined new terms for financial cooperation between CSOs and various funding entities. According to these changes, funding from corporate social responsibility programs, private foundations, and local CSOs will be centralized with local government authorities, which will contribute 10 percent of the funding to poverty reduction and entrepreneurial initiatives.
Legal expertise about the sector is limited. CSOs commonly obtain legal advice and representation from organizations with legal staff, such as THRDC. In 2019, THRDC prepared a compendium of laws governing the sector in Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar to improve CSOs’ legal awareness and compliance. The publication is available on the THRDC website and has been widely disseminated to THRDC members and other organizations.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.4**

The capacity of Tanzanian CSOs to self-manage and pursue set goals deteriorated slightly in 2019 following the introduction in 2018 of a requirement that CSOs obtain permits from PO-RALG and sectoral ministries before conducting activities at the community level. To reduce bureaucracy, ensure timely implementation of activities, and adhere to their budgets, CSOs often opted to implement programs that did not require permits, such as training for their members and direct beneficiaries. CSOs were also required to accommodate the attendance of district officers at their interventions at the local level, which burdened their budgets and affected their implementation strategies. These requirements strained CSOs’ operations and affected their relationships with constituencies, given the time that they had to take from implementing programs to travel to and from Dodoma and wait for permit approvals.

Well-established CSOs, such as the Benjamin Mkapa Foundation (BMF), HakiElimu, Center for Youth Dialogue (CYD), Zanzibar Youth Forum (ZYF), Miele Zanzibar Foundation, and Tanzania Media Women Association (TAMWA) Zanzibar, usually have strategic and operational plans, although operational realities may lead them to diverge from their plans. New organizations typically rely on their constitutions for guidance. Most CSOs develop internal policies to guide their programming, financial management, and other internal processes. Grantmaking CSOs often develop policies to tackle corruption and conflict of interest under the direction of their boards of directors. In Zanzibar, where most CSO personnel are also public servants, the issue of corruption is particularly relevant.

In addition to constitutions, CSOs must have governance structures in place at the time of registration. CSOs typically hold annual general meetings of members, quarterly board and executive committee meetings, and management meetings. National CSOs such as LHRC, Women’s Legal Aid Center (WLAC), and Women in Law and Development in Africa (WiLDAF) have independent boards of directors, while newer and smaller organizations have executive boards, whose duties overlap with those of management. In August 2019, two members of the board of the Zanzibar Legal Services Center appealed to the NGO Registrar to challenge a unilateral decision by the board chair to unseat them and choose a new board. The NGO Registrar did not intervene, and the parties eventually went to court. The effort of the Tanzania Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (TANGO) to revitalize itself in early 2019 by appointing a new board of directors and removing top staff failed after the staff contested their dismissals.

Erratic funding prevents many NGOs from hiring full-time staff. The human resource base of most CSOs is volunteers. Miele Zanzibar Foundation sponsors students in health sciences as volunteers in rural health posts during their studies. An internship program hosted by the Association of Non-Governmental Organizations in Zanzibar (ANGOZA), which concluded in 2019, placed graduates of three classes with member organizations.

Because of financial constraints, many CSOs use outdated office equipment. Internet access is unstable. Most CSO staff use hotspot tethering on mobile phones to access the internet. National CSOs such as the Tanzania Network of Legal Aid Providers, Police Forum, and Sikika use Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube to engage with the public. WhatsApp forums are a common mode of internal and external communication.
FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.9

CSOs' financial viability was unchanged in 2019. There was little diversification or innovation in CSOs' funding strategies, and initiatives to diversify funding did little to help meet financial needs. The bulk of organizations remained dependent on foreign funding.

Tanzania’s political climate and their own shifting priorities have made donors unwilling to fund activities in areas not supported by government, especially as they must obtain permits from government before supporting CSO programs. In 2019, there were no new funding opportunities for CSOs, and funding levels were largely unchanged. USAID and the governments of Switzerland, Finland, and Sweden supported the second phase of the United Nations (UN) Women’s Leadership and Political Participation project, known locally as Wanawake Wanaweza (“Women Can”). The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria, and Tuberculosis funded health-care projects, while the five-year, GBP 38-million (approximately $48-million) AcT2 program of the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development provided funding to increase government responsiveness and accountability through a strengthened civil society. The Zanzibar Non-State Actors Support Program (ZANSAP) of the European Union closed in September 2019, ending a significant source of funding for the sector.

ZYF ventured into public tenders in 2019 and won a bid to provide HIV/AIDS awareness training and condoms to construction workers building the road from Nyanya to Mkokotoni in Unguja. In September 2019, the Department of Disability Affairs began to support organizations in Zanzibar focused on disability rights. Regular audits indicate that 80 percent of local councils comply with the provision to provide interest-free loans to CSO members. For example, members of the Tanzania Association of the Deaf (CHAVITA) in Mtwara, Kondoa, and Kwimba obtained loans in 2019.

CSOs generally have inadequate skills in fundraising and creating sustainable funding sources. Some CSOs seek to raise funds from membership fees, the sale of products, crowd sourcing, and in-kind donations, but the returns are negligible. Faith-based organizations (FBOs) raise funds and material support to support their humanitarian services from congregations and religious institutions. In 2019, CHAVITA raised funds from the community in Bariadi to conduct sign language training. Although CSOs have yet to explore alternative funding sources, the Women Fund Tanzania hosted other African women’s funds in Zanzibar in July 2019 to discuss strengthening local and regional funding for work on women rights. The East African Philanthropy Network focused on promoting local philanthropy at its annual forum in September in Arusha. In 2019, FCS set up a trust to serve as an endowment fund to safeguard its financial autonomy.

The legal reforms of 2018 prompted CSOs to improve their financial management systems and reporting. For example, the NGO Act (Amendments) Regulations of 2018 require CSOs to submit their fundraising plans, donor contracts, and expenditures to the registrar and treasurer and publish them publicly on a biannual basis. The NGO Act 2002 for the mainland and the NGO Act 2009 for Zanzibar provide for NGOs to undergo annual audits and submit copies of their accounts and activity reports to the NGO Registrar, NGO Board, and the National Council of NGOs (NACONGO). Large organizations, such as THRDC, BMF, Tanzania Health Promotion Support (THPS), and Hakikilimu, have good financial management systems and receive funding from donors to conduct annual audits. Donors sometimes also conduct audits of the programs that they support and may offer capacity building to improve CSOs’ financial management skills. Most regional and district-level organizations lack the financial and technical capacity to conduct audits and rely on donors to conduct program or project audits. They submit their annual reports and accounts of expenditures to district community development officers.
CSOs' ability to advocate was slightly weaker in 2019. CSO advocacy initiatives were often hampered by the central government’s unresponsive attitude towards CSOs and its tendency to introduce reforms under a pretext of urgency, giving CSOs very little time to mobilize and unite on the issues. As a result, CSOs tended to react to government policy and legal reforms in an uncoordinated, ad hoc way. Moreover, they often lacked needed funding to meet unplanned travel and mobilization costs posed by last-minute invitations from the government and the parliament. CSOs also increasingly shied away from engaging publicly on national issues for fear of reprisal by state organs. For example, CSOs did not respond to the government’s unilateral decision to withdraw from the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights in 2019; did not criticize the poor management of local government elections, which prompted opposition parties to withdraw from the elections; and did not comment on the use of plea bargaining by the director of public prosecution, which distorted due process and subverted the rule of the law.

Several advocacy organizations attempted to improve their effectiveness in the changing environment in 2019. LHRC, for example, opened an office in Dodoma, the seat of government, to improve its relationship with government offices and engage more effectively with executive and legislative bodies.

Some CSO advocacy efforts were successful in 2019. LHRC, MCT, and THRDC argued successfully in the East Africa Court of Justice that the Media Services Act of 2016 severely violated freedom of expression by criminalizing defamation and sedition and giving excessive discretionary powers to the minister of information, culture, arts, and sports. The Msichana Initiative and Tanzania Ending Child Marriage Network made progress in their advocacy when the Court of Appeal declared the provision on the minimum age of marriage unconstitutional and ordered the government to amend the law. In May, Twaweza, Tamasha, LHRC, Jamii Forum, Change Tanzania, and Center for Strategic Litigation issued a press statement and launched a social media campaign demanding action against a wave of rapes by oil-covered men known as teleza (“slippery”) in Kigoma. Their actions increased public pressure on the police to investigate the incidents. In partnership with Maa Media, Twaweza hosted a thirty-minute television show, Mbunge Live, to link communities to their members of parliament. Twaweza also worked with the Christian Social Service Commission to promote school meal programs to improve primary education.

CSOs lobbied parliamentary committees on at least eleven bills in 2019. A number of their proposals were incorporated into draft legislations. For example, ZYF helped produce the Zanzibar Youth Council Bill and MKUZA III Zanzibar’s development blueprint. But generally, CSOs’ participation in the legislative process was routinely undermined by inadequate time for thorough consultation and analysis. This was particularly the case when bills amended more than one law, such as the Miscellaneous Amendments Act No. 3 of 2019, which amended the NGO, Societies, and Companies Acts, and the draft Miscellaneous Amendments Act No. 9 of 2019, which amended ten different acts. Other bills, such as the draft Fisheries Act and draft Plant Health Act, were introduced in parliament without effective public consultation, although required by regulation. CSOs’ engagement in legislative advocacy also exposed them to intimidation and harassment by state organs. For example, after a coalition of LHRC, TLS, MCT, Waandishi wa Habari za Maendeleo Zanzibar (WAHAMAZA), and Twaweza challenged provisions of the Political Parties Amendment Act, they were falsely accused of bribery in the media. The Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau later summoned the organizations for extensive questioning.

CSOs increasingly used social media to conduct advocacy campaigns in 2019. The campaign #JusticeforEric was launched to protest the arrest, detention, and indictment of a well-known investigative journalist in July 2019. In December, #JusticeforTito drew attention to the abduction of a LHRC public outreach officer. Msichana Initiative and TAMWA reactivated their #PediBilaKodi online campaign for tax-free sanitary pads after the government again imposed a tax on these essential products in its 2019–20 budget. Other hashtag campaigns included #Elimubilaubaguzi to promote the education of girls and #ArudiShule to support the reentry of pregnant girls to
school. The latter campaign was picked up by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank and featured as a condition for the approval of loans to the government, attracting heated parliamentary debate and publicity.

CSOs actively sought to address new legislation affecting the sector in 2019. NACONGO, THRDC, and CSO Directors’ Forum organized orientation sessions with local organizations on the Miscellaneous Amendments Bill No. 3 of 2019. LHRC, TLS, MCT, WAHAMAZA, and Twaweza issued press releases and newspaper articles commenting on proposed amendments to the Political Parties Act in January 2019. In collaboration with the Tanzania Revenue Authority, THRDC developed a tax tool kit to familiarize the sector with tax-related matters. About sixty local CSOs and paralegals participated in six regional workshops organized by PO-RALG in partnership with Twaweza on the Decentralization Policy and local and regional strengthening programs in 2019. The Ministry of Health, Community Development, Gender, Elderly, and Children and the Registrar of NGOs held consultations in Dar Es Salaam and five regional zones over the summer of 2019 to raise awareness about the new amendments affecting CSOs.

SERVICE PROVISION: 3.5

CSOs’ ability to provide goods and services was constant in 2019, despite the changing legal environment. Most organizations were able to provide services at levels similar to those in previous years, although they had to be flexible in adjusting their timelines and budgets while implementing their programs.

CSOs continued to provide services in diverse areas in 2019, including health care, sanitation, water, education, livelihoods, and economic and legal empowerment. For example, Muzdalifa Charitable Association, Al-Fatah Association, and Al-Nuur Charity supported the construction of water wells and classes on tailoring for communities in Unguja. Save the Children trained 2,031 community health workers in Morogoro, Dodoma, Iringa, and Rukwa, and Save the Children’s humanitarian response program provided more than 14,000 children in refugee camps in Nduta and Nyarugusu with services delivered mainly by the Child Friendly Space and community-based structures. An evaluation conducted at the end of the program revealed that the children felt less stress and were happier and more confident as a result of the services.

In partnership with the UN Population Fund, Children’s Dignity Forum (CDF) helped build police gender desks in Serengeti, Butiama, and Bunda and a “one-stop center” to support women and children survivors of violence in Mwananyamala Hospital in Dar es Salaam. CYD worked with at-risk urban communities to promote peace and development, while Medewell Charitable Health Center conducted 1,200 surgeries and paid for the transportation of patients who could not afford to reach health-care centers in Kibaha in 2019. TAWLA and the WLAC hosted toll-free numbers providing legal assistance to women.

Incorporating digital technologies into their services, CDF used WhatsApp to link FGM and child marriage survivors with support services and CHAVITA used WhatsApp to link the deaf with sign-language interpreters. LHRC has developed an android application called HakiKiganjani for the public to use in reporting human rights violations.
For the first time in Tanzania, nearly 2,800 children from Zanzibar, Kinondoni, and Mbozi were involved in developing a child-led report under the auspices of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) in 2019. In previous years, children had been consulted for a CSO-led report on children’s rights in Tanzania, but after taking part in capacity building offered under a project of the Swedish International Development Agency, the participating children decide to develop their own independent report. In March 2020, the children’s report from Tanzania will be presented to the UNCRC.

CSOs offer their goods and services to all members of the community without discrimination. Some CSOs charge small fees for their products and services. For example, FBOs often charge for health care and schooling, although they waive fees for vulnerable families.

The government recognizes CSOs’ contribution to the country’s development. In 2019, the prime minister praised CSOs and committed to cooperating with them during CSO Week. The minister of health, community development, gender, elderly, and children singled out the work of international partners and CSOs to curb violence against children and women during commemorations of the Day of the African Child and Zero Tolerance for FGM Day. The deputy speaker of the Zanzibar House of Representatives expressed appreciation for the work of CSOs supported by ZANSAP. The president granted audiences to FBOs in January, to sports and cultural associations in March, and to chambers of commerce in June, so he could hear their concerns and offer the government’s views regarding their sectors.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.1**

There was no change in the infrastructural support available to CSOs in 2019. No comprehensive resource center caters to the general needs of the sector. TGNP established district gender resource centers in Rorya, Kishapu, and Mbeya in 2019, and FCS provided funding to ANGOZA to set up a resource center to promote CSOs’ engagement in policy-making in Zanzibar. CSOs also used data and information hubs such as Data Lab, Seedspace, Kiota Hub, and Hub255, as well as the Knowledge for Change Global Consortium hub established by Mzumbe University, TANGO, and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. CSOs in rural areas have limited access to information and resources, since most resource centers serving rural areas have limited budgets, are unable to establish technological infrastructures, lack up-to-date informational materials, and do not have staff.

Among local grantmaking organizations, the Tanzania Media Fund continued to support media advocacy in 2019. WFT supported women’s leadership initiatives, and the Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology, in partnership with the UK-funded Human Development Innovation Fund, provided funding for using technology to address human development, some of which was available to CSOs. FCS continued to support local grassroots organizations. In 2019, FCS funded 151 organizations with sixty-five small grants, seventy-seven medium-sized grants, and nine strategic grants. FCS disbursed approximately $3.6 million to support CSOs’ strategic plans in 2019.

Tanzanian CSOs generally work effectively in coalitions and networks. The most prominent groups include THRDC, Policy Forum, Tanzania Education Network/Mtandao wa Elimu, and Tanzania Ending Child Marriage Network. In 2019, WiLDAF organized the CSO Women Directors’ Forum to share information and provide capacity building. CSOs often prefer to organize as coalitions to avoid being victimized or singled out by government agencies. Coalitions also provide opportunities for capacity building. For example, THRDC trained its members in security and risk management in 2019. However, despite their importance, CSO coalitions are often undermined by a lack of sustainable funding and weak institutionalization. In particular, NACONGO and TANGO faced governance challenges and failed to provide coordinated leadership on policy issues affecting the sector in
Their underperformance concerned CSOs about the general lack of leadership in the sector, which is especially troubling in the current context.

While most CSOs do not have funding to support training programs for their staff, they nevertheless benefitted from a variety of training opportunities in 2019. The Small Industries Development Organization offered entrepreneurship training to CSOs, women, and people with disabilities on the use of local technology to produce quality consumer goods. Mzumbe University offered free training to CSO women leaders on financial management and social entrepreneurship. With funding from FCS and coordination by Tree of Hope, twenty CSO representatives from Unguja and Pemba visited Tanga to learn about GBV, media advocacy, environmental conservation, and social accountability. Trainings and training materials for CSOs are usually in Kiswahili, the national language, and sometimes in English.

CSOs collaborated with government entities to implement programs in 2019. PO-RALG partnered with more than sixty national organizations on various programs. The Ministry of Health, Community Development, Gender, Elderly, and Children collaborated with THPS to renovate the Bungando Hospital laboratory and improve services to people living with HIV/AIDS. The Zanzibar Ministry of Health, UN Children’s Fund, Save the Children, and D-tree International worked together to enroll 227 community health volunteers in a new project to improve community health services. Milele Zanzibar Foundation, Zanzibar State University, and Forum for African Women Educationalists cooperated to improve teaching methodologies and girls’ involvement in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics in Zanzibar. At the district level, community development officers offered training to CSOs on agriculture, entrepreneurship, and financial management before providing them with funding. Local government authorities provided CHAVITA with sign-language training venues in Kwimba and Kondoa. Nature Protect, a conservation organization, entered into agreements with Itigi, Chunya, and Katavi district councils on protecting wildlife in southern corridors.

The business community contributed to CSOs’ social initiatives in 2019 by, for example, providing material support to the Matumaini Primary School, donating on Giving Tuesday, and taking part in various commemorations. The National Social Security Fund, CRDB Bank, Bank of Africa, and TIB Development Bank provided support to the TAWLA twenty-ninth annual general meeting in 2019.

CSOs’ public image was unchanged in 2019. The Tanzania Communication Regulatory Authority and government information officers continued to police media content on national issues under provisions of the laws on cybercrime, media services, and statistics. Clouds Radio, ITV, and Channel Ten dishonored contractual agreements with CSOs to air programs and spots that they deemed anti-government and refunded payments for these broadcasts. Major public and private television, radio, and print media, including TBC, ITV, and the Daily News, did not cover CSOs’ press statements or press conferences despite attending CSO events. CSOs resorted to using social media platforms and community media to air their views and engage with the public.

Public perceptions of CSOs remained positive in 2019, as communities relied on CSOs to provide services and serve as links to the government. The government turned to CSOs for information and expertise on various issues. The government usually viewed CSOs engaged in service provision more favorably than those dealing exclusively with advocacy, and it sometimes branded organizations or activists offering alternative analyses of public and national issues as supporters of the opposition or neo-colonialists.

The private sector viewed CSOs as partners and collaborated with them on issues of common interest in 2019, such as a favorable tax and business environment. Businesses provided CSOs with material support, especially for
initiatives helping vulnerable communities. Some businesses took part in Giving Tuesday and offered discounts to support CSOs’ programs.

CSOs foster positive press coverage with training, consultations, and press briefings for journalists and editors. For example, LHRC trained journalists on human rights monitoring and reporting in 2019. CSO Week in 2019 brought together a cross-section of local and national organizations to showcase their work and advocate for their interests before government officials and parliamentarians. As media was increasingly censored, CSOs adapted to social and online media to remain visible to diverse constituencies. Organizations such as ANGOZA, LHRC, and THRDC used Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube to engage with the public.

Organizations registered under the NGO Act are bound by the NGO Code of Conduct, which requires them to adhere to principles of accountability and transparency. They share organizational documents such as strategic plans and annual reports with members, government agencies, other stakeholders, and the public. Most national organizations, such as TAWLA, LHRC, THRDC, BMF, THPS, and HakiElimu, upload their strategic plans and annual reports to their websites. District and regional organizations submit their plans and reports to the district community and social welfare departments to ensure transparency and accountability.
As Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni served his thirty-third year in power in 2019, civic space in the country continued to be constrained. The government persisted in using the Public Order Management Act (POMA) to block peaceful gatherings. Members of opposition groups such as the Forum for Democratic Change and People’s Government Uganda were tear gassed, arrested, and prevented from conducting party activities. Between October and December, security forces used POMA to impede Fees Must Fall demonstrations by Makerere University students, who were challenging what they saw as unfair hikes in tuition. The police indefinitely banned well-known singer, activist, and parliament member Robert Kyagulanyi, also known as Bobi Wine, from conducting activities related to his presidential bid, although by law he is required to collect signatures to support his candidacy. Wine was also banned from holding concerts, and his promoters spent the year in and out of prison. Wine filed a petition in the High Court challenging the ban on his shows, which was unresolved at the end of the year. The Constitutional Court set a date in March 2020 for a judgment on a constitutional petition challenging POMA, which was submitted by the Human Rights Network and other CSOs.

Freedom of expression was restricted as security forces subjected journalists and media outlets to violence, harassment, and intimidation, according to the U.S. State Department’s 2019 Report on Human Rights Practices in Uganda. The Uganda Communications Commission ordered thirteen radio and television stations to suspend a total of thirty-nine staff members after they covered Wine in stories that the regulator claimed were “unbalanced, sensational and often [gave] undue prominence to specific individuals.” The public was banned from wearing red berets, which are widely regarded as the symbol of Wine’s People Power movement. Evangelist Joseph Kabuleta was arrested and held incommunicado for weeks until charged and imprisoned under the Computer Misuse Act 2011 and for “annoying the president.” Activist and scholar Dr. Stella Nyanzi was sentenced to eighteen months in prison for “cyber harassment” under the Computer Misuse Act.

The progressive Human Rights Enforcement Act was passed and assented to by the parliament in 2019. The law deters security officers from torturing citizens, halts illegal detentions beyond forty-eight hours, and makes individual officers liable for transgressions. Although the inspector general of police ordered police officers to adhere to the new law, many security personnel continued to torture suspects in custody and detain them beyond allowed time limits. Before even benefitting from the new law, Ugandans were shocked to learn that the government had started the process to amend the act. In November, the government gazetted eighteen regulations operationalizing the Uganda Communications Act 2013, which, in what many see as an attempt to curtail freedom of expression, extends regulatory oversight to online media. In a positive step, the president assented to the Data Protection and Privacy Act, which gives effect to Article 27(2) of the constitution providing for the protection of citizens’ rights to privacy.
The overall sustainability of the Ugandan CSO sector was stable in 2019. Service provision improved as the new Civil Society in Uganda Support Program (CUSP) helped CSOs serve their constituents more effectively. CSOs’ public image showed a slight improvement as organizations used various public and media platforms to showcase their work and share information. At the same time, the legal environment deteriorated slightly as CSOs experienced increased harassment, engaged in self-censorship, and were subject to a crackdown on dissent. The vibrancy of CSO advocacy dwindled slightly as many organizations remained in a mode of self-preservation because of police and administrative abuse. CSOs’ organizational capacity, financial viability, and sectoral infrastructure did not change.

The CSO sector in Uganda was comprised of 14,207 registered organizations in 2019, of which fewer than 3,810 organizations had valid permits, according to a verification exercise conducted by the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Bureau. Thousands of other CSOs exist as limited liability companies, and many more groups operate informally as community-based organizations (CBOs).

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.7**

The legal environment for civil society deteriorated slightly in 2019. All CSOs must register under the NGO Act 2016. The registration process is clear but elaborate. Organizations seeking to register must first incorporate as limited liability companies with the Uganda Registration Services Bureau (URSB); then register as NGOs with the NGO Bureau; and then apply for operating permits from the NGO Bureau. Registering organizations must also fulfill numerous other requirements, such as securing recommendations from multiple entities, including local governments and ministries. Each step involves fees that are unaffordable for many organizations. Because of the cost and burden of the registration process, many organizations stop seeking to register once they are incorporated as limited liability companies, or they operate informally as CBOs, which is permitted. The NGO Bureau often denies registration to groups whose charters declare that they intend to work on politics, the rights of sexual minorities, or other controversial issues. In so doing, the NGO Bureau usually cites Section 31 of the NGO Act, which bars the registration of CSOs whose objectives contravene the laws and interests of Uganda. Since those interests are not explicitly defined, the NGO Bureau may identify them at its discretion. Operating permits must be renewed periodically, with organizations having the option of paying for permits for one-, three-, or even five-year periods, depending on their capacity to pay. The permits impose strict limits on the geographical scope of organizations’ activities, and they may be revoked at the discretion of the NGO Bureau.

In 2019, the NGO Bureau conducted a three-month verification exercise to confirm that operating organizations had legal status. Many CSOs viewed the exercise as lacking a legal basis, and at least 70 percent of registered organizations refused to take part. The NGO Bureau declared that all organizations that did not verify their status would be viewed as operating illegally and that they had to validate their information to regain their NGO status. In a November 2019 press release, the NGO Bureau indicated that organizations that did not appear on the validated register should not operate. The bureau encouraged district NGO monitoring committees, police, banks, hotels, and financial regulatory bodies to check this registry regularly to determine the status of all organizations before interacting with them.

Implementation of the NGO Act 2016, which began in 2018, continued to be problematic in 2019. Government officials demanded inconsistent fees during registration, and local governments imposed differing interpretations of the requirement that CSOs share their work plans and budgets, with some even demanding that CSOs help fund local government budgets. While the law provides for the establishment of district-level NGO monitoring committees, the committees were inconsistently constituted and sometimes did not include adequate CSO representation. CSOs are required to sign memoranda of understanding with local chief administrators, who
sometimes use the agreements as a tool of control. For example, in 2019, a number of local authorities demanded that the memoranda be signed annually, which allowed them to harass organizations that they disliked. Some resident district commissioners demanded that CSOs sign memoranda with them as well, which is not in the new law.

Local security authorities continued to overstep their mandates in 2019. They issued notices requiring CSOs to submit random information, which the sector viewed as harassment. For instance, police in the Rwenzori sub-region asked CSOs to fill out forms indicating the names of their staff, whether they employed foreign staff, and whether they performed election-related work. CSOs viewed the last requirement as a sign that the police were identifying advocacy organizations to monitor in the run-up to the 2021 general elections. During an interagency security workshop in Munyonyo, a senior police officer was said to have mentioned “negative NGO advocacy” and singled out the Black Monday campaign as a security threat. A number of organizations in western Uganda reported that individuals from the Internal Security Organization (ISO) were present in their offices for days in an apparent effort to investigate their involvement in subversive activities. When contacted, the NGO Bureau confirmed that it had sent the ISO officials to conduct regular inspections of the organizations, which is provided for in the law. However, inspection procedures specified in the regulations, such as seven days' advance notice, were not followed.

The police invited representatives of various CSOs, including several international organizations, for questioning in 2019. A number of activists were arrested and illegally detained for engaging in protests and online blogging. For instance, young people from the Alternative Uganda social movement and Uganda Poor Youth Movement were arrested, tortured, and detained for protesting corruption in the parliament. The offices of a local CSO, Doing Good, were broken into by unknown thugs, and during the incident, five of their staff were wounded.

As provided in the Anti-Money Laundering Act 2013, the Financial Intelligence Authority (FIA) continued to demand that CSOs file reports regarding their funding and transactions and issued a notice in the newspapers reminding them to do so in 2019. CSOs viewed the requirement as a surveillance effort and excessive burden, since they already file reports with the URSB, Uganda Revenue Authority, National Security Fund, and NGO Bureau. The FIA sent banking institutions a list of thirteen organizations, including the Uganda National NGO Forum (UNNGOF), Citizens Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda (CCEDU), and Anti-Corruption Coalition of Uganda (ACCU), demanding information about their accounts. All of the listed CSOs focus on advocacy involving accountability, human rights, and governance, which the government views as subversive. The FIA said that it had credible information warranting an investigation of these CSOs under the Anti-Money Laundering Act, but it did not contact any of the organizations directly and had yet to issue a report about its investigations at the end of the year. The FIA’s actions created anxiety among CSOs, and many organizations shied away from engaging actively on critical public issues.

CSOs continued to pay value-added, pay-as-you-earn, withholding, and local service taxes in 2019. CSOs also paid a tax on financial transactions made through mobile phones, which was reduced from 1 percent in 2018 to 0.5 percent in 2019. The tax imposed a significant financial burden on CSOs, since donors often require them to pay vendors and other stakeholders through digital means such as mobile money. Although the law provides for the possibility of tax exemptions for CSOs, they rarely receive them unless donors such as embassies intervene. The minister of internal affairs said in 2019 that CSOs may apply for tax exemptions but must identify a ministry willing to cover the cost of their exemptions, which CSOs find is close to impossible.

Under the NGO Act, CSOs may conduct business operations, with any proceeds taxed under the rules for private businesses. Some CSOs are considering registering social enterprises to generate income, but many organizations believe that nonprofit organizations are still prohibited from operating businesses under the law.

CSOs are free to mobilize resources from foreign sources, although limits on the duration and geographical scope of operating permits can constrain their ability to negotiate long-term partnerships with potential donors. The FIA requires Ugandan banks to enforce a wide range of verification measures regarding resources coming into CSOs’ accounts from external sources, and many CSOs reported blocked funds and frozen bank accounts in 2019. CSOs are free to participate in calls for bids on projects in which the government is the lead implementer.

A number of law firms in Uganda have wide experience in human rights and other issues related to CSOs, but their services are unaffordable for most organizations. A few CSOs received pro bono services from Chapter 4 and the Legal Aid Service Providers Network in 2019. For example, Chapter 4 helped interested CSOs file the returns required by the FIA.

The 2019 CSO Sustainability Index for Uganda
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.1

CSOs’ organizational capacity did not change in 2019. A number of CSOs, including the Human Rights Center, Lira District NGO Forum, and Kick Corruption Out of Uganda (KICK-U), have developed close relationships with their beneficiaries and involve them in project development and implementation. In 2019, ActionAid Uganda engaged in a comprehensive and lengthy annual review process involving some of its partners and beneficiaries. The process was helpful in that it provided feedback from beneficiaries while making them feel valued as stakeholders. Other organizations often experience a disconnect with constituencies. In general, bottoms-up planning and the involvement of constituents in CSOs’ work have yet to gain traction. Informal groups such as Alternative Uganda, Solidarity Uganda, and Rhizing Women have invested heavily in training civic groups to build social movements, and this training was instrumental in nurturing student activist groups and successful demonstrations such as the Fees Must Fall campaign in 2019. ActionAid Uganda’s Activista Network, Western Ankole Civil Society Forum (WACSOF), and Make Bushenyi Great Again (MBUGA) are seeking to build social movements to compensate for the shrinking of civic space in the country, but the effort still needs work.

CSOs have mission, vision, and value statements, which they often pin up on their office walls. They sometimes have trouble connecting these statements to their action plans and projects, and very few organizations have the capacity to conduct periodic monitoring and evaluation exercises or midterm reviews to assess the ways in which their interventions help realize their mission statements. Although new regulations under the NGO Act require CSOs to have organizational plans, strategic planning tends to be largely donor driven. Few CSOs view strategic planning as a core programming activity. Even when they are able to engage in strategic planning, many organizations are frustrated in trying to raise the funding necessary to roll out their plans.

CSOs’ internal governance capacities ranged between fair and poor in 2019. Although a number of organizations demonstrated solid approaches to governance, several well-established CSOs reported conflicts between their boards and secretariats. A credible national-level network was on the brink of collapse after the outgoing board tried to bypass the general assembly and secure another term illegitimately. To resolve the situation, the secretariat and some board members involved the NGO Bureau, which instructed the organization to conduct an extraordinary annual general meeting to elect a new board. The NGO Law allows the bureau to intervene in such situations and this is often seen as preferable to involving the courts. In another national network, the staff teamed up with a faction on the board to take other board members to court over management issues. A number of organizations were unable to hold membership or annual general meetings because of similar conflicts and financial challenges. Local CSOs often struggle with founders’ syndrome, which hampers transparency and leadership transitions. Accountability and oversight in the sector is also undermined by executive directors serving on each other’s boards at many organizations. In 2019, CivSource Africa unveiled a coaching program designed to help CSO leaders avoid common governance challenges and manage transitions in their organizations.

Uganda’s civil society sector has accumulated a pool of relatively well-qualified human resources. The biggest challenge is that CSOs compete with other sectors for competent human resources. With donor funding dwindling and the majority of organizations receiving only project funding, CSOs often lack the stable income needed to attract and retain highly skilled staff. The attrition rate of CSO staff was high in 2019. At least four reputable organizations, including two international CSOs, struggled to replace director-level staff members who had departed. Because of funding challenges, many organizations rely on interns and volunteers to deliver their programs.

Some CSOs update their technology as funding allows, but the majority of organizations view this as a luxury and work with old equipment and software because of funding constraints and competing priorities. Only a few
organizations can afford training in digital security, which is offered by organizations such as Defend Defenders. A

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.2

CSOs’ financial viability remained the same in 2019. Most CSOs continued to rely on donor funding, and only a fraction of organizations had diversified funding sources. Reductions in donor funding levels and shifts in donor priorities had a negative impact on most organizations. CSOs’ dependence on donor financing is becoming unsustainable, and some organizations were forced to cut their operations or even close their offices because of a lack of funds.

There were no significant new sources of funding for CSOs in 2019. The Democratic Governance Facility (DGF), a conglomerate of funds from Austria, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the European Union (EU), remained the largest funder in 2019. But many CSOs have lost DGF funding for a number of reasons. Starting in 2017, DGF shifted from offering strategic or unrestricted funding to supporting specific projects only, which has undermined the financial viability of many CSOs. Eligibility conditions for DGF funding have become more restrictive and out of the reach of many organizations. A few funding entities, such as the Ford Foundation and CivSource Africa, unveiled new funding strategies in 2019, but they will not become operational until 2020.

Several CSOs raised resources for their work through consortia in 2019. The Strengthening Citizens’ Engagement in Elections (SCENE) project, funded by USAID, was awarded to a consortium composed of the Great Lakes Institute for Strategic Studies (GLISS), UNNGOF, and Forum for Women in Democracy.

CSOs are free to participate in calls for bids on projects in which the government is the lead implementer. In 2019, under the Development Initiative for Northern Uganda, the government received funds from the EU and the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund and awarded contracts to CSOs such as the Lira District NGO Forum to serve as implementing partners. This kind of funding is helpful supplemental income for the sector as direct donor funding dwindles.

The law permits CSOs to develop social enterprises, but most organizations have not explored this option, especially as donors are usually not so flexible as to allow their funds to be invested in starting up businesses. Some membership organizations have tried to mobilize resources from their members. These efforts have not met with much success, and CSOs’ incomes from their members constitutes a small fraction of their total budgets. Very few CSOs sell products or services to supplement their income.

CSOs tried a couple of new approaches to funding their work in 2019, such as developing local philanthropy. In addition to rolling out small grants to artists under the Kuonyesha Art Fund, CivSource Africa engaged CSOs in discussions about local philanthropy to help them realize that it is possible to tap into local funding. Several CSOs began contributing to the Ujasiri Fund, a local fund that aims to develop a pool of resources to support important civic work without the strain of working with donors. The Uhuru Institute for Social Development helped civic groups form savings and cooperative unions, while its offspring, the Nafasi cooperative, continued to grow and provide loan, insurance, and banking services to CSOs and their staff.

Efforts to improve transparency and accountability in the CSO sector reached a new high in 2019, as DGF’s forensic audits of several large organizations revealed serious loopholes related to fiduciary risk. A CSO working group was set up to undertake candid conversations about these findings with the aim of cleaning up the sector. The conversations revealed that some donor staff members had allegedly connived with grantee staff to commit financial irregularities. Several organizations lost funding and credibility, but by the end of 2019, CSOs and donors were engaged in a robust collaboration to address the challenges and build stronger financial management systems.
While this process is helping to push CSOs towards better accountability and sounder financial systems, the sector is still weak in this area.

**ADVOCACY: 3.7**

The vibrancy of advocacy work in Uganda has dwindled since the 2016 elections and continued to deteriorate slightly in 2019. No notable collective advocacy effort rallied either CSOs or large segments of public in 2019. Most organizations have been in a mode of self-preservation since the police raids on GLISS, Public Affairs Center (PAC), and other organizations in 2017. With police and administrative harassment still prevalent in 2019, advocacy CSOs maintained their protective stance.

CSOs take part in working committees in government ministries, departments, and agencies through their platforms and apex bodies. For instance, UNNGOF represents CSOs on the National Planning Authority Expanded Board and Africa Peer Review Mechanism Governing Council. At the local level, CSOs take part in district budgeting and planning processes. The NGO Act provides for CSO representation on the board of the NGO Bureau and district and sub-county NGO monitoring committees. These platforms provide formal lines of communication between the CSO sector and the government.

CSOs in Uganda have the capacity to conduct effective advocacy. In 2019, CSOs successfully supported amendments to the electoral laws through community engagements, media discussions, and social media posts. CSOs presented a detailed analysis of the bill to the parliament, which included at least 90 percent of their proposals in the final bill. In December, CSOs re-launched the Black Monday crusade against corruption, breathing new life into the movement and re-igniting public optimism.

Despite these successes, CSO advocacy is hampered by the government’s reluctance to engage on issues of governance and accountability. Advocacy efforts are driven by a few organizations able to form coalitions and mobilize other stakeholders. But the country’s political polarization impedes the work even of these organizations. Name-calling by government officials if CSOs advocate on controversial issues induces many organizations to engage in self-censorship.

Lobbying is not a common practice in Uganda. Although CSOs seek to engage with decision-makers, the nature of Ugandan politics makes it hard to identify where power actually lies, and CSOs spend a lot of time lobbying people with little or no influence. CSOs sometimes invest in hiring analysts who understand power relationships. Some CSOs use their informal relationships with members of parliament and key decision makers to influence important decisions.

Ugandan CSOs are assertive in advocating for a favorable legal and operating environment and engage regularly with the government to promote favorable reforms. In 2019, UNNGOF, working with the Human Rights Center and the NGO Bureau, organized quarterly meetings of CSO leaders and representatives of the Ministry for Internal Affairs and other government entities to discuss issues affecting the relationship between CSOs and government. These organizations also sought to inform the sector about the NGO Act.
SERVICE PROVISION: 3.5

Service delivery by Ugandan CSOs improved slightly in 2019 as the CUSP program helped CSOs serve their constituents more effectively. With funding from the EU and German Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), CUSP offered CSOs technical support so that they could better respond to community needs and better articulate those needs in their strategic plans. Organizations such as WACSOF, Kabarole NGOs/CBOs Association, Lira NGO Forum, Amuria CSO Network, Kitgum NGO Forum, and Iganga District NGO Forum benefitted from CUSP support. These and other beneficiary CSOs worked in a wide range of service areas, including renewable energy and energy efficiency, rural development, water and sanitation, good governance, and civil society strengthening. By the end of 2019, CUSP was operating in all fourteen regions of Uganda, and with its support, many organizations and district networks had improved their service-provision capacities.

CSOs are still among the biggest providers of services and humanitarian aid in Uganda, and they reach a significant proportion of the population. In 2019, CSOs continued to provide services to communities in areas such as education, water, and health care. The Danish Refugee Council, Bondoko Refugee Livelihoods Center, Action Against Hunger, and many other organizations provided services to Uganda’s more than 1.3 million refugees. Their support ranged from food supplies, safe water, and medical relief to legal aid and human rights services. Organizations such as the Red Cross, Water Aid, and Build Africa provided aid to victims of a landslide in Bududa, in the eastern part of the country. The Red Cross, for example, offered medical care and provided families affected by the landslide with kits containing cooking essentials, blankets, soap, tarpaulins, and mosquito nets. CSOs also offered vital services to victims of a mudslide in Kasese, in western Uganda, in 2019.

CSOs’ services are generally responsive to citizens’ priorities and are usually of better quality than those provided by the government. CSOs rely largely on observation, surveys, and interactive needs assessments to gauge constituencies’ needs. For example, TWAAWEZA, Oxfam, UNNGOF, and the Institute for Social Economic Research conduct needs-based assessments to understand the needs of their constituencies and of other CSOs. These assessments, which are sometimes funded by donors, have been helpful in informing sector-wide programming. Only a few organizations, such as ActionAid Uganda, Oxfam, UNNGOF, Kabarole Research and Resource Center, Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment, Action Africa Help, and Uganda Women’s Network, conduct impact assessments to collect data and document their achievements. For example, in its 2019–23 strategic plan posted on its website, Action Africa Help notes that its five-year strategic review found that they had directly reached 11.5 million people in need with life-saving and resilience-building support, investing $125 million over a five-year period.

In 2019, Oxfam and UNNGOF mapped out the value of CSOs’ services for the country’s development over the ten-year period from 2009 to 2019. The study found that CSO services go beyond their memberships to reach broader communities and do not discriminate in targeting their audiences.

CSOs rarely charge for the services they provide, since the majority of Ugandans are unable to pay.

The government appreciates the complimentary role played by CSOs in the provision of services. Its appreciation is generally greater at the local level. For example, in 2019, the Office of the Inspector General of Government gave recognition awards for a progressive partnership in fighting corruption to several local CSOs, including the Recreation for Peace and Development, Kick Corruption Out of Kigezi, Western Ankole Civil Society Forum, and Mid-Western Anti-Corruption Coalition. Such awards would be unheard of at the national level.
The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector was stagnant in 2019. CSO resource centers are located mainly in urban areas, and they continued to provide training and other support to a fair number of both urban and remote CSOs in 2019. Some organizations operate resource centers that offer support specific to certain programming areas. For example, the Uganda Project Implementation and Management Center (UPIMAC) hosts an elaborate center on civic education, and the Center for Basic Research focuses on social research. In 2019, CUSP operated regional hubs in Kampala, Gulu, Mbale, Arua, and Moroto, which offered technical assistance to CSOs in a wide range of areas. Additional hubs were scheduled to open in Mbarara, Fort Portal, and Kabale to service the western region.

Very few local organizations re-grant donor funding. With the support of bigger donors, CivSource Africa operates several re-granting programs, including the Kwonyesha Art Fund and the Zishaye Fund, which are still in their infancy. The International Development Fund struggled to get back on its feet in 2019 after fiduciary challenges caused the DGF, its major donor, to withdraw funding in 2017. The majority of re-granting entities are based in foreign countries. For example, the seven-year Strengthening Uganda’s Anti-Corruption and Accountability Regime (SUGAR) program, which wound up in 2019, was operated by the U.S.-based organization Research Triangle International.

Ugandan CSOs recognize the power of collective action and often come together to pursue joint agendas and share information. Among the many networks uniting sub-sectors of CSOs are the Development Network for Indigenous Voluntary Associations, Uganda Governance Monitoring Platform, and Youth Chapter on the African Charter for Democracy, Elections, and Good Governance. After a retreat of CSO leaders at the end of the year, which was supported by USAID under the SCENE project, the main apex body, UNNGOF, issued a New Year’s statement spelling out CSOs’ common aspirations and commitments for 2020. At end of 2019, discussions were taking place about forming a joint vehicle for CSOs to engage in the 2021 elections. Young people formed the Platform for Youth Inclusion in Politics to have a voice on governance issues and the upcoming elections. The Uhuru Institute, NGO Forum, CivSource Africa, and Innovations for Democratic Engagement and Action convened meetings to discuss alternative business and fundraising models for CSOs during the year. Despite their number, many coalitions, especially in rural areas, are not sustainable because they lack resources and have limited capacities for productive collaboration.

Ugandan CSOs had access to a number of training opportunities in 2019, although overall, the training provided by international organizations seemed to decrease. Through the CUSP program, organizations were trained in internal governance, organizational policy development, fundraising, the use of digital equipment and other topics. ActionAid Uganda and Oxfam offered capacity-building programs in organizational development and financial management to some of their implementing partners, while the Fredrich-Ebert-Stiftung and Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung supported training in policy analysis and development programs for young CSO leaders. The Uganda Youth Network and Youth Line Forum operated youth academies on politics for young CSO leaders, while Akina Mama wa Africa, Forum for Women in Democracy, and Mentoring Empowerment Program for Young Women offered mentorship programs for young feminists in 2019. A number of CSOs sent their staff to the MS Training Center for Development Cooperation for training. The Uganda Management Institute offered academic courses on CSO management, and for more specialized training, CSOs engaged qualified consultants and trainers, if they could afford them. In general, CSOs have not invested meaningfully in sustainable approaches to training without donor funding.

CSOs continued to appreciate the need to build partnerships with the media in 2019. CSOs and media outlets enjoyed symbiotic relationships, with CSOs developing resource materials such as research which the media then helped disseminate. ActionAid Uganda partnered with the Nation Media Group on the Integrity Awards, which recognizes public servants who exhibit acts of integrity, honesty, and moral value. CSOs and media also
collaborated to protect each other’s space in 2019. For example, Chapter 4, Center for Constitutional Governance, and other CSOs spearheaded a petition to overturn the ban imposed by the Uganda Communications Commission on media coverage of People Power leaders and Bobi Wine.

CSOs continued to partner with government in various ways in 2019, which helped to improve their relationship. For instance, UNNGOF and the Human Rights Center worked with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and NGO Bureau to organize activities aimed at publicizing and implementing the NGO Policy and NGO Act in a partnership supported by the Irish Aid. CSOs also met quarterly with the minister for internal affairs and participated in other joint meetings at the community level.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.1**

CSOs’ public image improved slightly in 2019 as CSOs used various public and media platforms to showcase their work, share information, and raise citizens’ awareness about governance and development issues.

Private media normally covered CSOs’ activities regularly and in an impartial way in 2019. In contrast, public media, which serves as a government mouthpiece, often distorted CSOs’ messages, especially if they were critical of government. Some media outlets, including Mulengera Express, Red Pepper, Nile Broadcasting, and Chimp Reports, ran inaccurate stories about the relationships between individual CSO leaders and their donors. The stories created the false impression of a crisis of accountability and leadership in the sector. However, the stories were short-lived, as CSOs and donors were able to clarify the issues in the mainstream media by issuing press releases and making guest appearances on different media platforms. CSOs often pay for program-specific coverage to ensure clear messaging. Activities by major CSOs in urban areas typically drew more media attention than those of CBOs or CSOs in rural areas.

Most of the public sees the CSO sector as legitimate, and CSOs enjoy good reputations based on their service delivery and ability to check government excesses. The public seems to trust CSOs more than the government, despite government narratives labeling CSOs as unaccountable and agents of foreign interests. Public understanding of the concept of civil society seems to be clear, as seen in the public’s supportive attitude towards CSOs’ work.

The relationship between the central government and civil society remained tense amid the government’s claims that CSOs were engaged in subversive activities in 2019. In one of his addresses, the president claimed that the People Power movement received money from certain CSOs to destabilize the country, and he vowed to crush the organizations. Although some local leaders also view CSOs as subversive, local governments are generally supportive of CSOs, especially those engaged in service delivery, which they view as stakeholders in the country’s development. Interestingly, many government stakeholders, even at national level, rely on CSOs’ data and expertise.

The business sector’s perception of CSOs is inconsistent. Some businesses seek partnerships with CSOs, while others have created limited liability companies to do the work that ordinarily would be performed through partnerships with existing CSOs.

CSOs with sufficient funding and capacity, such as FARAJA Africa Foundation, sought to gain visibility by building an online presence in 2019. By the end of the year, a number of CSOs had Twitter accounts and had organized Twitter chats and live sessions on Facebook. Some CSOs have elaborate websites. A number of CSO leaders participated in trainings about telling their stories in 2019, which should help them correct negative perceptions about CSOs perpetrated by government officials. At the end of the year, UNNGOF and Oxfam were concluding a survey documenting the contributions of CSOs to development, which will also help improve the image of CSOs.

Participation in Uganda’s Quality Assurance Mechanism (QuAM), a self-regulatory mechanism to enhance CSOs’ capacities and promote ethical conduct, was fairly low in 2019, mainly because the QuAM secretariat lacked the
funding for effective outreach. Some large CSOs, such as BRAC Uganda, UNNGOF, and World Vision, publish their annual reports with audited accounts on their website or in hard copies. Other organizations may present reports to their general assemblies. Many organizations do not take the trouble to publicize their reports at all.
Zambia continued to experience a high level of political tension in 2019. Leadership struggles in the ruling party, the Patriotic Front (PF), were compounded by inimical interparty relationships, particularly between the PF and the main opposition party, the United Party for National Development. By-elections in February 2019 in Sesheke District were disrupted by extreme violence. After opposition parties accused the PF of mismanagement and corruption, the government denied actors that it saw as opponents of their rights to assemble and access the media. The president of the opposition National Democratic Congress was arrested on charges of defaming the president in August 2019. Many observers saw the ruling party’s intolerance of dissent and disregard for institutional safeguards as a sign of its determination to win the elections in 2021.

The parliament approved the National Dialogue Bill in 2019, which provided for the establishment of the National Dialogue Forum, composed largely of government representatives and members of parliament. The forum was contentious among CSOs, and those that participated were viewed as pro-government by some members of the public. The stated purpose of the forum, which convened in April, was to facilitate the implementation of constitutional and institutional reforms related to issues such as the separation of powers, judicial independence, elections, freedom of assembly, and civility in politics. Before concluding in May, the forum adopted the draft Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Bill, Electoral Process (Amendment) Bill, and Public Order Bill for possible enactment by the parliament. The Constitution Amendment Bill 10, which contains two other bills and addresses additional issues, such as the formation of coalition governments, was presented to the parliament in August. All but three opposition or independent members walked out of the parliament to protest the bill, which threatens to weaken horizontal accountability between the parliament, the judiciary, and the executive and increase the power of the president. A parliamentary select committee was still reviewing the bill at the end of the year. CSOs keenly followed the discussions on Bill 10, as it was known, and were largely against it, claiming it did not take into account many important public concerns.

Zambia’s economy continued to falter in 2019. By the end of the year, the rate of growth stood at 2.3 percent, considerably lower than the 4 percent anticipated by the government. The government’s economic austerity program began to exact a harsh toll on the public, and households suffered under a steep rise in prices, particularly of food, fuel, and energy. The prolonged drought in Zambia increased food insecurity. The country’s domestic debt service repayment obligations and the declining value of the national currency caused public services to deteriorate.

Zambia’s worsening political and economic climate in 2019 had serious repercussions for civil society. Although the overall sustainability of the CSO sector did not change, CSOs’ organizational capacity deteriorated slightly as...
even larger organizations found it difficult to retain qualified staff, meet financial obligations such as taxes, and undertake outreach activities such as communications and meetings with beneficiaries. CSOs’ financial viability weakened slightly as very little government funding was available and larger organizations faced significantly decreased budgets for several years in a row. CSO advocacy improved slightly as the sector engaged successfully in a number of initiatives, including through coalitions, which offered a united voice while reducing operating costs. CSOs’ public image was also stronger thanks to increased coverage by private media. CSOs’ legal environment, service provision, and sectoral infrastructure did not change.

As of December 2019, 4,154 organizations were registered with the Registrar of Societies and 418 organizations were registered with the Patents and Companies Registration Agency as companies limited by guarantee. An additional 1,228 organization were registered under the NGO Act.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.9

The legal environment for CSOs in Zambia was unchanged in 2019. Most organizations register with the Registrar of Societies under the Societies Act and, in some cases, with the Patents and Companies Registration Agency under the Companies Act. Mostly because of a lack of information, some CSOs register under the 2009 NGO Act, which is slated to be repealed and replaced by a new law. Registration requirements and processes under all three laws are fairly straightforward, and most CSOs were able to register without much difficulty in 2019. CSOs in rural areas faced the hurdle of needing to travel to provincial centers to file their applications and annual reports, which increased their costs, especially as they could also experience requests for bribes for their paperwork to be processed in a timely manner. No CSO was reported dissolved in 2019.

In collaboration with the Council of NGOs, the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services began the process of repealing the 2009 NGO Act in 2019. CSOs oppose the current act, as they view it as unconstitutional and conducive to the exercise of arbitrary governmental authority. Information about the review process was limited, inconsistent, and not widely publicized. The reform of the Public Order Act, which the government has used to suppress freedom of assembly, also began in 2019 and proceeded at a slow pace. A revised Public Order Bill was presented in draft at a meeting of secretary generals of political parties in Siavonga, which proceeded the National Dialogue Forum. Among the proposed amendments were provisions to safeguard the right of freedom of assembly and association and to regulate the conduct of public gatherings to preserve public order. The Access to Information Bill, which has been pending since 2002, was approved by the cabinet in March 2019 and then tabled in the parliament for enactment. The bill made little progress, and CSOs established a coalition to advocate for its enactment, led by the Jesuit Center for Theological Reflection. These unfinished legislative processes meant that CSOs operated in a legal framework that was uncertain and prone to manipulation by the authorities.

Three laws implemented in 2019 seemed likely to put an additional strain on CSOs’ operations. The National Health Insurance Act of 2018, Skills Act of 2017, and Employment Code Act of 2019 are progressive in the sense of providing for better conditions for workers, but they impose new financial burdens on organizations that have already experienced years of financial decline.

Civic space in Zambia continued to shrink in 2019, as the Public Order Act, Penal Code, and other laws were selectively applied. Activities such as protests, petitions, and demonstrations were restricted unless the government viewed them as aligned with its interests. For instance, in February 2019, PF extra-legal militias known as cadres staged an illegal protest at the parliament building against the outcome of the Sesheke parliamentary by-election. Although the protesters failed to follow established procedures, the police took no step to arrest them. In contrast, the police were quick to arrest a well-known rap artist when he met with youth to discuss governance...
issues in a church in Livingstone in December. Some civil society members and activists were arrested in December 2019 on the grounds that their meeting was deemed “unlawful assembly.” The uneven application of laws was particularly unfavorable to organizations working on political issues, public finance, public accountability, and economic governance, which the government considers provocative. The authorities were very critical of advocacy carried out by Chapter One, which claimed that Bill 10 would increase presidential powers, and the Alliance for Community Action, which focuses on public accountability. The Non-Governmental Organizations Coordinating Council (NGOCC), World Wide Care for Nature (now Care For Nature), and Governance, Elections, Advocacy, Research Services also experienced a degree of harassment during the year. The government was somewhat more tolerant of CSO advocacy on issues related to service provision.

The police refused to sanction notifications of peaceful demonstrations by artists, CSOs, and other activists over corruption and the misuse of public resources in June and the closure of higher learning institutions, such as the Copperbelt University, in June and July 2019. The increased involvement of security forces, especially the Zambia Police Service and PF cadres, contributed to a sense of fear among CSOs. CSOs working on issues unpopular with the government, such as public finance and governance, engaged in self-censorship, especially after several radio stations featuring opposition political party leaders were attacked by cadres. The ability of most non-state actors to mobilize like-minded organizations against government actions diminished, and activists grew less inclined to be critical of the government as fears of imprisonment or threats to their families’ welfare multiplied.

In 2019, CSOs continued to be eligible for exemptions on excise duties, value-added tax, and income tax, on the recommendation of the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services and at the discretion of the minister of finance. Although international CSOs regularly receive exemptions, domestic CSOs, especially those that focus on advocacy, do not.

CSOs may undertake fundraising activities and accept foreign funding. They may engage in profit-making activities provided they register as businesses. Social enterprises are allowed but uncommon in Zambia.

Legal fees continued to be beyond what most CSOs could afford in 2019. Organizations such as Chapter One and Anchor Justice Zambia offer subsidized legal assistance to CSOs, which resulted in better representation for organizations facing legal difficulties in the shrinking civic space in 2019.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.4**

The organizational capacities of CSOs deteriorated slightly in 2019, largely because of the sector’s continuing financial decline. This deterioration particularly affected CSOs in rural and outlying areas, but it was also evident at some of the best-known mainstream organizations as they struggled to meet operational costs. For instance, Caritas Zambia, Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR), Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP), Zambia Center For Inter-Party Dialogue (ZCID), Jesuit Center for Theological Reflections (JCTR), and Anti-Voter Apathy Project (AVAP) all found it difficult to retain qualified staff, meet financial obligations such as taxes, and undertake outreach activities such as communications and meetings with beneficiaries. CBOs, FBOs, and informal, interest-based groupings such as marketeers’ and traders’ groups tended to operate more effectively on limited means than well-established organizations, probably because they are socially oriented and do not have to pay costs associated with formal legal status. In this way, Zambian CSOs with the capacities needed to operate at the highest level are sometimes undermined most by inadequate financial and other support.

Zambian CSOs usually engage with the communities in which they operate to ensure their programs’ success. Interventions by CSOs in communities in which they have had a presence for more than five years tend to be the most successful. Most CSOs had to reduce services and outreach activities in 2019 because they lacked financial resources. For example, CSPR could not monitor public-service delivery in most of its targeted areas. NGOCC
had to reorganize its countrywide membership to implement activities with fewer resources. Similarly, organizations such as JCTR, AVAP, Southern African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD), and FODEP cut down on their outreach activities as a result of inadequate resources.

Many CSOs have mission and values statements, objectives, strategic plans, and organograms but lacked the resources to implement them in 2019. In some cases, CSOs were unable to create new strategic plans or resorted to creating plans internally because they did not have the resources to hire consultants to facilitate the process. The internally developed plans often lacked good analysis and incorporated activities that are not very responsive to the needs of targeted groups. The activities of CSOs in service provision were increasingly influenced by donors’ interests in 2019. For example, the number of CSOs engaged in climate change increased, largely because of the availability of donor funding. Donors’ interests sometimes diverted CSOs from critical areas, especially those related to political, social, and economic governance. For instance, only a few mainly urban-based CSOs were able to engage in political and policy processes, even although it was clear that matters such as inequality and poverty worsened during the year.

Organizational activities, such as annual general meetings, board meetings, and advisory committees, became less common in 2019, as most CSOs lacked sufficient resources to conduct them. As a result, organizations often operated without adequate oversight and guidance or failed to make critical decisions because the decision makers could not convene. While many CSOs have written policies and systems in place, adherence to them was sometimes hampered by a lack of staffing. Inadequate staffing also made it difficult for some organizations to maintain appropriate divisions of organizational roles.

Larger CSOs, such as CSPR, JCTR, FODEP, and Zambia Council for Social Development (ZCSD), continued to find it difficult to afford to hire qualified persons to fill prescribed duties and roles. Some organizations had to trim their staff to secure a degree of financial stability. For instance, CSPR could not engage officers to fill key positions in communications and advocacy and had trouble maintaining volunteers as well. Some CSOs received capacity building provided by international aid agencies in 2019, which helped them improve their capacities in advocacy and project management.

Most CSOs are located in easily accessed offices with functioning equipment and furnishings. However, CSOs’ offices often do not match their organizational capacities. The condition of much equipment is worsening, and it is rarely updated or upgraded because of the lack of trained staff, reductions in funding, and donors’ withdrawal of institutional support. It is especially common to find outdated machinery and dilapidated furniture at local and rural CSOs. Most organizations do not have reliable internet connections.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.0**

CSOs’ financial viability deteriorated for the fourth year in a row in 2019. Most mainstream national CSOs, including Society for Women and Aids in Zambia (SWAAZ), NGOCC, FODEP, Caritas Zambia, and JCTR, remained financially weak and could not implement major activities. Observers have noted that most well-established CSOs in Zambia, such as CSPR, SACCORD, ZCID, and Zambia Association for Research and Development, have received half or less of their anticipated annual budgets for several years. The poor financial situation of lead organizations negatively impacted smaller CSOs, since they usually depend on large national organizations for support. Because of drops in funding, some CSOs failed to implement activities or reach all of their targeted populations in 2019.

CSOs continued to depend overwhelmingly on funding from international donors in 2019, as locally sourced funding is rarely available. Among the most significant awards of funding in 2019, the European Union continued to support a number of CSOs involved in justice and gender-based violence (GBV), with grants going to BBC Media.
Action, Lifeline/Childline Zambia, World Vision, and their many partners. A variety of urban and rural CSOs accessed financial support from Norwegian Church Aid, German Agency for International Cooperation, and Hivos, while service-providing CSOs benefited from funding from international CSOs such as Water Aid, World Vision, and Plan International. Most organizations received program-based funding rather than institutional support and experienced a reduction in funding from previous years.

Very little government funding was available in 2019. The only CSO known to have received direct funding from the government was ZCID, which has received institutional support from the Ministry of Justice since 2011.

Some companies have established corporate social responsibility programs and work with individual CSOs to provide communities with specific services. The establishment in 2019 of the Corporate Social Responsibility Network Zambia, a group of business and corporate institutions, prompted several corporations, including Airtel Zambia, Zambeef, Lafarge, and Maamba Collieries, to increase their support for CSO projects in education, health care, water and sanitation, housing, and economic empowerment.

Several CSOs, including the Center for Trade Policy and Development, raised funds from individual donations, service consultancies, or trainings for fellow CSOs at a fee. Most membership-based CSOs, including the Economics Association of Zambia and NGOCC, were unable to collect membership fees to adequately supplement their funding from other sources.

Several CSOs were unable to access funding directly from donors in 2019 because they failed to submit requested audited accounts. This failure resulted mainly from poor financial management systems, including the lack of qualified staff such as accountants and weak governance by boards and other oversight bodies.

**ADVOCACY: 3.3**

CSO advocacy improved slightly in 2019. The sector was actively engaged in areas ranging from water and sanitation, climate change, health care, and nutrition to public accountability, constitutional and judicial reform, gender equality, and disaster management. The areas of focus were largely determined by the willingness of donors to provide support.

CSOs generally cooperated effectively with the government on issues of policy implementation in 2019. CSOs’ most visible policy work with the government concerned service provision, and focus areas included water and sanitation, small-scale farming, nutrition, small-scale entrepreneurship, and the monitoring of the Seventh National Development Plan. For example, the NGO WASH Forum helped shape budget allocations and the policy and institutional framework for water and sanitation. Similar efforts were undertaken by CHAZ in health care and the Zambia National Education Coalition (ZANEC) in education. ZCID convened a meeting of political party secretary generals before the National Dialogue Forum to discuss the forum and the electoral code of conduct. CSOs also worked with the Ministry of Gender to promote gender issues.

CSOs on both the national and local levels developed effective strategies to cope with the changing political and financial landscape in 2019. For instance, CSOs increasingly worked in networks to present a strong united voice while sharing operating costs. Networks of women’s organizations and CSOs addressing gender-related issues were particularly effective. Under the NGOCC, a large intersectoral network on child marriage composed of government, CSO, donor, traditional, and church representatives increased the number of children retrieved from under-age marriages and helped empower them through training or school. In 2019, NGOCC established an intersectoral network on GBV and sexual violence, which included organizations such as Legal Resource Foundation, Women in Law in Southern Africa, Women in Law and Development in Africa, Law Association of Zambia, and the National Legal Clinic for Women. The network undertook advocacy that contributed to the rehabilitation of correctional facilities, a reduction in the backlog of pending cases, and better training of justice
personnel, especially at the local level. Seven CSOs, led by the Zambia National Women’s Lobby, partnered to promote women’s participation in the 2021 elections.

In other advocacy action, CSPR, NGOCC, and JCTR addressed reform of the national budgeting process and decent employment and remuneration through the Basic Needs Basket project. Restless Development, a youth-focused organization, undertook advocacy to advance young people’s sexual and reproductive health. CSOs were able to stop several mining projects in the lower Zambezi, publicly question the demarcation of Forest 27 for residences for the ruling elites, and ask for explanation of public expenditures on infrastructure such as roads. Many of these efforts were implemented through outreach structures at the provincial and district levels.

Although advocacy remained centralized in Lusaka, the year witnessed a growth of initiatives at the local level, particularly on the environment, climate change, sexual violence and GBV, and youth empowerment. CSOs initiated strong interventions in a number of provinces—for example, on climate change and the environment in Lunga, Milenge, Mwense, Chifunabuli, and Mwansambwe districts in Luapula Province; on agriculture and sustainable development in Chipata District in Eastern Province and Kalomo District in Southern Province; on climate change in the southern, central, and northern parts of the country; and on access to justice in most provinces. Local and rural communities were generally silent on issues related to the country’s political, economic, and financial governance.

Given the declining convening power of most organizations, some CSOs resorted to use radio and social media to campaign and mobilize communities. For example, MISA-Zambia and its partners continued to air radio programs on access to information, and CSPR hosted radio programs on Breeze FM in Chipata, Q-FM in Lusaka, and Radio Lyambai in Mongu district. CSPR enhanced its use of Facebook to disseminate its messages widely. It is not known whether such strategies led to sustainable influence or transformative change.

In 2019, CSOs, in collaboration with the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services, began to work on repealing and replacing the NGO Act of 2009 with new legislation that is more supportive of CSOs and democracy in Zambia. The process was not well publicized until towards the end of the year, when cooperating partners made funding available for the reform process.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.3**

CSO service provision did not change in 2019. CSOs continued to engage in service provision in many areas, including education, health care, economic and financial empowerment, water and sanitation, and housing. Through their members, NGOCC and Women for Change provided services addressing adult literacy and climate change adaptation strategies, while ZANEC and the Forum for African Women Educationalists of Zambia focused on ensuring an education for vulnerable populations, especially young children and children rescued from early marriages.

Zambian CSOs respond effectively to the needs of diverse target populations, usually by conducting baseline studies and undertaking needs assessments in targeted areas. During the year, local CSOs intervened in communities in Southern, Western, and Eastern provinces to alleviate hunger and help communities cope with the damage caused by floods and drought. In other parts of the country, FBOs distributed fertilizer and seed to small-scale farmers in remote areas. CSOs were also involved in malaria prevention, fish restocking, re-forestation, and conservation.

CSO services are generally provided to beneficiaries beyond their organizational members, even if CSOs target certain areas because they have members there. In most cases, CSOs do not seek to recover costs for services provided.
The ruling elites tend to be supportive of CSOs’ interventions if they contribute to perceptions that the government is fulfilling its promise to provide tangible goods and services. Government officials usually officiate at events such as CSOs’ handover of community infrastructure that they have constructed, and they generally acknowledge CSOs’ partnerships with the government and their contributions to Zambia’s development. For instance, in 2019, the government went on record recognizing the contribution of CSOs, especially FBOs, in the fight against hunger through their distribution of food in southern, western, and eastern parts of the country affected by drought and floods.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.9**

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector in Zambia was largely unchanged in 2019.

CSOs have little access to resource centers, especially outside of Lusaka. To some extent, the needs of rural CSOs are addressed through collaboration with urban CSOs, which may offer capacity building, share information, and help ensure the participation of rural CSOs in national and regional meetings. Existing resource centers mainly offer library services, such as documentation and internet access. Organizations such as the Zambia Association for Research and Development and Women for Change have physical spaces that they call “resource rooms,” where they provide reading space, media services, research reports, policy and program documents, and books for other CSOs to use. None of these organizations undertook any form of expansion or rehabilitation of their rooms in 2019, and the rooms were used mainly by students and a few researchers.

International CSOs such as ActionAid Zambia and Oxfam regrant donor funds to address locally identified needs and projects. Local organizations such as CHAZ provided critical support to many CSOs in 2019. Using resources from Norwegian Church Aid and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, CHAZ provided grants to a number of organizations for HIV-prevention activities.

CSOs in Zambia often work in networks and coalitions. Although there is not one overall umbrella organization, various issue-specific network organizations coordinate the work of groups of CSOs. For instance, Publish What You Pay coordinates CSOs focused on transparency and accountability in the management of natural resources, and the Zambia Tax Platform coordinates CSOs involved with tax issues.

In 2019, the Zambia Governance Foundation provided training on alternative approaches to financial sustainability, such as social enterprises and philanthropy, to its partner organizations, which are mainly CBOs and middle-sized CSOs. Some CSOs lacking the resources to sponsor staff training received capacity building in advocacy and project management provided by international aid agencies in 2019.

CSOs engaged in several important intersectoral initiatives in 2019. For example, in collaboration with CSPR and the African Forum on Debt and Development, the Consumer Unity and Trust Society hosted a symposium on the public debt, which was attended by private-sector, government, academic, and CSO representatives.
The public image of CSOs improved slightly in 2019 as coverage by private media increased. CSOs were seen as representing the public interest on several important issues, including women’s rights, Bill 10, and mining activities in the Lower Zambezi National Park. Most media portray CSOs, regardless of type, as development agents. But public and private media often differ in their emphasis. For instance, while many media outlets covered CSOs’ response to food scarcity in Southern, Eastern, and Western provinces in 2019, public media usually highlighted CSOs’ development role, while private media often added statements by stakeholders who condemned the government for its failure to declare hunger a national disaster.

CSOs’ image among government officials is largely politicized. The authorities generally have positive views of service-providing CSOs as bolstering the government’s performance and legitimacy, and they are tolerant of CSOs that engage in advocacy related to service provision. They are intolerant of CSOs that advocate for human rights and good governance. Government perceptions of CSOs can influence some donors, making them more inclined to fund FBOs, whose image is rarely tarnished in public debate.

The public tends to view CSOs in a positive light, even when they are criticized by the government. CSOs engaged in advocacy are often perceived as the voice of the people, especially in urban areas. Service-providing organizations are viewed approvingly as promoting positive change for vulnerable and poor populations.

CSOs in Zambia sought to promote their image in 2019 by publicizing their activities through press releases and invitations to journalists to cover their activities. CSOs also trained journalists on how to report on specific development issues. For instance, CSPR offered training to journalists on covering the Seventh National Development Plan and the national budget. The trainings helped create a pool of journalists that can effectively cover CSOs’ work.

Well-established CSOs continued to produce annual and financial reports in 2019, which they are required to submit to the government. The new NGO Act is expected to address the issue of self-regulation and include a CSO code of conduct.
ZIMBABWE

Capital: Harare
Population: 14,546,314
GDP per capita (PPP): $2,300
Human Development Index: Medium (0.563)
Freedom in the World: Partly Free (29/100)

OVERALL CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.8

CSOs in Zimbabwe faced unprecedented challenges in 2019, including perhaps the worst attacks on the sector in nearly a decade. A dramatic increase in rights violations followed a weeklong “stay-away” from work in January, which was called by labor groups unhappy with mounting costs and incommensurate wage and salary adjustments. Following this act of civil disobedience, government security agents clamped down on civil society. Many people were arrested, and security forces were reported to be involved in a number of murders and hundreds of cases of gunshot wounds and torture. The government illegally shut down the internet for six days, which some people believed was intended to prevent access to anti-government information.

In the face of this repression, Zimbabwe’s civil society showed itself to be strong and resilient. For example, during the internet shutdown, the Media Institute of Southern Africa–Zimbabwe and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) challenged the government’s action in court. Their challenge proved successful when the court ruled that the shutdown was imposed by an official who lacked proper authority and ordered internet services restored. Because of the crackdown, many civil society leaders and human rights defenders fled into exile, and the state hunted them down with countrywide searches, roadblocks, and intelligence and military deployments at borders. CSOs requested the intervention of the international community, and the United Nations (UN) special rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association visited Zimbabwe in September. In his report, the special rapporteur deplored the government’s suppression of human freedoms, particularly the rights to peaceful protest and petition, which, he said, was “resulting in fear, frustration and anxiety among a large number of Zimbabweans.” The special rapporteur singled out the Maintenance of Peace and Order Act (MOPA) passed in August as a special concern, since it failed to guarantee the right to peaceful assembly and continued to give law enforcement agencies broad regulatory discretion and powers. A major diplomatic row erupted in the autumn when the government accused the U.S. ambassador to Zimbabwe of funding “regime change outfits” and threatened to expel him, prompting a number of foreign ambassadors to issue a joint statement denouncing the charges.

In March 2019, the eastern highlands of Zimbabwe were ravaged by cyclone Idai, which left some three hundred people dead and hundreds of thousands homeless. The World Bank and African Development Bank pledged a combined $96.5 million in assistance. CSOs worked with the government, UN, and other international bodies to rebuild infrastructure, restore livelihoods, and provide basic health care to cyclone victims. After political parties were given responsibility for distributing relief aid packages, reports emerged of looting and partisan-based distribution of the aid packages. The government quickly mobilized the Catholic Church and pro-government Civil Society Platform to visit affected areas and then released a statement claiming that the public was satisfied with the government’s handling of relief aid.
According to the African Development Bank, inflation in Zimbabwe spiked from the single digits in 2018 to more than 200 percent in November 2019, while the gross domestic product shrank by 12.8 percent. Extreme poverty rose to 34 percent from 29 percent the previous year. About one-third of Zimbabwe’s 16 million people needed humanitarian food aid in 2019, according to the UN. Zimbabwe ranked 158 out of 180 counties on Transparency International’s 2019 Corruption Perceptions Index. In October, Zimbabwe was placed under increased monitoring by the Financial Action Task Force, the global money laundering and terrorist financing watchdog. The government committed to addressing strategic deficiencies in its efforts to counter money laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation.

The overall sustainability of the CSO sector did not change in 2018. The legal environment for CSOs deteriorated moderately in the wake of government attacks on CSOs, a shutdown of internet services, and the introduction of MOPA, a restrictive new law. All other dimensions were unchanged.

According to the National Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (NANGO), the official coordinating body for CSOs, there were 993 private voluntary organizations (PVOs) in Zimbabwe in 2016, the most recent year for which statistics are available. Estimates suggest that at that time, there were also more than 5,000 trusts and common-law organizations known as universitas.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.6**

The legal environment for CSOs in Zimbabwe deteriorated moderately in 2019 with government attacks on CSOs, a shutdown of internet services, and the introduction of MOPA.

Most CSOs register as trusts through the Registrar of Deeds Office. Although the registration process is fairly simple, the cost is high, ranging between $500 and $5,000. It is easier for an organization to form as a universitas, which operates on the common-law principle that an organization exists once it has a constitution. However, many universitas eventually end up registering as trusts, since universitas tend to run into hurdles with local authorities, which may require CSOs to enter into memoranda of understanding to operate locally.

CSOs may also register as PVOs, which also find it easier to enter into the memoranda of understanding with local authorities. Some donors prefer to cooperate with PVOs rather than trusts, especially in the area of humanitarian assistance. Applicants seeking to register as PVOs must pay up to $10,000 in fees, and the registration process can take more than two years. In 2019, the Minister of Public Service, Labor, and Social Welfare indicated that the registration of PVOs would start to be finished more quickly, as the PVO Board planned to meet at least four times a year. The PVO Board includes representatives of the Office of the President and security forces, although the PVO Act does not name them as members. The PVO Board often denies registration to organizations working on human rights, democracy, and good governance.

Youth groups register with the Zimbabwe Youth Council, which includes appointees from the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF). Like the PVO Board, the Youth Council often refuses to register CSOs focused on human rights, democracy, and good governance. If the Youth Council approves the registration of an organization working in these areas, it usually instructs the group to change its focus to youth economic empowerment. However, CSOs often disregard this order once registration is obtained and proceed to perform the work that they had initially planned, without repercussion.

Organizations are typically able to start operating from the moment they submit papers and do not have to wait for formal approval. However, they can face administrative challenges, such as the inability to open bank accounts without proof of registration.

In 2019, civil society suffered perhaps the worst rights violations in a decade, as the government accused both opposition parties and CSOs of engaging in treasonous offences to unseat a constitutionally elected government.
Nineteen CSO representatives were charged with subversion during the year. For example, in May, despite calls from international actors for the government to protect democratic space in Zimbabwe, the authorities arrested seven CSO leaders at the airport as they returned from a workshop on non-violent advocacy in Maldives. The individuals were charged with subversion and awaited trial at the end of the year. In August, the government detained and questioned thirty-four activists who had attended the People’s Summit organized by the Southern Africa People’s Solidarity Network on the side of the heads of state summit of the South African Development Community (SADC) in Tanzania. The activists were alleged to have plotted anti-government protests to humiliate the president. Zimbabwe’s largest daily, the state-owned Herald, published two articles identifying the activists and accusing them of planning illegal demonstrations.

The government’s shutdown of the internet during the weeklong stay-away in January was another notable incident of repression. CSOs responded by sharing information through alternative platforms, such as free VPN. Through the Media Institute of Southern Africa, CSOs lodged an urgent court case arguing that the internet shutdown was illegal, and the High Court ruled that the government had not followed the law and correct procedures before taking this action. Most organizations were denied permission to convene peaceful marches and protests, despite the right to assembly, which is clearly stated in the constitution. CSOs were sometimes denied the right to submit petitions to the parliament and executive branch entities at the end of a march or protest if authorization for the march or protest had been denied. The Women’s Academy for Leadership and Political Excellence was denied clearance to convene a peaceful protest and submit a petition to the parliament on the grounds that the director of the organization had been arrested and charged with subversion.

In the past, party activists from the ruling ZANU–PF party have formed quasi-CSOs to demonize pro-democracy groups and support government programs. In 2019, a new government-supported organization, the Concerned Citizens Platform, accused CSOs, particularly the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition (CiZC), ZLHR, and Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, of engaging in terrorist activities to unseat the government. The platform held a press conference at which it denounced CiZC’s “illegal” and “criminal” operations and threatened to charge the three organizations with failing to abide by their mandates of “offering relief during humanitarian crises,” which was an inaccurate description of their missions as stated in their founding documents. The president openly supported the Concerned Citizens Platform and accused CiZC of receiving more than $3 million from the U.S. embassy to unconstitutionally unseat the government. In support of these allegations, state-owned newspapers ran numerous stories accusing CSOs of criminal operations, all of which were written by the political editor at the state-owned Herald. Quasi-opposition organizations sometimes demonize organizations that they view as pro-government or that seek to engage constructively with government entities.

In August 2019, the parliament passed MOPA to replace the draconian Public Order and Security Act (POSA). The president signed the act into law in November. According to CSOs’ analyses, the new law is as repressive as POSA, and, in fact, the two laws have few differences. Under MOPA, organizers of public gatherings may be charged with criminal and civil offenses if they fail to notify the police of their events seven days in advance, and the police may prohibit gatherings based on security concerns. After the wave of civil disobedience in January 2019, the government, through the Ministry of Information, escalated calls for a new act to criminalize the spread of “false” information on social media. CSOs feared that any new law to replace the notorious Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act would be used to curtail fundamental rights to information even more stringently.

CSOs do not ordinarily pay income tax. Organizations that operate businesses must register separate accounts for their enterprises with the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority and pay income tax on profits. Most CSOs pay pay-as-you-earn and social security taxes for their employees. In 2019, the government passed a raft of changes to the taxation system, one of which required any taxpayer receiving a salary in a foreign currency to pay income tax in that currency. The move was viewed as targeting CSO staff, since they are the largest sector paid in foreign currencies.

CSOs are permitted to earn income through the provision of goods and services. While the law does not prevent CSOs from competing for government contracts, the only CSOs known to have received such contracts are government-supported organizations, which sometimes receive funding from entities such as the Zimbabwe Youth Council or the Ministry of Women Affairs, Community, Small and Medium Enterprises Development.

CSOs may engage in fundraising campaigns and receive foreign assistance. The government often demonizes CSOs that accept foreign funding as puppets of foreign governments and agents of illegal regime change, especially if they work in the democracy and governance sector.
CSOs in Zimbabwe have access to highly trained lawyers, including those at ZLHR, which focuses on public interest litigation, and Veritas, which tracks legislative processes. Other organizations that offer legal services include Abammeli Human Rights Lawyers, Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, and Center for Applied Legal Research. ZLHR reported that in 2019, it assisted more than 500 individuals charged with inciting violence or participating in illegal demonstrations.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.5**

CSOs’ organizational capacity did not change in 2019.

Zimbabwean organizations often employ innovative approaches to identifying the priorities of local communities. These initiatives include inclusive strategic planning, future search tools, and constituency mapping. For instance, in 2019, following the hiring of a new director, ActionAid Zimbabwe (AAZ) held a strategic planning exercise and created a new country strategy incorporating the results of consultations with community members. As donors increasingly require CSOs’ projects to demonstrate community involvement in their design, implementation, and evaluation, CSOs often rely on local structures to gather information about particular needs. For example, in 2019, the Women’s Academy for Leadership and Political Excellence worked with its community groups while researching the impact of proportional representation in Zimbabwe.

Most CSOs in Zimbabwe have clearly defined visions, missions, and goals. They often have access to funding for strategic planning, including funds to hire consultants. CSOs usually seek to adhere to their missions and strategic plans in their interventions. However, to take advantage of available funding, organizations sometimes engage in activities outside of their missions or adopt wider mandates that allow them to engage in both advocacy and service provision. The broader range of activities is often related to emergency situations, which tend to attract additional funding. For instance, in 2019, the Platform for Youth Development, which had focused primarily on land rights in the Chipinge District, rebranded as the Platform for Youth and Community Development and began to undertake humanitarian interventions, such as constructing a classroom block at a school ravaged by cyclone Idai.

CSOs’ constitutions spell out their internal governance structures according to their legal forms. CSOs registered as trusts are governed by trustees and have boards of directors and, sometimes, general councils as their apex decision-making bodies. The Zimbabwe National Students Union, for example, has a general council consisting of elected members and general councilors. Universitas and PVOs have boards of directors. Zimbabwean CSOs usually have clear procedural manuals, including written instructions for dealing with finances, human resources, procurement, and harassment. Smaller organizations are often deliberate in their governance processes, since they aim to develop into effective organizations. It is a standard practice for boards to develop policies and systems with the assistance of companies such as KFM Consultants. Staff members must usually undergo an induction process on organizational policies and their implementation. Many CSOs also review their policies periodically with a view to strengthening their administrative capacities. Organizations that do not have these tools are often incubated by larger organizations and adopt manuals as part of the process of building their partners’ trust. CSOs also sign contracts with donors that spell out clear obligations, such as procedures for dealing with conflict of interest and fraud. In 2019, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) required its partners to develop policies against sexual harassment. Many donors undertake organizational capacity assessments to evaluate the extent to which potential grantees comply with the law and have clear and solid administrations.

Many CSOs used to recruit and retain sizeable staffs, but recent cuts in funding, particularly in the governance sector, have forced organizations to downsize and rely on volunteers. Given a national unemployment rate of more than 90 percent, CSOs often tap into the huge pool of unemployed university graduates to serve as professional interns or part-time employees for the duration of funded projects. Most CSOs have clear human
resource policies and institutional sustainability plans detailing recruitment processes, job descriptions, and staff succession, since these are usually prerequisites for funding. CSOs have access to highly competent internal and external experts in Zimbabwe, and many organizations have staff members with expertise in digital technology or hire the services of external firms.

CSOs in Zimbabwe have access to the internet and use it as their primary means of communication. Most organizations use WhatsApp, Facebook, and Twitter. During the intense clampdown on CSOs in 2019, they relied on more secure platforms such as Signal. Since internet services are expensive, CSOs have begun to explore cheaper ways such as WhatsApp to keep their constituencies informed.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.8**

CSOs’ financial viability did not change in 2019. Most CSOs rely on foreign donors as their main source of funding. Major donors include USAID, NPA, the United Kingdom (UK)’s Department for International Development (DFID), Canada Fund for Local Initiatives, TrustAfrica, Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, and Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa. Donors usually fund projects lasting an average of twelve months, although some donors, including USAID, NPA, and DFID, offer funding for periods of three to five years. Despite this sizeable funding base, donor interest in Zimbabwean CSOs has decreased in recent years. CSOs feel that the decline is due in part to donors’ disappointment with seemingly limited results after more than two decades of supporting the sector, as well as reported cases of the misuse of funds and CSOs’ lack of financial probity.

Most CSOs do not seek government funding, because of their poor relationship with the government. Some CSOs linked to the ruling ZANU–PF party receive support from the Ministry of Women’s Affairs or the Zimbabwe Youth Council to further the party’s objectives. Few accountability mechanisms govern the disbursement of government funding to these CSOs.

Local businesses have shown interest in funding CSOs. But in 2019, the political environment and fears of victimization or deregistration because of funding “illegal” regime-change agents greatly hampered partnerships between businesses and CSOs. In addition, some corporations prefer to establish their own organizations as part of their efforts to give back to communities. For instance, the foundation of Econet Wireless pays school fees for talented students from disadvantaged backgrounds.

The country’s prolonged economic crisis has reduced the public’s ability to give donations to CSOs. Nevertheless, CSOs sometimes engage in fundraising campaigns. In 2019, the Center for Community Development Solutions, Help Age Zimbabwe, Youth Dialogue Network, and many other organizations helped mobilize resources for victims of cyclone Idai. Although few organizations use crowdfunding platforms to generate income, Zimbabweans living in the diaspora helped rebuild schools and houses destroyed in the cyclone by donating to a GoFundMe campaign run by the entrepreneur Freeman Chari. The use of sporting events and festivals to raise funds is unexplored, although CSOs acknowledge that they could be the future of fundraising.

Some CSOs earn income from membership fees, consultancy services, transportation services, the online sale of publications, or the rental of office space or conference facilities. For example, NANGO receives membership fees from members, the Zimbabwe Women’s Bureau rents out meeting facilities, and SAPES Trust and Zimbabwe Democracy Institute provide consultancy services. Any income generated through these activities is usually used to cover overhead expenses. Most CSOs report that they sometimes offer their services and products free of charge to new or struggling organizations.
Donor-supported CSOs in Zimbabwe have sound financial management systems, with clearly defined systems for managing funding, including policies on petty cash, procurement, and anti-fraud measures. Organizations seeking donor funding and lacking solid financial management systems often appoint fiscal agents (usually more competent organizations) to manage their funding until their internal systems develop. Most organizations use the Belina payroll system. As part of contractual obligations with donors, CSOs are often required to undertake financial audits at the end of projects, and donors sometimes request audits during project implementation.

**ADVOCACY: 4.1**

Advocacy by Zimbabwean CSOs was unchanged in 2019. CSOs continued to share information and engage in joint advocacy initiatives, sometimes through consortia. For instance, a number of organizations formed the Matabeleland Collective to address access to water and seek redress for the Gukurahundi genocide of the 1980s. Although some members left the collective, the government transferred control of the Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project to the collective and its technical partner, the Matabeleland Zambezi Water Trust, in 2019. The Media Alliance of Zimbabwe, a coalition of CSOs in the media sector, pushed for repeal of the notorious Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act and sought to replace it with the Zimbabwe Media Commission Bill, Access to Information Bill, and Cybersecurity and Data Protection Bill. The proposed legislation was submitted for debate in 2019.

CSOs continued to engage formally with the government on policy issues in 2019. For instance, the Progressive Teachers Union of Zimbabwe and the Amalgamated Rural Teachers of Zimbabwe continued to cooperate with the government through the Apex Council on improving the salaries and working conditions of teachers. This policy engagement continued despite the clampdown on the teachers’ union and civil society through the continued persecution of the leadership of rural teachers. In 2019, Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe produced and submitted to the minister of health a report on the engagement of Zimbabwe civil society in health policy and law and advocated for the removal of legal and policy barriers to health care for key populations.

CSOs lobbied the UK to reconsider its policy on Zimbabwe in 2019. At an urgent panel of the UK parliament’s International Development Committee, Zimbabwean CSOs submitted reports describing human rights violations, the closing of democratic space, and the clampdown on CSOs and opposition leaders following the January stay-away. Afterwards, taking a more hardline approach, the UK urged the government to uphold its human rights commitments and undertake a more comprehensive, inclusive approach to resolving the impasse resulting from the 2018 elections. CSOs also lobbied the SADC and African Union about the deteriorating human rights situation in Zimbabwe. At a meeting of African Union heads of states in Addis Ababa, President Mnangagwa was requested to respond to CSOs’ allegations on rights abuses in Zimbabwe. The president responded that CSOs are funded by the west to undertake illegal regime change and any violence in the country was the fruit of collusion between CSOs and the MDC Alliance. CSOs were also at the forefront of criticizing the government for the partisan distribution of relief aid and the looting of aid packages.

CSOs engaged in advocacy to defend the space for civil society in 2019. After the government indicated its intention to amend the PVO Act in 2018, CSOs engaged in a series of meetings with the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, the bill’s sponsoring ministry, to deter any changes that would further shrink democratic space. CSOs expected the government to propose restrictive amendments to the PVO Act in 2019, but it did not do so. CSOs worked on three bills to replace the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, and they made a spirited effort to ensure the repeal of POSA by submitting a position paper to the Center for Applied Legal Research and the attorney general. The paper, which was coordinated by the Zimbabwe Institute, called for a law to liberalize freedoms of assembly, expression, and right to peaceful protest as enshrined in the Zimbabwean constitution. Unfortunately, the government went on to enact equally unfavorable legislation.
SERVICE PROVISION: 3.2

Service provision by Zimbabwean CSOs was stable in 2019. CSOs offer a variety of goods and services. For example, after cyclone Idai, Oxfam, Save the Children, NANGO, Help Age Zimbabwe, AAZ, and many other organizations offered relief services, including food aid, temporary tent accommodations, evacuations, medicine, and infrastructure reconstruction. Some advocacy organizations turned to service provision in 2019 in an effort to bridge funding gaps. The Zimbabwe Environmental Lawyers Association, for example, began to offer services related to climate change and environmental protection.

Most local authorities refused to cooperate with CSOs in the aftermath of the January 2019 clampdown, which meant that activities planned by CSOs could not be implemented. For instance, in Masvingo, the Community Tolerance, Reconciliation, and Development Trust could not distribute drought-relief food packages to communities in Zaka after the local district administrator accused the organization of engaging in illegal regime-change schemes and banned its operations. The trust filed a legal challenge to the ban through ZLHR and was eventually allowed to resume its work.

Many CSOs respond to their communities by undertaking baseline studies of needs with interviews, focus group discussions, and validation exercises to confirm that research reflects the view of community members. For example, in 2019, AAZ and its partners undertook a capacity needs assessment before implementing interventions to assist victims of cyclone Idai. CSOs also collect data from sources such as the National Statistics Agency and evaluation reports from previous projects. The Labor and Economic Development Research Institute of Zimbabwe used labor-related data from the government during the 2019 Tripartite Negotiating Forum on labor issues.

CSOs in Zimbabwe extend their goods and services beyond their memberships to benefit others in their communities. In 2019, a number of CSOs offered relief aid to victims of cyclone Idai regardless of their membership in particular organizations. It is standard for CSOs to provide services without discriminating on the basis of the political, religious, or ethnic affiliations of recipients, as guided by the national constitution and their own mission statements and guiding principles, which typically emphasize inclusion and diversity. The Zimbabwe Democracy Institute distributed two research papers to other CSOs, partners, the government, and the public in 2019.

CSOs have limited possibilities to recover the costs of products and service. Occasionally, organizations market publications on Amazon. More commonly, CSOs seek to recover costs by charging grant management fees. In 2019, for example, the Zimbabwe Human Rights Association administered a grant for CiZC and charged a percentage of the total amount of the grant as an administrative and management fee. CSOs perform limited research on the markets for their products and services.

CSOs are able to work as partners of the government, as demonstrated by their collaboration when providing assistance after cyclone Idai. However, for most of the year, the government made public statements demonizing CSOs and accusing civic groups of criminal activities.

SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.9

The sectoral infrastructure for CSOs did not change in 2019. A number of resource centers and tech hubs provide services to CSOs. For instance, the Magamba Network supports youth engagement, hosts a creative hub, and incubates young bloggers. In 2019, Magamba Network continued to house the organization Citizens Manifesto and assisted CSOs’ communications with short videos, documentaries, and the design of information packages such as fliers, brochures, and newsletters. Magamba Network was also appointed to manage information and campaign communications for the #GoZim voter-education campaign.
Local intermediary support organizations (ISOs) such as Pact Zimbabwe and AAZ provide funding to CSOs, usually in the form of small grants for short-term or rapid-response projects. These grants seek to respond to local needs, with CSOs required to demonstrate that targeted beneficiaries have taken part in project conceptualization. ISOs fundraise from the local or foreign offices of international donors, such as USAID and the European Union. For example, DANIDA operated through ISOs such as DanChurchAid and NPA in 2019. Zimbabwe does not have well-established domestic grantmaking foundations.

Zimbabwe has many networks and coalitions in which CSOs work together to share information, pool resources, and coordinate effective responses to national and international issues. They are usually organized according to thematic areas. CiZC, for instance, has more than eighty members working to bring about social change. Its seven committees address topics such as women, youth, and peace building while contributing to a single strategic objective. In 2019, CiZC’s committees contributed varying perspectives to a campaign to resist the shrinking of democratic space in Zimbabwe and the criminalization of CSOs’ work. CSOs in the media sector worked through the Media Alliance of Zimbabwe on media-related legislation in 2019. The Community-Based Organizations Association formed a new coalition in 2019.

Coalitions also serve as spaces in which local CSOs can access training. For instance, NANGO offered its members training in budget monitoring and tracking in 2019. CSOs sometimes partner with local universities to offer training to their staff and members. In 2019, the Savannah Trust continued its partnership with the University of Zimbabwe’s theater department to train artists to take part in its Southern Africa Theater Camp, which addresses community development from residents’ point of view. The Midlands AIDS Service Organization partnered with Midlands State University to train its members and volunteers in community advocacy, counseling, and psychosocial support. A number of ISOs also provide training. For instance, Pact Zimbabwe and the Transparency Responsiveness Accountability Citizen Engagement project usually offer their grantees, and at times other CSOs, training in grant management. AAZ provided valuable training on using digital technologies to social movements so that they could engage in “virtual” advocacy work in 2019. Most training offered by ISOs is free of charge, and ISOs usually cover transportation, accommodations, meals, and other costs to participating organizations. Zimbabwe has skilled trainers working for consultancy firms, international companies, and local universities.

CSOs sometimes partner with government and business entities on joint projects, although businesses are often reluctant to work with CSOs for fear of deregistration. In 2019, the Basilizwi Trust in Binga District translated local government training manuals into local languages as part of its effort to strengthen the capacity of communities to hold local authorities to account. The National AIDS Council, which coordinates the national multi-sectoral response to HIV/AIDS, partnered with the government and local businesses such as Econet Wireless to raise awareness about the disease among school-aged children.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.5**

CSOs’ public image did not change in 2019. CSOs rarely enjoy positive media coverage in either national or local state-owned media houses. The state-owned media have traditionally been at the forefront of attacks on civic groups, and in 2019, they seemed desperate to prove that CSOs were enemies of the people and undertaking activities meant to tarnish the image of the country. The state-owned newspapers *The Herald*, *Sunday Mail*, and *The Chronicle* published articles daily alleging that CSOs were plotting to unseat the constitutionally elected government. Following this protracted verbal onslaught, CSOs relied heavily on private owned media to convey their messages both domestically and internationally. Their messages sought to expose the grave human rights situation in Zimbabwe and called for foreign intervention to pressure the government into considering an inclusive national dialogue.
Zimbabwe’s polarization is reflected in equally divided public opinion about CSOs. Years of propaganda have convinced a number of people that CSOs have a hidden agenda to unseat the government. At the same time, a huge portion of the public has a positive view of CSOs and believes that the government is lying about and victimizing the sector. After a story appeared in The Herald in 2019 alleging that CSOs were collecting arms to overthrow the government, more than 3,000 public comments flowed in that were largely dismissive of the story. The public strongly supports CSOs’ activities that address community needs.

No clear research exists showing whether the private sector has positive or negative perceptions of CSOs. Most businesses are cautious about engaging with CSOs.

They usually prefer to donate to the government for specific initiatives rather than risk deregistration by publicly supporting the CSO sector, especially on governance-related issues.

CSOs have a strong presence in private media and often publish information about their initiatives. Many CSOs employ information officers who are experienced journalists and have a well-developed range of contacts. In practice, CSO seek actively to deconstruct some of the stereotypes perpetrated publicly by the government and the ruling party. For example, in 2019, CIZC and a number of other organizations ran a campaign called #StopCriminalizingCSOs, with the subtitle “CSOs are Partners in Development.” The intent was to show that CSOs do not engage in anti-government initiatives. While the campaign was not successful in halting the government’s hostile treatment of CSOs, it garnered marked public support. CSOs use social media to reach wide audiences and often engage the services of comic artists to develop short satiric videos to spread their messages.

Some CSOs publish annual reports. For instance, the Amalgamated Rural Teachers Union distributed its annual report at its annual general meeting and shared hard copies and online copies of the report with funding partners, members, and other stakeholders in 2019. Although CSOs have discussed self-regulation in recent years, they took no concrete steps in this direction in 2019.
ANNEX A: CSO SUSTAINABILITY INDEX METHODOLOGY

INSTRUCTIONS FOR CSOSI IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS

2019 CSO SUSTAINABILITY INDEX

I. INTRODUCTION

USAID’s Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index (the Index or CSOSI) reports annually on the strength and overall viability of CSO sectors in Africa, Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, and Mexico. The CSO Sustainability Index is a tool developed by USAID to assess the strength and overall viability of CSO sectors in countries around the world. By analyzing seven dimensions that are critical to sectoral sustainability, the Index highlights both strengths and constraints in CSO development. The Index allows for comparisons both across countries and over time. Initially developed in 1997 for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, the CSOSI is a valued tool and methodology used by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), governments, donors, academics and others to better understand the sustainability of the civil society sector. USAID is continually striving to ensure the cross-national comparability of the Index scores, and to improve the reliability and validity of measurements, adequate standardization of units and definitions, local ownership of the Index, transparency of the process of Index compilation, and representative composition of panels delivering the scores.

Beginning with the 2017 Index and for the following four years, FHI 360 and the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) are managing the coordination and editing of the CSOSI. A senior staff member from both FHI 360 and ICNL will serve on the Editorial Committee as will one or more senior USAID/Washington officials. FHI 360 will provide small grants to local CSOs to implement the CSOSI methodology in country, while ICNL will be primarily responsible for editing the reports. Local Implementing Partners (IPs) play an essential role in developing the CSO SI and need a combination of research, convening, and advocacy skills for carrying out a high quality CSOSI.

Local Implementing Partners should please remember:

- Panels must include a diverse range of civil society representatives.
- Panelists should formulate initial scores for dimensions and justifications individually and in advance of the Panel Meeting.
- Discuss each indicator and dimension at the Panel Meeting and provide justification for the proposed score for each dimension.
- Compare the score for each dimension with last year’s score to ensure that the direction of change reflects developments during the year being assessed.
- Note changes to any indicators and dimensions in the country report to justify proposed score changes.
- The Editorial Committee will request additional information if the scores are not supported by the report. If adequate information is not provided, the EC has the right to adjust the scores accordingly.
II. METHODOLOGY FOR THE IMPLEMENTER

The following steps should be followed by the IP to assemble the Expert Panel that will meet in person to discuss the status of civil society over the reporting year, determine scores, and prepare a country report for the 2019 Civil Society Organization (CSO) Sustainability Index.

I. Select Panel Experts. Carefully select a group of at least 8-10 civil society representatives to serve as panel experts. Panel members must include representatives of a diverse range of CSOs and other stakeholders, such as:

- CSO support centers, resource centers or intermediary support organizations (ISOs);
- CSOs, community-based organizations (CBOs), and faith-based organizations (FBOs) involved in a range of service delivery and/or advocacy activities;
- CSOs involved in local and national level government oversight/watchdog/advocacy activities;
- Academia with expertise related to civil society and CSO sustainability;
- CSO partners from government, business or media;
- Think tanks working in the area of civil society development;
- Member associations such as cooperatives, lawyers’ associations and natural resources users’ groups;
- Representatives of diverse geographic areas and population groups, e.g. minorities;
- International donors who support civil society and CSOs; and
- Other local partners.

It is important that the Panel members be able to assess a wide spectrum of CSO activities in various sectors ranging from democracy, human rights and governance reforms to the delivery of basic services to constituencies. CSOs represented on the panel must include both those whose work is heavily focused on advocacy and social service delivery. To the extent possible, panels should include representatives of both rural and urban parts of the country, as well as women’s groups, minority populations, and other marginalized groups, as well as sub-sectors such as women’s rights, community-based development, civic education, microfinance, environment, human rights, and youth. The Panel should to the extent possible include an equal representation of men and women. If two or more representatives of the same CSO participate in the Panel, they can only cast one vote. It is recommended that at least 70 percent of the Expert Panel be nationals of the country that is being rated.

In countries experiencing civil war, individuals should be brought from areas controlled by each of the regimes if possible. If not, individuals from the other regime’s territory should at least be contacted, to incorporate their local perspective.
In some instances, it may be appropriate to select a larger group in order to better reflect the diversity and breadth of the civil society sector in the country. For countries where regional differences are significant, implementers should incorporate, to the greatest extent possible, differing regional perspectives. If financial constraints do not allow for in-person regional representation, alternative, low cost options, including emailing scores/comments, teleconferencing/Skype, may be used.

If there is a USAID Mission in the country, a USAID representative must be invited to attend the panel. USAID representatives that attend are welcome to provide some words of introduction to open the event, as it is funded by USAID, and they are welcome to observe and participate in the discussion. However, they will not have the ability to cast their vote in terms of scores.

Please submit to FHI 360 for approval the list of the Panel members who you plan to invite at least two weeks before the meeting is scheduled to occur using the form provided in Annex A. It is the responsibility of the IP to ensure that the panel composition, and the resulting score and narrative, are sufficiently representative of a cross-section of civil society and include the perspectives of various types of stakeholders from different sectors and different areas of the country.

2. Prepare the Panel meeting. Ensure that panel members understand the objectives of the Panel, including developing a consensus-based rating for each of the seven dimensions of civil society sustainability covered by the Index and articulating a justification or explanation for each rating consistent with the methodology described below. We encourage you to hold a brief orientation session for the panelists prior to the panel discussion. This is particularly important for new panelists but is also useful to update all panelists on methodology and process changes. Some partners choose to hold a formal training session with panel members, reviewing the methodology document and instructions. Other partners provide a more general discussion about the objectives of the exercise and process to the panelists.

The overall goal of the Index is to track and compare progress in the sector over time, increasing the ability of local entities to undertake self-assessment and analysis. To ensure a common understanding of what is being assessed, the convener shall provide a definition of civil society to the panel members. The CSOSI uses the enclosed definition to ensure the report addresses a broad swath of civil society.

In order to allow adequate time to prepare for the panel, distribute the instructions, rating description documents and a copy of the previous year’s country chapter to the members of the Expert Panel a minimum of three days before convening the Panel so that they may develop their initial scores for each dimension before meeting with the other panel members. It is critical to emphasize the importance of developing their scores and justifications before attending the panel. It is also important to remind panel members that the scores should reflect developments during the 2019 calendar year (January 1, 2019, through December 31, 2019).

We also recommend you encourage panelists to think of concrete examples that illustrate trends, since this information will be crucial to justifying their proposed scores. In countries with closing civic space, the IP should take initiative to ensure that expert panel members do not self-censor themselves, including by taking whatever
measures possible to build trust. The confidentiality of all members must be ensured, and participants must be protected against retaliation; to this end, the IP can choose to enforce Chatham House Rules.

Lastly, it is highly recommended to compile and send to panelists data and information sources to guide them as they score. Recommendations of information sources are listed below under #4.

We are very interested in using the preparation of this year’s Index to track lessons learned for use in improving the monitoring process in upcoming years. In addition, we will solicit feedback through regional debrief meetings, and will create an online forum where IPs can share best practices, ask questions, and submit their comments or suggestions. These methods will be supplemented by brief satisfaction surveys that will be used to help evaluate the success of methodological and process innovations.

3. Convene a meeting of the CSO Expert Panel.

3.a. We do not require panelists to score individual indicators but only overall dimensions. For each dimension, allow each panel member to share his or her initial score and justification with the rest of the group. (Note: If two or more representatives of the same CSO participate in the Panel, only one vote can be cast on their behalf.) Although scoring will not take place at the indicator level, please be sure that panel members discuss each indicator within each dimension of the CSOSI and provide evidence-based, country-relevant examples of recent or historical conditions, policies, and events within each of the dimension narratives. Please take notes on the discussion of each indicator and dimension, detailing the justification for all dimension scores, in the template provided. These notes must be submitted to FHI 360 with the first draft of the narratives (they do not have to be translated to English if not originally written in English).

At the end of the discussion of each dimension, allow panel members to adjust their scores, if desired. Then, for each dimension, eliminate the highest score and the lowest score (if there are two or more of the highest or lowest scores, only eliminate one of them) and average the remaining scores together to come up with a single score for each dimension. Calculate the average or arithmetic mean of these scores for a preliminary score for the dimension. Please keep all scores on record, making sure that personal attribution cannot be made to individual panel members. Use a table similar to the one provided below to track panel members’ scores without personal attribution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel Member</th>
<th>Legal Environment</th>
<th>Organizational Capacity</th>
<th>Financial Viability</th>
<th>Advocacy</th>
<th>Service Provision</th>
<th>Sectoral Infrastructure</th>
<th>Public Image</th>
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3.b. Once a score is determined for a dimension, please have panel members compare the proposed score with last year’s score to ensure that the direction and magnitude of the change reflects developments during the year. For example, if an improved score is proposed, this should be based on concrete positive developments during the year that are noted in the report. On the other hand, if the situation worsened during the year, this should be reflected in a worse score (i.e. a higher number on the 1-7 scale).

Please note that for countries where a democratic revolution took place in the previous year, the panelists should be conscious to avoid scoring based on a post-revolution euphoria. The score-change framework should be closely followed to avoid panelists scoring based on anticipated changes, rather than the actual level of change thus far.

A change of 0.1 should generally be used to reflect modest changes in a dimension. Larger differences may be warranted if there are more significant changes in the sector. The evidence to support the scoring change must always be discussed by the panel and documented in the dimension narrative. See CSOSI Codebook – Instructions for Expert Panel Members for more details about this scoring scale.

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1 Arithmetic mean is the sum of all scores divided by the total number of scores.

The 2019 CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa
In addition, for each dimension score, review the relevant description of that dimension in “CSOSI Codebook – Tiers and Scores: A Closer Look.” Discuss with the group whether the score for a country matches that rating description. For example, a score of 2.3 in organizational capacity would mean that the civil society sector is in the “Sustainability Enhanced” phase. Please read the “Sustainability Enhanced” section for Organizational Capacity in “Ratings: A Closer Look” to ensure that this accurately describes the civil society environment.

If the panel does not feel that the proposed score is accurate after these two reviews, please note this when submitting proposed scores in your narrative report, and the Editorial Committee will discuss whether one or more scores needs to be reset with a new baseline. Ultimately, each score should reflect consensus among group members.

3.c. Discuss each of the seven dimensions of the Index and score them in a similar manner. Once all seven dimensions have been scored, average the final dimension scores together to get the overall CSO sustainability score. Please submit the table with the scores from the individual panelists together with the narrative report. Panelists should be designated numerically.

3.d. Please remind the group at this stage that reports will be reviewed by an Editorial Committee (EC) in Washington, D.C. The Editorial Committee will ensure that all scores are adequately supported and may ask for additional evidence to support a score. If adequate information is not provided, the EC may adjust the scores.

4. Prepare a draft country report. The report should focus on developments over the calendar year 2019 (January 1, 2019, through December 31, 2019).

The report should then include sections on each dimension. Each of these sections should begin with a summary of the reasons for any score changes during the year. For example, if a better score is proposed, the basis for this improvement should be clearly stated up front. These sections should include a discussion of both accomplishments and strengths in that dimension, as well as obstacles to sustainability and weaknesses that impact the operations of a broad range of CSOs. Each indicator within each dimension should be addressed in the report.

The report should be written based on the Panel members’ discussion and input, as well as a review of other sources of information about the CSO sector including but not limited to analytical studies of the sector, statistical data, public opinion polls and other relevant third-party data. Some international sources of information and data that should be considered include the following:

- CIVICUS Monitor - [https://monitor.civicus.org/](https://monitor.civicus.org/)
- World Giving Index - [https://www.cafonline.org/about-us/publications](https://www.cafonline.org/about-us/publications)
- Varities of Democracy (V-Dem) - [https://www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/](https://www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/)
- Media Sustainability Index - [https://www.irex.org/projects/media-sustainability-index-msi](https://www.irex.org/projects/media-sustainability-index-msi)
- Nations in Transit - [https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/nations-transit#VdugbqSFOh1](https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/nations-transit#VdugbqSFOh1)
- ITUC Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights: [https://survey.ituc-csi.org/](https://survey.ituc-csi.org/)
- U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report: [https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/](https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/)
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: [https://carnegieendowment.org/regions](https://carnegieendowment.org/regions)
Please limit the draft reports to a maximum of **ten pages in English**. Please keep in mind that we rely on implementers to ensure that reports are an appropriate length and are well written.

While the individual country reports for the 2019 CSO Sustainability Index must be brief, implementers may write longer reports for their own use to more fully describe the substance of the panel meetings. Longer reports may include additional country context information or examples and could be used for a variety of purposes, including advocacy initiatives, research, informing project designs, etc.

Please include a list of the experts who served on the panel using the form provided. This will be for our reference only and will not be made public. Also, please remember to provide the individual panelists’ ratings for each dimension (with the names replaced by numbers).

Submit the draft country reports with rankings via email to FHI 360 by the date indicated in your grant’s Project Description.

5. **Initial edits of the country report.** Within a few weeks of receiving your draft report, FHI 360 and its partner, ICNL, will send you a revised version of your report that has been edited for grammar, style and content. As necessary, the editors will request additional information to ensure that the report is complete and/or to clarify statements in the report. Please request any clarification needed from the editor as soon as possible, then submit your revised report by the deadline indicated.

6. **Editorial Committee review.** In Washington, an Editorial Committee (EC) will review the scores and revised draft country reports. The EC consists of representatives from USAID, FHI 360, ICNL, and at least one regional expert well versed in the issues and dynamics affecting civil society in the region. A USAID representative chairs the EC. If the EC determines that the panel’s scores are not adequately supported by the country report, particularly in comparison to the previous year’s scores and the scores and reports of other countries in the region, the EC may request that the scores be adjusted, thereby ensuring comparability over time and among countries, or request that additional information be provided to support the panel’s scores. Further description of the EC is included in the following section, “The Role of the Editorial Committee.”

7. **Additional report revision.** After the EC meets, the editor will send a revised report that indicates the EC’s recommended scores, and where further supporting evidence or clarification is required. Within the draft, boxes will be added where you will note whether you accept the revised scores or where you can provide further evidence to support the original proposed score.

The report should be revised and returned to the editor within the allotted timeframe. The project editor will continue to be in contact with you to discuss any outstanding questions and clarifications regarding the scoring and the report’s content. Your organization will be responsible for responding to all outstanding comments from the EC, as communicated by the project editor, until the report is approved and accepted by USAID.

8. **Dissemination and promotion of the final reports.** After the reports are approved by USAID and final formatting is conducted, the country reports will be grouped into regional reports. Each Implementing Partner will be responsible for promoting both the final, published country report and the regional report. Your organization will conduct activities to promote the Index’s use and its visibility. This may include organizing a local public event, panel discussion, or workshop and by making the report available electronically by web posting or creating a social network page for the country report and through the other methods described in your Use and Visibility Plan. Documentation that you have conducted these activities as described in that Plan must be submitted to FHI 360 before it will authorize the final payment.

• Afro-Barometer: [http://www.afrobarometer.org/](http://www.afrobarometer.org/)
III. THE ROLE OF THE EDITORIAL COMMITTEE

As an important step in the CSO Sustainability Index process, all country reports are reviewed and discussed by an Editorial Committee composed of regional and sector experts in Washington, DC, and an expert based in the region. This committee is chaired by a USAID Democracy Specialist and includes rotating members from USAID (past members have included experts from regional bureaus, the USAID Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance’s Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DCHA/DRG), the USAID Bureau for Economic Growth, Education and the Environment’s Local Solutions Office, and USAID Democracy, Human Rights and Governance foreign service officers). The committee also includes civil society experts from FHI 360 and ICNL.

The Editorial Committee has three main roles. It reviews all reports and scores to ensure that narratives are adequate and compelling from the standpoint of supporting the proposed score and to determine if the proposed change in score is supported by the narrative. A compelling narrative demonstrates that a score results from evidence of systematic and widespread cases and is not based on one or two individual cases. For example, a country environment characterized by a growing number of CSOs with strong financial management systems that raise funds locally from diverse sources is a compelling justification for an elevated financial viability score. A country in which one or two large CSOs now have the ability to raise funds from diverse sources is not. The Editorial Committee also checks that scores for each dimension meet the criteria described in “Ratings: A Closer Look,” to ensure that scores and narratives accurately reflect the actual stage of CSO sector development. Finally, the Editorial Committee considers a country’s score in relation to the proposed scores in other countries, providing a regional perspective that ensures comparability of scores across all countries.

CSOs are encouraged to remind their panels from the outset that the Editorial Committee may ask for further clarification of scores and may modify scores, where appropriate. While implementing partners will have the chance to dispute these modifications by providing more evidence for the scores the panel proposed, the USAID Chair of the EC will ultimately have the final say on all scores. However, by asking panels to compare their scores with last year’s scores and “Ratings: A Closer Look” (which is essentially what the Editorial Committee does), it is hoped that there will be few differences between proposed scores and final scores. Ensuring that the narrative section for each dimension includes adequate explanations for all scores will also limit the need for the Editorial Committee to ask for further clarification.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR CSOSI EXPERT PANEL MEMBERS

Introduction

USAID’s Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index (the Index or CSOSI) is a tool developed by USAID to assess the strength and overall viability of the CSO sectors. By analyzing seven dimensions that are critical to sectoral sustainability on an annual basis, the Index highlights both strengths and constraints in CSO development.

The Index allows for comparisons both across countries and over time. Initially developed in 1997 for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, the CSOSI is a valued tool and methodology used by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), governments, donors, academics and others to better understand the sustainability of the civil society sector. In 2019 the CSOSI was implemented in 74 countries.

Beginning with the 2017 Index and for the following four years, FHI 360 and the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) are managing the coordination and editing of the CSOSI. To develop the Index each year, FHI 360 provides small grants to local CSOs to serve as implementing Partners (IPs) that implement the CSOSI methodology in country. ICNL is primarily responsible for editing the country reports once they are drafted by IPs. A senior staff member from both FHI 360 and ICNL serves on an Editorial Committee that reviews all reports, as do one or more senior USAID/Washington officials.

The expert panel members for whom this Codebook is designed participate in in-country panel discussions on the seven dimensions of sustainability covered by the Index. The IP convenes these panel discussions annually to assess the situation of civil society in their countries and determine scores based on an objective analysis of the factual evidence.

The CSOSI team is continually striving to ensure the cross-country and cross-year comparability of the Index’s scores, as well as to improve the reliability and validity of measurements, standardization of definitions, local ownership of the Index, and transparency of the Index’s methodology and processes.

Therefore, FHI 360 has created this Codebook to inform and guide expert panel members through the scoring process. The Codebook provides definitions of the key concepts used to assess the overall strength and sustainability of the civil society sector in a given country, explains the scoring process, and standardizes the scale to be used when proposing score changes.

This is the first part of the Codebook, providing an overview of the concepts and processes that guide the expert panel members’ role in the CSOSI’s methodology. The second part of the Codebook provides descriptions, or vignettes, of each score for each dimension, to standardize expert panel members’ understanding of the scoring scale and to assist them in ensuring that scores are accurate.

CSOSI Methodology

The CSOSI measures the sustainability of each country’s CSO sector based on the CSOSI’s seven dimensions: legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, sectoral infrastructure, and public image. Its seven-point scoring scale mirrors those used by Freedom House in its publications “Nations in Transit” and “Freedom in the World.”

The Implementing Partner (IP) in each country leads the process of organizing and convening a diverse and representative panel of CSO experts. Expert panels discuss the level of change during the year being assessed in each of the seven dimensions and determine proposed scores for each dimension. The scores are organized into three basic “tiers” representing the level of viability of the civil society sector: Sustainability Impeded; Sustainability Evolving; and Sustainability Enhanced. All scores and narratives are then reviewed by a Washington, D.C.-based Editorial Committee (EC), assisted by regional civil society experts. The graph below summarizes the approach and process.
Definition of Concepts

The overall goal of the Index is to track progress or regression in the CSO sector over time, increasing the ability of local entities to undertake self-assessment and analysis. To ensure a common understanding of what is being assessed, panel members need a shared understanding of the key concepts underlying their assessment.

Civil Society Organization

Civil society organizations are defined:

“...As any organizations, whether formal or informal, that are not part of the apparatus of government, that do not distribute profits to their directors or operators, that are self-governing, and in which participation is a matter of free choice. Both member-serving and public-serving organizations are included. Embraced within this definition, therefore, are private, not-for-profit health providers, schools, advocacy groups, social service agencies, anti-poverty groups, development agencies, professional associations, community-based organizations, unions, religious bodies, recreation organizations, cultural institutions, and many more.”

This definition of CSO includes informal, unregistered groups and movements, but to be included in the CSOSI, the movement must possess the structure and continuity to be distinguished from a single gathering of individuals and from personal or family relationships. In many countries political parties and private companies establish and support CSOs, but these entities are usually either public, for-profit, or not self-governing.

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Seven Dimensions of Sustainability

The CSOSI measures sustainability across seven dimensions by analyzing a series of indicators related to each dimension.

1- **LEGAL ENVIRONMENT**: The legal and regulatory environment governing the CSO sector and its implementation

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Registration – Legal procedures to formalize the existence of a CSO</td>
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<td>Operation – The enforcement of the laws and its effects on CSOs</td>
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<tr>
<td>State Harassment – Abuses committed against CSOs and their members by state institutions and groups acting on behalf of the state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxation – Tax policies that affect CSOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Resources – Legal opportunities for CSOs to mobilize financial resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Legal Capacity – Availability and quality of legal expertise for CSOs</td>
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2- **ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY**: The internal capacity of the CSO sector to pursue its goals

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constituency Building – Relationships with individuals or groups affected by or interested in issues on which CSOs work</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic Planning – Organizational goals and priorities for a set timeframe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Management – Structures and processes to guide the work of CSOs</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO Staffing – Quality and management of human resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>Technical Advancement – Access to and use of technology</td>
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3- **FINANCIAL VIABILITY**: The CSO sector’s access to various sources of financial support

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<tr>
<td>Diversification – Access to multiple sources of funding</td>
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<td>Local Support – Domestic sources of funding and resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Support – Foreign sources of funding and resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fundraising – CSOs’ capacity to raise funds</td>
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<tr>
<td>Earned Income – Revenue generated from the sale of products and services</td>
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<tr>
<td>Financial Management Systems – Processes, procedures and tools to manage financial resources and operations.</td>
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4- **ADVOCACY**: The CSO sector’s ability to influence public opinion and public policy

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Cooperation with Local and Central Government – Access to government decision-making processes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy Advocacy Initiatives – Initiatives to shape the public agenda, public opinion, or legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobbying Efforts – Engagement with lawmakers to directly influence the legislative process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy for CSO Law Reform – Initiatives to promote a more favorable legal and regulatory framework for the CSO sector</td>
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5- **SERVICE PROVISION**: The CSO sector’s ability to provide goods and services

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<th>Indicator</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Range of Goods and Services – Variety of goods and services offered</td>
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<tr>
<td>Responsiveness to the Community – Extent to which goods and services address local needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituencies and Clientele – People, organizations and communities who utilize or benefit from CSOs’ services and goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost Recovery – Capacity to generate revenue through service provision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Recognition and Support – Government appreciation for CSO service provision</td>
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6- **SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE**: Support services available to the CSO sector

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<tr>
<td>Intermediary Support Organizations (ISOs) and CSO Resource Centers – Organizations and programs that provide CSOs with training and other support services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Grant Making Organizations – Local institutions, organizations or programs providing financial resources to CSOs</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO Coalitions – Cooperation within the CSO sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training – Training opportunities available to CSOs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intersectoral Partnerships – Collaboration between CSOs and other sectors</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
7 - PUBLIC IMAGE: Society’s perception of the CSO sector

| Media Coverage – Presence of CSOs and their activities in the media (print, television, radio and online) |
| Government/Business Perception of CSOs – Reputation with the government and business sector |
| Public Relations – Efforts to promote organizational image and activities |
| Self-Regulation – Actions taken to increase accountability and transparency |

How to Score

The CSO Sustainability Index uses a seven-point scale from 1 to 7. **Lower numbers indicate more robust levels of CSO sustainability.** These characteristics and levels are drawn from empirical observations of the sector’s development in the region, rather than a causal theory of development. Given the decentralized nature of civil society sectors, many contradictory developments may be taking place simultaneously. The levels of sustainability are organized into three broad clusters:

- **Sustainability Enhanced (1 to 3)** - the highest level of sustainability, corresponds to a score between 1.0 and 3.0;
- **Sustainability Evolving (3.1 to 5)** - corresponds to a score between 3.1 and 5.0;
- **Sustainability Impeded (5.1 to 7)** – the lowest level of sustainability, corresponds to a score between 5.1 and 7.0.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sustainability Enhanced</th>
<th>Sustainability Evolving</th>
<th>Sustainability Impeded</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0 – 3.0</td>
<td>3.1 – 5.0</td>
<td>5.1 – 7.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Scoring Process

The primary role of the expert panel is to provide an assessment of the CSO environment based on the seven dimensions mentioned above. During the panel discussion, panel members are tasked with discussing their initial scores for each dimension, including their evidence for these scores, and determining their final proposed scores for each dimension. The overall score for the country will be an average of these seven scores. Below are the steps to be followed by members of the expert panel:

**Step 1:** Please start by reviewing last year’s report and other sources of information about sectoral developments from the last year of which you are aware. Then, rate each dimension on the following scale from 1 to 7, with a score of 1 indicating a very advanced civil society sector with a high level of sustainability, and a score of 7 indicating a fragile, unsustainable sector with a low level of development. Fractional scores to one decimal place are encouraged. See “Scoring based on Level of Change” on page 8 below for guidance on how to determine proposed scores.

When rating each dimension, please remember to consider each indicator carefully and make note of any specific, country-relevant examples of recent or historical conditions, policies, or events that you used as a basis for determining this score.

**Step 2:** Review your proposed score for each dimension to ensure that it makes sense in comparison to last year’s score given the weight of the impact the developments will have at the sector level and the scoring guidance below. In determining the level of change, look at the evidence of change and the various factors over the year being assessed that led to those changes (events, policies, laws, etc.).

**Step 3:** Once you have scores for each dimension, average these seven scores together to arrive at an overall CSO sustainability score and provide all these scores to the Implementing Partner before you attend the Expert Panel discussion.

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3 The ‘Sustainability Evolving’ categorization does not assume a direct or forward trajectory. Dimension and Overall Sustainability scores that fall within this category may represent both improvements and regressions.
**Step 4:** Attend the Expert Panel discussion. Listen to other experts describe the justification for their scores. After discussing each indicator in a dimension, you will have the opportunity to revise your proposed score. The Implementing Partner will use the consensus score as the final proposed score. If consensus is not reached during the discussion, the Implementing Partner will average the Expert Panelists’ scores, removing one instance of the highest and lowest scores, to arrive at the final scores that will be proposed to the Editorial Committee.

It is very important that the discussion includes specific examples and information that can be used to justify the Expert Panelist’s scores. Therefore, please come prepared to share specific evidence of examples to support trends you have noted during the year. **If adequate information is not provided, the Editorial Committee has the right to adjust the scores accordingly.**

**Important Note:** In countries with disputed territories or areas (e.g. self-declared states, breakaway states, partially recognized states, declared people’s republics, proto-states, or territories annexed by another country’s government), panelists should score based only on the area under the national government’s control. However, these territories’ contexts should be discussed, to be referenced briefly in the introduction of the country report.

In countries experiencing civil war (political and armed movements that administer parts of the country, regions governed by alternative ruling bodies), panelists should balance the situation in each of the territories when determining all scores and discuss trends and developments under each regime.

In countries where a great deal of regional autonomy is recognized (e.g. Iraqi Kurdistan), expert panelists should take those areas into account when scoring and compiling examples, and IPs should ensure the situation in these areas are well-integrated into the scoring decisions and narrative report.

For countries with closing civic space, sufficient data and informational sources should be discussed to both acknowledge the changes in civic space and consider its impacts on dimensions. The panelists should respond to published sources and present their evidence to ensure balance between positive and negative developments affecting civil society in their country. To avoid self-censorship and ensure the confidentiality of and non-retaliation against any expert panel member, the IP could choose to enforce the Chatham House Rule.

In countries where a democratic revolution took place in the previous year, the panelists should still closely follow the score-change framework when determining the new dimension-level scores to justify the changes, avoiding exaggerated score increases that may be due to a post-revolution feeling of euphoria. The proposed scores should always measure the actual changes thus far and not anticipated impacts in the near future.

**Scoring Based on Level of Change**

The level of change in a dimension from one year to the next is determined by assessing the impact of multiple factors including new policies and laws, changes in implementation of existing policies and laws, various organization-level achievements and setbacks, changes in funding levels and patterns, as well as contextual political, economic, and social developments. While individual examples may seem impactful on their own, ultimately a sector’s long-term sustainability only changes gradually over time as the implications of these positive or negative developments begin to be felt and their long-term effects take hold. Therefore, dimension-level score changes each year should not in normal circumstances exceed a 0.5-point change from the previous year.

When determining what weight to give different trends and developments in how they affect the scores, consider the relative scope of the changes and the duration of their impacts. Those trends and developments that will have larger and longer-term impacts on the sector as a whole should be weighted more heavily compared to those that affect only limited parts of the sector and are more likely to change from year to year. For example, a demonstrated increased capability to mobilize domestic resources (e.g. through corporate philanthropy or

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4 **Note:** This scale has been adjusted for the 2018 CSOSI to more accurately reflect the scale at which trends and developments should impact a score given the definitions of the scoring scale above.
crowdfunding), or a new mechanism for long-term funding of CSOs (e.g. through a basket fund or a tax designation mechanism) would signal a longer-term change in a sector’s financial viability than a one-year increase in donor funding to CSOs conducting work around national elections.

In determining how the level of change in the dimension of sustainability should translate into a change in score, the following scale can be used to assist expert panel members’ decision making:

*What was the overall impact of the change(s) on the dimension?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deterioration</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cataclysmic deterioration</td>
<td>Trends and developments have had a completely transformative negative effect on at least one or two indicators in the dimension and significantly affected other dimensions as well.</td>
<td>0.5 or greater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example: Legal Environment – A law has banned all international CSOs and their affiliates from the country, as part of the government’s systematic crackdown on civil society organizations.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Extreme deterioration</td>
<td>Trends and developments have had very important negative effects on at least one or two indicators in the dimension.</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example: Organizational Capacity – Economic depression and instability have led donor basket funds to close abruptly, leaving many major CSOs without funding for their activities. Outreach efforts to constituencies have been halted due to funding shortages and many major CSOs have lost their well-qualified staff members.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant deterioration</td>
<td>Trends and developments have had important negative effects on at least one or two indicators in the dimension.</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example: Public Image – The government conducts a relentless media campaign to discredit the image of CSOs by calling them agents of foreign actors seeking to destabilize the country. At the same, the government intimidates media outlets and threatens them with retaliation should they partner with or cover CSO activities without prior approval by the government.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Moderate deterioration</td>
<td>Trends and developments have had a somewhat negative impact in at least one or two indicators in the dimension.</td>
<td>0.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Example: Legal Environment – In an effort to increase public revenue, the government has decided to increase fees by 100% for some types of government services, including CSO registration renewal fees, which were already very high according to many CSOs. As a result, some CSOs, particularly community-based organizations (CBOs), had to delay or suspend their activities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slight deterioration</td>
<td>Trends or developments have had a slightly negative impact on at least one or two indicators in the dimension.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example: Legal Environment – The government has decided that CSOs should submit their financial statement and annual activity report to the registration agency every year. This may have a long-term positive effect but in the short-term it has increased bureaucratic hurdles and the possibility of harassment by overzealous government officials.</td>
<td></td>
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<td>No Change</td>
<td>The country has not encountered any significant trends or developments in the dimension or developments have been both positive and negative in equal measure.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>The country has not encountered any significant trends or developments in the dimension or developments have been both positive and negative in equal measure.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slight improvement</td>
<td>Trends or developments have had a slightly positive impact on at least one or two indicators in the dimension.</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate improvement</td>
<td>Trends and developments have had a somewhat positive impact in at least one or two indicators in the dimension.</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant improvement</td>
<td>Trends and developments have had important positive effects on at least one or two indicators in the dimension.</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme improvement</td>
<td>Trends and developments have had very important positive effects on several indicators in the dimension.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformative improvement</td>
<td>Trends and developments have had a completely transformative positive effect on at least one or two indicators in the dimension and will potentially affect other dimensions as well.</td>
<td>0.5 or</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Instructions for Baseline Recalibration

Background
To enhance its methodology, the Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index (CSOSI) incorporates recalibration as one of the pilot activities for 2018 and again in 2019 CSOSI. Recalibration is introduced to adjust dimension-level scores that are not accurate, either because their baseline scores lack accuracy or because they have not moved significantly enough over time to reflect structural changes in the sector’s sustainability. The goal of resetting these scores is to improve the cross-country comparability of scores and to increase the analytical usefulness of the CSOSI to its target audiences. The scores to be recalibrated have been selected after review by the Editorial Committee and verification by regional experts and have been finalized after consultation with the Implementing Partner (IP).

Instructions
1. Communicate with participating expert panel members – The IP communicates to the expert panelists the purpose and the scores that have been selected for recalibration.

2. Use Sustainability Categories and Scores – A Closer Look and a comparison to other scores in their region to determine new score(s) – Instead of using the scoring guidance whereby proposed scores are determined by analyzing the level of change from the previous year, the scores identified for recalibration are determined by analyzing where they fall on the one-to-seven scoring scale, as well as a comparison with the other scores for that dimension in the other countries covered by the CSOSI in the region. The expert panelists should review the vignettes and illustrative examples in Sustainability Categories and Scores – A Closer Look to familiarize themselves with how various levels of CSO sustainability should correspond to the CSOSI’s scoring spectrum. Scores should be proposed based on how well they match the descriptions of the various full-point scores listed in this codebook. To help narrow proposed scores to the tenth decimal point, experts can review other countries’ scores listed for that dimension in the most recent regional report (which are provided to the IP with the other scores to be recalibrated removed to avoid confusion).

3. Discuss evidence for recalibrated scores, as well as trends and developments in the past year that led to improvements and deterioration in the dimension – The narrative report should be drafted the same as the other dimensions, reviewing the current situation and discussing what has changed over the previous year. A note will be included into the final report that clarifies that the new score for that dimension is based on a recalibration and should not be compared with the previous year’s score to make assertions about improvement or deterioration.

Tips
Implementing Partners should communicate with the expert panelists which dimensions have been selected for baseline recalibration at least one week in advance of the panel discussion. This will give the panelists an opportunity to prepare evidence about the status quo in the country under this dimension to inform their selection of a new baseline score.
Instructions for Electronic Questionnaire

Background
To enhance its methodology, the Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index (CSOSI) has incorporated several activities into its annual process in select countries. These new activities respond directly to the methodological issues identified through the feedback and consultation process conducted with project stakeholders from June to August 2018 and again in July and August of 2019.

One of these activities to enhance the methodology's implementation is to disseminate an electronic questionnaire to a larger group of individuals. The goal of incorporating this questionnaire is to enable new individuals to contribute their perspectives and insights on the CSOSI dimensions, to increase the representativeness and inclusiveness of the process, and increase the amount of data and information Implementing Partners (IPs) receive to use as evidence of the assertions made in their report.

Instructions

1. Identify about 50 additional participants to whom you will send the questionnaire – The IP selects individuals who will expand the scope and diversity of inputs into the process. The selected individuals should include representatives of or specialists in specific sub-sectors of civil society organizations (CSOs), such as labor unions, capacity building organizations, organizations representing marginalized and vulnerable groups, informal movements, community-based organizations, faith-based organizations, intermediary support organizations, resource centers, and research institutes. Emphasis should be placed on selecting individuals who are in other localities of the country and those located in rural areas. The objective is for the IP to select a group of people who would add new perspectives on various aspects of the sector on which the in-person panelists might not have deep expertise, as well as individuals who have broad knowledge but would be unable or available to attend the in-person panel discussion. FHI 360 and the local USAID Mission may request additions to the list of questionnaire recipients from their own network of contacts.

2. Disseminate the electronic questionnaire to your selected additional participants – FHI 360 provides the IP with a link to the questionnaire, which includes both structured and open-ended sections, to distribute to the IP’s selected additional participants. Upon request, FHI 360 can send the IP the text of the questionnaire beforehand so the IP can translate it into its local language. The questionnaire is brief and should take no more than 15 minutes to complete, so the IP should ask the additional participants to complete it within a period of two weeks or less.

3. Receive analysis of the questionnaire’s results from FHI 360 – FHI 360 compiles the quantitative and qualitative data received and submits it to the IP.

4. Incorporate the findings into the panel discussion – Statistics and examples that are raised through the questionnaire responses should be presented to the in-person panel to serve as an additional data source for the scoring process and the discussion around the relevant indicators.

5. Write the conclusions reached into the narrative report – In addition to discussing these additional inputs in the panel discussion, they should also be incorporated wherever possible into the narrative report. The data and information received from the electronic questionnaire should be incorporated in the same way that the expert panelists’ insights are incorporated, in that individual participants should not be attributed, nor should the questionnaire be explicitly cited. Instead, their inputs should simply be mentioned where relevant as evidence of what has changed positively or negatively in ways that affected the sustainability of the CSO sector in the relevant year.

Tips
When selecting additional participants, please keep the following points in mind:

• If you or your organization has partnered with other organizations or individuals in other areas of the country, sending the questionnaire to people with whom you already have a working relationship may increase the response rate;
• Sharing the questionnaire with donor agencies operating in your country and allowing them to propose other individuals to receive the questionnaire can be a useful way of reaching new experts and perspectives outside of your own organization’s network;
• Sharing the questionnaire with civil society networks and allowing them to forward it to their member organizations’ leaders, or other experts with whom they work, is a useful way of maximizing circulation outside of your network;
• When sending out the questionnaire, it may be useful to commit to sending participants a copy of the final country and regional reports, so they feel a sense of participation in the larger process of developing the CSOSI.
• As a best practice, the IP can compile a written overview of the conclusions and evidence of the additional participants and send it to the expert panel members before the panel discussion, so they can review it. FHI 360 will provide all the results to the IP. If a written overview is sent out before the panel discussion, the IP can ask the expert panelists at the discussion which findings stood out most to them, to spur discussion.
• Pay special attention to geography – if your country has breakaway regions or is experiencing civil war, make extra efforts to reach people in all the relevant areas.
• Convincing the participants that their inputs are confidential is key to obtaining a high participation rate and meaningful findings. Especially in countries where self-censorship might be an issue, be very clear that only your organization and FHI 360 will see their inputs, and no comments made will be personally attributed under any circumstances.
Instructions for University Review

Background
The Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index (CSOSI) measures the civil society sector’s sustainability in 74 countries across seven dimensions of sustainability: legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, sectoral infrastructure, and public image. The methodology for developing the Index each year involves working with a local Implementing Partner (IP) in each country to convene a panel of local experts to discuss trends and developments over the past year and re-score the seven dimension-level scores based on a list of indicators. Based on this panel discussion and some additional research, the IP then drafts an eight- to ten-page narrative report summarizing the status of civil society in their country and explaining their evidence and providing examples of how the situation has changed from the previous year.

FHI 360 develops the CSOSI in collaboration with the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), whose editors work with the IP to revise and improve their report. After editing and revision, the report is sent to the local USAID Mission and an Editorial Committee (EC) in Washington, DC that consists of representatives from FHI 360, ICNL, USAID, and a regional expert to further review the content of the reports and the scoring decisions made by the expert panelists.

Purpose of the Review
To enhance its methodology, the CSOSI will incorporate several pilot integration activities into its annual process in select countries in developing the 2019 CSOSI. These pilot activities respond directly to methodological issues identified through a feedback and consultation process conducted with project stakeholders from June to August 2018, and again in summer of 2019.

One of the pilot integration activities to be implemented for the 2019 CSOSI is to work with the local university for its peer review of the draft country report. The goal of incorporating this review is to add a quality control mechanism in which the reviewers have local knowledge, to improve the validity of the narrative reports.

Instructions
1. Read the draft CSOSI country report – The university reviewer(s) read through the draft and note any inaccuracies or overlooked trends and developments for civil society in the country in 2019. Please note that the CSOSI reports on the developments of the previous year.

2. Make comments on the report – Comments should include corrections, additional statistics and information that would be useful for the Implementing Partner (IP) to include, and recommendations of other relevant data sources that the IP could benefit from reviewing. The university reviewers do not propose scores but can provide their thoughts on the IP’s proposed scores.

3. Return the report to FHI 360 – The draft CSOSI country reports are returned to FHI 360 within two weeks, so the comments can be reviewed by the Editorial Committee reviewers before they meet to discuss the report and forward it to the IP for consideration. Please note that since the CSOSI country reports are eight to ten pages long, the IP might not be able to fully address the comments from the university reviewers.

Tips
• Ideally, universities should select two to three individuals to review the draft report. This will increase the depth and breadth of inputs without overloading the draft with too many comments.
• Select individuals to review who collectively have broad expertise in civil society in your country, as well as current information on the trends and developments that have affected civil society in the previous year specifically.
• If you identify an inaccuracy, or a statement that lacks neutrality or evidence, please propose a specific phrasing, or example that supports the assertion.
# ANNEX B: STATISTICAL DATA

## 2019 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA SCORES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>CSO Sustainability</th>
<th>Legal Environment</th>
<th>Organizational Capacity</th>
<th>Financial Viability</th>
<th>Advocacy</th>
<th>Service Provision</th>
<th>Sectoral Infrastructure</th>
<th>Public Image</th>
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The 2019 CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa

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## COUNTRIES RANKED BY SCORE

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